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From Features via Frames to Spaces: Modeling Scientific Conceptual Change Without Incommensurability or Aprioricity

Zenker, Frank LU (2014) In Frames and Concept Types: Applications in Language and Philosophy, p.69-89
Abstract
The (dynamic) frame model, originating in artificial intelligence and cognitive psychology, has recently been applied to change-phenomena traditionally studied within history and philosophy of science. Its application purpose is to account for episodes of conceptual dynamics in the empirical sciences (allegedly) suggestive of incommensurability as evidenced by “ruptures” in the symbolic forms of historically successive empirical theories with similar classes of applications. This article reviews the frame model and traces its development from the feature list model. Drawing on extant literature, examples of frame-reconstructed taxonomic change are presented. This occurs for purposes of comparison with an alternative tool, conceptual... (More)
The (dynamic) frame model, originating in artificial intelligence and cognitive psychology, has recently been applied to change-phenomena traditionally studied within history and philosophy of science. Its application purpose is to account for episodes of conceptual dynamics in the empirical sciences (allegedly) suggestive of incommensurability as evidenced by “ruptures” in the symbolic forms of historically successive empirical theories with similar classes of applications. This article reviews the frame model and traces its development from the feature list model. Drawing on extant literature, examples of frame-reconstructed taxonomic change are presented. This occurs for purposes of comparison with an alternative tool, conceptual spaces. The main claim is that conceptual spaces save the merits of the frame model and provide a powerful model for conceptual change in scientific knowledge, since distinctions arising in measurement theory are native to the model. It is suggested how incommensurability as incomparability of theoretical frameworks might be avoided (thus coming on par with a key-result of applying frames). Moreover, as non(inter-)translatability of worldviews, it need not to be treated as a genuine problem of conceptual representation. The status of laws vis à vis their dimensional bases as well as diachronic similarity measures are (inconclusively) discussed. (Less)
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author
organization
publishing date
type
Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding
publication status
published
subject
keywords
Dimension, Measurement, Natural law, Scientific change, Symbolic representation
in
Frames and Concept Types: Applications in Language and Philosophy,
editor
T., Gamerschlag; R., Gerland; R., Osswald and W., Petersen
pages
69 - 89
publisher
Springer
ISBN
978-3-319-01540-8
DOI
10.1007/978-3-319-01541-5__3
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
28160625-259f-4d0e-b4ed-61e8b43dd701 (old id 4076851)
date added to LUP
2013-10-14 13:53:16
date last changed
2016-04-16 10:16:42
@misc{28160625-259f-4d0e-b4ed-61e8b43dd701,
  abstract     = {The (dynamic) frame model, originating in artificial intelligence and cognitive psychology, has recently been applied to change-phenomena traditionally studied within history and philosophy of science. Its application purpose is to account for episodes of conceptual dynamics in the empirical sciences (allegedly) suggestive of incommensurability as evidenced by “ruptures” in the symbolic forms of historically successive empirical theories with similar classes of applications. This article reviews the frame model and traces its development from the feature list model. Drawing on extant literature, examples of frame-reconstructed taxonomic change are presented. This occurs for purposes of comparison with an alternative tool, conceptual spaces. The main claim is that conceptual spaces save the merits of the frame model and provide a powerful model for conceptual change in scientific knowledge, since distinctions arising in measurement theory are native to the model. It is suggested how incommensurability as incomparability of theoretical frameworks might be avoided (thus coming on par with a key-result of applying frames). Moreover, as non(inter-)translatability of worldviews, it need not to be treated as a genuine problem of conceptual representation. The status of laws vis à vis their dimensional bases as well as diachronic similarity measures are (inconclusively) discussed.},
  author       = {Zenker, Frank},
  editor       = {T., Gamerschlag and R., Gerland and R., Osswald and W., Petersen},
  isbn         = {978-3-319-01540-8},
  keyword      = {Dimension,Measurement,Natural law,Scientific change,Symbolic representation},
  language     = {eng},
  pages        = {69--89},
  publisher    = {ARRAY(0xb32dd88)},
  series       = {Frames and Concept Types: Applications in Language and Philosophy,},
  title        = {From Features via Frames to Spaces: Modeling Scientific Conceptual Change Without Incommensurability or Aprioricity},
  url          = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-01541-5__3},
  year         = {2014},
}