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From a sensorimotor to a sensorimotor-plus-plus account of embodied conceptual cognition

Parthemore, Joel LU (2014) In Contemporary Sensorimotor Theory: Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics 15. p.137-158
Abstract
Since the publication of O'Regan and Noë's original article in Behavioral and Brain Sciences in 2001, which first set out the sensorimotor account by which sensory experience and motor engagement are inextricably intertwined, there have been not just one but many sensorimotor accounts. However, in many ways that original article remains the canonical account. In this paper, I discuss a particular theory of concepts from philosophy of mind -- the unified conceptual space theory, based on Peter Gärdenfors' conceptual spaces theory -- and, in that light, set out what I take to be the key points of the 2001 account, along with its strengths and weaknesses. I discuss the ways in which the 2001 account aligns with, and departs from, the unified... (More)
Since the publication of O'Regan and Noë's original article in Behavioral and Brain Sciences in 2001, which first set out the sensorimotor account by which sensory experience and motor engagement are inextricably intertwined, there have been not just one but many sensorimotor accounts. However, in many ways that original article remains the canonical account. In this paper, I discuss a particular theory of concepts from philosophy of mind -- the unified conceptual space theory, based on Peter Gärdenfors' conceptual spaces theory -- and, in that light, set out what I take to be the key points of the 2001 account, along with its strengths and weaknesses. I discuss the ways in which the 2001 account aligns with, and departs from, the unified conceptual space theory; and I offer an extension to it that I call sensorimotor++, which adds to the 2001 account a key role for emotional affect and the somatosensory system, with which one might ground salience, and a key role for (so-called 'mental') representation, properly understood. I argue that sensorimotor++ makes for a better theory of concepts -- one that is not just embedded and embodied but enactive -- and, perhaps, a better sensorimotor theory more broadly. (Less)
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author
organization
publishing date
type
Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding
publication status
published
subject
keywords
sensorimotor theory, concepts, representations, enaction, enactive, circular causality, conceptual spaces theory, unified conceptual space theory
in
Contemporary Sensorimotor Theory: Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics
editor
Bishop, John Mark and Martin, Andrew Owen
volume
15
pages
137 - 158
publisher
Springer
ISBN
978-3-319-05106-2
project
Centre for Cognitive Semiotics (CCS)
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
ba249e22-156a-48db-85bb-0f7c5c23c497 (old id 4276771)
date added to LUP
2014-01-30 13:22:22
date last changed
2016-04-16 07:21:54
@misc{ba249e22-156a-48db-85bb-0f7c5c23c497,
  abstract     = {Since the publication of O'Regan and Noë's original article in Behavioral and Brain Sciences in 2001, which first set out the sensorimotor account by which sensory experience and motor engagement are inextricably intertwined, there have been not just one but many sensorimotor accounts. However, in many ways that original article remains the canonical account. In this paper, I discuss a particular theory of concepts from philosophy of mind -- the unified conceptual space theory, based on Peter Gärdenfors' conceptual spaces theory -- and, in that light, set out what I take to be the key points of the 2001 account, along with its strengths and weaknesses. I discuss the ways in which the 2001 account aligns with, and departs from, the unified conceptual space theory; and I offer an extension to it that I call sensorimotor++, which adds to the 2001 account a key role for emotional affect and the somatosensory system, with which one might ground salience, and a key role for (so-called 'mental') representation, properly understood. I argue that sensorimotor++ makes for a better theory of concepts -- one that is not just embedded and embodied but enactive -- and, perhaps, a better sensorimotor theory more broadly.},
  author       = {Parthemore, Joel},
  editor       = {Bishop, John Mark and Martin, Andrew Owen},
  isbn         = {978-3-319-05106-2},
  keyword      = {sensorimotor theory,concepts,representations,enaction,enactive,circular causality,conceptual spaces theory,unified conceptual space theory},
  language     = {eng},
  pages        = {137--158},
  publisher    = {ARRAY(0x9773e50)},
  series       = {Contemporary Sensorimotor Theory: Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics},
  title        = {From a sensorimotor to a sensorimotor-plus-plus account of embodied conceptual cognition},
  volume       = {15},
  year         = {2014},
}