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Whose mind? : Two interpretations of what it is to directly perceive other minds

LO PRESTI, PATRIZIO LU (2016) In Theory & Psychology
Abstract
According to direct perception theory (DPT) people understand each other’s minds by way of perceiving each other’s behavioral engagements in the world. I argue that DPT admits of two interpretations. One interpretation is found in Searle’s social ontology. The other interpretation departs from an enactivist account of social cognition. Both can be employed to make sense of what it is to perceive other minds, but in two different senses. The first allows for the claim that people can directly perceive states of mind shared in a community. In contrast, the second interpretation allows for direct perception of particular individuals’ states of mind in the context of participation in social practices. The two interpretations are argued to be... (More)
According to direct perception theory (DPT) people understand each other’s minds by way of perceiving each other’s behavioral engagements in the world. I argue that DPT admits of two interpretations. One interpretation is found in Searle’s social ontology. The other interpretation departs from an enactivist account of social cognition. Both can be employed to make sense of what it is to perceive other minds, but in two different senses. The first allows for the claim that people can directly perceive states of mind shared in a community. In contrast, the second interpretation allows for direct perception of particular individuals’ states of mind in the context of participation in social practices. The two interpretations are argued to be compatible. People can perceive communal states of mind in another’s responsiveness to action possibilities in social environments, not only the particular other’s states of mind. (Less)
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author
organization
publishing date
type
Contribution to journal
publication status
published
subject
keywords
social understanding, Direct perception, Constitutive rules , Enaction, Collective intentionality
in
Theory & Psychology
pages
18 pages
publisher
SAGE Publications
external identifiers
  • Scopus:84979893979
ISSN
1461-7447
DOI
10.1177/0959354316650943
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
5668a121-aa07-4c03-b366-4447c796d0be
alternative location
http://tap.sagepub.com/content/early/2016/05/24/0959354316650943.full.pdf+html
date added to LUP
2016-04-11 09:45:46
date last changed
2016-10-13 05:05:41
@misc{5668a121-aa07-4c03-b366-4447c796d0be,
  abstract     = {According to direct perception theory (DPT) people understand each other’s minds by way of perceiving each other’s behavioral engagements in the world. I argue that DPT admits of two interpretations. One interpretation is found in Searle’s social ontology. The other interpretation departs from an enactivist account of social cognition. Both can be employed to make sense of what it is to perceive other minds, but in two different senses. The first allows for the claim that people can directly perceive states of mind shared in a community. In contrast, the second interpretation allows for direct perception of particular individuals’ states of mind in the context of participation in social practices. The two interpretations are argued to be compatible. People can perceive communal states of mind in another’s responsiveness to action possibilities in social environments, not only the particular other’s states of mind.},
  author       = {LO PRESTI, PATRIZIO},
  issn         = {1461-7447},
  keyword      = {social understanding,Direct perception,Constitutive rules  ,Enaction,Collective intentionality},
  language     = {eng},
  month        = {03},
  pages        = {18},
  publisher    = {ARRAY(0x9b57790)},
  series       = {Theory & Psychology},
  title        = {Whose mind? : Two interpretations of what it is to directly perceive other minds},
  url          = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0959354316650943},
  year         = {2016},
}