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Buck-Passing Personal Values

Rønnow-Rasmussen, Toni LU (2008) In Values, Rational Choice, and the Will: New Essays in Moral Psychology p.37-51
Abstract (Swedish)
Abstract in Undetermined

So-called fitting-attitude analyses or buck-passing accounts of value have lately received much attention among philosophers of value. These analyses set out from the idea that values must be understood in terms of attitudinal responses that we have reason to or that it is fitting or that we ought to have regarding the valuable object. This work examines to what extent this kind of analysis also can be applied to so-called personal values - value-for, rather than to the impersonal value period which has been the standard analysandum. The shift from impersonal to personal values can, it is argued, be taken without any major change to the pattern. It is not the normative element that needs to be... (More)
Abstract in Undetermined

So-called fitting-attitude analyses or buck-passing accounts of value have lately received much attention among philosophers of value. These analyses set out from the idea that values must be understood in terms of attitudinal responses that we have reason to or that it is fitting or that we ought to have regarding the valuable object. This work examines to what extent this kind of analysis also can be applied to so-called personal values - value-for, rather than to the impersonal value period which has been the standard analysandum. The shift from impersonal to personal values can, it is argued, be taken without any major change to the pattern. It is not the normative element that needs to be changed in the analysis but rather the kind of attitude - what is required is that the attitudes all have to be so called 'for someone's sake' attitudes. (Less)
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author
organization
publishing date
type
Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding
publication status
published
subject
keywords
buck-passing, fitting-attitude analysis, good-for, personal values, value-for
in
Values, Rational Choice, and the Will: New Essays in Moral Psychology
editor
Chan, David
pages
37 - 51
publisher
Springer
external identifiers
  • WOS:000254405300003
ISBN
978-1-4020-6871-3
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
bc961448-860b-40fa-9e78-6db86ab7c1f7 (old id 789574)
date added to LUP
2008-01-28 09:10:06
date last changed
2016-04-16 07:51:15
@misc{bc961448-860b-40fa-9e78-6db86ab7c1f7,
  abstract     = {<b>Abstract in Undetermined</b><br/><br>
So-called fitting-attitude analyses or buck-passing accounts of value have lately received much attention among philosophers of value. These analyses set out from the idea that values must be understood in terms of attitudinal responses that we have reason to or that it is fitting or that we ought to have regarding the valuable object. This work examines to what extent this kind of analysis also can be applied to so-called personal values - value-for, rather than to the impersonal value period which has been the standard analysandum. The shift from impersonal to personal values can, it is argued, be taken without any major change to the pattern. It is not the normative element that needs to be changed in the analysis but rather the kind of attitude - what is required is that the attitudes all have to be so called 'for someone's sake' attitudes.},
  author       = {Rønnow-Rasmussen, Toni},
  editor       = {Chan, David},
  isbn         = {978-1-4020-6871-3},
  keyword      = {buck-passing,fitting-attitude analysis,good-for,personal values,value-for},
  language     = {eng},
  pages        = {37--51},
  publisher    = {ARRAY(0xb1c5ee8)},
  series       = {Values, Rational Choice, and the Will: New Essays in Moral Psychology},
  title        = {Buck-Passing Personal Values},
  year         = {2008},
}