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Between *Sumud* and Submission

Palestinian Popular Practices on the Land in the Edge Areas of Jerusalem

Noura Alkhalili

DOCTORAL DISSERTATION
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9 June 2017, 13:15hrs

*Faculty opponent*
Dr. Adam Hanieh
Senior lecturer in Development Studies
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This thesis delves into two ‘edge areas’ located in and around East Jerusalem. It attempts to unfold and analyze the dynamics in these edge areas, while investigating the agency of the people present there through their own perceptions and practices towards the land, the urbanization processes, the power circulation and the structural impositions. Squeezed by a settler-colonial domination that continuously encroaches further on their lives, the Palestinians, in return, seek to carve out a space for their own enduring presence on the land. That pursuit combines elements of sumud (steadfastness) and adaptation, tenacity and accommodation, actions that sometimes subvert the occupation and some other times submit to its logic. The thesis traces the contradiction between a proliferating ethos of individual enrichment and the remaining collective culture of political struggle. It also scrutinizes the ways that Palestinians move between those poles as always conditioned by the pressure from the overarching structure of settler-colonial domination. Furthermore, the thesis examines how certain structural patterns are unconsciously reproduced by the agents of these specific areas, even when their intention and desire could be to resist them. The thesis argues that East Jerusalem should be approached from the theory of settler-colonial hegemony. Thus, these areas are the by-products of the settler-colonial domination present in East Jerusalem, intentionally assembled by the Israeli authorities as “containers” that collect undesired Palestinian Jerusalemites, while leaving them trapped in a state of permanent temporariness. This situation has developed gradually through the construction of the separation wall, so as to further enhance the systematic displacement of the Palestinian Jerusalemites and achieve the Judaization of Jerusalem. The thesis claims that acts of resistance and accommodation of certain colonial practices have the inclination to collide and interact with each other, and hence obfuscate the demarcation between them. This dynamic has been unpacked through coining the concept ‘enclosures from below’. The thesis aims to contribute to scholarship on Palestine and provide a detailed analysis that could feed into a wider analysis of the dynamics of settler-colonialism, as well as inform Palestinian strategies in the ongoing struggle for liberation.
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Palestinian Popular Practices on the Land in the Edge Areas of Jerusalem

Noura Alkhalili
To Nawal and Ghazi
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Acknowledgements

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My final thoughts are with all the Palestinian brothers and sisters, and all the oppressed people across this universe. The struggle for liberation shall continue.
List of Articles

Article I

Article II

Article III
Alkhalili N. (Forthcoming June 2017) Protection from Below: on *Waqf* between Theft and Morality. *Jerusalem Quarterly*.

This article won the ‘Ibrahim Dakkak Annual Award for the best essay on Jerusalem IDAA 2016’

Article VI
List of Abbreviations

CIP       Camp Improvement Program
PA        Palestinian Authority
PFLP      The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
PLO       Palestinian Liberation Organization
UN        The United Nations
UNRWA     The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
UNSCOP    The United Nations Special Committee on Palestine

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Introduction

Understanding Palestinian history and the fluctuations of the liberation movement is not an easy task, and one that requires caution with regards to the selected approach and the lens used. Over more than one hundred years, since the Zionist project began in earnest, Palestine has witnessed sharp changes and rifts; politically, socially and geographically. Yet Zionism ‘was born in a certain historical reality and is still unchanged in a very different one more than a century later’ (Pappé 2012:41). While Palestine has endured different empires and rules since the late 19th century, the main objective of the Zionist movement has remained the same: the ‘Zionisation and de-Arabization of Palestine’ through the establishment of an exclusively Jewish state (Sayigh 2012:219). The Zionist movement has worked hard to achieve this goal already before the 1948 war. In fact, the war came as the zenith moment for Zionist leaders, a major opportunity to accomplish this old task and seize territory (Sayigh 2012:219).

Since then, with all the offensives of colonization that followed the 1948 war, the Palestinian people have been divided into different groups marked by diverse classifications: citizens of Israel, residents of East Jerusalem, residents of the Gaza Strip, residents of the West Bank, refugees living in the Palestinian refugee camps in the Occupied Territories and neighboring countries, and Palestinians in the diaspora. On top of this, their land has been fragmented into the pieces of an irresolvable puzzle. This in itself is an aggressive act that has and continues to ‘dehistoricize’ Palestinian existence and reduce it to a contemporary narrative that deals with the fragmentation as something that is permanent and fixed (Hanieh 2013:120). Consequently, studies and scholarship on Palestine have the tendency to look at the occupation as an ‘ontological category distinct from the larger structures of the Israeli settler colonialism’ (Salamanca et al 2012:2). Therefore, as Hanieh reminds us:
It becomes possible to speak of “Gazans,” for example, around 70 percent of whom are actually refugees from 1948, with no reference to how this category was constructed through the forcible fragmentation of the Palestinian people as a whole—first during al-nakba ['the catastrophe', the Palestinian name for the 1948 war], and then through the separation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Or to speak of “empty spaces” in the West Bank with no mention of the dispossession of one-fifth of the population in 1967. Because these categories are accepted as given—legitimized as the focus of political negotiations, financial aid packages, and development strategies—they continue to be reproduced. This process is normalized and sustained through the operational practices of foreign governments, NGOs, and a myriad of development agencies, thus providing a materiality to Israeli power. (Hanieh 2013:120-121)

Likewise, understanding Palestine today requires analyzing Zionism through the framework of both colonialism and settler colonialism. By doing so, we may reach a deeper intellectual and political understanding of key structures and processes, and also break through the embedded view of Zionism and Israel as utterly exceptional cases. Furthermore, with such a lens we can avoid placing Palestine/Israel within categories of generic ethnic conflicts, which is a typical error. This allows us to open new inquiries based on comparisons with other similar phenomena in various temporal and spatial settings (Collins 2011:8-9). This as Salamanca et al (2012) have shown:

brings Israel into comparison with cases such as South Africa, Rhodesia and French-Algeria, and earlier settler colonial formations such as the United States, Canada or Australia, rather than the contemporary European democracies to which Israel seeks comparison. For Palestine, it means the reiteration of the fact that Palestinians are an indigenous people, and an alignment of Palestine scholarship with indigenous and native studies. (Salamanca et al 2012:4)

Furthermore, this reveals that the Belfour Declaration of 1917, the Nakba of 1948, the war of 1967, and the military occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip are not mere random events, but rather interconnected temporal moments in the spatial expansion of the Zionist entity. Events are ‘path dependent’, so that what occurred previously will have an impact on the sequence of events and their outcomes at a later stage (Sewell Jr. 2005:100). Therefore, what is happening today in the form of continued domination, fragmentation and subjugation of Palestinians by Israelis is not due to micropolitical practices, but instead is the result of sharp manifestations of the underlying Israeli settler-colonial structure (Salamanca et al 2012:2).
Saying this is not meant to undermine the importance of historical events. Events have the power to reshape history through instants of accelerated change that bring a sort of rupture, and are able to transform previous structures (Sewell Jr. 2005:226-227). It could therefore be argued that events produce structures, and subsequently transform them; a structure is not in a static state, but rather in a process of constant changes, even if some basic parameters remain intact (Sewell Jr. 2005: 227). Furthermore, structures are not necessarily singular, but may be multiple and intersecting (Sewell Jr. 2005: 143). In Palestine, this is evident through the alterations of the colonial regimes due to crucial historical events that produced new structures that operate differently, or reinforce prior ones: the outbreak of the First World War and the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the 1917 Belfour Declaration and the British Mandate, the 1948 Nakba and the foundation of the state of Israel, the 1967 war and the military occupation of what remained of historical Palestine. The resulting structures – notably the Zionist colonization of all of Palestine – surely constrain human actions (cf. Sewell Jr. 2005:143). There are few places in which structure is such a palpable reality as in Palestine. The structure of the occupation – the checkpoints, settlements, settler-only roads, military patrols, permanent surveillance etcetera – hems in human actions from all sides. At the same time, it is important to remember that structures are also the outcome of human actions, and that there is always some room for human agency, including from subaltern classes and peoples. This, of course, is the very premise of struggles for liberation and decolonization. Most of the research in this thesis focuses precisely on how Palestinians act in the present, under the immense pressure from the structure of Zionist occupation.

This research focuses on two specific micro-spaces, which I refer to as ‘edge areas’. They are located in Jerusalem, and more specifically in and around East Jerusalem. Each area is composed of a refugee camp and a residual space of Jerusalem. The areas are the by-products of the settler-colonial domination present in East Jerusalem. The Israeli authorities have used these areas as “containers” that collect undesired Palestinian Jerusalemites, while leaving them trapped in a state of permanent temporariness. This situation has developed gradually through the construction of the separation wall, so as to further enhance the systematic displacement of the Palestinian Jerusalemites and achieve the Judaization of Jerusalem.

Within these micro-spaces, I mostly look at the ordinary human power and practices that constantly seek to resist the structure through human
stubbornness and creativity. I seek to initially recognize and then scrutinize the agency of social actors, always in interaction with the structural forces at play, in accordance with the classical statement by Marx (1852):

Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly found, given and transmitted from the past.

The agents in these micro-spaces have to act and re-act constantly, due to the conditions imposed on them. The circumstances are created and imposed by the Zionist settler-colonial domination. On top of the colonial project is the neoliberal project brought forward following the Oslo Accords,\(^1\) another crucial event that has modified the operational mechanism of the existing structure; this is further detailed below.

In this research, I seek to map the tensions between agency and structure in one very specific case: the way Palestinians in the edge areas relate to the land on which they live and build on it. Squeezed by a settler-colonial domination that continuously encroaches further on the lives of the Palestinians, they also seek to carve out – quite literally – a space for their own enduring presence on the land. That pursuit combines elements of *sumud* (steadfastness) and adaptation, tenacity and accommodation, actions that subvert the occupation and sometimes submit to its logic. I trace the contradiction between a proliferating ethos of individual enrichment and the remaining collective culture of political struggle. I further understand the ways that Palestinians move between those poles as always conditioned by the pressure from the overarching structure of occupation. Furthermore, I look at how certain structural patterns are unconsciously reproduced by the agents of these areas, even when their intention and desire might be to resist them.

However, not wanting to repeat the typical mistake of taking the fragmentation of the Palestinian land and people as a given, to get trapped within narrow micro-spaces or to focus on dramatic events as singular occurrences, I would like to begin from the deeply entrenched roots of the

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\(^1\) The Oslo Accords were signed in Washington DC on September 13\(^{th}\) 1993, after a period of secret negotiations between the Israeli government and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO); at a time when public negotiations were taking place in Washington since the Madrid conference in 1991. It was the first signed agreement between the two sides, and was intended to function through an interim period of no longer than five years, by which final status issues would be negotiated.
conflict in Palestine. In other words, I would like to shed light on the essentiality of the structure that conditions daily developments on the ground. This requires taking a long history into consideration, since what is happening now cannot be understood outside of this past that continues to shape daily life in Palestine. Palestine should be approached through using the conceptual lenses of colonialism and settler colonialism. Furthermore, it is important to make distinctions between these two concepts and carefully situate Zionist practices within their matrices. Therefore, the organization of this thesis will not take the classical approach of initially introducing the research. Rather, it will take the reader on a journey through the history of Palestine and Palestinian colonization starting with the wider structural formations and narrowing into the micro-spaces, which the research itself is focused on. I kindly urge the reader to be patient with me as I provide the context, which is critical to understand the research in a meaningful way. Nevertheless, prior to doing so I will briefly hint at what this research is concerned with.

**Research Aim, Questions and Outline**

The aim of the research is twofold. Firstly, I strive to dig deeply into the dynamics and lived realities in these specific micro-spaces – i.e. the edge areas – so as to trace the spatial dynamics and patterns there, as well as to unfold the popular practices and dominant perceptions in relation to the land present within these areas. I aim, more specifically, to understand the ways and changes in how people relate to land following the years of the Oslo Accords. These areas have emerged within the past decade or so, with barely any archived accounts on them; they have witnessed fast changes and alterations that deserve thorough examination and documentation. This constitutes another important aim of this research. Secondly, I intend to theorize beyond these micro-spaces, elevate them to a higher analytical level, and situate them within a wider structural formation that is deeply rooted in history, while open for anticipating and guiding the future. More precisely, I aim to approach these areas from the theory of settler-colonial hegemony. The purpose is to contribute to scholarship on Palestine and provide a detailed analysis that could feed into a wider analysis of the dynamics of settler colonialism, as well as inform Palestinian strategies in the ongoing struggle for liberation. Consequently, the overarching research questions that guide my research are:
How have the relations between Palestinians and their land developed since the Oslo Accords in the edge areas of East Jerusalem, more specifically around the refugee camps located there?

What are the current popular perceptions and practices towards the land, in a context of enduring settler-colonial domination and persistent Palestinian resistance?

How do such perceptions and practices collide with the settler-colonial structure, and how do they accommodate and adapt to that structure? How do moments of resistance and submission play out on the land?

Can the development of Palestinian spatial politics in those edge areas inform self-critical reappraisals of the anti-colonial struggle?

The thesis is composed of the Kappa and a compilation of four separate articles. The Kappa consists of six chapters: following this introduction, I move to chapter one where I discuss the distinctions between settler colonialism and colonialism. After that I move to chapter two where I seek to situate Palestine since late 19th century within the hegemonic settler-colonial and colonial formations. Based on that, I apply a similar approach to Jerusalem, which is my broader research setting, in chapter three. In chapter four I delve into my own research, where I assume that the reader is ready to explore the edge areas that the research is concerned with. This chapter introduces the research setting, based on two case studies; as well as introduces the main arguments of the articles and points out linkages between them. In chapter five, I describe and reflect on my methodological approaches and choices that allowed for my empirical findings. Finally, in chapter six, the concluding chapter, I end with reflections based on the research findings.
1. Settler Colonialism and Colonialism

The publication of Patrick Wolfe’s book *Settler Colonialism and the Transformation of Anthropology* in 1999 marked a noteworthy academic moment. Highlighting the structural distinction between colonialism and settler colonialism, this seminal work laid the foundations for settler colonial studies as a field of inquiry in its own right, rather than a subdivision within colonial/post-colonial scholarly work (Veracini 2010:9). Years later, Lorenzo Veracini followed this theoretical path with his book *Settler Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview* (2010), where he reinforced settler colonial studies as an autonomous field, concerned with studying specific social formations (cf. Veracini 2015:6):

This book is a theoretical reflection on settler colonialism as distinct from colonialism. It suggests that it is a global and genuinely transnational phenomenon, a phenomenon that national and imperial historiographies fail to address as such, and that colonial studies and postcolonial literatures have developed interpretative categories that are not specifically suited for an appraisal of settler colonial circumstances. The dynamics of imperial and colonial expansion, a focus on the formation of national structures and on national independence [...] have often obscured the presence and operation of a specific pan-European understanding of a settler colonial sovereign capacity. Settler Colonialism addresses a scholarly gap. (Veracini 2010:2)

Both Wolfe and Veracini strongly emphasize the need to see settler colonialism as structurally and analytically detached from colonialism. While they acknowledge that both colonial and settler colonial formations interact and mutually define each other (Veracini 2010:4), they also stress that due to their contrasting modes of operation they exist in a ‘dialectical tension’, which needs to be tackled further (quotation in Veracini 2010: 7; Veracini 2010:11-12; Veracini 2011:1-3).
Wolfe reflects on a primary structural dissimilarity, when he addresses the imperial colonial enterprise and its need for exploitation of labor and extraction of resources, placed within the classical hierarchy of dependent colonies subjugated under direct metropolitan control, as incompatible with settler colonialism:

But what if the colonizers are not dependent on native labour? –indeed, what if the natives themselves have been reduced to a small minority whose survival can hardly be seen to furnish the colonizing society with more than remission from ideological embarrassment? (Wolfe 1999:1-2)

Wolfe emphasizes that the settler colonial project does not operate through the classical exploitation of surplus value from indigenous labor, but is rather concerned with land itself – or, in other words, with the replacement of the indigenous people through an institutionalized project of elimination (Wolfe 1999:163):

The primary motive for elimination is not race (or religion, ethnicity, grade of civilization, etc.) but access to territory. Territoriality is settler colonialism’s specific, irreducible element. (Wolfe 2006:388)

Similarly, Veracini sharply highlights the dispensability of the indigenous person in a settler colonial context (Veracini 2010:8), when he simply notes:

However, if I come and say: ‘you, work for me’, it’s not the same as saying ‘you, go away’. This is why colonialism is not settler colonialism: both colonisers and settler colonisers move across space, and both establish their ascendancy in specific locales. While significant, the similarities end there. (Veracini 2011:1)

Both Wolfe’s and Veracini’s analyses are built upon this fundamental distinction, where classical theory about colonialism (focusing on racialized labor and resource extraction) is incapable of defining the settler colonial formation that is principally based on the destruction of the indigenous worlds – ‘settler colonialism destroys to replace’ (quotation from Veracini 2015: 27-28; Wolfe 2006:387).

Starting from that analytical point of departure, Wolfe further details features of settler colonialism: he writes that settler colonialists come to stay, and therefore insist that ‘invasion is a structure not an event’ (Wolfe 1999:2). Settler colonialism is not merely an occurrence belonging to specific temporal and spatial settings, after which we can say that settler colonialism
is over and we live in ‘postcolonial settler societies’ (Veracini 2015:6). Rather, it is an ongoing structure that belongs to both the past and the present, which affects contemporary life due to the enduring presence of the settler colonialists (Pappé 2012:40; Veracini 2010; Veracini 2015:8-9). The invasion is a violent manifestation of an ‘ever expanding spatial intervention that creates a new form of habitat by means of conquest, domination, and displacement-replacement’ (Svirsky 2016:2). Following this logic, Veracini has put forward four important points outlining what settler colonialism is not: settler colonialism is not colonialism; settlers are not migrants; settler colonialism is not elsewhere and should be understood globally as a settler colonial global present; and settler colonialism is not finished (Veracini 2015).

Wolfe and Veracini have clearly argued the importance of distinguishing between colonial and settler colonial paradigms. They operate differently and result in different consequences. Where colonialism seeks to sustain and reproduce itself, mostly by making it impossible for the colonized to seek their liberation and self-determination, settler colonialism on the other hand seeks to abolish itself (Veracini 2011:3). Colonialism endures by sustaining the desired exploitation through the subjugation and domination of the colonized, as long as the metropole is in control of the colony, then the colonial system persists. This is not the case for settler colonialism – on the contrary, it strives to overcome its aggressive phase and become fully institutionalized and normalized. A successful settler colonial project is the one that manages to ‘tame’ a variety of wildernesses, end up establishing independent nations, effectively repress, co-opt, and extinguish indigenous alterities, and productively manage ethnic diversity’ (Veracini 2011:2; Veracini 2013:28). So contrary to colonialism, settler colonialism seeks to become autonomous, break away from the metropole, and constitute its own localized sovereignty (Veracini 2010:6; Veracini 2011: 2; Veracini 2013:34).

Along similar lines, power and domination play out differently. In colonial settings, the colonizers seek to perpetually control the indigenous from the core, while keeping a distance between the colonizer and the colonized. Settler colonialism instead exercises its power through the replacement of the majority of the indigenous populations with those from the external metropole and other places. It retains a manageable minority of the indigenous population, which is offered citizenship as part of an assimilation process that serves to normalize the colonial project (Veracini 2013: 27 & 30).
Those distinctions do not mean that all settler colonial contexts and processes are identical; nonetheless, they all share similar eliminatory outcomes (Wolfe 2012:135). For instance, Zionist colonialism in Palestine is different from that in Australia and North America. To start with Zionism, it originated as a movement that willfully chose to be transnational, not belonging to a singular metropole (Wolfe, 2012:135-136). In fact, the Zionist movement comprised of the alliance between European Jewish supporters of Zionism and their gentile patrons due to their shared views on anti-Semitism and the colonial idea (Massad 2006:15):

Removing Jews from gentile societies and “normalizing” them by creating a state for them would be, the Zionist argued, the only way to end anti-Semitism. Thus, Zionism and anti-Semitism had a unified goal—the removal of Jews from Europe—which became the basis for their shared imperial vision. (Massad 2006:15)

Towards the end of the 19th century, both British and French colonial administrators openly shared their ideas of a European Jewish colonization of Palestine and envisioned it as a fulfilling project towards achieving an imperial anchor in the region (Massad 2006:14). This was a colonial project shared by Zionist leaders, as Zionism’s major objective conveyed by the Basel Congress was establishing ‘the Jewish people a home in Palestine secured by public law’ (Cohen cited in Sayigh 2010:208). Prior to 1947, the Zionist enterprise managed to get hold of land in Palestine in conformity first with the local laws of the Ottoman Empire and then, more extensively, during the British Mandate. This is strikingly different from the classical settler method of acquiring indigenous land, which tends to occur without systems of laws and regulations, as in the cases of Australia and North America (Wolfe 2012). On the other hand, it was the war of 1948, following the withdrawal of the British Mandate that allowed Zionism to implement its aggressive appropriation of land. After all, then, Zionism should not be seen as exceptional; rather, as Wolfe frames it, it should be considered more of a special case that allows us to further comprehend the settler-colonial logic of elimination (Wolfe 2012:136-137).

Based on the main distinctions between settler colonialism and colonialism, where do we situate Palestine? To start with, which Palestine exactly are we talking about? Palestine 1948 (that has become the state of Israel)? Or the West Bank and the Gaza Strip? And what about Jerusalem? East or West? In the following chapters, and based on the above, I strive to situate Palestine within those paradigms in the past 100 years, with a special focus on the city of Jerusalem.
2. Situating Palestine

One of the first elements to consider is the labor condition for native Palestinians; starting with the first Zionist attempts to implant a settler community in Palestine. As briefly mentioned above, the Zionist movement commenced building settlements in Palestine during the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The first ‘Aliya’ (Zionist immigration into Palestine) (1882-1900), which was relatively sparse and sporadic, adopted the European agricultural colonization model. It especially mirrored the strategy deployed in Algeria and Tunisia, based on the cultivation of a single crop (in this case mostly grapevines) (Shafir 1996:86). It was Baron Edmond de Rothchild, a strong supporter of Zionism, who funded those monoculture agricultural cooperatives, which were largely dependent on low-waged Palestinian labor (Shafir 1996:21; Wolfe 2012: 150-151& 140-141). However, this first attempt to implant a Zionist settler community did not succeed as desired, leading the Zionist movement to rethink its strategies during the First Zionist Congress in Basel (1897) led by Theodor Herzl (Sayigh 2012:208). The congress lead to the second Aliya (1904 -1914), which, in contrast to the first one, adopted the model of exclusive Jewish-only colonies and renounced the employment of non-Jewish labor (Wolfe 2012:140-141). This was made possible through the ‘Conquest of Labour’, a policy of the Jewish Workers’ party that called for a dependence of the settlements on an exclusive and protected economy that should only accept the participation of Jewish workers. The Jewish Workers’ party ‘Hapoel Hatzair’ initiated this policy in 1905 with the aim of ensuring full reliance on Jewish labor (Shafir, 1996:228-230; Wolfe, 2012:151). Within this wave of settlements, the moshav agricultural collectives emerged and later on the core institution of the kibbutzim (Wolfe 2006: 389; Wolfe 2012:140-141), which played a key role in creating ‘the new Jew’ by displacing the indigenous Palestinians from their land and boycotting their labor. All of this served to negate the reliance on the Other and empower the ‘self-sufficient proto-national Yishuv (Jewish community in Palestine)’ (Quotation in Wolfe 2006:390; Wolfe 2012:152).
Even though the second wave of Zionist colonization was more strategically organized regarding the location of settlements and the enhancement of the Jewish laborer, it did not, surprisingly, achieve better results than the first one (Sayigh 2012:211). Fayyez Sayigh highlights the causes behind this to begin with, at this early stage; Zionists still lacked the requisite support from Jewish populations in Europe. Many turned their backs on the proposal to migrate to Palestine, instead favoring assimilation as a more promising path, and hence there was insufficient human capital for the colonization effort. Another factor was the presence of the Ottoman Empire, which did not provide Zionism with the support needed to facilitate settlement. Thus, by 1914, even after nearly 30 years of Zionist attempts to colonize the land of Palestine, the Jewish population only amounted to 8% of the inhabitants of Palestine and held a mere 2.5% of the land (Sayigh 2012:211-212).

This situation changed right after the First World War and the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, which massively improved the prospects for the Zionist movement. Britain secured its presence in Palestine through the British Mandate, which fostered a strong coalition between British imperialism and Zionist colonialism, whose shared goals were most clearly expressed in the Balfour Declaration of 1917 that promised a Jewish national home in Palestine (Sayigh 2012:212; Wolfe 2012:143-145). In the following years the gates of Palestine were opened for the Zionist colonizers, invited by the British Empire to come and establish a stronger settler community. The presence of the British meant vital protection and facilitation:

Britain lost no time in creating the appropriate conditions for Zionist colonisation. It appointed a Zionist Jew [Herbert Samuel] as its first High Commissioner in Palestine. It recognised the World Zionist Organisation as a representative ‘Jewish Agency’. It opened the gates of Palestine to massive Zionist immigration, despite Arab protests. It transferred state lands to the Zionists for colonisation. It protected the institutions of the fledgling [Jewish] ‘National Home’. It permitted the Zionist community to run its own schools and to maintain its military establishment (the Haganah). It trained mobile Zionist striking forces (the Palmach), and condoned the existence of ‘underground’ terrorist organisations (the Stern group and the Irgun). No wonder that, by the mid-thirties, a British Royal Commission had come to describe the Zionist settler-community in Palestine as a ‘state within a state’. (Sayigh 2012:212)

The portrayal of the Zionist presence in Palestine as a ‘state within a state’ could be interpreted as a settler colonial core nurtured within the conventional imperial colonial shell. If we look at the land component, both
the British and Zionists were interested in similar end-goals. The British imperialists strove to import their capitalist values into Palestine, and as Luxemburg reminds us (2003), privatizing the land that was collectively owned and disposing of the indigenous peasants is a prerequisite for making the resources of a colony available for capital accumulation. Likewise, for the Zionists colonizers, their zero-sum goal was, and continues to be, the attainment of the land by any mean possible to achieve their settler colonial project. The Zionists during the British mandate were still protected by the colonial shell, complying with the domestic laws, which worked in their own favor. This, however, was not received passively from the indigenous Palestinians, who were aware of the British-Zionist alliance that over the years gradually become more evident. Several sporadic clashes broke out between indigenous Palestinians and Zionists, notably during the uprisings in 1921, 1929 and 1933, leading up to the renowned 1936-1939 revolt. Consisting of civil disobedience, strikes and guerilla warfare, the rebellions of 1936 spread throughout the country; and constitute one of the greatest anticolonial uprisings of the twentieth century. The revolt was eventually suppressed by British military forces in cooperation with Zionist units.

In February 1947, the British decided to end their colonization of Palestine and leave the question of its fate with the United Nations (UN). The British decision to depart came after the Second World War; they were incapable of dealing with a forthcoming Jewish rebellion after the Holocaust, similar to the great Arab revolt of 1936-1939. The British left India and consequently Palestine lost much of it importance. Meanwhile, the Labor party made the decision to focus on building a welfare state at home rather than holding on to distant lands (Pappé 2016:27-28).

The UN General Assembly – having been established only two years earlier – appointed a special committee (UN3SCOP) to decide the fate of Palestine. The members of this committee, whose knowledge in solving conflicts was rather limited and their understanding of Palestine not even worth mentioning, recommended partitioning Palestine into two states – Jewish and Arab – with Jerusalem as an international zone, ‘corpus separatum’ UN administration. This was approved by the majority of the committee on 29 November 1947 and became General Assembly Resolution 181 (Pappé 2016:31).

Despite the efforts of the British mandate to enhance Zionist settler-colonial presence, still by 1947, Jewish ownership did not even exceed 6% of the cultivated land of Palestine and the Yishuv composed less than one third of
the population (Kahlidi 1997:11; Pappé 2016:31). This meant that the vast majority of the cultivated land in Palestine was held and inhabited by a majority of indigenous Palestinian Arabs (Pappé 2006:28; Said 1979:46). But the partition resolution gave the Zionists more than half of the land of Palestine (55.5%), which is easily deemed an offensive act that ignored the majority of indigenous Palestinians living there for centuries, and granted the bulk of the land to newly arrived Zionist settlers (Khalidi 1997:11).

In light of this, the indigenous Palestinians and the Arab states rejected the partition resolution, considering it hostile to the national rights of the Palestinian people and their right to self-determination. Nevertheless, the UN General Assembly ignored the facts on the ground and gave its blessing to the Zionist project, in what was seen as a reparation for the Nazi Holocaust in Europe (Khalidi 1997:5; Pappé 2006:31). The 181 resolution gave the Zionist leaders their long-waited moment to conquer and invade Palestine, allowing for a campaign of ethnic cleansing (Khalidi 1997:5; Pappé 2006:35). Towards the end of 1947, the Palestinian armed resistance was ignited once again against both Zionists and their British allies. On May 14th 1948, the British mandate ended, and the day after, the state of Israel declared its independence, after which it was swiftly recognized by the USA and the USSR (Pappé 2006:40). In response to these events, a number of neighboring Arab states – Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon – entered the ongoing conflict in support of the Palestinian resistance. As the war continued, in 1949 the UN General Assembly imposed permanent armistice agreements between the Arab states and the state of Israel. What remained of Palestine, not yet occupied by Israel, were the territories that became known as the West Bank, which fell under the Jordanian rule, and the Gaza Strip, under the Egyptian rule. Jerusalem had been split into eastern and western sectors, with the former to be administered under the state of Israel and the latter under Jordanian rule.

Between late 1947 and early 1949, Palestine witnessed the Nakba (the catastrophe), or what Ilan Pappé refers to as an episode of massive ‘ethnic cleansing’ (Pappé 2006). Palestinian land and population changed beyond recognition, through the organized attacks from the Jewish militias that later became the Israel Defense Forces (Wolfe 2012), which included several massacres. 750,000 indigenous Palestinians were forcefully expelled from their villages, towns and cities and driven into exile, while almost 500 villages were destroyed, most of them entirely erased from the landscape. In major cities and towns Palestinian homes were either demolished or
appropriated by newly arrived Zionist settlers (see Abu Sitta 2004; Finkelstein 1995; Khalidi 1992; Pappé 2006; Wolfe 2012).

By 1949, following the armistice agreements, the land held by the Zionist entity reached 77%, and in this area the Jewish population increased to 80% of the total (Wolfe 2012:133-134). Returning to Wolfe’s statement ‘invasion is a structure not an event’ (Wolfe 1999:2), and approaching the Nakba from such a perspective, it is fundamental to avoid considering Nakba as one singular event, but rather to thoroughly examine the underlying context and consider all of the historical preconditions that allowed it to take place (Wolfe 2012:133). As mentioned earlier, the Nakba accelerated the process of Zionist land appropriation that had been going on for almost half of a century. During the Nakba, the process reached a pinnacle of aggression (Wolfe 2012:159):

To understand the Nakba, therefore, we have to keep in mind the crucial fact that it was Zionism’s first opportunity. The fact that the emergent Jewish state seized this opportunity with such devastating effectiveness was both a testament to and a legacy of its preparedness. As we have seen, the creation of the Jewish state and the ethnic cleansing of Palestine were two sides of the same coin. (Wolfe 2012:160)

In the spirit of all that, Veracini has stressed that by 1948 the Zionist movement succeeded remarkably in achieving its settler-colonial project in what became the state of Israel. In theory, the settler-colonial phenomenon is characterized by an expulsion of the majority of the indigenous population and its replacement with an ‘exogenous’ one coming from a mixture of locations (Veracini 2010; Veracini 2013:28). In the case of Palestine, nearly 750,000 indigenous Palestinians were expelled and only 150,000 remained in Israel proper, as a minority subjected to a set of martial laws – which included travel permits, curfews, administrative detentions, to name but a few – in place until 1966. Even though they were granted citizenship, they were considered second-class citizens. The expelled Palestinian peasantry and urbanites became refugees dispersed in camps administered by the UN in neighboring countries and in what remained of historical Palestine (i.e. within the borders of the British mandate), the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. As Wolfe points out, ‘elimination is an organizing principal of settler-colonial society rather than a one-off (and superseded) occurrence’ (Wolfe 2006:387); the settler colonizers come to stay, following the destruction and displacement of the indigenous other (Wolfe 2006). Israel is a settler-colonial state that sought to invent a novel socio-political order with a newly arrived
population from a variety of locations, amalgamated into a new national identity that normalized settlers and turned them into first-class citizens. Again, as Veracini confirms, settler-colonial states usually seek to extinguish their settler-colonial nature by becoming democratic polities with a measure of ethnic diversity (Veracini 2011:2).

Given that the ever-lasting aim of the Zionist movement is to conquer as much land as possible and allow for as few indigenous people to stay as possible, the creation of the state of Israel within the armistice lines of 1949 was not the end of the conquest. After the end of the war, the religious Zionists, Israeli right-wing parties and some supporters of the Labor party were not willing to let go of East Jerusalem, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Their shared vision was rather to seize these territories and turn them into parts of Israel, due to strategic and religious motives. Strategically, the West Bank and Gaza Strip would serve to enhance the protection of Israel from an external assault; the water reservoirs in the West Bank were essential resources for Israel. From a religious point of view, the West Bank and Gaza Strip are seen as biblical territories that should belong to Israel and the Jews, especially the West Bank, which is referred to in Zionist discourse as Judea and Samaria (Gordon 2008:5). As for East Jerusalem, in the eyes of the Zionists, it is inseparable from West Jerusalem and integral to the ‘eternal and indivisible’ capital of the Jewish state. Israel’s ultimate goal has been the reunification of the city and the transformation it into the permanent capital of the Zionist entity, and the exclusion of any Palestinian claims to it.

In the June war of 1967, the 1949 armistice agreements were broken and Israel occupied what remained of historical Palestinian – the West Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem. Previous laws from past rules were reactivated – Ottoman, British, Jordanian and Egyptian codes and statues – and combined with a continuously expanding series of Israeli military orders. Contrary to the West Bank and Gaza Strip, East Jerusalem – including some 70 square kilometers added to the old city limits – was illegally annexed, according to international law, by the state of Israel, and forced to follow the existing Israeli laws in 1980. This will be further detailed in the coming chapter.

This time however, the Israeli forces did not expel as many Palestinians as they did in 1948. Instead, two areas were emptied from their Palestinian inhabitants, the Jordan Valley and a ring of villages around Jerusalem, primarily for strategic reasons. A total of nearly 220,000 Palestinians from the West Bank were forced to flee into Jordan, while 1 million remained in
both the West Bank and Gaza Strip (Gordon 2008:6; Hanieh 2013:102). Due to the high population that remained in the occupied territories, and fear of losing Jewish identity in Israel, Israeli leaders settled on granting the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza Strip special residency ID cards instead of Israeli citizenship, thereby also facilitating surveillance and control by the military. Israel made a clear division between the land occupied and the population inhabiting it. An array of application processes and apparatuses were designed and implemented to confiscate land. From early on, the areas that were depopulated during the war were colonized to serve their functions in constructing Jewish-only settlements and fragmenting the Palestinian urban and rural fabric (Gordon 2008:6; Hanieh 2013:102-103).

Another key mechanism of the occupation has been the gradual weakening of Palestinian small industries and agriculture, where the end goal is not merely a distorted economic potential, but rather a negated and precluded one (Roy 2001). Thus, creating the concomitant dependency on Israeli capitalism (Hanieh 2013:100; Roy 2001). The West Bank has been known for its agricultural productivity and livestock production. During Jordanian rule, it was the main provider of vegetables, fruits and grains in that state. The peasant refugees in the West Bank generally worked as sharecroppers, meaning that as landless farmers they would cultivate the land in return for some share of the crops (Hanieh 2013:102). Following the 1967 war, however, Israel imposed several military orders to impede both industrial and agricultural activities; the decline of the domestic economy freed up a Palestinian reserve army of labor, which was recruited into Israel as a super-exploited workforce (Hanieh 2016:38). This change of labor strategy in comparison to pre-1948 – when indigenous Palestinian workers were rejected rather than exploited – was partly due to the higher wages of Jewish labor, giving Israeli capitalists an interest in utilizing Palestinian workers at this moment in time. Jewish workers received relatively good salaries as a way to keep them in Israel and maintain a standard of life similar to that in Europe. Israel needed cheap exploitable labor, and thus the Palestinians were the best option to fill in the gaps (Gordon 2008:76). Moreover, Israel sought to establish some kind of political stability following the aftermath of the war; given the severe effects on Palestinian economy, allowing Palestinian labor into Israeli economy was expected to compensate for some of the losses, improve livelihoods of the dispossessed inhabitants of the occupied territories and create a sort of normalization (Gordon 2008:77).
In this regard, one could argue that, from the political economy perspective, a
different sort of displacement occurred in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
Israel succeeded in achieving its deliberate strategy by destroying the
Palestinian agricultural sector and pulling Palestinians – mainly those at the
lower rung of the social hierarchy – out of their rural areas towards work in
the Israeli agricultural and construction sectors. This, in return, boosted the
Israeli economy, by allowing for high rates of exploitation of Palestinian
labor (Hanieh 2013:104), in what Hanieh expresses as the ‘Palestinian boom’:

The resulting Israeli economic expansion was dubbed the “Palestinian boom.”
By the mid-1980s, Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza Strip made up
around 7 percent of the Israeli labor force. Around one-third of the West Bank
labor force worked in Israel in 1985, with around half this number working in
the construction industry—a vital sector that was at the core of Israel’s
capitalist class, composed of large conglomerates tied to the state, private
capital, and the labor Zionist movement. In this manner, labor filled the lowest
rungs of the labor market and covered some of the demand shortfall caused by
prolonged Israeli military service for Jewish citizens. (Hanieh 2013:105)

The 1967 war, again, was not a random event. The occupation of what
remained of historical Palestine occurred as a continuation to the Zionist
settler-colonial project, whose top priority has always and continues to be the
conquest of land, rather than solely generating profit through the economic
exploitation of indigenous Palestinians (Roy 2001: 124). However, even if
the war was informed by the ideologies of this project, Veracini points out
that the Zionist endeavors after 1967 actually failed to achieve successful
settler colonialism in the occupied territories, in stark contrast to the success
after 1948 within Israel proper. He further suggests that when a settler-
colonial project fails, it lapses into colonialism. In other words, Veracini
emphasizes that the colonial formation has predominated in the West Bank
and the Gaza Strip (Veracini 2013:34). In his own words:

We are confronted with one Zionist settler colonial project and two outcomes:
one largely successful, the other largely unsuccessful. The coexistence of
successful and failed settler colonialisms—that is, of a largely successful
settler society in Israel, and a largely successful colonial formation in the
occupied territories. (Veracini 2013:38)

Why is that so? And how could this be the case if Israel has been active since
1967 in constructing illegal Zionist settlements in the occupied territories? As
clarified previously, a settler-colonial project seeks to abolish itself after the conquest of the desired land, so as to become normalized. Contrary to that, colonialism has to maintain its permanence through domination and strict division between core and periphery (Veracini 2013). Following the decision not to include the Palestinian population in Israel – that is, by not giving the inhabitants of the newly occupied territories citizenship – the military occupation sustained the expansion of settlements while the majority of the population remained in place. The occupation maintained a sharp separation between the settlers and the indigenous Palestinians, deviating from the way settler colonialism normally functions (Veracini 2013). In the areas conquered in 1948, the Palestinians mostly disappeared, making the settler-colonial entity eminently victorious; in those seized in 1967, they mostly remained in situ, undermining its typical logic.

What brings the West Bank and Gaza Strip – here excluding East Jerusalem – under a colonial formation are various factors. The way Israel maintains hegemony over the occupied territories through military and administrative rules is similar to how Britain controlled Palestine before 1948. It is, again, the dual relationship between metropole and colony; both regimes – the mandate and Israel – promoted the Zionist settlements and offered protection to allow for a systematic segregation between the settlers and the indigenous Palestinians (Veracini 2013:29). Another crucial factor is demography. Despite the fact that in 1967 Israel succeeded in displacing nearly 220,000 Palestinians from the West Bank, the proportion of the Palestinian population that stayed on the land is very high in comparison to the fraction that remained after the ethnic cleansing of 1948. Moreover, the exploitation of cheap Palestinian labor within the Israeli economy is a typical feature of a colonial – as opposed to a settler-colonial – context. Therefore, and based on the central argument of Veracini, the Israeli military occupation of 1967 has prevailed as a structural *colonial* formation, and so the settler-colonial model – where the indigenous population becomes a minority at best – does not apply within the occupied territories (Veracini 2013:38). This remains the case until the outbreak of the First Intifada in 1987. Since then, the territories have shifted towards being constrained by the modus operandi of settler-colonial domination, which will be detailed further ahead.

Nevertheless, those clear distinctions notwithstanding, Zionism as such remains a settler-colonial movement, and it has operated either through establishing a settler-colonial state (1948) or through a military occupation (1967) that nurtures the Jewish-only settlements in the occupied territories.
These are mere differences of mechanisms and apparatuses at work, but the outcomes are similar: one people is dispossessed of its land, seized by an ever-expanding colonizing entity.

**Shifting the Focus**

If one shifts focus to the other side of the coin – of settler-colonial and colonial domination, that is –, one is always confronted with indigenous resistance, which is not often analyzed in comparison to the focus on the structural forms of power in settler-colonial/colonial paradigms (Svirsky 2016:3; Wolfe 1999). When looking at Palestine, most scholarly attention is on the Zionist mechanisms of control (Salamanca et al 2012). This tendency is misleading and potentially harmful, as it presents indigenous people as without agency, and places them in peripheral positions (Wolfe 1999:167). Furthermore, resistance and survival are entwined and together form the strongest weapons of the colonized in the struggle to prevent colonialism as well as settler colonialism from arriving at complete victories (Veracini 2013:3-4). The Palestinian struggle and resistance referred to as *sumud* (steadfastness) is essential when understanding the developments of Zionism; as much as the latter, they are not mere events but are in a constant dynamic process. In this process, different structural formations provoke various ways to resist and survive, but they all intertwine and feed into each other at some point (Veracini 2013:3-4). For instance, the indigenous Palestinians who remained in what became Israel have endured and managed to survive as second-class citizens within a settler-colonial state. Their *sumud* on Palestinian soil is what creates an obstacle for the settler-colonial state in its efforts to abolish the settler colonial relation; their struggle is to survive through the persistence of indigenous-settler binary relationship (Veracini 2011).

More specifically, following the 1967 war, the Palestinians in the occupied territories and in exile started a new phase of more intense armed struggle and popular war. This alone returned the Palestinians and their cause to the political map of the region and the world, as a question of people and homeland, and not just of refugees. All the Palestinian organizational formations and their armed vanguards united within the framework of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). The most prominent of these groups at that time were the Fatah movement, whose leader Yasser Arafat
became the chairman of the PLO, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) led by George Habash.

In 1974, with the UN recognition of the PLO and its admission as an observer, and with the Arab League recognizing the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, the Palestinians concluded an essential stage in their struggle for liberation. In the next step, the Palestinian cause turned to a phase of trying to embody its geo-political entity on its homeland, and thus the political and the diplomatic struggle became entwined with the armed struggle.

Following the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the PLO endured its worst political exile during the second half of the 1980s (after being previously exiled from Jordan). However, just as it seemed that the Palestinian cause was relegated to utter indifference and the PLO role was being overlooked, an unexpected and significant turn of events began to take shape with the start of the First Intifada in the occupied West Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem in December 1987. The Intifada, which literally means ‘shaking off’ but translates as ‘popular uprising’, was the peak moment for resistance on the ground in the occupied territories. Its outbreak through grassroots activism surprised the detached leadership in exile, and aimed to confront the Israeli colonial structural domination through obstructing attempts to normalize the military occupation (Robinson 1997). In the occupied territories, the sumud meant staying on the land and transforming the occupation from a ‘profitable enterprise into a costly project’ (Gordon 2008:155). This happened through organized resistance through diverse strategies such as mass demonstrations, clashes with the Israeli army, organized civil disobedience through strikes, boycott of Israeli products and collective refusal to pay taxes. Israel responded with a comprehensive system of segregation including curfews, permits and military checkpoints controlling access to the occupied territories. Later on, this system of control and segregation was even more institutionalized and enhanced during the Oslo Accords, under which the population centers of the occupied territories were turned into a patchwork of fragmented and disjointed enclaves (Hanieh 2013:106).

Within Israel proper, which is not the scope of this research, indigenous Palestinians have been pursuing their own goals separate from the PLO and the Oslo peace process, through their own leadership. Their main target has been to ‘transform an apartheid state of world Jewry to a state of its own Israeli citizens, Jews and Arabs’ (Maasad 2006:127).
Returning to the Colonial Enterprise

The First Intifada was brought to an end when the Israeli government of Yitzhak Rabin decided to sign a deal with the PLO. The agreement was reached after lengthy secret negotiations between the two parties in Oslo, and was signed on the White House lawn in 1993: a process that became known as the Oslo Accords.

The Oslo Accords and the subsequent process of Palestinian state-building came with different connotations for the two parties, the Israeli government and the PLO. Following the eruption of the First Intifada and Israel’s incapability to suppress the mass uprising, Israel realized that its current apparatus of control was not enough to dominate as desired, and thus a new strategy was deemed necessary (Gordon 2008:169). Israel sought ‘to outsource the responsibility for the population to a subcontractor’ (emphasis in Gordon 2008:169). Hence, the Palestinian Authority (PA) was established and given a kind of self-rule in exchange for delivering a set of services to Israel, primarily providing security and enhancing Israel’s economic supremacy. Outside of the PA enclaves, Israel continued to directly control more than half of the occupied territories. In other words, the PA was given the Palestinian population to manage without the land or resources, accepting a system that many have seen as a sort of urban apartheid composed of fragmented enclaves under different jurisdictions.²

² Areas A (full civil and security control by the PA) is 17.2% of West Bank and B (Palestinian civil control and Israeli security control) is 23.8% of the West Bank, containing 227 fragmented enclaves cut from one another with a regime of movement restrictions between them. These enclaves are surrounded by Area C, which covers the entire remaining area and is the only contiguous area of the West Bank. Area C is under full control of the Israeli military for both security and civilian affairs related to territory. It is sparsely populated and underutilized (except by Israeli settlements and reserves), and holds the majority of the land (PASSIA 2015)
Map 1
The enclaves of the West Bank and the separation wall. Map by author (2017)
For the state of Israel, the Oslo Accords became a way to restructure the apparatus of occupation rather than withdraw from it. Through this structural adjustment, Israel could maintain its control of the occupied population from a distance, which consolidated the colonial subjugation (Gordon 2008:170). The negotiations of ‘the peace process’ focused more on temporary aspects than on the four core issues of the Palestinian struggle: the right of return for the refugees, Jerusalem, and the Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and the borders of 1967, which were postponed for future negotiations (Robinson 1997:175). Alas, the Oslo Accords were little more than a catalyst to empower and accelerate the colonization of the occupied territories, in a modified version that suited the globalized capitalism of the 1990s (Hanieh 2013:107).

If the Oslo Accords were all about this, then what were the motives for the PLO to accept them? In trying to answer this question, Robinson argues that the establishment of the PA in the occupied territories came as a savior of the PLO – based in Tunis at the times – rescuing it from permanent oblivion, at a distance from the territories where the fight for liberation actually played out. Economically speaking, the PLO’s choice to support Iraq during the Gulf War (1990-91) led to a major crisis, with the organization losing its main financial sponsors: Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. By 1992, the PLO in Tunis was undergoing an acute bankruptcy, marginalized by the Arab states as well as internationally (see Hanieh 2013; Robinson 1997). From a political viewpoint, the First Intifada brought to the forefront a new elite based in the occupied territories, somehow detached from the ‘outside elite’ of the PLO institutions in the diaspora. This needed to be dealt with urgently:

The principal political task for the PLO as it returned to Palestine from Tunis was to consolidate its power over a population with whom it shared many emotional bonds but with whom it had no practical political experience. In order to consolidate its own power, the returning PLO had to undermine, through coercion, co-optation, and marginalization, the new elite which had emerged during the Intifada. In other words, the first job of “outside PLO” was to neutralize the “inside PLO” in order to assert its own authority. (Robinson 1997:176-177)

The PLO at the time was frightened by having to deal with the independent leadership that had grown in the occupied territories; thus hijacking the Intifada seemed to be a convenient tactic to regain control (Massad 2006:115). The Oslo Accords provided an exit from such conditions, and becoming entrusted with authority on the occupied territories would bring
forward the logic of state-building and readjust the position of the ‘outside PLO’ politically, organizationally as well as locally. However, the post-Oslo process remained focused on short-term practicalities, mostly dealing with the inhabitants’ daily matters. This worked perfectly for Israel, as it gave the rest of the world the illusion of power having been handed over to the PA – exactly what was intended by the ‘outsourcing’ strategy. Thus, Israeli power did not diminish but rather changed and flowed through different channels (Gordon 2008:171; Hanieh 2016:37).

Post Oslo Accords

The period following the Oslo Accords witnessed a major shift from a collective struggle focused on the liberation of the colonized land – historical Palestine – towards the construction of an institution preoccupied with state-building with almost no land and hardly any sovereignty, in the context of a neoliberal economic order. With the signing of the Oslo Accords, the PA chose to adapt to a certain kind of political pragmatism, where ‘everything Israel rejects is “not pragmatic” while everything it accepts is “pragmatic”’ (Massad 2006:117). This pragmatic standpoint of the PA meant their accepting the role of providing security for the colonial regime without ensuring any sort of Palestinian economic autonomy or real political independence. This has prompted reduced popular legitimacy of the PA, and has brought about extreme reliance on foreign aid alongside a forced subsumption under the Israeli economy (Hanieh 2013; Tartir 2015:469). Within the narrow constraints set up by the Oslo Accords, the PA has banked on neoliberal development as the path to better lives for Palestinians (Hanieh 2013; Tartir 2015). This neoliberal project has furthered processes of atomization and weakened the collective political culture of the Palestinian people by opening up for market-based relations (Hanieh 2013:121). It has fortified a class of political and economic elites strongly linked to this neoliberal state building, sharing common interests with the Israeli colonial project as minor partners in the status quo and benefitting from close relations with the occupier. At the same time, this neoliberal turn has marginalized the majority of the Palestinian people politically and economically, and in many cases brought a sort of misery to their daily life (Haddad 2016: 263; Hanieh 2013; Tartir 2015).

The political economic conditions have altered dramatically since 1993. The cheap Palestinian labor force has mostly been excluded from the Israeli
market and has been replaced by skilled and unskilled foreign workers from Asia and Eastern Europe. Meanwhile, Israel’s main economic driver has shifted from construction and agriculture to high-tech industries. Thus, over the high era of the Oslo Accords, from 1993 to 1999, the share of the Palestinian workforce working inside Israel nearly halved (then 1999 was a relatively good year for Palestinian workers in Israel). Pushed out in the margins of the Israeli labor market, the inhabitants of the occupied territories became ‘a marginal but highly flexible reserve’ for Israeli capital, available on demand (Hanieh 2013:109). With a major source of employment and earnings cut off, the majority of the Palestinian labor became reliant on jobs in the PA’s public institutions and ministries, which reached 25% of total employment in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in mid 2000 (Hanieh 2013:109).

With the outbreak of the Second Intifada in 2000, the situation deteriorated even further with Israel implementing all kinds of control apparatuses; closures and curfews imposed over Palestinians that further entrenched the bantustanization that came after the First Intifada, especially with curfews of 1991-92 and onwards, in particular, after the Oslo Accords. In 2002, the construction of the separation wall started, and up to 80,000 Palestinian workers were denied permits to enter into Israel, thus losing their jobs there (Hanieh 2013:112). The unemployment rate increased and many were left to provide for their livelihoods outside of the PA apparatus. Palestinian refugees were among those highly affected by the major shifts resulting from the Oslo Accords and then later on the Second Intifada. For example, there was a significant increase in unemployment rates among those living the refugee camps.

The neoliberal state-building project, while seeking to harmonize relations with the colonizer through private finance corporations and opening up to the regional and global markets, revealed the fragility of such a national project. Chiefly, by acting as Israel’s proxy security force, it explicitly exposed its co-optation to the colonial military occupation. Moreover, it replaced the collective ethos of a society defined by political struggle with an atomized community of households indebted with loans and connected through a web of finance, which directly fuelled processes of class formation and growing economic divisions. A capitalist class has emerged through subcontracting and profiting from the occupation, while the majority has been left impoverished (Haddad 2016; Hanieh 2013; Tartir 2015).
Within Palestinian society, refugee camps have been among the most affected. It was the Oslo Accords that brought an end to the Palestinian refugees’ long-standing struggle to realize UN General Assembly Resolution 194 (III) of December 1948, known as the ‘right of return’, which declared that:

Refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbors should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property, which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the governments or authorities responsible. (UNRWA 2016b)

Though Palestinian refugees are considered part of a supposed final settlement that should theoretically emerge at some future date at the end of the negotiation process (which is presumed to include Jerusalem, the Zionist settlements and borders), their cause has been postponed and, to a certain extent, marginalized. In fact, the final status agreement of Oslo was never concluded, and Israel refused to make serious concessions on any of the central issues. Instead, the negotiations collapsed in July 2000 during the infamous summit at Camp David, to which Bill Clinton had invited Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and Palestinian president Yasser Arafat to conclude the unfinished process (Hanieh 2013:112). It remains unfinished to this day, with a final status agreement appearing far less likely at the time of writing this text than it did in 2000.

Through this process of interminable negotiations, the whole discourse relating to Palestinian refugees and their ‘right of return’ has been gradually vanishing from the table. While Israel still refuses to implement or even acknowledge the internationally recognized UN resolution 194, refugee camps still exist and have been evolving for 69 years. In other words, there is no other refugee population in the world as old and large as the population of Palestinian refugees. This has created a situation where the question of the fate of Palestinian refugees has been abandoned by the PA – under the pressure of Israeli governments – and marginalized the PLO, as a vehicle for Palestinians to claim their rights enshrined in international law, most notably in resolution 194.

This has generated a sharp rupture in the role of refugee camps within the Palestinian struggle. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the refugee camps in the occupied territories and neighboring countries were the most fertile
grounds for political mobilization for national demands, military training and
resistance (Hanieh 2013:99; Peteet 2005; Sayigh 2007). However, the Oslo
Accords and their aftermath enhanced pre-existing class divisions within
Palestinian society, particularly between refugee and non-refugee populations
and their spaces. The refugees have been specifically impoverished by the
pitifully low economic performance of the PA, and so refugee camps have
tended to become sites of despair and desolation.

To sum up the above: since the first Zionist settlers came to the shores of
Palestine, the country has been subjected to a hybrid of both settler-colonial
and colonial dominations, over different geographies and across time. What I
have emphasized in this first chapter is that it is essential to make clear
analytical and structural distinctions between settler colonialism and
colonialism (Veracini 2010). These distinctions are useful analytical tools,
however analysis of the history and contemporary reality in Palestine, there
seems to show that there is a hybrid system of domination. I have sought to
demonstrate such hybridity within the case of Palestine, by arguing that from
1948 onwards, Zionism successfully achieved its settler-colonial project in
what has become Israel. From 1967, the conditions have varied. Between
1967 and until the outbreak of the First Intifada in 1987, Zionism resorted to
a more standard mode of colonial subjugation of the occupied territories.
Even though one could argue that it took the shape of center-periphery
relations, however, it is not fully the classical one, which usually allows for a
minimum economic development in the periphery that is still dependent on
the center (Roy 2001: 119). The relation between Israel and the occupied
territories in that period was rather based on a deliberate destruction of the
economic potential in the territories, through the deployment of various
methods with the ultimate goal to dispossess the people from their land and
so make it available for colonization (Roy 2001:120). Therefore, Zionist
colonial domination imposed on the territories did not really occur to achieve
the classical economic exploitation of the natives for the sake of profit.
Although such exploitation has in fact occurred in various times and spaces,
the Zionists’ over-arching and ultimate goal has remained the conquest of
land by any means. The classical model is a particularly poor fit for a place
like the old city of Hebron, where Palestinians are systematically displaced
from the area around the settlements; though this is not the focus of my
research, it could be a significant example, since it is clearly an instance of
settler-colonial domination. There are plenty of other cases of active
displacement of Palestinians from parts of the West Bank – sometimes
violently aggressive, sometimes gradual and bureaucratic – repeating the
The foundational sequence of the Nakba. East Jerusalem, occupied following the 1967 war, is likewise under settler-colonial domination, which I pursue to demonstrate in detail in the next chapter.

The period following the First Intifada, with all the concomitant closures that were further enhanced during the Second Intifada, sharply affected the exploitable Palestinian labor and brought it into steep decline. And with the ongoing expansion and construction of illegal settlements in the West Bank, the domination in the territories has reverted to typical settler-colonial subjugation. As clarified earlier, Israel has sought to outsource the responsibility of the indigenous Palestinians in the occupied territories to a subcontractor, herein the PA, granting it neither sovereignty nor economic autonomy. Israel has maintained the ultimate goal of conquering the land in the territories and not the economic exploitation of the population and extraction of resources, which has rather occurred by default (Roy 2001).

Here I argue that Zionism, as a political movement and an ideology informed by settler-colonial strategies, has generated both settler-colonial and colonial relations, where those two types of formations mutually interact and define each other, in a ‘dialectical tension’ (quotations in Veracini 2010: 7; Veracini 2010:11-12; Veracini 2011:1-3). I consider this a hybrid situation, where elements of settler colonialism and colonialism are present, but to varying degrees over particular periods and places in the history of the occupation. I now proceed to a more detailed analysis of the city of Jerusalem.
3. The City of Jerusalem

Jerusalem has developed and changed character throughout the past century due to diverse socio-political drivers. Traditionally, it was renowned for its religious significance, and not for its economic or agricultural activities (Davis, 2002a:10). Moreover, it is often forgotten that prior to the 1948 war, it once was ‘an ordinary city’ inhabited by diverse communities and ethnicities, organized in various neighborhoods and social class structures. The reputation of Jerusalem as a city partitioned between the eastern and western parts came only after the 1948 war. Today, and following 1967 it is ‘divided by nationality and united by the military might of Israel’ (Tamari 2002a:2).

Towards the late 19th century, while still under the Ottoman Empire, Jerusalem started to become more significant in terms of population, infrastructure and the general physical layout (Davis 2002a:11). But it wasn’t until 1917, with the arrival of the British mandate, that Jerusalem became recognized as the capital of Palestine, even if it had long been the de facto capital. Since 1917, mainstream narratives characterized it as a backward city due to an extended period of Ottoman stagnation. In the era of colonialism and missionary activities, British colonialists, Christian travellers and Zionist scholars championed the vision of bringing the culture of the European upper and middle classes, alongside religious and political beliefs, to “the holy land”. This was a way to justify their efforts in transforming Jerusalem from a dormant inactive city to a rapidly growing one with a cosmopolitan character depicted through the ‘coexistence of traditional, messianic, and secular trends’ (Davis 2002:10; quotation in Tamari 2002a:2). Indeed, Jerusalem underwent major urban transformations, redefining its connection to the surrounding villages, which meant, for some of those villages, becoming suburbanized over time (Tamari 2002b:71). Little acknowledgement is given to the role of the indigenous communities of Jerusalem in contributing actively to the development of the New City outside the walls of the Old City (Davis 2002b:30). The Old and New terms became class indicators in Jerusalem, where the Old City was left inhabited
by the poor and elderly while the New hosted the rising upper and middle classes (Davis 2002b:36).

As stated earlier, the 1947 partition plan declared Jerusalem an international zone or corpus separatum under the UN administration. Yet, following the 1948 war, East and West Jerusalem were introduced as terms demarcating a political boundary defined by the armistice agreement that separated the Israeli-held part (west) from the Jordanian part (east). Prior to 1948, western and eastern Jerusalem were defined through topography and commercial significance. The western region of Jerusalem – including villages and the hinterland – had rich soil and a higher rate of rainfall than the eastern one, which was mostly arid and semi-arid. Moreover, the western villages were adjacent to the Jaffa-Tel Aviv highway, and expanded towards the urban middle-class neighborhoods. For this reason, there was a higher population density and concentration of villages in the western region, which came under Israeli control, causing the depopulation and destruction of urban and rural areas respectively (Tamari 2002b:71). The Zionist forces targeted the western region for tactical reasons: first, the Jaffa-Tel Aviv highway was a strategic point to be captured, so as to allow for free movement of the Zionist forces into Jerusalem. Second, the western region would provide a sort of connectivity towards the rest of the Zionist settlements across the coast. Thus the Zionist forces led thirteen operations in order to evict Palestinians from the western villages and urban neighborhoods. These operations occurred in several phases between December 1947 and July 1949 (Tamari 2002b:75). With the completion of the operations, the Zionist forces managed to evict a total of 23,649 indigenous Palestinians from the western villages, and another 25,000 from the western urban neighborhoods (Tamari 2002b:72).

Following the armistice agreements in 1949, Jordan took over the eastern part of Jerusalem, which included the Old City and the holy places, while Israel took over nearly 85% of the former municipal area of Jerusalem, together with an enclave to the northeast (within the Jordanian held part) encompassing the Hebrew University on Mount Scopus (Dumper 2014:46). Later on, Jordan expanded the municipal boundaries of the eastern part to include the surrounding villages, due to the pressing need to accommodate all the displaced Palestinians from the western side. On the lands of some villages on the outskirts of eastern Jerusalem, two UN refugee camps were set up, soon known as the Shu’faat and Qalandia refugee camps. Nevertheless, the eastern side remained small in comparison to the Israeli one. The situation in the city became extremely tense and hardly any contact
took place between the two parts. In particular, displaced Palestinians were not allowed to return back to their former homes and lands on the western side (Dumper 2014:48).

It wasn’t until the 1967 war that East Jerusalem became subjected to settler-colonial domination. Even though the 1967 war did not expel the majority of Palestinian Jerusalemites, as was the case in the 1948 ethnic cleansing, a process of gradual, systematic displacement has been entrenched through an array of demographic laws and spatial policies that, taken together, have become known as the Judaization of Jerusalem. Therefore, this chapter argues that East Jerusalem should be analyzed as a site of settler-colonial domination. Ever since 1967, Israel insists on portraying Jerusalem as a city with a Jewish character, thus denying the presence of two ethnic groups with equal rights. Furthermore, the Israeli government has forced Palestinian Jerusalemites to see the Judaization as an unquestionable matter, part of ‘the modern development of the Jerusalem metropolis’ (Yiftachel & Yacobi 2006:173). In other words, Israel’s goal is to normalize its annexation by creating facts on the ground, and somehow abolishing its settler-colonial project under a set of systematic policies that occur over a long period of time. This creates a blurry situation that is sometimes hard to grasp through the lens of the theory of settler colonialism.

Right after the 1967 war, Israel issued the Law and Administration Ordinance (Amendment No 11) Law, expanding its municipal jurisdiction over East Jerusalem. In 1980, Israel constitutionalized the annexation of East Jerusalem, in contravention of international law that considered it illegal and unilateral, affirmed by the fact that the move was immediately condemned by the UN (Jefferis 2012a:209). Regardless, Israel put this law into practice and expanded its municipal jurisdiction to include occupied East Jerusalem alongside an additional 70 square kilometers that compromised 28 surrounding villages and open spaces considered state land during Jordanian rule (Abowd 2014:11; Cohen 1993:80; Jefferis 2012a:209; OCHA 2011). This annexation gave Israel full sovereignty over the land, in terms of spatial planning, housing policies, political arrangements and the re-drawing of the Jerusalem boundary (Khamaisi 2011; Khamaisi &Nasrallah: 2006).
Diminishing the Palestinian Jerusalemites

Driven by the Zionist settler-colonial strategy, with the ultimate goal to conquer the land but not the indigenous population, Israel had to implement procedures that would render the Palestinian Jerusalemites who were present at the time a controllable minority. Two days after the 1967 war ended, Israel conducted a census survey in the occupied part of Jerusalem and granted those present permanent residency rights, meaning that those who were not present during the survey for any possible reason lost their legal ties to their city and were prevented from their right to be permanent residents (Jefferis 2012a:209). Formally, according to Israel, Palestinian Jerusalemites were also entitled to apply for citizenship as stated by the Israeli Citizenship Law of 1952; however, this was not the case in reality. In order to be granted Israeli citizenship, apart from the regular procedures concerning the amount of years inhabiting the city by the time of application and having a fair knowledge of Hebrew, Palestinian Jerusalemites might be denied citizenship even if they had met all the requested requirements. Besides, if their application was accepted, Palestinian Jerusalemites were obliged to perform a loyalty oath to the state of Israel, and consequently acknowledge the illegal annexation of East Jerusalem. Due to the severe complications at the time, and the Palestinians’ collective refusal to accept or even acknowledge the conquest of their territory – combined with their determination to acquire their internationally recognized rights – most Palestinian Jerusalemites did not apply for citizenship. This meant living for years on their ancestral soil as permanent residents, with limited rights in comparison to Israeli citizens (including those settling in East Jerusalem) (Jefferis 2012a:209; Jefferis 2012b:95; Khamiasi 2011).

The permanent residency status leaves Palestinian Jerusalemites in an ambiguous situation. On the one hand, it allows them to access some benefits and rights: of the likes that those living in the West bank and the Gaza Strip could only dream of. Yet, on the other hand, it weakens their ties to the land and reduces their power to influence the socio-political conditions in the longer run, as it places them under constant threat of losing their residency. To elaborate on that, Palestinian Jerusalemites enjoy the freedom to live, work and travel inside of Israel, move freely in and out of the West Bank as well as benefit from the Israeli National Insurance system. Moreover, they are entitled to participate in the municipal elections, but not run as a candidate for more significant positions such as the Mayor’s office. While
that is the case, Palestinian Jerusalemites have to date chosen to boycott the municipal elections as a manifestation of their refusal to recognize the Israeli occupation and the illegally forced annexation (Jefferis 2012:209; Khamiasi 2011). On the other hand, due to their non-citizenship status they are not allowed to participate in the Israeli Parliament (Knesset) (Jefferis 2012a:209; Khamiasi 2011), and likewise are not permitted to have prominent jobs within state institutions. Politically speaking, this serves to shrink their presence and power to influence any decision-making process that concerns their everyday life, such as city planning and development, which will be elaborated on further ahead.

Another mechanism to hamper the Palestinian presence on the land is through limiting the population growth in any possible way. By 1967, Palestinian Jerusalemites compromised a population of 68,600 (Khamiasi 2011); Israel anticipated that in the coming year this number would likely double, if not even triple. In order to maintain a Jewish demographic supremacy within the city, the state of Israel has pursued a policy goal entitled ‘demographic balance’. It aims to limit the Palestinian population in Jerusalem to 30 % of the city’s total population, with the remaining 70 % being Jewish. This formula has guided the Israeli authorities in setting their planning policies and political decisions (B’Tselem 2013; Khamaisi 2011; Khamaisi 2007; Margalit 2007). This by itself is an oppressive act, hindering the natural growth of the Palestinian population present in the city in favor of another, based solely on the category of ethnicity (B’Tselem 2013).

To achieve such a ‘demographic balance’, in 1988 the Israeli High Court issued another policy named the ‘center of life’ that was put into practice in 1995 by the Ministry of Interior (B’Tselem 2013). The ‘center of life’ policy states that Palestinian Jerusalemites must reside and work within the Jerusalem municipal boundaries in order to maintain their residency rights in the city. This requires that they prove that Jerusalem has been their center of life through an evidence of payment of taxes and services to Israel. Those who study or work abroad or even live in a nearby suburb that lies outside of the municipal boundary of Jerusalem risk having their residency revoked. Since 1967, Israel has revoked the permanent residency of over 14,000 Palestinians who have not complied with this law, on the basis that they live outside of the municipality borders. In 2008, according to the Israeli Ministry of Interior, 4,577 Jerusalemite IDs were revoked (B’Tselem 2013). Jefferis argues that this is a ‘legalized cleansing’ that allows for the disappearance of a targeted population through official bureaucracy: a strong manifestation of
the ongoing forced displacement that happens on a daily basis and not just in one violent event (Jefferis 2012b: 94).

To further obstruct the natural growth of the Palestinian Jerusalemites, Israel has legalized another limitation on those holding permanent residency. Since 2003, family reunification has become almost impossible to obtain. The amendments to the Nationality Law of 1952 forbid Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza Strip from applying for family unification if married to a Palestinian Jerusalemite or a citizen of Israel. This has also limited the possibility to register children where one parent is a Jerusalem resident and the other is a resident of the West Bank or Gaza Strip (Jefferis 2012a:210-211; Jefferis 2012b:95). Thus, most families are forced to live in areas that provide them with the requirements of proving that they live within the Jerusalem municipality limits but also offer a legal base for the Palestinian ID holders who are members of their family (OCHA 2011).

Today Jerusalem has a total population of 850,000, of which 534,000 are Israeli Jews living mainly in West Jerusalem (among them are 200,000 settlers in East Jerusalem) and 316,000 are Palestinian Jerusalemites residing in East Jerusalem (CBS 2014). In other words, 37% are Palestinian Jerusalemites and 63% are Israeli Jews and others, bearing in mind that the Palestinian demographic growth is higher than the Israeli Jewish one. In 2012, the Palestinian growth rate was 2.6%, while that of the Jewish population was 0.9% (B’Tselem 2015).

Since 1967, Israel’s main goal has been to thwart the Palestinian demography in Jerusalem by any possible means. All those tailored demographic mechanisms, embedded within the legal system and solely applying to Palestinian Jerusalemites have gradually marginalized the Palestinian presence in their city, systematically displaced them and disempowered their potential to resist and alter this unilateral hegemony. The demographic policies have also guided the planning policies and development of Jerusalem, which has further entrenched the invisible division and inequalities between East and West Jerusalem, and has ensured the supremacy of the Jewish population over the Palestinian Jerusalemites.
Expanding the Territory

While systematically striving to reduce the Palestinian population in East Jerusalem, Israel has been active in expanding the territory under its authority and control. As stated earlier, the Israeli state’s ultimate goal has been the reunification of the city and the declaration of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, and the illegal annexation of East Jerusalem was as a first step towards achieving this. This entailed expanding the municipal boundary by an additional 70 kilometers square to the surrounded territory (thereby including Arab East Jerusalem and 28 adjacent villages), which is immensely larger than the eastern part when controlled by the Jordanian regime (Dumper 2014:64; OCHA 2011). Today, the total area of Jerusalem within the Israeli-drawn municipal boundaries compromises 125,1 kilometers square, of which West Jerusalem is 55 square kilometers, and East Jerusalem is 70 square kilometers (Abowd 2014). The planning mechanism functions under the dual authority of the Jerusalem municipality and the Jerusalem district of the Ministry of the Interior, which is highly centralized and mostly supervised by the Israeli Government that leaves little space for the engagement of the local population (Khamaisi 2011). The Palestinian Jerusalemites are thus dominated by policies and spatial planning regulations over which they have no control, and their quality of life is severely restricted and highly altered due to these decisions (Pullan 2009).

Since 1967, the planning and development needs of the Palestinian population have been deliberately ignored. The authorities have adopted a range of planning policies and measures that have constrained the development of Palestinian neighborhoods in East Jerusalem. Palestinian Jerusalemites are discouraged from applying for building permits because of the extreme difficulty in obtaining one, not to mention the very expensive process it entails, which can last for years. Therefore, Palestinian residents are forced to build illegally inside the East Jerusalem neighborhoods and face demolition orders, imprisonment and fines, which has led to a severe housing shortage.

At the same time, the construction of illegal Zionist settlements on Palestinian land in East Jerusalem and other adjacent occupied territories has, of course, been vitally sponsored by the Israeli government. Twelve settlements have been constructed in East Jerusalem since 1967, while not even one Palestinian neighborhood has been planned or constructed (Wari 2011:460). The zoning of East of Jerusalem has been mostly allocated to
settlements. 35% of confiscated Palestinian land in East Jerusalem was allocated for the construction of a ring of illegal settlements at three levels – inner, municipal and metropolitan – 22% is allocated to so-called green areas, 30% is left unplanned, leaving only 13% for Palestinian construction, while in reality only 7% is currently used for Palestinian neighborhoods (Dumper 2014: 86; OCHA 2011). Even though the construction of the settlements in East Jerusalem has been in violation of international law, the state of Israel has used such urban development in order to achieve the desired Judaization of Jerusalem. The well-known strategy is to create facts on the ground and establish a significant Jewish presence throughout the annexed territories, so as to make the division of the city unfeasible and even practically impossible, guaranteeing its status as de facto capital of the state of Israel (Bollens 1998). Additionally, to enhance the identity of Jerusalem as Jewish, the Israeli authorities have constructed the separation wall that has severely isolated East Jerusalem from the rest of the West Bank and largely destroyed its position as the main economic and cultural hub for the Palestinian population residing in the West Bank. Politically speaking, while the “peace process” of the 1990s postulated East Jerusalem as the future capital for the Palestinian state, this turned out to be only an illusion: the leadership of the PA cannot govern the Palestinian Jerusalemites or even set foot inside the city.

In conclusion, to briefly summarize the history of Jerusalem since 1948; in 1948 the western part of Jerusalem and adjacent villages were entirely depopulated of indigenous Palestinians. Some villages were entirely destroyed and a new settler population was brought to populate the area. This was part of the ethnic cleansing of Palestine in 1948. Following the 1967 war, East Jerusalem was granted special conditions, and placed in situation distinct from the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The annexation of East Jerusalem gave the Israeli authorities the full power to achieve two goals: first, to gradually reduce the Palestinian Jerusalemite population present there through several procedures of systematic displacement; second, to include the Zionist settlements within the expanding municipal boundaries, treat them as normal neighborhoods or suburbs of Jerusalem, and, accordingly, seek to establish Greater Jerusalem as the “eternal” capital of Israel. Therefore, East Jerusalem is under settler-colonial hegemony, where the displacement of indigenous Palestinians is more systematic and institutionalized than in most cities of the West Bank, e.g. Ramallah and Nablus. This displacement has been happening gradually, on a daily basis, with the ultimate goal being the Judaization of Jerusalem. As elaborated previously by both Wolfe and Veracini, for a settler-colonial project to succeed it needs to create facts on
the ground that help normalize its enterprise, while pretending to be democratic (Wolfe 1999, Veracini 2010; 2011; 2013; 2015). Returning to Wolfe’s crucial statement ‘invasion is a structure not an event’ (Wolfe 1999:2): what occurred in Jerusalem is not only the events of 1948 and the ones that followed in 1967, but it is the continuous domination of the Zionist settler-colonial structure.
4. The Edge Areas of Jerusalem

This chapter introduces the research setting by detailing the two edge areas, which I termed earlier the micro-spaces. I go on to present the four articles by giving an overview of the main argument in each article and drawing linkages between them.

The research, as previously mentioned, is based in Jerusalem, specifically in East Jerusalem; in areas that I referred to in Article VI as the ‘edge areas’. Through the planning and housing policies imposed in East Jerusalem, the Israeli settler-colonial structure continuously attempts to empty East Jerusalem from most of its Palestinian inhabitants through pushing them towards peripheral areas abandoned behind the wall, and thus lacking any services or administration. The only benefit of living in these areas is that they are still within the Jerusalem boundary, so the displaced Palestinian Jerusalemites could maintain their permanent residency status and not risk losing it due to the ‘center of life’ policy. These areas are trapped between different jurisdictions, the enclaves of the West Bank and that of Jerusalem. These areas have witnessed a vast influx of Palestinian Jerusalemites, due to the uncontrolled urbanization, which has become the only option for Palestinian Jerusalemites as a result of the discriminatory housing, planning, and residency mechanisms entrenched in the law that are imposed solely on them. These areas are a contemporary phenomenon; the uncontrolled construction started during the Second Intifada, and has arrived to its peak after the construction of the separation wall.

The research is conducted in two edge areas: one is entirely within the Jerusalem municipal boundary called Shu’faat area, while the other, the Kufr Aqab/Qalandia area, is partially within the Jerusalem municipal boundary and partially in Area C. There are no accurate demographic figures for these areas (especially concerning the Palestinian Jerusalemites), but it has been estimated that currently the population of both areas taken together is approximately 132,500 (of which 36,500 are refugees living in both camps present there) (UNRWA 2016). Neither edge area receives municipal services from Jerusalem, however the Palestinian Jerusalemites residing in
the residual spaces must pay their full municipal taxes (*Arnona*), while the refugee camps are under the administration of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) with respect to infrastructure, health and education provision.

**Map 2**

East Jerusalem. Map by author (2017)
**Map 3**  
The Edge Areas. Map by author (2017)

### Edge Area One: the Shu’faat Area

This edge area lies northeast of Jerusalem and is within the municipal boundary of Jerusalem (3 km from the center of Jerusalem), encircled by a ring of three major settlements: French Hill (constructed in 1968), Neve Ya’akov (constructed in 1972) and Pisgat Ze’ev (constructed in 1982) (Cohen 1993). This edge area is composed of the Shu’faat Refugee camp as well as mostly unlicensed urbanization surrounding it in the residual space of Jerusalem, which includes several neighborhoods: *waqf*’al-Shaykh Lulu / Ras Shehade/ Dahiyet al-Mukhayyam/ Ras Khamis/ Dahiyet al-Salam. This area
has been gradually abandoned, and, with the completion of the wall in 2008, it witnessed a complete enclosure and exclusion from the rest of Jerusalem.

Shu’фааt Camp is the only camp within the Jerusalem municipal boundary;³ it was founded in 1965 on the lands of Shu’ фааt to accommodate refugees⁴ who previously lived in the Mu’скаr camp – located in the Sharaf quarter of Jerusalem Old City – currently known as the Jewish quarter. Shu’ фааt used to be a village, and its lands extended towards Beit Hanina, Anata, and Lifta villages. It was one of the villages that was suburbanized during the British mandate period. During the Jordanian rule, parts of it fell within the expanded municipal boundary of ‘Arab East Jerusalem’ (Dumper 2014:47). After the 1967 war, Shu’ фааt village was entirely incorporated into the municipal boundary of Jerusalem, and came under the control of the Israeli authorities. Since then, Shu’ фааt developed into a middle-class urban neighborhood of East Jerusalem, inhabited by Palestinian Jerusalemites. Next to this neighborhood lies the Shu’ фааt refugee camp. After the completion of the wall in 2008, the Shu’ фааt camp, together with some Shu’ фааt land, have been completely excluded from the rest of the Shu’ фааt neighborhood and Jerusalem as a whole, and the only way to access Jerusalem is through an installed military border crossing.

The urbanization process, led by the unregistered Palestinian contractors, surrounding the camp also happened gradually, even prior to the construction of the wall. Some neighborhoods had already existed since the Jordanian rule, like Dahiyet al-Salam, along with a few other houses scattered around the camp that are licensed. But the flood of unlicensed construction initially occurred towards the end of the First Intifada, and then again during the Second Intifada, while the peak was after the construction of the wall. The camp has become the central node for this urbanization- geographically and in terms of infrastructure.

³ Currently the camp has a population of approximately 24,000 of which 12,500 are officially registered in UNRWA (UNRWA 2016a).

⁴ Refugees in Shu’ фааt camp hold permanent residency similar to the Palestinian Jerusalemites, however they do not pay municipal taxes (Arnona). They originally come from 55 villages in the Jerusalem, Lydd, Jaffa, and Ramleh areas. Most refugees come from villages around the Old City of Jerusalem like Qatamon, Beith Thoul, al Walajh, Lifta, and Malha (UNRWA 2016a). Following the 1948 war, villages with close proximity to the old city like Malha were suburbanized due to high value of land, while those of intermediate proximity like Beith Thul were completely demolished (Tamari 2002b:72).
Edge Area Two: the Kufr Aqab/ Qalandia Area

This edge area is located north of Jerusalem. It lies between Jerusalem and Ramallah (Area A), 14km away from the old city of Jerusalem and 3km from Ramallah city; it is composed of Qalandia refugee camp 5 (established in 1949 on land as part of Qalandia village) and the residual space Kufr Aqab. They are adjacent to each other and were once located within Jerusalem. Following the Oslo Accords, Qalandia Camp has been categorized Area C, while Kufr Aqab has been divided between two jurisdictions: 30% is within the municipal boundary of Jerusalem while 70% is in Area C. Later on, in 1999, a village council – under the PA – was established in Area C to provide basic services for the 1000 residents present there at the time.

Until 1967, Kufr Aqab was considered a village with a small population – most of its original residents reside abroad, and only 700 remained in the area. The land was agricultural and not highly in demand for construction purposes. Since 1967, the Israeli authorities have gradually confiscated the land of Kufr Aqab. Kokhav Yaakov settlement was constructed in 1985 on the village’s land and has been expanding ever since. 6 Since the Oslo Accords, a small part of it was included within the Jerusalem municipal boundary, but even so, the area was not considered a particularly attractive place for Palestinian Jerusalemites to reside, thus the population at the time was only 10,000.

The Israeli authorities started to abandon this area gradually, starting with the army withdrawal in 2004, followed by the installment of a permanent military crossing terminal in the separation wall in 2006. At first there was a ‘flying checkpoint’ 7 that was placed in 2001, which soon developed into a more stable checkpoint, with soldiers behind concrete blocks and a surveillance tower that sporadically stopped people on the road. Over the following four years, this checkpoint stretched out into a permanent, rigorous fortification and blockade, until finally it became a fully developed terminal,

5 Currently there are 12,500 refugees registered in UNRWA, they are holders of West Bank IDs. Refugees originate from the Jerusalem area, Haifa, Lydd, Ramleh and the area west of Hebron (UNRWA 2016a).

6 From a total area of 6 square kilometers, 2.5 square kilometers have been confiscated by the settlement and later on for the construction of the separation wall in Kufr Aqab (KA VC 2014).

7 Flying checkpoint is a term used to describe when a checkpoint is not constantly there, yet it comes and goes as desired by soldiers, and if soldiers are present they stop passers by and ask for IDs.
equipped with high tech security that was installed inside the separation wall. This became the main crossing point between East Jerusalem and Ramallah, where everybody has to be scanned and surveyed to pass. Consequently, in early 2006 Qalandia checkpoint became Qalandia terminal – one of eleven high tech military terminals constructed across the West Bank (Hammami 2010). Moreover, there was a military base in Kufr Aqab (that lies within Jerusalem municipality) just across the main road leading to the Qalandia terminal, constantly observing people, and keeping them under perpetual surveillance. In fact, from 1999 – 2004 no construction occurred in that area due to the continuous military presence. In 2005, once the wall was on its way to finalization, Qalandia Terminal was almost installed, and the army withdrew from the KA area, the unlicensed construction boom began.

Overview and Linkages between the Articles

The research is composed of four articles that have been produced over different periods of time. While I have allowed the articles to take different directions, I believe that they are all embedded within an overarching theme and purpose, which is to analyze the dynamics in these edge areas, while investigating the agency of the people present there through their own perceptions and practices towards the land, the urbanization processes, the power circulation and the structural impositions.

Article I, ‘Shifting Realities: Dislocating Palestinian Jerusalemites from the Capital to the Edge’, is part of a special edition on ‘housing and the right to the city’, thus we were challenged to engage with Lefebvre’s concept ‘the right to the city’ (Lefebvre 1996), and apply it to one of the residual spaces, Kufr Aqab. This article aimed to situate Kufr Aqab within its appropriate, non-western context, and located the point of departure as the Israeli occupation and not that of industrialization. Our main questions are: How applicable are the concepts expressed in ‘the right to the city’ in a context of territorial occupation where the elements of space and citizenship are in

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8 West Bank ID holders are allowed entry into Jerusalem only with special permits issued by the Israeli Authorities that are difficult to obtain, and are only granted for urgent matters such as medical treatment or on special religious feasts. Nowadays, those above 65 years and children under 14 years are allowed to cross into Jerusalem without a permit, but this can vary from case to case.
continuous alteration? How could the segregation of the working class be compared with the ethno-segregation of the Palestinians?

This article discusses in detail the situation of East Jerusalem and introduces the term ‘residual spaces’. Furthermore, we seek to distinguish Kufr Aqab from other periphery urbanization happening in the global south. We argue that the violations of the right to the city are not resultant of neoliberal policies, but rather are happening because of a specific form of ethnic segregation aiming to politically and geographically exclude the Palestinian Jerusalemites from their city of ancestors so as to achieve the desired Judaization, implemented by the State of Israel through an array of institutionalized spatial and demographic policies. This paper ends with a recommendation that future research further engage with theories relating to colonial/post-colonial settings that could inform such kinds of urban dilemmas more aptly, and are more relevant than the Lefebvrian concept ‘the right to the city’.

In sum, Article I invested in discussing the structural mechanisms subjected by the Israeli hegemonic regime on the Palestinian Jerusalemites, and did not delve deeply into the counter mechanisms utilized by the colonized to resist or even accommodate them, apart from slightly mentioning ‘the opportunistic invasion by unregistered contractors seeking mere profit from such housing developments’ (See Article I). This argument has been illuminated and further extended in Articles II and III. Those two articles have carefully examined the popular practices from below, of those located relatively low on the social and political hierarchy, towards protecting the land in a settler-colonial context. Both articles focus on one edge area, Shu’faat area. I will discuss them separately, starting with Article II entitled ‘Enclosures from Below: The Mushaa’ in Contemporary Palestine’. This article traces the fate of the mushaa’, a once-prominent culture of common land management in use for generations in agrarian areas in the Levant. It seeks to understand how the mushaa’ is perceived and practiced in the present within urban areas, through looking at the dynamics of the seizure of the commons by refugees, who once were the peasants (fellaheen) practicing mushaa’ on their own lands. Thus, Article II examines and analyses the practices of the colonized in the Shu’faat area that seem to lack any legal regulations. To do so, I introduce the concept ‘enclosures from below’ that captures the dynamics of the landless Palestinian refugees who became expert contractors, break up the commons and turn them into private plots for construction. In the view of the contractors, their act is a sort of resistance against the systematic oppression
imposed on them from the settler colonial regime, by protecting the land from settler colonial expansion. It is also understood as a sort of a national act that provides housing alternatives for the displaced Palestinian Jerusalemites, in the absence of the Palestinian Authority (PA) and the systematic exclusion by the Israeli State. The paper focuses on the situation since the Oslo process that opened the possibility of neoliberal dynamics to take place, which has altered a once collective society into an atomized one. Despite the fact that Article II delves into one specific location, the idea of enclosures from below reflect broader tendencies at work in the Palestinian society as a whole, as well as in similar settler-colonial contexts belonging to various temporal and spatial settings.

Whereas Article III, entitled ‘Protection from Below: On Waqf between Theft and Morality’ examines similar tendencies towards the privatization and protection of the land. But in this case it is the waqf, which is a category of property, often translated as “religious endowment,” whose use and status is governed according to Islamic law. The article traces the privatization of waqf land as a mode to protect it from settler colonial appropriation prior to the construction of the separation wall in the Shu’faat area. Again, the refugees are the agents of the enclosures over the waqf land, however, in this case, the seized land has been used to expand the suffocating Shu’faat refugee camp, and after the construction of the wall, what had been managed to be protected was returned back to the Awaqf Administration, in return the Awqaf Administration celebrated this as a heroic act of national resistance that must be acknowledged. Article III stands as a companion to Article II, since it shows a different way to understand the way a centuries old institution of land tenure is changing, and how the refugees again seek to protect land through privatization, which is contradictory to the intended practice of waqf. Thus, “protection from below” and “enclosure from below” share certain commonalities while remaining distinct. Both articles use the conditions in the edge areas to their advantage, as sites of legal vacuums assembled without predetermined logic, the edge areas helped reveal, trace and unfold some significant popular practices. Specifically, they offer possibilities for studying how popular conceptions of land have changed through the successive phases of domination, and continue to do so currently within a settler-colonial context. This, in return, could help feed into a wider structural settler-colonial analysis. These two papers argue that in a settler-colonial context, resistance and accommodation occur simultaneously and feed into each other within a complex dynamic that needs close and careful considerations in order to decolonize the structure itself.
Article VI takes a somewhat different path and investigates the detailed urbanization process within both edge areas. This article under the title ‘A Forest of Urbanization: Camp Metropolis in the Edge Areas’ introduces the term ‘edge areas’, where I seek to analyze the production of these areas through engaging with Foucault’s work on disciplinary power and surveillance (Foucault 1991), while tracing the collisions and interactions between the refugee camps present there and the residual spaces of Jerusalem around them. This paper investigates the role of the refugee camps present there in acting as engines for the urbanization, either through the provision of land, contractors or infrastructure. This is by portraying the camp as the metropole. In this context, “Camp Metropolis” conveys how the forgotten refugee camp has managed to re-adjust its position from being left at the fringes of the city towards a more central location and role in the edge areas. Where the Jerusalem municipality is absent, the UNRWA is not very present, and the PA is not allowed to act; so the camp has filled those missing gaps. The main argument of the article claims that it is important to be reminded that the production of these edge areas is due to a structured settler-colonial project, intentionally assembled to further oppress the colonized with an end goal to be eliminated from the desired territory, which in this case is East Jerusalem (Wolfe 1999). Article VI enhances the argument brought forward in Article I and claims that what is occurring in these areas is ‘not a matter of the disadvantaged subalterns who fall out of reach of neoliberal agendas adopted by authorities, yet a racialized class that is systematically displaced towards areas stuck in a limbo, completely separated from the rest of the city, physically and politically’ (see Article VI). Therefore, this article argues that such existent abusive urbanization in the residual spaces of Jerusalem is a manifestation of the systematic elimination process of the indigenous Palestinians from the city of Jerusalem due to the imposed settler-colonial domination.
5. Methodology

This chapter introduces the methodology that I have used while conducting my fieldwork, and then explains how I gathered, analyzed and interpreted my empirical material. It takes the reader on a journey of my personal process in engaging, questioning, understanding and making meaning. This is a qualitative research project that follows the extended case method as the main methodological application (Burawoy 1998) with the focus on two specific case studies (Yin 1997; Berg 2001; Flyvbjerg 2006), using various qualitative methods that will be detailed further ahead.

The extended case method is concerned with reflexive science, a science model that produces knowledge through embedded engagement instead of detachment. Thus, the extended case method is engaged through dialogue that is entrenched in a local process and at the same understood to be influenced by external forces. This method shifts between the micro settings and the macro structures all the while navigating wider historical patterns. Consequently, it links the present and the past while anticipating the future. It also expands outside the field, towards novel theoretical formations that build on previous theories, all this without renouncing either the empirical phenomena or science (Buroway 1998:5).

Before I clarify my methodological approaches I would like to express that the point of departure in this research has been the refugee camp. I was striving to explore and understand the contemporary geographies that were emerging just beyond the UNRWA camp boundaries. I knew from the beginning that I would not focus on the refugee camp per se. This is due to the fact that much scholarly work has already focused on the specificity the Palestinian refugee camps. Initially, this work happened via a statistical approach, but has evolved over the past decades into research focusing on refugees as active political agents of change; tracing not only their living conditions, but also their memory and identity dynamics, imagined homeland, histories and crucial roles in the national struggle (e.g. Gandolfo 2005; Knudsen and Hanafi 2010; Masalha 2004; Nabulsi 2006; Peteet 2005; Sayigh 2007). Likewise, action research within the urban studies paradigm
has focused on the socio-spatial evolution of the refugee camps, their complex power structures, urbanization and eventually introducing camp improvement programs (see UNRWA 2016a). However, little attention has been given to the refugees’ flexibility and willingness in taking risks as active urban agents. Refugees appropriate, produce, reproduce and squat spaces beyond the UNRWA camp spaces, to the extent that the camp becomes the central engine of a vast contemporary urbanization around it. Therefore, I would say I started from the UN camp boundaries, and moved into the residual spaces around the camps, where an unregulated urbanization boom is unfolding. I then came back again, transgressing the UN boundaries into the refugee camps, where I was able to look at these edge areas as a whole.

In this research, I have worked on two unique and extreme cases. They are considered the only cases undergoing the previously detailed extreme conditions (Flyvbjerg 2006). Generally speaking, a case study has become a credible research methodology in social sciences, as it allows researchers to trace specific patterns and delve into them carefully due to its closeness to reality and to human behaviors (Flyvbjerg 2006). Therefore, a case study analysis is an empirical process that permits one to explore a contemporary phenomenon in depth while giving due attention to contextual conditions based on their respective essentiality and pertinence, by relying on various existent sources to understand how a specific setting operates and why a group of people act in a specific manner (Yin 1997; Berg 2001). Moreover, case studies give space for undertaking exploratory approaches, like initiating fieldwork and primary empirical material gathering prior to defining a precise research question (Berg 2001). This could assist to specify main points of inquiry after a place or phenomenon is already known in significant depth, which later on would develop into research questions and help to point out main arguments. The justification of ones choice of the selected case study is necessary; surely intuition plays a crucial role in identifying and justifying a case study, but that is not enough and there should be a sort of logic behind the selection process (Flyvbjerg 2006).

In my research process, the choice of the two case studies, Shu’faat and Qalandia/Kufr Aqab, was not random, though I consider them to be unique and extreme cases. The extremity of their circumstances helps to reveal processes and allow for tracing patterns that in other cases might be harder to unfold (Flyvbjerg 2006: 229). In other words, these areas, as illustrated

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9 See Infrastructure and Camp Improvement program (CIP): https://www.unrwa.org/what-we-do/infrastructure-camp-improvement
earlier, stand within an administrative vacuum; they do not follow any predetermined logic in how to function. This leaves more space to trace the contemporary perceptions and practices from below that do not follow any rules or regulations. Moreover, the notion of power is highly contested in these areas, thus makes such uniqueness more intriguing to understand and reflect upon both empirically and theoretically.

To be more specific, initially I was utterly taken by the complexity of the residual spaces, since they are contemporary phenomena that have been vastly exploding following the outbreak of the Second Intifada without any significant proceedings on them. These spaces are not fully investigated, apart from some scholarly research that has emerged within the last ten years (see Bulle 2009; Hammami 2010; Abourahme 2011; Graff 2014; Harker et al 2014; Hammoudeh et al 2016). Nevertheless, two things are important to mention: in this existing research, these areas were never taken as a whole (refugee camps plus residual spaces). Additionally, they were not examined together with consideration of both their similarities and distinctions. I am not claiming here that I have analyzed dynamics in the two areas using a comparative approach, but rather looked at both cases and sought to trace their own dynamics together or separately, based on the arguments of concern. Therefore, on the one hand, the choice of the case studies is an attempt to fill this scholarly gap. On the other hand, though they are unique cases, it is possible to elevate the specific arguments to a macro level where structural influences could be identified, and where similar patterns in other cases, belonging to different temporal and spatial settings, could be traced (Buroway 1998). The extended case study method is composed of four important phases: intervention, process, structuration and reconstruction (see Buroway 1998). I believe I have followed a similar path and will elaborate on this in detail. The following section is divided into two parts. The first one describes my methodological process within the field, and, consequently, the methods deployed in gathering my empirical materials, which are relevant to intervention and process. The second part is concerned with exiting the field, and accordingly, the methods utilized to interpret and analyze the gathered empirical materials, which are relevant to structuration and reconstruction.
Entering the Field

Palestine is considered an unstable area, where anything could happen at any time, especially where I was planning to conduct my fieldwork. The edge areas are known as *manateq tamas* or ‘areas of frictions’, as they lie very near to the Separation wall, surveillance towers and military crossing borders. Thus, friction and clashes with the Israeli military is very probable to occur due to the continuous invasion of the Israeli military that sporadically enter and leave. Furthermore these areas – due to the refugee camps presence there- have the tendency to ignite mass demonstrations against the Israeli forces, whenever a war erupts (for instance the Gaza Wars) or when any provocation takes place from the Israeli side, thus making them spaces of collision and arenas of contestation.

This meant that having a fixed plan or a predetermined strategy would not work well due to the turbulent context and its uncertainty. Rather, I was flexible and open to anything that might happen. It helped that I come from Palestine and I am quite familiar with the context. You learn to live without plans or certainty, on a day-to-day basis. There is a famous saying in Palestine: ‘*inshalla iza dallena aysheen*’ which means ‘hopefully if we stay alive’. However, this does not mean I did not have any presuppositions, questions or strategies to follow, but they were somehow evolving guidelines (Burawoy 1998).

Moreover, the residual spaces that I wanted to explore did not have any written documents that I could use as starting points for research. Most of the documents and scholarly work was on the refugee camps. Having decided that my point of departure was the UN camp boundary, it was clear to me from the beginning that the methods deployed would entail engaging with the people through dialogue, which creates an interplay between their own narratives and that of academic theory in a reality that also has its own “situated knowledge”. And so, the context acts as a point of departure and not that to conclude with (Haraway 1991; Buroway 1998).

Two field visits took place during my PhD research, each lasting for 3 months. The first one took place from September to November 2013 in the Shu’faat area and the second from June to August 2014 in Qalandia/ Kufr Aqab area. The methods deployed in the field were composed of informal conversations, participant observations, walk-along and, predominantly, in-depth interviews.
Intervening and Processing in the Field

Intervention is not only an unavoidable part of social research but a virtue to be exploited. It is by mutual reaction that we discover the properties of the social order. Interventions create perturbations that are not noise to be expurgated but music to be appreciated, transmitting the hidden secrets of the participant’s world. (Buroway 1998:14)

Going to Shu’faat area is not a common thing to do among West Bank residents for issues related to political geography and safety. If you have nothing specific to do there, you never consider it accessible geography. In our minds we know it is located within the Jerusalem municipal boundary; thus in theory, it is inaccessible to West Bank ID holders. Since the outburst of the Second Intifada and with the construction of the wall, Palestinians have been living a collective trauma ‘ma fina inruh al quds’ (we cannot go to Jerusalem), similar to the other collective trauma ‘ma fina inruh al bahar’ (we cannot go to the sea). These have created some kind of a mental disability, that anything relevant to Jerusalem or the sea is out of reach and so distant, like a mirage somewhere or an imagined, far-fetched landscape only romanticized. These two icons, Jerusalem and the sea, have paralyzed the minds of almost half of a nation.

The trip starting from Ramallah, where I was staying, to Shu’faat area is a very intense one. One single trip allows the rider to experience all kinds of geographies and jurisdictions; Area A, Jerusalem, Area C, Area B, and again finish with Jerusalem, a flip through all those Bantustans with all sorts of bypass roads and highways. The rider cannot tell where an area ends and another starts, yet the surrounding landscape with the practices present on it (illegal Israeli settlements, military crossing borders, Palestinian chaotic construction, the wall, a pile of stolen cars with Israeli plates, a Palestinian organic town or village, etc.) give clues and a geographical indication. The entrance to Shu’faat area is through a long tight road bombarded by a row of high-rise buildings at both sides, where suddenly the road ends, the wall shines in front of us, the driver stops, does a U-turn and returns back. This is the end of the route, the end of a Bantustan.

The first feeling that captured me in the Shu’faat area is how the wall envelops the whole area and seems to suffocate it. Then internally, many activities happen at once, people pass by from all directions, garbage everywhere, electricity lines strangulated together, sewage water flooding on the streets: everything seems to be functioning in a state of chaos. At first it is
hard to tell where the camp stands, but then you find it hiding behind the shadows of this massive urbanization with the UNRWA blue flag and graffiti on most walls. I had to first identify the entrance of the camp, so as to depart towards these residual spaces suffocating the camp.

The Qalandia/ Kufr Aqab area is more accessible and evident compared to the Shu’faat one; actually it is a trespass between Ramallah towards Jerusalem or the rest of the south of the West Bank. The road is a very busy one, always jammed with traffic as it leads towards the Qalandia military crossing border installed in the separation wall. Even though this is a bit of Jerusalem that the residents of the West Bank are allowed to step into, nobody considers it so due to the oppressive situation and the conditions.

For both field visits, my initial interventions into the field were through informal conversations and observations while walking inside the residual spaces. One of the mechanisms I followed was to start my process at the entrance of each refugee camp and then walk towards the surrounding areas. The camp was my point of reference; it felt more familiar and is somehow a scale more comprehensible to humans, in comparison to the massive construction surrounding both camps.

Walking around and conducting my own observations with no agenda was a pleasant thing to do. It helped me begin to understand the complexity of those frenetic spaces and find my own orientation and landmarks within them. While walking I would stop and talk to shop keepers and people passing by about the name of the neighborhood, if it is related to the refugee camp and when was it constructed. These were just brief questions intended to help me gain an initial, actual geographical orientation and to feed my own curiosity. I was prepared for these areas to have their own localized knowledge, one that only the people would help me reveal through dialogue and engagement. People were friendly and responded without feeling invaded or even wondering why I was asking. In some cases, if they did ask, I would explain that I was doing a research project without giving many details. These walks, together with the informal talks and personal observations, helped me get closer to reality and make my themes initial themes more concrete, and, consequently, start feeling ready to shift towards finding my interviewees and conducting the in-depth interviews.
In-Depth Qualitative Interviews

Interviews are among the most commonly used methods when conducting qualitative research (Mason 2002). In the domain of Human Geography, interviews are usually deployed to capture people’s emotions and views in order to get relatively close to people’s lives. They are based on talking to people and in some cases, even interacting informally (Longhurst 2009). The interview is by itself a ‘social context’, embedded within other socio-political contexts that it cannot be isolated from (Buroway 1998:12). They are seen as both ‘sensitive and powerful’ (Kvale 2006: 497); sensitive, as it is crucial to consider the position of the interviewer in relation to broader power dynamics, like class and gender, for instance, and to be aware of how certain power structures might emerge and impact the interview. On the other hand, interviews are considered powerful because in certain situations, they have the ability to give voice to the underrepresented and the forgotten (Kvale 2006: 481).

My choice of in-depth interviews as the main qualitative method to inform my research was made for several reasons. Essentially, understanding the production of these residual spaces and how they function requires taking into consideration people’s knowledge, perceptions, views and understandings. Moreover, through in-depth interviews I wanted to gain access to people’s choice of the use of language and wording; their capacities to verbalize, remember and construct some previous accounts (Mason 2002). I am convinced that knowledge is situationally and interactionally created within social situations and not just by individuals (Buroway 1998; Mason 2002). Therefore exploring social processes constitute important platforms to draw upon. Interviews can help a researcher step into an actual context and grasp the reality there, and thus limit abstraction, at least when inside the field. Having in mind all that, I was aware that I must maintain the flexibility and willingness to allow for flow of various dynamics in, and for diverse interactions to emerge (Mason 2002). Therefore, every time I was about to have an interview I was prepared for it to be an experience of its own. Hence, my approach to interviews was based on preparing a set of themes that I was striving to explore and then letting them develop throughout the interview, with several questions that were tailored based on each interviewee, in case the flow of themes did not proceed in the desired direction or the conversation became too loose (Valentine 1997). I was keen on understanding and tracing the urbanization process that occurred beyond the refugee camps’ boundaries, specifically in the residual spaces of Jerusalem. I
wanted to learn how they had emerged, who was leading the construction processes and how the infrastructure was operating. This meant I had to recruit interviewees who would be able to provide me with their own localized knowledge and personal engagement in the processes. The research process was initiated from within both refugee camps. Even though I was not intending to delve into the camp itself, as expressed earlier the camps were my point of departure. The initial contacts I had were from the refugee camps. They were key figures that were well informed about the overall situation and had a wide list of contacts both inside and outside of the camps. This helped find suitable informants and expand through snowballing: a technique I used in order to create various layers of contacts (Valentine 1997). Other interviewees were selected intentionally like those who work in a specific institution or hold key positions (See Appendix 1 for list of interviewees in both case studies).

The interviews had different styles, depending on the context, the interviewees and the dominant themes. Some had a ‘narrative’ approach. This allowed the interviewees to feel confident and more secure by sharing their own narratives and stories rather than feeling obliged to follow a standardized set of questions. I used this technique mostly when interviewing women about their life experiences in a specific area through reflecting on their own timeline and daily narratives (Buroway 1998; Mason 2002). Other interviews had more of a conversational style. I allowed the conversations to flow somehow openly by asking open-ended questions, all the while attempting to steer them to a deeper level (Longhurst 2009). This was mostly applied when I was meeting male contractors; I intentionally wanted them to feel that they had power over the direction of the conversation and remained in control - yet with me steering it indirectly. In some cases, this led to uncovering hidden arguments that I hadn’t thought of before. These were emergent in several interviews, and include issues directly related to the land and the contractors’ role in the national struggle and so on. Of course, these were not normal dialogues; I had control of the conversations to some extent, and worked to keep them on a certain track relevant to the themes I am investigating, I did this by directing the interviewees once I noticed that they fell off track and started talking about issues irrelevant to my research (Longhurst 2009).

Another key issue that I have been aware of is the power relations between the informants and me. Despite the fact that most interviews were embedded within dialogue or conversational styles, I was attentive to my own position
and was conscious about the fact that these are not standard conversations occurring between two equal parts. Rather, I was eager to grasp the local knowledge from the informants as an end goal to our dialogues (Kvale 2006). The power relations also varied from one interview to another, depending on my informants. For instance, when I was interviewing male contractors, I sometimes had the feeling that they were mostly in the dominant position. Though this was also my indirect intention, to make them feel the beholders of the power and thus motivated to speak up, this reality also relates to the patriarchal context in which I conducted my interviews, where a male would feel more in power more generally. Thus, I wanted to respect their background and not impose myself. Additionally, perhaps particularly relevant due to the illicit information they were revealing, sharing information in this way meant they decided what to reveal and what not to reveal (Valentine 2005). In this regard, one interview unfolded differently than the others. This difference could be understood as either failed – where the goals were not achieved – or to have happened because I was seen as incompatible for the task because I am a young woman. This happened while interviewing a male contractor who accepted to meet me but the information he shared was very brief and somehow not relevant to what I was looking for, as if he was trying to undermine my presence and what I am aiming to further comprehend (Jacobsson & Åkerström 2012). Another incident that is worth mentioning is an interview with a key figure in the Awqaf institution, a religious institution that is in charge of the waqf properties in Jerusalem (Islamic pious endowments). The informant was a shaykh, so I was advised to put on a veil when meeting him. This brought discomfort to me, as I felt I had to pretend to be religious while I am not. Throughout the interview, he had a dominant position, especially when he was questioning my knowledge of religious aspects and why I am pursuing my degree in a western context. He also did not allow me to record the interview. Such incidents during fieldwork have been taken seriously by feminist, social and cultural geographers while discussing power relations, in relation to the way in some situations that the expected power dynamics between researcher and researched shift. For example, if the interviewee is male and relatively older they could be the one more control if the researcher is a young female and so on (Longhurst 2009).

However, within these constantly altering power relations, many different dynamics have facilitated the interactions between my informants and me. Finding commonalities among us has brought us closer and made the conversations deeper, as well as brought more compassion and respect among
us (Valentine 1997). Sometimes when interviewing refugees, I found myself talking about my own personal experience of being born in a refugee camp and my mother being a refugee herself. Such shared experiences brought about mutual understanding and empathy. Sharing my own story with the informant was also important to find stronger bridges among us, even though I was fully aware of the power relations and class issues at work, and conscious of my position as a privileged Palestinian with cultural and educational capital. I was honest about my role in doing research and that the interviewees’ support is extremely crucial and helpful to deepen my understanding. After all, asymmetrical power relations, inevitable in many knowledge production processes, can be legitimate and accounted for, if the researcher works to acknowledge the power imbalances for what they are (Longhurst 2009: 485-486). In other cases, people I interviewed encouraged me in this learning experience and told me that it is important to voice our lived experiences from a local perspective, given that Palestine is a spot that many foreign researchers focus on. People welcomed me; most interviews occurred in people’s houses, which provided a relaxing environment and allowed for better comprehension of the context. Many interviews ended by us talking about the political situation and shared common frustrations and angers. That was an important aspect that brought us closer: feeling oppressed and having one common struggle that we believe in, regardless of class and power.

The language in use (i.e. popular terms) and the mode of expression in the interviews was another element that I was paying attention to. All the interviews happened in colloquial Arabic. Arabic is my mother tongue, thus this made it an easier process for the interviewees to speak openly and to use their own popular terms that are familiar to both of us. Such a language situation was very valuable and important, as it brought key insights and reflections concerning the people’s perceptions and views. I will further elaborate on the language aspect in the second part with more details. Throughout the fieldwork processes, I was active and reflexive while gathering my empirical material. I worked to allow for multiple readings and then sought to transform my understanding of specific situations into a broader understanding of social processes. I was constantly reflecting on every interview conducted, on my own observations, and also understood that new themes were emerging that I started building upon. Thus, the field process has been a process of intervening, engaging and reflecting all together, in other words, it has been a trajectory of continuous flux (Buroway 1998).
Exiting the Field

Leaving the field is another kind of intervention, but different than when entering it, as it requires elevating to a different level where micro social situations are linked to macro forces. Moreover, it is in this phase where the actual present is rejoined with past occurrences and processes through extending and building on relevant theories, and finally all this in the pursuit of informing and anticipating the future, which, in my research, requires rethinking the process of decolonization and inquiring more deeply concerning the ongoing anti-colonial struggle (Buroway 1998).

The phases following each field trip visit consisted of transcribing all of the conducted interviews. I managed to record most of the interviews alongside writing down my own notes and memos. I made sure to transcribe them in colloquial Arabic in order to keep the original verbal ways of expressing and explaining certain opinions, incidents and perceptions. That was a time consuming process, yet one that was very essential. While transcribing I would write down my own notes and highlight the essential phrases, as well as compare them to my own written notes to verify the transcripts.

The analysis of the transcripts was a process based on comparisons, searching for contradictions, replications and commonalities. I have also collected a set of GIS aerial images\(^\text{10}\) dating to different years that show the spatial developments for both case studies, as a way to compare and verify the narratives collected regarding time with some facts on the ground, as people have the tendency to relate to time/ space in a subjective way. My main method was based on thematic extraction. I managed to construct my own arguments through relating to wider structural forces. Buroway (1998) refers to this as ‘Structuration’, where everyday life and micro dynamics are shaped by external macro structures. Furthermore, I expanded towards connecting to preexisting theories while offering original visions to arguments that developed into manuscripts (Buroway 1998).

In addition, the analysis process following the first field visit included a review of archival documents regarding the land culture and ownership status

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in Palestine during the late period of the Ottoman Empire and the British mandate. This was reflected and used in articles II and III. I was a visiting scholar at UC Berkeley between February and May 2014. The library provided the facilities for this.

The analysis process in my own opinion is not “objective”, rather it is motivated implicitly and explicitly by the researcher’s political standpoints, emotions, understanding, interactions while interviewing people, which entails critical thinking of social life, justice and power. Or, as Fairclough puts it, ‘there is no such thing as an ‘objective’ analysis of text’ (Fairclough 2003: 14). Similarly, other scholars have argued that there is no objectivity in social science research (Valentine 1997). This may not provide a path towards the absolute truth, but paves the path towards insights of what people think and practice (Longhurst 2009). Furthermore, it reveals social processes in relation to external structural forces (Buroway 1998). Personally, I did not find it hard to get the interviewees to confide in me. On the contrary, I had the impression that they all spoke their minds and shared what they could share. Of course it is impossible know precisely how much accuracy and truth was reflected in the interviews, but again, there is no absolute truth, rather relative truth, and as a researcher I tried to grasp what I observed as specific patterns (it is here that my own observations and analysis come in). After all, ‘science offers no final truth, no certainties, but exists in a state of continual revision’ (Buroway 1998:16).

Finally, it is worth saying that my own experience in producing knowledge has been explicitly affected by my own role as a researcher influenced by the field and context, as well as a Palestinian engaged and influenced by the collective anti-colonial struggle, of which the research has been an outlet and a platform to express my own views and have the opportunity to be critical of our own pitfalls. I made sure to trace some emerging patterns and conceptions that are important to be brought into the public view and further debated and reflected upon. I hope this text will be help to avoid over-romanticizing the Palestinian struggle just because we are the oppressed; and instead assert that collective organized action is needed now more than ever.
Who am I and what Do I have to Say

Geographers have continuously discussed the ‘positionality’ of the researcher regarding cultural, social, sexual, economic, gendered and racialized processes, which must be taken into consideration by the researcher and reflected upon throughout the entire process of engaging, observing, analyzing and producing knowledge (Longhurst 2009: 583). I will take this opportunity to have a wider reflection on my own personal process and how it has contributed to and influenced this research.

Palestine has always been difficult for me to fully understand because I have been immersed in its struggles (both in exile and inside). These struggles have shaped and influenced me strongly since birth, which is something worth reflecting on. I was born in Yarmouk refugee camp in Syria, to politically engaged parents in the Palestinian struggle, and grew up in exile within a PLO environment. ‘Palestine’ meant to me a kind of ‘love relationship’ to a homeland that I have never seen but knew was very magnificent, from all the stories narrated to me about the tasteful orange orchards in Yafa, the deeply rooted olive trees across the terraces of Nablus, the grape vineyards across Hebron, the beautiful Akka with its walls, the beauty of the Mediterranean sea all through the long coast, and the charm of al Bassa village (the village where my mother’s family came from. In 1948 they were expelled and the village was completely destroyed). All these stories made me imagine and envisage the landscape of Palestine. I felt I knew it by heart as if it was real, a place I would run into through my imagination and feel as though I was in paradise. I was first aware of the struggle in Palestine during the occurrence of the First Intifada. I was 6 years old and living in Prague. I recall how my parents would make me and my brother sit and watch recorded footages of the Intifada, taken by a few journalists who made it into the occupied territories. We were proud to hear how Palestinian children were called *atfal al hijara* ‘the children of stone’. This brought to me a revolutionary, proud feeling, one that has been deeply rooted since childhood. Even though we were in exile and away from the homeland, the people around us, *al rifaq* (comrades from my parents political party) and their children, made it like ‘Palestine’. We were taught to sing all the PLO revolutionary songs about liberation and the armed resistance. I even attended the PLO school of exile ‘Al Quds’ in Tunis, which sharpened my political belonging.
My family was among those permitted to enter Palestine following the Oslo Accords. We were among the returnees of the exiled PLO. The return (or the arrival) to Palestine was a strong and a sharp turning point for me. I was, for the first time, able to live what I had imagined for almost 15 years. When I went there for the first time I was so perplexed that my imagination completely failed to correspond to the reality I was confronted with. As a reaction, I somehow lost memory of the first years I moved to Palestine. Perhaps due to the illusion of the peace process, nothing seemed real, everything appeared surreal. My “concrete” memory started with the outbreak of the Second Intifada, and me starting to attend Birzeit University in 2000. Those were my politically conscious years and the beginning of my real engagement with the context, and of a new relationship to Palestine, based on daily military invasions, bombings, military attacks, curfews and daily demonstrations while crossing the check point between Ramallah where I lived and Birzeit, where the university is located. It was not anymore the pure love that I once had. I started experiencing more anger, sometimes hatred and at other times complete passion.

So much has happened afterwards, and I will not go into details, but what I have intended to show here, is that Palestine is a context that has strongly shaped me both in exile and when I lived in the West Bank, especially during the years of struggle throughout the Second Intifada. Therefore, Palestine is not a neutral place for me; it is a place with constant ruptures and sudden changes that continue to shape me and influence my connection to it. All this has obviously affected my role as a researcher. I have my own strong political views and standpoints regarding the situation and the struggle. There are moments that I am prone to become very emotional and shaken. For instance, my second field visit, which took place between June and August in 2014, was obstructed and hindered due to the eruption of the Gaza war. July was a very turbulent month; everyday I recall waking up to the news of hundreds of people in Gaza bombarded and complete neighborhoods razed. This also ignited the situation in the West Bank, with constant clashes taking place against the invading Israeli military and demonstrations in the major cities. I was doing my fieldwork then in the Qalandia/Kufr Aqab area. The Qalandia refugee camp was been constantly invaded and there were several martyrs. Therefore, my research area has been stormy with constant clashes with the Israeli military. At some point, I was not able to continue with my research. I was emotionally affected, so I had to put my research aside and live the actual time/space of the context, collectively with the people. I recall strongly questioning the essentiality of the research I was doing, while
witnessing daily destructions and massacres. I was unable to trace a process of urbanization; I was thinking constantly, all this could be razed out in just few seconds, so why bother to investigate it? I recall strongly one night when a big demonstration was organized to take place starting from Ramallah and ending by the Qalandia military crossing border. I participated alongside hundreds of people. That was our collective way to vent out the anger and pain that we all shared towards Gaza, which is unreachable to us. It was an awkward emotion being in my research field, but in a very different way, totally distant from the researcher and completely embedded in the local context, that I have been distanced from due to my move to Sweden. That day made me reconnect to my past records of the Second Intifada and the demonstrations that we had on daily basis on the way to university, due to an imposed checkpoint and consequent closures. The demonstration was big and intense, I recall even seeing some of my informants from the Qalandia refugee camp in the demonstration, and some friends of mine were shot and injured. Later on, I comprehended that the demonstration was another way to re-enter into my research and my field site. I was not able to engage directly with my research, but somehow ended up going back there to demonstrate. Smaller scale demonstrations and clashes with the Israeli military continued until the seizure of war. The return back to Sweden and my consequent research process was very hard; I was emotionally and psychologically affected by the Gaza War, and this made me distance myself from academia. I was unconsciously rejecting it as a non-human machine that has no space for emotions to be expressed or allowed in. It was a hard mission for me to pick up my role as a researcher, distance myself from Palestine and personal emotions, and dive into the research through a scientific lens. However, no matter how much we try to elevate into different levels of doing research, I believe our identities, emotions, connections to certain geographies and above all memories will always be present in the way we write and express, perhaps not directly but in one way or another. For instance, in some texts I realized I wrote with ‘we’, because I feel I am part of a collective, perhaps that was the closest I was allowed to get to the self explicitly in my writings.
6. Conclusions

Where are we now and what is next? These are two important questions that need to be posed constantly when rethinking the Palestinian struggle and anticipating the future. Since the Oslo Accords, the Palestinian struggle has lost its significant moment, and finds itself deeply fractured. It has lost its direction and key organizational tactics, which are the most essential elements for any decolonization project. To further understand these ruptures in the movement, I will allow myself to be guided by Fanon’s prophecy in *The Wretched of the Earth* (2004)[1963], where he anticipated the emergence of neo-colonialism after independence in Africa. In his book, Fanon critiqued the intellectuals, the political parties and the business elites as the main hindrances and obstacles towards achieving a true decolonization based on a revolutionary praxis. Fanon’s testament echoes loudly in today’s dismal post-Oslo situation in Palestine – which by no means implies that Palestine is in a post-colonial phase, or Israel a post-Zionist society. Rather, I emphasize the ongoing Zionist settler-colonial project imposed on Palestinians as a whole, in Israel proper, the occupied territories, East Jerusalem and exile. In this final chapter, I would like to extract some lessons from Fanon to reflect upon and learn from, and see how this could be a compass towards re-navigating a dim and a dark path.

In his writings, Fanon examines three groups and their dynamics during a colonial period. He first looks at the nationalist political parties that are occupied mostly with electoral purposes, as well as engaged with philosophical speeches and political slogans concerned with human rights, democracy, freedom and self-determination. Their biggest pitfall, Fanon highlights, is that ‘they are violent in their words and reformist in their attitudes’ (Fanon 2004:22). They lack an actual radical agenda with which to confront the system and overthrow it. He then reminds us that this is due to the urban nature of these national political parties; the majority of their supporters and voters are urban middle-class residents whose main concern is a better life, and as long as they profit from the colonial system – even if pathetically – they would not seek to interrupt any sort of dialogue between
the political party representing them and the colonial system. It is only the peasantry that is revolutionary, left out of the agenda of the nationalist party. The exploited and disadvantaged peasants are the holders of truth in the view of Fanon; the peasantry, he says, ‘has nothing to lose and everything to gain’, and hence it will soon realize that only violence pays off in the anti-colonial struggle (Fanon 2004:23). Then, Fanon shifts towards both the colonized business elites and intellectuals, who are in favor of Western values, and seem to have accepted the Western domination channeled into their lives, even though these ideas may be completely meaningless and irrelevant to the real struggle of the people (Fanon 2004:11). Fanon underpins how the colonized elites manage to break the collectivist colonized society by adopting new forms of living, ‘the colonialist bourgeoisie hammered into the colonized mind the notion of a society of individuals where each is locked in his subjectivity, where wealth lies in thought’ (Fanon 2004:11). Their main concern becomes maintaining their common business interests, with those of the colonialists, preserved and not obstructed through the reckless violence. Consequently, non-violence becomes the strategy that is collectively admired among the colonized intellectuals, business elites and the leaders of the nationalist parties. Dialogue and negotiations becomes the way to settle the colonial problem through a notion of compromise between the colonial system and the national bourgeoisie (Fanon 2004:24). The leaders of the nationalist parties become concerned with the pacification of the masses by pretending to be objective and pragmatic, constantly reminding the people of the unequal game of power, confirming that they are the losers from the beginning when confronted with the tanks and fighter planes of those of the colonialists, while all the natives have are knives and shotguns. In this regard, Fanon sharply points out that the claimed objectivity of the colonized intellectuals and the leaders of the nationalist parties is by no means objective, but rather based on fear that violence will make their interests unattainable and out of reach (Fanon 2004:25).

Shifting the argument towards the contemporary context in Palestine, it is remarkable how Fanon’s model of the domestic distortions created by the indigenous elite fits developments in Palestine since Oslo. The Palestinian leadership deliberately smothered the First Intifada and its mass mobilization in favor of bidding for recognition by Israel and the Western powers. This meant accepting compromise and negotiation with the Israeli enemy and emulating the colonialists’ values, which obscures the asymmetric power relations and legitimizes the illegal military occupation. In other words,
following the terms set by the colonizers as a path towards liberation (Fanon 2004).

As Fanon indicates, usually these encounters between the colonized intellectuals and the colonialist bourgeoisie happen secretly, away from the knowledge of the people (Fanon 2004:8). The Oslo Accords came into public after a series of undeclared meetings between the PLO leaders and the Israeli colonizers. Ever since that moment, the Palestinian leadership shifted the struggle from a collective one based on the praxis of armed resistance to liberate a colonized land, towards one concerned with neoliberal state-building with almost no land and hardly any sovereignty or economic autonomy. Similar to what Fanon has anticipated, pragmatism becomes the salvation from radically engaging in an actual revolution that overthrows the imposed structure of domination. Indeed, the PA has adopted a pragmatic standpoint, which has meant providing security coordination for Israel, as well as reliance on international foreign aid and a compulsory submission to the Israeli economy (Hanieh 2013; Tartir 2015). The character of the Palestinian national movement – or, to be precise, that part of it controlled by the PA – morphed from popular anti-colonial struggle into a depoliticized development-oriented industry functioning through a large network of NGOs, through capacity building programs all funded by foreign aid and mostly managed by foreign experts. This, in return, empowered and enhanced the military occupation by making it cheap for Israel to handle. Moreover, as stated previously, this has brought to the fore a tiny class of political elites affiliated with the PA and agents of capital accumulation serving as intermediaries to global capitalism; both are connected to a neoliberal agenda and share common interests with the Israeli colonial project. Meanwhile, the majority of Palestinian people in the West Bank and East Jerusalem have been disenfranchised and dispossessed economically; most are heavily indebted and must work hard to pay off loans, hoping to have a flavor of a decent normalized life under the occupation (Hanieh 2013). This has entailed distancing the people from the political arena, where the nationalist political parties, instead of engaging in a dialogue with the people, ‘form a screen between the masses and the leadership’ (Fanon 2004:115). Alas, what brings the people together nowadays is rather a collective attitude towards the overall miserable conditions, analogous to what Fanon calls ‘head-in-the-sand’ behavior (Fanon 2004:17). Through this, the people manage to ignore the obstacles and postpone the real path towards self-liberation that is the inevitable organized mass struggle and popular resistance against the imposed structure (Fanon 2004).
Throughout this research, I have delved into specific micro-spaces—in which so many contradictory tendencies are playing out. Apart from the uncontrolled urbanization boom and the conditions that allowed for them to emerge, the most striking issue is the relationship that the Palestinians have towards the land, specifically, towards the long-standing cultures of land tenure and their enduring institutions—in particular the *mushaa'* and the *waqf*—following the Oslo years. A few things call for reflection here. Fanon, as we have seen, singles out the peasants as the subject of the real revolution against the colonial system, since they have nothing to lose (Fanon 2004). However, in Palestine the situation seems to have taken a somewhat different direction, which is what I tried to illustrate in Articles II and III, by revealing the perplexed cycle of an internalized colonial legacy towards these institutions of land tenure. The issue at stake here is how the people at the lower end of the Palestinian social hierarchy—former peasants, refugees and the underprivileged—are convinced of seeing their acts of reproducing these colonial practices as *sumud* and resistance in the face of the ruthless settler-colonial project. This is widely reflected in the specific cases where I have conducted my research: how some refugees or the expert contractors have the conviction of protecting the land from the settler-colonial land seizure. In their own view, keeping the land within Palestinian ownership—even if this requires destroying a long enduring culture of land tenure—is considered a national act; what matters is to keep the land in Palestinian hands and preserve it so that it is not consumed by the settlers. One could argue that this practice is due to the conditioned authority vacuum imposed on these areas, which has allowed for these kinds of chaotic acts to occur individually and with the aim of self-enrichment. Shifting towards the West Bank, where the PA has built its quasi-state apparatus, similar attempts are being made, which I have shed some light on in Article II. The PA has encouraged the Palestinians in the West Bank to register their land ownership (*tabu*), mainly by breaking the *mushaa'* and turning it into individual plots through a computerized system. This has also been promoted as a national effort to protect the land from being confiscated by the state of Israel and to save it for mostly Palestinian residential purposes. Such attempts reflect tendencies in the Palestinian society that Fanon anticipated, although he locates them in a general colonial context. People have the tendency to see their acts as heroic—regardless of the type of action—as long as it is exclusively directed against a colonial individual or the colonial power in general, and in such cases ‘there is no point, obviously in saying that such a hero is a thief, a thug, or a degenerate’ (Fanon 2004:30). What is at risk is
that acts of resistance and accommodation of certain colonial practices have
the inclination to collide and interact with each other, and hence obfuscate the
demarcation between them. I sought to unfold this dynamic through coining
the concept “enclosures from below” on the mushaa’ land illustrated in
Article II. Later on, the ‘enclosure from below’ is coupled with what I termed
the ‘protection from below’ for the waqf land in Article III. Both constitute
actions towards the salvation of land from below, but with distinct
approaches. In both cases, the agents perform these actions due to conditions
imposed on them. These conditions include first and foremost the Zionist
settler-colonial domination, as well as to some extent the neoliberal project
within Palestinian society introduced by the PA. These agents working
towards land salvation work within conditions imposed from above, at the
same time as they try to further their own individual and collective goals.
This research unpacks these tensions that play out between the stubbornness
and persistence of the agents on the ground and the accommodation to the
settler-colonial structure.

In this final chapter, there are several issues to be reflected upon, related
strictly to this research as well as to the society and land I belong to. It is
important to delve into fragmented micro-spaces spanning over a wider scale
across Palestine as a whole, where many tendencies are at work, by diving
deeply below the surface in order to carefully comprehend the current
perceptions, practices and, even to a certain extent, the emotions. Moreover,
we should remember that the stubborn presence of the Palestinians does
hamper the full realization of the Zionist project – but that alone is not
enough. Scholarship on Palestine should work to exit the common mistake of
rendering the Zionist impositions on the Palestinians ‘as a series of distinct –
yet related – events’; instead there should be a solid and coherent framework
that works from a structural perspective (Salamanca et al 2012:2). Therefore,
at the next stage, such work should be brought to an analytical level deeply
rooted in history and open to anticipating and guiding the future. This could,
ideally, contribute to ensuring that actions are actually working in a coherent
way to decolonize the settler-colonial structure rather than accommodating
and reproducing it.

Furthermore, it is time for the Palestinian community to engage in some self-
criticism, which could bring back the lost collectiveness – or, as Fanon
reminds us:
Self-criticism has been much talked about recently, but few realize it was first of all an African institution. Whether it be in the *djemaas* of North Africa or the palavers of West Africa, tradition has it that disputes which break out in a village are worked out in public. By this I mean collective self-criticism with a touch of humor because everyone is relaxed, because in the end we all want the same thing (Fanon 2004:12)

Such self-criticism would provide a platform for analysis of specific dynamics and practices that – even if unintentionally – feed into the wider settler-colonial structures. It could inform the ongoing anti-colonial struggle in Palestine, which must always be criticized, questioned and opened up for modification; it cannot to be taken as a given and for granted.

So what do I mean by decolonization here? In a land severely fragmented, subjected to the Zionist structural violence of land dispossession, ethnic cleansing and systematic displacement (Salamanca et al 2012:1). Theoretically speaking, decolonization seeks to break the colonial system (Veracini 2001:7). Fanon confidently defines decolonization as ‘quite simply the substitution of one “species” of mankind by another. This substitution is unconditional, absolute, total, and seamless’, that is ready to alter the order of the world (Fanon 2004:1-2). However, Fanon in his agenda for an entire disorder did not only imply the simple reorganization ‘the last shall be first’, though he used this phrase to accurately define decolonization. Mamdani clarifies that decolonization is not solely a matter of ‘turning the colonial worlds upside down’ by simply favoring the indigenous and allowing them to rule through emulating the political world assembled by the previous rulers; rather, it should be a radical change of the whole universe (Mamdani 2001:658). Therefore, decolonization is a matter of introducing a completely new humanity, as Fanon stresses:

> It infuses a new rhythm, specific to a new generation of men, with a new language and a new humanity. Decolonization is truly the creation of a new man. But such a creation cannot be attributed to a supernatural power: the ‘thing’ colonized becomes a man through the very process of liberation. (Fanon 2004:2)

Shifting to a practical level, the decolonization of settler colonialism might vary as well from that of a context subjected to colonialism due to the distinct structural arrangements and mechanisms. In a post-colonial polity, even if it is no longer formally ruled by outside colonial forces, in reality, decolonization often remains only an illusion and has is hampered by a sort
of neo-colonialism. The former colonized territory often becomes economically dependent on the previous colonizer, and the ex-colonial population has become a consumer market for the colonial nation-states (Fanon 2004:55; Veracini 2011:8). Contrary to that, settler colonialism, as stated earlier, strives to abolish itself until the settler-colonial relation becomes normalized and, to a certain extent, ceases to exist. Thus the struggle against the structure involves trying to maintain the binary indigenous-settler relationship, yet the struggle is much more than this and does not end there (Veracini 2011:7). In settler-colonial societies, there have been efforts towards shifting from repressing the indigenous to including them through the politics of recognition. However, Veracini confirms that such recognition is likewise another sort of illusionary decolonization, since it radically alters neither the settler-colonial regime nor the world order. Thus, here also, a new language and wider imaginations are much needed to allow for an actual decolonization of the settler-colonial impositions (Veracini 2011).

Palestine, as discussed earlier on, has been subjected to a hybrid of both settler-colonial and colonial dominations, over distinct periods and places throughout the history since the first Zionist settlers came into the country. Therefore, due to this hybrid situation, the struggle for decolonization has to adopt a complex approach: it would mean breaking both elements of the colonial subjugation in the occupied territories.

On a local level, some classical ideals of the liberation era might still be worth considering: those of re-connecting collectively to the land and working towards a complete decolonization of land, minds and bodies, this seems to be more needed than ever. Several small initiatives have been happening across Palestine on a micro scale, such as preservation of traditional seeds, supporting local farmers, building houses by means of traditional local materials as clay, boycotting Israeli products, introducing agricultural cooperatives, working towards popular knowledge production regarding the Palestinian struggle through a settler-colonial lens and much more. These initiatives do matter, even if they are small in scale and are fragmented in space, yet they need to be further connected and reproduced in villages, refugee camps, towns and not only in major cities. Furthermore, such initiatives need to find ways to reconnect between people of the West Bank, Gaza Strip, East Jerusalem, Palestinians residing in Israel proper and eventually those in exile.
Land is a central element in the Palestinian struggle. Strategies should be in place to make sure that protection of land also includes safeguarding the practice of the long enduring cultures of land management, and not solely keeping the land within Palestinian hands. Actions from below through both collective and individual efforts are necessary, but they should be placed within the framework of a wider collective political project that serves the struggle as a whole. My intention here is not to come out with a manifesto of what an act of resistance is and is not, but to point out contradictions that play out on the land that need further careful consideration.

On a more global scale, it is equally fundamental to establish ‘genuine bi-directional solidarity alliances and political fraternity’ with other struggles and oppressed people elsewhere. Such exchange of solidarity and alliance among movements helps to exchange tools and knowledge that work to empower the oppressed towards their path for liberation. Furthermore, it allows for the establishment of common platforms for actions and principles. After all, the Palestinian struggle against Zionism and its settler-colonial ideology cannot be separated from the rest of the struggles worldwide – ‘all anti-imperial, all anti-racist, and all struggling to make another world possible’ (Salamanca et al 2012:5).

Concluding on a more human and universal scale, I find myself returning to the Fanonian Humanism (Nissim-Sabat 2010), in which he asserts that introducing a new language and a new humanity is the path towards liberation. Fanonian Humanism therefore, as Nissim-Sabat argues, ‘differs from and is critical of both the Western humanist tradition and, by implication, the postmodernist critique of that tradition’ (Nissim-Sabat 2010:39). In this regard, Nissim-Sabat underpins the Fanonian intention, by noting that in order to speak of new universal humanism, then decolonization must as a first step work ‘to deontologize whiteness in order to eradicate white privilege’, where the lived experience of human beings matters, and specifically those experiences relevant to oppression and liberation (Nissim-Sabat 2010:50). According to Fanon, humanity means the elimination of the subjugation of any human being in this world, where the colonial powers have constantly sought to ‘dehumanize’ the colonized due to inferiority, and placed them within the ‘non-human’ or ‘animal’ categories. Therefore, Fanon asserts that liberation requires achieving ‘the universality, the oneness, or unity of humanity’, by restructuring the world through a complete alteration of the socio-economic structures (Nissim-Sabat 2010:49).


Appendix 1

I have conducted a total of 34 in-depth interviews for both case studies. During the first fieldwork I have conducted 14 in-depth interviews; while for the second field visit I have conducted 20 in-depth interviews. However, I would like to note that during my first field visit I have followed a third case study, Ad-Doha in Bethlehem area (area A). However, eventually I have decided to drop it (12 in-depth interviews). Below is the list of interviews for the first field visit and second one, in addition to the dropped case study.

*Fieldwork 1: Shu’faat Edge Area*

September, October and November 2013

1. Anonymous (Male), key contact in Shu’faat Camp, 23rd September 2013.
3. Anonymous (Male), LC member, Shu’faat Camp director, 1st of October 2013.
4. Anonymous (Female), active refugee and resident of *waqf* al-Shaykh Lulu, 2nd of October 2013.
5. A group of women, active refugees and residents of *waqf* al-Shaykh Lulu, 6th of October 2013.
6. Anonymous (Female), active refugee and resident of *waqf* al-Shaykh Lulu, 6th of October 2013.
7. Anonymous (Male), contractor, head of committee of *waqf* al-Shaykh Lulu, key figure in the Shu’faat camp, political activist, 7th of October 2013.
9. Anonymous (Male), key figure and contractor, 8th of October 2013.
10. Anonymous (Female), engaged resident in Shu’faat Area, 10th of October 2013.
13. Shaykh Ibrahim Za’atra, director of Jerusalem waqf affairs, 10th of November 2013.
14. Dr. Lisa Taraki, Professor of Urban Sociology at Birzeit University, 20th of November 2013.
Fieldwork 2: Kufr Aqab/ Qalandia Area
June, July, and August 2014

1. Anonymous (Male), key figure in Qalandia camp, 17th June 2014.
2. Anonymous (Male), Key contact in Kufr Aqab Area, 18th June 2014.
3. Anonymous (Male), Popular Committee member of Qalandia Camp, 18th June 2014.
4. Anonymous (Male), Popular Committee member of Qalandia Camp, 19th June 2014.
7. Anonymous (Male), main contractor from Kufr Aqab, 24th June 2014.
8. Anonymous (Male), key Figure in Qalandia Refugee Camp, contractor from Qalandia Refugee Camp, 24th June 2014.
10. Two anonymous (Male), Representatives of the Kassarat Neighbourhood (next to Qalandia Camp), 2nd July 2014.
12. Anonymous (Male), Jalazoun Refugee Camp Popular Committee Jalazoun Refugee Camp, Camp expansion in areas C and B, 10th July 2014
16. Linda Quiquivix, Geographer, 9th August 2014
18. Dr. Reem Botmeh, Professor of Law/ Land Affairs at Birzeit University, 20th August 2014.
19. Dr. Salim Tamari, Professor of Sociology at Birzeit University, senior fellow at the Institute of Palestine Studies (IPS), 20th August 2014.
Dropped case study: Ad-Doha area, Bethlehem (Area A)
September, October and November 2013

3. Abu Akram, Member of the Municipal Council of Ad-Doha municipality, 21st of October 2013.
8. Jiries Arja, ex-member of the municipal council of Beit Jala municipality (70s, 80s), 11th of November 2013.
10. Anonymous, political activist from Deheishe Refugee Camp, 12th of November 2013.
12. Khalil el Helu (Abu Abdullah), ex-member of the municipal council of Ad Doha, 18th of November 2013.

Archival research of the Ad-Doha municipality for construction licenses (samples of real and fake licenses), 3 days: 24th, 27th, 29th October 2013.
Between *Sumud* and Submission

This thesis delves into two ‘edge areas’ located in and around East Jerusalem. It attempts to unfold and analyze the dynamics in these edge areas, while investigating the agency of the people present there through their own perceptions and practices towards the land, the urbanization processes, the power circulation and the structural impositions. Squeezed by a settler-colonial domination that continuously encroaches further on their lives, the Palestinians, in return, seek to carve out a space for their own enduring presence on the land. That pursuit combines elements of *sumud* (steadfastness) and adaptation, tenacity and accommodation, actions that sometimes subvert the occupation and some other times submit to its logic. The thesis traces the contradiction between a proliferating ethos of individual enrichment and the remaining collective culture of political struggle. It also scrutinizes the ways that Palestinians move between those poles as always conditioned by the pressure from the overarching structure of settler-colonial domination.