Between Communication and Community
EU Constitution Making, a European Public Sphere and the (Un-)Likelihood of Transnational Debate
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EU Constitution Making, a European Public Sphere and the (Un-)Likelihood of Transnational Debate

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Für Hulda und Elin Snæfríður
“The cure for the ailments of democracy is more democracy. The prime difficulty [...] is that of discovering the means by which a scattered, mobile and manifold public may so recognize itself as to define and express its interests.”


„Mond sagt, es gibt immer eine Lösung, für alles!“

- Der Mondbär
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Oslo, October 31, 2009
PART ONE

INTRODUCTION
1 Democracy: The Unfinished Project of European Integration

Introduction

EU legislation has a tendency to catch people off guard. Too often, Europeans are not aware of the laws that the European institutions produce until they begin to feel the effects on their own skin. And when they do, what they tend to question is not the legitimacy of a given piece of legislation, but rather of the EU political system as a whole. Yet from a deliberative perspective, the popular and to some extent even the academic debate on the democratic deficit has been barking up the wrong tree. The European Union’s democratic deficit is not primarily an institutional deficit that can be fixed for instance through a gradual strengthening of the European and/or the respective member state parliaments. Such institutional reforms have of course taken place from the mid-1980s and onwards, and to some extent they may even have enhanced at least the perception of the democratic character of EU law-making. Through a series of treaty reform processes, the European Parliament has gone from being little more than a consultative body to a “coequal” legislator (Tsebelis & Garrett 2001: 358) on par with the Council of Ministers, the union’s main intergovernmental institution.¹ Most recently, the Lisbon Treaty – pending its entry into force – furthermore strengthens the role of member state parliaments as a kind of control mechanism in EU decision making.² But while such reforms may help,

¹ Beginning with the introduction of the so-called “cooperation procedure” in the Single European Act, the competences of the European Parliament have gradually and continuously been extended. While the cooperation procedure still meant that decision making power resided exclusively with the Council of Ministers, the Treaty on European Union (the “Maastricht Treaty”) introduced the so-called “co-decision procedure” in a limited number of policy areas, later to be extended to further policy areas in the treaties of Amsterdam and Nice. In the Lisbon Treaty, finally, co-decision between the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers is to become the rule in EU decision making.

² While already the Constitutional Treaty contained a provision through which national parliaments were empowered to monitor the application of the principle of subsidiarity, the Lisbon Treaty goes one step further and introduces the so-called “orange card procedure”: if one third of all member state parliaments find that a legislative proposal breaches the principle of subsidiarity, they can demand that the Commission abandon the
they are more of a cosmetic than substantive nature. At best, they pay
inadequate respect to the broader transformation of democracy that is
necessitated by the processes summed up under the caption of
globalization, specifically the transformation of democracy beyond the
caption of the nation-state, imagined either in terms of post- or transnational democracy
(Habermas 1998: chap. 5; cf. Bohman 2007a; Sjövik 2004).
The democratic deficit in EU decision making is not as much a problem
connected to the loss of control that nationally anchored democratic
assemblies suffer in the context of European integration. The problem is
rather that democratic politics itself is moving beyond the nation-state.
As decision making increasingly moves beyond the nation-state, a
fundamental need for democratic control mechanisms emerges also
beyond the nation-state. Whether institutional reform alone can provide
solutions to such pressing problems seems doubtful. In the context of the
European Union as arguably the world’s first postnational polity (in the
making), the democratic deficit consists less in the member states’ failure
to find appropriate institutional solutions than in the absence of a
fundamental ingredient of democratic politics: a lively public sphere that
could provide a communicative counterweight to the institutions of the
EU political system.
This deliberative understanding of democracy as an interplay between the
public sphere and the institutions of the political system is one crucial
aspect of Jürgen Habermas’s discourse theory of democracy (Habermas
1996). It is an understanding of democracy that can help us understand
the nature of the EU’s democratic deficit beyond purely institutional
and/or “affective” factors (cf. Warleigh 2003: chap. 1). In this deliberative
understanding, representative government can claim legitimacy only if
decision making is accompanied by free, lively and inclusive debate in the
public sphere (Habermas 1996: chap. 7-8). Democracy is therefore an ideal
that requires a highly active notion of citizenship. In the European Union,
there is good reason to question whether the promise of deliberative
democracy has been fulfilled in the sense of such an interplay between the
public sphere and the political system. While decisions are increasingly
made at the European level, public opinion and will formation have
largely remained within the member states (Gerhards 2000).

proposal in question. In the event that the Commission proceeds nonetheless, the process
can be stopped by 55% of member states in the Council, or by 50% of MEPs in the
European Parliament (Kurpas 2007).

3 Alex Warleigh argues that the EU democratic deficit consists in part of institutional
factors, but also in “affective factors” amounting to a lack of channels through which
citizens can influence the EU decision making process (Warleigh 2003: chap. 1).
Consequently, EU politics tends to take place in the shadow of an at best embryonic public sphere. This is a crucial aspect of the democratic deficit that institutional reform will not be able to fix, simply because it is located outside the institutional system of the EU. Viewed in this light, attempts by the European institutions – foremost by the European Commission as well as to a lesser extent by the European Parliament – to contribute to the coming into being of a European public sphere come across as ironic: well aware of the democratic illegitimacy that arises out of decision making in the absence of a shared public sphere, the EU political system depends in its legitimacy on supporting the manufacturing of its own communicative counterweight. In recent years, the European Commission has done so prominently through a “period of reflection” in the aftermath of the French and Dutch referenda on the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, through a Plan D for Democracy, Dialogue and Debate, and most recently through one of the most ambitious external communication efforts to date, namely the “presseurop.eu” website. Aiming at “promoting informed democratic debate within the EU”, the latter project translates and disseminates press articles from the EU’s 27 member states, and is currently available in 10 different languages.

But is a third transformation of democracy a realistic possibility (Dahl 1989: 224), that is: is democracy beyond the nation-state possible to begin with? As a reference point for collective identities, norms, values and traditions, the nation-state is often viewed as a natural home of democracy, particularly by those who implicitly or explicitly subscribe to communitarian presuppositions about the very nature of democracy. In such readings, democracy is viewed to presuppose a normatively integrated community of values. Deliberation is thought to be possible only to the extent that deliberators can rely on a shared conception of the good in settling normative disputes. Most of all, a thick sense of collective identity is seen as a necessary condition for the very possibility of social solidarity (Calhoun 2002). The critique of such communitarian ideas about democracy is hardly new. Already in 1971, Rawls’ Theory of Justice, developed a conception of social justice that takes into account that modern societies rarely (if ever) truly are communities: they are not integrated around one, but around several conceptions of the good. Societies are made up of many communities, often with mutually irreconcilable “comprehensive doctrines” (Rawls 1971). But the normative conclusion that Rawlsian liberalism draws from this empirical observation
is unsatisfactory to those who see democratic politics as more than a mere search for compromise.\footnote{This argument is developed further in chapter 3.}

Habermas has opened up a radically different path. Agreeing with Rawls that the notion of societies as communities is in itself a myth, Habermas nonetheless maintains that democratic deliberation beyond a mere search for compromise is possible. For Habermas, public deliberation has a civilizing function, forcing debaters to argue not on the basis of their individual values, beliefs or interests, but on the basis of a commonly acceptable human characteristic: the capacity for reason.\footnote{This argument is developed in detail in chapter 2.} Under these conditions, democracy even in a deliberative sense is possible also in diverse, heterogeneous nation-state societies (Habermas 1996: chap. 5). But if democracy is possible despite such challenges, why should it be inconceivable beyond the nation-state?

The crossroads which the European Union faces at present is foremost a democratic dilemma. Are Europe’s citizens willing to take on the task of finishing the unfinished project of European integration, namely the quest for a full democratization of the EU? This point concerns the European institutions less than it does the public sphere. The European Union can become fully democratic only if a European public sphere emerges as a control mechanism in relation to the EU political system. But this can only come about at what some would consider a cost, possibly even a dramatic cost: it would require that Europeans begin to recognize one another as part of the same political community, as fellow citizens in the world’s first postnational polity (Eriksen & Fossum 2004; 2007). Communication necessitates community, yet not in the sense of a thick collective identity, but instead in the sense of mutual recognition. The European public sphere can take the step from communicative freedom to communicative power only if and when public debate begins to transcend national borders (cf. Bohman 2007a; chap. 2). For a European public sphere to function as a communicative counterweight against the institutions of the EU political system, the institutionalization of communicative freedom also needs to be utilized by European citizens to speak up collectively against the EU legislative process whenever protest is deemed necessary.

To a radical democrat like Habermas (cf. Warren 1995), the promise of postnational democracy outweighs whatever “cost” may be associated with a move of democratic decision making beyond the nation-state.
But clearly, postnational democracy does not appeal equally to all. Communitarian undertones pervade much of the debate on the democratic deficit, both on the left and right side of the political spectrum. A clear expression of this can be found in the debate surrounding the so-called “no demos thesis”, both in academic and popular usage. Based on the notion that an “internally coherent demos must exist prior to democracy” (Trenz 2009: 3), the no demos thesis refers to the observation that the presumed absence of a coherent European demos makes European-level democracy difficult to achieve – if not outright impossible. There is of course a lot to this. Democracy in the EU requires that EU citizens begin to recognize one another as members of the same political community. At the same time, we should be cautious not to confuse recognition with collective identity. Recognizing one another as equals in deliberation does not imply the existence of a thick sense of collective identity. Communication may or may not constitute community, but the latter is no precondition for the former (Eder 1999). Two different readings of the no demos thesis should be emphasized in this context. On the one hand, the no demos thesis comes primarily from the field of constitutional law. Famously, Dieter Grimm has argued that due to the absence of a single European demos, the EU cannot give itself a democratic constitution beyond the form of a mere intergovernmental treaty (Grimm 1995; cf. Weiler 2005). But this legal understanding of the no demos thesis needs to be distinguished from a more clearly political reading, based in turn on implicit or explicit communitarian presuppositions. This understanding includes the view that democracy itself is impossible beyond the nation-state, and has been applied not least in discussions about strengthening the EU’s supranational institutions, most of all the directly elected European Parliament. The strengthening of the EP has been met with skepticism based on the view that in the absence of a single European demos, there cannot be any

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6 Habermas’s notion of postnational democracy has to be distinguished from related notions of transnational democracy (e.g. Bohman 2005; Bohman 2007a; Dryzek 2000). For Habermas, the postnational constellation is characterized foremost by an increasing loss of problem-solving capacity that the nation-state suffers in the context of globalization. This challenge can however be counteracted through a reconstitution of democracy at the European level. For Bohman, the postnational constellation necessitates something qualitatively different than the alleged search for a new demos beyond the nation-state. Instead, the postnational constellation urges the search for a new democratic ideal in which democracy is no longer the rule of the demos, but rather the rule of demoi (in the plural).

7 This argument is developed in detail in chapter 3.
democratically legitimate parliamentary assembly speaking on behalf of the European people.

Such a political understanding of the no demos thesis is however normatively problematic. Read in this way, the no demos thesis is little more than a self-fulfilling prophecy to be employed as a potent strategy against the very idea of European demos construction, i.e. against “the arrested development of European citizenship” (Warleigh 2003: chap. 6). On the one hand, the no demos thesis is used *empirically* to support claims that a fundamental precondition for democracy is not met at the European level: those affected by EU legislation do not constitute one singular demos, but rather a multitude of currently 27 separate demoi. On the other hand, the no demos thesis is used *normatively* to support claims that democratic control of the EU decision-making process must be exercised *exclusively* within the nation-state. But this normative side of the no demos thesis has problematic exclusionary connotations. It prescribes that public opinion and will formation on European-level legislation take place exclusively in the forums of the national public sphere. It therefore prescribes that the members of the national community have a privileged position in public opinion and will formation in the national public sphere, and that citizens of other EU countries need not be recognized as equals in democratic deliberation, even though they are also part of the same legal space in which collectively binding decisions are made.

Under these conditions, a European demos *and* a European public sphere are very difficult to imagine. A European demos can emerge only gradually, through the recognition of other EU citizens as part of the same political community and consequently as equals in democratic deliberation. The no demos thesis fails to take into account that a European collective identity *need not* be a basic infrastructural requirement of democracy at the European level, but that it can emerge also in the course of democratic practice (Trenz 2009). The view that democracy is bound to the context of the nation-state is as historically contingent as the notion that the demos itself is bound to the nation-state: there is no inherent conceptual link between the two (Habermas 1998; Bohman 2007a). Correspondingly, the absence of a European demos is not the *root* of the EU democratic deficit, but rather one of its clearest expressions – and consequences. While certain legal and/or empirical arguments certainly support the no demos thesis, normative arguments *against* the very constitution of such a European demos are problematic because they inhibit the very prospect for democracy beyond the nation-state.
This is not to say, however, that a European demos would (or should) subsume or replace the existing demoi in the union’s member states. On the contrary, as James Bohmanformulates it, the current transformation of democracy requires that both bigger and smaller units be involved in democratic governance, i.e. that the current problems of democracy be solved not through the search for “some optimal size or ideal democratic procedure, but rather [through the establishment of] a more complex democratic ideal” (Bohman 2007a: 2). What appears clear, however, is that democracy in the European Union depends on much more than institutional reform alone. The democratic legitimacy of EU decision making fundamentally depends fundamentally on the emergence of a European public sphere that can serve as a counterweight to the institutions of the EU political system. Such a European public sphere has to be the site of a lively, inclusive and free debate on EU politics. But this takes us back to the question of collective identity: how can a European public sphere emerge in the presumed absence of a thick sense of European collective identity (Eriksen 2005)?

**Purpose & Ambition**

The purpose of this study is to delve further into the conditions under which a shared public sphere is possible in the European Union. Against the backdrop of debates on the transformation of democracy beyond the nation-state (Dahl 1994), the study explores the role that daily newspapers have played in providing forums for transnational debate on EU constitution making in the presumed absence of an overarching European collective identity. In doing so, the study uses empirical means to reconsider a contentious question stemming from the realm of political theory, namely the question of the supposed co-constitutiveness of public spheres and political communities. In the discourse theoretical perspective, public spheres in the strong, deliberative sense are thought

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8 While drawing inspiration from the work of Dewey and Habermas, Bohman nonetheless steers clear of the concept of postnational democracy and proposes “transnational democracy” instead, which he understands foremost as a democracy of demoi (2007: 7) rather than merely as a democracy of a new larger demos, such as suggested most prominently by cosmopolitan visions of democracy. For Bohman, the link between democracy and the nation-state is as “particular and historically contingent” (2007: 19) as it is for Habermas (1998: chap. 5). Dahl’s question about the possibility of a third transformation of democracy, i.e. a transformation of democracy beyond the nation-state, is thus a “realistic possibility if it is fundamentally a transition from a singular to a plural subject, from demos to demoi” (Bohman 2007: 21).
not to depend on communitarian resources. But if this is the case, how can we conceptualize the “minimum level of social integration” (Kantner 2004) thought necessary in order for individuals to initiate a deliberative search for solutions – in our case in the European Union? Recent efforts to conceptualize this minimum level of social integration as some form of “identity light” (Risse 2004) are highly commendable. On the other hand, such attempts are misleading to the extent that they maintain that identity (even in a thin form) rather is an ontological precondition for deliberation. As an alternative, this study argues that transnational debate instead depends on the extent to which European integration is thought to affect EU citizens collectively or as member state citizens. From a normative perspective, transnational debate should be stronger where European integration is viewed to affect all Europeans, and thus where “second country nationals” are recognized as members of the same political community. In the empirical context of EU constitution making, this study therefore explores whether daily newspapers in Germany and Sweden have actively provided forums for transnational debate. Can more lively transnational debate be observed in newspapers with stronger preferences for postnational democracy in the EU?

To begin with, let us consider what reasons we have, normatively and empirically speaking, for assuming that newspapers should have different practices in this regard. From a social constructivist point of view, affectedness can rarely (if ever) be determined objectively. EU constitution making may be considered a problem in terms of the sovereignty of the nation-state, but it can also be considered a solution to the problem of a loss of democratic control. Problems lack essential qualities and are constituted in the subjective interpretation of an observer, often through the use of frames (e.g. Tankard 2001; cf. Strömbäck 2004: chap. 2). Affectedness is therefore also determined in framing processes, moving the act of as well as the actor constructing an issue to the center of analytical attention. Consequently, we need to look at the actors framing an issue and thereby setting the standard for recognition of legitimate participants in any given debate. From this perspective, we have reason to believe that newspapers with stronger postnational preferences should apply different frames than their conservative, intergovernmentally oriented counterparts. And

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9 A detailed discussion of this social constructivist perspective on framing as a process of sense-making and on the benefits of an agency-oriented approach in European public sphere research follows in chapter 3, alongside a detailed discussion of the Deweyan notion of “affectedness” as the primary criterion for engaging in deliberation across community boundaries.
normatively speaking, we should also expect transnational debate to be stronger in newspapers promoting more democracy beyond the nation-state than in newspapers favoring intergovernmental integration. A related point stems from the perspective of media studies in conceptualizing the mass media as gatekeepers in public communication (McQuail 1994: chap. 8; Strömbäck 2004). Following this perspective, this study explores the role of daily newspapers in framing EU constitution making and in allowing (or not!) speakers from other national contexts “to pass through the ‘gates’ of a news medium” (McQuail 1994: 213). Based on the notion that EU constitution making allows for a variety of contending and even mutually exclusive interpretations, different newspapers’ use of frames may result in very different practices in providing forums for transnational debate. But is there also an empirical connection between a normative commitment to postnational democracy and more lively transnational debate?\textsuperscript{10} In other words: do newspapers with postnational orientations live up to normative expectations about providing forums for transnational debate?

**Contribution to European Public Sphere Research**

The study’s main contribution to the literature on the European public sphere consists primarily in bringing together two strands of scholarship that have previously co-existed more or less in isolation from one another. One key area of interest motivating this study obviously stems from the field of political philosophy, where debates on the preconditions for democracy both within (e.g. Forst 1993) and beyond the nation-state (e.g. Habermas 1998; Bohman 2007a) have been met with questions as to whether or not a European public sphere is theoretically imaginable in principle even in the presumed absence of a European collective identity (e.g. Eriksen 2005; Eder & Kantner 2002). On the other hand, this study is also informed by an empirically oriented research agenda within media studies in political science and/or sociology. In this research, attention has been paid primarily to the Europeanization of public communication in a number of member state public spheres, measured primarily in terms of the Europeanization of “meaning structures” (i.e. similar use of frames) and/or the Europeanization of “interactive structures” (i.e.

\textsuperscript{10} A detailed discussion of these questions follows in chapter 3, alongside an introduction to the methodological choices made in designing the study.
communication across borders) (Trenz 2007). Despite an enormous output in terms of cross-country comparative media content analyses, the public sphere/political community relationship has not been explored sufficiently. The latter has remained the domain of political philosophy and drawn on arguments familiar from the liberal-communitarian debate of the 1980s and 1990s, whereas empirical studies on transnational debate in the presumed European public sphere at best touch on issues of European identity construction in passing. The ambition and contribution of this study is therefore to fill this gap by reconnecting empirical European public sphere research with a political philosophical question that continues to haunt debates over whether or not democracy in a deliberative sense is possible at all within the European Union.

**Research Design**

What role have daily newspapers played in providing forums for transnational debate? Is a normative commitment to postnational democracy also matched by a higher relative degree of transnational communication in debates on EU constitution making? This question is explored by contrasting (1) the results of an interview study of newspaper journalists’ normative preferences on European integration and EU democracy with (2) the results of a quantitative and qualitative content analysis of opinion articles stemming from debates on the constitution-making process in the newspapers analyzed. The newspapers studied here come from Sweden and Germany, and were selected so as to reflect similar orientations on a left-right scale of the political spectrum. For the Swedish part, these include *Svenska Dagbladet* (Stockholm, conservative), *Dagens Nyheter* (Stockholm, liberal), and *Aftonbladet* (Stockholm, social democratic/left). For the German part, they include *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (Frankfurt, conservative), *Süddeutsche Zeitung* (Munich, liberal), and *die tageszeitung* (Berlin, left/alternative).

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11 Where European public sphere research addresses issues of collective identity empirically, it tends to look at processes of identity construction in public discourse, yet without exploring the preconditions for such processes.

12 Some key arguments from the liberal-communitarian debate are discussed in chapter 2. A detailed account of the debate is offered e.g. by Rainer Forst (1993) as well as by the other contributions in a volume edited by Axel Honneth (1993).

13 A discussion on the problems associated with assuming comparability of newspapers across countries follows in the methodological introduction in chapter 3.
In the first part of the analysis, the study draws on 21 semi-structured interviews with the respective newspapers’ EU correspondents, correspondents in certain other EU states, and editorialists in the respective newspapers’ home offices in Stockholm, Berlin, Frankfurt and Munich. Respondents were selected on the basis of their participation in the debates analyzed. They were asked to reflect about the historical development of the EU both from an empirical and from a normative point of view, and more specifically to develop their normative preferences for the future of European integration. In that context, respondents were asked to relate to three different scenarios for the future of European integration, i.e. whether they would describe the EU as being en route to becoming (or remaining) (a) an intergovernmental problem-solving organization, (b) a supranational federation based on communal values, or (c) a rights-based, postnational union (Eriksen & Fossum 2004; Eriksen & Fossum 2007). In addition, they were asked to comment on the extent to which they welcome or reject such developments. The analytical purpose of the interview study is to establish (a) whether and to what extent the analyzed newspapers do in fact have any coherent perspective on European integration and the future of EU democracy. To the extent that this is the case, we further want to establish (b) how these perspectives can be defined in relation to our ideal-typical prescriptions for EU democracy: do the analyzed newspapers express a preference for intergovernmental/delegated, supranational, or postnational democracy? In this context, it is not individual journalists’ perspectives per se that we are interested in, but instead the views of individual journalists as carriers of their respective newspapers’ perspectives. 

The media content analysis is based on a sample of over 600 opinion articles from the debate on the EU constitution making process as it has taken place in the newspapers studied (see appendix 4). The media

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14 Correspondents in other EU member states included the Paris-based correspondent of the Süddeutsche Zeitung (Gerd Kröncke), as well as the London-based correspondent of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (Johannes Leithäuser), both of whom published a fair number of articles in the debate around the French referendum in the spring of 2005, and the beginning of the British Council Presidency in the summer of 2005.

15 A complete list of all interview respondents is included in chapter 4.

16 A more detailed account of how the interviews were conducted follows in chapter 4.

17 With this, we are not raising any causal claims regarding the extent to which individual journalists are compelled in their professional roles to adopt any pre-established perspective, or whether individual journalists instead shape their newspaper’s perspective. In any case, our assumption is that if a given newspaper does have any particular perspective, it will be reflected in the responses given in our interview study.
content analysis includes articles sampled for three periods of the debate, specifically (a) the constitutional process’s *agenda-setting phase* characterized by the so-called *finality debate* following the German foreign minister Joschka Fischer’s ‘reflections on the finality of European integration’ at Humboldt University in Berlin in May 2000; (b) the *constitutional ratification crisis debate* around the French and Dutch referenda on the Constitutional Treaty in the spring of 2005; and (c) the *constitutional re-launch debate* in the spring of 2007, following the Berlin Declaration at the 50th anniversary celebrations for the Treaties of Rome.

The media content analysis is based on a standardized codebook developed exclusively for this project (see appendix 2), but utilizes some of the typologies developed for recent work on ‘media discourse analysis’ conducted within work package 5 of the RECON project (Civil Society and the Public Sphere) as well as for a project on building the EU’s social constituency (Vetters et al. 2006; Trenz et al. 2007). The media content analysis is based on three analytical tasks, i.e. to assess the “Europeanization” of meaning structures and interactive structures in the selected debates (Trenz 2007). First, the media content analysis explores (a) whether newspaper framing follows national or cross-national patterns. This part of the analysis indicates to what extent and in which ways debaters in the selected newspapers (and countries) actually speak of the same thing when they discuss the EU constitution making process. Next, the media content analysis assesses the transnational character of the respective debates by analyzing (b) the inclusion of non-domestic speakers as authors in domestic debates, and by analyzing (c) engagement with non-domestic speakers in the debate, i.e. the inclusion of non-domestic speakers as objects of critique in domestic debates.

All three analytical tasks locate a European public sphere where spaces for transnational debate emerge. A European public sphere as a communicative context does not emerge when the same issues are merely discussed at the same time in parallel, but rather when the domestic public sphere becomes permeable to the contributions of non-domestic speakers (Conrad 2007; cf. Wimmel 2004, 2006): European-level law-making has to be subjected to European-level opinion and will formation. Consequently, any assessment of transnational debate has to focus on the

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18 These include the RECON project’s typology of statements as well as the EU’s social constituency project’s typology of styles of evaluation. They were adopted for the sake of increasing the comparability of research findings, i.e. to make our study’s “raw” data useful also for other projects employing the adopted typologies. Our research task, it should nonetheless be emphasized, is entirely independent from previous European public sphere research.
extent to which non-domestic speakers come in as authors in domestic debates. Second, it has to analyze the argumentative tools which are used in evaluating and engaging with contributions by non-domestic speakers. Are they merely observed and left alone, or are they also engaged in debate?  

**Overview of Chapters**

Following this introductory chapter, chapter 2 presents a thought experiment about how a European public sphere can be imagined. The chapter develops an argument as to why political debate on EU issues taking place in separation may produce *publicity* as one of the key functions of the democratic public sphere, but contends that mutually closed-off communicative spaces cannot provide the form of *shared* communicative space that would constitute a common European public sphere. Only when a European public sphere constitutes itself at the European level can it serve as a communicative counterweight to the institutions of the EU political system.

Chapter 3 offers an elaboration of the study’s theoretical argument. Specifically, it formulates an ontological critique of the way the public sphere/political community relationship has been conceptualized in previous work on the European public sphere. Drawing on the intellectual legacies of social constructivism, Habermas’s concept of constitutional patriotism and Deweyan pragmatism, the chapter advances a view of public spheres and political communities not only as *co-constitutive* and *co-original*, but also as *processes* constituted by and developing in the practice of thinking and talking about them.

Chapter 4 serves as a methodological introduction and presents the study’s analytical framework. Specifically, the chapter demonstrates how our combination of an interview study and a media content analysis of debates on EU constitution making in daily newspapers can contribute to a reconceptualized understanding of the public sphere/political community relationship. Once again, the argument is based on the view that agency matters in setting the agenda for transnational debate as much as it does in setting the agenda for recognition of potential deliberators as affected parties.

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19 Chapter 4 provides an elaboration of our operationalization of engagement with a particular (domestic or non-domestic) speaker’s claims. The analysis is based on a typology of statements and evaluative styles that has been adopted from the RECON research project, for reasons of comparability of our research findings (as outlined above).
Chapter 5 is the first of four empirical chapters and presents the findings of our interview study with editorialists and correspondents of the six newspapers analyzed. In relation to three imaginable future scenarios, the chapter establishes the different newspapers’ perspectives on European integration and the future of EU democracy as they have been formulated by our interview respondents. The chapter concludes by formulating a normative and empirical expectation regarding the quantity and quality of transnational debate to be observed in the six newspapers analyzed: how lively should transnational debate be in light of newspapers’ contending views of EU democracy?

Chapters 6 through 8 present the results of our media content analyses of newspaper debates during the three selected phases of the EU constitution making process.

Chapter 9 is a concluding chapter, revisiting the initial theoretical perspectives on communication and community in the public sphere/political community relationship. The chapter reviews the findings of our empirical analysis and reconsiders their implications for the possibility of a European public sphere: is a transnational communicative context possible in the absence of a thick sense of collective identity?
2 Communicative Spaces between Communication and Community

A Thought Experiment

Consider a thought experiment: in a master’s course in European Governance at Lund University, the teacher has his class of sixty students discuss the theme of the day in smaller groups. He divides the whole group into three groups of twenty, sends the three groups to three different rooms and has them discuss ‘the EU public sphere deficit’ at the same time, yet without any interaction across groups. The doors to the respective rooms remain closed. After 45 minutes of in-group discussion, the teacher reconvenes the whole group of sixty students and has one spokesperson from each group report about the outcomes of the respective discussions. As it turns out, the first group focused on the issue of language diversity in the EU. In their discussion, the participants arrived at the conclusion that the absence of a shared European language currently impairs the prospects for European-wide public debate. Nevertheless, English may one day emerge as a European lingua franca to make European-wide public debate more inclusive than it could be today. The second group also addressed the issue of language diversity, but emphasized a different aspect: the emergence of English as a European-wide first foreign language could certainly facilitate public debate among elites, but only at a dramatic democratic price. Since most people would not be able to learn English well enough to participate in political debates, any step away from a commitment to language diversity would only serve exclusionary purposes and further exacerbate the already apparent democratic deficit.

Finally, the third group disregarded language diversity and emphasized issues of collective identity instead: since Europe is made up of so many different national cultures, identities and traditions, it is difficult to imagine the realization of the normative ideal of democratic deliberation beyond the nation-state. Europeans, the third group’s spokesperson indicated, lack the sense of collective identity that could furnish them with shared values to relate to in settling normative disputes.
We could imagine the same scenario with basically any other political issue. The key point for us is not that debates can branch out into very different directions, allowing certain understandings of what is at stake in a given debate to appear more pertinent than others. Rather, the point is metaphorical: if the doors to our three rooms remain closed, the three rooms constitute three separate communicative spaces between which no interaction is possible. And while it is conceivable at least in principle that individuals from any of the three classrooms could also follow and participate in the discussions going on in the other two rooms, the three rooms constitute no broader, shared communicative space.

The metaphor of the three separate communicative spaces illustrates the difficulties we encounter when attempting to specify which form of communicative space is normatively desirable and empirically viable as a public sphere (or as some form of functional equivalent thereof) in a multinational, multilingual context such as the European Union: can we imagine (and do we want) an all-encompassing European-level replacement of existing national public spheres (cf. Kielmansegg 1996), or rather an “interdiscursive” space of communicative spaces (Eder & Kantner 2000, 2002; cf. Schlesinger & Kevin 2000), a “transnational community of communication” (Risse 2004, Risse & van de Steeg 2003), a “Europeanized discursive public sphere” (Wimmel 2006), or still something else? Fundamentally, questions about the possibility and desirability of a European-level communicative space are about the element of separation between the three metaphorical communicative spaces: how closed are the doors to these rooms in fact? How open should they be? And what chances do (or should) members of other communicative spaces have to participate? And not least: why and how do such issues matter to European integration?

For the time being, consider a slight modification to our thought experiment. Imagine that the caretaker at the Political Science Department has been instructed to contribute to a free exchange of ideas by taking our classroom doors off their hinges and stowing them away in the basement of the building. The members of our three groups are now free to move from room to room to form their own understanding of how the given problem is perceived in the other two groups, and possibly to return to their own group and report about what they have learned from the other discussions. Of course, this would come at a price. They would have to violate their teacher’s instructions (i.e. to discuss in separation). Maybe they would even have to know a foreign language to understand what the other groups talk about. But in principle, it is now possible for individuals to move around and form an opinion on the discussions in the
other groups. Most importantly, each group is now free to send observers into the other classrooms to retrieve information and report about the discussions in the other groups.

Consider also a second modification to our thought experiment. Imagine, in addition, that one group invites speakers from a second group to explain their views on the matter at hand. And imagine, finally, that the speakers from this second group would later return to the first group and present their own group’s rebuttal to the claims raised by the first group. In this scenario, not only would the doors have been removed, but there would also be direct channels of communication across classrooms: a direct exchange of ideas across groups that would in turn constitute a shared communicative space.

What Kind of European Public Sphere?

These hypothetical scenarios relate to different ways of thinking about the European public sphere deficit as a democratic dilemma that has emerged basically as a side-effect of European integration. The supranationalization of EU decision making has not been matched by a parallel transnationalization of forms (and forums!) for European-level opinion formation: opinion formation on EU politics is traditionally said to have remained at the national level, indicating that no European public sphere exists and giving rise to speculations that no such European-level forum for opinion formation may be possible (Gerhards 2000). To what extent such assertions are empirically and normatively tenable is the subject of an ongoing academic and to some extent even popular debate. To what extent any such claims matter, furthermore, is a question of democratic theory and specifically a question of what kind of democracy is to be considered desirable at the EU level. Why opinion formation and decision making should occur at the same level is a normative question intimately connected to the very conceptualization of democratic politics, rendering it highly contested among advocates of contending visions of democratic politics in general, and of the role of the public sphere in particular (cf. Marx-Ferree et al. 2002). The normative desirability of a European public sphere (or of any functionally equivalent communicative space) can thus by no means be taken for granted. But where democracy is viewed as the interplay between the political system and the “wild complex” of the public sphere (Fraser 1992), i.e. between administrative and communicative power formed in mutually complementary spheres of social and political life (Habermas 1992), an EU-level public sphere forms
an “infrastructural requirement” of EU democracy (Trenz et al. 2009). So what form of communicative space is possible at the European level that can serve as a public sphere (Eriksen 2005)?

The scenarios in our thought experiment are illustrations of how an EU-level public sphere has been imagined until today. More precisely, they are illustrations of the kinds of communicative spaces that have been imagined to perform the functions of what is referred to more broadly and more ambiguously as Öffentlichkeit in German usage. All three scenarios are illustrations of methodological approaches that share discourse theoretical roots. However, they differ with regard to the empirical conditions considered necessary and sufficient to constitute a European public sphere as an interdiscursive or in various ways transnational communicative space.

Our initial scenario of three parallel discussions taking place behind closed doors relates to Eder & Kantner’s early formulation of “interdiscursivity” (Eder & Kantner 2000; 2002). Eder & Kantner originally believed that Öffentlichkeit in the sense of publicity, i.e. in the sense of subjecting political decision making to the critical scrutiny of a public, is constituted already if the same issues are discussed at the same time with the same criteria of relevance in the different national public spheres. Consequently, they believed that even in the absence of direct communicative exchange across borders and across national public spheres, the very function that discourse theory ascribes to the public sphere – to produce communicative power to be used as a counterweight to the political system’s administrative power – could be performed even in the absence of a genuine or literally transnational communicative aspect. Our initial scenario thus represents the synchronous discussion of the same topic in separate communicative spaces. By extension, it represents the production of publicity even in the absence of direct interaction across communicative spaces. Eder & Kantner’s emphasis was on the question of whether or not individuals from different (e.g. national) communicative spaces can in principle come together and deliberate on issues of shared concern. In this regard, Eder & Kantner’s contribution to European public sphere debates can be seen rather as a rejection of communitarian claims to the impossibility of communication.

As Hartmut Kaelble reminds us, Habermas chose the more abstract German concept of Öffentlichkeit deliberately, denoting (a) the public sphere as a communicative space, relating not least to the ancient Greek agonistic notion of a public meeting place, but also (b) the idea of publicity or publicness itself, and (c) public as a noun in the sense of a collective of private individuals assembling ‘in public’ (Kaelble 2007). A more detailed discussion on this point follows below.
across difference rather than as a conceptualization of any genuinely transnational communicative space (cf. Kantner 2004; van de Steeg 2003). From the vantage point of communicative power formation, however, our thought experiment suggests that separate communicative spaces are bound to fail in producing communicative power in the sense of European-level public opinion and will formation.

Others have found Eder & Kantner’s original notion of Öffentlichkeit through interdiscursivity normatively unsatisfactory to the extent that it fails to demonstrate how an interactive transnational communicative context can be imagined. While national publics generate publicity in the way Eder & Kantner imagine, no shared communicative space in the sense of a transnationalization of interactive structures emerges (van de Steeg 2003; Wimmel 2004, 2006). In other words, it is not enough to look for a European public sphere by analyzing the Europeanization of meaning structures. In addition, a European communicative space that could function as a public sphere would therefore have to be Europeanized both in terms of meaning structures and in terms of interactive structures (Trenz 2007): the same issues have to be discussed throughout Europe, but also cross-border patterns of communicative interaction have to become more prominent. Only in this way can communicative power formation occur at the European level.

The first modification of our thought experiment is one way of imagining the European character of interactive structures: individuals are now provided with the opportunity of moving from one room to another to listen to the arguments presented in those other communicative spaces. But interaction is still limited to mere observation; active participation is not yet possible. In the context of European public spheres, this scenario corresponds to the passive observation of discussions in the media in other national public spheres. This form of observation is highly conditional, requiring not least certain foreign language skills, but also a broader understanding of the political and cultural context of such ongoing discussions. This function is usually performed by the mass media themselves. Foreign correspondents usually play the role of selecting what is newsworthy and of condensing the available information in a way that domestic readerships can relate to/understand. In short, foreign correspondents play a translator’s role in the literal sense of translating from a foreign to the domestic vernacular, but also in the metaphorical sense of providing relevant background knowledge.

The second modification of our thought experiment relates to what we will refer to as the permeability of national public spheres. When given issues of EU politics are framed as shared concerns, are non-domestic
speakers as affected parties also given voice in the ongoing debate? Metaphorically speaking, are speakers from the other communicative spaces also invited to present their arguments in the domestic communicative space? In journalistic practice, this would occur through the provision of space on the editorial and/or opinion pages of a given newspaper.

Both of these modifications to our initial thought experiment—passive observation and providing voice—metaphorically represent elements that are standard practice in newspaper journalism. As such, they point to specific ways in which to imagine not only the European character of meaning structures, but also of interactive structures in an emerging European transnational communicative space. Communicative processes in national public spheres are open at least to the passive observation of external actors. In newspaper journalism, the observer role from our thought experiment is usually played by foreign correspondents (Wimmel 2006: 21f.). Active participation in the sense of voicing own opinions in another communicative space, on the other hand, is considerably more restricted. It is conditional on the approval of particular actors. In the case of newspapers, it is up to the responsible editor to select which domestic and non-domestic speakers should be given voice on a given topic.

Crucially, public spheres as communicative spaces are difficult to imagine in complete isolation. Even where an active exchange of ideas across communicative spaces is difficult to achieve, the publicity of public communication enables also otherwise uninvolved bystanders to observe and form an opinion about the arguments presented in any given discussion. The initial scenario of mutually isolated communicative spaces can therefore be dismissed as a model for a European public sphere. But is mutual observation of the arguments presented in otherwise isolated communicative spaces, such as presented in the no-door scenario, a normatively satisfactory conceptualization of a shared communicative space? The notion of a shared communicative space also necessitates more active forms of communicative interaction across communicative spaces, such as outlined in the third scenario. This argument requires the introduction of a fundamental reason why a shared European communicative space is normatively necessary and empirically plausible.
The Public Sphere Deficit: A Democratic Deficit?

On its own, our thought experiment says little about the context in which most European public sphere debates take place, namely as part and parcel of what is considered the EU’s democratic deficit. Where a vital public sphere is considered a crucial precondition for democratic politics, the perceived absence of at least a functional equivalent of a European public sphere suggests a fundamental problem in the EU’s democratic infrastructure. At the same time, even the quest for a “functional equivalent” is conceptually problematic because the public sphere’s democratic role only describes one such function. Different theoretical traditions assign very different and even mutually contradictory functions to the public sphere. Assigning the public sphere a primarily democratic rather than, say, an identity-shaping or interest-mediating function (as in communitarian and liberal understandings, respectively) is by no means theoretically innocent.

The perceived public sphere deficit in EU decision making is a democratic deficit most clearly in relation to Habermas’s discourse theory of democracy (Habermas 1992). So far, the public sphere has been introduced as an implicitly uniform communicative space, a singular forum very much like the metaphor of a classroom in which all debate takes place. But the public sphere is obviously much more, making the term “public sphere” at best a “bad translation” (Kaelble 2007) of the much broader German concept of Öffentlichkeit. Habermas refers “in an emphatic sense” to the spatial connotation of the public sphere as a communicative space constituted in “communication among actors coming forward from their private environments to deliberate on issues of general interest” (Peters 1994: 45, author’s translation), as well as to publics as the kind of social collectives that are constituted by

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21 As Jürgen Gerhards points out, whether and to what extent the EU suffers from a democratic deficit (and from a public sphere deficit) depends on the perspective applied in making such assessments. From a representative-liberal perspective, a European public sphere may fulfill the criterion of publicity already if and when communication among elected representatives produces transparency among competing positions and opinions (Gerhards 2002: 136f.).

22 „Öffentlichkeit (...) wird herausgebildet durch Kommunikation unter Akteuren, die aus ihren privaten Lebenskreisen heraustreten, um sich über Angelegenheiten von allgemeinem Interesse zu verstständigen.“
participation in this kind of communicative interaction (ibid.). Following Bernhard Peters, Habermas argues that the concept itself refers neither purely to the functions nor to the content of day-to-day communication, but much rather to the social space constituted in communicative action (Habermas 1992: 436). In this sense, the public sphere is as much a social space as it “depicts a relationship between the speakers and the audience that is created by social actors experiencing the by-products of cooperation and the inclusion of affected parties” (Eriksen 2004).

The kind of communicative interactions that are viewed as constitutive of public spheres can take different forms. Most concretely, a public is constituted already through day-to-day public encounters between individuals, such as in Habermas’s example of a coffeehouse situation: whenever private individuals come together in public to deliberate on shared concerns, they constitute an “episodic public” that is part of the wider communicative context of the public sphere (cf. Gerhards & Neidhardt 1991: 50f.). Beyond such concrete communicative interactions in the form of an episodic public, Habermas distinguishes organized event publics such as larger-scale meetings, public debates, all forms of demonstrations, and so on. At the most abstract level, finally, the public sphere is constituted by the entirely abstract speaker-audience or author-reader relationships that are established through the mass media (Habermas 1992: chap. 8).

Habermas reminds us of the public sphere’s abstract spatial connotation by drawing our attention to the architectural metaphors through which we make sense of the concept: we speak of arenas, forums or stages even when referring to the public sphere in its more abstract forms (cf. Kantner 2004: 55). We view the public sphere as an onstage dialog between two or more speakers, taking place in front of an audience in some form of arena or forum, even if this dialog only takes place in the metaphorical arena of the mass media (Habermas 1992: 437).

In its conceptual history, the idea of the public sphere as an arena or forum comes from the ancient Greek understanding of the agora.

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23 In German, one way of maintaining the distinction between Öffentlichkeit as public sphere and Öffentlichkeit as public is to speak of Öffentlichkeit in the emphatic sense (“Öffentlichkeit im emphatischen Sinn”) when referring to the concept of the public sphere (Peters 1994); other ways include referring to public as Publikum or to the public sphere as öffentlicher Raum, i.e. literally as the public space (Habermas 1998a: chap. 8).
24 By saying this, we do not mean to imply that the public sphere can be dissociated from its functions. In the deliberative perspective, a vital public sphere can be said to exist only to the extent that it performs its function as a counterweight to the political system.
market square, as a site for deliberation on “res publica”, i.e. matters of public concern (cf. Arendt 1958/2002: chap. 2). Consequently, the spatial connotation of the public sphere is based foremost on Habermas’s historical reconstruction of the emergence (and decline) of the ideal-typical bourgeois public sphere in the 18th and 19th centuries (Habermas 1962/1990). As Habermas’s reconstruction illustrates, the public sphere – as it emerged out of the public gatherings of private individuals to form literary and subsequently political publics – was constituted by face-to-face encounters between individuals gathering in an actual, concrete place, i.e. in the literary salons of the time.

In modern, complex and large-scale societies, mediated public communication and abstract speaker-audience or author-reader relationships have come to be understood as virtually synonymous with the idea of the public sphere per se (Gerhards & Neidhardt 1991), foremost because communicative power in any meaningful sense can only be generated by such virtually all-encompassing arenas. When we speak of the lack of a European public sphere, we therefore refer to the lack of a shared space for European-wide opinion formation rather than to the lack of transnational (or national) publics articulating their views about European politics. This further underlines the problem of separate communicative spaces: unless member state public spheres open up to one another, they will fail to become arenas for European-level public opinion and will formation. As such, they will remain weak in generating communicative power to be used vis-à-vis the European institutions. The European public sphere deficit therefore amounts primarily to a communicative power deficit, resulting from a lack of mediated public communication about European-level decision making.

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25 It may very well be that the public sphere deficit is a communication deficit about European politics in general as well. Gerhards (2000) shows, for instance, that coverage of European politics plays a continually marginal role in European newspapers. An interesting aspect of this issue is for instance the question to what extent communication about EU politics manages to move beyond the sort of trench warfare between respective pro- and anti-European integration camps. Trenz et al. (2007) argue, for example, that public debate about the ratification of the Constitutional Treaty marked the end-point, not the start of the politicization of EU politics. To what extent the public sphere deficit is precisely this kind of general communication deficit about European politics is however a question that falls outside the scope of this chapter.
Preconditions for Transnational Debate: Two Clichés

But under which conditions is European-level public opinion and will formation possible? On this point, academic debates on the European public sphere deficit are characterized by two contending clichés, corresponding to two fundamentally contrasting views on the possibility of a European public sphere as well as more relevantly to two contending readings of democratic politics. According to the first cliché, a European public sphere is impossible *inter alia* due to the insurmountable barrier of language diversity in the EU. Europe is no *community of communication*. Inasmuch as Europeans cannot speak to one another other than through the medium of a foreign language, “the most banal fact is at the same time the most elementary” (Kielmansegg 1996: 55; author’s translation): without a shared *lingua franca*, there can be no communicative space *shared* by all Europeans that could serve as a public sphere in the EU. This, Kielmansegg argues, is “not a ‘technical’ problem because it has no ‘technical’ solution” (ibid., author’s translation).26 Beyond the language issue, this view is often connected to a communitarian-inspired emphasis on pre-political collective identities as preconditions for public spheres (Kantner 2004; Eriksen 2005). Settling normative disputes through reasoned consensus, in this view, is possible only to the extent that *truth-seeking* (rather than merely *compromise-seeking*) argumentation can appeal to an established pre-political, cultural background consensus, i.e. to an intersubjectively shared notion of the constitutive, fundamental values of a given community.

The second cliché has emerged, broadly speaking, as an academic response to the first. Beginning with Eder & Kantner’s initial conceptual clarification that membership in one communicative context does not preclude truth-seeking communication across difference (Eder & Kantner 2002, see above), this second cliché amounts to the claim that a European public sphere is not only possible and plausible, but moreover that it is already observable. However, it exists only in an embryonic form and is therefore often criticized for being inherently elitist in character: it is

26 Kielmansegg embeds this argument in a discussion on the reason for a lack of a politically relevant collective identity of Europeans. Such a collective identity does not exist because Europe “is no community of communication, barely a community of memory and only to a very limited extent a community of experience”, whereas it is exactly this type of communities where collective identities form and stabilize. (ibid., author’s translation).
confined to the mass media, or better said to expert debates taking place foremost in *quality newspapers*. Consequently, the contending communitarian cliché is considered flawed in part due to the fact that its proponents are looking for a European public sphere with the conceptual tools developed for the analysis of the public sphere at the *nation-state level*. But the EU, as another popular cliché has it, is a polity *sui generis*, a political system so fundamentally different from both the nation-state *and* any other international organization that *methodological nationalism* (cf. Beck 2003) is a questionable basis for the study of transnational communicative processes.²⁷ And while normatively refuting communitarian claims to notions of a pre-political community of fate as a precondition for truth-seeking communication, this second camp holds that transnational communication aimed at reasoned consensus *across Europe* is not only plausible, but also observable already in an increasing convergence both of meaning structures (Risse & van de Steeg 2003; Risse 2004) *and* interactive structures (Wimmel 2004, 2006).²⁸

**Communication versus Community: ‘Identity Light’ and Beyond?**

The two contending theoretical perspectives can be summarized under the captions of ‘communication’ and ‘community’, respectively. In the communitarian perspective, public spheres in a strong sense are highly conditional. Their emergence is considered possible only if a thick sense of community is already in place, i.e. when individuals within that prospective communicative space have a strong sense of membership of

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²⁷ Hans-Jörg Trenz is generally critical of the methodological nationalism in most, if not all media-oriented empirical European public sphere research, but argues at the same time that this methodological nationalism is also founded on the highly segmented character of national media systems in the EU member states. Consequently, while “the national public sphere should not be taken as the template for a European sphere of communication”, the way forward in European public sphere research has to be to “search for a theoretically sound and empirically grounded way of thinking how the public sphere beyond the national level becomes possible” (Trenz 2007: 3).

²⁸ Authors subscribing to this notion tend to base their assessment on arguments adopted from Habermas’ *Theory of Communicative Action* (Habermas 1981). As a medium of communication, language is thought to bear an immanent potential for reason (*Vernunftpotential*). Because deliberators are bound in their argumentation by principles of reason, their arguments can be challenged even by people with contending normative predispositions. *Reason*, in other words, takes the place of *community* in forming the basis for communication across difference. This argument is developed further in chapter 3.
their community (Taylor 2002: 16). Consequently, the communitarian idea of community is pre-political/pre-reflexive: communities are collectives that individuals are more or less born into. Individuals are a product of their respective communities, making membership in – and the community itself – a matter of fate, as Habermas summarizes (e.g. 1998: 117).

‘Communication’, on the other hand, denotes the discourse theoretical perspective associated with notions of communicative action and deliberative democracy. To a lesser extent, it also denotes the social constructivism of Thomas Risse, who draws on Habermasian notions while emphasizing the social construction of public spheres. In this communicative perspective, truth-seeking communication is considered possible even across difference, and is conditional on nothing more (but also nothing less) than communicators’ capacity for reason. Community, in this perspective, is always a thin concept, emerging out of the inclusiveness of communication and democratic procedures.

But the communicative perspective is characterized by a peculiar tension: while community is dismissed as a precondition for truth-seeking communication, Thomas Risse (Risse 2003, Risse & van de Steeg 2003) nonetheless depends on collective identity in explaining why communication is more likely among some than among others. For Risse & van de Steeg, the mere recognition of non-domestic speakers as legitimate participants in a debate on shared concerns already implies a thin sense of community, an “identity light” which is taken to imply not “a deep sense of loyalty toward each other, but some minimum sense of belonging to the same community” (Risse & van de Steeg 2003: 19). The argument is convincing to the extent that the perception of a given problem as concerning one rather than another collective of people presupposes some notion of commonality. Nevertheless, we are offered no indication as to how community can be imagined in a thin or light sense beyond communitarianism. This lack of clarity as regards the content of

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29 As Risse & van de Steeg argue, “[p]ublic spheres are not a given, are not out there waiting to be discovered by some analysts. Rather, they are social constructions in the true sense of the word. Public spheres emerge in the process in which people debate controversial issues in the public. The more we debate issues, the more we engage each other in our public discourses, the more we actually create political communities” (Risse & van de Steeg 2003: 15).

30 This view furthermore corresponds to the idea of constitutional patriotism as a post-communitarian mode of allegiance, located between communitarian understandings of the community as a pre-reflexive community of fate and the cosmopolitan utopianism of a worldwide community of human beings (Müller 2007: chap. 1).
an “identity light” leaves us wondering about its implications for the public sphere/political community relationship: public spheres can emerge even in the absence of a thick collective identity. But exactly how much social integration, as Cathleen Kantner (2004) asks, is necessary to perceive collective action problems as shared, as in need of a deliberative search for solutions? Kantner draws on John Dewey’s pragmatism to offer an intriguing answer: communication is premised rather on the experience of collectively being affected by the same problem(s) (Kantner 2004: chaps. 4-5). Consequently, a public in the Deweyan sense emerges as “that sphere of social action that a social group can successfully prove to be in need of general regulation because encroaching consequences are being generated” (Honneth 1998: 774). Community is in turn constituted in “experiential act of participation” (Whipple 2005: 161), i.e. in the experience of cooperative problem-solving despite the absence of a prior sense of community (cf. Kantner 2004: chap. 5).

But even such assertions bracket questions about the ontological status of “issues” or “problems”. From an ontological perspective, the meaning of any given problem cannot be separated from the observer. To the extent that the meaning of a problem – and consequently who is affected by that problem – is constructed in observation and interpretation, questions of agency become relevant: who determines what the problem is, whom it affects and who should be included in the cooperative problem-solving effort?

Bringing Agency Back In

Attempting to assign ontological primacy to either public spheres or political communities/collective identities is bound to yield unsatisfactory answers. Public spheres and political communities are co-original and co-constitutive. Both emerge out of communicative interactions taking place in public settings. But what alternatives are there towards specifying the contours of a post-communitarian ‘identity light’ allowing for communication across difference? In this study, we explore one possible answer, arguing that an emphasis on collective identity as a precondition for communication is misleading even in any post-communitarian form. Most importantly, this is so because any such focus is bound to miss relevant questions of agency in the conceptualization of the public sphere/political community relationship. By questions of agency, we mean the role which particular actors within the public sphere – whether the mass media, political parties, associations of civil society etc. – play in
determining the criteria for access to and recognition as legitimate participants in public debates. We suggest a conceptualization of the public sphere/political community relationship that shifts focus away from (a) issues of ontological primacy and (b) an implicit or explicit view of public spheres and political communities as static entities. Instead, we emphasize (a) issues of agency in constructing the public sphere/political community relationship and (b) a view of public spheres and political communities as dynamic entities, ontologically better understood as processes (cf. Strippel 2005). A processual ontology allows us to see that public spheres and political communities are not only co-original and co-constitutive, but that they are social constructions that come into being (and develop!) in the process of thinking and talking about them (Searle 1995).

Questions of agency come into the picture in determining, in the Deweyan sense, who is and who is not to be considered affected by a given problem, and by extension who is and who is not to be considered a legitimate participant in political discourse. While notions of community (or the collective identity thereof) play a role in determining (non-)recognition of potential participants, they are never objective categories. Whether or not to recognize a prospective speaker as a legitimate participant is itself the object of contestation. Contestation on this aspect, in turn, is focused less on the prospective speaker’s identity (or rather: the latter’s membership in a specific community) than on the identity (or definition) of the issue at hand: is the EU public sphere deficit, to return to the example from our thought experiment, a problem that concerns Europeans as members of a community of Europeans, or as members of their respective national communities? There is nothing objective about answering such questions, but the answers given – the criteria of relevance applied to an issue at hand – set the standard for who is and who is not recognized as a legitimate participant in the debate. This is precisely why questions of agency can be imagined to tell us more about the prospect for transnational public spheres than notions of collective identity: which actors set the tone in debates on EU politics in the different national public spheres? What views do they hold on European integration and EU democracy? Do they want “more democracy” beyond the nation-state, with transnational debate alongside European-level decision making? Or do they stick to communitarian notions about the national community as the natural home of democracy, about the coincidence and/or congruence of ethnos and demos that has been “achieved” in the institutional framework of the nation-state (cf. Eder 2004)?
What gives rise to public debate on any given issue is not the ‘nature’ of the issue in any essentializing sense. Issues have no essential qualities (see the discussion in chapter 3). Rather, what is at stake in a given debate is constructed in subjective sense-making within any given debate. This view has implications for the way we have traditionally thought about the (identitarian) preconditions for transnational communication. The communitarian perspective cannot account for the occurrence of communication across difference. The communicative perspective, on the other hand, has hitherto not managed to demonstrate convincingly what that peculiar ‘identity light’ consists of that qualifies us to participate in transnational debates. In this context, much could be gained from relieving the notion of collective identity even in a thin, light, post-communitarian form. Instead, we could emphasize the normative preferences that daily newspapers hold on European integration and the future of democracy in the EU as a precondition for any Europeanization of meaning and interactive structures in European public spheres. When the doors to the three classrooms in our thought experiment are removed, the three communicative spaces are in principle open to the observation of outsiders. But it still takes the initiative of one or several members of a given communicative space to offer the floor to outside voices – and to provide good arguments as to why the floor should be offered to them. Such good arguments, in turn, have to be based on a certain understanding of the problem currently discussed within the given communicative context. There has to be an understanding that the problem at hand is shared and therefore warrants the recognition and participation of voices from outside the own communicative context.

31 The example of EU institutional reform in the wake of the constitution-making process is a case in point. Even if everyone around me claims that EU institutional reform concerns Swedes as Swedes rather than as Europeans, based on the notion that the extension of qualified majority voting represents a loss of sovereignty, I can still challenge this particular way of making sense of the issue by demonstrating that qualified majority voting is no less a means to avoid an institutional deadlock in decision making in an enlarged union.
3 Communication vs. Community: An Ontological Critique – and Beyond

Introduction

What can an analysis of newspaper debates on EU constitution making contribute to an understanding of the public sphere/political community relationship in “postcommunitarian” contexts (Eriksen & Fossum 2004: 443)? Concretely, it can contribute to such an understanding by showing under which conditions and in which forms transnational debate can occur in the presumed absence of a thick sense of community in the European Union. Chapter 2 introduced communication and community as prerequisites for a transnational communicative space in Europe. Furthermore, the chapter outlined the rough contours of an imaginable ontological critique of the public sphere/political community relationship conceptualized as a matter of ontological primacy, hinging on two varieties of the view that perceptions of commonality form the backbone of communicative interaction.

The present chapter develops this argument further. It begins by elaborating the communitarian and communicative perspectives on the possibility of deliberation in a transnational European public sphere. Next, it investigates the insights to be gained from a re-introduction of ontological issues into an understanding of public spheres and political communities as processes (cf. Stripple 2005: chap. 1). The chapter develops an ontological critique founded on the view that problem-solving communication occurs among some people rather than among others not because of the nature or essence of a given problem, but because the latter is construed as concerning one rather than another collective of people. In developing this argument, section 3 draws on three legacies relevant in answering questions about the public sphere/political community relationship, namely (a) a social constructivist legacy reconsidering the ontological status of public spheres, political communities and political issues as processes rather than static units; (b) a Habermasian legacy emphasizing constitutional patriotism as an
inclusive form of thin identity that emerges out of rather than represents a precondition for communication; and (c) a Deweyan/pragmatist legacy introducing affectedness as the root of communication across difference, as well as the constitution of community in the experience of cooperative problem-solving.

Communication and Community: Two Perspectives on Meaningful Communication

What makes meaningful communication in a deliberative sense possible to begin with? Here, we use two ideal-typical perspectives to show how the possibility of a deliberative public sphere with strong normative connotations has been imagined so far. These ideal-typical perspectives are referred to as communication and community, respectively. Proponents of the two contending perspectives give very different answers to this fundamental question, with fundamentally different conclusions to be drawn regarding the prospects for a European public sphere.

The Public Sphere as a Site of Self-Affirmation

For communitarians, the very idea of democracy and particularly the idea of democratic deliberation are highly conditional ("voraussetzungsvoll"), hinging on the fulfillment of strong identitarian requirements. Democracy and the very idea of a democratically constituted community are only possible to the extent that they are integrated around one normative conception of the good. Without a certain measure of patriotic attachment transcending a liberally conceived orientation towards the ideal of justice, liberal democratic societies are thought incapable of maintaining such institutions that guarantee individual freedom (Taylor 1989). Political communication is consequently dependent on more than liberal ideas about a mere acceptance of the ‘rules of the game’. Rather,

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32 It should be emphasized that communitarians share with discourse theorists a subscription to the ideal of communication in the strong, deliberative or truth-seeking sense that liberals find impossible due to the value pluralism characteristic of any modern, complex society. Habermas's discourse theory of democracy has already been introduced as a middle ground between liberalism and communitarianism, rejecting the latter's notion of the democratic polity as a community of values while stressing that deliberative truth-seeking is possible even “among strangers”, to paraphrase Habermas (1998: 112f.).
political communication depends also on the existence of a broad pre-political background consensus, involving pre-political identities, shared values, traditions and not least shared communicative arenas (Kantner 2004: 13). “A volonté générale,” Erik Oddvar Eriksen summarizes, “is possible because citizens are equal and share common values. In case of conflict, parties can reach an agreement on the basis of a hermeneutical interpretation of who they are and who they would like to be with reference to a pre-political accord” (Eriksen 2005: 343; cf. Eriksen & Fossum 2004: 441f.). In other words, the identity of the political community is constituted and reproduced in public “sense-making” discourses (öffentliche Selbstverständigungsdiskurse). Political discourse can only make use of (and reinforce) existing resources of community, but it cannot generate them itself (Kantner 2004: 13). Public sense-making in the deliberative sense is thus possible only if deliberators share certain normative predispositions, namely the constitutive norms of the community of which they are part (Habermas 1992: 359).

Originally, communitarianism emerged as a label designating scholars critical of John Rawls’ liberalism as formulated in A Theory of Justice. In particular, those scholars that came to be identified as communitarians only in hindsight (Honneth 1993) question Rawls’ initial view of the person. For Rawls, society is made up of “atomistic” individuals. The original communitarian critique of Rawls’ work was formulated in turn on anthropological rather than normative grounds: communitarians simply did not believe that the person and individual identity can be imagined so completely outside social and cultural contexts. While particularly the later Rawls is not as fundamentally anti-communitarian as liberalism per se is often made out to be (Mulhall & Swift 2003), early communitarianism thrives on the notion that atomism is a fundamental flaw in liberal theory. For communitarians, individuals are always embedded in social settings and can only define their identity in relation to such social settings. The person can therefore only be imagined in a holistic perspective (Honneth 1993), as a social being embedded in a particular community.

In the communitarian view, societies are communities. As such, they are normatively integrated and founded above all on shared values (Eriksen & Weigård 1999: 152f.) And while any distinction between collective and individual identity is therefore problematic, the values held by any particular individual are always at the very least a reflection of the values of the community to which that particular individual belongs (Taylor 1992). Significantly, communitarians subscribe to the belief that community itself is pre-political in character, a pre-reflexive matter of fate.
rather than of choice or deliberation. Meaningful communication aimed
at more than the liberal conceptualization of *compromise* between
otherwise irreconcilable interests of atomistic individuals is therefore
possible only if it can draw on more than a mere agreement on the
fundamental rules of the game (cf. Marx-Ferree et al. 2002). Reasoned
consensus can occur only against the backdrop of shared values, or rather
through the hermeneutic re-interpretation of the constitutive values of
the community (Habermas 1992: 359; Kantner 2004: 13): the
appropriateness of any proposed course of action has to be derived from
existing communal norms.

Consequently, the notion of a deliberative transnational public sphere
that accommodates value pluralism confronts communitarians with a
fundamental ontological problem: unless deliberators can draw on pre-
existing communal values in searching for a reasoned compromise,
communication across difference becomes conceptually impossible. A
thick sense of community endowing individuals with a pre-reflexive
notion of the good – a community of fate, in Habermasian usage – is a
*necessary precondition* for public spheres understood in a strong,
deliberative sense. Consequently, communitarian-inspired arguments
about the possibility of a European public sphere *beyond* a sphere of mere
interest mediation and compromise have largely expressed a strong
skepticism, often by reference to the so-called *no demos thesis* (Grimm

But there is an inherently static element in this communitarian way of
reasoning that does not sit well with any social constructivist
understanding of political communities and public spheres. Empirically,
such claims are objectionable because they cannot account for value
change within societies. Conceptually, this need not be a problem for
communitarians arguing that the public sphere (and therefore the
democratic process per se) foremost performs a social integrative function
that is “renewed in the ritualized remembrance of the republican
founding act” (Habermas 1992: 359, author’s translation). But from a
normative perspective, it underlines the liberal and discourse theoretical
critique: while communitarianism has a strong concept of “the good”
(defined in terms of the collective will of the community), it lacks a
concept of “the right”, i.e. an account of the democratic process that takes
adequate account of individual rights (Eriksen & Weigård 1999: chap. 6).
Concretely, this question concerns the preconditions for participation in
sense-making deliberation in the communitarian public sphere: if a
subscription to the fundamental values of the community is a
precondition for participation in sense-making deliberation, then
communitarianism simply cannot come to terms with the empirical fact that modern societies are integrated around multiple normative conceptions of “the good” (Eriksen & Weigård 1999: 152), as liberals and discourse theorists argue. So how can value change within societies be accounted for if the communitarian public sphere is conceptualized foremost as a sphere of the self-reconstitution of the community’s fundamental values?

The Public Sphere as a Site of Inclusive Deliberation

This point underlines the strength of the communicative perspective. The communicative perspective can be developed in relation to its own counter-critique of the communitarian critique of liberalism in the initial phase of the liberal-communitarian debate. The liberal critique of communitarianism’s presuppositions strikes a chord in Habermas’s view of the democratic process. While Habermas does not subscribe to the frequently misconstrued liberal idea of society as made up of “atomistic individuals” (Rawls 1971; cf. Mulhall & Swift 2003: 466ff.), there is little contention over the notion that society at large is by no means as uniform a community as communitarians imply. Any given society is instead made up of multiple communities with individually “comprehensive doctrines”, resulting in the view that society as a community centered on one comprehensive doctrine “is excluded by the fact of reasonable pluralism” (Rawls 1993: 146). Most, if not all, large-scale modern societies are complex and heterogeneous. Consequently, they are integrated around multiple conceptions of ‘the good’, making a communitarian understanding of democracy questionable both in an empirical and in a normative sense.

Habermas and Rawls agree on this latter point, i.e. that communitarianism offers a normatively and empirically unsatisfactory model of democracy that fails to take diversity into account adequately and therefore cannot perform the social integrative function of the democratic process. But while Habermas and Rawls agree in their rejection of the communitarian notion of society as a community with one such comprehensive doctrine, they differ in their conclusions on the normative connotations of the democratic process (Habermas 1992: chap. 7). For liberals, the democratic process becomes a process of interest mediation. Accordingly, the liberal reading of the public sphere is based on a strictly legalistic/formalistic understanding of the democratic process, in which notions of the common good are arrived at through the
aggregation of contending interests through representative-democratic procedures (e.g. Marx-Ferree et al. 2002). The liberal reading fundamentally questions the possibility of finding a reasoned consensus through argumentation, based on the notion that different societal groups may have contending and mutually irreconcilable normative beliefs (Gerhards 1997: 9). After all, society is no community integrated around one comprehensive notion of the good. Consequently, the purpose of the democratic process consists rather in finding mutually acceptable compromises among contending interests (Habermas 1992: 359). The public sphere is therefore first and foremost the realm of mutual observation and interest mediation (Gerhards 1997: 9), not however of negotiating individual identities and interests per se. The latter are in turn the product of private and pre-political processes (Kantner 2004: 13). Normative disputes are settled within communities, while at the level of society at large, mere compromise between contending interests and irreconcilable normative predispositions is the most to be hoped for. Habermas is dissatisfied with such a view of democracy. To him, the normative connotations that Rawls connects with the democratic process are too weak (Habermas 1992: chap. 7), particularly in relation to the social integrative function that the communicative perspective ascribes to the democratic process and specifically to the public sphere. Deliberation is thought to generate precisely those resources of community that it is held merely to make use of in the communitarian reading. In Habermas’s conceptualization, legally institutionalized procedures enjoy primacy over pre-political identities and the interests of the members of the community (Kantner 2004). The democratic process thus performs a social integrative function, warranting legitimacy and producing a shared political culture even in light of a changing cultural composition of the population (Habermas 1998b: 113). The Habermasian project of a discourse theory of democracy is therefore about reconciling empirical arguments about the heterogeneity that de facto characterizes modern societies (otherwise construed as communities), with normative arguments about the purpose of the democratic process, namely as an inclusive and deliberative procedure for the exercise of popular sovereignty. In drawing on the liberal counter-critique of communitarianism, Habermas develops the idea that pre-politically agreed upon notions of the good life (that are thought to be constitutive of the idea of a community) are no necessary condition for the possibility of reasoned consensus in public deliberation (Habermas 1992: chap. 7; Habermas 1998: chap. 4).
Communication is thus significantly less conditional in the communicative perspective, but it comes with similarly demanding normative connotations. For Habermas, reasoned consensus is not contingent on the hermeneutic re-interpretation of any pre-political background consensus. Rather, this background consensus secured by cultural homogeneity becomes redundant to the extent that public, deliberative opinion and will formation makes political communication possible even among strangers (Habermas 1998: 112f.). This view is broadly based on the idea of communicative rationality as developed in the Theory of Communicative Action (Habermas 1981a, 1981b). Everyday communicative practice – more specifically the validity claims that individuals raise therein – bears an immanent potential for reason (Vernunftpotential) extending beyond the confines of particular communities and normative predispositions. Communicative rationality denotes the observation that actors act rationally not only if they choose the instrumental means necessary to achieve their self-interested ends (which would be characteristic of instrumental rationality), but also if they can provide good reasons for their actions (Eriksen & Weigård 1999: 155). This view is in turn based on Habermas’s view of the use of language as a medium of interpersonal communication. The fact that interpersonal communication largely depends on the medium of language brings with it the notion of implicit validity claims raised by speakers in a conversation. When people speak to each other, they have to be able to assume that what their counterpart says is true, at least to the best of their knowledge (Kantner 2004: 116) – otherwise, communication would be pointless, and we could “argue strategically until [we] are all blue in the face and still not change anyone’s mind” (Risse 2000). The demand for implicit validity in every kind of communicative interaction lays the foundation for what Habermas considers to be the immanent potential for reason that resides in the medium of language. This immanent potential for reason in turn makes communication possible even among strangers, i.e. among people who do not share the same normative predispositions derived from a pre-reflexive sense of community.

Discourse theory thereby sees reason-giving as a substitute for the communitarian notion of a pre-political background consensus (Eriksen & Weigård 1999: 154f.). Broadly speaking, Habermasian discourse theory develops a reading of the public sphere that combines a (republican) emphasis on democratic procedures and citizen participation with an accommodation of the kind of cultural diversity characteristic of complex modern societies (Habermas 1996), and not least of the kind of postcommunitarian polity that the EU is thought to represent (Habermas
Accordingly, the communicative perspective assesses the prospects for a European public sphere as a transnational communicative space much more optimistically (Eriksen & Fossum 2004; Bohman 2007b). In the communicative perspective, a European public sphere would be less conditional than communitarianism holds: contrary to the communitarian perspective, communication across difference is not only possible, but it is also possible in a strong, deliberative sense. However, the communicative perspective also places much higher demands on the actual occurrence of deliberation “in a multitude of increasingly convergent public spheres” (Eriksen & Fossum 2004: 446).

An Ontological Critique: ‘Identity Light’ and beyond

Three intellectual legacies can help us move beyond the fundamental opposition between the communitarian and communicative perspectives, offering paths beyond notions of ‘identity light’ as a quasi-communitarian precondition for transnational communicative spaces. First, a social constructivist legacy contributes to an understanding of process, agency and language in the construction of political problems – and thus also in the construction of affectedness. Second, constitutional patriotism suggests a post-communitarian form of attachment between (and beyond!) communitarianism and cosmopolitanism (Müller 2007) that emphasizes recognition, not however collective identity. Third, a Deweyan/pragmatist legacy suggests a processual understanding of the public sphere/political community relationship, emphasizing the notion of publics as constituted in the experience of collective affectedness and notion of community as constituted in communication on shared concerns.

A Social Constructivist Legacy

Corresponding to the view that the social construction of reality denotes foremost an ontological orientation, it tends to appear at best as an implicit conventional wisdom in the work of the more clearly discourse theoretically oriented authors discussed in the following paragraphs. Nevertheless, the claim to be advanced here is that where social construction is drawn on, either implicitly or explicitly (as in Risse’s case), that path is not explored all the way, leading to a peculiar ontological tension in argumentation.
Public Spheres and Political Communities as Social Constructions

Social constructivists emphasize the social and discursive practices through which public spheres come into being. At the same time, Thomas Risse claims that some sort of collective identification has to precede this process of social construction through discursive practice (Risse 2003). Risse argues that “public spheres and communities of communication [...] are social constructions in the true sense of the word, [emerging] in the process in which people debate controversial issues in public. The more we debate issues, [...] the more we actually create political communities” (Risse 2003: 5). Yet while Risse emphasizes the importance of not conceptualizing collective identities and public spheres as essential categories or static entities, no account is offered of how a social constructivist notion of collective identity could be imagined that would underpin the initiation of communication across difference. Similarly, it remains unclear what constitutes the qualitative difference between ‘identity light’ as a thin form of identification and a (quasi-) communitarian sense of community as a precondition for problem-solving communication.

Klaus Eder identifies precisely this ontological flaw in the communitarian conceptualization of community as a precondition for truth-seeking deliberation. Notions such as culture, community, collective identity etc., Eder remarks, have no essential properties. Instead, they are themselves the product of communicative processes and therefore never pre-political or pre-reflexive (Eder 1999, 2004). ‘Communities of fate’ in the way communitarians imagine are therefore a contradiction in terms. Elsewhere, Eder argues similarly that culture per se cannot be the root of communication, as culture quite clearly already is the product of communication. What is the root of culture is rather dissent: without dissent, there wouldn’t be a need for culture (Eder 1999: 150). “Social order,” consequently, “emerges only where people talk to (and argue with) one another,” leading to a radical image of social integration through communication (ibid.: 162, author’s translation). Drawing on George Herbert Mead, Cathleen Kantner similarly argues that differences rather than similarities in perspectives are constitutive of any conversation (Kantner 2004: 118). And along the same lines, Erik Oddvar Eriksen writes that even in the absence of a pre-existing thick sense of collective identification, the emergence of a shared public sphere is possible: “the lack of pre-political identification with the emerging political community can be recompensed through a public debate with catalytic effects on
enlarged citizenship, solidarity and plural identities” (Eriksen 2005: 344; cf. Eder & Kantner 2002: 308).

**Public Spheres and Political Communities as Quasi-Static Entities**

Yet Risse’s social constructivist treatment concedes that we cannot know exactly how much and what kind of collective identity needs to be in place to allow for the emergence of public spheres – all we know, instead, is that there has to be *some* kind of collective identity: “a meaningful concept of a public sphere implies the emergence of a community of communication which presupposes *some* degree of collective identification with each other’s fate” (Risse 2003: 8, author’s italics). Similarly, social constructivists tend to content themselves with treating the collective identity/public sphere relationship as an egg-or-chicken conundrum while nevertheless maintaining that we are in fact dealing with an issue of conditionality (Risse 2003): public spheres are portrayed as dependent on the *prior* existence of some form of underlying collective identity. At the same time, precisely this form of collective identity is constructed and reconstructed within the public sphere. At a fairly underspecified level, there seems to be an awareness of the tension outlined in chapter 2, namely that Risse’s social constructivist line of reasoning – in spite of itself – falls back on an essential (or essentializing) concept of collective identity. To go around this tension, Risse argues that the public sphere’s identitarian precondition consists of something we could call “‘identity light’, since it does not imply a *deep* sense of loyalty toward each other, but some *minimum* sense of belonging to the same community” (ibid., author’s emphasis).

Craig Calhoun makes this point explicit by arguing for a form of attachment based on an understanding of constitutional patriotism beyond a purely legalistic one, an understanding that also incorporates the process of constructing culture and identity into the concept of the constitution. “Participation in democratic public life,” Calhoun argues, “is not [...] separate from the processes through which culture is produced and reproduced in modern societies; it is integral to them, and likewise part of the process by which individual and collective identities are made and remade.” Further, Calhoun holds that culture cannot be treated in the communitarian sense as inheritance and thus be placed in sharp opposition to reason. Instead, culture has to be recognized “as *activity*, not simply inheritance”, also because reason cannot be fully disembedded from culture (Calhoun 2002: 157; cf. Calhoun 2005: 261).
Also Cathleen Kantner agrees in principle with the communitarian claim that democratic practice necessitates certain *minimal* social requirements, and argues that one of these crucial preconditions has not been met at the European level, namely the mutual recognition of European citizens as members of the same political community (Kantner 2004: 12). Although problem-oriented communication is viewed to have a community-shaping effect, the mechanisms of which are drawn from Dewey (Eder & Kantner 2002: 310), the crucial question is necessarily the following: what preconditions have to be fulfilled in order for individuals without a shared sense of ‘pre-reflexive’ historical experience (ibid., 308) to engage one another in deliberation? Or, to paraphrase Eriksen: what is that “certain minimum of unity and solidarity [that] is held to be necessary for actors to at all come together in public spaces to fight for the realization of collective goals and be prepared to take on new obligations” (Eriksen 2005: 345, author’s italics)?

Risse doesn’t follow the same path as e.g. Eder (2004), Kantner (2004), and Eder & Kantner (2002), namely to explore the community-shaping effect of problem-solving communication *across difference*. Particularly, he doesn’t explore what accounts for communication across difference among some strangers rather than among others. This is basically the Deweyan legacy of European public sphere research that was introduced by Eder and Kantner (see below). But while the Deweyan legacy indicates that the collective experience of affectedness by problems accounts for problem-solving communication, it remains ontologically questionable whether affectedness can ever be imagined as objective.

**Bringing Process and Agency Back In**

The social constructivist legacy thus begs a re-consideration of the public sphere/political community relationship that takes into account that public spheres and political communities are processes rather than static entities. Even an *implicitly* static view of public spheres and political communities is inconsistent with the basic ontological premises of social constructivism. Although social constructivism is of course far from being a uniform theory or even ontology (cf. Christiansen et al. 2001; Adler 2002), what unites most (if not all) social constructivisms is that they challenge such static conceptualizations and taken-for-granted categories.

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33 A cut in unemployment benefits may be a good example to illustrate this point. Obviously, this is a problem that concerns the unemployed, who will receive less money from the state. But whether and to what extent other groups – or society as a whole – is affected by legislation to this effect is a matter of contestation.
and argue instead that at least the concepts through the use of which we make sense of the social world are of our making (cf. Hopf 1998, Risse 2004b, Checkel 2006). Prominently, this challenging of taken-for-granted concepts and categories is done by bringing process back into the picture to show how such concepts and categories are constructed in the first place (cf. Stripple 2005; Rescher 1996), and how they come to achieve a quasi-essential ontological status.

The insight that communities are social constructions bare of any essential qualities has become a cliché in its own right in the literature on nations and nationalism (e.g. Anderson 1991; Hobsbawm 1992; Gellner 1983; Billig 1995). However, the same cannot be said yet about the public sphere, particularly in the latter's relationship to notions of political community. The idea of process in the construction of public spheres is not applied consistently in the treatment of the public sphere/political community relationship.

Chapter 2 has made clear that the notion of the public sphere is an abstraction, a spatial metaphor referring to the imagined communicative space emerging when private individuals deliberate in public on res publica, on matters of public concern. By definition, there is not one such imagined communicative space, but many: they can come into being whenever and wherever people share the notion that their deliberations have a quality such as to constitute a shared forum for debate. This highlights the processual ontological take on the coming into being rather than existence of public spheres as communicative spaces: they come into being to the extent that their participants or observers experience (and refer to) them as shared forums, stages, arenas etc.

Against such a social constructivist backdrop, a European public sphere understood as a transnational communicative space does not emerges out of the subscription to notions of a thick or thin collective identity, but is constituted in (1) public deliberation on matters of public concern across borders. Furthermore, a European public sphere emerges out of (2) the perception that such public deliberation amounts to the coming into being of a European forum for public debate, wherever this forum may be located. Drawing on the Deweyan notion of affectedness, the social constructivist understanding suggests that ontologically, matters of European public concern are not reducible to questions of collective identity. Instead, they hinge on the perception that a collective bigger than the national community is affected by an existing problem, and that communication about such problems should transcend the confines of the national community.
But what constitutes European-level *res publica*? The crucial question in this regard is what – and as we will see who – defines the Deweyan notion of affectedness. When is a matter a matter of public concern for Europeans rather than for other collectives? What constitutes collective affectedness beyond the national community? For social constructivists, there is nothing essential about any such question. Also political issues/problems are social constructions and as such best understood as processes, as the practices through which the meaning of existing problems is constructed.

Fundamentally, these arguments illustrate the processual ontological notion of the priority of process over product, the notion that “processes are basic and things are ‘derivative’” (Stripple 2005: 17). In line with social constructivist thinking about the social world as *of our making*, “concepts are best understood as performative practices, i.e. language shifts from being a ‘mirror’ of the world to being constitutive of the world” (ibid.: 15). The public sphere does not mirror any objective truth in the social world, it does not denote anything that we can touch and feel – and even if it did, our way of thinking about would still be conditioned by the performative practice of assigning meaning to it. In the same way, affectedness depends on how the meaning of the problem is defined, i.e. how actors make sense of it and thereby define who is and who is not affected by it. From this perspective, even an implicit assigning of ontological primacy to collective identity (or political community) or the public sphere becomes problematic for reasons of ontological consistency. An implicitly static view of the social construct of collective identity precludes the possibility of the co-constitution and co-originality of political communities and public spheres. If we on the other hand depart from the idea that the public sphere/political community relationship represents an egg-or-chicken conundrum and focus instead on the role of *process* in constructing public spheres and political communities, questions of the co-originality of public spheres and political communities become rather a matter of agency, i.e. of the processes of making sense of ‘problems’ to be dealt with in the public sphere. Such a perspective has primarily two advantages: first, a focus on process shifts emphasis away from empirically awkward questions about the *amount* and *type* of collective identity necessary to allow for the existence (or emergence) of public spheres. Such questions are empirically awkward because collective *identity* is difficult, if not outright impossible to
“measure”. Second, it also brings relevant questions of agency back into debates on the preconditions for a transnational communicative space in Europe, as developed in chapter 2. Who is affected by an existing problem is a matter of framing rather than of the ‘essence’ of a given problem.

**Constitutional Patriotism as ‘Identity Light’**

Habermas’s suggestion of constitutional patriotism as a thin form of attachment represents a second legacy worth exploring en route to an understanding of the public sphere/political community relationship. Constitutional patriotism takes attachment as an outcome rather than as a precondition for democratic deliberation. Where ‘identity light’ has to rely on the pre-existence of a minimal sense of belonging, constitutional patriotism emphasizes allegiance as stemming from the inclusiveness of democratic procedures.

Broadly speaking, constitutional patriotism denotes a mode of attachment that stretches far beyond the preconditions for deliberation in a transnational communicative space in the sense discussed here. More precisely, the idea of constitutional patriotism suggests a form of post-communitarian attachment not only to polities conceived of as postnational in the sense that the European Union is often imagined as (most prominently Habermas 1998; see also Eriksen & Fossum 2004, Eriksen & Fossum 2007), but also to polities characterized by deep diversity in Charles Taylor’s sense.

Much like the idea of constitutional patriotism itself, European integration has been claimed to be “bloodless” or postemotional, thus lacking the emotive capacity that nations and nation-states possess (Müller 2007: chap. 1; cf. Calhoun 2002). In large part, this view is connected to an understanding of the EU as a novel form of polity

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34 In this context, it is important to maintain a distinction between identity on the one hand, and what is often taken as an empirical or quantitative proxy for identity, namely identification with any given collective.

35 As Jan-Werner Müller reminds us, the conceptual history of constitutional patriotism begins with Dolf Sternberger, although it is most frequently associated with Habermas’s name (Müller 2007: chap. 1).

36 Constitutional patriotism has nonetheless been criticized precisely for its allegedly quasi-communitarian basis (Müller 2007, 2008). Consequently, the success of constitutional patriotism as a “viable alternative form of political identification” has been argued to hinge on its capacity to demonstrate that “allegiance to democratic principles can foster forms of collective identity that are capable of commanding allegiance while nevertheless remaining open to transformation in response to the demands of universalistic norms of justice” (Cronin 2003: 2).
without any historical precedent, as a *polity sui generis*, or as the world’s first genuine postnational polity. European integration therefore cannot (and ought not) draw on the same communitarian resources that underpin national communities. But while a potentially postnational EU is thought to have to come up also with novel, civic forms of identification and attachment, precisely this ambition of establishing political community on the basis of “thin identities and normative universalism” (Calhoun 2002: 157) – the cosmopolitan aspect of constitutional patriotism – is the reason why constitutional patriotism is frequently called into question. Is such an abstract, post-emotive attachment possible, and if so, is it sufficient to provide for social integration? In other words: would it “achieve a sufficient solidarity to be truly motivating for its members,” and could it “stand alone as an adequate source of belonging and mutual commitment?” (ibid.; cf. Cronin 2003; Baumeister 2007).

Craig Calhoun offers an intriguing and for our purposes highly relevant response to such questions. Calhoun suggests reading public discourse as a form of social solidarity (ibid.: 158). Very much in line with his proposed reading of constitutional patriotism to include also *the process of constructing culture and identity*, Calhoun indicates the frequent, yet ontologically problematic view of social solidarity as an effect of the *prior existence of a collective subject*. But in line with Habermas, Calhoun demonstrates that activity in the public sphere is about *constituting* the collective subject as much as it is about steering it. Social solidarity is therefore something that is produced in the public sphere rather than merely drawing on pre-existing social integration. In this sense, public discourse can be read as solidarity (Calhoun 2002). Habermas’s notion of constitutional patriotism furthermore hinges on constitutional principles *not*, as his critics would have it, “as disembodied abstractions but as embedded in *particular* democratic political and legal cultures, since only thus can they shape citizens’ identities and loyalties” (Cronin 2003: 1, author’s emphasis). In other words, constitutional patriotism is founded on a notion of thin identity, but it is *not* abstract cosmopolitanism all the

37 In addition, constitutional patriotism has been criticized for favoring liberal constitutional “values” in a far more extensive way than Habermas acknowledges. Andrea Baumeister argues, for instance, that for Habermas, “cultures and traditions only deserve protection in as far as they promote the well-being of individuals” (Baumeister 2007: 491). Consequently, constitutional patriotism is criticized for merely being “the expression of a distinctively liberal form of civic nationalism” (ibid.: 495). Similarly, Justine Lacroix criticizes the alleged “discrepancy between Habermas’ initial plea for rational and critical identities and his more recent glorification of the European model” (Lacroix 2009: 142).
Rather, Habermasian constitutional patriotism adopts elements of communitarianism and cosmopolitanism and combines them in a novel way. Constitutional patriotism, while accused by many of being a contradiction in terms (Müller 2007), is a theory of inclusive citizenship at the same time as it is a theory of emotional attachment and/or social integration.

From communitarianism, constitutional patriotism takes the idea that a sense of belonging and emotional attachment is a key prerequisite for the functioning of democratic politics, specifically in generating social solidarity (cf. Calhoun 2002, 2005). But constitutional patriotism rejects the communitarian tenet that this sense of belonging to the community is out there, and that democratic politics is inconceivable without a pre-existing ethical self-understanding of the community. Instead, constitutional patriotism holds that the mere idea of even a national community with a singular, coherent collective identity is a myth. In keeping with the liberal tradition, constitutional patriotism holds that few, if any societies in today’s world can claim to be integrated around one single, coherent collective identity endowing its members with one single, coherent notion of the good.

Challenging the conceptual bond between communitarian understandings of the nation and patriotism as a form of allegiance to the state, and consequently the notion of the nation as a community of fate, then, constitutional patriotism provides a theory of inclusive citizenship, suggesting the inclusiveness of democratic procedures (and their community-shaping effect) as a source of an ongoing process of social cohesion. But while cosmopolitan-inspired on this point, constitutional patriotism rejects the former’s de-contextualized aspect and subscribes instead to the enduring role and social-psychological importance of the nation-state: as the object of a sense of attachment and belonging, the nation-state plays a crucial role, not least as a source of social solidarity. In this sense, constitutional patriotism argues that cosmopolitanism’s universalist values can only be realized in particular settings.

But most relevantly for this discussion, constitutional patriotism in the Habermasian understanding offers not only a suggestion for how a thin identity could be imagined, namely as a combination of communitarian and cosmopolitan ideas. Furthermore, Habermas’s constitutional patriotism goes around the quasi-communitarian connotations of the idea of an ‘identity light’ that takes notions of commonality as a precondition for public spheres and democratic procedures. For Habermas, the crucial requirement for deliberation is recognition, not collective identity (Habermas 1996). It is the inclusiveness of democratic procedures that
fosters communal sentiment even in contexts characterized by the kind of diversity that would make deliberation impossible in the communitarian sense. In this regard, Habermas’s constitutional patriotism resonates well with the third legacy to be discussed here, namely John Dewey’s work on the community-shaping effect of cooperative problem-solving.

A Deweyan Legacy: Community through Communication

The Deweyan legacy towards an understanding of the public sphere/political community relationship has already been considered by authors like Eder and Kantner (Eder & Kantner 2002; Eder 2004; Kantner 2004). The Deweyan legacy consists primarily of the contribution that pragmatist philosophy offers towards an understanding of (a) problem-solving communication across difference as an outcome of collective affectedness, and (b) the constitution of community in communication about shared problems. Both aspects are addressed here in relation to what they can and cannot tell us about the public sphere/political community relationship. On the first point, Dewey believed that people engage in cooperative problem-solving not because of membership in any particular pre-political community of fate, but because they experience collective affectedness by an existing problem. In other words, publics emerge when and where problems emerge, and they emerge solely for the purpose of tackling such collective problems. On the second point, Dewey argues that although publics form for problem-solving purposes, the success of such cooperative efforts across communities in itself constitutes community.

The historical context of Dewey’s work on democracy and particularly on the public sphere (or rather: “the public”) parallels many of the challenges of “reconstituting democracy” that the European integration process is faced with in the post-Maastricht move towards “ever closer union”. Dewey’s work has to be read in the context of debates about the fundamental possibility of mass democracy in the United States of the 1920s, a context characterized by extreme ethnic, social and political-cultural heterogeneity (Kantner 2004: 164f.). While the American experience of the time called the possibility of reconstituting democracy beyond face-to-face encounters into question, debates about the possibility of a reconstitution of democracy in Europe today are questions about the possibility of democracy beyond the nation-state. In theoretical perspective, the questions Dewey asked and the responses he gave in his debate with Walter Lippmann in the 1920s, echo the questions that
communitarian skeptics of the possibility and/or desirability of a full democraticization of the EU raise today: how can democracy be possible today considering the absence of Europeans’ mutual recognition as members of the same community (Kantner 2004: 12), considering the absence of a European lingua franca (Kraus 2002; 2004), considering also the absence of a shared (media) public sphere (Gerhards 2000, Kielmansegg 1996)? Following Dewey in presuming that deliberation is possible across difference (Kantner 2004; Habermas 1996, 1998), the question boils down to what makes people perceive existing problems as shared: when is there a need for cooperative problem-solving beyond the own community? At the same time, the Deweyan perspective is not in itself sufficient, as it does not adequately address the notion that affectedness is itself an object of contestation. A Deweyan perspective allows us to view the act of constructing affectedness – through public sense-making discourses – as the missing link that allows communication to constitute community. We can develop this argument in three steps. (1) First, we introduce Dewey’s view on what constitutes collective affectedness. (2) Second, we introduce Dewey’s view on how community is constituted in problem-solving communication across difference. (3) Finally, a framing perspective suggests how problems come to be perceived as shared rather than particular.

Dewey on Problem-Solving Communication

For Dewey, democracy was much more than an institutional set-up or a form of governance. Rather, it is the “idea of community life itself”, an ideal in the sense of “the tendency and movement of some thing which exists carried to its final limit, viewed as completed, perfected” (Dewey 1927: 148, author’s emphasis). And in much the same way as the democratic ideal in Dewey’s sense has never been realized, neither has the idea of a “community unalloyed by alien elements” (ibid.). Dewey viewed democracy as a way of life in which all members of a society participate in the cooperative solution of existing problems. As a consequence of this societal division of labor, all participants experience the benefit of the cooperative effort and thereby develop a sense of community. Yet a pre-existing sense of community is by no means a precondition for an individual’s participation in the problem-solving effort. On the contrary, value pluralism is seen not only as an empirical fact in the political and historical context in which Dewey wrote The Public and its Problems. Importantly, it is also considered to be an asset contributing “to the development of an abundance of completely different interests and
abilities”, and thereby to a successful societal division of labor, based nonetheless on “an individual orientation toward a jointly shared good” (Honneth 1998: 777f.). Dewey thus viewed democracy as a “reflexive form of community cooperation” in the sense that it finds expression in the “reciprocal confidence that all members of a society can constitute a community, that each individual can find her appropriate function within society’s complex of cooperation” (Honneth 1998: 765). But this reflexive form of community cooperation requires no prior awareness of the community. As we will see below, community is instead constituted in the experiential act of participation (Whipple 2005: 161). Community cannot be a precondition for communication because interpersonal communication per se is pre-political. For Dewey, it is elemental to human life. Social life begins before the formation of any political unit, making it unimaginable for Dewey that “prior to the formation of the state, individuals exist without any communicative relationship in total isolation” (ibid.: 767). All sociality therefore begins with cooperation (see also Eder 1999; 2004). This has important implications for our view of communication as a means of collective problem-solving. *Who is* and *who is not* to be involved in the collective, cooperative search for solutions is no longer a matter of membership in any given political unit, but rather a matter of a specific view of the problem to be dealt with. Concretely, it is a matter of the perception *who else* – apart from oneself – is affected by (the negative consequences of) the problem at hand, and who can make what contribution towards solving it.

It appears that Dewey’s view of publics as collectives of people affected by given problems should hinge on some notion of subjectivity in identifying the nature of an existing problem, and by extension in determining affectedness. For Dewey, a public is “that sphere of social action that a social group can successfully prove to be in need of general regulation because encroaching consequences are being generated”, “the circle of citizens who, on the basis of a jointly experienced concern, share the conviction that they have to turn to the rest of society for the purposes of administratively controlling the relevant interaction” (Honneth 1998: 774). Collective action therefore does not take its starting point in communitarian assumptions, but rather in the fact that actions have consequences beyond those immediately involved in them.38 Yet one

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38 In Dewey’s words, “the characteristic of the public as a state springs from the fact that all modes of associated behavior may have enduring consequences which involve others beyond those directly engaged in them. When these consequences are in turn realized in
question remains unanswered: are there objective standards for determining affectedness? Before introducing a framing perspective, we will first have a look at Dewey’s view of how community is constituted in communication.

**Dewey on the Constitution of Community in Communication**

Problem-oriented communication and action is thought to help create shared horizons and experiences and thereby have a *community-shaping effect* (Eder & Kantner 2002: 310). For Dewey, community is understood as a “community of cooperation” (Honneth 1998), shaped through the experience of communication, through the “experiential act of participation” (Whipple 2005: 161). The experience of community is a direct outcome of the experience of a successful collective problem-solving effort. “Wherever there is conjoint activity whose consequences are appreciated as good by all singular persons who take part in it,” Dewey writes, “and where the realization of the good is such as to effect an energetic desire and effort to sustain it in being just because it is a good shared by all, there is in so far a community” (Dewey 1927: 149). In this way, Dewey assumes that democratic politics has a social integrative effect even in heterogeneous societies such as the United States of his day. On this basis, authors like Eder and Kantner conclude that the same applies to contemporary Europe: problem-oriented communication and action is thought eventually to create shared horizons, experience, and finally community (Kantner 2004: 175).

But it is not collective action per se that is held to be constitutive of community, but rather a cognitive shift thought to take place in participants in the course of the cooperative effort: a sort of ‘we-feeling’ – a thin identity, one may be tempted to suggest – that amounts to a perception of the benefits of cooperation as desirable. In Dewey’s words, “no amount of aggregated collective action of itself constitutes a community. [...] ‘We’ and ‘our’ exist only when the consequences of combined action are perceived and become an object of desire and effort [...] Human associations may be ever so organic in origin and firm in operation, but they develop into societies in a human sense only as their consequences, being known, are esteemed and sought for” (Dewey 1927: 151f.)

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*thought and sentiment, recognition of them reacts to remake the conditions out of which they arose* (Dewey 1927: 27)
Framing: The Social Construction of Affectedness

While the Deweyan legacy provides important insights both into the possibility of deliberation across difference and into the community-shaping effect that the success of such cooperative efforts may have, we are left with one key question that paves the way for a social constructivist reconsideration of the Deweyan notion of affectedness. For Dewey, a particular perception or experience forms the root of problem-solving communication across difference. This is the shared experience of being negatively affected by an existing problem. But what constitutes the experience of affectedness? For many problems, the perception of being negatively affected by the consequences may have a (quasi-)objective quality. Before, I have used the example of unemployment benefits to illustrate this point. A policy change to the effect of a cut in unemployment benefits has more objectively negative consequences for an unemployed person than, say, the decision to build a new road in the neighborhood where that particular person lives. This point illustrates that even the experience of affectedness by the consequences of a particular action has to be understood in processual rather than essential terms. Ontologically, affectedness comes second to the process of constructing the ways in which a particular action – a cut in unemployment benefits or the decision to build a new road – affects different individuals. Affectedness is as much a matter of contestation as the cooperative search for solutions. Already the definition of the problem and of who is affected by it is a process, a performative act, making the process of defining the problem basic, and the definition of the problem and who is affected by it (and the ways in which they are affected by it) derivative. This view has particular implications for the empirical context of EU constitution making. EU constitution making has been considered problematic, as presenting Europe’s citizens with a variety of problems in terms of the Constitutional Treaty’s and later the Lisbon Treaty’s constitutional, democratic and not least social implications (see the media content analysis in chapters 6 through 8). The process of making sense of EU constitution making in such terms is illustrative of the ontological claims raised above. EU constitution making, at least where it is perceived to confront people with a problem, is an issue that does not have any essential qualities. Instead, the perception of EU constitution making as problematic is itself the outcome of the process of constructing a particular kind of meaning. Methodologically, this view suggests the use of a prominent social constructivist method, namely frame analysis (see chapter 4), to get at what may be called the social construction of
affectedness. Theoretically, the point in our context is that a Deweyan perspective of collective affectedness by the same problems has to be complemented with a social constructivist perspective on the processes in which affectedness is constructed as a particular form of meaning.

Summary: Public Spheres between Communication and Community?

This chapter has formulated an ontological critique of the idea of ‘identity light’. Specifically, ‘identity light’ has been criticized for its quasi-communitarian connotations, making a sense of belonging to a community of Europeans a precondition for transnational communication. In developing this argument, I have drawn on three distinct intellectual legacies that help shed light theoretically on the public sphere/political community relationship in the context of European public sphere debates. First, I have argued on ontological grounds against the very notion of an identitarian minimum providing for the proper functioning of any public sphere – and by extension of democracy itself. While the conclusion that democracy depends on a certain level of identification with the community is shared by communitarians and those liberals who share communitarianism’s basic anthropological view of human nature as by definition social/holistic rather than atomistic (Honneth 1993), the first point to be made was that even against this backdrop, collective identities cannot be ontologically prior to public spheres, as the collective identity of any community is negotiated in public discourse. Particularly social constructivism has to take such ontological issues seriously en route to an understanding of the public sphere/political community relationship.

One famous interpretation of the idea of a thin identity as a mode of attachment to the postnational European polity has already been suggested, namely constitutional patriotism. While combining certain elements of communitarianism and cosmopolitanism, respectively, Habermasian constitutional patriotism nonetheless does not fall prey to the temptation of ascribing ontological priority to communal sentiment (even in a thin form) over public deliberation. Rather, Habermas’s focus is on allegiance to universalist norms, yet in particular settings. As such, constitutional patriotism takes community and communal sentiment to emerge out of the constitutionally entrenched inclusiveness of democratic procedures. In a nutshell, constitutional patriotism’s thin identity is
‘identity light’ minus the cumbersome quasi-communitarian presupposition of a communal sentiment as the root rather than the product of inclusive public deliberation.

John Dewey’s pragmatism is useful to develop a specific way of imagining the very possibility of deliberation in the absence of a prior attachment to (or awareness of) the community. Dewey’s work has been highlighted as instructive for European public sphere debates already in earlier work, but his arguments are particularly intriguing in a more direct engagement with the public sphere/political community relationship. If deliberation and the inclusiveness of democratic procedures have a community-shaping effect, what is it then that allows for deliberation across difference to begin with? Dewey’s suggestion that communication across difference is an outcome of the experience of collective affectedness by existing problems is as instructive as the suggestion that the experience of successful problem-solving has a community-shaping effect. Yet it does not answer questions about the process in which the meaning of a problem is constructed, i.e. in which a problem is constructed as affecting one rather than another collective. Here, the Deweyan perspective can usefully be complemented by a social constructivist perspective on framing.

With these three elements in place, a conceptualization of the public sphere/political community relationship emerges that neither emphasizes communication nor community as a necessary condition for the emergence of communicative spaces. Instead, mutual recognition takes the place of collective identity in fostering communication (even across difference), and recognition hinges in turn on the discursive construction of affectedness: is a given issue framed as affecting one rather than another group of people? While EU constitution making can be perceived as problematic in a variety of ways – in terms of its presumed positive or negative democratic, constitutional and social implications – the emergence of a transnational communicative space in which such issues can be debated is not dependent on pre-existing communal sentiment or a pre-established European-level communicative forum. Instead, it is dependent on the discursive construction of affectedness. Like other mass media, daily newspapers play a key function in framing affectedness.
4 Connecting the Dots: Daily Newspapers, Transnational Debate and the Public Sphere/Political Community Relationship

Introduction

What are the respective roles of communication and community in the constitution of public spheres, and what are the prospects for a European public sphere as a transnational communicative context in light of such aspects? An abstract theoretical question of this kind does not lend itself easily to any empirical operationalization. Communication and community are analytically difficult to grasp. Consequently, the purpose of the present methodological introduction is twofold: the chapter has to outline the contours of the empirical analysis that forms the core of this study. To that end, this chapter introduces (a) the interview study with newspaper journalists and (b) the media content analysis. More importantly, however, this chapter demonstrates the connection between the study’s theoretical and empirical ambitions, indicating how the empirical analysis contributes to an understanding of the public sphere/political community relationship beyond communitarian and quasi-communitarian presuppositions. A vast (and growing) body of literature suggests that an empirical focus on media content serves an analytical purpose in itself. But media content analysis can also be fruitful in shedding light on questions that are otherwise confined to the realm of political philosophy. The public sphere/political community relationship is a prime example of such a political-philosophical question.

Chapter 2 indicated that even quasi-communitarian conceptualizations of the preconditions for public spheres are misleading. This theoretical argument was developed further in chapter 3, emphasizing the social construction of public spheres and political communities, but also of political issues and the very notion of affectedness. This view shifts our attention to issues of agency, i.e. to the actors involved in defining what is at stake in a given matter – and thus who can be considered affected by it. Where affectedness transcends national borders, so should public debate.
Consequently, this study wants to know whether newspapers’ perspectives on European integration and the future of democracy in the EU lead to particular patterns in framing EU constitution making, and whether these in turn have an impact on the liveliness of transnational debate in the different newspapers. This aim is modest and ambitious at the same time: it aims at contributing to an empirically grounded reconsideration of the public sphere/political community relationship, specifically by playing off notions of collective identity/political community against notions of agency in the construction of meaning. At the same time, this study is modest with regard to any possible generalizing ambitions. Since the empirical analysis draws on press material from only a small number of newspapers and countries, weighing qualitative and/or interpretative aspects stronger than quantitative ones, it is difficult to maintain a generalizing ambition applicable to the wider multinational, multilingual context of an EU of 27+ member states. In addition, the empirical analysis draws on material from debates that may in some ways be held to be particularly well-suited for cross-border opinion formation. In this sense, this study allows for no wider generalizations as to the sufficient conditions under which transnational communication necessarily and predictably has to occur. However, it shows when and under which conditions transnational communication has occurred, and which forms it took when it did. The minimal conclusion that can be drawn from any such analysis, as we will see throughout this study, is that transnational debate on European integration is possible, provided that certain conditions are met. Still, this ambition should not be sold short: even if transnational communication here occurs only in a very limited segment of the public sphere during a very limited period of time and under highly specific conditions, its occurrence in the first place is testimony to the fact that transnational communication is possible in principle. And if transnational debate is possible in certain conditions, this very insight allows us to refute claims that deliberative communication across difference is impossible to begin with.

**Selection of Cases**

Before introducing the study’s analytical framework, let us begin by introducing some of the choices that were made regarding selection of cases. The process of case selection involved at least five choices, which are referred to here as (a) the choice for newspapers (as opposed to other
(mass) media formats); (b) the choice for Germany and Sweden; (c) the choice for six newspapers in particular; (d) the choice for EU constitution making; and (e) the choice for three particular periods in the debate on EU constitution making.

The Choice for Newspapers

First, the choice for newspapers needs to be motivated as a principal choice. Newspapers represent a somewhat problematic choice. After all, our analysis aims at exploring communication in the public sphere, and newspapers (or the mass media in general) represent only one – albeit an extremely prominent – segment of the much larger communicative context of the public sphere. In Thomas Risse’s words, they are a “problematic proxy” for the public sphere (Risse 2003). The mass media, and daily newspapers no less, are obviously a highly restricted, even elitist forum for public communication. Access to the public sphere via the channels provided by the mass media in general and newspapers in particular is extremely restricted. Only a very small portion of any given population can hope (or expect) to have access, and access is usually restricted to individuals that have important societal, economic or political functions. Also the free flow of ideas – a hallmark of the Habermasian notion of the public sphere – is restricted by what is usually referred to as the “gatekeeping” role of the mass media, i.e. the decision “whether or not to admit a particular news story to pass through the ‘gates’ of a news medium into the news channels” (McQuail 1994: 213). At the same time, quality newspapers are the “backbone of the public sphere”: both in their analytical and opinion-making functions, they are indispensable for the “discursive vitality of the public sphere (Habermas 2008).

Also from a methodological point of view, the choice for newspapers has undisputable advantages. Newspapers provide the researcher with a sizable and fairly easily accessible abundance of textual material. In addition, the same material is similarly easily accessible for other researchers, enhancing the intersubjectivity of the research process. Using newspapers for purposes of media content analysis quite simply increases the transparency of the research process, which is an indispensable feature particularly in qualitative and/or interpretative research.

The mass media’s gatekeeping role heavily restricts access to daily newspapers. But because access is so heavily restricted, it dramatically increases the visibility of the mass media. An important function of the mass media in general and of newspapers in particular is to filter out,
condense and amplify relevant information (e.g. Strömbäck 2004: 120f.). Reality and the amount of information available is virtually limitless (Luhmann 1996), creating the necessity of a medium that performs precisely the function of a condenser and amplifier of those aspects that can be considered relevant. And while the information (and the opinions!) published in newspapers only represent a minimal part of all information available, precisely this condensation increases the visibility of this information. While we need to be aware of the possible biases that newspapers certainly have in performing their gatekeeper role, the high visibility of daily newspapers is a strong argument for considering them for studies of this kind.

The Choice for Germany and Sweden

The choice for Sweden and Germany is motivated by practical as well as theoretical reasons. For theoretical reasons, this choice can only be motivated in combination. Sweden and Germany represent a theoretically sound choice because both are countries with so-called democratic corporatist media (and political) systems. In their oft-quoted analysis of 18 media systems (16 European plus the United States and Canada), Daniel Hallin and Paolo Mancini established a close connection between the historical developments and the respective media systems in the countries analyzed. They establish a distinction between “three models of media and politics” that follows a strongly geographical pattern that at first seems coincidental, but that actually shows clear parallels between media systems and the respective countries’ political development. These models are the democratic corporatist model in Northern and Central Europe (including Sweden and Germany), the polarized-pluralist model in Southern Europe, and the liberal model in the United Kingdom, the United States and Canada.39

Comparisons between debates on European politics in different national media are impaired by the fact that media systems are so different across Europe. This applies particularly to different traditions as regards distinctions between news-reporting, analysis and opinion-making. For Hallin & Mancini, much of these differences in journalistic traditions are

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39 Hallin & Mancini’s model does not incorporate any of the so-called “Central and Eastern European Countries”. While the authors note that in their historical development, many of the accession countries of the 2004/2007 round of EU enlargement share patterns with the democratic-corporatist countries, “the experience of communism obviously separates their political and media history from that of the countries discussed here” (Hallin & Mancini 2004: 144).
connected to the concept of political parallelism, a modification of the earlier concept of party-press parallelism (cf. Blumler & Gurevitch 1975). Party-press parallelism denoted the degree of influence that particular parties had on newspapers, whereas Hallin & Mancini’s preferred concept of political parallelism refers instead to the subscription of newspapers to “general political tendencies” (Hallin & Mancini 2004: 27). In the German case, for instance, the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung and the Süddeutsche Zeitung, two of the newspapers included in our study, correspond to broadly conservative and liberal orientations, respectively. However, no affinity to any particular party can be clearly determined (Hallin & Mancini 2004: 27). Political parallelism is considered strong in the democratic-corporatist countries of Northern and Central Europe, but even stronger in the advocative press of the Southern European polarized-pluralist countries. By comparison, it is weak or non-existent in the liberal media systems of the United Kingdom, the United States and Canada (ibid.: chap. 7).

The notion of political parallelism matters to our choice of countries because it has a profound impact on what Hallin & Mancini call journalistic role orientations and practices. Democratic-corporatist countries share an orientation towards both a journalistic and a publicist role in newspaper journalism, i.e. an orientation towards both providing information and influencing public opinion. While we may take both of these aspects for granted and even have strong normative expectations that the mass media and particularly the press ought to perform both of these roles, they are very clear expressions of a particular tradition of newspaper journalism that does not exist in the same way across Europe. Since our analysis is based on newspaper opinion-making, we are dependent on certain similarities in the traditions and journalistic role perceptions in the countries to be analyzed. Our cases need to be sufficiently similar for us to be able to compare them. Simply put, we need to compare newspapers from countries that share similar journalistic traditions.

But there are more theoretical arguments supporting the choice for Sweden and Germany. One such argument is related to a form of selection bias that has characterized much of the earlier empirical work on the European public sphere. This is problematic because precisely this work has informed the cliché that a European public sphere is not only possible, but that it already manifests itself in similar understandings of European issues and even a certain degree of transnational debate. However, this early work on the European public sphere tended to be based on older, to some extent bigger and also fairly central EU member
states: Germany, France, the Netherlands are most often represented, while smaller and especially more recently acceded member states have only recently started to attract the interest of European public sphere research. This situation underlines the need to include more recently acceded, possibly peripheral member states in the analysis. A German-Swedish comparison appears particularly intriguing because it would allow us specifically to compare the experience of a big, central and founding state with the experience of a smaller, more peripheral and more recently acceded state in which European integration is still very much a contested issue.

Finally, the choice for Sweden and Germany is motivated by practical reasons, which are nonetheless important from a methodological point of view. The presentation of the analytical framework underlines this study’s strong focus on interpretation. Where journalistic references to individual speakers are coded, each quotation consists of six codes, five of which (with the exception of the reference’s name) involve an interpretation on the part of the researcher. Due to this strong emphasis on interpretation, the researcher needs to have a certain level of familiarity with the political and cultural context of the debate to be analyzed – in addition to language skills, which are obviously the most fundamental requirement for any kind of qualitative analysis.

These aspects narrow the available choices down tremendously. In fact, they leave few other alternatives. Let us summarize the criteria that we have developed so far: (1) we would like to have two democratic-corporatist countries, (2) one of which is an older and bigger, one of which is a more recently acceded and smaller (possibly peripheral) member state. This would leave us with Germany or the Netherlands and Finland or Sweden, respectively.40 In this context, language skills and the necessary familiarity with the political and cultural context of the German and Swedish debates therefore easily tip the scale into this direction.

### The Choice for Particular Newspapers

Most comparative empirical research on the European public sphere tends to limit its analysis to two newspapers per country, in most cases one conservative and one liberal broadsheet. In most cases, the choice for particular newspapers is not discussed in detail, and authors tend to

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40 France would be an option only to some degree, but the French media system is considered a mix between the democratic-corporatist and the polarized-pluralist models. Alternatively, we could opt for the Netherlands and Finland, but there are no strong theoretical reasons that suggest such a choice over Germany and Sweden.
content themselves with selecting “leading newspapers” (Vetters et al. 2006) in the countries studied. Part of the reason for this tendency is that objective selection criteria for “leading” or even “important” newspapers are difficult to develop. Newspaper circulation is often considered a relevant criterion, but it is clearly not sufficient. There are also newspapers – the German *tageszeitung* is a case in point – that are rather small in terms of circulation. Yet while the taz’s circulation is smaller than that of some regional and even local newspapers, it is nonetheless widely considered to be an important publication, particularly on the left/alternative part of the political spectrum.

While it is therefore difficult to establish objective selection criteria, there are strong reasons for selecting newspapers that cover contending “general political tendencies” (Hallin & Mancini 2004: 27). Previous research on the European public sphere has done so only to a certain degree. Most studies include only two newspapers per country (e.g. Trenz 2006; Trenz et al. 2007; Vetters et al. 2006; Wimmel 2006; Risse 2004). Some authors have even limited their analysis to only one daily broadsheet (Pettersson 2005) or one weekly newsmagazine (van de Steeg 2002) per country. This practice has led to a virtually complete and systematic neglect of left newspapers. In the present study, we therefore analyze three newspapers per country, and the newspapers chosen were initially selected on the basis of their respective ideological orientations on a left-right scale of the political spectrum. For the Swedish part, these include *Svenska Dagbladet* (Stockholm, conservative), *Dagens Nyheter* (Stockholm, liberal), and *Aftonbladet* (Stockholm, social democratic/left). For the German part, they include the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (Frankfurt, conservative), the *Süddeutsche Zeitung* (Munich, liberal), and *die tageszeitung* (Berlin, left/alternative).

Despite the advantage of broadening the analysis through the inclusion of one left newspaper per country, the assumption that a German liberal broadsheet newspaper necessarily has to have a close equivalent in Sweden is somewhat problematic. The same applies to the conservative and left newspapers. Nevertheless, our comparison works reasonably well between the two conservative as well as between the two liberal newspapers. In these cases, we can also be confident that the selected newspapers are in fact the ones considered the most important or leading broadsheet newspapers in the two countries.41 The *Frankfurter Allgemeine* 

41 In the German case, this assertion may leave some room for contention, as also the *Frankfurter Rundschau* is widely acknowledged as a leading liberal newspaper. While both the *Süddeutsche Zeitung* and the *Frankfurter Rundschau* have a roughly similar standing in
Zeitung, on the other hand, is almost undisputed as the most important conservative daily broadsheet and is therefore frequently used in comparative media analyses on the European public sphere. As far as the liberal and conservative Swedish newspapers are concerned, things are fairly clear-cut. Here, Svenska Dagbladet and Dagens Nyheter are without doubt considered the most important nationwide newspapers. It should be noted, however, that conservative Svenska Dagbladet is only the fifth largest newspaper in Sweden in terms of circulation. Nonetheless, it is the biggest conservative broadsheet newspaper in the country.42

On the left side of the spectrum, we are analyzing a social democratic tabloid in the Swedish case. The choice for Aftonbladet was motivated foremost by the newspaper’s political orientation on the left side of the political spectrum, not however by its categorization as a tabloid newspaper. As a matter of fact, what constitutes a tabloid has such different meanings in different countries and media systems that such distinctions in themselves are questionable for purposes of comparative analysis. Furthermore, provided that distinctions between tabloid and broadsheet newspapers are problematic in cross-country comparison, the choice for Aftonbladet is motivated by the newspaper’s standing as the most-sold newspapers in the Swedish market (with a circulation of close to 400,000). The choice of a left newspaper in the German case, finally, was fairly obvious, although die tageszeitung cannot be described as a perfect match in the search for a German equivalent of Aftonbladet. While the tageszeitung is the seventh biggest nationwide or “supraregional” (“überregional”) newspaper in the German market, it is still a rather small publication by comparison to Aftonbladet, especially considering the respective sizes of the two countries.43

The Choice for EU Constitution Making

Debates on EU constitution making address fundamental issues concerning the future of European integration. Seen in this light, one may argue that the choice for constitution-making debates represents a form of selection bias: constitution making may provide more suitable

the German newspaper market and also fairly similar ideological orientations, the SZ can nonetheless be argued to be more influential not least to its higher circulation.(447,000 in the case of the SZ, compared to 160,000 in the case of the FR).

42 In 2007, Svenska Dagbladet’s circulation amounted to 196,600 (TidningsUtgivarna/Swedish Newspaper Publishers’ Association 2008).
43 The tageszeitung has a circulation of 57,000.
Precisely the history-making character of EU constitution making can also be viewed to inhibit rather than facilitate transnational debate. While the common future of Europe is at stake in debates on EU constitution making, so is the future of the nation-state. Any renegotiation of the fundamental functioning of the EU, particularly as regards the role of the individual member states within the European institutions, calls also for national introspection: how much supranational integration do we want? How much qualified majority voting in the Council of Ministers is necessary and/or tolerable? And what role should national parliaments play in EU decision making? The point to be made here is that EU constitution making does not by itself foster more transnational debate than possible alternative debates. Instead, EU constitution making is a process that can be read in very different ways, with very different conclusions to be drawn as to who should and who should not be considered a legitimate participant in the discourse about it.

A different approach could have consisted in an analysis of so-called everyday politics in the EU. Yet even in this context, two things need to be taken into consideration. In the latter case, we would also be faced with a completely different kind of selection bias, consisting of the choice of a least-likely case for transnational debate. The bottom line of this approach would have consisted in an analysis of so-called everyday politics in the EU. Yet even in this context, two things need to be taken into consideration. In the former case, on the other hand, we would have consisted in an analysis of so-called everyday politics in the EU. Yet even in this context, two things need to be taken into consideration.
absolutely cannot be argued to represent any form of selection bias, either in the direction of a most-likely or least-likely scenario for transnational debate. In addition, and maybe more importantly, (b) public debates always develop their own dynamics, making it virtually impossible for the researcher to determine whether any given debate would necessarily proceed along a transnational or an intranational path. In light of these arguments, EU constitution making is a highly intriguing case because it allows for two very different understandings of who should and who should not be allowed to have a say in the ensuing debates. EU constitution making represents a most-likely scenario for transnational despite the possibility of a contrary reading. Yet to the extent that this assertion is true, the selection of a most-likely case also bears certain advantages. Particularly in light of communitarian claims about the impossibility of deliberation across difference, it appears adequate to test whether transnational debate occurs when it is most likely to do so. Another question altogether is to what extent any generalization is possible on the basis of findings that are in turn based on a most-likely scenario. This study has only limited generalizing ambitions. The ambition is rather to show when, in which forms and under which conditions transnational debate has occurred in the debate on EU constitution making, and whether and to what extent the forms of transnational debate identified can be attributed to the active role played by daily newspapers. Nonetheless, this study develops an analytical framework that can very well be applied in further studies of other newspaper debates, whether on everyday politics or any form of history-making decision.

The Choice for Three Debates

On the basis of the arguments presented in the previous paragraphs, the choice for the three periods of the constitution-making process that I have selected is arguably the least controversial of the five choices discussed here. The debates studied include (i) the so-called finality debate during the constitutional process’ agenda-setting phase following the German foreign minister Joschka Fischer’s ‘reflections on the finality

46 Similarly, Sebastian Kurpas explains his choice of press coverage of the Convention as an example of a European public sphere (or rather of European Öffentlichkeit), arguing that a strongly national perspective even under the otherwise beneficial circumstances of the Convention would be an indication of the existence of “fundamentally different discourses about the European integration process that enduringly obstruct any transnational exchange” (Kurpas 2008: 21; author’s translation).
of European integration’ at Humboldt University in Berlin in May 2000 (chapter 6); (2) the ratification crisis debate in the run-up to as well as in the aftermath of the French and Dutch referenda on the Constitutional Treaty in the spring of 2005 (chapter 7); and finally (3) the constitutional re-launch debate, covering the period from the so-called Berlin Declaration on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the Rome Treaties (in March 2007) to the Brussels European Council in June 2007, where the reform treaty now known as the Lisbon Treaty was negotiated (chapter 8). The three chosen periods were selected because a high level of attention to issues directly or indirectly related to EU constitution making could be expected. This choice therefore corresponds closely to the “most-likely scenario” discussed in connection to the choice for EU constitution making. This would be a problematic choice for studies that aim at establishing whether and to what extent a European public sphere exists. But this is not the question here. The present study has no ambition of providing answers to the question of whether a European public sphere necessitates transnational debate on all EU issues at all times. Instead, this study explores the role of newspapers in transnational debates. Consequently, it is advantageous to choose periods during which lively debate can be expected, not least because an increase in sample size also promises an increase in the validity of our results. Beyond this point, the guiding ambition in selecting these periods was to cover a longer period of the constitution-making process, particularly by including also the so-called agenda-setting phase of the constitutional project prior to the Laeken Declaration of December 2001.47 Most qualitative studies tend to analyze relatively short periods of time, often ranging from a few months to little over a year (e.g. Risse 2004; Trenz et al. 2007). Quantitative studies sometimes analyze very long periods (in some cases several decades), but tend to remain rather shallow in terms of their units of analysis (e.g. Gerhards 2000).48 The present analysis begins already in the agenda-setting phase, i.e. immediately after the idea of a

47 While the Laeken Declaration, an annex to the Belgian Council Presidency’s conclusions at the end of the European Council meeting in Laeken, is usually considered the birth of the constitution-making process, the idea of a constitution for Europe – or a constitutional treaty – has a much longer history.

48 In his famous and (in the German literature) oft-quoted study of the (non-)Europeanization of German newspapers, Jürgen Gerhards analyzes the period from 1950 to 1992 and arrives at the conclusion that the share of European issues covered by German quality newspapers has by and large remained constant (Gerhards 2000). However, as Friedhelm Neidhardt objects, Gerhards only includes primary topics in his analysis, omitting other relevant aspects such as secondary and tertiary topics (Neidhardt 2006).
European constitution was introduced in Joschka Fischer’s speech at Humboldt University. This is motivated in part by the absence of this agenda-setting phase from previous studies on the European public sphere despite the observation that Fischer’s proposals did create a lively public debate across borders, albeit at the elite level (Nelsen & Stubb 2003: 69).

The second period selected is motivated both by the mere amount of public attention that the referenda on the Constitutional Treaty in France and the Netherlands drew, and by the fact that the referenda marked the beginning of the end of the Constitutional Treaty. Also the re-launch of the constitution-making process was chosen foremost because it drew substantial public attention. All three periods were chosen for the intensity with which the (constitutional) future of Europe was discussed at these points. Most importantly, our inclusion of the finality debate broadens our perspective on the constitution-making process better than an exclusive focus on the Convention and/or the Constitutional Treaty would.

A final word ought to be said about the time frame for the different sampling periods. Broadly speaking, three two-month periods were chosen for the three media content analyses. It should be noted, however, that both the finality and the re-launch debate had for the most part faded out well before the respective sampling periods ended. In addition, the ratification crisis debate more or less faded in slowly in the beginning of May 2005, resulting in a strong concentration of the sampled articles during the last six weeks of the sampling period.

The starting point for the finality debate was for fairly obvious reasons set to the day of Joschka Fischer’s speech at Humboldt University. Since the ratification crisis debate has no corresponding natural triggering event, the choice of starting point for this debate is more arbitrary. In this case, articles were sampled for the months of May and June 2005, i.e. roughly one month prior to and one month following the referenda in France and the Netherlands. The fact that the debate gradually faded in during the first few days of May indicates, however, that the starting point was well-chosen in the sense that the whole debate in the run-up to the referenda is covered by our analysis. The end date of the ratification crisis debate is somewhat more problematic for reasons outlined above, but we can say with at least some certainty that our sampling period did cover those
parts of the debate when the two referenda and the constitutional future of the EU was debated.49

In the case of the re-launch debate, the sampling period was guided primarily by two events: the issuing of the so-called Berlin Declaration during the celebrations commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of the Treaties of Rome in late March 2007, and the Brussels European Council in late June. To cover also the run-up to the Berlin Declaration as well as the immediate aftermath of the Brussels European Council, the sampling period covers the period from the beginning of March until the end of June 2007.

**Studying Transnational Communication: An Analytical Framework**

Analyzing transnational communication is no end in itself, but rather an empirical means to a theoretical end. Our aim is to explore whether and in which ways transnational political debate can be understood as a function of daily newspapers’ perspectives on European integration and the future of democracy in the EU. In doing so, we want to explore the theoretical question of whether transnational debate and a transnational public sphere is possible even in the absence of a thick sense of European identity.

**Communication and Community: Two Theoretical Ideal-Types**

Chapter 3 introduced “communication” and “community” as theoretical ideal-types to be drawn on in the analysis. The communitarian perspective suggests a strong skepticism towards the notion of postnational democracy at the European level. The EU is considered, after all, to be an international organization whose democratic legitimacy consequently rests on indirect channels of legitimation, i.e. on the institutionalization of democratic channels of delegation of authority at the national level. Consequently, there is no need for transnational

49 A review of other issues that were discussed in the course of the ratification crisis debate follows in the introduction to chapter 7. Prominent among these issues were the negotiations on the EU’s budget for the period from 2007-2013, the start of the British Council Presidency, and not least the European Commission’s announcement of a period of reflection.
communication in any deliberative sense. After all, democratic opinion-
formation is to take place in the national public sphere. Regarding the
prospects for transnational debate, we can therefore have only modest
expectations towards newspapers adopting a primarily intergovernmental
perspective: transnational communication can here be expected to be less
lively than in newspapers with stronger postnational perspectives.\footnote{\textsuperscript{50}}

Table 3.1. Communication versus Community.

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<thead>
<tr>
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<th>“Community”</th>
<th>“Communication”</th>
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<tr>
<td>Theoretical Basis</td>
<td>Communitarianism</td>
<td>Habermasian discourse theory</td>
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<tr>
<td>Communication/Community</td>
<td>Communal values as a precondition for meaningful communication</td>
<td>Communication as a precondition for the emergence of culture/community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relationship</td>
<td>Priority on EU democracy</td>
<td>Delegated/intergovernmental Postnational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Choice of frames (expected)</td>
<td>“Nation-state frames”</td>
<td>“Postnational frames”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Permeability (expected)</td>
<td>Low number of non-domestic authors</td>
<td>High number of non-domestic authors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transnational Engagement (expected)</td>
<td>Mainly representative function</td>
<td>Both representative and critical function</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

In the communicative perspective, democracy at the European level consequentely hinges on vital communicative exchange across borders; a lack thereof is in turn one of the root causes of the democratic deficit. In other words, postnational democracy is both possible and necessary at the EU level. Delegated democracy is in turn insufficient. Regarding the prospects for transnational debate, newspapers with stronger postnational

\footnote{\textsuperscript{50} It should be made clear that the aim is not to establish absolute criteria for when a given debate can be characterized as containing a lively transnational element. Instead, the aim is to establish relative differences between newspapers representing different perspectives on European integration and EU democracy, and to analyze whether and in what ways these relative differences correspond to the newspapers’ respective perspectives on EU democracy as (a) intergovernmental/delegated, (b) supranational, or (c) postnational democracy.}

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perspectives can be expected to play a more active role in providing forums for transnational debate.

Three Analytical Tasks

With these elements in place, our analysis consists of three distinct tasks: (1) an interview study with journalists writing on European Union politics for the different newspapers selected; (2) a media content analysis of 600 newspaper articles, based on a standardized codebook developed specifically for this purpose (see appendix 2); and finally (3) a synthesis where the findings from the first two parts are contrasted so as to establish in what ways newspapers’ normative preferences on EU democracy correspond to our normative expectations regarding the degree of transnational communication found in debates on EU constitution making.

Table 3.2. Three Analytical Tasks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Interview Study (Chapter 5)</th>
<th>Media Content Analysis (Chapters 6-8)</th>
<th>Synthesis (Chapter 9)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Material</strong></td>
<td>Interview Transcripts</td>
<td>600 opinion articles</td>
<td>Interview Study &amp; Media Content Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Analytical Purpose</strong></td>
<td>Newspapers’ perspectives:</td>
<td>• Choice of frames</td>
<td>Relationship between newspaper orientations and transnational debate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• intergovernmental</td>
<td>• Permeability</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>• supranational</td>
<td>• Transnational engagement</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• postnational democracy</td>
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</table>

First, in order to assess the role that newspaper journalists’ views and orientations on European integration can play in providing forums for transnational communicative exchange, we need to understand precisely what those views and orientations consist of. To arrive at such an understanding, I have conducted an interview study with newspaper journalists writing on European integration for the newspapers selected. An interview study has a number of advantages. First, it allows the researcher to obtain direct responses on the questions that are of interest.
in this context, and therefore to obtain otherwise unattainable material. Second, even semi-structured interviews allow the researcher to obtain roughly the same kind of information from all participating respondents, increasing the comparability of the responses given. Third, and connected to the first two points, the participating respondents’ contributions to the debates analyzed in the media content analysis can be used to confirm the accuracy of our (somewhat stylized) accounts of their respective normative preferences on European integration and EU democracy, arrived at in the interview study.

**An Interview Study**

The material in the interview study stems from 21 semi-structured interviews with the respective newspapers’ EU correspondents, correspondents in certain other EU states, and editorialists in the respective newspapers’ home offices in Stockholm, Berlin, Frankfurt and Munich. Respondents were selected on the basis of their participation in the debates analyzed. They were initially contacted with a letter, and in subsequent rounds sent a reminder letter and/or contacted by phone. For the most part, the interviews were conducted on site in the participating journalists’ offices, although 4 were conducted as telephone interviews.

The interviews were conducted in the respective journalists’ native language, i.e. Swedish or German, and lasted between 45 and 70 minutes. The interviews were guided by a fixed set of structuring questions that respondents had been informed about well in advance through the use of an interview guide sent to them by e-mail (see appendix 1), and were kept on track by the use of a fixed set of planned prompts (cf. Leech 2002: 667f.).

In the interviews, respondents were asked to reflect on the historical development of the EU both from an empirical and from a normative point of view. They were asked to describe how they interpret the EU’s development, and more importantly, to develop their own normative preferences for the future of the EU. In this context, respondents were asked to reflect on the extent to which they would describe the EU as

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51 Correspondents in other EU member states included the Paris-based correspondent of the Süddeutsche Zeitung (Gerd Kröncke), as well as the London-based correspondent of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (Johannes Leithäuser), both of whom published a fair number of articles in the debate around the French referendum in the spring of 2005, and the beginning of the British Council Presidency in the summer of 2005.

52 Telephone interviews were conducted with the taz’s Hannes Koch (Berlin), the FAZ’ Johannes Leithäuser (London), and the SZ’ Cornelia Bolesch (Brussels) and Gerd Kröncke (Paris).
being (or developing into) (a) an intergovernmental problem-solving organization, (b) a supranational federation based on communal values, or (c) a rights-based, postnational union (Eriksen and Fossum, 2004, Eriksen and Fossum, 2007), and on the extent to which they welcome or reject such developments.53

Furthermore, respondents were asked to define what the European Union’s democratic deficit consists of, if in fact they find that there is one to begin with. This question was included as a way of confirming which kind of democracy the respective respondents envision for the present and future of European integration. Descriptions of a lack of democracy hinge on the kind of democracy that the respondents consider desirable. Consequently, proponents of delegated, intergovernmental democracy (Eriksen & Fossum 2007) were expected to be less likely than proponents of postnational democracy to find something fundamentally deficient about EU decision making. Therefore, the rationale behind including this question was the expectation that assessments of the democratic deficit would largely correspond to the respective respondents’ normative preferences on European-level democracy.

Similarly, respondents were asked to reflect about their own role as journalists in the context of the perceived democratic deficit. Do they see any European-level equivalent to the role that they play as amplifiers in the national public sphere? Also this question was included as a way of confirming the different respondents’ normative preferences as regards European-level democracy.54

All interviews were digitally recorded, stored and subsequently transcribed. On the basis of these interview transcripts, the different newspapers were then grouped according to which kind of democracy their respondents find normatively most appropriate for the present and future course of the integration process. This grouping then formed the basis for our formulation of normative expectations about the quantity and quality of transnational communication in the upcoming media content analysis. These expectations are introduced in more detail in chapter 5, but can be summarized as follows: transnational debate is expected to be least lively in newspapers advocating intergovernmental/

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53 A detailed account of what the different ideal-typical scenarios entail is included in chapter 4, where the results of the interview study are presented.
54 The interview guide (see appendix 1) also included questions about a European dimension in the respective newspaper’s coverage as well as about which foreign newspapers the respective respondents read on a daily basis. For time constraints, however, these questions were in practice only touched upon briefly, and are only used for additional information in this study.
delegated democracy category. Correspondingly, it is expected to be most lively in newspapers advocating European integration as a development towards postnational democracy.

A Media Content Analysis

The material in the media content analysis consists of over 600 opinion articles (see appendix 4) from the debate on the European Union’s constitution-making process in the selected newspapers. The media content analysis includes articles sampled for the abovementioned three periods of the debate. The media content analysis is based on three analytical tasks, namely to assess the occurrence of transnational debate through an analysis of (1) newspaper framing; (2) the inclusion of non-domestic as compared to domestic speakers as authors in the three debates; and (3) engagement with non-domestic compared to domestic references in the three debates.

A Frame Analysis

To begin with, the media content analysis comprises a comparison of the different newspapers’ use of frames in constructing EU constitution making. Frame analysis is a useful tool in establishing to what extent newspaper debates in different countries and in different newspapers do (or do not) construct a given issue in similar terms. For our purposes, this is important because it allows us to draw conclusions about a central precondition for transnational debate, namely the existence of shared understandings about the problem at hand. For our purposes, frame analysis is used to operationalize one of the indicators that Eder & Kantner (2002) have introduced for interdiscursivity, namely that debates in different media spheres have to be characterized by the same criteria of relevance. This is relevant especially because it allows us to analyze whether interpretations of a given issue follow exclusively country-

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55 Following Trenz et al (2007:7f.), opinion articles are here defined rather widely as all articles containing opinions of the respective authors. Consequently, we distinguish between news articles where journalists “abstain from value judgments and the expression of author opinion” (ibid.) and all other forms of articles. Alternatively, we could have opted for a narrower definition of opinion-making articles and consequently only included editorials, signed commentaries and op-eds. However, in that case we would have missed a considerable amount of opinion articles published e.g. in the respective cultural sections of the different newspapers. In addition, we would have also missed all opinions formulated in the otherwise fairly distanced-analytical background opinion articles authored by the respective newspapers’ correspondents.
specific lines, or whether cross-country parallels can be discerned between newspapers of similar “general political tendencies”.

For Risse (2004) and Risse & van de Steeg (2003), the crucial question for European public sphere research was whether a “transnational community of communication” emerges (in part) due to framing processes in newspaper debates: is a given issue (such as the EU member states’ sanctions against Austria during the Haider affair in 2000) a matter that concerns Europeans as Europeans, or rather as members of their respective national (communicative) communities? For our present purposes, however, a frame analysis has to be broader. What is at stake in the constitution-making process can be (and is!) framed in terms of its implications for e.g. national sovereignty, but other aspects matter as well and possibly even to a much larger extent. Also, different newspapers tend to emphasize different issues differently, with different outcomes regarding their respective use of frames. Consequently, a broader frame analysis is necessary for our present purposes.

Frames: Interpretative Packages for the Organization of Experience

Despite the advantages outlined so far, frame analysis is often considered to be empirically problematic. In part, such problems are related to the fact that Erving Goffman’s initial introduction of the concept (Goffman 1974) has prompted a variety of different and to some extent even contradictory usages of the concept (König 2004; D’Angelo 2002). This has to do not least with the ontological as well as epistemological status of frames, i.e. questions regarding (1) whether frames are “out there” for the researcher to be discovered or whether they are rather an analytical construction on the part of the researcher, and (2) how we can know that one frame is used and how we can claim that such observations are intersubjectively possible. Other problems include methodological aspects, i.e. how to conduct frame analysis systematically (Johnston 1995), how to identify frames and how to show convincingly that a given text actually qualifies as the kind of frame that the researcher codes.

The very idea of frames and framing is based on the notion that social reality is or at the very least can be tremendously complex. Consequently, any understanding thereof depends on our ability to highlight certain aspects while toning down others. In order to understand social reality, we need to attempt to reduce complexity and bring some sort of order into it. In Goffman’s words, we need to “organize” our experience of social reality. Metaphorically speaking, we thus place a frame over an otherwise
indigestible amount of information so that we end up seeing only one particular aspect of it.\textsuperscript{56}

EU constitution making is an excellent illustration. We can choose to focus on (read: frame) aspects related to “decision-making efficiency” and view the Constitutional Treaty and/or the Lisbon Treaty as an exercise in institutional reform, i.e. as a way of making EU decision making more efficient: more qualified majority voting means less deadlock in a Council of Ministers of 27+ member states. However, we could also focus on an increase of qualified majority voting in the Council of Ministers and view the respective treaties as one further step in the direction of an “EU superstate”. By emphasizing different aspects differently – by framing the issue of institutional reform differently – we arrive at different and contending ways of “organizing experience”.

For the purposes of this study – once again, our use of frame analysis aims at understanding particular individuals’ understanding(s) of a given situation – we can adhere to Goffman’s original understanding of framing. While most communications research nowadays is focused on the effects of media framing (and thereby on the recipients rather than in the senders of a given message), what is of analytical interest here is rather sense-making through speakers involved in the debates analyzed – nothing more, nothing less. In this sense, it suffices to understand frames, as Goffman did, as “mental orientations that organize perception and interpretation”, or to a lesser extent as “problem-solving schemata [...] for the interpretative task of making sense of presenting situations” (Goffman 1974). In this sense, the frame analysis conducted here is very close in ambition to the frame analysis done by Trenz et al. (2007). In their analysis of constitutional debates in six European countries, Trenz et al. look at framing as a particular way of sense-making, namely “as a more indirect way of newspaper opinion-making, which allows journalists to transmit meaning without necessarily entering an argumentative practice with the audience (Trenz et al. 2007: 29).

In the present frame analysis, we are thus interested mainly in the question of whether and to what extent newspaper framing follows national or cross-national patterns. The frame analysis proceeds almost entirely inductively. A few frames are borrowed from an earlier project (Trenz et al. 2007), but these turned out to be not even remotely

\textsuperscript{56} James N. Druckman uses the example of a Ku Klux Klan rally to illustrate how the same event can be framed in completely different ways. Citizens’ opinions about such a rally may depend, Druckman argues, on “whether elites frame it as a free speech issue or a public safety issue” (Druckman 2001: 1041).
exhaustive of the way meaning was constructed in the Swedish or the German debates. The frames employed here broadly fall into three categories, namely frames relating to the (a) history, (b) present; and (c) future of European integration. Furthermore, our analysis indicates that many frames – yet not all – appear in contending readings. Consequently, we distinguish not only between individual frames, but where applicable also between a positive/commendable and a negative/undesirable reading of the different frames. An illustrative example of this is the frequent use of the citizenship/democracy frame, which is used both in a negative and in a positive sense. Where the frame is applied positively, the content of the Constitutional Treaty is seen at the very least as a step in the right direction, towards democratizing European integration. Where the frame is applied negatively, on the other hand, EU constitution making is portrayed as exacerbating the democratic deficit, widening the gap between voters and EU decision-makers. In sum, our analysis identified a total of fifteen frames, examples of which are offered in appendix 4.

**Frames relating to the history of European integration**
The so-called “heroic frame” is the only frame relating to the history of European integration, but it appears rather frequently in all newspapers. The frame originated in Trenz et al. (2007), where it is understood to entail references to the heroic achievement(s) of European integration, but was modified somewhat for our purposes, i.e. to match its application in our sample. For Trenz et al., the heroic frame is a frame referring to “role ascriptions” of the constitution-makers: constitution-makers are here seen to be “in the tradition of the founding fathers, defending the common good of Europeans” (Trenz et al. 2007: 40). In our context, the heroic frame is both narrower and wider. It is narrower in the sense that it focuses on the role of the founding fathers rather than on the constitution-makers following in their footsteps. However, it is also wider in the sense that it emphasizes not only the role of the founding fathers, but rather the high value of European integration per se, an achievement which is running the risk of being compromised in the wake of ratification failure. Understood in this way, the heroic frame also encompasses references to the EU as a “success story”, as an unprecedented “peace project” and as the only viable force to counter global climate change and international terrorism. As the name indicates, no negative reading of the heroic frame is applicable.
Frames relating to the present of European integration

Seven frames pertain to the present of European integration: (a) the *elite versus the people* frame; (b) the *adversarial* frame; (c) the *blame game* frame; (d) the *compromise* frame; (e) the *business as usual* frame; (f) the *lack of leadership* frame; and (g) the *Europe in crisis* frame.

(a) Strikingly, the elite versus the people frame appears also in a positive reading. While the negative reading emphasizes constitution making as a case of an EU elite acting *against* the expressed or at least implicit will of its citizens, the frame’s “positive” reading entails an elite acting on behalf of a citizenry that does not express any clear preferences. In this sense, such a positive reading of the frame is closely connected to notions of the permissive consensus that is thought to have characterized the early stages of European integration (cf. Lindberg & Scheingold 1970).

(b) According to the adversarial frame, European integration is “fundamentally conflict-driven” (Trenz et al. 2007: 40). In our case, the frame is used to conceptualize constitution making as well as European integration per se in primarily adversarial terms, i.e. as a site of power struggle between different categories of member states with contending interests. This frame is particularly salient during the budget negotiations in June 2005, but also in the Swedish “finality debate” in the spring and summer of 2000 and in the German “re-launch debate” in the spring of 2007.

(c) The *blame game* frame is used to make sense of crisis or disintegration in the EU, and is particularly frequent in the phase of ratification failure in June 2005. Where the frame is applied, ratification failure is constructed as a result of the frequent practice of domestic politicians to “blame Brussels” for policy outcomes considered undesirable at home.

Table 3.3. Frames relating to the present of European integration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frame name</th>
<th>positive reading</th>
<th>negative reading</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>elite versus the people</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>adversarial frame</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>blame game</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>business as usual</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>compromise, best possible solution</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe in crisis</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lack of leadership</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(d) The **compromise/best possible solution** frame emphasizes the complexity of treaty reform, arguing fundamentally that both the Constitutional Treaty as well as later on the Lisbon Treaty are complicated outcomes of long negotiations between the contending interests of the member states. While they may not be to anyone’s liking in their entirety, they are nonetheless the best that was achievable at a given point in time and under the given circumstances.

(e) Similarly, the **business as usual** frame is used to make sense of ratification failure, indicating that due to the adversarial nature of European integration, ratification failure is a temporary setback at best. While its consequences may not be beneficial by any means, it is business as usual and no crisis more fundamental than other temporary setbacks that the EU and EC have previously encountered. The frame is particularly salient among newspapers that oppose any further supranationalization of EU decision making.

(f) The counterpart to the **business as usual** frame is the **Europe in crisis** frame, which is used to interpret ratification failure as a crisis much more fundamental than earlier crises in the history of European integration. The integration process is here viewed to have reached a crossroads at which the previous path of integration is no longer an option, and that something different has to be done to reconnect the EU with its citizens.

(g) The **lack of leadership/Europe in need of a vision** frame, finally, conceptualizes ratification failure as a consequence of a failure of European politicians to exercise leadership in the constitution-making process and to convince people of the desirability of the constitution-making process as well as of European integration per se.

**Frames relating to the future of European integration**

Finally, our analysis draws on six frames relating to the future of European integration: (a) the EU superstate; supranational/federal versus intergovernmental Europe frame; (b) the postnational union frame; (c) the decision-making efficiency frame; (d) the citizenship/democracy frame; (e) the deepening versus widening frame; and (f) the neo-liberal/market versus social/interventionist Europe frame.

(a) The EU superstate; supranational/federal versus intergovernmental Europe frame considers EU constitution making as an indication of the future of political order in the European Union. The frame’s positive reading emphasizes further supranational integration as a laudable effort and consequently commends those aspects of the Constitutional Treaty that point in a federal direction. In negative reading, the literal “EU superstate” aspect takes center stage, taking constitution making as an
indication at least of the drive among certain EU-level political elites to create an all-regulating EU superstate at the expense of the individual member states. In this reading, the EU superstate frame is thus closely connected to notions of the loss of national sovereignty.

(b) The postnational union frame, on the other hand, appears only in a positive reading. Constitution making is here understood as a first (or next) step in the larger process of institutionalizing a postnational polity, emphasizing European citizenship as well as the peaceful uniting of the European continent, amongst others.

Table 3.4. Frames relating to the future of European integration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frame name</th>
<th>positive reading</th>
<th>negative reading</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EU superstate frame; supranational/federal vs. intergovernmental Europe</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>postnational union</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>decision-making efficiency</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>citizenship/democracy</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>deepening versus widening</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>neo-liberal/market Europe vs. social/protectionist Europe</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) The decision-making efficiency frame appears only in a positive reading. A negative reading in terms of decision-making efficiency implying a loss of national sovereignty is conceivable, but would in that event coincide with the negative reading of the EU superstate frame. The decision-making efficiency frame emphasizes the part of the Constitutional Treaty and later the Lisbon Treaty that deals with institutional reform of the EU decision-making process, often most closely connected to voting rules in the Council of Ministers, but also to the extension of qualified majority voting (QMV) to further policy areas.

(d) The citizenship/democracy frame emphasizes the democratic aspect in EU constitution making. In its positive reading, EU constitution making is considered commendable due to its achievements in democratizing EU decision making. Examples of the latter frequently include references to a further institutionalization of European citizenship (often connected to citizens’ right to petition) and the strengthening of the European Parliament’s role in the EU’s legislative process. In its negative reading,
the frame often criticizes a further transfer of power away from direct channels of accountability.

(e) The *deepening versus widening* frame views EU constitution making in light of unresolved tensions regarding the future of EU enlargement. Its negative reading emphasizes EU enlargement as a source of popular opposition to the European project. In another form, it furthermore sees institutional reform as detrimental to the prospect of further EU enlargement. EU enlargement, according to this interpretation, is only possible to the extent that further supranationalization is halted. In its positive reading, on the other hand, the frame constructs constitution making (understood as in terms of institutional reform) as a necessary condition for the functioning of the institutions in the post-enlargement EU.

(f) The *neo-liberal market versus social/interventionist Europe* frame is one of the most frequently applied frames, interpreting EU constitution making in relation to claims about European integration as an ultra- or neo-liberal market project undermining a presumed European social model. In its negative reading, the frame interprets EU constitution making and particularly the Constitutional Treaty as an expression of the attempt to constitutionalize neo-liberal politics. In its positive reading, the frame interprets EU constitution making either as a constitutionalization of social rights, or as a combination of elements of the social welfare state and elements of a free market economy.

**Transnational Communication as Permeability**

*Permeability* refers to the question of whether the boundaries of the national public sphere are open or closed (i.e. “permeable” or not) to the contributions of speakers from outside the communicative context of the national public sphere. The concept is used here in much the same way that Habermas prescribes for the public sphere in general: as a matter of principle, the public sphere as a shared social space has to be open to the contributions of any potential participant in a debate (Habermas 1992: 435ff.). This criterion of openness also applies to the transnational communicative context. Transnational communication in the national media therefore also has to be understood in terms of the participation or inclusion of non-domestic speakers as *authors* in an ongoing debate in a particular country. Permeability of the public sphere’s boundaries thus means recognition of non-domestic speakers as legitimate participants in a discourse on a matter of shared concern. But permeability refers not only to the normative *recognition* of non-domestic speakers, but also the
empirical observation of actual transnational communication interpreted in such a literal way (Conrad 2007).

Regardless of a certain degree of variation, contributions by external authors are a standard feature in most newspapers. Precisely who is given the opportunity to voice an opinion is on the other hand closely related to the condensing and amplifying role of the mass media: condensing public discourse involves selecting contributions by speakers whose perspectives are deemed relevant in a given context. Where such direct external contributions are accepted, there is no direct normative reason, from a discourse theoretical point of view, to limit such contributions to speakers from within the communicative context of the national public sphere (cf. Habermas 1992: 435ff.).

The same applies to language diversity as an inhibiting factor for transnational communication thus operationalized. While certainly impairing the prospects for any genuinely transnational public sphere, language diversity is by no means an insurmountable obstacle. Even in everyday journalistic practice, the mass media perform a translator’s task both in a literal and in a metaphorical sense. In a metaphorical sense, the mass media condense vast and practically indigestible amounts of information into smaller units of information that mass audiences can process. But they also translate accessible information in the literal sense of making otherwise unintelligible information in other languages accessible to the broader public at home. Mutual observation as prescribed (and described) by e.g. Risse & van de Steeg (2003) and permeability are therefore both dependent on the translation of the mass media. As such, there is no normative reason why transnational communication should end at mutual observation – at least not due to languages.57

**Transnational Engagement**

By engagement with non-domestic speakers’ claims, next, we mean the inclusion of non-domestic speakers as objects of critique in domestic debates. Transnational debate – and by extension a transnational

57 *Project Syndicate* is a case in point for the translator’s task performed by newspaper journalists. Describing itself as “an association of quality newspapers around the world”, Project Syndicate is a network of newspapers and newspaper journalists committed to translating and subsequently disseminating newspaper commentaries to participating newspapers around the world. In Sweden, both of the quality newspapers selected for my study (as well as Malmö-based Sydsvenska Dagbladet) participate in the project. In Germany, the Süddeutsche Zeitung is the only one of the three sampled newspapers that contributes to Project Syndicate.
communicative context that could emerge as a transnational public sphere – is genuine debate only when participants in the debate systematically enter into a practice of arguing with one another, i.e. when they engage with and evaluate each other’s claims also in a transnational sense. The assessment of the extent to which any given debate can be characterized as transnational therefore depends on patterns of engagement with domestic compared to non-domestic speakers’ claims. Very simply, the higher the level of engagement with non-domestic speakers (i.e. the more evaluations are being offered on non-domestic speakers’ claims), the stronger the transnational character of a given debate. Our operationalization of ‘engagement’ as an indicator for transnational communication draws in part on work that has previously been done in projects such as RECON, ConstEPS and Building the EU’s Social Constituency (see above). For our present purposes, we analyze the tools with which non-domestic speakers’ claims are met: are they merely observed and left alone, or are they also being made the object of critique? This question in turn necessitates an analysis of two aspects: (1) the kinds of statements that an author makes about domestic and non-domestic speakers’ claims, respectively; and (2) the stylistic tools with which domestic as compared to non-domestic speakers’ claims are evaluated.

Regarding the typology of statements, our present codebook draws on the RECON codebook for media discourse analysis. Regarding the typology of evaluations, it draws on the codebook(s) of the Building the European Social Constituency project (cf. Vettes et al. 2006, Trenz et al. 2007). The RECON codebook distinguishes between four types of statements: (a) definitive, i.e. defining the meaning of a given situation; (b) designative, i.e. designating a matter of fact; (c) evaluative, i.e. evaluating a situation, a statement, etc. in either a positive, neutral or negative way; and finally (d) advocative, i.e. advocating (advocative positive) or rejecting (advocative negative) a suggested course of action. The European Social Constituency project distinguishes between six styles of evaluation: (a) objective-analytical, (b) ironic-satirical, (c) dramatizing, (d) polemical-scandalizing, (e) advisory-pedagogical, and (f) populist-demagogical. For our purposes, we use one more style of evaluation, namely ‘acclamatory-applauding’, the reason being that the coding process clearly indicated that ‘objective-analytical’ as the only positive style of evaluation clearly does not exhaust the kind of evaluations found in our newspaper sample. Consequently, we added ‘acclamatory-applauding’ as a style of evaluation that supports a situation, statement or suggested course of action, yet without offering any reasons. The guiding assumption in the analysis is that a higher
degree of engagement with a speaker’s claims translates into more advocative and evaluative statements. A lower degree of engagement translates into more designative, definitive or evaluative-neutral statements.\footnote{A few illustrative examples of how different statements were coded are included as appendix 3.}

**Summary**

How well do our methodological tools and our analytical framework fit the theoretical questions asked? Our aim is to explore the black box of European public sphere research by shifting focus away from issues of collective identity, away from ontological issues in the relationship between public spheres and political communities. While we do want to find out how an ‘identity light’ can be imagined as a context for transnational debate, this goal can only be achieved by *discarding* the concept of identity. Our focus on daily newspapers’ perspectives on European integration and the future of democracy in the EU performs this task: we relieve the communitarian hypothesis for the time being and explore how much and in what forms transnational debate occurs in the presumed absence of a thick sense of European collective identity. Our empirical analysis will then allow us to ask questions about the conditions under which transnational debate can occur despite the absence of communitarian requirements. Does transnational debate hinge less on collective identity than on particular understandings of European integration as a challenge or opportunity to democracy within and beyond the nation-state?
PART TWO

DAILY NEWSPAPERS AND EU CONSTITUTION MAKING
5 Intergovernmental, Supranational or Postnational? Daily Newspapers’ Views on European Integration and EU Democracy

Introduction

Newspaper journalists play a crucial role in selecting, condensing and amplifying available information and making it accessible to their respective reading audiences (van de Steeg 2002). Niklas Luhmann famously went so far as to claim that we know what we know – not least about politics – from the mass media (Luhmann 1996). If it wasn’t for the latter’s condensing and amplifying functions, it would be impossible to make sense of the virtually limitless amounts of information surrounding us. In these regards, daily newspapers perform a crucial task not only in providing forums for democratic deliberation. They furthermore provide deliberators not only with the relevant background knowledge, but also with topics to discuss.\(^{\text{59}}\)

But while there is little contention about assigning any such role to the mass media in general and to newspapers in particular in the context of the national public sphere, their role in providing forums for transnational debate on European politics is less obvious. The present chapter explores six daily newspapers’ normative orientations on European integration and EU democracy. Following Eriksen & Fossum’s conceptualization of different logics of integration and strategies of legitimation (Eriksen & Fossum 2004) as well as of different models of EU

\(^{\text{59}}\) In the same vein, Peter Dahlgren describes the public sphere as “a concept which in the context of today’s society points to the issues of how and to what extent the mass media, especially in their journalistic role, can help citizens learn about the world, debate their responses to it and reach informed decisions about what courses of action to adopt” (Dahlgren 1993: 1). Also Jürgen Gerhards and Friedhelm Neidhardt argue that issues of public concern only achieve that status once they are taken up by the mass media: in complex societies, publicity is impossible to achieve without the mass media (Gerhards & Neidhardt 1991: 55).
democracy (Eriksen & Fossum 2007), we distinguish between three ideal-typical sets of normative preferences to which newspaper journalists can subscribe (in varying degrees): (1) a predominantly intergovernmental view of European integration, emphasizing the project’s problem-solving character and founded on delegated democracy; (2) a predominantly supranational view of European integration, emphasizing the project’s basis in a European community of values and aiming at a deepening/federalization of the integration process; and (3) a predominantly postnational view of European integration, emphasizing European-level citizenship rights and a better institutionalization of democratic procedures at the EU level. From these ideal-typical normative preferences, we then go on to develop normative expectations as to the quantity and quality of transnational debate to be expected in newspapers with different orientations: how much and what forms of transnational debate do intergovernmental, supranational and postnational perspectives on EU democracy prescribe in relation to indicators such as framing, inclusion of non-domestic authors and transnational engagement?

Three Perspectives on European Integration and the Future of Democracy

Eriksen & Fossum’s first logic of integration is highly reminiscent of Andrew Moravcsik’s liberal intergovernmentalism, conceptualizing the EU as a predominantly intergovernmental organization controlled by and serving the interests of its member states (Moravcsik 1998).60 Following an instrumental perspective on member state rationality, the EU is viewed here as a problem-solving organization, the legitimacy of which depends on its effectiveness (and efficiency) in providing adequate solutions to problems that exceed the problem-solving capacity of the nation-state. In Moravcsik’s terms, delegation to supranational institutions occurs when it is thought to promote the interests of a given member state. As a strategy for the integration process, conceptualizing the EU as merely a problem-

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60 In his analysis of five history-making decisions up to the Treaty on European Union, Moravcsik indicates that the driving force of the integration process is first and foremost economic interdependence. The integration process is portrayed as guided by and in the hands of the member states, whose interests it serves. Where delegation of sovereignty occurs, it does so out of the strategic interests of the member states, i.e. delegation of sovereignty reflects patterns of commercial advantage and the enhancement of the credibility of interstate commitments (Moravcsik 1998 chap. 1).
solving entity furthermore means reducing the scope of integration by downscaling supranational ambitions for the benefit of the union’s intergovernmental character. In terms of legitimacy, the instrumental mode of rationality underlying this first path renders the legitimacy of the integration process the most volatile: European integration can only be considered legitimate if it has a demonstrable capacity to solve given problems in a better and more efficient way than the individual member states could (Eriksen & Fossum 2004: 437).

Table 5.1. Normative preferences on European integration and EU democracy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mode of integration</th>
<th>Logic of Integration</th>
<th>Source of Legitimacy</th>
<th>View of EU democracy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intergovernmental</td>
<td>Instrumental</td>
<td>Problem-solving capacity</td>
<td>Delegated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supranational</td>
<td>Contextual</td>
<td>Community of values</td>
<td>Federal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postnational</td>
<td>Communicative</td>
<td>Citizenship rights</td>
<td>Cosmopolitan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The second logic of integration follows a contextual perspective on rationality to conceive of the EU foremost as a community of values that derives its legitimacy from a thick sense of European collective identity (Eriksen & Fossum 2004: 437f.). In terms of democratic theory, this strategy has strong communitarian connotations in that it hinges on establishing an account of the commonalities between the different national cultures in Europe. The legitimacy of the European institutions is in turn derived from some notion of a European identity based on some form of cultural/pre-political common ground. Based on the notion that democracy is premised on the prior existence of an internally coherent demos, “the substance of European democracy” is consequently “searched for in the manifestations of culture, traditions and distinct ways of life” (Trenz 2009: 3).

The third logic of integration draws on Habermas’s discourse theory of democracy. The idea of the EU as a right-based, post-national union takes its starting point in the view that European integration has proceeded too far beyond a mere internal market to be legitimated only indirectly, namely through democratic procedures institutionalized at the member state level. At the same time, this third perspective departs from the communitarian notion that the legitimacy of the integration process has
to draw on a European collective identity. Acknowledging the diversity and “post-communitarian” character of the EU, the rights-based perspective proposes an alternative hinging on the institutionalization of more democracy beyond the nation-state as a solution to the ailments of EU democracy. In particular, this perspective advances a strengthening of European-level citizenship rights and of the European Parliament in the EU decision-making process, yet without insisting on the prior existence of a European community of values.

Following this brief introduction to the three ideal-typical perspectives on European integration and the future of EU democracy, we need to formulate what we can expect to find in our interview study. What camps or positions are possible and conceivable? The ideal-typical character of the three theoretical positions suggests that certain overlaps are possible despite the fact that in terms of strategies for legitimation, they are in fact quite distinct. Nonetheless, overlaps are conceivable indeed between on the one hand the intergovernmental and supranational perspectives, and on the other hand between the postnational and the supranational perspectives. In a sense, we could even argue that at least the intergovernmental perspective is very difficult to imagine without any supranational element at all. For Eriksen & Fossum (2004), the intergovernmental perspective means less supranational integration than we already have. The perspective implies a step back from the status quo. And while this perspective is imaginable as an ideal-type, it is very difficult to imagine a retreat to a completely intergovernmental integration – one that would render the European Union a sort of “common market de luxe”, as some have called it, similar to the European Free Trade Agreement. Consequently, it is difficult to imagine that any of the six newspapers analyzed here – all of which hold by and large positive views about European integration per se – would subscribe to such a radical position. Therefore, the question is rather how much supranational integration can be tolerated in a process that has gone far beyond pure intergovernmentalism, but is and ought to be in the hands of the member states. From this perspective, a position somewhere at the intersection of the intergovernmental and supranational perspectives appears more plausible than a purely intergovernmental perspective.

The same applies to the postnational perspective. While postnational aspects can be expected in the sense of a reconstitution of democracy beyond the nation-state (even if only as a complement to national and subnational democracy), a complete rejection of the nation-state can be considered highly unlikely among the six newspapers analyzed here. In this sense, even the liberal and left newspapers can be expected rather to
promote a mix of postnational and supranational elements. The more plausible position to expect therefore lies at the intersection between the postnational and supranational perspectives.

**Figure 5.1. Possible perspectives on European integration and EU democracy**

Nevertheless, it is difficult to imagine any overlaps between the postnational and intergovernmental perspectives. The former prioritizes a reconstitution of democracy beyond the nation-state, while the latter maintains that democracy should remain within the nation-state and that the democratic quality of EU decision making hinges on the institutionalization of appropriate accountability mechanisms at the national, not however at the European level.

How significant can we expect differences to be between the six newspapers analyzed? If all six newspapers are rather integration-friendly, shouldn’t the differences be relatively minor? The answer is: yes and no. Differences can be expected to be minor to the extent that all newspapers do advocate European integration in one form or another. But when it comes to the fundamental questions related to where democracy should be exercised (within the nation-state, beyond it, or both), considerable differences can be expected. Nevertheless, in our interview study, the supranational perspective tended to be merged with the postnational and intergovernmental perspectives, respectively. Aspects of supranational governance fit well with both postnational and intergovernmental ideas. Supranational governance can be read both in a federalist way, creating strong union-level institutions. But it can also be read in an
intergovernmental way, where supranational institutions are created as facilitating devices in the hands of the member states: delegation to supranational institutions occurs because it serves the interests of the member states. Even intergovernmental integration requires supranational institutions strong enough to make sure that states follow the common rules of the game (cf. Moravcsik 1998; Tallberg 1999).

In the following sections, we will review the findings of our interview study, locating the six newspapers studied at the intergovernmental/supranational and postnational/supranational intersections, respectively. As we will see, the two conservative newspapers are characterized by a predominantly intergovernmental/supranational perspective, while both the liberal and left newspapers are characterized by a predominantly postnational/supranational perspective.

The Intergovernmental/Supranational Intersection

**Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung**

In the German case, the intergovernmental/delegated model of EU democracy is most clearly advocated in the conservative *Frankfurter Allgemeine*. While all respondents emphasize that at least in certain ways and to differing extents, the EU has been and will continue to be a mix of intergovernmental, supranational and even postnational elements, it is nonetheless the process’ problem-solving character and ambitions that are considered to have defined the course of European integration from the outset. But while this emphasis on the problem-solving character of European integration is shared by all of the *Frankfurter Allgemeine* respondents, editorialists and correspondents diverge in the formulation of their normative preferences for the future of European integration. On this point, the Frankfurt-based editorialists (including the newspaper’s co-editor Günther Nonnenmacher) are much more skeptical than their correspondent counterparts.⁶¹

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⁶¹ Frankfurt-based Klaus-Dieter Frankenberger even mentions this divergence explicitly, claiming that editorialists in different newspapers’ home offices tend to be much more skeptical about European integration than their counterparts in Brussels. “The difference lies in the role you are playing. Whether we sit here in our central offices or whether you are a correspondent in Brussels. If you ask the correspondent in Brussels, he will probably tell you that his role is also to promote the European idea. These guys are fairly quickly
Table 5.2. List of Interview Respondents.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Newspaper</th>
<th>Based in</th>
</tr>
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For Günther Nonnenmacher, European integration is fundamentally a means to achieve peace and economic prosperity. While the process – and the political order emerging from it – may also entail shared values and even postnational elements, it is nonetheless the problem-solving character that fundamentally defines European integration. Similarly, editorialist Klaus-Dieter Frankenberger acknowledges some level of convergence among Europe’s otherwise highly heterogeneous national cultures, but contends that it is nonetheless the problem-solving character that drives and also lends legitimacy to the integration process,
specifically in the form of a “material value added”, namely securing peace and providing prosperity on the European continent. In the same vein, London-based correspondent Johannes Leithäuser considers “global challenges” facing the European continent to be the main driving force behind the integration process. Any deepening of the integration process in the sense of a strengthening of the European institutions will consequently occur only if unfolding global challenges so demand. A European state made up of European citizens is thus considered an illusion. EU correspondent Michael Stabenow is an exception to this pattern in the Frankfurter Allgemeine. In line with early neo-functionalist arguments, Stabenow indicates that European integration has historically been a political project based on shared values, drawing on economic means only to achieve political goals.

None of the four respondents from the Frankfurter Allgemeine see any development in the direction of European statehood. Nonetheless, institutional reform process is considered by all to be a necessity primarily in the wake of EU enlargement. However, correspondents and editorialists diverge in their assessment of the alleged trend towards further centralization. Klaus-Dieter Frankenberger considers any development towards EU statehood to be highly undesirable. “What would the price be,” Frankenberger asks, “for (...) a United States of Europe? It would be much stronger in its capacity to act, but the price would be (...) loss of democracy, loss of national autonomy - less as regards the capacity to act, but rather as regards the identity and identification of the citizens.” Accordingly, any move in the direction of increased EU statehood runs counter to the will and identification of the people in the member states. “[People’s] preferences, loyalties and political identity,” Frankenberger claims, “[are] national and often even subnational. You have to acknowledge that. [In] the political-institutional dimension and as regards the political-mental disposition, most [people] feel allegiance to the nation-state and its institutions”. And while not seeing any such development at the moment, Frankenberger contends that strong centralizing tendencies are discernible not only among “integrationists”, but moreover among the entire “European political class”, which “sometimes acts as if autistic, displaying a relatively big distance to the political symbols and interests of the people.”

This claim is however contested both by Johannes Leithäuser (London) and Michael Stabenow (Brussels). Despite what Leithäuser describes as “some shared elite awareness”, he claims that “there is no power center independent of the nation-states that attempts to drive towards European statehood.” Stabenow, in turn, argues that the strengthening of the
communal element in EU decision making “indicates that certain things cannot be tackled on the national level and therefore require a transfer to the European level.”

The EU’s democratic deficit, finally, is not considered to be a major problem. Corresponding to the view that the EU is primarily a problem-solving organization, democratic legitimacy is viewed to stem from the institutionalization of adequate channels of accountability within the nation-state. Since the EU is not a state, as Günther Nonnenmacher argues, it “is not subject to the same legitimacy requirements that a national political system is. If it were to turn into a state, it would be subjected to the same democratic theoretical requirements. But in its current situation, it isn’t. One thing is clear: a full parliamentarization of the EU would be far from solving the democratic deficit”. In line with this ambivalent assessment of the role of the European Parliament, Klaus-Dieter Frankenberger claims that “democratic legitimacy still resides in the member states’ parliaments. They are the place where the peoples exercise their sovereignty.” The democratic deficit should therefore be located not at the European, but rather at the national level: delegation of authority at the national level has to be subjected to clearer accountability relationships.

Notions of a European community of values tend to come second to a predominantly problem-driven view of European integration. For Johannes Leithäuser (London), shared values are the “foundation” and “the precondition for reaching an understanding about [...] precisely what it is that we are promoting or defending [...]. This shared idea is provided by precisely this community of values.” Despite the problem-oriented character of European integration, references to a European community of values are frequent even in the assessments of the two Frankfurt-based editorialists. Despite its internal cultural heterogeneity, Europe is a community of values particularly in relation to the prospect of Turkish EU membership. For Günther Nonnenmacher, a European community of values is equivalent to a fundamental compatibility of political systems and political cultures, without which supranational cooperation would not be possible. However, this minimum level of compatibility does not extend to Turkey and would overburden European citizens: “I believe,” Nonnenmacher argues, “that EU citizens also need something like this [community of values]. This is the reason why we have always stood up against Turkish EU membership, because we believe that a political community, in the widest sense, cannot exist over time without any we-feeling.”
Also for Klaus-Dieter Frankenberger, Europe emerges as a cohesive entity foremost when faced with the question of Turkish EU membership. Turkish EU membership should be rejected due to the lack of a sufficient “shared repository of values in the sense of political culture [...] between Turkey and the European Union”. To the extent that such a sense of cultural convergence exists among European nation-states, Frankenberger argues, it is reasonable to consider the EU a community of values. For EU correspondent Michael Stabenow, finally, the integration process has historically used economic means to achieve political goals, namely to preserve peace on the European continent. Yet even in his reference to the early neo-functionalist logic of European integration, Stabenow argues that the integration process is by and large problem-driven: while shared values certainly facilitate the search for solutions to problems beyond the nation-state, these shared values do not by themselves constitute a viable legitimacy basis for European integration as such.

In sum, the Frankfurter Allgemeine respondents diverge to some extent in their normative preferences on European integration and EU democracy. Broadly speaking, however, they tend to subscribe strongly to our first ideal-type: although all elements of all three ideal-types are thought to come into the picture in some way, the description of the current state of European integration, both in normative and empirical terms, reflects a commitment to the problem-solving character of European integration. Consequently, the process should continue to focus on the provision of economic prosperity as well as of political stability on the European continent. At the same time, the process can also draw on cultural similarities among the union’s member states: Europe is characterized also by compatible political systems and political cultures. Democratic reform, however, would need to take place foremost on the national level, through ascribing a bigger role to national parliaments in EU decision making.

**Svenska Dagbladet**

*Svenska Dagbladet’s* editorialist Claes Arvidsson expresses a clear preference for a primarily intergovernmental problem-solving organization. Arvidsson argues that the EU already is a “form of state”, or elsewhere that it is “a state without being a state”, with strong supranational elements that are constantly gaining in strength. At the same time, he maintains that in “very fundamental things, [decision making] should remain at the national level, such as in tax and labor law.” EU correspondent Rolf Gustavsson argues that while Europe has
historically also been a European community of values, it is nonetheless the integration process’s problem-solving character that figures most prominently. Like his colleague Michael Stabenow of the Frankfurter Allgemeine, Gustavsson refutes claims to the coming-into-being of an EU superstate. The EU is and has historically been a hybrid, a mix of intergovernmental and supranational/federal elements, leading Gustavsson to conclude that “this is not and probably never will be a state. It is no state in the making, but rather a sophisticated form of international cooperation, in which there are federal elements, but without being en route to becoming a federation. It is my opinion that you can accept certain federal elements without being a federalist.” On this basis, Gustavsson criticizes the use of language in the Constitutional Treaty as suggesting EU statehood and undermining the EU’s primary character as a problem-solving organization. The EU “has made the mistake of furnishing this construction with an enormously pretentious rhetoric and a kind of symbolism that gives the impression that this is a state.”

Also Gustavsson’s colleague Mats Hallgren comments on the symbolic language used in the Constitutional Treaty. For Hallgren, European integration has been and still is a fundamentally problem-driven process: it is “economics in the service of politics”. Consistent with this problem-oriented view of European integration as a process driven by sovereign states, standards of democratic performance are toned down significantly. The democratic deficit is therefore not considered to be a fundamental problem. This view is articulated most clearly by editorialist Claes Arvidsson, who argues that while there may (or may not) be deficiencies in the institutional set-up of the union, we cannot meaningfully speak of a democratic deficit because Europe’s citizens do not make use even of the channels of influence currently available to them. There is no democratic deficit because citizens are not interested in democratic participation: “If you look at people’s level of interest, which most fundamentally finds

62 “The economy forms the basis for cooperation,” Hallgren argues, “but economic integration serves an overarching political goal, namely democracy, human rights and peace. To build prosperity, increase standards of living, integrate countries and thereby also to create security.” Elsewhere, Hallgren describes the EU as “first and foremost a method, it is first and foremost a way of working, a border-crossing method for cooperation among sovereign states. And this method is based on economic integration, on tearing down visible and invisible boundaries, creating a common market, economic integration in order to create prosperity and to integrate countries so deeply that they don’t go to war with each other. And it is precisely this method that forms the core of the European Union.”
expression in elections to the European Parliament, you see that this deficit is not substantiated, simply because people to a large extent don’t care.”

Furthermore, Arvidsson implies that due to the complex intergovernmental nature of the EU and the variety of contending national interests that have to be taken into consideration in EU decision making, expectations as regards democratic performance need to be adjusted and/or toned down accordingly. “Briefly put,” Arvidsson argues, “I am not sure whether the democratic deficit is any big problem. […] There is this image that the EU works really badly, but maybe that’s not at all the case. Maybe the EU works reasonably well. And that is precisely the level you can expect from such a complicated construction that has to weigh such different interests.”

Also Rolf Gustavsson is critical of notions of a democratic deficit, arguing that the concept has “received an undeservedly established status as if it referred to a given fact.” The democratic deficit is understood to be rooted more in perceptions than in the institutional set-up and decision making procedures at the EU level. Therefore, it is unclear whether institutional reform would decrease the democratic deficit, as it is unclear whether institutional reform would amount to any change in the public’s perceptions of the EU. “In order for [reforms] to be sufficient,” Gustavsson remarks, “the citizens also have to see them as such” (Rolf Gustavsson, SvD).

Only Tomas Lundin, Svenska Dagbladet’s correspondent in Bonn, argues that EU democracy is not the kind of democracy we would ideally envision in terms of citizen participation and broad, transnational public debate. And while for Lundin, the democratic deficit is primarily a collective identity deficit (see below), he does share a commitment to introducing non-domestic perspectives into the domestic debate with his fellow correspondent Rolf Gustavsson. And while Gustavsson argues that introducing a transnational element into his reporting and providing a sound basis for understanding other countries’ positions on EU issues was most certainly one of his main ambitions, editorialist Claes Arvidsson is more reserved towards the idea of a special journalistic role in stimulating transnational debate: “We should lower our expectations for what the debate is supposed to look like. Of course, I think it would be great to

63 “Even if I am beginning to get old and tired,” Gustavsson says, “my ambition is still to not only tell what is going on, but I also believe you have to try to tell about the different values that exist not only in Brussels, but in the most important member states, [...] and try to introduce these elements into the analysis.”
have a more lively debate, with more voices from Europe or all sorts of different places, but I don’t think you can expect that.”

*Svenska Dagbladet’s* respondents believe in a close connection between the problem-driven character of European integration and a sense of community of values. Without the latter, the founding of the original Coal and Steel Community would have been difficult to imagine. Nevertheless, this European community of values does not amount to a European collective identity strong enough to provide a basis for postnational democracy. Based not least on the view of European integration as problem- and interest-driven, democracy is considered to reside within the nation-states. Nevertheless, Rolf Gustavsson (Brussels) and Tomas Lundin (Bonn) argue that at least for legitimatory purposes, more European-level democracy would be desirable.

For Tomas Lundin (Bonn), the democratic deficit is not least a collective identity deficit. In order for democracy to work at the European level in ways similar to the nation-state, there has to be a certain level of trust that the political process produces just outcomes, and particularly that the political process strives for the common good rather than for particularistic interests. According to Lundin, this level of trust does not exist (yet) in Europe. Since the democratic deficit is based on the absence of an overarching collective identity, there is no simple institutional fix. On the other hand, Lundin is optimistic that the practice and/or experience of European cooperation will eventually lead to a stronger sense of community in Europe. “Practice builds identity,” Lundin says. “I believe that the Euro, the fact that we use the same currency, is small piece of the puzzle in this identity construction. I believe that small things like this create a sense of community.”

In sum, the respondents from *Svenska Dagbladet* thus find that European integration is and ought to be a process driven foremost by the ambition of solving problems beyond the capacity of the nation-state, but a process that also draws on the values that constitute Europe as a community. However, this European community of values does not in itself constitute a collective identity strong enough to provide a solid basis for postnational democracy.
The Postnational/Supranational Intersection

Süddeutsche Zeitung

The responses from journalists working for the Süddeutsche Zeitung indicate a preference for more democracy beyond the nation-state. All respondents – albeit to different degrees – view a deepening of the integration process and particularly a strengthening of the European-level institutions as desirable. Jeanne Rubner (Munich) explicitly argues for “as strong a union as possible, as political a union as possible”. However, Rubner also objects that the union’s capacity for reaching this goal may have been compromised by the fifth round of EU enlargement in 2004/2007. To Rubner, this widening of the integration process may very well have come at the expense of a further deepening. Due to the “massive round of enlargement,” Rubner argues, “the EU has in a way robbed itself of the opportunity to act as a political union. […] I believe it would have been good to enlarge slowly and in the process give oneself the instruments to be a political union.”

This reservation is shared by Gerd Kröncke, the newspaper’s correspondent in Paris. While Kröncke had originally also hoped for a much smaller, but internally much more cohesive and equal union, precisely this prospect may have been compromised for the sake of EU enlargement. “In the way that it has developed,” Kröncke finds “the EU too big in order to become what I once envisioned, […] a union with equal rights for all parts. I have the feeling that this will not be achievable any more, considering the new members and the size that we have reached.”

Consistent with these views, the Süddeutsche Zeitung respondents are critical of claims to the emergence of some form of EU superstate, but express that they would not find increased European statehood particularly problematic either. Rubner claims not to be “afraid of an EU superstate”, arguing that “it makes sense to put national interests second to the goal of achieving a strong European Union. That doesn’t scare me in the slightest. […] If I want a strong EU, then I also have to be willing to concede some national privileges and particularities.” (Jeanne Rubner, SZ). Kröncke, in turn, argues that it is “necessary that decisions on certain issues are taken centrally somewhere. And I see this neither with fear nor with concern […]. If we want this common Europe, then this is what we need. […] I am unsure whether it will come true, but it is desirable, yes.”
The respondents from the *Süddeutsche Zeitung* largely view a European community of values as a complement to rather than as an exclusive and/or sufficient basis for legitimacy in the integration process. All respondents agree that there is a European collective identity that can be defined not merely in relation to any particular ‘other’, i.e. in relation to what is *not* part of that identity. Instead, a European collective identity can also be defined in more positive terms in relation to the fundamental values that European nations share. Editorialist Jeanne Rubner (Munich) summarizes such fundamental values as those captured in the Charter of Fundamental Rights, and further as the values of the Enlightenment. Cornelia Bolesch (Brussels) suggests that Europe’s particular cultural heritage forms the backdrop for a European collective identity. “Despite the fortunately great differences between national cultures,” Bolesch says, “Europe has a shared cultural foundation with very many national forms.”

Gerd Kröncke (Paris) shares the view that a European identity and community of values exists, but believes that it is confined to a rather small circle of European countries that is difficult to define, but which revolves around the founding countries of the original coal and steel community. At the same time, Kröncke indicates that this community of values is not a sufficient basis for legitimacy in the EU.

With regard to where democratic politics should be exercised (and where the democratic deficit can be located), Jeanne Rubner (Munich) follows a predominantly supranational line of argumentation. Emphasizing the *sui generis* character of European integration, Rubner holds that requirements for the EU’s democratic performance necessarily have to look different from those applicable at the nation-state level. Even a further strengthening of the European Parliament would therefore not change the institutional fundamentals of an organization that has gone well beyond intergovernmental integration, but is still far short of being a postnational polity.

By comparison, the idea of a purely problem-oriented, intergovernmental model for European integration plays a minor role in the *Süddeutsche Zeitung*. When it does, it does so mainly in descriptions of the EU political system as a hybrid, incorporating elements of all three perspectives. In addition, arguments drawn from the perspective of delegated democracy are used in defense against claims that the EU political system is characterized by a democratic deficit. Cornelia Bolesch (Brussels) emphasizes that “the integration process is legitimated by the fact that the member states want it and that the citizens have not vehemently demanded anything else yet in any elections.” Consequently, Bolesch sees no reason to speak of a democratic deficit in EU decision making: “there
are areas where improvements are possible and desirable. But I reject the claim that the EU is undemocratic. [...] The Commission is staffed by the governments, but the governments are in turn democratically legitimated in the individual member states. [...] I could imagine that in the case of the Commission, the Commission President could one day be elected directly. But you have to be careful even in this regard. The Commission [...] has the right of initiative and fairly many competences, but it is nonetheless an assistant to the governments and to the heads of government. And I find that that's what it should remain.”

Dagens Nyheter

Dagens Nyheter’s respondents express the clearest preference for a postnational EU organized by federal principles, and which acknowledges that the utopian idealism of a postnational EU may have to be adjusted in light of popular resistance. Broadly speaking, Dagens Nyheter’s respondents view the overcoming of the national constellation as the highest normative priority in European integration. Editorialist Niklas Ekdal (Stockholm) begins by advocating a United States of Europe with a federal constitution, further characterized by “clear accountability relationships and a clear democratic structure.” Similarly, editorialist Henrik Berggren (Stockholm) finds the EU appealing in that it provides the opportunity to leave the nation-state and the national constellation behind. “What is attractive about the EU,” Berggren says, “is that it is a utopian idea about the question: would a part of humanity be able to move beyond the nation-state model?” And also Dagens Nyheter’s EU reporter Ingrid Hedström (Stockholm), overall more analytical than advocative in her account, expresses that “the thought of a federal system [...] is appealing in the sense that it is democratically crystal-clear, while the intergovernmental system has the major disadvantage that decisions are taken in closed diplomatic rooms, characterized by secrecy and no open debate.”

Nevertheless, all Dagens Nyheter respondents also acknowledge that their normative preferences do not correspond to current developments in the EU, or might not even be viable in the first place. Henrik Berggren argues that as attractive as the utopian vision of a postnational EU may be, it is at the same time unrealistic, as it ignores “the importance of culture, identity, that democracy has developed within the nation-state.” However, Berggren and his colleague Niklas Ekdal emphasize the postnational perspective’s focus on rights, and consequently view this aspect as one of the most valuable achievements of the integration
process. Despite the failure of the Constitutional Treaty, Berggren argues that “the EU can play a decisive historic role” in guaranteeing civil rights in Europe: “that’s what I believe the EU can stand for.” Consistent with the requirements of postnational democracy, Dagens Nyheter’s respondents are more concerned about a lack of European-level democracy than proponents of the supranational perspective. Prominently, the virtual impossibility for any “normal citizen” to understand even of the basics of EU decision making is considered a major part of the democratic deficit. “If journalists who have the time and the energy and the resources and the contacts,” says Henrik Berggren, “have such a hard time finding information and understanding decision making procedures, how is it then supposed to be for ordinary citizens?” However, Barbro Hedvall emphasizes that despite such shortcomings, EU decision making nonetheless draws on indirect channels of democratic legitimation via the nation-state. In this sense, Hedvall is similarly critical of the notion of a democratic deficit as her colleague Cornelia Bolesch (Süddeutsche Zeitung, Brussels). For Niklas Ekdal, on the other hand, the democratic deficit is not a democratic deficit per se, but rather “a democratic mismatch” emerging precisely from the hybrid character of the EU, i.e. from the combination of intergovernmental and supranational elements. We expect democratic standards to apply in non-democratic settings, namely in intergovernmental negotiations in the Council of Ministers.64

Finally, the lack of a European public sphere is considered a challenge to the full democratization of the EU that may be difficult to overcome in the nearer future. In this context, Dagens Nyheter’s respondents emphasize a journalistic role in stimulating transnational debate about European issues as one of the newspaper’s editorial staff’s key ambitions in EU politics. Contributing to a European public sphere, Niklas Ekdal claims, is in certain ways an overarching ambition shared by the editorial team as a whole: “[We can contribute by] giving space to European voices, by using writers from other European countries. [...] That is an attempt to create such a public sphere. [...] We have to recognize our limitations, but we do have a publicist ambition with this newspaper. And to the extent

64 “Diplomacy,” Ekdal argues, “is so prominent in this intergovernmental negotiation game that it is difficult to get this kind of democratic accountability. And accountability is basically the most important aspect of a democracy. [...] Today, you don't have this relationship of accountability; instead, it is up to the national parliaments to evaluate how governments govern the Council. There you have a democratic mismatch” (Niklas Ekdal, DN).
that we can contribute to a European public sphere, I think one should have that as a goal.”

By comparison, the idea of European integration as a primarily problem-driven process serving the interests of the member states also plays only a minor role for the respondents from *Dagens Nyheter*. For all respondents, the problem-solving aspect has historically characterized the development of European integration, but the value of the integration process lies more in notions of leaving the age of nationalism behind. Henrik Berggren believes “that there is an integration process that takes place out of pure necessity, that there are forces that compel us to cooperate. But that in itself doesn’t provide for cooperation, the same processes may just as well create even more conflicts. So that in itself is not enough.” Niklas Ekdal goes one step further. While viewing the provision of civil rights in a prospective postnational union as one of the main normative goals of the integration process, the path to such achievements depends on a solid legitimatory basis that precisely the union’s problem-solving capacity can provide. For Ekdal, a “supranational guarantee for civil rights” is one of the achievements of European integration that contributes to broader legitimacy “in the more sophisticated analysis”, while legitimacy primarily stems from “the problem-solving aspect: in part how to handle all these experiences and conflict, to make sure that conflict becomes impossible, and then to create prosperity and to solve collective problems effectively. That’s what provides legitimacy.”

References to a European community of values play only a minor role for the respondents from *Dagens Nyheter*. While all four respondents believe in the existence of some form of shared values or at least of a clear affinity among European nations in this regard, the idea of European integration as a process underpinned by such notions of cultural affinity is outweighed by the newspaper’s advocacy for postnational integration and an institutionalization of civil rights at the European level. Barbro Hedvall describes European integration “as a fundamentally value-driven project”, but even here, notions of a European community of values are seen as complementary rather than as a sufficient, let alone exclusive basis for legitimacy in the integration process. Although a certain level of cultural affinity is thought to exist among the nations of Europe, any attempt at constructing a European identity beyond national identities is a tremendously problematic effort. In this vein, Henrik Berggren argues e.g. that national identities are still more salient than the values that constitute a European community, and that Europe exists as a community of experience only in the sense of the shared experience of the “total
catastrophe” of the 20th century. In addition, Berggren emphasizes diversity as a defining feature of Europe, not only in relation to territorial identities. “You can speak of Europe as a historic entity,” Berggren explains, “but at the same time it falls into a variety of histories in a sense, there are Catholics and Protestants, there are Muslims in a number of places and so on. It is multifaceted.”

Overall, however, the respondents from Dagens Nyheter see communal values as a complement that adds to the legitimacy of European integration, but that is not sufficient of itself to provide for a solid legitimatory basis. Also the problem-solving aspect of European integration, captured for instance preserving peace and insuring prosperity, provides broad popular legitimacy. Yet the true normative value of European integration lies in the overcoming of the age of nationalism. Consequently, both problem-solving and shared cultural values come second the idea of postnational integration and democracy.

die tageszeitung

In the case of die tageszeitung, a preference for postnational integration is clearest in the account of Hannes Koch (Berlin). While subscribing to the view that the EU fundamentally also has relevant problem-solving ambitions (see below), Koch believes that the integration process has moved far beyond the point of intergovernmental cooperation. Rather, there are indications that European integration also has a profound effect on the self-perceptions of Europeans, so that Europe is emerging more and more along the lines of what could be described as a postnational polity. The EU shows “clear indications of integration beyond a simple form of cooperation among and coexistence of states”, most relevantly “also on the level of the political awareness of Europe’s inhabitants.” To Koch, “a European debate has developed in the last 10 or 20 years. What happens in the media elsewhere influences the way we report here at home, [...] and that naturally has consequences for the awareness of people living in Europe. Many see themselves at least in part as Europeans.” Koch considers such developments to be highly desirable. European integration ought to be more than merely a market project. It should also be used also in the promotion of e.g. European-wide social standards. “I would find stronger integration desirable,” Koch argues, suggesting that the common market should “be supported by a common social order, which would one day have to lead to [...] common standards regarding minimum wages, social security and so on, [...] to ensure that the people living in Europe can have a somewhat agreeable life.”
These views correspond closely to Koch’s normative preferences for the future of democracy in the European Union. Because European integration has come as far as it has, indirect channels of democratic legitimation are no longer sufficient. Consequently, Koch argues that there is a fundamental democratic deficit in EU law-making, which in turn has to do with precisely this lack of direct channels of influence between the citizens and the European institutions. Therefore, Koch argues specifically for a strengthening of voter influence on European decision making. “A lot of decision making competences are located at the level of governments and [governmental] bodies, and too few competences reside in the Parliament and therefore with the voters,” which Koch believes to be “in part responsible for the sort of Eurofrustration existing in large parts of the population.” Furthermore, Koch pleads for a further development of the EU’s “political structures in the direction of a democratic constitution”, with more rights for the European Parliament and some form of bicameral legislative. “Considering today’s EU,” Koch argues, “it would more appropriate to have a form of two-chamber-system, with a common European Parliament and a very strong second chamber with representatives of the national governments. Currently, the role of national governments is still too strong and should be reduced for the benefit of a common European government and also of the law-making power of a common European Parliament. National parliaments and national governments would have fewer competences. But on a global scale, I would find that justified in this European integration which I find extremely promising and necessary.” For Koch, a federal state less centralized than the Federal Republic of Germany, but more federal than the current European construction would be desirable. “The German federal state is probably too centralist for Europe. […] I plead for a federal structure that would grant more influence and powers to the nation-states of today. But definitely as a state in the sense of strengthening the central government.”

The taz’s EU correspondent Daniela Weingärtner is skeptical of claims to the emergence of an EU superstate, arguing that “we are delegating to the European level what the European level is better suited to deal with. Already today, every member state can go to court if it believes the principle of subsidiarity has been violated. The constitution strengthens this even further. There are so many brakes that the EU cannot develop into a state. And it should not do so either.” Nevertheless, Weingärtner does advocate a fundamental and explicitly “radical” reform of the EU political system, “much more radical than the constitution would have provided for, namely demolition and reconstruction.” Weingärtner
advocates an EU “built on a community principle, with a strong parliament that elects the Commission President, [and] a classical bicameral system, similar to the German Bundestag and Bundesrat.”

Hannes Koch’s views on the European public sphere deficit further suggest a decidedly postnational orientation. Consistent with the views that the democratic deficit is located foremost on the European level, Koch emphasizes the role of journalists in the context of the European public sphere deficit. While debates take place largely within the different national public spheres, EU politics should be characterized much more what he calls “supranational discourse”: “Supranational discourse would mean that things are also discussed in a border-crossing way, [...] that voices from other countries are heard in the own country, that they resonate and that people of different nationalities take part in these debates.” In this context, journalists have a special responsibility, namely “to mediate” and to “explain the different conditions under which people live” in different countries. In doing so, Koch suggests, journalists can “contribute to this identity formation which brings us advantages in political as well as in economic terms.” On this point, Koch’s views are very similar to those of Dagens Nyheter’s editorialists, and they differ fundamentally from those of the conservative newspapers’ respondents.65

Both Hannes Koch and Daniela Weingärtner believe in the existence of a European community of values, but see it as a complementary rather than as an exclusive or sufficient source of legitimacy. Weingärtner emphasizes that communities of values can exist entirely independently of any form of political organization, and that the existence of a value-based community therefore stands in no connection to the way the EU institutions are organized. Despite this reservation, Weingärtner finds that Europeans share certain abstract values, among which particularly “human rights, civil society, transparency, bottom-up influence, representative democracy as well as [...] a foreign policy element of soft influence” figure prominently. Weingärtner further emphasizes that in its role in international politics, Europe is characterized by a “modest sense of mission which does not turn into delusions of grandeur.”

Hannes Koch sees the development of a European identity foremost as an organic process, as a gradual Europeanization of collective identity through which individuals begin to perceive themselves less and less exclusively as members of their respective national communities, but

65 However, also Daniela Weingärtner perceives her journalistic role primarily as serving her German audience. Criticizing non-domestic speakers, Weingärtner argues, is not a part of her professional responsibilities, on the other hand.
additionally also as Europeans. Here, Koch thinks more of a European demos than about a European community of values: “I believe that a European demos is slowly emerging. A shared awareness is developing, a common identity. […] And this awareness is of course important, otherwise the European institutions would not function and the Parliament would have no informed electorate. […] We have to adapt, but this is also happening. I can clearly see that on myself, my colleagues, my friends.” In addition, Koch believes that a sense of community of values resides in the way Europeans think about issues of social models and social security. This sense of community of values, Koch believes, is constructed particularly in opposition to what is considered to be the Anglo-Saxon social model. “Already references to a European social model indicate that a common identity is emerging,” Koch believes, “and also a common identity based on a shared past and a shared value system.”

By contrast, the problem-solving character of European integration plays only a limited role for Koch and Weingärtner. Weingärtner considers the aspect of a union equipped with the instruments to act in an international arena an important source of legitimacy, based on a popular desire shared by many of Europe’s citizens. “Legitimacy comes from citizens’ desire for capacity for action,” Weingärtner argues. “One European country on its own amounts to nothing in the world. Everyone has understood that by now. And exactly like the EU is a very pragmatic construction, even this is once again very pragmatic.” On the other hand, Hannes Koch finds that the EU has over the last years moved far beyond this intergovernmental aspect, suggesting that legitimacy has to be based on more than mere problem-solving capacity. While the latter contributes to the perception of legitimacy, it cannot serve as a model for EU democracy.

In sum, the respondents from the taz favor postnational integration and democracy, particularly in relation to the demand for more direct channels of democratic legitimation between European citizens and the European institutions. Despite certain differences between the two respondents, the democratic deficit is thought to be located at the European level. Consequently, mere indirect democratic legitimation via the member states is no longer deemed sufficient. As in the other newspapers reviewed so far, European values are described in rather abstract terms. And while a long-term, organic process of European identity (and demos) construction is thought to take place, notions of a European community of values are seen to foremost to serve complementary legitimatory purposes. The European institutions can function only if they can draw on a sense of community. Democratic
legitimacy, as we have seen, has to stem however from the institutionalization of democratic procedures at the European level.

**Aftonbladet**

*Aftonbladet’s* respondents would welcome a federally organized, postnational EU, but only to the extent that it could emerge as a by-product of the problem-solving approach. A postnational EU would have to emerge out a solid conviction on the part of the European citizens that the nation-state is no longer capable of providing adequate responses to increasingly transnational problems. *Aftonbladet’s* two editorialists thus present an argument similar to that advanced by their counterparts at liberal *Dagens Nyheter*, but they address the issue from the opposite end: whereas the normative priority for *Dagens Nyheter’s* journalists is the overcoming of the national constellation (a normative priority that has to be adjusted to the will of the people), the tendency among *Aftonbladet’s* editorialists is rather that the will of the people is the normative priority, and that a postnational union can only be achieved if this development is also supported by the people. Mats Engström sees “a major value in the value-based community” and further believes “in a stronger union in the near future, which would lie closer to the postnational.” However, he argues that this in turn “has to emerge from the EU as a problem-solver. That is what gives the union its legitimacy. [...] You can never achieve these larger visions unless you take the problem-solving EU as your point of departure. It has to be about policies that the citizens find important, it must not get too abstract.”

Nevertheless, the constitutionalization of the charter of fundamental rights is viewed as more than an attractive byproduct the integration process. “On this count,” Engström says that he changed his mind: “there is a point in the EU guaranteeing its citizens the sort of rights that it does in the part of the Constitution that deals with fundamental rights.” *Aftonbladet’s* editorialists furthermore emphasize the impact of globalization on European integration much more than the other newspapers. For Mats Engström, “globalization calls for a stronger EU relatively soon. [The EU] has not become sufficiently strong to deliver solutions, so we have to convince citizens that we have to proceed faster in making the EU stronger in a number of areas. If the EU is to deliver, it has to get stronger a whole lot faster.”

Similar to the German *taz*, *Aftonbladet’s* respondents locate the democratic deficit foremost on the European level, specifically as a perceived lack of clear accountability relationships between the European
institutions and the constituent electorate(s). European integration requires more democracy beyond the nation-state. Mats Engström argues for more transparency in the European institutions and improved channels of influence for associations of civil society. But Engström specifically also addresses the public sphere deficit as part and parcel of the democratic deficit, particularly in relation to the role that is or could be played by the mass media in general and by newspapers in particular.

With regard to the value basis of European integration, Aftonbladet’s Jesper Bengtsson argues that the lack of a sufficiently strong sense of European identity is a problem for the EU. But while most of it has been swept away by the experience of the 20th century, Bengtsson argues, “there is a historic, border-crossing identity which is difficult to describe, but which is about a shared experience of emigration, a shared experience of war between Catholics and Protestants, a shared experience of world wars. [...] This kind of shared experience exists.”

Overall, however, the value-based view plays a minor role in the account of Aftonbladet’s respondents. While some form of European collective identity may exist or may be possible to imagine, it is difficult to pinpoint precisely what this element of cultural or value-based community consists of. Consequently, shared values form only an insufficient basis for legitimacy in the integration process, which in turn depends much more on an institutionalization of democratic procedures at the European level (see below).

Similar to the account of the taz’s Daniela Weingärtner, the problem-solving aspect plays an important role in providing for the legitimacy of European integration. However, it is seen here mainly as a stepping stone towards something bigger: Mats Engström (Stockholm) embraces the emergence of a postnational European Union, but emphasizes that it would have to be rooted in people’s conviction of the desirability of any such path of integration. The key to convincing people of the desirability of postnational integration, in turn, is however seen to lie within the problem-solving approach. For Jesper Bengtsson, the EU has been characterized by a form of schizophrenia not least in the wake of the French and Dutch referenda on the Constitutional Treaty: it has postnational ambitions while at the same time trying to portray itself as a problem-solving organization. In the eyes of the public, however, Bengtsson claims that the EU is perceived as neither: “it is a schizophrenic organization in practice, basically because it has not decided what it wants to be.”

In sum, Aftonbladet’s respondents favor ideas of postnational integration and democracy, but believe that they have to be rooted in a solid
conviction of the citizens. This conviction can only emerge out of a
perception that certain problems are better tackled beyond the nation-
state. Nonetheless, there is no doubt that it would be beneficial if the
citizens could in fact be convinced of a more decisive move towards
institutionalizing democracy beyond the nation-state.

What kind of transnational debate can be expected?

In light of the ideal-typical character of the three scenarios for the future
of European integration with which interview respondents were
confronted, it is not surprising that all respondents claimed that at least
to some extent, elements of all three scenarios have historically played
and will continue to play a role also in the future of European integration.
This applies not only to the empirical description of European integration,
but also – even if to a lesser extent – to the normative preferences that
respondents formulated in their responses. Consequently, this summary
of our findings is also highly stylized. Newspapers whose respondents
could be grouped neatly into any one of the three categories are rather
exceptional. Even the respondents from the most postnationally oriented
newspaper in this study – Swedish liberal Dagens Nyheter – indicated for
instance that also elements of collective identity and of a European
community of values provide an important – albeit not in itself sufficient
– source of legitimacy. Consequently, all six newspapers are located at the
intersections of two of our theoretical ideal-types: they are located either
at the intergovernmental/supranational, or at the postnational/
supranational intersection. Figure 5.2 is an attempt at visualizing the
orientation of the different newspapers’ views in relation to the three
different ideal types.

What distinguishes the newspapers studies is foremost their respective
views on the future of democracy in the European Union. The Frankfurter
Allgemeine in Germany and Svenska Dagbladet in Sweden can be located
at the intergovernmental/supranational intersection. Both newspapers’
respondents emphasize the hybrid character of the EU political system
and indicate that while integration has and by all means should move far
beyond mere intergovernmentalism or a form of “common market de
luxe”, the present channels of democratic legitimation are sufficient for
the kind of organization that the EU represents. At best, democratic
legitimacy could be enhanced at the national level, prominently through a
strengthening of the role of the respective national parliaments. Prospects of a postnational Europe are consequently dismissed as failing to adequately pay respect to the existing identifications of Europe’s citizens.

**Figure 5.2. Newspapers’ normative perspectives on European integration and EU democracy.**

The liberal and left newspapers can be located at the postnational/supranational intersection, although certain qualifications are in order. The German liberal *Süddeutsche Zeitung*’s journalists subscribe to the notion of an existing or at least emerging European community of values, however concrete or abstract those values may be defined. Furthermore, they subscribe in a normative sense to visions of a postnational Europe while at the same time contending that the EU’s present institutional set-up – a form of supranational democracy founded on a mix of intergovernmental and supranational elements – is at worst good enough, at best the currently optimal institutional solution, also in terms of providing for democratic legitimacy. Specifically, the respondents from the *Süddeutsche Zeitung* argue for a stronger, more integrated and more political union, even with a bicameral legislative along federal lines, but at the same time rejecting claims that an institutional democratic deficit exists. Similarly, the *Süddeutsche Zeitung*’s
respondents are not afraid of further steps in the direction of increased EU statehood.
The three remaining newspapers hold more pronounced postnational views, at least to the extent that they can win the approval of the citizens. Consequently, respondents from these newspapers believe that there are fundamental shortcomings in the democratic quality of EU decision making, most of all as regards popular participation and direct channels of influence between the citizens and the European-level institutions. In this category, we have *Dagens Nyheter* and the *tageszeitung* with the most pronounced postnational and/or federalist orientations, as well as in a more cautious way *Aftonbladet*. Newspapers in this group also subscribe to the value of a transnational public sphere in the European Union, and to a certain degree (with the partial exception of the *taz’s* Daniela Weingärtner) also to the view that journalists have a special role to play in this context. European integration is perceived by the respondents from all three newspapers – *Dagens Nyheter*, *taz* and *Aftonbladet* – to necessitate more direct forms of democratic legitimation, expressed particularly in the notion that the democratic deficit is located primarily at the European level.

How much and what kind of transnational communication can we then expect in the different newspapers, both from a normative and from an empirical perspective? In answering this question, we need to emphasize in particular the answers that respondents from the different newspapers have given in relation to their perceived role in stimulating or providing forums for transnational debate: the conservative newspapers with more or less intergovernmental/supranational orientations were rather reserved on this point. The liberal and left newspapers, on the other hand expressed highly positive views, claiming that contributing to the emergence of a European public sphere is and by all means should be part of their respective professional ambitions. At the same time, respondents from the left and liberal newspapers (at least in Sweden) also indicated that they were well aware of their limitations in this regard. This perspective suggests a clearer distinction between normative and empirical expectations regarding a connection between newspaper orientation and the likelihood (and liveliness) of transnational debate. From a normative perspective, more intensive transnational debate should be expected in newspapers subscribing to the view that European-level decision making also necessitates European-level debate and citizen participation. Correspondingly, less intensive transnational debate should expected in newspapers subscribing to the view that democracy itself as well as opinion and will formation should remain within the nation-state.
On this basis, we would therefore expect lively transnational debate to figure most prominently in *Dagens Nyheter* and the *tageszeitung*, followed by *Aftonbladet* and the *Süddeutsche Zeitung*. In the two conservative newspapers at the supranational/intergovernmental intersection, we would expect a correspondingly low level of transnational communication.
6 The Finality Debate

Introduction

On May 12, 2000, German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer gave a speech at Humboldt University in Berlin that rocked the foundations of European integration, a process thought of until this point largely as an intergovernmental project based on a strategy of incremental integration. Almost to the day fifty years after the Schuman Declaration, Fischer presented his “thoughts on the finality of European integration,” maintaining that he was speaking as a “convinced European and Member of the German Parliament” rather than representing the German federal government. In his speech, Fischer advanced the idea of a fundamental federal reorganization of the European Union, arguing for a full parliamentarization and the creation of a European federal government with true legislative and executive powers. Such fundamental reform was necessary, Fischer argued, to meet the challenge of the impending fifth round of enlargement and the threat of institutional deadlock. “Enlargement,” Fischer claimed, “will render imperative a fundamental reform of the European institutions.” But Fischer also believed that institutional reform would be a sensible response to the growing alienation of EU citizens with an increasingly incomprehensible system of decision making. “How,” Fischer asked suggestively, “can one prevent the EU from becoming utterly intransparent, compromises from becoming

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66 The Schuman Declaration is considered by many as the starting point of European integration as we understand it today. On May 9, 1950, Jean Monnet’s foreign minister Robert Schuman presented his strategy of placing French and German coal and steel production under one supranational authority. The Schuman Declaration led not only to the founding of the European Coal and Steel Community, but in the medium term also to the Treaties of Rome, founding the European Community with the same institutions that were in place until the signing of the Maastricht Treaty and the founding of the European Union. Furthermore, the Schuman Declaration and the integration strategy contained therein paved the way for the neofunctionalist logic of integration that has by and large marked European integration as a process of incremental integration, as opposed to the radically federalist vision supported by contemporary thinkers of European integration such as foremost Altiero Spinelli (Pistone 2003).

67 Joschka Fischer, “Vom Staatenverbund zur Föderation – Gedanken über die Finalität der europäischen Integration”.

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stranger and more incomprehensible, and the citizens’ acceptance of the EU from eventually hitting rock bottom?”

One element in Fischer’s speech turned out to cause even more controversy than the idea of a European federation itself. Fischer suggested that a core Europe could move onwards to deepened integration even if not all member states were willing or able to follow suit. In the ensuing debate, alternative concepts used to express similar ideas prominently included “a gravitational center”, “a pioneer group” as well as “an avant-garde”. “One possible interim step on the road to completing political integration,” Fischer argued, “could then later be the formation of a centre of gravity. [...] Such a centre of gravity would have to be the avant-garde, the driving force for the completion of political integration and should from the start comprise all the elements of the future federation.” The idea of a core Europe is by no means new, as Fischer added in his remarks, yet Fischer argued for a more open and inclusive approach: “As early as 1994, Karl Lamers and Wolfgang Schäuble proposed the creation of a ‘core Europe’, but it was stillborn, as it were, because it presupposed an exclusive, closed ‘core’, even omitting the founding state Italy, rather than a magnet of integration open to all.”

Nonetheless, particularly the more conservative and/or Euroskeptic press in Scandinavia construed Fischer’s ideas as implying a conscious strategy not only on Germany’s, but also on France’s part to secure the influence of the “Franco-German axis” in the enlarged EU-25/27 by dividing the enlarged union into a privileged A-camp and an underprivileged B-camp. Provocative as Fischer’s remarks may have been, they are seen today as something of a textbook example of the (temporary) coming to life of a European public sphere characterized by debate across borders (Nelsen & Stubb 2003: 69; Schmidt 2006: 8). In the weeks and months to come, Fischer’s remarks were met by comments, rebuttals and additions not least by “virtually every head of state and government, foreign minister, and minister of Europe of both member and candidate countries” (Nelsen & Stubb 2003: 69). For instance, French President Jacques Chirac commented on Fischer’s ideas in a speech delivered at the German federal parliament on June 27, 2000. While sympathetic to the idea of a core Europe or an avant-garde, as he called it, Chirac expressed a certain

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68 Whereas the idea of a core Europe has been assigned to Joschka Fischer via Karl Lamers and Wolfgang Schäuble, Jacques Chirac’s notion of enhanced integration has been summarized under the label of a ‘pioneer group’ of European states. In public debate, as the following reconstruction shows, notions of core Europe, enhanced integration, deepened integration and a pioneer group have frequently been conflated and even equated.
measure of skepticism towards the idea of a federal reorganization of the
EU.\textsuperscript{69}
Fischer’s and Chirac’s contributions marked the key triggering events of
the larger debate on the finality of European integration that ensued in
the weeks to come. But how did the two debates develop in the two
countries and six newspapers analyzed here? First of all, we have to note
that the Swedish and German debates \textit{beyond} the level of individual
newspapers played out quite differently. Such developments can be
observed through an initial reconstruction of the two debates, specifically
by looking at (1) the triggering events for the sampled articles, and (2) the
primary topics discussed in the sampled articles.

\textbf{The German Finality Debate: A “German-French Psycho-Drama”?}

The German debate begins promptly after Fischer’s Humboldt speech.
Already on the day following the speech, all three newspapers devoted
space not only to reporting on the details of Fischer’s propositions on
their respective news pages. In addition, all three newspapers entered into
a practice of explaining, interpreting, evaluating and discussing the
Foreign Minister’s idea at this early stage, resulting in no less than eight
articles by the first day of the debate.\textsuperscript{70} In this early phase, the debate
involves political as well as to some extent cultural journalists and
editorialists. The overall tone in these initial evaluations is
overwhelmingly positive. In the most skeptical assessment, Berthold
Kohler of the conservative \textit{Frankfurter Allgemeine} inquires why Fischer
was not courageous enough to advocate his ideas \textit{also} in his function as
German Foreign Minister. A more purely positive and even acclamatory-
applauding style is dominant in the evaluations offered in the liberal
\textit{Süddeutsche Zeitung} and to a lesser extent in the left-alternative \textit{taz}.\textsuperscript{71}
The debate is structured by three key events: (1) Fischer’s speech itself, the
contents and details of which are discussed throughout the period

\begin{footnotes}
\item[69] Chirac’s speech is available on the website of the German Parliament at http://
\item[70] The \textit{Süddeutsche Zeitung} had even reported on the planned speech on the day before it
was actually delivered.
\item[71] “Fischer’s ideas are outstanding,” the \textit{Süddeutsche Zeitung} writes, “also because they are
so necessary. Europe is beginning to reach its limits the more it expands. The union is
losing its capacity for action if it grows any further. A Council with 30 members and
endless intergovernmental conferences, a rampant Commission: it is impossible to govern
this way” (SZ 2000-05-13b).
\end{footnotes}
covered; (2) French Interior Minister Jean-Pierre Chevènement’s critical response to Fischer’s speech; and finally (3) the speech delivered by French President Jacques Chirac at the German Bundestag on June 27, 2000. While the German debate in the short initial phase discusses Fischer’s ideas as highly timely, necessary and reasonable, a phase characterized by a significantly higher level of contestation begins only shortly after with remarks made by French Interior Minister Jean-Pierre Chevènement. Chevènement claims that Fischer’s ideas illustrate that Germany has “still not recovered from the derailment of national socialism” and exemplify “the German tendency to force its own federalist model onto its partners” (e.g. FAZ 2000-05-23). Chevènement’s remarks spark controversy in the German debate and add a peculiar French-German dynamic that obviously does not find any parallel in the Swedish debate. As a matter of fact, in the weeks until the end of May 2000, the German debate on Fischer’s reflections is difficult to separate from the context of the Chevènement remarks. Particularly in the Frankfurter Allgemeine (and to a lesser extent in the taz), the debate during this second half of May 2000 is focused heavily on the role of Chevènement. This is particularly clear in the articles written during this phase by the Frankfurter Allgemeine’s Geneva-based correspondent Jürg Altwegg, in which the actual content of Fischer’s reflections tends to come second to the scandalizing evaluation of the role (and not least character) of Chevènement. However, this changes following an interview with Chevènement in the Frankfurter Allgemeine on May 29, 2000. While not revoking his earlier claims, Chevènement regrets that they have been misunderstood or misconstrued. What he had meant was that “the Germans condemn national socialism so strongly that they at times also condemn the nation” (FAZ 2000-05-29).

While this “French-German psycho-drama” (Jürg Altwegg, FAZ 2000-05-23) gradually fades, the debate’s French-German character cannot be attributed solely to the dynamics of the Chevènement remarks. The latter can only account for the amount of space given to numerous French speakers (including Chevènement himself) – both as references and as authors – to comment on Chevènement’s remarks. Yet French speakers are highly prominent in the German debate also before and after. The overall image is that Fischer’s speech resonated tremendously among leading French politicians. Particularly the conservative Frankfurter Allgemeine emerges as a forum for French-German debate, providing editorial space also for French Foreign Minister Hubert Védrine and his open letter to Fischer (“Dear Joschka, ...”), as well as for Nicole Fontaine, President of the European Parliament at the time. This applies also to the
third phase of the German debate, which is triggered by Jacques Chirac’s speech at the German Bundestag on June 27, 2000. Chirac’s speech is seen by many observers not least as a response to Fischer’s reflections on the future of Europe. While generally positive towards ideas such as the notion of a Europe of different speeds, enhanced integration and/or a core Europe, Chirac disagrees with Fischer on the very nature of European integration: to Chirac, there is no fundamental opposition between advocates of an intergovernmental and a supranational Europe. Instead, European integration has been and is characterized by an organizational hybrid incorporating intergovernmental and supranational elements. Chirac’s remarks received more attention in the conservative Frankfurter Allgemeine and in the left-alternative taz than in the liberal Süddeutsche Zeitung. In the Süddeutsche Zeitung, the speech was only taken up in the context of the impending French Council Presidency. Generally, the German finality debate can be summarized as a French-German affair that for the most part celebrated or at least welcomed Fischer’s proposals for the finality of European integration. For some time, however, the debate also turned into a heated psycho-drama.

The Swedish Finality Debate: ‘Enlargement First’ versus ‘Institutional Reform First’

By comparison, the Swedish debate was relatively slow to pick up, not least when it comes to how Fischer’s speech was received by the sampled newspapers’ editorialists. After an initial phase of rather distanced reporting, the Swedish debate only picked up in a more controversial and confrontational manner almost a week after the Humboldt speech. And once the debate did pick up following a debate article authored by Left Party MEP Jonas Sjöstedt on the opinion pages of conservative Svenska Dagbladet, our analysis indicates a sudden politicization of the debate, involving a host of domestic political actors of different stripes, all of whom respond to the claims raised by Sjöstedt rather than directly to the

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Sjöstedt’s op-ed article is not formally included in our newspaper sample since it does not in any way refer to Joschka Fischer’s Humboldt speech or the finality debate as such. Instead, Sjöstedt tackles the idea of an emerging “EU superstate” independently as an already threatening outcome of EU institutional reform. The article had a clear impact on the Swedish debate, as it is explicitly named in subsequent articles and has therefore been coded as a triggering event in two sampled articles. In addition, more contributions to the debate directly address Sjöstedt’s claims. Consequently, it is necessary to relate to the article as a form of external stimulus that had a direct impact on the further course of the Swedish finality debate.
content of Fischer’s Humboldt speech. Consistent with this latter observation, the debate is also strikingly (re-)nationalized, taking the Fischer speech as a reason for contemplating Sweden’s role within and towards the European Union. Where Fischer’s remarks are applauded, such as foremost in liberal Dagens Nyheter, they are taken at least initially as a backdrop for criticizing domestic political leaders such as foremost Prime Minister Göran Persson. The latter is attacked for lacking a visionary capacity comparable to Fischer’s, not only on EU matters, but in foreign policy in general.73

In terms of its broad structure, the Swedish finality debate is very different from its German counterpart. During an initial phase of fairly distanced expert commenting, Svenska Dagbladet’s veteran EU correspondent Rolf Gustavsson is the sole commentator on Fischer’s reflections until the above-mentioned interjection by Jonas Sjöstedt a week after the Humboldt speech. This latter contribution can in turn account for a clear subsequent intensification, politicization and even re-nationalization of the debate during the second half of May and well into June 2000. From here onwards, the debate comes to life, engaging not only editorialists from all three newspapers, but also a large number of external authors, including foremost domestic politicians such as either Swedish Members of Parliament and/or cabinet members, but also a large number of Swedish Members of the European Parliament. Broadly speaking, our analysis indicates two subordinate debates within this second phase that lasted from around May 20, 2000 until around June 13, 2000.74 First, Sjöstedt’s op-ed article triggered a largely self-referential debate between domestic MEPs. Second, an equally self-referential debate ensues on Svenska Dagbladet’s opinion pages. Here, Svenska Dagbladet’s Anders Björnsson and historian/freelance writer Håkan Arvidsson delve into ideas about a structural transformation of democracy and the prospects of recovering democracy beyond the nation-state.75

73 “[A leading politician] is expected to show the way, to reason about the ways in which change is to be brought about, to take a stand. Just like the German foreign minister Joschka Fischer, who created such big interest with his speech on the future of Europe and the development of the EU” (DN 2000-05-24).

74 The beginning and end dates of this second phase are chosen in part on the basis of the Swedish debate’s coverage cycle, which peaked during this phase, and in part on the basis of the debate that went on between domestic political actors, beginning with the abovementioned editorial in Aftonbladet, and ending with op-ed articles authored by MEP’s Anders Wijkman (June 7, 2000) and Per Gahrton (May 13, 2000).

75 The debate between Arvidsson and Björnsson initially begins with the former’s op-ed article advocating Fischer’s proposed ‘enhanced integration’, without which the EU is seen by Arvidsson to have no chance to act as a counterweight to the global economy (SvD

An op-ed article by Carl Lidbom triggers a second thread in this debate (DN 2000-05-24), which takes place on the editorial and op-ed pages of liberal Dagens Nyheter. Lidbom furthermore sets the tone for a discussion of the perceived tension between a deepening and widening of European integration. In this part of the debate, institutional reform is closely connected to EU enlargement, but contestation occurs on whether enlargement is possible without prior institutional reform, or whether institutional reform has to be subordinated to the normative prioritization of enlargement. Lidbom applauds Fischer’s ideas, emphasizing in particular the need for far-reaching institutional reform that would have to be completed before enlargement can take place. “The EU has to change,” Lidbom argues, “in order to avoid stagnation and deep crisis. And this has to happen before new states can be taken in as members” (DN 2000-05-24). Lidbom further urges a more active approach on the part of Swedish politicians – both government and opposition – in tackling such pressing issues. Lidbom explicitly attacks the Swedish Foreign Minister Anna Lindh, urging that “Anna Lindh or someone else in the Swedish government [keep] Joschka Fischer company in his efforts to create a more open EU debate than we have so far had to content ourselves with” (DN 2000-05-24). Foreign minister Anna Lindh responds promptly, emphasizing particularly the role that EU enlargement plays as a cornerstone of Swedish European policy. Concretely, Lindh contends
that deepening and widening, i.e. institutional reform and EU enlargement on the contrary can and should go hand in hand.\textsuperscript{76}

The ensuing debate on the tension between enlargement and institutional reform is highly polemical in tone. While explicitly \textit{not} accusing Fischer or Lidbom of any such thoughts, Lindh argues that those reluctant to enlarge often hide their reluctance behind the need for institutional reform. Lindh’s article in turn prompts critical responses on the part of Christian Democratic MEP Anders Wijkman as well as an editorial in \textit{Dagens Nyheter}, but is also supported in a signed commentary by Aftonbladet’s editorialist Olle Svenning (Ab 2000-06-08). Lindh’s criticism of Lidbom is as polemical as Wijkman’s and \textit{Dagens Nyheter}’s criticism of Lindh’s contribution. While Wijkman accuses Lindh of “postponing a number of questions indefinitely, questions on which a clear message is needed in order to make the EU more effective, clear and democratic” (Wijkman, DN 2000-06-07), \textit{Dagens Nyheter} criticizes the Swedish foreign minister for not offering any reasons as to why incremental integration should be preferred to a debate about a European federation. “Does the government believe,” \textit{Dagens Nyheter} inquires, “that it needs not give reasons for its own position - whatever that may be?” (DN 2000-06-05).

Yet while the Swedish finality debate is largely a domestic debate on enlargement versus institutional reform, a good deal of more direct engagement with Joschka Fischer’s finality remarks can nonetheless be observed. This engagement with Fischer’s claims is however confined to the respective newspapers’ editorial sections. This is clearest in the case of social democratic Aftonbladet, where eight of the ten sampled articles address the idea of a federalization of Europe and/or the idea of a core Europe, and five of these are written by \textit{Aftonbladet}’s editorialists. For the most part, Fischer’s ideas are commended, often combined with an advisory style of evaluation. European integration is portrayed here as a chance for democracy and welfare rather than as a threat to it, yet combined with an emphasis on the need for solid popular support for the project. \textsuperscript{1} “First,” Aftonbladet argues, “the EU has to become relevant for the citizens and demonstrate that a political union can improve the

\textsuperscript{76} “A clear-sighted debate on the future of Europe,” Lindh argues, “has to begin with the question of how we can tackle the most important task best, namely to unite Europe […]. The discussion about the future of Europe cannot only be about long-term questions such as a European federation. Carl Lidbom holds […] that EU enlargement has to wait so that we can manage to deepen our cooperation first. I believe that enlargement and a gradual deepening of integration can go hand in hand. Right now, enlargement is the most central.”
conditions for a majority of people in Europe. [...] After that, a federal process is both desirable and possible. In the long run, it could strengthen democracy. Joschka Fischer's remarks ought to be seen as a vision that can invigorate EU debate" (Aftonbladet 2000-05-20). At the same time, the newspaper is also the most divided in its editorial opinion on Fischer's (and later Jacques Chirac's) ideas: whereas a federalization of Europe is commended by some, it is framed by others to imply nothing short of a division of Europe into qualitatively different categories of member states – the good versus the bad, the privileged versus the underprivileged, the rich versus the poor.77

Frames: What’s at stake in the finality debate?

Broadly speaking, our frame analysis suggests considerable convergence in the use of frames in the Swedish and German finality debates. The three most salient frames are identical in the German and the Swedish debates, indicating that the general understanding of what is at stake in the debate is very similar in the two countries. However, the Swedish newspapers are much more ambivalent in their use of frames, indicating not least that the finality debate is testimony also to the adversarial character of European integration as a process driven by member states' contending interests. This applies particularly to the Swedish newspapers’ considerably more ambivalent position towards the prospect of a federal constitution with a clear division of competences, which is considered in highly positive terms in the German newspapers. Nonetheless, our frame analysis indicates that despite these country-specific patterns, considerable parallels are also clear across countries in newspapers of similar orientation: Fischer's ideas, even where construed in explicitly

77 “You don’t have to subscribe to any conspiracy theories in order to guess what a divided EU would look like, in which an enthusiastic and well-off core (Germany, France, Italy, the Benelux countries) forms a powerful and direction-giving A-team. In this worst case scenario, the new Eastern members would end up in a B-team together with England, Sweden and some other countries, a laggard that in practice plays no role in directing the future of the EU. Any such development has to be avoided” (Ab 2000-07-05); “[Anna Lindh’s] attack targets German foreign minister Joschka Fischer, who has recently and somewhat speculatively drawn up a kind of EU superstate. What Fischer and many of his followers [...] are after is a postponement of enlargement. They want a special EU core of countries which shape and decide on Europe. The Eastern and Central European countries are placed in the periphery, powerless and deprived of many of the EU’s rights” (Ab 2000-06-08).
federalist terms, are framed in much more positive terms in liberal (and left) than in conservative newspapers.

**Frames in the German Debate**

In the German debate, four frames stand out in particular, appearing in at least 20% of the coded articles, namely the EU superstate/supranational vs. intergovernmental Europe frame (39% on average), the citizenship/democracy frame (29%), the deepening vs. widening frame (25%) and the decision-making efficiency frame (22%). All four of these frames are applied with similar frequency in the three German newspapers. Yet as the following discussion shows, notable differences can be discerned between the three newspapers as to which reading of the respective frames has been applied, indicating that the different newspapers have very different ways of making sense of the Fischer proposals for the future and finality of European integration.

Appearing on average in 39% of the coded articles, the ‘EU superstate’ frame is by far the most salient frame in the German sample. Considering the overarching topic of the debate – Fischer’s proposal for a federalization of the EU – as well as the fact that the frame can be (and has been!) applied both in a highly positive and in a rather negative way, this finding in itself is not overly surprising. Instead, we need to focus on how the three German newspapers make use of contending readings of the *EU superstate* frame, and how these findings relate to the findings from the Swedish sample.

The negative reading of the ‘EU superstate’ frame is applied foremost in the conservative *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, where it is frequently employed by editorialists as well as by external authors. In this negative reading of the ‘EU superstate’ frame, the EU’s alleged failure to acknowledge the strength and relevance of the nation-state as a source for collective identification is a frequent object of critique. Wolfgang Schäuble, otherwise a critical supporter of Fischer’s ideas, writes in a direct response to the latter’s Humboldt speech that “[a]s far as identity as a precondition for the voluntary incorporation into a legally constituted society [...] is concerned, Europe [...] will remain dependent on the nation and the nation-state. Attempting to weaken forces of national cohesion in the end puts the free, tolerant and pluralistic constitutional state at risk” (FAZ 2000-06-08).

In the left-alternative *taz*, the ‘EU superstate’ frame is similarly salient, but is used here in more distanced way. Here, the frame is used to suggest that what is at stake in the debate is the supranational and/or
intergovernmental future of the EU, without deciding whether or in what ways the Fischer proposal can be seen as constituting an implicit or explicit argument for a European federation understood as an EU superstate. Here, authors rather discuss the plausibility of a European federation of nation-states. Political scientist Carsten Schymik praises Fischer’s attempt at “squaring the circle” (taz 2000-06-13), but concludes that Fischer’s federation can nonetheless only be achieved at the expense of the nation-state. “A federation equipped with the core sovereignties envisaged by Fischer,” Schymik argues, “could continue to refer to its members as nation-states. But our familiar definition of the nation-state would in fact no longer be able to characterize these units demoted to federal territories [Bundesländer]” (taz 2000-06-13).

Table 6.1. German finality debate. Most salient frames.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>frame name</th>
<th>FAZ</th>
<th>SZ</th>
<th>taz</th>
<th>Total</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td># of art.</td>
<td>% of art.</td>
<td># of art.</td>
<td>% of art.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;EU superstate&quot;</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>citizenship/democracy</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>deepening vs. widening</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>decision-making efficiency</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lack of leadership</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Strikingly, the liberal Süddeutsche Zeitung makes almost no use of the EU superstate frame, emphasizing instead the democratic implications of a possible federalization of the EU. The citizenship/democracy frame is applied on average in 29% of the coded articles. The frame is used mainly positively, emphasizing a European constitution as a beneficial step towards democratizing European integration. Most of all, the citizenship/democracy frame is used in relation to the perceived need of a “competence catalog”, i.e. a codified, clear division of competences between the union and member state levels. In this respect, the German sample differs from its Swedish counterpart, where also the negative
reading of the frame is highly salient, emphasizing European integration and any step in a federal direction as automatically detrimental to democracy. In the German debate, a future constitution in the form of a competence catalog is hailed both by proponents of more European-level federalism and otherwise more skeptical proponents of a more intergovernmental EU. In the latter case, a competence catalog is advocated foremost as a way of halting the incremental transfer of competences from the national to the supranational level, which is here framed as a democratic issue. Wolfgang Schäuble is highly outspoken on this point, although the frame is applied similarly in the French foreign minister Hubert Védrine’s open letter to Fischer in the Frankfurter Allgemeine.

Yet while the ‘citizenship/democracy’ frame is by and large employed positively in the German debate, an exception consists of Jean-Pierre Chevènement’s use of the frame’s negative reading. According to Chevènement, the nation-state is a natural home for democracy and democratic debate, consequently making any move towards more federalism by definition undemocratic. “In the European Union,” Chevènement argues, “[the] preconditions for public debate equivalent to discussions in the nation-states are not fulfilled. Under these circumstances, a European Federation would mean turning our backs on democracy” (FAZ 2000-05-29).

Also the deepening versus widening frame is by and large applied positively in the German newspapers, and it is applied with similar frequency in all three. In this context, Fischer’s proposal is construed as a solution to the threat of institutional deadlock after the impending fifth round of EU enlargement. This pattern applies also to the use of the decision-making efficiency frame. Fischer’s ideas are seen foremost as a strategy for ensuring that the decision-making process will still work in

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78 “As long as competences are not settled bindingly and satisfactorily,” Schäuble argues in his response to Fischer, “every European institution will - when in doubt - attempt to find reasons for European-level competences, in line with the basic idea of an incremental communitization” (FAZ 2000-06-08).

79 “In the spirit of subsidiarity, we will have to see what is to remain at the national level and what needs to be transferred back to national level, and whether it is possible to establish what the federation would be responsible for. This demarcation is indispensible. Precisely this way of organizing things is the defining feature of a federation. And those in favor of the drafting of a European constitution pursue the same goal. But also on this matter, clear debate is necessary. Are we talking about formulating the legally binding division of competences between, or does the creation of a federation only lead to the transfer of important sovereignty rights in new areas, and if so: in which areas? (Hubert Védrine, FAZ 2000-06-13)”
the enlarged union. Also here, the three newspapers are very similar both in their positive assessment of institutional reform and in the frequency with which the decision-making efficiency frame is applied. However, the adversarial frame plays at best a marginal role in the German debate: the Fischer speech is only rarely interpreted as an expression of an adversarial relationship between big and small, old and new, or between rich and poor (future) EU member states. In sum, the German debate is clearly dominated by four frames, outlining the major ways in which the problem is perceived and construed. Mainly, the Fischer remarks ignite a debate about the desirability of a federal constitutional future of Europe as opposed to a return to a more purely intergovernmental form of integration. Second, a possible constitutionalization of Europe understood as a codification of a clear division of competences is discussed in terms of its democratic implications. Third, institutional reform and decision-making efficiency, understood as a deepening of integration, are emphasized as crucial preconditions for a functioning larger union rather than as a way of postponing enlargement. Consequently, the adversarial relationship between different (groups of) member states plays only a minor role.

Frames in the Swedish Debate

Four out of the five most salient frames in the Swedish debate are the same as in the German sample, indicating that in broad terms, the issue or problem emerging in the wake of Fischer’s finality speech is constructed very similarly in Sweden and Germany. As in the German case, the Swedish debate emphasizes issues related to the possible coming of an EU superstate, deepening versus widening, citizenship/democracy and decision-making efficiency. However, the Swedish debate is much more varied as regards the use of contending readings of the same frames. As in the German case, and plausibly due to the topic of the Fischer remarks, the ‘EU superstate’ frame is by far the most frequent frame also in the Swedish debate, appearing on average in 47% of all coded articles, as well as in 50% of the coded articles in both social democratic Aftonbladet and liberal Dagens Nyheter (see table 6.2 below). However, the ‘deepening versus widening’ frame plays a much more central role in the Swedish debate than it does in Germany, particularly in the negative reading that was applied in the debate among domestic political actors on the op-ed pages of conservative Svenska Dagbladet as well as to a lesser extent on the op-ed pages of liberal Dagens Nyheter. Here, the negative reading of the ‘deepening versus widening’ frame construes Fischer’s
advance as a conscious strategy towards delaying the enlargement process. So while the deepening versus widening frame is applied foremost in a positive sense in the German debate, the Swedish debate witnesses much more of a clash of the frame’s two contending readings. The most notable discrepancy between the German and Swedish newspapers in framing the finality debate is related to the use of the adversarial frame. While the frame plays virtually no role in the German debate, it turns out to be highly salient in the Swedish case. Here, the finality debate is construed not least as an instance of conflict between big (read: France and Germany) and small member states (read: not least Sweden), but also as a conflict between old (read, again: France and Germany) and new member states (read, again: not least Sweden). With regard to the different newspapers’ use of the frame, liberal Dagens Nyheter and social democratic Aftonbladet are considerably less frequent in applying the frame than their conservative counterpart Svenska Dagbladet.

Table 6.2. Swedish finality debate. Most salient frames.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>frame name</th>
<th>SvD</th>
<th>DN</th>
<th>Ab</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>#</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>#</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“EU superstate”</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>adversarial frame</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>deepening vs. widening</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>citizenship/democracy</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>decision-making efficiency</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>#</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>#</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the use of the ‘EU superstate’ frame, we see cross-country similarities between newspapers of similar orientation. Corresponding to the high frequency of positive evaluations with which Fischer’s remarks are met in the two liberal newspapers, Dagens Nyheter and the Süddeutsche Zeitung are particularly frequent in applying the positive reading of the ‘EU superstate’ frame on their editorial pages. The introduction of clearer federal structures is discussed as a challenging, yet potentially highly
beneficial idea. *Dagens Nyheter*’s editorialists are particularly outspoken in commending the German foreign minister, yet not without connecting their applause to a criticism of the own domestic government’s lack of similar visions. In one main editorial of the day, *Dagens Nyheter* praises Fischer’s version of a European federation as a thought “that should challenge not least those here at home that resent even the word ‘federalism’. It should not be enough to dismiss Fischer’s proposals as lacking popular support [...]. We have a right to expect an answer to the question: if not this way, then what way?” (DN 2000-05-24b). While this latter aspect is of course absent in the German case, the issue is construed in very similar ways in the two liberal newspapers: what is at stake is the idea of a federalization of Europe, an idea that ought to be debated at length and that potentially has great benefits to offer.

The negative reading of the ‘EU superstate’ frame is much more salient on the editorial and op-ed pages of conservative *Svenska Dagbladet*, but to a lesser extent also in social democratic *Aftonbladet*. While certain similarities can be discerned in the framing of the issue in the conservative newspapers, the two left newspapers diverge more clearly in construing the issue. While some authors in *Aftonbladet* emphasize federalization not least as an opportunity for democracy80, others are more skeptical in their interpretation of what is at stake in the debate. For the latter, Fischer’s speech is most of all an expression of a French-German ambition to create a French-German-led European superpower.81 While the negative reading of the ‘EU superstate’ frame is frequently applied by external authors in the case of *Aftonbladet*, the harshest words of criticism are however expressed by editorialist Olle Svenning, who defends foreign minister Anna Lindh’s rejection of any move towards federalizing the EU. Also in his view, any strategy of deepening at the

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80 “The EU’s citizens have now come to a fork in the road politically that offers them three alternatives: a return to 1950’s style national independence with secret diplomacy and without any supranational element; a union run by experts and secret diplomacy with weak democratic institutions; or an EU with a democratic constitution and federative/regional governance. The first alternative would have to be characterized as a catastrophic scenario. The second alternative, which corresponds to the situation as it is today, is deeply unsatisfactory from a democratic perspective and gives citizens far too weak influence. That leaves the hitherto untested alternative to develop and fully democratize the EU” (Ab 2000-05-23).

81 “France is now supported by Germany in forming a federal Europe. The two states aim at forming a sort of inner core of original EU states. They are meeting at [Rambouillet castle] to draw up the guidelines. They are discussing a new constitution, a new EU parliament, a common defense. They cannot decide these matters on their own. That is clear. But I don’t think one should underestimate the French” (Ab 2000-06-03).
expense of widening is merely a disguise under which to postpone
enlargement and create an EU superstate. “What Fischer and many of his
followers [...] are after,” Svenning argues, “is a postponement of
enlargement. They want a special EU core of countries which shape and
decide on Europe. The Eastern and Central European countries are placed
on the periphery, powerless and deprived of many of the EU’s rights” (Ab
2000-06-08).

Similar to the application of the ‘EU superstate’ frame, also the ‘deepening
versus widening’ frame is applied in a more diverse way than is the case in
the German debate. Once again, we see a clash between contending
readings: the finality debate is construed on the one hand in terms of its
institutional benefits – something that makes a widening of integration
possible in the first place – and on the other hand in terms of Fischer’s
presumed ambition of delaying EU enlargement. This latter point is
emphasized most emphatically *Aftonbladet’s* editorialist Olle Svenning.
From this vantage point, the oft-mentioned debate among domestic
political actors on the op-ed pages of *Svenska Dagbladet* and to a lesser
extent *Dagens Nyheter* is not least a clash of the contending readings of
the ‘deepening versus widening’ frame. This applies to foreign minister
Anna Lindh’s controversially received op-ed article in *Dagens Nyheter*82 as
much as it does to more outspoken EU skeptics such as Green Party MEP
Per Gahrton. In an article in *Svenska Dagbladet*, Gahrton urges Prime
Minister Göran Persson to strive for “quick enlargement” as well as for
“decentralization and more flexibility”, so that the EU would “soon be able
to get 40-45 members” (SvD 2000-06-13). The positive reading, on the
other hand, is applied by MEPs such as Christian democrat Anders
Wijkman83 and liberals Cecilia Malmström, Marit Paulsen and Olle
Schmidt.84

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82 In her article, Lindh spoke of a conscious strategy on the part of certain actors to delay
enlargement for self-interested motives: “We have to be aware that those who want to
introduce federal systems at this point may want to disguise their reluctance to enlarge
and to concede their regional and agricultural support. I do not accuse Lidbom or the
German foreign minister, Joschka Fischer, of having such ambitions, but there are others
who want to move the focus away from enlargement to deepening for merely a few” (DN
2000-06-04).

83 Anders Wijkman accuses Jonas Sjöstedt and the Left Party of “seeing ghosts” in the form
of an EU superstate, maintaining that “without a quick reform of the institutions and
decision making rules, the whole Eastern enlargement is put at risk” (SvD 2000-05-25).

84 Similar to Anders Wijkman, the three liberal MEPs construe institutional reform as a
functional necessity to make “the historic and moral responsibility represented by
enlargement” possible. “Decision making in the EU institutions,” they argue, “has to be
simplified and made more effective” (SvD 2000-05-25e).
The Swedish debate differs fundamentally from the German one in its heavy emphasis on the adversarial frame, which plays virtually no role in the German debate. The Fischer proposal is frequently understood, explained and evaluated in terms of a struggle for influence between different categories of member states. Remarkably, this adversarial interpretation of the Fischer speech is therefore far more salient than issues of decision-making efficiency (which is applied in only 18% of the Swedish articles). Nonetheless, *Dagens Nyheter* stands out in using the adversarial frame much less frequently than the other two newspapers, consistent also with the higher frequency with which a positive reading of the ‘EU superstate’ frame is applied.

*Dagens Nyheter*’s use of the adversarial frame is connected to questions about the role that Sweden would be able to play in an enlarged and increasingly federal EU. Yet in its editorial opinion, *Dagens Nyheter* supports a constitutionalization of Europe, arguing that precisely because of the supposedly adversarial character of European integration, smaller member states have a vested interest in a clearly codified division of competences between different levels of governance. “The Swedish position is strange,” the newspaper argues, “because it is small countries that have the strongest interest in an institutional framework. The big can always speak the language of power, the little have to lean on rules and forms” (DN 2000-06-29). In this context, *Dagens Nyheter*’s use of the adversarial frame is less polemical and more analytical than *Svenska Dagbladet*’s and in part *Aftonbladet*’s. In the latter two, Sweden as a recently acceded state is placed into one category with the twelve candidate countries of the fifth round of enlargement, whose position in a federal Europe is painted in bleak colors, pitted against an alliance of older member states under the leadership of France and Germany.

In sum, our frame analysis indicates that there are relatively clear cross-country patterns in the way newspapers frame the finality debate: not only are four out of the five most prominent frames identical in the Swedish and German debates, but we can also observe parallels in the ways in which newspapers of similar orientations emphasize certain aspects more strongly than others. Issues of citizenship and democracy as well as a positive understanding of an increasing federalization and most of all a constitutionalization of Europe are emphasized much more in the

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85 “The German foreign minister Joschka Fischer’s vision of a federal Europe has been received in Sweden as an interesting contribution to a debate on the EU’s distant future. Few newspaper readers have however noticed that his proposal about a few countries moving forward to form a core group is an immediate provocation of a country like Sweden. Does Sweden want to be a part of the core group or not?” (SvD 2000-05-25d).
liberal and to a lesser extent in the left newspapers. Conservative newspapers, on the other hand, tend to emphasize the loss of national sovereignty (i.e. a negative reading of the superstate frame) more strongly. These similarities in newspapers’ framing indicate a considerable convergence of meaning structures across borders. At the same time, the prominence of the adversarial frame in the Swedish sample indicates that also strongly national ways of framing the issue occur. Yet even here, we see a clear indication that this aspect is more pronounced in conservative Svenska Dagbladet than it is in liberal Dagens Nyheter. How do these findings correspond to our analysis of the authors and references appearing in the six newspapers studied?

**Permeability: Domestic and Non-Domestic Authors in the German and Swedish Debates**

To what extent are the Swedish and German finality debates *transnational* as regards the inclusion of non-domestic speakers as authors and references? In terms of the numbers of opinion articles published, the level of interest that Fischer’s Humboldt speech sparked was quite similar in Germany and Sweden. In fact, it is the only one of the three periods covered where the Swedish sample is larger than the German (51 and 49 articles, respectively). Furthermore, the Swedish sample also contained more non-domestic authors and/or featured speakers than its German counterpart. Also from this perspective, the Swedish finality debate is exceptional by comparison to the respective ratification crisis and constitutional re-launch debates.

**Domestic and Non-Domestic Authors in the German Debate**

Four out of the 49 articles in the German sample involve non-domestic speakers as either authors or interview respondents (8%). Three out of these appear in the conservative Frankfurter Allgemeine and one in the left-alternative taz, while the liberal Süddeutsche Zeitung scores blank. In the two other phases analyzed, the respective German samples were significantly larger than the Swedish ones (see chapters 7 and 8). The conservative Frankfurter Allgemeine publishes French Foreign Minister Hubert Védrine’s open letter to Joschka Fischer as well as an interview with Jean-Pierre
Moreover, the *Frankfurter Allgemeine* has the largest share of non-domestic authors of all six newspapers sampled (17%, compared to Swedish liberal ‘runner-up’ *Dagens Nyheter* at 13%), despite the rather reserved views that the newspaper’s interview respondents hold on European integration *beyond* the intergovernmental/supranational intersection (see chapter 5).

Table 6.3. German finality debate. Most prominent categories of authors/featured speakers by newspaper.88

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category of author/featured speaker</th>
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<th>taz</th>
<th>total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own newspaper, correspondent, other EU country</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own newspaper journalist, editorialist/editor</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own newspaper journalist, politics pages</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own newspaper journalist, cultural pages</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freelance journalist, domestic</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government/cabinet, other EU country</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>total</strong>*</td>
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<td>15</td>
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<table>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>8</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

* number of sampled/coded articles in parentheses

88 Percentages were calculated according to the following guideline: In the case of articles co-authored by individuals representing different categories of authors (e.g. a domestic and a non-domestic MEP), an article was counted for all categories. The sums listed in ‘total’ are therefore sums of *authors* rather than sums of *articles* sampled. The calculated percentages of non-domestic authors/featured speakers, on the other hand, correspond to the share of non-domestic speakers in the total number of articles sampled.
All four non-domestic speakers in the German sample are French. This is however due only in part to the French-German “psychodrama” surrounding French Interior Minister Jean-Pierre Chevènement’s reaction to Joschka Fischer’s speech. While Chevènement developed his views in an interview with the Frankfurter Allgemeine (FAZ 2000-05-29), a significant part of the French-German debate nonetheless revolves around Jacques Chirac’s response to Fischer’s ideas before the German Bundestag. Similarly, Foreign Minister Hubert Védrine addresses an open letter addressed to Joschka Fischer, once again published in the Frankfurter Allgemeine (FAZ 2000-06-13).

Broadly speaking, the overall share of non-domestic authors in the German sample is relatively high despite the complete absence of non-domestic authors in the liberal Süddeutsche Zeitung. While the latter fails to live up to our normative expectations regarding the providing of a forum for transnational debate, this function is performed foremost by the conservative Frankfurter Allgemeine, as well as to a lesser extent by the left-alternative tageszeitung.

**Domestic and Non-Domestic Authors in the Swedish Debate**

The Swedish finality debate is considerably more diverse than its German counterpart in terms of the categories as well as national origins of the speakers represented. Most strikingly, domestic Members of the European Parliament are highly involved in the debate, an element almost completely absent in the German case. In the Swedish debate, domestic MEP’s are consequently the second most prominent group of authors/featured speakers. With nine out of the 51 articles sampled, they are by far the largest non-journalistic group of authors, still ahead of the respective newspapers’ EU correspondents/reporters.

This higher diversity of speakers in the Swedish sample also finds expression in the higher number of non-domestic speakers represented. Six of the 51 articles feature speakers from other national contexts: three members of other EU countries’ governments (all of which are commented interviews conducted by Svenska Dagbladet’s correspondent Rolf Gustavsson), in addition to three articles co-authored by Swedish MEP’s and MEP’s from other member states.

In total, the average share of non-domestic authors and featured speakers lies at a remarkable 12%. Differences between the three newspapers are however only minor. Conservative Svenska Dagbladet is only marginally behind liberal Dagens Nyheter (within 1%). Also social democratic
Aftonbladet (10%) is only shortly behind, indicating that the different newspapers respective normative preferences on European integration have no direct effect on the share of non-domestic authors in our sample.

Table 6.4. Swedish finality debate. Most prominent categories of authors/featured speakers by newspaper.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category of author/featured speaker</th>
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<th>DN</th>
<th>Ab</th>
<th>total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
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<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEP, domestic</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2¹</td>
<td>2¹</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own newspaper journalist, EU correspondent/reporter</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own newspaper journalist, politics pages</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Government/cabinet, other EU country</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Own newspaper, correspondent, other EU country</td>
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<td>Freelance journalist, domestic</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic government/cabinet</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEP, other EU country</td>
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<td><strong>total</strong>*</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>11</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* number of sampled/coded articles sampled/coded in parentheses

¹ one article co-authored by one domestic and one or several non-domestic MEP

The non-domestic speakers in the Swedish sample are furthermore much more varied with regard to their respective national origins. As in the German case, the voice of speakers from a neighboring country plays a key role. Three of the six articles are either co-authored by or feature an interview respondent from neighboring Finland. Furthermore, the voice of MEP’s plays a larger role than it does in the German sample. Two of the three articles involving Finnish speakers are op-ed articles co-authored by Swedish MEP’s of the same party group in the European Parliament. ⁸⁹ As

⁸⁹ One of these articles is co-authored by Per Gahrton, along with four other Green MEP’s. Another is co-authored by Karl Erik Olsson, at the time a member of the European Liberal
regards the involved newspapers’ translator function, the sample contains only one translated op-ed article, i.e. an article by French Foreign Minister Hubert Védrine on the eve of the French Council Presidency, beginning on July 1, 2000.

**Transnational Engagement in the Two Debates**

But how are non-domestic speakers dealt with as references? Both the Swedish and the German finality debates are characterized by a high number of references to non-domestic speakers, in both cases clearly outnumbering their domestic counterparts. But how are the claims raised by non-domestic, i.e. in which ways are they contested or supported, if at all? Our indicator for engagement with (as opposed to mere observation of) non-domestic speakers’ claims relates to the evaluations offered for a given statement, both as regards (a) the kind of statement made on the respective reference, and as regards (b) the style with which a given statement is evaluated. A speaker who is merely observed would most frequently be referred to using *definitive, designative* or – to a lesser extent – *neutral evaluative* statements. In terms of style of evaluation, furthermore, his or her claims would either not be evaluated at all, or they would be evaluated in a distanced, objective-analytical way. A speaker whose claims a commentator engages with, on the other hand, would be referred to using evaluative or advocative statements. In terms of style of evaluation, furthermore, his or her claims would be evaluated in an opinionated way, i.e. through the use of an ironic-satirical, dramatizing, polemical-scandalizing, advisory-pedagogical, populist-demagogical, or acclamatory-applauding style of evaluation (see chapter 4). These aspects are here analyzed here to assess the level of transnational engagement.

**Transnational Engagement in the German Finality Debate**

At first sight, the German sample as a whole appears *not* to be characterized by any strikingly high level of engagement with non-domestic speakers. Non-domestic speakers are frequently met with designative statements, indicating that the different newspapers tend to

Democrat and Reform group (ELDR) in the European Parliament (as is his co-author Paavo Väyrynen).
merely report on rather than engage with the former’s claims: counter-arguments are offered only rarely. On the other hand, this practice overwhelmingly appears clustered towards the end of analytical background opinion articles, offering the reader information on ‘who else said what’ in the context of the finality debate. An analysis of engagement with the most prominent speakers in the debate yields a different image. While the debate is unsurprisingly focused on the role and ideas of Joschka Fischer, the sample is nonetheless considerably rich not only in references to, but also in engagement with non-domestic speakers. Notably, the conservative Frankfurter Allgemeine displays a very active and confrontational style of engaging with non-domestic speakers. In this sense, our expectations are in a sense exceeded: the FAZ scores highest in the use of an ironic-satirical, polemical-scandalizing and advisory-pedagogical style in its engagement with non-domestic speakers. The liberal Süddeutsche Zeitung, on the other hand, is much more active in its engagement with domestic speakers, displaying high relative shares of an advisory-pedagogical and acclamatory-applauding, but also of a polemical-scandalizing style in meeting the claims of domestic speakers. In the case of the Frankfurter Allgemeine, much of this is connected to the role of Jean-Pierre Chevènement, against whose claims Joschka Fischer’s federal vision – and in a sense Germany as a whole - is defended. Correspondingly, the Süddeutsche Zeitung pays significantly more attention to Fischer himself. In this sense, the overall very positive evaluation of domestic speakers in the SZ sample is attributable foremost to Fischer’s role. This observation is confirmed by our analysis of the statements offered on domestic compared to non-domestic speakers. The Frankfurter Allgemeine scores high on positive evaluative statements on domestic (read: foremost Fischer) and on negative evaluative statements on non-domestic speakers (read: foremost Chevènement). Similarly, the Süddeutsche Zeitung scores low on any kind of evaluative statement on non-domestic speakers, but displays a tremendously high share of positive evaluative statements on domestic speakers (foremost Fischer). Once again, this can be attributed to the overwhelmingly positive assessment of Fischer’s proposal – and the prospect of a federal future for the EU – in the liberal newspaper. Once again, also, the high level of engagement with non-domestic speakers in the conservative newspaper is surprising, but can be explained by reference to the French-German psycho-drama following Jean-Pierre Chevènement’s remarked on Fischer.
Table 6.5. German finality debate. Evaluations of domestic and non-domestic speakers, by newspaper (% in parentheses).

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<td>1 (1)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7 (10)</td>
<td>8 (12)</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>33 (49)</td>
<td>68 (100)</td>
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<td>9 (10)</td>
<td>47 (53)</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Sum, non-domestic 157</td>
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</table>

How do these findings relate to our analysis of the most prominent speakers in the respective samples? Apart from Joschka Fischer, our material indicates that domestic speakers by no means figure as prominently in the German newspapers as one might assume. While Fischer is head and shoulders above the rest as the most-quoted speaker in the sample as a whole as well as in every one of the German newspapers, the debate is nonetheless characterized by a lively practice of engagement with non-domestic speakers. This applies most of all to the
most prominent speakers in the debate. For one, the ten most-quoted speakers in the sample include only two German speakers (Fischer and Chancellor Gerhard Schröder). Strikingly, seven out of the remaining eight are French, underlining the French-German character of the debate that was already apparent in the high number of French guest authors. In particular, President Jacques Chirac (in the aftermath of his speech in the German Bundestag) and Interior Minister Chevenement (in the aftermath of his remarks on Fischer) manage to draw the attention of the three German newspapers.

Table 6.6. German finality debate. Statements made on domestic and non-domestic speakers, by newspaper (% in parentheses).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspaper</th>
<th>defin.</th>
<th>design.</th>
<th>eval. +</th>
<th>eval. o</th>
<th>eval. -</th>
<th>advoc. +</th>
<th>advoc. o</th>
<th>advoc. -</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>5 (5)</td>
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<td>17 (16)</td>
<td>31 (30)</td>
<td>12 (12)</td>
<td>7 (7)</td>
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<td>104 (100)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>15 (32)</td>
<td>12 (26)</td>
<td>3 (6)</td>
<td>6 (13)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>4 (9)</td>
<td>47 (100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>9 (16)</td>
<td>1 (2)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>15 (22)</td>
<td>8 (12)</td>
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<td>2 (9)</td>
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<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>33 (100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>non-domestic</td>
<td>1 (2)</td>
<td>30 (55)</td>
<td>3 (6)</td>
<td>13 (24)</td>
<td>8 (15)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
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<td>55 (100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sum, domestic</td>
<td>1 (1)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>12 (8)</td>
<td>45 (29)</td>
<td>20 (13)</td>
<td>2 (1)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>2 (1)</td>
<td>157 (100)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Our analysis of these three most prominent speakers yields fairly clear differences between the conservative Frankfurter Allgemeine on the one hand, and the left-alternative tageszeitung and the liberal Süddeutsche Zeitung on the other hand. Once again, the Frankfurter Allgemeine exceeds our expectations as regards engagement with non-domestic speakers. On the other hand, our analysis also shows that this engagement crystallizes largely around Jean-Pierre Chevènement. While Chevènement is barely noted in the left and liberal newspapers\textsuperscript{90}, the Frankfurter Allgemeine evaluates his remarks highly negatively, often through the use of a polemical-scandalizing tone. Particularly the Frankfurter Allgemeine’s Jürg Altwegg criticizes Chevènement heavily, claiming that the latter’s own “derailment is no accident” (FAZ 2000-05-27). The newspaper even goes so far as to portray Chevènement as a problem to the French government in the context of the country’s impending Council Presidency in the second half of 2000. “Chevènement is not alone,” Altwegg argues, “but the influence of the circles he is representing is diminishing. […] But Chirac and Jospin have to ask themselves whether they want to take over the European Union Presidency on July 1 with Chevènement as Interior Minister” (FAZ 2000-05-23).

Ironically enough, the Chevènement remarks also contribute to the overall positive and advisory-pedagogical reception of Fischer’s ideas in the German sample. As Jürg Altwegg argues elsewhere, the French interior minister caused much more controversy in France than he did in Germany. Yet to the extent that the negative French response to Chevènement’s remarks was represented in the German press, it resulted in turn in rather positive evaluations of French speakers’ criticism.\textsuperscript{91}

\textsuperscript{90} The left-alternative tageszeitung represents a partial exception in this context. While Chevènement is for the most part not evaluated in the newspaper’s coverage, the taz’s EU correspondent Daniela Weingärtner on one occasion defends Chevènement’s critique of what is portrayed here as a German attempt at forcing its federalist model on its neighbors in the EU. “A week after the Fischer speech,” Weingärtner writes, “Chevènement finally articulates what a lot of neighbors are already contemplating – not only in France: is the world supposed to become a better place in line with German models? Is this German politician trying to tell us how much of our national sovereignty we will have to be willing to dispose of?” (taz 2000-05-23b).

\textsuperscript{91} “Crises have brought Europe forward. Sometimes a psycho-drama is enough. The course of one week has shown that after the neo-fascists, even the left and right ‘sovereignists’ are retreating in France. And politics with Germanophobic tones – which had long been a speciality of Gaullists and communists – no longer works. More than Fischer’s speech, Chevènement’s derailment has brought Europe back on track” (FAZ 2000-05-27).
Table 6.7. German finality debate. Top 3 references, by newspaper and styles of evaluation

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<td>J. Fischer</td>
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<tr>
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<td>7</td>
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<td>20</td>
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With the partial exception of the left-alternative tageszeitung, the German newspapers – including the conservative Frankfurter Allgemeine – are overwhelmingly positive to Fischer’s ideas. To some extent, this results in the frequent application of an advisory-pedagogical style in evaluating Fischer’s proposal: the presented ideas are considered not least as a guideline for further debate. The Süddeutsche Zeitung even goes so far as to claim that “it would have been detrimental not to give this speech at this point. […] Why should Germany and the rest of Europe not contemplate ‘finality’? Why should this country not be allowed to reflect about sense and non-sense of the nation-state, about its sovereignty, about the future of its parliament or its highest court?” (SZ 2000-06-19; author’s emphasis).

A more critical form of approval is frequently found in the Frankfurter Allgemeine (which is otherwise not at the forefront in supporting the Green foreign minister), not least by reference to earlier and similar ‘core Europe’ proposals by conservative (CDU) politicians Wolfgang Schäuble and Karl Lamers. Schäuble himself welcomes Fischer’s initiative in a guest article, arguing however that it still bears potential for improvement.
While generally agreeing with Fischer, Schäuble argues that Fischer is “incorrect if he places this debate into the category of ‘long term, far beyond the current intergovernmental conference.’ We are not talking about developments in the far-away future, and ‘finality’ is a questionable concept anyhow, reserved for an open-ended history” (FAZ 2000-06-08).

Third among the most prominent speakers in the German sample is French President Jacques Chirac, foremost in his role as Council President during the second half of 2000, but due also to his speech delivered in the German Bundestag. Similar to Fischer, Chirac is evaluated in broadly positive terms, underlined by an acclamatory-applauding and an advisory-pedagogical style that is applied in all three newspapers. In this sense, Chirac’s remarks draw attention, but they are by no means received controversially. At most, the German newspapers – including the conservative Frankfurter Allgemeine – acknowledge the fact that Chirac has at long last recognized the need for a European constitution. As editorialist and co-editor Günther Nonnenmacher writes: “To the French, the nation-state is no obstacle to be overcome, but the unalterable foundation for European development. But even Chirac […] realizes that something has emerged beyond the cosmos of nation-states, and that it has a life of its own and will need […] a constitution: the European Union” (FAZ 2000-06-28).

In sum, transnational engagement in a quantitative sense is strongest in the conservative Frankfurter Allgemeine. On the other hand, the qualitative analysis indicates that this engagement more or less targets one person only (i.e. Jean-Pierre Chevènement), and does not refer directly to the debate on the federal and/or constitutional future of Europe. Nevertheless, the Frankfurter Allgemeine also devotes more attention to Jacques Chirac than its liberal counterpart Süddeutsche Zeitung. While the former is generally positive to Chirac’s new receptiveness to the idea of a European constitution, the latter devotes almost no attention to Chirac. Even in this sense, the Frankfurter Allgemeine exceeds our expectations as regards transnational engagement.

Transnational Engagement in the Swedish Finality Debate

In the Swedish finality debate, the claims raised by non-domestic speakers prompt lively contestation both in terms of the statements made and the evaluations offered by Swedish commentators. More than half of the claims made by non-domestic speakers (59%) are met with an evaluative
response, in addition to a rather low share of neutral evaluations (16%). In addition, differences between newspapers are notable.

Table 6.8. Swedish finality debate. Statements made on all domestic and non-domestic speakers, by newspaper (% in parentheses).

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The authors in conservative *Svenska Dagbladet* are most active in their engagement with domestic as well as non-domestic speakers, offering evaluations of two out of three coded quotations (65%). However, the more contentious character of the debate in *Svenska Dagbladet* is to a
large extent attributable to a lively debate among domestic political actors on the newspaper’s op-ed pages. Consequently, the share of negative evaluative statements on domestic speakers’ claims is overwhelming (88%), supporting our expectation that domestic debate would figure most prominently in conservative newspapers. Nonetheless, Svenska Dagbladet’s authors are also more active in engaging with non-domestic speakers than their counterparts in liberal Dagens Nyheter. The latter newspaper takes an overall more distanced approach, offering a lower share of evaluations on non-domestic speakers’ claims. Nonetheless, even Dagens Nyheter does enter into a relatively strong practice of engaging with non-domestic speakers.

In one respect, the Swedish debate is nonetheless considerably more domestic in character than its German counterpart. In the Swedish debate, there is no counterpart to the French-German “psycho-drama” surrounding French Interior Minister Jean-Pierre Chevènement. Consequently, the Swedish debate emphasizes instead the positions taken by domestic actors on Fischer’s (and subsequently Chirac’s) ideas. Domestic speakers in the Swedish finality debate are therefore highly likely to encounter contestation, most of all on the op-ed pages of conservative Svenska Dagbladet. As much of the largely self-referential debate among domestic political actors takes place here, no less than 88% of domestic speakers’ claims are met with a negative evaluation. Correspondingly, the debate in Svenska Dagbladet is characterized by a highly polemical-scandalizing tone in the evaluation of domestic authors (77%).

Non-domestic speakers, on the other hand, are frequently met with an advisory-pedagogical as well as an acclamatory-applauding style in their evaluation, both in Svenska Dagbladet and in liberal Dagens Nyheter (29 and 36% combined, respectively). This finding is attributable to the largely benevolent reception of Fischer’s remarks in the two newspapers. Svenska Dagbladet is rather ambivalent in its editorial opinion on Fischer’s proposal, whereas the newspaper’s EU correspondent Rolf Gustavsson expresses a much more welcoming position. In addition, the debate on the newspaper’s op-ed pages tended to broach the finality question without too many explicit references to Fischer.
Table 6.9. Swedish finality debate. Evaluations of all domestic and non-domestic speakers, by newspaper (% in parentheses).

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How do these findings relate to a qualitative analysis of the most prominent speakers in the Swedish debate? Two speakers stand out in particular in the Swedish debate, namely Joschka Fischer and Jacques Chirac. They are the most-quoted speakers in the sample overall as well as in all three of the Swedish newspapers. No significant differences can be discerned between the three newspapers’ engagement with Fischer’s
claims. All three newspapers engage extensively with Fischer’s claims, and to a somewhat lesser extent also with Chirac’s. However, the newspapers differ widely in their assessment of Fischer’s (and Chirac’s) claims. Conservative *Svenska Dagbladet* expresses at least a certain measure of ambivalence about Fischer’s proposals, while the finality debate is by and large welcomed by authors in *Dagens Nyheter* and *Aftonbladet*.

In *Svenska Dagbladet*, contestation about the content of the Fischer speech finds expression in the frequent use of a polemical style, both by external authors (for the most part domestic political actors) on the newspaper’s op-ed pages (“*Brännpunkt*”) and the newspaper’s editorialists. In one editorial, Fischer is criticized for his “incoherent vision” that “hardly lives up to standards as an intellectual concept” (*SvD* 2000-05-22). Furthermore, *Svenska Dagbladet*’s editorialists criticize Fischer’s proposal for jeopardizing the impending fifth round of EU enlargement, which is in turn presented as an immediate normative priority. Nonetheless, Fischer’s views are welcomed by the newspaper’s EU correspondent Rolf Gustavsson, mostly because they “force Europe’s politicians to show color on the questions of the future” (*SvD* 2000-05-17).

In sum, however, *Svenska Dagbladet* stands out as the most skeptical of the three Swedish newspapers in its editorial opinion. Jacques Chirac’s proposals are no major bone of contention in the Swedish sample. In liberal *Dagens Nyheter*, they are discussed in a fairly uncontroversial way, more or less as a complement to the debate initiated by Joschka Fischer. And while the newspaper is by and large positive to the debate as such, a considerably more negative tone is applied only by a guest author, namely Sverker Gustavsson, a professor in Political Science at Uppsala University. Gustavsson interprets Chirac’s proposal as implying a demand for more power for the union’s bigger states, claiming in addition that despite his “grand rhetoric, Chirac does not really know where he wants to go” with his plans (*DN* 2000-07-26). Conservative *Svenska Dagbladet* is fairly reserved in its evaluation, devoting only one editorial to the topic and viewing it skeptically as a proposal that could speed up the enlargement process, yet at the cost of an avant-garde of older member states neglecting the interests of the accession countries (*SvD* 2000-06-29b). Contestation is strongest in social democratic

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92 On the occasion of a European Council meeting in Santa Maria da Feira (during the Portuguese Council Presidency), *Svenska Dagbladet* argued the following in its main editorial of the day: “The European Council meeting in Feira takes place also against the backdrop of the debate that ensued in the wake of German foreign minister Joschka Fischer’s so-called visionary EU proposal. A new vision is necessary, it has been argued. But such a vision already exists: that of a union for all of Europe” (*SvD* 2000-06-18).
Aftonbladet, where precisely this latter aspect is viewed as “fateful”: even though flexible integration might facilitate the enlargement process, a division of Europe into a core and a periphery would have to be avoided by all means. “It would be fateful if [Eastern enlargement] led to a division of the union into two” (Ab 2000-07-05).

Table 6.10. Swedish finality debate. Top 3 references, by newspaper and styles of evaluation.

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In sum, contestation with the most prominent speakers in the Swedish debate broadly follows the patterns staked out by the different newspapers’ orientations on European integration. Transnational engagement is liveliest with Joschka Fischer, whose claims are met highly benevolently. Most of all, this applies to liberal Dagens Nyheter, but also to social democratic Aftonbladet. Here, a constitutionalization of Europe is viewed as a high normative priority not least for democratic reasons. By contrast, conservative Svenska Dagbladet is highly skeptical of such proposals in its editorial opinion, although the newspaper’s EU correspondent welcomes a debate about the constitutional future of Europe. Also engagement with Jacques Chirac corresponds to the
different newspapers’ orientations on European integration: contestation is liveliest in those two newspapers that believe that a deepening of European integration should be subordinated to a widening of the process.

**The German and Swedish Finality Debates: Transnational Debate?**

The Swedish finality debate is characterized by a form of domestic contestation that finds no counterpart in the German debate, at least not beyond the criticism that Fischer’s thoughts are by no means new and mainly a distraction from other shortcomings of the German “red-green” coalition government. The German debate can in turn be characterized foremost as a French-German reflection not only on the future of European integration, but moreover on the future of French-German relations within European integration. The spirit in this debate is at first highly amiable, but the debate also undergoes a phase of “French-German psycho-drama” that obviously finds no counterpart in the Swedish debate. Broadly speaking, therefore, the debates follow rather strong country-specific patterns that transcend distinctions between the newspapers’ political orientation and rather confirm the presumed nation-state character of public spheres in which issues of European integration are debated.

Nevertheless, we can also observe remarkable parallels between the two debates. This applies foremost to the six newspapers’ use of frames in constructing the Fischer proposal. The three most salient frames coincide in the German and the Swedish debates, indicating that the general understanding of what is at stake in the debate is very similar in the two countries. Most importantly, newspaper framing largely follows newspapers’ orientations on European integration. Nonetheless, we need to emphasize that frames suggesting the adversarial character of European integration resonate much more strongly in Sweden than in Germany. Furthermore, while the German newspapers apply frames in a predominantly positive way (such as the prospect of a federal constitution for Europe, with a clear division of competences), the Swedish debate is much more ambivalent in the interpretation of the issue at hand.

With regard to the authors involved in the debate, the German and Swedish finality debates are relatively similar. This finding does not however correspond clearly to practices of engaging with non-domestic
speakers. In this regard, the Swedish and German finality debates are – albeit in different ways and varying degrees – highly transnational in character. All six newspapers enter into a practice of critique not only of domestic, but relevantly also of non-domestic speakers. In both samples, non-domestic speakers are more likely to be met with an evaluation than domestic speakers. In the Swedish case, this is largely due the prominent role of Joschka Fischer, whose proposals are a natural point of reference for all three newspapers. In the German case, where Fischer is obviously a domestic speaker, the lively practice of engagement with non-domestic speakers is foremost attributable to the high level of interest that Fischer attracted internationally, most of all in France. In a nutshell, all three German newspapers respond to responses that non-domestic speakers formulated on Fischer’s ideas. What is most noteworthy, in this regard, is that all six newspapers enter into a similar practice of critique of Fischer, indicating a remarkable cross-country rather than cross-newspaper pattern. Parallels are here strongest between newspapers of similar orientation rather than between newspapers from the same country, and therefore reflect the different newspapers’ orientations on and normative preferences for European integration. The conservative newspapers are generally – although in varying degrees and for different reasons – more skeptical of Fischer’s proposal than their liberal and left counterparts. Most skeptical is Swedish conservative Svenska Dagbladet, but also the German conservative Frankfurter Allgemeine is more reserved to the Green foreign minister’s ideas than the most purely applauding liberal newspapers Süddeutsche Zeitung and Dagens Nyheter.

In sum, however, we can maintain that while the two debates crystallize around a limited number of key actors, the finality debates in Sweden and Germany are in fact characterized by a relatively high degree of engagement with non-domestic speakers. Cross-country parallels between newspapers of similar orientation are related to the ways non-domestic actors are evaluated, indicating that the debate is overall a very good example for transnational political debate.
7 Constitutional Ratification Crisis

Introduction
In the spring of 2005, the Constitutional Treaty’s ratification process ground to an abrupt halt as a consequence of the two ratification referenda held in France and the Netherlands within only five days. After the Treaty had been rejected by 55% of the French electorate on May 29, 62% of Dutch voters said ‘no’ on June 2, effectively putting the ratification process ‘on ice’. Nevertheless, a number of member states subsequently decided to proceed with the ratification process, insisting that the French and Dutch votes did not have any implications for the respective domestic procedures. Nonetheless, other member states responded by suspending ratification. In the British case, this announcement came merely four days after the Dutch referendum, contributing to a situation of high uncertainty as regards the future of the ratification process and of the Constitutional Treaty itself. In the Swedish case, the ratification crisis debate reinvigorated questions about whether to subject ratification to a popular referendum or whether to ratify in parliament. Despite its initial announcement to ratify the treaty in parliament prior to the upcoming national elections in September 2006, the Swedish government subsequently decided to put ratification on hold indefinitely. Germany, finally, had planned its own parliamentary ratification process to be finished just in time before the French referendum. By the time of the

93 Legally speaking, the Dutch referendum – the first referendum to take place in the country for over 200 years – served only consultative purposes. However, the Dutch government had announced in advance that it would accept the outcome of the referendum, provided that at least 30% of the electorate participated. In the end, 63.3% participated, with 61.6% saying no. In the French case, voter turnout was 69%.
94 In the Swedish case, the question of timing was also highly controversial. While the government initially argued for parliamentary ratification before the next national elections in September 2006, even opponents of a referendum (such as prominently Dagens Nyheter’s editorial board) argued for parliamentary ratification after the next elections so that the Constitutional Treaty could be made a key campaign issue.
95 Due to Germany’s federal constitution, the Constitutional Treaty had to pass both chambers of parliament (i.e. the Bundestag and the Bundesrat) in order to be ratified. While the ratification debate and vote in the Bundestag on May 12, 2005 drew significantly more media attention, the ratification procedure was not completed until the
French and Dutch referenda, ten member states plus the two upcoming members Bulgaria and Romania had already ratified the Treaty. After the referenda in France and the Netherlands, six more member states ratified the Treaty, increasing the overall number to eighteen out of the member states of the EU-27.

In the period immediately after the two referenda, the future of the Constitutional Treaty was highly unclear, resulting in a debate of rarely seen intensity, during which possible future options for the constitution-making process were discussed controversially. A particularly salient issue was the question of whether the ratification process should be continued or whether the treaty as a whole should be renegotiated. While the European Commission responded by announcing a period of reflection and subsequently presenting a new White Paper on communication strategy, the period analyzed here is characterized by a high degree of uncertainty as regards the possible future of the EU’s constitutional project. Consequently, the two referenda trigger a debate that is highly exceptional not least as regards the high number of articles that are published in a very short time. However, the German debate yields more than twice as many articles as its Swedish counterpart (219 and 106, respectively), although sample sizes during the finality debate were virtually identical.

The German ‘Ratification Crisis’ Debate: A Multiple Ratification Debate

The German ratification crisis debate can be described as a double debate: it discusses the Constitutional Treaty’s ratification in the German parliament as much as the two referenda in France and the Netherlands. Due to the timing of the German ratification process, the German ‘ratification crisis’ debate begins much quicker than its Swedish counterpart. Broadly speaking, the German debate focuses (1) on the domestic German ratification process as well as on (2) the double referenda in France and the Netherlands. In its later stages from around the second half of June 2005, however, the debate widens to include also aspects such as (3) the European Commission’s announcement of the so-
called period of reflection as well as (4) the budget negotiations taking place during the European Council meeting in Brussels in mid-June.

(1) At the outset, the three German newspapers discuss the content and supposed implications of the Constitutional Treaty in the context of the domestic ratification process. Although Germany has no constitutional basis for nation-wide referenda and ratification was therefore to take place in the country’s two chambers of parliament, a lively debate nonetheless ensued already throughout the first half of May. During this domestic ratification phase, the liberal Süddeutsche Zeitung and the left-alternative tageszeitung (taz) devote significantly more space to the Constitutional Treaty than the conservative Frankfurter Allgemeine.\(^98\) The taz emphasizes an ambivalent evaluation of the treaty’s presumed social and democratic implications (taz 2005-05-13d), whereas the Süddeutsche Zeitung is more positive in its evaluation of the treaty’s general content as well as its social and institutional implications. Despite undeniable shortcomings, the treaty is considered to be a step in the right direction. Consequently, the Süddeutsche Zeitung applauds the Bundestag’s ratification vote, arguing that “the Bundestag’s ratification of the constitution was a courageous act, one that has faith in the potential for improving this constitution even if it is by no means optimal” (Heribert Prantl, SZ 2005-05-13b). Nevertheless, both the taz and the Süddeutsche Zeitung – whose editorial opinion is unequivocally in favor of the Constitutional Treaty – provide space also to declared opponents of the treaty. In the case of the Süddeutsche Zeitung, this practice relates mainly to the interviews foremost with German MP’s rejecting the CT. In general, however, the debate at this point involves almost only journalists, with no guest contributions from non-journalistic actors apart from the mentioned interviews.

(2) This aspect changes around mid-May, when the impending French and Dutch referenda take center stage in the German debate. The shift in context in the German debate occurs shortly after the conclusion of the German parliamentary ratification process. The primary topics discussed in this phase are very similar in all three newspapers: until the day after the French referendum, the arguments presented parallel those already brought forth in the context of the German ratification process. However, correspondents based in Brussels as well as in France and the Netherlands begin to play a more prominent role, providing background information

\(^{98}\) Between May 12 and May 14, the Frankfurter Allgemeine published three articles on the Constitutional Treaty. In the case of the Süddeutsche Zeitung and the taz, the respective samples include nine articles each.
about the respective contexts of the impending referenda, but also contributing to the debate’s overall rather distanced character. The dynamic of the debate changes in the aftermath of the French referendum. While fairly objective-analytical background opinion articles were frequent in the run-up to the referendum, the editorial voice begins to play a much more central role in all three newspapers in the immediate aftermath. In particular, the debate intensifies in the conservative Frankfurter Allgemeine, which had played a much more passive role up until this point. Now, the supposed reasons for ratification failure play as prominent a role as the supposed consequences. Whereas the topics discussed in the three newspapers are very similar, the evaluation of the unfolding situation is very different: the liberal Süddeutsche Zeitung, whose journalists expressed a strong preference for a European (federal) constitution, evaluates ratification failure in broadly negative terms. “The damage done is considerable,” argues Gustav Seibt, “and repairing it will take a return to traditional cabinet politics. There cannot be a more paradoxical outcome of a popular referendum” (SZ 2005-05-31a).

For the conservative Frankfurter Allgemeine’s editorialists, ratification failure is a necessary consequence of the elite character of European integration, manifested foremost in the ongoing expansion of the union. In particular, accession negotiations with Turkey are here considered a crucial aspect towards explaining ratification failure. “Enlargement,” as editorialist Klaus-Dieter Frankenberger argues, “means Turkey. The latter has become synonymous with a union whose territorial reach and the associated risk of overstretch has ignored the identity needs of the citizens. The French did not get to decide on Turkish membership. Yet as a subtext, the issue was nonetheless present” (FAZ 2005-05-31c).

In all three newspapers, however, the search for reasons for ratification failure clearly comes second to an attempt to identify its likely consequences. Particularly salient in this regard are questions about the future of the ratification process, i.e. whether, under which conditions and not least at what expense the ratification process can continue in the remaining member states. All three newspapers are skeptical of the option of re-submitting the treaty to a second French referendum. Even the Süddeutsche Zeitung concedes that “[c]ontinuing the ratification process is a futile and painful exercise” (SZ 2005-06-06b). However, the Frankfurter Allgemeine’s editorialists Günther Nonnenmacher and Klaus-Dieter Frankenberger are particularly outspoken on this point, regarding any such strategy as politically out of the question. “The surprisingly clear, massive French ‘no’”, Nonnenmacher argues, “makes a repeat referendum politically impossible. [...] This constitutional treaty [...] has failed for
good this weekend” (FAZ 2005-05-31d). Correspondingly, the Frankfurter Allgemeine’s editorialists are also the most outspoken in arguing for abandoning the Constitutional Treaty altogether, scandalizing those who would argue otherwise for their “at times condescending, at times stubborn rejection of reality” (FAZ 2005-06-03). Nevertheless, the Süddeutsche Zeitung is equally skeptical of the “illusion” of renegotiating the Constitutional Treaty, arguing that the treaty’s “positive innovations” would be jeopardized (SZ 2005-06-02d). In other words, in this immediate aftermath of the two referenda, the three German newspapers highlight the existing impasse rather than point to possible solutions: a renegotiation is deemed impossible considering the CT’s achievements as well as its character as a complex compromise between 27 member states. At the same time, resubmitting the existing treaty to another referendum is deemed impossible due to the strength of the no-votes both in France and the Netherlands.

(3) The debate then takes a different turn throughout the second half of June. During this phase, the debate focuses on the European Commission’s announcement of a “period of reflection”, and most importantly on the (failed) negotiations about the EU budget for the years 2007-2013, construed here as the EU’s double crisis in connection with the failed referenda. The referendum in Luxembourg in July plays only a minor role in this context, mostly in connection to Luxembourg’s Presidency in the Council of Ministers. The Süddeutsche Zeitung views the period of reflection as a strategic necessity in coping with ratification failure. While emphasizing the opportunity that was lost in the French referendum, a pause in the ratification process is considered the only viable option towards salvaging as much as possible of the treaty’s substantive content. This applies very strongly to the Süddeutsche Zeitung’s Brussels-based correspondents, among whom particularly Cornelia Bolesch expresses a high regard for the strategic use of a period of reflection, yet combined with strong expectations as to what has to be done during such a period of reflection. While the Süddeutsche Zeitung emphasizes the potential of the period of reflection, the taz and the Frankfurter Allgemeine are more outspoken in their negative assessment. For the taz, the period of reflection is little more than a disguise for “cluelessness” (taz 2005-06-18b), whereas the Frankfurter Allgemeine finds that “Plan D is not really a plan, but simply an empty formula” (FAZ 2005-06-18b).

(4) Finally, a last phase in the German ratification crisis debate ensues in the context of the European Council meeting in Brussels on June 16-17, 2005, during which the assembled heads of state and government failed to
reach a compromise on the EU’s next budget for the years 2007-2013. The debate emphasizes the role played by the UK and Tony Blair in the negotiations, not least in the context of the impending British Council Presidency. While the budget crisis is at best indirectly related to ratification failure, the two issues are construed as part and parcel of a more fundamental crisis of European integration. In that sense, budget reform – framed foremost as a conflict between Blair’s (progressive) market liberalism and Chirac’s (conservative) protectionism takes center stage in the larger debate about the future of Europe, and can therefore be seen as a direct continuation of the ratification crisis debate.

Blair’s speech before the European Parliament on June 23, 2005, urging a more modern EU budget, is celebrated as a “brilliant performance” in the conservative Frankfurter Allgemeine. In particular, the newspaper applauds Blair for his “indictment” of the “outdated” views of the French and German governments on social policy (FAZ 2005-06-24b). The liberal Süddeutsche Zeitung and the taz are considerably more skeptical, on the other hand, fundamentally questioning Blair’s credibility and sincerity as an EU reformer. “Blair has a deservedly bad reputation in Europe,” the Süddeutsche Zeitung writes, owing to what is considered a traditional reluctance to “contribute constructively to finding a solid foundation for the EU’s finances” (SZ 2005-06-21b). In the left-alternative taz, Bernard Cassen of Le Monde diplomatique even goes so far as to label Blair “a thoughtless liberal”, whose Council Presidency would “present a fireworks of initiatives towards diminishing social and regulatory policy” (taz 2005-07-08).

In sum, the German debate begins by focusing on the German ratification process during the first half of May. During the second half of May, the content and particularly the supposed consequences of the Constitutional Treaty are debated in the context of the French and Dutch referenda. After the referenda, the German newspapers devote most of their attention to finding explanations for the outcomes of the referenda, before exploring the perceived consequences of ratification failure. A last phase of the debate then emphasizes the Commission’s proposal for a period of reflection and the failure of budget negotiations at the European Council meeting in Brussels.
The Swedish ‘Ratification Crisis’ Debate: A Domestic Referendum Debate?

As the German ratification process draws no attention in the Swedish context, the Swedish debate begins much later and more gradually than its German counterpart. On the other hand, all other key triggering events identified in the German debate are salient also the Swedish debate. Broadly speaking, the Swedish debate unfolds in three main periods, during which (1) the reasons for and consequences of the French and Dutch referenda and (2) the future of the EU budget are discussed in more general terms. However, the Swedish debate is also characterized by an emphasis on the modalities of the domestic ratification process (i.e. national referendum versus parliamentary ratification, either before or after the next national elections). While the debate basically comes to a stop in *Svenska Dagbladet* and *Aftonbladet* after the budget negotiations, it continues in *Dagens Nyheter*, where (3) the future of European integration in the aftermath of the EU’s period of ratification crisis is discussed in broader terms, a process continuing throughout the period studied.

(1) While the Swedish debate picks up only gradually in the run-up to the French referendum, a much more lively debate ensues in the wake of the French and Dutch referenda. This phase of intensified debate begins on May 26, two days prior to the French referendum. With the exception of liberal *Dagens Nyheter*, however, also this part of the debate ends rather quickly following the Dutch referendum. While the issue is continuously discussed in *Dagens Nyheter* throughout the period covered, both social democratic *Aftonbladet* and conservative *Svenska Dagbladet* basically take a break in their coverage between the Dutch referendum and the budget negotiations at the European Council meeting in Brussels on June 15-16, 2005. During this most intense phase, all three newspapers enter into an intensive practice of providing background information as well as commenting on the unfolding situation in France and the Netherlands as well as in the EU in broader terms. Particularly in the two broadsheets, the voice of correspondents (both in Brussels and in France as well as the Netherlands) plays a prominent role. However, liberal *Dagens Nyheter* complements this background information with editorial commenting already during this early phase, setting it apart from its conservative counterpart *Svenska Dagbladet*. In the latter newspaper, editorials are clearly the exception, the rule rather being background opinion articles by the newspaper’s correspondents.
Dagens Nyheter is the only one of the three newspapers whose editorial opinion is unequivocally in favor of the Constitutional Treaty. Therefore, the consequences of a possible ‘no’ in France and the Netherlands are commented on already earlier than in the other newspapers.\(^99\) On the day of as well as in the days following the French referendum, Dagens Nyheter’s editorialists are preoccupied with the reasons and potential consequences of ratification failure, lamenting the opportunity that was missed and scandalizing the actors deemed responsible for the outcome of the referendum. Ratification failure “does not have to be the end of the EU”, as the newspaper claims in its main editorial on May 29, “but we have to be aware of what we have lost. […] We could have broken with history and built a new kind of supranational political community - neither nation-state nor federation - by peaceful and democratic means. […] You might interject that this was too grand a dream. But if the EU falls, the question goes back to those who voted no: What kind of future international solidarity is it that you are dreaming of behind your secure borders?” (2005-05-29d).

Svenska Dagbladet’s editorial opinion is much more reserved at this point, perceiving the EU’s current crisis as running deeper than the two negative referenda that are thought inevitable at this point. Instead, the EU’s crisis is presented as an outcome of EU leaders’ failure to acknowledge a widespread “reluctance to move more power to Brussels” (SvD 2005-05-28). But such arguments are also connected to a criticism of the instrument of popular referenda, which according to Svenska Dagbladet are always susceptible to misrepresentations and populism. “Referenda,” the newspaper claims, “are not as idyllic as their proponents want to have us believe. In France, the no is both about an unhappiness with President Chirac and about the hope to put an end to Turkish membership” (SvD 2005-05-28).

Aftonbladet is highly skeptical of ratification failure in its editorial opinion. Similar to Dagens Nyheter, Aftonbladet’s editorialists draw attention to the opportunity that was lost particularly with regard to the Constitutional Treaty’s democratic innovations. “For all its shortcomings,” the newspaper argues, “the [Constitutional Treaty] aimed at more transparent decision-making processes. It included important social and human rights. It expanded labor union rights. […] Some part can possibly

\(^{99}\) Already two weeks before the referendum in France, Dagens Nyheter’s cultural journalist Maciej Zaremba speaks of a “window of opportunity” that is about to close again: “A union of European states was completely unrealistic in 1920 and might again be in 2020. In a few years, the memories of the second world war will be pure history” (DN 2005-05-15).
be recovered. [...] But the thought that a new treaty would be more progressive is an illusion" (Ab 2005-05-30c). Similarly, a return to the negotiation table is no viable alternative at least for editorialist Olle Svenning. For Svenning, this would necessarily imply renegotiation at the hands of “a European Commission, a Council and a European Parliament dominated by right-wing liberals” (Ab 2005-05-26b).

During this phase, the debate is heavily dominated by journalists. However, external authors begin to play a more prominent role shortly after in the two quality newspapers. For the most part, this debate takes place among domestic political actors. Some of those are representatives of European institutions, such as prominently Commissioner Margot Wallström, the head of the Commission’s representation in Sweden or domestic MEP’s. Non-domestic public intellectuals such as Ulrich Beck and Joseph Nye are clearly exceptional in the debate.

What clearly sets the Swedish debate apart from its German counterpart is the understandably heavy emphasis on the domestic ratification process. While the Swedish debate responds to the same triggering events as the German debate (save the German Parliament’s ratification vote), these triggering events serve foremost to bring the domestic ratification process back into focus. Consequently, the French referendum is taken as a backdrop for arguments for or against a referendum in Sweden. In the case of Svenska Dagbladet, these arguments are outspokenly negative. Dagens Nyheter’s editorialists, on the other hand, argue that the treaty should be dealt with in parliament, but not until after the elections, so that the treaty can be made an issue in the election campaign. Aftonbladet argues rather that both options – a popular referendum or parliamentary ratification after the next elections – are reasonable.

(2) After a pause in Svenska Dagbladet after the Dutch referendum and in Aftonbladet after the British government’s suspension of the planned UK referendum, all three newspapers pick up the ball again around the time of the European Council meeting in Brussels in mid-June. At this point, they connect the unfolding budget reform crisis to the ongoing ratification crisis in ways very similar to the German debate. However, the debate only flares up again for a rather short period in the Swedish case. In particular, very little attention is paid to Tony Blair’s speech at the European Parliament on June 23, which was construed in the German debate as part of the ongoing budget crisis. Nonetheless, all three newspapers devote editorial space to the issue. Dagens Nyheter sees the budget crisis as part of a more fundamental crisis of European integration and consequently urges EU leaders “to initiate a dialog with their citizens about what the actual alternatives are”, warning of a “summit turned into
nothing more than a tug-of-war about the British budget rebate and French agricultural subsidies” (DN 2005-06-16). *Svenska Dagbladet* applies a more polemical tone, construing the budget crisis as “an example of a lack of political leadership” (SvD 2005-06-15), another expression of which is to be found in the decision for a period of reflection – a pause which “reflects escape rather than political energy” (SvD 2005-06-15). *Aftonbladet*, finally, discusses the collapse of the budget negotiations as a threat to future EU enlargement, which according to editorialist Mats Engström ought not be compromised (Ab 2005-06-18).

(3) The budget crisis debate marks the end of the ratification crisis debate in *Aftonbladet* and *Svenska Dagbladet*, but the debate continues in *Dagens Nyheter*. In late June and throughout July, the debate moves beyond assessing the consequences of ratification failure and discusses possible strategies to move beyond its current deadlock. The editorial voice is highly prominent during this phase, but this is also the phase where (non-domestic) public intellectuals such as Ulrich Beck and Joseph Nye contribute to the debate.

In sum, the Swedish ratification crisis debate largely responds to the same triggering events as the German debate, with the exception of the German domestic ratification procedure. Consequently, the Swedish debate falls into three major phases, namely (1) a phase around the French and Dutch referenda, (2) a phase around the European Council meeting and the budget negotiations in mid-June, and finally (3) a phase following the collapse of the budget negotiations, during which the future of the constitutional project and of European integration more generally is however discussed only in liberal *Dagens Nyheter*. Notably, the Swedish ratification crisis debate differs from the German debate on at least two counts. First, while responding to the same triggering events, the Swedish debate focuses heavily on the modalities of the domestic ratification process, i.e. referendum versus parliamentary ratification (cf. Conrad 2007). Second, particularly in the latter phase of the debate, ratification failure is assessed in terms of its consequences for EU enlargement. On this count, we see a striking similarity between the Swedish ratification crisis and finality debates: also in the case of the Swedish finality debate, the issue at hand (i.e. the Fischer proposals) was discussed in terms of its implications for EU enlargement and/or for the role of acceding member states in an EU of different speeds.
Frames: what’s at stake in the ratification crisis debate?

Do the German and Swedish newspapers discuss the same thing in their respective ratification crisis debates? To answer this question, we need to have a look at what frames are applied in making sense of the situation. As in the finality debate, we can discern certain parallels not only between the two countries, but more importantly also between newspapers of similar orientation. The three most frequently applied frames in the two samples are the same, namely the elite vs. the people frame, the citizenship/democracy frame, and the neo-liberal vs. social Europe frame. Furthermore, the left and liberal newspapers tend to frame ratification failure in terms of its democratic implications, resulting in a more frequent use of the citizenship/democracy frame, whereas this aspect was clearly toned down in the conservative newspapers.

Frames in the German Debate

By far the most salient frame in the German debate is the elite versus the people frame, appearing in almost 40% of all articles and taking a prominent position in all three newspapers. The frame is most frequently applied in the left-alternative *taz*, where it appears in 56% of the coded articles. Strikingly, this frame is particularly prominent also in the conservative *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, where it appears in close to half of all coded articles. The *Frankfurter Allgemeine* uses the frame particularly in the aftermath of the French and Dutch referenda, and does so in an explanatory as well as evaluative way: ratification failure is explained as a logical consequence of the failure of European political elites to take the preferences of the people into account. In this context, the *Frankfurter Allgemeine*’s editorialists highlight two aspects in particular, both of which are seen as cases in point of the larger phenomenon described: (1) the continued supranationalization of the EU, understood amongst others as the continued transfer of competences from the national to the European level; and (2) the continued enlargement process against the perceived (and expressed) will of the people, an argument launched primarily in the context of a possible Turkish accession to the union. Similarly, the *Frankfurter Allgemeine* is frequent in the use of two other frames that emphasize such aspects, i.e. the EU superstate frame and the deepening versus widening frame. The EU superstate frame is most prominent in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, and it is also used in a different way than in the other two German newspapers. While the *Süddeutsche*
Zeitung and the taz use the frame mainly to explain the outcome of the French and Dutch referenda, the supranational character of the Constitutional Treaty is by and large welcomed. Nonetheless, the Süddeutsche Zeitung and the taz emphasize issues of citizenship and democracy much more strongly. The citizenship/democracy frame is therefore considerably more salient in the taz and Süddeutsche Zeitung than it is in the Frankfurter Allgemeine. Yet while the liberal Süddeutsche Zeitung – very much in line with its liberal Swedish counterpart Dagens Nyheter – is rather uniform in its positive reading of the citizenship/democracy frame, the left-alternative taz is considerably more ambivalent on the matter. In both cases, however, the Constitutional Treaty is more frequently construed as a matter of democracy rather than of the making of an EU superstate.

Similarly salient in the German sample is the neo-liberal/market versus social Europe frame. All three newspapers apply the frame with very similar frequency, although also this frame is applied quite differently in the different newspapers. Yet despite this convergence, we see even stronger cross-country convergence between newspapers of similar orientation as regards the ways in which the frame is used. Similar to Svenska Dagbladet (see below), the conservative Frankfurter Allgemeine argues for the free market liberal aspects of the Constitutional Treaty, whereas the taz’s more ambivalent evaluation bears similarities to the assessment made in Swedish Aftonbladet (see below).

In sum, the German debate is heavily dominated by only a limited number of frames, the most salient of which are the elite versus the people frame, the citizenship/democracy frame and the neo-liberal/market versus social Europe frame. In the application of these frames, we see divergences between the three newspapers that closely

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100 The taz’s Paris-based correspondent Dorothea Hahn very much mirrors the critique of the French left no-camp, arguing that “the treaty benefits an elite of politicians and lobbyists who prefer quick and efficient decision making in a closed circle to dealing with parliaments and public opinions. Because the treaty strengthens institutions like the Commission, whose members are not elected by any sovereign, by any people, and it gives the final say to the Council. Parliaments need not even be asked prior to military operations” (taz 2005-05-12a). The newspaper’s Brussels-based correspondent Daniela Weingärtner, on the other hand, argues the contrary: “Depending on your political standpoint, finding the new EU treaty capable of intruding even further into areas of national sovereignty would mean either over- or underestimating it. European politics will be somewhat easier to organize, processes will become a little more understandable and more open, citizens and national parliaments will get a little more say. To EU-opponents, this is already too much. For most EU-supporters, it is far too little. But we will either have to swallow this cake or remain hungry” (taz 2005-05-12b).
correspond to their respective orientation. As we will see below in the analysis of the frames used in the Swedish debate, however, there is at least some cross-country convergence in the way newspapers of similar orientations apply different frames.

Table 7.1. German ratification crisis debate. Most salient frames.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>frame name</th>
<th>FAZ</th>
<th>SZ</th>
<th>taz</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>#</td>
<td>% of art.</td>
<td>#</td>
<td>% of art.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>elite vs. the people</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>citizenship/democracy</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>neo-liberal vs. social Europe</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“EU superstate”</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>deepening vs. widening</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Frames in the Swedish debate

Strikingly, the EU superstate frame plays only a minor role during the ratification crisis debate. While it was by far the most frequently applied frame in the Swedish finality debate, it is here applied in less than 10% of the 106 articles in the Swedish sample. However, it is applied most frequently in conservative Svenska Dagbladet, very much in line with the way the frame was applied in the German case. Also in the German context, the frame was applied mainly by the conservative newspaper (the Frankfurter Allgemeine), all the more so in its negative reading construing the Constitutional Treaty as part and parcel of a larger ambition to create an EU superstate. In the Swedish case, the low frequency with which the frame is applied may be attributable to the minor role that the anti-EU camp played in the ratification crisis debate, at least in comparison to the prominent role that it played in the finality debate. Where authors from the anti-EU camp appear, so does the negative reading of the EU
superstate frame. Nevertheless, the anti-EU camp is not alone in applying the frame, even in its negative reading. The frame is also applied in conservative Svenska Dagbladet. Here, it is however applied in a more analytical tone, emphasizing the hybrid character of an EU polity consisting of supranational as well as of intergovernmental elements.

Table 7.2. Swedish ratification crisis debate. Most salient frames.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>frame name</th>
<th>SvD</th>
<th>DN</th>
<th>Ab</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>#</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>#</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>elite vs. the people</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>neo-liberal vs. social Europe</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>citizenship/democracy</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>business as usual</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lack of leadership</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While the EU superstate frame thus plays at best a minor role in the debate taken as a whole, the related elite versus the people frame turns out

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101 This is particularly true for two of the more outspoken EU critics that are included in our sample, namely Green Party spokesperson Maria Wetterstrand and Göran Greider, editor-in-chief of the social democratic regional newspaper Dala-Demokraten. Wetterstrand urges a new Swedish initiative for the future of European integration, based on a “cooperation between independent states” and a strong reduction of supranational elements (SvD 2005-05-31d). Greider, on the other hand, claims that “the spirit of the Constitutional Treaty is frightening. There is talk that ‘the peoples of Europe, in creating an ever closer union among them, are resolved to share a common future’ or meticulously determine which will be the union’s symbols. My God, how this sounds of great nationalisms of the past!” (DN 2005-06-14b).

102 Rolf Gustavsson emphasizes this point by arguing that “the EU is no state formation of the kind that a lot of symbolism and intimidating talk about the ‘superstate’ misleadingly implies. The EU is and remains an international cooperation with a mix of supranational (federal) and traditionally intergovernmental forms. The part that is currently suffering the deepest crisis of confidence is the intergovernmental one, represented by the […] European Council […]. There, if anywhere, openness and transparency are needed. Who wouldn’t want to hear discussions between Jacques Chirac and Tony Blair?” (SvD 2005-06-19).
to be most salient in all three newspapers. Strikingly, it is most salient in liberal *Dagens Nyheter* (appearing in 41% of all articles) and social democratic *Aftonbladet* (41%), i.e. two newspapers that have otherwise strongly emphasized the democratic achievements of the Constitutional Treaty. The frame is used in an *explanatory* rather than *evaluative* way in these two newspapers. While the elite versus the people frame is used not least as a tool to argue against European integration and/or the Constitutional Treaty, liberal *Dagens Nyheter* and social democratic *Aftonbladet* use it to account for ratification failure despite the Constitutional Treaty’s democratic innovations. Ratification failure is seen rather as an outcome of the long period during which the EU institutions have neglected the views and concerns of their citizens. For *Dagens Nyheter*, “it is easy to interpret popular mistrust and unwillingness towards the EU as the people versus the elite. This aspect certainly exists, and the responsibility for people all around Europe saying no to the development of the EU project rests heavily on their political leaders. The latter have not cared about explaining EU politics, they have not let Europe become a part of people’s everyday lives” (DN 2005-06-03b).

Correspondingly, also the lack of leadership frame appears in the Swedish debate, but is nowhere near as frequent as the elite versus the people frame. Where it is applied – the numbers are quite similar for all three newspapers –, ratification failure is construed as the result of a failure of political actors to take charge in the constitution-making process and to stand up for the necessity and benefits of the constitutional project. The lack of leadership frame is applied as frequently as the citizenship/democracy frame. The latter emphasizes the potential for democratic improvements residing in the institutional reform part of the Constitutional Treaty, and is most frequently applied in its positive reading in the left and liberal newspapers.

Despite a number of noteworthy similarities between the use of frames in the Swedish and German debates, all three Swedish newspapers emphasize the perceived tension between market integration and the lack of a social dimension in the integration process. While the neoliberal/market vs. social Europe frame is used only rarely in the German newspapers, it is the second most prominent in the Swedish sample, taking center stage foremost in conservative *Svenska Dagbladet*. Here, the frame is used by the newspaper’s editorialists primarily for the purpose of discarding notions that the Constitutional Treaty is an expression of an ultraliberal market order. In addition, the frame is used in connection to claims that the a social Europe or European welfare state is possible only if it is at the same time market-based. In other words, *Svenska Dagbladet*
employs the frame to emphasize that these two aspects always go hand in hand. Consequently, the French left is criticized for “wishing away a united Europe as well as the ‘negative effects’ of any further globalization” while portraying the EU “as a vandal in the French welfare state” (SvD 2005-05-28).

In sum, our frame analysis suggests that country-specific patterns in newspapers’ use of frames only apply to some extent. Instead, we have seen clear parallels between newspapers of similar orientation. The two conservative newspapers strongly emphasized the elitist character of EU constitution making, and they did so not merely in an explanatory way. Ratification failure is consistently viewed here as much more than the unfortunate outcome of a failure of European elites to communicate the high value of the constitutional project. Instead, European elites basically got what they deserved for not taking the will of the people into account. For the liberal and left newspapers, on the other hand, ratification failure is foremost a communicative failure: convinced of the high democratic value of EU constitution making, Dagens Nyheter, the Süddeutsche Zeitung, the taz and also Aftonbladet use the citizenship/democracy frame to emphasize the democratic opportunity that was missed. Overall, these findings suggest strong cross-country patterns in the way newspapers frame EU constitution making as well as ratification failure.

Permeability: Domestic and Non-Domestic Authors in the Two Debates

Both the German and Swedish samples for the ratification crisis debate are significantly larger than for both the finality and the re-launch debates. But the ratification crisis debate also suggests that transnational debate in the sense of an inclusion of non-domestic authors is by far a more frequent phenomenon in Germany than in Sweden. Differences in this regard follow country-specific rather than newspaper-specific lines. Although the Swedish ratification crisis debate yielded more than twice as many articles as the finality debate, the number of non-domestic authors and/or featured speakers is virtually negligible. The Swedish debate features three non-domestic speakers, while the German sample includes no less than 28.
Domestic and Non-Domestic Authors in the German ‘Ratification Crisis’ Debate

The frequency with which non-domestic authors appear in the different German newspapers is considerable, ranging from 9% of articles in the liberal Süddeutsche Zeitung to as high as 17% in the taz. Whereas the Süddeutsche Zeitung lags behind, this low share is attributable also to the fact that the Süddeutsche Zeitung writes by far the most articles on the unfolding ratification crisis. Consequently, the number of non-domestic authors/featured speakers in the Süddeutsche Zeitung is virtually identical to the other two newspapers.\footnote{The Frankfurter Allgemeine published ten articles written by or featuring non-domestic speakers, whereas both the taz and the Süddeutsche Zeitung published nine each.}

Moreover, all three newspapers display similar patterns as regards national origins and to some extent also the positions/functions of the non-domestic authors who are given voice in the ratification crisis debate. Unsurprisingly, Dutch and French speakers assume a prominent position in all three newspapers.\footnote{The Frankfurter Allgemeine published one interview with the Dutch architects Reinier de Graaf and Rem Koolhaas and one with Frans Timmermans, the initiator of the Dutch ratification referendum. In addition, the newspaper published articles written by the French philosopher Bernard-Henri Lévy, the Dutch author Cees Nooteboom, the Dutch journalist Michaël Zeeman and the former French foreign minister Hubert Védrine. The Süddeutsche Zeitung published articles written by the Dutch foreign minister Bernard Bot and the French sociologist Alain Touraine. In addition, the newspaper published interviews with the French historian Alfred Grosser, with French MP Jean-Luc Mélenchon, with the writer Jean Rouaud. The taz, finally, published articles by Bernard Cassen and Anne-Cécile Robert of Le Monde diplomatique as well as by the French social scientist Frédéric Lordon. In addition, the newspaper published interviews with the French-German MEP Daniel Cohn-Bendit and with Françoise Bavay of the French Greens.} However, the conservative Frankfurter Allgemeine is the most diverse of the three newspapers in terms of the national origins of the non-domestic speakers featured. In the wake of the French and Dutch referenda, the newspaper’s cultural section prompted public intellectuals from different European countries to comment on the implications of the referenda. As a result, the Frankfurter Allgemeine includes speakers from as many as seven different countries.

However, this diversity ironically enough illustrates an elitist element in the German debate and particularly in the conservative Frankfurter Allgemeine that plays a much smaller role in the Swedish debate. In the Frankfurter Allgemeine, but to a similar extent also in the Süddeutsche Zeitung and the taz, governmental/institutional actors and public intellectuals are particularly prominent. The role played by public
intellectuals is notable in the German debate, particularly in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine*. National origin tends to play only a minor role in this context, as both domestic and non-domestic public intellectuals are strongly represented. Domestic public intellectuals (17 articles) and public intellectuals from other EU states (10 articles) are the two highest-ranking non-journalistic groups in the German sample (see table 7.3). As in the German finality debate, the *Frankfurter Allgemeine* thus emerges as a forum for transnational debate. Notably, also the journalistic voice from other EU states plays its role, as does the voice of oppositional speakers from other member states.

Table 7.3. German ratification crisis debate. Most prominent categories of authors/featured speakers, by newspaper.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category of author/featured speaker</th>
<th>FAZ</th>
<th>SZ</th>
<th>taz</th>
<th>total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Own newspaper journalist, EU correspondent/reporter</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own newspaper journalist, editorialist/editor</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own newspaper journalist, politics pages</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own newspaper, correspondent, other EU country</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public intellectual, domestic</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own newspaper journalist, cultural pages</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public intellectual, other EU country</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government/coalition, other EU country</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>73</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>(number of sampled/coded articles in parentheses)</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

EU correspondents play a prominent role in the *Süddeutsche Zeitung*. Here, this rather small group of journalists accounts for 43% of all articles. By comparison, both the *Frankfurter Allgemeine* and the *taz* feature only 15 and 14 articles, respectively, written by their EU correspondents. The high number of articles written by Brussels correspondents in the case of the *Süddeutsche Zeitung* comes at the expense of the newspaper’s
editorialists, who play a relatively minor role, at least compared to the Frankfurter Allgemeine. In the case of the Frankfurter Allgemeine, the issue is commented on foremost by the newspaper’s Frankfurt-based editorialists, while editorial space in the Süddeutsche Zeitung is instead provided to the newspaper’s EU correspondents. In the case of the Frankfurter Allgemeine, the editorial voice plays a dominant role particularly in the later stages of the ratification crisis debate. Strikingly, the editorial voice plays almost no role in the case of the taz (two articles), where opinion-making is to a large extent left to external speakers.

**Domestic and Non-Domestic Authors in the Swedish ‘Ratification Crisis’ Debate**

In the Swedish ratification crisis debate, non-domestic authors/featured speakers are at best a marginal phenomenon. Neither Svenska Dagbladet nor Aftonbladet feature any contributions by non-domestic speakers. And even in Dagens Nyheter, the share of non-domestic authors/featured speakers amounts to a mere 6% - lower than in any of the German newspapers. In terms of authorship, the Swedish debate therefore has a strongly domestic character. With the partial exception of conservative Svenska Dagbladet, it is furthermore strongly dominated by the journalistic voice. In total, the three newspapers’ journalists account for a total of 82 out of the 106 articles (77%). However, Svenska Dagbladet offers most space to external authors (cf. Trenz et al. 2009), and thus displays a significantly smaller share of articles written by the newspaper’s own journalists than the other two newspapers studied (61%).

Liberal Dagens Nyheter and social democratic Aftonbladet devote a great amount of editorial space – 20 and 13 editorials, respectively – to discussing and at least in part promoting the Constitutional Treaty in the run-up to the French and Dutch referenda, as well as later on to contemplating the implications of ratification failure. Strikingly, the editorial voice is on the other hand almost silent in the case of conservative Svenska Dagbladet (only four editorials), where ratification failure is seen as a severe, yet temporary set-back for the EU. Here, the debate involves mainly the newspaper’s correspondents, such as foremost EU correspondent Rolf Gustavsson.

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105 In Dagens Nyheter, four out of five articles are written by the newspaper’s own journalists (80%), while Aftonbladet almost exclusively uses its own journalists in reporting on and making sense of the unfolding situation (96%).
The voice of public intellectuals plays a smaller role in the Swedish than in the German sample, yet not an altogether insignificant one. Instead, it is rather the voice of non-domestic public intellectuals that represents a marginal phenomenon. Nonetheless, all three non-domestic authors in the Swedish sample are public intellectuals (Gisèle Halimi, Ulrich Beck and Joseph Nye), and all three appeared in liberal Dagens Nyheter. Four of the five articles written by domestic public intellectuals appeared in conservative Svenska Dagbladet. Svenska Dagbladet can thus be characterized as a forum for domestic debate, whereas liberal Dagens Nyheter also serves as a forum for transnational debate on the constitutional future of the EU.

Table 7.4. Swedish ratification crisis debate. Most prominent categories of authors/featured speakers, by newspaper.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category of author/featured speaker</th>
<th>SvD</th>
<th>DN</th>
<th>Ab</th>
<th>total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Own newspaper journalist, editorialist/editor</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own newspaper journalist, EU correspondent/reporter</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own newspaper journalist, politics pages</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own newspaper journalist, cultural pages</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own newspaper, correspondent, other EU country</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public intellectual, domestic</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>33</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* number of sampled/coded articles in parentheses

By comparison to the Swedish finality debate, domestic Members of the European Parliament play only a minor role throughout the ratification crisis debate. As we have seen in the last chapter, the finality debate gained its momentum in part from the input of Swedish MEP’s of all stripes. In the ratification crisis debate, however, Gunnar Hökmark of the conservative European People’s Party group is alone in voicing his opinion, albeit on two different occasions and in two different newspapers (Svenska Dagbladet and Dagens Nyheter).
Transnational Engagement in the Two Debates

Despite considerable differences in sample size, both the German and Swedish ratification crisis debates are characterized by a much higher share of non-domestic than domestic references. In the run-up to the two referenda, all newspapers adopt a fairly distanced style in their coverage of the situation in the two countries. In this phase, a high share of designative and definitive statements suggests that non-domestic speakers’ claims are only rarely evaluated. Rather, this phase is characterized by a practice of offering quotes from Dutch and French voters, mainly for the purpose of illustrating the unfolding situation. This finding corresponds to a high number of background opinion articles in this initial phase of the debate, whereas the editorial voice does not come into the picture until after the two referenda. In other words, there is only very little opinion-making at this point in the debate.

Considering this practice of offering illustrative quotes for the purpose of defining the unfolding situation, the high share of references to non-domestic speakers is unsurprising. In both countries, references to non-domestic speakers outweigh references to domestic speakers by almost three to one.\(^\text{106}\) Despite these similarities, the Swedish and German debates display very different characteristics with regard to engagement with non-domestic speakers. In this regard, the level of contestation varies depending on the (categories of) speakers quoted as well as on the phase of the debate analyzed. Engagement in the form of evaluative and advocative statements is more frequent in the assessment of political actors than of ‘the average citizen’. Furthermore, engagement is more frequent in the aftermath of the two referenda. In the same vein, a polemical tone is most frequently applied in the evaluation of political actors deemed responsible for ratification failure, whereas ‘the average citizen’ is for the most part spared this kind of critique.\(^\text{107}\)

\(^{106}\) The Swedish sample contains 172 references to non-domestic and 62 references to domestic speakers. The German sample contains 491 references to non-domestic and 164 references to domestic speakers.

\(^{107}\) One notable exception to this general rule of thumb is an above-quoted editorial from liberal *Dagens Nyheter*, which includes a general indictment of all no-voters: “What kind of future international solidarity is it,” the author asks rhetorically, “that you are dreaming of behind your secure borders?” (DN 2005-05-29d).
Transnational Engagement in the German Debate

In both the *Süddeutsche Zeitung* and the *taz*, non-domestic speakers are considerably more likely to encounter contestation than domestic speakers. Non-domestic speakers are met here with negative evaluative statements more than twice as frequently as domestic speakers.\textsuperscript{108} In the conservative *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, on the other hand, the image is virtually the opposite: engagement with domestic speakers is here considerably more frequent than with non-domestic speakers.\textsuperscript{109} This is an interesting finding compared to the high number of non-domestic authors that has otherwise characterized the *Frankfurter Allgemeine*: while the FAZ stands out as a forum for transnational debate in this latter respect, *engagement* with non-domestic speakers as references is by far a more frequent practice in the *taz* and the *Süddeutsche Zeitung*. In this sense, our empirical expectation is met: contestation across borders occurs more frequently in the left and liberal newspapers whose authors express a preference for postnational democracy.

This finding can be explored in relation to the sense of disillusionment expressed by the liberal newspapers (also in Sweden) after the ratification process had failed in France and the Netherlands: in these newspapers, non-domestic actors are evaluated negatively because they are considered culpable for the failure of the constitutional project.\textsuperscript{110} In the conservative newspapers (both in Germany and Sweden), on the other hand, ratification failure is seen in a less dramatic way, i.e. as a temporary setback that does not in any way question the future of European integration, particularly where the latter is conceived of (and advocated)

\textsuperscript{108} The *Süddeutsche Zeitung* and the *taz* offer negative evaluations of 28% and 27% of the quoted non-domestic speakers, whereas the corresponding share in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine* is only 13%.

\textsuperscript{109} In this context, the *Frankfurter Allgemeine* offers *advocative* or *evaluative* statements on 36% of the 194 claims raised by non-domestic speakers, and on 49% of the 43 claims raised by domestic speakers.

\textsuperscript{110} Foremost, this relates to the role of Jacques Chirac, As the SZ’s Paris-based correspondent Gerd Kröncke puts it: “When Chirac decided on the referendum a year ago, […] support by far exceeded 60 percent. But it crumbled […], foremost because the rulers as well as the biggest opposition party displayed a kind of empathic arrogance towards all who wanted to vote against the constitution. […] The President would possibly have served his cause better by staying out of the campaign. […] Every one of his public appearances has strengthened the opposition against him and brought about more support for the no-camp. The voters did not want to be asked and be called ignorant at the same time by the same person who asked the question, simply because they did not want to adopt his answer” (SZ 2005-05-27b).
in a more or less intergovernmental form. As editorialist Klaus-Dieter Frankenberger argues: “Yes, the EU would enter a turbulent phase, a phase of uncertainty, in the event that the Constitutional Treaty [...] should fail first in France and then possibly in the Netherlands. [...] A French no would certainly have consequences – but it would not mean the end for ‘Europe’” (FAZ 2005-05-28c). As we have seen, this point is also underlined in the framing of the issue and is expressed clearly in the Frankfurter Allgemeine’s editorials and signed commentaries on the issue.

Table 7.5. German ratification crisis debate. Statements made on domestic and non-domestic speakers (% in parentheses).
The higher level of engagement with non-domestic speakers in the left and liberal newspapers also finds expression in the use of evaluative styles. In the *Süddeutsche Zeitung* and in the *taz*, non-domestic speakers are more frequently met with a *polemical-scandalizing* tone than in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine*. Correspondingly, the *Frankfurter Allgemeine* tends to apply an objective-analytical style in evaluating non-domestic speakers. Also in this regard, our empirical expectations are met. Nevertheless, the image is not as clear here as it is in the context of the statements made on domestic compared to non-domestic speakers. As a case in point, the *Frankfurter Allgemeine* is as frequent as the *Süddeutsche Zeitung* (and even more frequent than the *taz*) in its use of an ironic-satirical style, suggesting that engagement with non-domestic speakers does occur here as well.

Yet while certain differences can be demonstrated as regards different newspapers’ engagement with non-domestic speakers, they appear less pronounced than we had assumed. To some extent, this is attributable to the voice of the ‘average citizen’ particularly in the initial phase of the debate (as outlined above). Particularly in the run-up to the two referenda, the German sample is rich in references to ‘average citizens’, but also to other speakers from the French and Dutch contexts whose contributions serve illustrative purposes. As such, they are not contested by the respective journalists. And since this is a practice that all three newspapers adopt, differences between the three newspapers appear rather small for the respective samples taken as a whole. Contestation remains restricted, in the end, to political actors within the two national contexts that are thought to have played a decisive role in the respective referendum outcomes. But if this is the case, we should be able to discern clearer differences in the different newspapers’ engagement with actors that were particularly prominent in the debate.

Another aspect to be considered in this regard is the consistently negative evaluation of Jacques Chirac. All three newspapers single out Chirac as the man to blame for ratification failure. But while all three newspapers are highly polemical in their evaluation of Chirac, they are so for different reasons, consistent with their respective assessments of ratification failure. For the *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, Chirac is to be scandalized foremost for the perceived populism of his attacks on “Anglo-Saxon ultraliberalism” (FAZ 2005-05-28b). Before this background, contestation is strong even in the conservative *Frankfurter Allgemeine*. The left-alternative *taz* and and most of all the liberal *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, on the other hand, scandalize Chirac for compromising the benefits of the constitution-making process per se. For the latter newspapers, the
Constitutional Treaty represented foremost a historic opportunity not only for making the European polity more democratic, but also for making it institutionally fit to cope with future enlargement.

Table 7.6. German ratification crisis debate. Evaluations of all domestic and non-domestic speakers (% in parentheses).

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Similarly, Dutch Prime Minister Jan-Peter Balkenende is a frequent target of critique in the Dutch context, but other members of his cabinet and their claims are also frequently evaluated negatively. While not among
the four most-quoted speakers, Balkenende (and his cabinet) are nonetheless frequently considered to bear the responsibility for the outcome of the Dutch referendum. “Unfortunately,” writes Michael Kläsgen of the *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, “the Dutch government has failed to take away the basis of the Euroskeptics’ opposition. Its yes-campaign came too late and was too diffuse. [...] The prime minister would make a mistake if he didn’t do everything in his power to restore popular trust in Europe as soon as possible” (SZ 2005-06-02c).

Table 7.7. German ratification crisis debate. Top 4 references, by newspaper and styles of evaluation.

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<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
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Jean-Claude Juncker’s prominent position in the German sample is due to his position as Council President at the time of the two referenda. While

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Since Tony Blair and Gerhard Schröder appear in the same number of articles, both are included in this table.
not considered to have played any role in the respective referendum outcomes, Juncker is nevertheless at the forefront of the German newspapers’ interest in his role as a sort of crisis manager particularly in the context of the unfolding budget crisis in the second half of June. Considering this mediator role, Juncker’s role is discussed in a mix of a distanced and sympathetic style, through the frequent employment of designative and definitive, but also neutral evaluative statements. Juncker’s role is furthermore taken as part and parcel of the voice of the European institutions, described as helpless in the aftermath of the referenda as well as during the budget crisis. As Bernard Cassen of Le monde diplomatique ironically points out in the taz, “the leaders of the EU institutions are meanwhile trying not to lose face altogether, even if it means denying the facts. [...] Council President Jean-Claude Juncker [...] went so far as to raise the surreal claim that ‘I want to believe that neither the French nor the Dutch have rejected the constitution’” (taz 2005-07-08).

Tony Blair plays yet another role in the German debate. Blair only enters the stage towards the end of the German debate, foremost in the context of the EU’s budget crisis, but particularly in his role as Council President during the second half of 2005. The three newspapers’ engagement with Blair further underlines their different orientations on European integration, most of all in the context of the budget crisis. While Blair is criticized heavily in the left and liberal newspapers for what is considered a hard-headed approach in the budget negotiations, the conservative (and market liberal) Frankfurter Allgemeine applauds Blair for his advance for a more modern EU budget. In the liberal SZ, on the other hand, Blair is foremost criticized for a lack of credibility: based on his previous lack of enthusiasm for EU issues, his proposals for reforming the EU budget are now said to come across foremost as self-interested. Overall, Blair’s role indicates that engagement with non-domestic speakers – this time in a positive sense – also occurs in the conservative Frankfurter Allgemeine. At the same time, this engagement does reflect the different newspapers’ respective orientations on European integration.

In sum, non-domestic speakers in the German sample are considerably more likely to encounter contestation than their domestic counterparts. However, contestation is focused particularly on specific actors, most of all in the immediate pre- as well as post-referendum phases of the debate (here: particularly Jacques Chirac), but also in the context of the budget crisis in the second half of June (here: particularly Tony Blair). Ratification failure is construed as a failure of French and Dutch political actors, in the French case attributable more to the role of Jacques Chirac than to the
content of the Constitutional Treaty. In the Dutch case, blame is assigned to domestic political actors within the Dutch government, but the focus is not on one single individual as in the French case. The consequences of this assessment for engagement with non-domestic speakers differ between newspapers, however, depending on the respective newspapers’ assessment of the consequences of ratification failure: the graver the consequences are considered, the more negative and polemical the evaluation of the actors held responsible.

**Transnational Engagement in the Swedish Debate**

Non-domestic speakers clearly outweigh domestic speakers in the Swedish sample as well. Compared to domestic speakers, they are considerably less frequent to be met with contestation, as a high frequency of designative and definitive statements indicates. Yet this finding is at least in large part attributable to the same journalistic practice already witnessed also in the German debate, namely that all three Swedish newspapers frequently use illustrative quotes of ‘the average citizen’ in France and the Netherlands in the initial phase of the debate. Since these quotes serve illustrative purposes, they are usually left unevaluated. At best, a rather distanced, objective-analytical style is used in evaluating such quotes. Engagement with non-political actors thus virtually does not occur. As in the German debate, finally, this practice is found foremost in a large number of background opinion articles in the initial phase of the debate, written foremost by the respective reporters and/or correspondents covering the EU, France and the Netherlands.

Yet while the German and the Swedish debates are overall characterized by such similarities, domestic speakers are considerably more likely to encounter contestation in the Swedish than in the German sample. Strikingly, this applies foremost to liberal *Dagens Nyheter*, where we had expected strong transnational engagement. Yet here, almost half the claims raised by domestic speakers (48%) are met with a negative evaluative statement, whereas the same is true for less than one fifth of all claims raised by non-domestic speakers (19%). On the other hand, the

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112 Correspondingly, evaluative statements are offered only rarely, while advocative statements do not appear at all.

113 In the case of *Dagens Nyheter*, these background opinion articles are written mainly by Ingrid Hedström and Sigrid Bøe; in the case of SvD by Rolf Gustavsson and Tomas Lundin; and in the case of *Aftonbladet* by Lena Mellin and Olle Svenning (the latter is otherwise mostly known for his editorials).
Swedish sample contains relatively few references to domestic speakers. At the same time, *Dagens Nyheter* offers more references to non-domestic speakers than either of the other Swedish newspapers. Since many of these references appear for illustrative rather than evaluative purposes in the initial phase of the debate, we need to differentiate our analysis and focus on more prominent actors in the debate.

Table 7.8. Swedish ratification crisis debate. Statements made on domestic and non-domestic speakers (% in parentheses).
Nonetheless, we need to emphasize that *Svenska Dagbladet* is exceptional in the Swedish context in that the newspaper is frequent in offering evaluations of non-domestic speakers. In particular, the newspaper displays a high share of positive evaluations of non-domestic speakers. As we will see below, this is largely due – as in the German conservative *Frankfurter Allgemeine* – to the role played by Tony Blair in the context of the budget crisis. Whereas Blair is scandalized in the liberal and left newspapers, his ideas for a more “modern” EU budget are applauded in the conservative (read: market liberal) newspapers.

In this regard, transnational engagement largely follows a cross-country pattern: newspapers of similar orientation also show similar practices of engagement. Ratification failure reads as a story of disillusionment in liberal *Dagens Nyheter*, broadly corresponding to the newspaper’s liberal counterpart in Germany. Just as the *Süddeutsche Zeitung* in Germany, *Dagens Nyheter* constructs ratification failure as a failure of French and Dutch political actors. Consequently, also *Dagens Nyheter* negatively emphasizes the role of Jacques Chirac, frequently through the use of a polemical-scandalizing tone. Correspondingly, the blame in the Dutch case is placed on a more diverse set of Dutch political actors, but ratification failure is also here considered to be an effect of mistrust in domestic politicians. Jan Peter Balkenende is here a frequent target of critique in much the same way as in the German *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, but emphasis is also placed on other members of his cabinet, whose claims are evaluated negatively and in a polemical tone.

But how can we account for the negative evaluation of domestic speakers in *Dagens Nyheter*? The target of *Dagens Nyheter*’s critique consists of basically two groups: (a) the non-domestic no-camp as well as those parts of the non-domestic yes-camp considered responsible for the outcome of the referenda; and (b) the domestic yes-camp, which is criticized for celebrating the French and Dutch ‘no’. In this context, *Dagens Nyheter*’s Henrik Berggren scandalizes both the Swedish and the French no-camps for their perceived nationalism. “Nationalism,” Berggren bitterly remarks, “is after all the most successful form of internationalism: everyone can agree that the own country is best. That feels like a solid foundation for the future of European cooperation” (DN 2005-06-02). In other words, *Dagens Nyheter* is highly specific in its selection of domestic speakers, referring mainly to those who are considered to have contributed to (or outright celebrate) ratification failure. In this light, the high relative degree of domestic engagement in *Dagens Nyheter* is unsurprising and also consistent with the newspaper’s overall take on ratification failure.
Table 7.9. Swedish ratification crisis debate. Evaluations of domestic and non-domestic speakers (% in parentheses).

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The evaluative styles applied by the different newspapers suggest that transnational engagement is stronger in the left and liberal newspapers. Also in this regard, the observable patterns are cross-national. Both in Sweden and in Germany, non-domestic speakers are more frequently met with a polemical-scandalizing style than they are in the respective conservative newspapers. Nevertheless, the Swedish debate is...
considerably more focused on domestic actors than its German counterpart. This central role of domestic actors, whether representing political parties, the respective yes- or no-camps or even domestic representatives of the European institutions, is underlined by our analysis of the most prominent speakers in the Swedish sample.

Two Swedes are among the four most prominent actors, namely Prime Minister Göran Persson and Commission Vice President Margot Wallström. Persson’s prominent position can be attributed in part to the high salience of matters related to the domestic ratification process (and Persson’s central role within this debate), but in part also to his rather passive position in the constitutional debate overall. For the latter, he is frequently criticized by Dagens Nyheter, whereas his advocacy of a period of reflection is received more benevolently.

Table 7.10. Swedish ratification crisis debate. Top 3 references, by newspaper and styles of evaluation

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Margot Wallström, in turn, is a standard point of reference in Swedish EU debates. In the unfolding ratification crisis debate, she plays an even more central role because of her close connection to the idea (and announcement) of the Commission’s period of reflection as well as
subsequently of the so-called Plan D for Dialogue, Democracy and Debate. Consequently, almost any evaluation of the period of reflection and of Plan D is also – and much more so than in the German case – an evaluation of Margot Wallström’s performance. Plan D and the period of reflection are viewed with a good deal of skepticism even in those of the Swedish newspapers that otherwise support debate as a fundamental democratic mechanism. Dagens Nyheter’s editorialists are sympathetic to the idea of initiating more public debate, but the notion that the aims of Plan D can be achieved through top-down communication is evaluated more ambivalently. As editorialist Barbro Hedvall writes: “Not that there is anything wrong with [...] promoting a ‘democratic infrastructure’ [...] and supporting forums all over Europe. But is a Commission proposal really the right point of departure?” (DN 2005-06-09). In the same context, editorialist Hanne Kjöller wonders how “all-European debate beyond the nation-state [...] can be accomplished,” but argues that “you can hardly question its necessity” (DN 2005-06-11b).

The two most prominent non-domestic actors in the Swedish newspapers are Jacques Chirac and the French no-camp in general. However, references to both are considerably fewer in the Swedish than in the German debate, so that a quantitative analysis of differences between the three newspapers is problematic. What can be said, however, is that all three newspapers single out Jacques Chirac as the man to blame for ratification failure. And while the three newspapers have contending views on the implications of ratification failure, all converge in their adoption of a polemical-scandalizing and/or ironic-satirical style in evaluating Chirac’s role and claims. Even though Svenska Dagbladet views ratification failure primarily as a temporary setback, the newspaper is nonetheless relentless in its evaluation of Chirac. In its main editorial of the day on May 28, the newspaper writes that “Chirac has personally contributed to the idea of the EU as a threat to the French welfare state”, wondering “why skeptical Frenchmen [should] believe him now that he claims that the constitution is a bulwark against ‘ultraliberalism’ outside the EU?” (SvD 2005-05-28).

The French no-camp plays a similarly prominent role, but is referred to mainly for the sake of finding an explanation for the outcome of the French referendum. In this regard, Dagens Nyheter certainly stands out as the newspaper that goes furthest in its criticism, scandalizing those who voted no in the French referendum: ratification failure is construed here an act of nationalism, jeopardizing the future of European cooperation (see editorialist Henrik Berggren’s quote above).
In sum, the Swedish ratification crisis debate is not in itself more domestic than its German counterpart. However, since the Swedish ratification crisis debate takes place also in the context of a domestic debate about the Swedish ratification process, domestic actors (such as Prime Minister Göran Persson) are a more frequent – and natural – target of critique than they are in the German debate. Nonetheless, also the Swedish ratification crisis debate is characterized by lively transnational engagement. Relevantly, the patterns discerned here among the Swedish newspapers broadly follow cross-national lines: the liberal and left newspapers in both countries engage heavily with non-domestic political actors that are considered responsible for ratification failure. And while this finding applies even to the two conservative newspapers, most prominently as regards the role of Jacques Chirac, it does so for different reasons. For the conservative (and market liberal newspapers), Chirac is to be scandalized foremost for what is considered a populist exploitation of popular sentiment against the market orientation of the integration process. For the liberal and left newspapers, he is to be scandalized for jeopardizing the perceived benefits of the Constitutional Treaty in terms of citizenship and democracy. In this regard, both the Swedish and the German liberal and left newspapers see ratification failure in much more dramatic terms: while it is merely a temporary setback for the conservative newspapers, a historic opportunity for more democracy was missed in the eyes of the liberal and left newspapers.

The German and Swedish ‘Ratification Crisis’ Debates – Transnational Debate?

Our frame analysis of the German and Swedish ratification crisis debates suggested strong cross-country patterns. While the most salient frames in the Swedish and German sample were very similar overall, even stronger parallels emerged between newspapers of similar orientation. The two conservative newspapers emphasized the elite versus the people as well as the EU superstate frames, whereas the left and liberal newspapers chose to frame ratification failure in line with the citizenship/democracy frame. In this latter regard, we even see convergence to the extent that the liberal newspapers unanimously frame the Constitutional Treaty as democratically beneficial, whereas the two left newspapers are more ambivalent in their assessment, consequently applying both the positive and the negative reading of the citizenship/democracy frame. Strikingly,
the question of a Swedish referendum on the Constitutional Treaty appeared to have no impact on the frames used in the debate. Consequently, even the Swedish debate broadly focused on the question of what ratification crisis means for the European Union rather than what the Constitutional Treaty would imply for Sweden within the EU.

In terms of the authors involved, the German ratification crisis debate turned out to be significantly more transnational than its Swedish counterpart. The German debate involved authors from a variety of countries, not least from France and the Netherlands, but also representing the European institutions. Sure enough, these non-domestic contributions included a number of interviews, but also a large number of “genuine” guest contributions. This latter element was almost non-existent in the Swedish case. This may in part be due to the observation that to a large extent, the Swedish debate addressed the domestic ratification procedure and thus naturally turned out to be a debate foremost among domestic actors. Even where the French and Dutch context was discussed, it was frequently taken as background information for an otherwise domestic debate. In this sense, we have seen strong country-specific differences. While certain tendencies have been demonstrated particularly in liberal Dagens Nyheter to broaden the debate by including non-domestic voices as authors, the overall image is nonetheless that the Swedish debate by and large remained confined to the domestic arena.

While patterns in authorship thus vary widely between the Swedish and German debates, much stronger cross-country patterns are discernible as far as transnational engagement is concerned. However, these patterns do not always match our empirical expectations, as transnational engagement was also evident at least in the analysis of certain key actors in the ratification crisis debate. To begin with, the liberal newspapers (and to a lesser extent the left newspapers) in both countries are more active in engaging with non-domestic speakers than their respective conservative counterparts. In the latter, a more distanced, objective-analytical style prevails in the evaluation of non-domestic speakers. This also corresponds to the framing of the issue, i.e. the different newspapers’ understanding of the consequences of ratification failure. Here, an understanding of ratification failure as merely a temporary setback corresponds to a much less emotional tone in the evaluation of those non-domestic actors that are held responsible for ratification failure. Nonetheless, ratification failure is perceived in highly negative terms even here. Consequently, Jacques Chirac – the man to blame in all six newspapers – is not spared even by the conservative newspapers. In the
left and liberal newspapers, in turn, Chirac is scandalized most of all out of an understanding of ratification failure as highly lamentable, if not outright catastrophic in terms of the historic opportunity for bringing democratic legitimacy to the European polity and to the integration process as a whole.
8 The Re-launch of the Constitutional Process

Introduction

The referenda on the Constitutional Treaty in France and the Netherlands in the late spring of 2005 have been recognized as the definite end of the so-called “permissive consensus” that had characterized earlier phases in the history of European integration. According to one prominent reading of the ratification process' failure, the people in France and the Netherlands had said no foremost to voice their discontent with European integration having gone too far without any popular input. Particularly in the French context, ratification failure was construed as a belated way of saying no to the Maastricht Treaty, i.e. to the founding of the European Union. In light of such observations, one prominent interpretation of the outcome of the French and Dutch referenda was that the constitution-making process’s ambitions had been too high, and that they would necessarily have to be scaled down if any attempt was to be made to salvage at least certain parts of the original text. Following the referenda in France and the Netherlands, the European Commission reacted by announcing first a period of reflection, later to be followed by a so-called Plan D for Democracy, Dialogue and Debate (European Commission 2005) as well as a new White Paper on communication strategy, presented in February 2006 (European Commission 2006). The underlying assumption in these documents was that better communications efforts on the part of the European institutions and particularly a more interactive style of engaging with – and listening to – the citizens was a fundamental means of improving the perceived lack of popular legitimacy in European integration. The period of reflection was initially proposed for a period of one year, but was subsequently extended by another year, i.e. until the spring of 2007.

On January 1, 2007, Germany took over the Presidency in the Council of Ministers. Already in the presentation of its program for the Council Presidency, the German federal government specified that one of its declared ambitions was to bring the constitutional process back on track, arguing that “the European Constitutional Treaty provides for the internal
reforms needed to ensure the viability of the enlarged European Union” (German Federal Government 2007a: 4). This commitment was based not least on a mandate for holding in-depth consultations with all member state governments, given to the German Presidency already in advance at the European Council meeting in Brussels on June 15-16, 2006 (Council 2006: 17). In bringing the constitutional process back on track, the German Council Presidency was faced primarily with the challenge of finding an agreeable compromise between those eighteen member states that had already ratified the original Constitutional Treaty and most of all France and the Netherlands. Such a compromise would have to be close enough to the original Constitutional Treaty to be acceptable to those countries that had already ratified, yet different enough from the original treaty to make it possible for the treaty to be ratified even in France and the Netherlands. When the constitutional process was taken up again by the German Council Presidency in the early spring of 2007, a variety of new proposals were therefore made regarding the content, but not least the very form of the new treaty to be negotiated. Similar to former Convention President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, the German Council Presidency urged that as little as possible of the original Constitutional Treaty should be changed, arguing that the Constitutional Treaty was a package deal that should not be re-opened. Nikolas Sarkozy, on the other hand, running for the French Presidency, proposed to eliminate all the constitutional symbolism of the original treaty, arguing instead for a mini-treaty that would mainly tackle institutional reforms. In regard to the form of the treaty, Sarkozy and later Tony Blair argued for a standard intergovernmental treaty stripped of all constitutional symbolism and connotations (in the latter case to make it possible to ratify the treaty in Parliament). In other words, Sarkozy and Blair argued for an intergovernmental treaty and explicitly against a “real” constitution. For the Dutch government of Prime Minister Jan Peter Balkenende, finally, the main lesson to be learned from the 2005 referendum on the Constitutional Treaty was that national parliaments would have to play a larger role in the new treaty.

The celebrations commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of the signing of the Treaties of Rome in March 2007 in Berlin marked the beginning of the German Council Presidency’s effort to re-launch the constitutional project. In the run-up to the celebrations, the German Council Presidency had worked on drafting a declaration in which the member states would present a common statement on the achievements and future perspectives of European integration. Yet foremost, the declaration was
intended also to include a commitment to re-launching the constitutional project. And while no direct reference is made to the original Constitutional Treaty or any other, revised version of a constitutional treaty, the so-called “Berlin Declaration” concludes with the commitment that “50 years after the signing of the Treaties of Rome, we are united in our aim of placing the European Union on a renewed common basis before the European Parliament elections in 2009” (German Federal Government 2007b).

The Berlin Declaration paved the way for the European Council meeting in Brussels in late June 2007, during which the mandate for the upcoming Intergovernmental Conference was to be negotiated. Beyond the problematic areas regarding the form and content of the new treaty outlined above, negotiations at the Brussels European Council in June 2007 were further complicated by Polish demands for a revision of the original Constitutional Treaty’s voting rules in the Council of Ministers. While the German Council Presidency was principally reluctant to allow for any renegotiations of the parts of the Constitutional Treaty that dealt with institutional reform, the Polish government soon threatened to veto the outcome of the negotiations unless its demands for a change of Council voting rules were at least considered. The Polish government demanded the introduction of a new system of voting weights in the Council of Ministers according to which not the population, but rather the square root of the population of a given country should determine its number of votes in the Council of Ministers. The Polish proposal stirred significant controversy in the German newspapers, but was received in a much cooler way in the Swedish newspapers. In the end, a compromise was nonetheless found to the effect that a modified version of the Constitutional Treaty’s original system of a double majority would be introduced, but not without relatively long transition periods.

The German Re-launch Debate: Square Root or Death?

The German re-launch debate is structured primarily around three main events: (a) the issuing of the Berlin Declaration in March and the Rome Treaties anniversary celebrations; (b) the first and second rounds of the French Presidential elections in late April and early May; and (c) the European Council meeting at Brussels in late June. In the context of the Rome Treaties anniversary celebrations in late March, the German debate begins with a discussion of the achievements of fifty years of European
integration. In this initial phase of the debate, the conservative Frankfurter Allgemeine issues a special supplement dedicated entirely to the occasion of the anniversary. This supplement features guest commentaries from heads of state or government of ten EU member states as well as one by European Parliament President Hans-Gert Pöttering and an interview with Commission President José Manuel Barroso. All these contributions evaluate the historic achievements as well as assess the future perspectives of European integration. In this latter context, the constitutional process and/or the need for more or less far-reaching institutional reform are frequently mentioned as an immediate challenge and priority. Other major topics discussed in this initial phase in the German debate include the Berlin Declaration both in relation to its content and drafting process.

A second phase is triggered by the first and second rounds of the French Presidential elections in late April and early May 2007. In this context, the debate is largely analytical in character, assessing the potential consequences that the three major candidates running for French President would imply for the future of European integration and particularly for the future of the constitutional process. Particular emphasis is placed here on differences between the conservative and socialist candidates, i.e. Nicolas Sarkozy and Ségolène Royal, respectively. In large part, however, the German debate is not a debate about the idea of a re-launch of the constitutional process per se, but about Polish-German relations in the context of the re-launch of the constitutional process. Throughout the second half of June, the debate strongly emphasizes Polish-German relations in the context of the Polish government’s square root proposal. While favored by mathematicians, the idea behind the square root proposal had not until this point received any political attention or support. In the German newspapers, the Polish government’s insistence on the square root system – including the threat to veto the mandate for the upcoming Intergovernmental Conference – was broadly perceived as an act of defiance against the efforts of the German Council Presidency as well as crucially as a way of weakening Germany’s influence in Council decision making. The whole German debate in the second half of June dealt with the difficulties of reaching an agreement on what is by now referred to as the EU’s “reform treaty” (later to be called the “Lisbon Treaty”). During this concluding phase, the debate reads foremost as a conflict between the German Council Presidency and 2-3 countries portrayed as difficult, among which the Polish position is characterized as the most unwilling to compromise. However, the German newspapers differ fundamentally in their
assessment of the Polish negotiating position. The conservative Frankfurter Allgemeine and the liberal Süddeutsche Zeitung are highly critical of the Polish approach (as personified by the Kaczynski brothers). The left-alternative taz, on the other hand, assumes a much more apologetic position and provides space also for Polish authors to develop their analysis of the situation.

The Swedish Re-launch Debate: “Personal Triumph” for Angela Merkel?

Similar to the German debate, the debate in the Swedish newspapers begins with a discussion of the historic achievements and future perspectives of European integration in the context of the 50th anniversary celebrations for the Treaties of Rome. During this initial phase, the Swedish debate largely remains distanced and analytical, underlined by a large share of background opinion articles written by the newspapers’ respective EU correspondents/reporters. Furthermore, the Swedish debate involves only domestic authors throughout the period sampled. Compared to the German debate, the French Presidential elections play only a minor role in the Swedish context, at least as far as the elections’ implications for the future of the constitutional process are concerned. Liberal Dagens Nyheter forms the clearest exception in this case, publishing two editorials and one background opinion article in this context. In the second half of April, instead, the debate gradually moves forward to discussing the ongoing treaty reform process as the impending European Council meeting in Brussels in June draws closer.

The clearest difference between the German and the Swedish samples is related to the Polish government’s square root proposal. While the issue was met with strongly polemical reactions in the German debate (to some extent even in the taz), German-Polish relations played at best a marginal role in the Swedish debate. Where the square root proposal was taken up, it tended to be met with skepticism on the part of the Swedish newspapers, but the Swedish authors maintained a rather distanced and objective-analytical position and consequently did not delve into the depths of the Polish-German relationship. However, liberal Dagens Nyheter stands out in assuming a more critical position towards the Polish square root proposal. Most of all, Dagens Nyheter’s editorialist Karin Rebas scandalized the Polish negotiating position as an indefensible stumbling block on the way to necessary treaty reform. In this regard, we see certain similarities to the Swedish ratification crisis debate, in the
course of which liberal *Dagens Nyheter* scandalized foremost those non-domestic actors that were deemed responsible for the failure of the Constitutional Treaty, which was in turn perceived to be as desirable as necessary. On a broader level, however, the Polish square root proposal was treated as merely one of several obstacles in the reform negotiations. Correspondingly, the Polish position was not singled out as clearly as it was in the German case. Instead, EU enlargement once again turned out to be as salient a context issue as it already had been in the finality and ratification crisis debates in the spring of 2000. In the present context, enlargement was discussed foremost in relation to the clear opposition of French President-elect Nicolas Sarkozy towards Turkish EU membership.

Towards the end of the sampled period, the re-launch of the constitutional process is construed as a success story for the German Council Presidency and foremost Angela Merkel. Both in connection with the Berlin Declaration and the treaty reform negotiations in June, the Swedish debate focuses heavily on the role and leadership of the German Chancellor. All three newspapers emphasize what *Svenska Dagbladet*’s EU correspondent Rolf Gustavsson describes as the “Merkel method”, alluding to the early “Monnet method” of incremental integration: “a quiet stubbornness that achieves its purpose through mediation, persuasion and sometimes harsh honesty” (*Svenska Dagbladet* 2007-06-17). Consequently, the re-launch of the constitutional process is construed foremost as a story of successful political leadership and a “personal triumph” for Angela Merkel, who stepped forward as “Europe’s savior angel” (ibid.).

**Frames: What’s at stake in the debate?**

Our frame analysis indicates that although the most frequently applied frames in Sweden and Germany are almost identical, the more striking parallels can be discerned *across countries*, i.e. between newspapers of similar orientation. In both countries, the conservative newspapers emphasize aspects that are very different from those emphasized by left and liberal newspapers, respectively. However, newspapers of one orientation in Germany tend to apply the same frames with similar frequency as their respective counterparts in Sweden, suggesting that meaning structures in the debate on the re-launch of the constitutional process by and large follow transnational rather than national lines.
Frames in the German Debate

In the German debate, four frames stand out in particular. The most salient frame in the German sample is the citizenship/democracy frame, appearing in 25% of all articles, followed by the elite versus the people frame (24%), the decision-making efficiency frame (23%) and the heroic frame (19%). However, the frequency with which particular frames are applied varies widely between the three German newspapers. Instead of following country-specific lines in their framing of the re-launch of the constitutional process, the three newspapers’ use of frames rather corresponds to their respective political orientations.

The most striking contrast between the three German newspapers concerns the application of the heroic frame, which owes its prominence almost exclusively to the frequency with which it is used in the conservative Frankfurter Allgemeine (30% of all articles). This high number can in turn be attributed to the Frankfurter Allgemeine’s abovementioned supplement on the occasion of the Rome Treaties anniversary celebrations in March. In their reflections on the historic achievements of European integration, a number of EU heads of state and government as well as representatives of the European institutions are unsurprisingly frequent in their use of the heroic frame. By comparison, the heroic frame is applied only rarely in the left-alternative taz (6%) and in the liberal Süddeutsche Zeitung (7%).

Similarly, the prominence of the elite versus the people frame as well as to a somewhat lesser extent the citizenship/democracy frame is due foremost to the taz’s strong emphasis on democratic concerns. Similarly, the taz strongly emphasizes the social implications of the constitutional process, applying the neo-liberal vs. social Europe frame in 20% of its articles – around three times as frequently as the Frankfurter Allgemeine and the Süddeutsche Zeitung do. Also this is a clear indication that framing corresponds to the respective newspapers’ general political orientations, and that there is no one dominant understanding of the re-launch of the constitutional process that is applied consistently in all German newspapers.

Although the most salient frames are applied with similar frequency in the sample taken as a whole, the three newspapers have a strong tendency to favor and emphasize contending readings of the re-launch of the constitutional process. In the conservative Frankfurter Allgemeine, the historic achievements of European integration play a larger role (30%) than concerns about an insufficiently “social Europe” (7%). The latter point is in turn emphasized strongly in the left-alternative taz (20%),
whose authors on the other hand tend to view decision-making efficiency only as a subordinate concern (13%). Decision-making efficiency, finally, is far more relevant to the authors of the liberal Süddeutsche Zeitung (30%) than to their counterparts in the Frankfurter Allgemeine and taz.

Table 8.1. German re-launch debate. Most frequently identified frames.

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</table>

These findings suggest that the different newspapers’ respective emphases on different aspects of the re-launch of the constitutional process broadly correspond to their respective orientations rather than to their national origin as German newspapers. To the taz as a left newspaper, the tension between notions of a “neo-liberal” as opposed to a “social Europe” outweighs the question of an increased supranationalization of EU decision making and/or the notion of a coming EU superstate. As in the case of the ratification crisis debate, however, the latter frame is applied frequently in the conservative Frankfurter Allgemeine. Both in the ratification crisis debate and in the re-launch debate, the Frankfurter Allgemeine repeatedly emphasized the continuous transfer of sovereignty from the national to the supranational level as a trigger for the popular rejection of the Constitutional Treaty. Along these lines, Kurt Faßbender, a legal scholar at the University of Bonn, argues in a background opinion article (Frankfurter Allgemeine 2007-06-15): “A closer analysis of the French and Dutch referenda suggests that the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty is the outcome of a principal objection to the ever
increasing scope of EU politics […]. Rationally, this sentiment can only be met with a claim that has been raised for years, namely that the competences of the European Union be given clear boundaries.” In line with this reading of ratification failure and the prospect for a re-launch of the constitutional process, the Frankfurter Allgemeine is consequently also frequent in its application of the elite versus the people frame and of a negative reading of the citizenship/democracy frame. EU constitution making is perceived as problematic because it moves democracy further away from the nation-state.

For the liberal Süddeutsche Zeitung, finally, none of these aspects matter much, at least not in relation to the issue of decision-making efficiency. The decision-making efficiency frame is head and shoulders above the rest in the Süddeutsche Zeitung, appearing twice as often as the second most frequently applied frame. Also this finding closely parallels the interviewed journalists’ welcoming view of supranational integration as something highly beneficial and commendable.

In sum, we can therefore conclude that the observed differences in framing the re-launch of the constitutional process broadly correspond to the respective newspapers’ ideological orientations and views on European integration and EU democracy. But are these findings also supported by a frame analysis of the Swedish debate?

**Frames in the Swedish Debate**

In broad terms, the Swedish debate follows the same pattern with regard to the use of frames by the three different newspapers. Also the Swedish newspapers emphasize different aspects in different ways, underlining that the re-launch of the constitutional process is by no means understood in any uniform way. Three out of the five most salient frames in the German and Swedish samples are nonetheless identical. Also the Swedish newspapers frame the re-launch of the constitutional process foremost as an issue of citizenship/democracy (24%), but also the elite versus the people and the decision-making efficiency frames are applied with high frequency (14% each).

Similar to the German sample, the three Swedish newspapers have distinct preferences as regards which aspects of the treaty reform process are considered most relevant to discuss, and these preferences broadly correspond to the respective newspapers’ political orientations as well as to their views and preferences on European integration and EU democracy. The citizenship/democracy frame certainly plays a large role in conservative Svenska Dagbladet’s coverage (19% of articles), but it is
emphasized considerably more strongly in liberal *Dagens Nyheter* (27%) and social-democratic *Aftonbladet* (25%), i.e. the two newspapers whose interview respondents expressed a stronger preference for postnational democracy. More importantly, *Svenska Dagbladet* tends to apply not least a negative reading of the frame, discussing a sell-out of nation-state democracy rather than any possible democratic benefit of the constitutional project. For Sverker Gustavsson, “[t]he perpetual peace has been bought for the price of a return to the principle of a balance of powers where powers are out of reach for the voters” (*Svenska Dagbladet* 2007-03-22). For *Dagens Nyheter* and *Aftonbladet*, on the other hand, democratic issues come into the picture foremost in that the current treaty reform process does not live up to the same democratic standards as the Convention that drafted the Constitutional Treaty. “The contrast could not be wider,” *Dagens Nyheter*’s EU reporter Ingrid Hedström writes, “to the convention that drafted the EU basic law, a lively debating assembly that in total openness wrote what was meant to be a constitution for the new, enlarged union. Now, it’s back to closed doors” (*Dagens Nyheter* 2007-06-04).

### Table 8.2. Swedish re-launch debate. Most salient frames.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>frame name</th>
<th>SvD</th>
<th>DN</th>
<th>Ab</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td># of art.</td>
<td>% of art.</td>
<td># of art.</td>
<td>% of art.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizenship/democracy</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normative vs. military power Europe</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decision-making efficiency</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elite vs. the people</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“EU superstate”</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Also with regard to other frequently applied frames, the three Swedish newspapers emphasize different aspects as to what is at stake in the treaty reform process. For *Svenska Dagbladet* with its preference for a smoothly
functioning intergovernmental organization with the necessary supranational elements, decision-making efficiency is discussed more frequently (19%) than it is in Dagens Nyheter (15%), whereas the frame is not applied at all in Aftonbladet.\footnote{Aftonbladet's sample for the re-launch debate is very small (12 articles). In addition, nine of the twelve articles are written by the same author (Tommy Svensson), so the numbers presented here must be interpreted with caution.} Similarly, Svenska Dagbladet is less concerned with treaty reform as an elite process carried out against the will of the people than Dagens Nyheter. On this point, Svenska Dagbladet differs somewhat from the German conservative Frankfurter Allgemeine, in which the elite versus the people frame was frequently used in relation to the allegedly excessive supranationalization and enlargement of the EU. While the Frankfurter Allgemeine explicitly argued against further enlargement and took “enlargement fatigue” as a major factor in explaining the French and Dutch referendum outcomes, Svenska Dagbladet decidedly argues in favor of further enlargement.

Compared to the ratification crisis debate, the EU superstate frame played a relatively minor role in the Swedish re-launch debate. It does however appear frequently in Aftonbladet (25% of articles), possibly due to the small size of the Aftonbladet sample. Beyond that, the frame was foremost applied in a rather analytical way, emphasizing that neither the Constitutional Treaty nor the current treaty reform process would result in anything substantially more or different from a “fundamentally intergovernmental cooperation” (Aftonbladet 2007-06-23). Aftonbladet’s prioritized frame is clearly the neo-liberal versus social Europe frame. The frame appears in half of the sampled articles and corresponds to the newspaper’s orientation as a social democratic newspaper concerned with the prospect of a social Europe. In this regard, we also see a clear parallel to the way the re-launch of the constitutional process was framed in the German taz. Aftonbladet is not only the only newspaper in the Swedish sample to apply this frame, but furthermore does so in a strongly advocative way, arguing that those parts of the original Constitutional Treaty that introduced a better balance between social and economic aspects should by all means be maintained in the current reform treaty.

In sum, our frame analysis indicates the Swedish debate broadly addresses similar questions as the German debate, emphasizing in particular issues of citizenship/democracy, decision-making efficiency and EU constitution making as an elite project. These parallels in the two debates indicate a certain measure of Europeanization of meaning structures: not only are the same issues discussed at the same time in the different media spheres,
but there are also convergences in the meanings that are connected to the issue of EU constitution making. In addition, we can discern parallels in the way EU constitution making is framed not only between the two countries, but also between newspapers of similar orientation across countries. Liberal (and to a different extent left) newspapers tend to emphasize different aspects of the constitution-making process than their conservative counterparts. The conclusion to be drawn from this observation is therefore that on the aggregate level, the Swedish and German debates look similar in relation to the frames applied. But more relevantly, these aggregate images are the result also of convergences among newspapers of similar orientation. This indicates that meaning structures in debates on EU constitution making are in fact European(ized). But does this European(ized) character also apply to interactive structures in the debates analyzed?

Permeability: Domestic and Non-Domestic Authors in the Two Debates

Domestic and Non-Domestic Authors in the German Debate

As in the case of the ratification crisis debate, the German sample is once again quite rich in contributions from non-domestic authors (and interviews with non-domestic respondents). To some extent, this is due to the aforementioned supplement that the Frankfurter Allgemeine published on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the Treaties of Rome. For this supplement, the Frankfurter Allgemeine had invited heads of state or government from other EU member states as well as representatives of the European institutions – both domestic and non-domestic – to reflect on the historical achievements as well as the future perspectives for European integration. However, since all of these contributions appeared on the same day (March 23, 2007), conclusions as to the extent to which the German re-launch debate as a whole can be

115 Published on March 23, 2007, the Frankfurter Allgemeine supplement included contributions by Commission President Barroso, Alfred Gusenbauer (Austria), Anders Fogh Rasmussen (Denmark), Bertie Ahern (Ireland), Jan Peter Balkenende (Netherlands), Jean-Claude Juncker (Luxembourg), José Luis R. Zapatero (Spain), Kostas Karamanlis (Greece), László Sólyom (Hungary), Tassos Papadopoulos (Cyprus) and Valdas Adamkus (Lithuania).
considered “transnational” have to be drawn with caution. On the other hand, the high number of contributions by non-domestic authors in the German sample is by no means due exclusively to the impact of the Frankfurter Allgemeine. Of the 117 articles in the German sample for the re-launch debate, 22 are contributions written by or interviews with non-domestic individuals (19%). The share of non-domestic authors/featured speakers is highest in the Frankfurter Allgemeine (22%), but the taz is not far behind (20%), and even the Süddeutsche Zeitung – while displaying the lowest share of non-domestic authors/featured speakers – still scores much higher (12%) than any of the Swedish newspapers.

Table 8.3. German re-launch debate. Most prominent categories of authors/featured speakers, by newspaper.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category of Author</th>
<th>FAZ</th>
<th>SZ</th>
<th>taz</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Own newspaper journalist, EU correspondent/reporter</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own newspaper journalist, politics pages</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own newspaper journalist, editorialist/editor</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government/cabinet, other EU country</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own newspaper, correspondent, other EU country</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public intellectual, domestic</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEP, domestic</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public intellectual, other EU country</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own newspaper journalist, economy pages</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEP, other EU country</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commission/staff, other EU country</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*<em>Total</em></td>
<td>54</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># of non-domestic authors/featured speakers</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of non-domestic authors/featured speakers</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* number of sampled/coded articles in parentheses
Nevertheless, non-domestic authors are strikingly rare in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine* in the period after the Rome Treaties celebrations in March. After March 23, the sample only includes one interview with Czech President Vaclav Klaus, making the newspaper’s record throughout the rest of the sampled period rather weak, not least in comparison to the other two German newspapers. Also the groups of non-domestic authors which appear most frequently in the German debate have to be viewed in this light. EU member state governments are by far the largest group of non-domestic authors in the German sample, due almost exclusively to the *Frankfurter Allgemeine’s* supplement. Yet also the liberal *Süddeutsche Zeitung* emphasizes the voice of non-domestic political actors, in this case represented by Commission President Barroso, the former President of the Convention Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, Tony Blair and the French MP Jean-François Poncet. Only the left-alternative *taz* emerges as a forum for a broader debate involving also the voice of non-domestic public intellectuals as well as one non-domestic journalist. However, this is due at least in part to the Polish-German character of the German debate towards the end of June, in the context of the Polish government’s controversially received square root proposal. Yet all things considered, the *taz* does nonetheless stand out in offering an inclusive forum for this kind of transnational debate. Also this finding therefore corresponds to our normative expectation that transnational debate should be more likely in newspapers that share a preference for more postnational forms of democratic debate on European issues.

To summarize, inclusion of non-domestic authors is at first sight strongest in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine*. Here, however, the transnational element was limited to one single day and furthermore involved only representatives from member state governments as well as from the European institutions. This finding broadly corresponds to our normative expectation towards a newspaper at the intergovernmental/supranational intersection, a view of integration that necessitates information about the views held by other member state governments and to a lesser extent by the European institutions. But since the integration process is by and large in the hands of the member states, democratic opinion and will formation can remain within the nation-state even if decision-making authority is delegated to the European level.

Beyond the *Frankfurter Allgemeine’s* supplement on the Rome Treaties anniversary, transnational debate on the re-launch of the constitutional process was stronger in the liberal *Süddeutsche Zeitung*. Yet also here, the transnational element is limited to political actors from other member states and the European institutions. In other words, transnational debate
in terms of the authors involved looks quite similar in the *Süddeutsche Zeitung* and the *Frankfurter Allgemeine*. Only the left-alternative *taz* emerges as a forum for a broader and more inclusive debate in which also the voice of public intellectuals is heard. Empirically, these findings about the *taz* thus correspond to the normative expectations towards a newspaper with a decidedly postnational view of European integration. Considering the strong belief in supranational integration held by the interviewed journalists of the *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, on the other hand, our analysis of the categories of non-domestic authors in the debate indicates that the normative expectation of a broad and inclusive transnational debate in this sense has not been fulfilled entirely.

**Domestic and Non-Domestic Authors in the Swedish Debate**

In terms of authorship, the Swedish re-launch debate is an exclusively domestic affair. None of the three newspapers published any articles written by or interviews with non-domestic speakers. Instead, the debate is clearly dominated by the journalistic voice (accounting for 76% of all articles), although fairly clear differences can be discerned between the three newspapers as to who writes which form of article. *Svenska Dagbladet* applies a fairly distanced style in its coverage, which finds expression in a large number of analytical background opinion articles written by EU correspondent Rolf Gustavsson. By comparison, only a small portion of *Svenska Dagbladet*’s articles are editorials and/or signed commentaries written by the newspaper’s Stockholm-based editorial staff, indicating that the re-launch of the constitutional process is not as high a priority for the newspaper’s opinion-making journalists as it is for instance for the editorialists of liberal *Dagens Nyheter*. The latter newspaper strikes a balance between on the one hand background opinion articles written by its EU correspondent Marianne Björklund and EU reporter Ingrid Hedström, and on the other hand editorials/signed commentaries written by the newspaper’s editorialists. For *Dagens Nyheter*’s editorialists, the re-launch of the constitutional process is a priority in opinion-making for similar reasons as for *Aftonbladet*. For one, both newspapers criticize the return to intergovernmental treaty reform “behind closed doors” and a departure from the Convention method employed in the drafting of the Constitutional Treaty. But furthermore, *Dagens Nyheter*’s and *Aftonbladet*’s editorialists step forward as advocates of a re-launch of the constitutional process out of a commitment to treaty reform and a strengthening of the democratic quality of EU decision
making. In the case of *Aftonbladet*, finally, a third reason for advocating treaty reform (and thus to play more than a merely analytical role) is a concern that the current treaty reform process may undermine the balance between market and social concerns achieved in the Constitutional Treaty.

Table 8.4. Swedish re-launch debate. Most prominent categories of authors/featured speakers, by newspaper.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category of author/featured speaker</th>
<th>SvD</th>
<th>DN</th>
<th>Ab</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Own newspaper journalist, EU correspondent/reporter</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own newspaper journalist, editorialist/editor</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own newspaper journalist, politics pages</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public intellectual, domestic</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic government/cabinet</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP, domestic, opposition</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commission/staff, domestic</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other, domestic</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>22</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| # of non-domestic authors/featured speakers         | 0   | 0  | 0  | 0     |
| % of non-domestic authors/featured speakers         | 0   | 0  | 0  | 0     |

* number of sampled/coded articles in parentheses

Corresponding to the dominating role of the journalistic voice in the Swedish re-launch debate, the voice of public intellectuals and/or civil society plays only a minor role, as does the voice of the European institutions. However, *Svenska Dagbladet’s* distanced position in the debate is underlined also by the fact that opinion-making on the relaunch of the constitutional process is left largely to external authors, namely to domestic public intellectuals like Sverker Gustavsson or historian Bo Stråth, or to domestic political actors such as Prime Minister Fredrik Reinfeldt.

To summarize, our analysis of the authors in the Swedish debate indicates that even in the complete absence of non-domestic authors in the debate, differences can nonetheless be discerned in the ways in which different
understandings of the importance of EU constitution making result in differing styles of engagement with the topic of the re-launch of the constitutional process. To conservative *Svenska Dagbladet*, the re-launch is no major priority, and neither is a return to a purely intergovernmental mode of treaty reform. Consequently, the newspaper does not engage in any strongly advocative way in the debate, as the low share of opinion-making articles written by the newspaper’s editorialists indicates. For the liberal and left newspapers that have stronger preferences for more (postnational) democracy at the European level, the re-launch of the constitutional process is a high priority, on the other hand. Consequently, they adopt a more engaged, advocative style in their coverage of the process, underlined by a high share of opinion-making articles written by their respective editorialists.

**Transnational Engagement in the Two Debates**

What differences can be discerned between the six newspapers with regard to their respective engagement with domestic compared to non-domestic speakers? Due to Germany’s Council presidency, the German and the Swedish debates contain a high frequency of references to German speakers, such as foremost Chancellor Angela Merkel.

**Transnational Engagement in the German Debate**

In the German debate, all three newspapers are notably more frequent in their references to non-domestic than to domestic speakers, and they are so despite the fact that the prominent role of the (domestic) Council Presidency. On average, more than two out of three references made in the German sample are to non-domestic speakers (69%). The share of non-domestic references is very similar between the left-alternative *taz* (63%) and the conservative *Frankfurter Allgemeine* (62%), but the liberal *Süddeutsche Zeitung* clearly stands out with the highest share of non-domestic references (84%).

Beyond this distribution of non-domestic compared to domestic speakers, the overarching pattern is that all three newspapers are more frequent in applying designative statements in their evaluation of domestic than of non-domestic speakers. In other words, domestic speakers’ claims are
more frequently reported on in a more distanced, news-reporting form than their non-domestic counterparts. Engagement with domestic speakers is thus weaker than engagement with non-domestic speakers, a pattern which can be found in all three newspapers with only minor variations (within 2%).

Correspondingly, negative evaluative statements are more frequently applied on claims raised by non-domestic than domestic speakers, further indicating a higher level of engagement with non-domestic than domestic speakers. In this case, the liberal Süddeutsche Zeitung stands out, displaying the strongest record of engagement with non-domestic speakers: negative evaluative statements are nearly three times as frequent on non-domestic as they are on domestic speakers’ claims. Also by comparison to the left-alternative taz and the conservative Frankfurter Allgemeine, the Süddeutsche Zeitung has a considerably higher share of negative evaluative statements on non-domestic speakers’ claims (20% for the Süddeutsche Zeitung, 14% for the taz, and 11% for the Frankfurter Allgemeine). In a quantitative sense, this finding corresponds to the (empirical) expectation that engagement with non-domestic references should be higher in the left and liberal newspapers that promote postnational democracy. Below, these expectations are qualified through an in-depth look at how the three newspapers engage with the most central speakers in the debate.

Finally, all three newspapers apply definitive statements with much higher frequency in engaging with non-domestic speakers. As in the ratification crisis debates, references to non-domestic speakers are most frequently used to define the meaning of a given situation: the statement made by a quoted speaker is taken to represent or illustrate the situation at large. Even where definitive statements are used in combination with a negative style of evaluation, references to non-domestic speakers thus frequently serve such illustrative purposes. This practice occurs most frequently in the conservative Frankfurter Allgemeine and the left-alternative taz, where close to 60% of statements on non-domestic speakers are definitive statements (compared to 45% in the case of the liberal Süddeutsche Zeitung). Also this indicates a higher level and a more direct form of engagement with non-domestic speakers in the liberal Süddeutsche Zeitung than in the conservative Frankfurter Allgemeine and left-alternative taz.
Table 8.5. German re-launch debate. Statements made on domestic and non-domestic speakers, by newspaper (% in parentheses).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspaper</th>
<th>defin.</th>
<th>design.</th>
<th>eval. +</th>
<th>eval. o</th>
<th>eval. -</th>
<th>advoc. +</th>
<th>advoc. o</th>
<th>advoc. -</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FAZ</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(46)</td>
<td>(28)</td>
<td>(6)</td>
<td>(10)</td>
<td>(10)</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(0)</td>
<td>(0)</td>
<td>(100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>domestic</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(26)</td>
<td>(44)</td>
<td>(7)</td>
<td>(13)</td>
<td>(9)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(0)</td>
<td>(0)</td>
<td>(39)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>non-d.</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(58)</td>
<td>(18)</td>
<td>(5)</td>
<td>(8)</td>
<td>(11)</td>
<td>(0)</td>
<td>(0)</td>
<td>(0)</td>
<td>(62)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SZ</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(45)</td>
<td>(20)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(7)</td>
<td>(19)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(0)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>domestic</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(46)</td>
<td>(23)</td>
<td>(0)</td>
<td>(15)</td>
<td>(8)</td>
<td>(8)</td>
<td>(0)</td>
<td>(0)</td>
<td>(16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>non-d.</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2</td>
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Our analysis of the types of statements made in the German debate therefore suggests that engagement with non-domestic speakers is generally rather high, and that it is highest in the case of the liberal Südwestdeutsche Zeitung. But is this pattern also reflected in the stylistic tools that the newspapers apply in evaluating claims raised by domestic compared to non-domestic speakers?
Table 8.6. German re-launch debate. Evaluations of all domestic and non-domestic speakers, by newspaper (% in parentheses).

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Our analysis shows certain similarities between the left-alternative taz and the conservative Frankfurter Allgemeine. Once again, the liberal Süddeutsche Zeitung emerges as the newspaper with the strongest level of engagement with non-domestic speakers, expressed both in a low share of rather distanced, objective-analytical evaluations (or no evaluation at all), and correspondingly a comparatively high share of polemical-scandalizing as well as to a lesser extent ironic-satirical evaluations of non-domestic speakers. The Süddeutsche Zeitung applies an objective-analytical style in merely 17% of cases (compared to 20% and 40% in the case of the Frankfurter Allgemeine and taz, respectively). Correspondingly, the
Süddeutsche Zeitung applies a polemical-scandalizing or ironic-satirical style on 42% of non-domestic speakers’ claims, compared to 34% in the case of the Frankfurter Allgemeine and only 21% in the case of the taz. In the case of the taz, the qualitative analysis below will show that this low share of negative evaluative styles is closely connected to the apologetic position that the newspaper broadly assumes on the position taken by the Polish government in the treaty reform process. In the case of the Frankfurter Allgemeine, on the other hand, the qualitative analysis below indicates that precisely the rejection of the Polish position can account for the higher frequency of a negative evaluative style in the Frankfurter Allgemeine compared to the taz.

Also these observations indicate that in quantitative terms, the liberal Süddeutsche Zeitung stands out as the newspaper that most strongly engages with non-domestic speakers. This is underlined most of all by the use of a polemical-scandalizing style in evaluating non-domestic speakers: while not a single domestic speaker is evaluated through the use of this style, it is by far the most prominent style in evaluating non-domestic speakers.

How do these findings correspond to a qualitative analysis of the way authors in the different newspapers engage with the most frequently quoted domestic and non-domestic speakers? To begin with, a look at the most frequently quoted speakers in the German sample underlines how strongly the German sample is dominated by references to non-domestic speakers: eight out of the top ten references are non-domestic. The list of the most-quoted speakers in the German sample overall furthermore shows the prominent position not only of the Polish government in general (second, appearing in 15% of articles), but also of other governments that were portrayed as in one way or another problematic in the treaty reform process: the British government in general and Tony Blair in particular, as well as Vaclav Klaus in particular and the Czech government in general. Yet the top reference in the German sample is Nicolas Sarkozy, owing to the high salience of the French Presidential elections in the German debate. The elections were placed very much in the context of EU treaty reform, specifically with regard to the question of the implications that each presidential candidate would have for the treaty reform process.

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116 This number only includes references to the Polish government in general, therefore excluding specific references to either of the Kaczynski brothers or Foreign Minister Anna Fotyga.
Table 8.7. German re-launch debate. Top 3 references, by newspaper and styles of evaluation.

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Only three speakers/actors appear in more than ten percent of the coded articles, namely Nicolas Sarkozy (17%), the Polish government (15%) and Angela Merkel (15%). Nicolas Sarkozy’s role as the (potential) new French President is assessed primarily in relation to the future of European integration and the constitutional process. While all three newspapers are rather negative in their evaluation of Sarkozy’s views and strategies for the future of European integration and the constitutional process, the taz nonetheless stands out in its frequent use of a polemical-scandalizing tone. Foremost, the left-alternative newspaper takes issue with Sarkozy’s take on the notion of a “core Europe”, which is considered to be overly exclusive. Daniela Weingärtner (Brussels) writes for instance: “When the conservative presidential candidate defines the conditions for membership in this new club, it sounds quite exclusive. By no means would it be open to all in the way that the notion of ‘enhanced integration’ provided for in the Constitutional Treaty” (taz 2007-03-29). Moreover, the taz either questions Sarkozy’s commitment to European integration or outright criticizes him for overemphasizing French national interests, accusing him of “protectionist, chauvinist and nationalist”
tendencies (Dorothea Hahn, *taz* 2007-05-16). In this sense, engagement with Sarkozy is particularly strong in the left-alternative *taz*, and corresponds, once again, to the newspaper’s general ideological orientation.

While the Polish government is made a frequent target of critique both in the conservative *Frankfurter Allgemeine* and the liberal *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, the left-alternative *taz* is rather apologetic of the Polish position in the treaty reform negotiations. Most of all, this allows us to understand why we observe a high level of engagement with certain non-domestic actors even in the conservative *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, whose journalists otherwise tend not to view notions of postnational integration and postnational democracy as a normative priority. In the course of the German debate, the re-launch of the constitutional process became at least to a large extent a matter of German-Polish relations particularly in the conservative *Frankfurter Allgemeine* and the left-alternative *taz*. As a consequence, even the conservative *Frankfurter Allgemeine* entered in a practice of engaging with the Polish government, as a high share of negative evaluations underlines. In particular, the *Frankfurter Allgemeine* takes issue (as does the *Süddeutsche Zeitung*) with the Polish government’s and particularly the Kaczynski brothers’ instrumental use of the historical experience of the Second World War as a bargaining tool for increasing Poland’s voting power in the Council of Ministers. “The Kaczynski brothers,” the *Frankfurter Allgemeine*’s Warsaw-correspondent Konrad Schuller argues, “have viewed the Germans as the nation of the skull and bones squads of the SS ever since they were children. Consequently, their only purpose is to prevent at any cost that Berlin becomes too powerful in Europe” (*Frankfurter Allgemeine* 2007-06-17). Yet the critique of the Polish government is every bit as scathing in the liberal *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, whose EU correspondent Cornelia Bolesch writes that “the Polish government is parading the dead,” and that the latter’s “reference to history [...] seems to preclude the possibility of any reasoned compromise” (*Süddeutsche Zeitung* 2007-06-23).

Engagement with the Polish government takes a very different form in the left-alternative *taz*. Here, the Polish square root proposal and the arguments presented by the Kaczynski brothers are met with a rather apologetic position, due in part to the fact that the *taz* is the only of the three newspapers that invites Polish authors to develop their view of the unfolding situation. For instance, the Polish journalist Rafal Wos of the daily newspaper *Dziennik* expresses a certain amount of criticism of the Kaczynski brothers’ rhetoric, but emphasizes a much more objective-analytical approach, offering perspectives that intend to help to
understand the Polish position. “This past year,” Wos explains, “has been a complete crash test in foreign policy. Now we are testing the EU’s limits. Square root or death is a path that stems from a mixture of mistrust and lack of experience. This is where the Kaczynski twins have ended up in a dead-end. Only if you understand all that can you criticize the [Polish] government” (taz 2007-06-21).

While positive evaluations of the Polish government’s position are thus rare in the German sample, the qualitative analysis shows similarities between the liberal Südliche Zeitung and the conservative Frankfurter Allgemeine in applying a more scandalizing tone in their evaluation. The left-alternative taz, on the other hand, is more analytical in its treatment of the Polish government. But even where similarities can be identified between the liberal Südliche Zeitung and the conservative Frankfurter Allgemeine, the Südliche Zeitung is arguably more emphatic in its critique of the Polish position. This would in turn indicate a stronger level of engagement on the part of the Südliche Zeitung, corresponding to the quantitative findings reviewed above.

Finally, Angela Merkel receives a substantial amount of attention in the German media, owing to her double role as German Chancellor and Council President. Particular emphasis is placed on Merkel’s (and her government’s) role in laying the foundation for an agreeable compromise on treaty reform. In this regard, Merkel’s role is evaluated in highly positive terms, although this positive evaluation is confined to the Frankfurter Allgemeine and the Südliche Zeitung, not however the taz.

Transnational Engagement in the Swedish Debate

The Swedish sample is only slightly more domestic in character than its German counterpart, despite the prominent role of the German Council President Angela Merkel (who is counted here as a non-domestic speaker). Similar to the German sample, non-domestic speakers outweigh domestic speakers by a ratio of roughly 3 to 2. However, differences between the three newspapers in this regard are significant. While liberal Dagens Nyheter, very much as we had expected, stands out as in giving voice to the largest share of non-domestic speakers (75%), less than 40% of social democratic Aftonbladet’s references are non-domestic. Conservative Svenska Dagbladet, finally, has a share of about 65% of non-domestic references.
Table 8.8. Swedish re-launch debate. Statements made on domestic and non-domestic speakers, by newspaper (% in parentheses).

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</table>

The ten most frequently quoted speakers in the Swedish sample include three domestic speakers, and the Swedish government appears as the second most frequently quoted actor overall. This may have to do with the characterization of the treaty reform process as having moved beyond the democratic experiment of the Convention and back to a purely intergovernmental mode. In this context, the three Swedish newspapers focus on the role played by and the priorities formulated by the Swedish government. This is furthermore underlined by the prominence of Prime Minister Fredrik Reinfeldt, the 6th most quoted actor, appearing in 10% of
the coded articles. Apart from Swedish domestic speakers, the list of the ten most quoted speakers in the Swedish sample looks rather similar to its German counterpart. Both the Polish government and French President-elect Nicolas Sarkozy are among the top three, and they are accompanied by governments and individual representatives thereof that were portrayed as in one way or another difficult to handle in the treaty reform process: the British government (14%), Tony Blair (9%), Jaroslaw Kaczynski (7%), and Angela Merkel (14%) and the German Council Presidency in general (7%).

As in the German sample, a large share of non-domestic speakers’ claims are met with definitive statements, indicating that non-domestic speakers are referred to for the most part for the purpose of defining a given situation. This element is strongest in the case of social democratic Aftonbladet, where definitive statements are made on close to two thirds of all non-domestic references. But it is also very strong in Dagens Nyheter and Svenska Dagbladet (46% each), attributable foremost to a large number of analytical articles written by the respective newspapers’ correspondents and/or EU reporters. Yet while the use of definitive statements would suggest a rather distanced form of opinion journalism, definitive statements frequently appear in combination with a negative style of evaluation (see below in the analysis of the stylistic tools used in the three newspapers): non-domestic authors are frequently quoted in order to define a negatively evaluated situation.

In liberal Dagens Nyheter, engagement with non-domestic speakers is rather weak in relation to all references to non-domestic speakers. While 42% of domestic speakers in Dagens Nyheter’s coverage prompt a negative evaluative statement from the newspaper’s authors, the same applies to only 10% of non-domestic speakers. At the same time, Dagens Nyheter is much more frequent in evaluating non-domestic speakers in a positive (9%) or neutral way (3%). But even taking this aspect into account, engagement with non-domestic speakers is weaker in Dagens Nyheter than in the newspaper’s left and conservative counterparts. On this point, conservative Svenska Dagbladet strikes most of a balance in its engagement with domestic and non-domestic speakers, offering negative evaluative statements on 18% of domestic and 19% of non-domestic speakers.

How can we account for this low level of engagement with non-domestic speakers in the case of liberal Dagens Nyheter? At least the low frequency of negative evaluative statements in Dagens Nyheter is connected to the role of the German Council Presidency in general as well as with Angela Merkel in particular, both of whom are assessed in highly positive terms.
in Dagens Nyheter. For Dagens Nyheter’s editorialists, the re-launch of the constitutional process is a high normative priority despite claims that the Constitutional Treaty and particularly its drafting process would have been the democratically more suitable alternative. As Henrik Berggren argues, the return to an intergovernmental process of treaty reform “behind closed doors” was a reasonable alternative at least in light of the continued need for institutional reform following the referenda in France and the Netherlands (Dagens Nyheter 2007-05-22). In this context, the initiative taken by the German Council Presidency is commented on in a highly benevolent way, accounting for a high frequency of acclamatory-applauding evaluations on non-domestic speakers. Dagens Nyheter’s EU reporter Ingrid Hedström praises Angela Merkel’s “triumph” in the treaty reform process particularly in relation to her predecessor as German Chancellor, Gerhard Schröder: Merkel, she writes, “celebrated yet another triumph as a European and international leader when she […] accomplished an agreement despite initially tough antagonisms. A major contrast to her predecessor Gerhard Schröder, who was never truly interested in EU politics” (Dagens Nyheter 2007-06-24). But this does not explain the high share of non-domestic speakers whose claims are not evaluated at all (45%). This is in part attributable to the fact that Dagens Nyheter simply offers more information than the other two newspapers: while the number of evaluative statements on non-domestic speakers is almost identical in Svenska Dagbladet and Dagens Nyheter, the latter offers a much greater number of designative statements on non-domestic speakers in addition. In other words, Dagens Nyheter features non-domestic speakers both for informative/representative and for critical/opinion-making purposes. By comparison, the latter aspect is less prominent in the case of conservative Svenska Dagbladet. Overall, Dagens Nyheter refers to non-domestic speakers more often than Svenska Dagbladet and Aftonbladet combined (almost twice as often as Svenska Dagbladet, and almost three times as often as Aftonbladet). Nonetheless, objective-analytical evaluations of non-domestic speakers are only slightly more frequent in Dagens Nyheter (33%) than in Svenska Dagbladet (31%) and Aftonbladet (29%). Nonetheless, conservative Svenska Dagbladet is strikingly active in its engagement with non-domestic speakers, both as regards positive and negative evaluations. Treaty reform and the re-launch of the constitutional process are considered indispensible here as well. Consequently, Svenska Dagbladet’s coverage of the re-launch debate welcomes the role played by Council President Angela Merkel at the same time as it is critical of the roles played by Nicolas Sarkozy and the Polish
government, respectively. *Svenska Dagbladet*’s correspondent in Brussels, Rolf Gustavsson, celebrates Angela Merkel’s leadership skills: “Merkel takes over the political vacuum that was created by the lack of political leadership in Europe in recent years. After a few years’ pause for reflection, Angela Merkel appears as Europe’s savior angel” (*Svenska Dagbladet* 2007-06-17).

Table 8.9. Swedish re-launch debate. Evaluations of domestic and non-domestic speakers, by newspaper (% in parentheses).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SvD</td>
<td>13 (27)</td>
<td>5 (10)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>14 (29)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>2 (4)</td>
<td>15 (31)</td>
<td>49 (100)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>domestic</td>
<td>3 (18)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>4 (24)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>10 (59)</td>
<td>17 (35)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>non-domestic</td>
<td>10 (31)</td>
<td>5 (16)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>10 (31)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>2 (0)</td>
<td>5 (16)</td>
<td>32 (65)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DN</td>
<td>21 (27)</td>
<td>2 (3)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>13 (17)</td>
<td>1 (1)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>8 (10)</td>
<td>32 (42)</td>
<td>77 (100)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>domestic</td>
<td>2 (11)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>8 (42)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>3 (16)</td>
<td>6 (32)</td>
<td>19 (25)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>non-domestic</td>
<td>19 (33)</td>
<td>2 (3)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>5 (9)</td>
<td>1 (2)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>5 (9)</td>
<td>26 (45)</td>
<td>58 (75)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ab</td>
<td>11 (31)</td>
<td>2 (6)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>12 (33)</td>
<td>1 (3)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>4 (11)</td>
<td>6 (17)</td>
<td>36 (100)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>domestic</td>
<td>7 (31)</td>
<td>2 (9)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>4 (18)</td>
<td>1 (5)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>4 (18)</td>
<td>4 (18)</td>
<td>22 (61)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>non-domestic</td>
<td>4 (29)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>8 (57)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>2 (14)</td>
<td>14 (39)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sum, domestic</td>
<td>12 (21)</td>
<td>2 (3)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>16 (28)</td>
<td>1 (2)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>7 (12)</td>
<td>20 (35)</td>
<td>58 (36)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sum, non-domestic</td>
<td>33 (32)</td>
<td>7 (7)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>23 (22)</td>
<td>1 (1)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>7 (32)</td>
<td>33 (64)</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As far as negative evaluations are concerned, polemical-scandalizing (31%) and ironic-satirical evaluations (16%) account here for nearly half of the references made to non-domestic speakers. For the most part, these
polemical-scandalizing evaluations are reserved for Nicolas Sarkozy. Similar to the German newspapers, particularly conservative Svenska Dagbladet devotes space to investigating the implications of a potential French President Sarkozy for European integration and the future of the constitutional process. But polemical-scandalizing evaluations in the case of Svenska Dagbladet are also offered on the Polish government, whose role in the treaty reform process is simply considered to lack cooperative spirit.

Table 8.10. Swedish re-launch debate. Top 3 references, by newspaper and styles of evaluation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>style of evaluation</th>
<th>Polish gov’t</th>
<th>N. Sarkozy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Obj.-anal.</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iron.-satir.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dramat.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polem.-scand.</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advis.-ped.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Popul.-demag.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accl.-app.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No eval.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total # of art.</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of art.</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Polish government is the most frequent reference in the Swedish sample, appearing in one quarter of all coded articles. Interest in the Polish government’s claims is lowest in conservative Svenska Dagbladet (19%), stronger in liberal Dagens Nyheter (27%) and strongest in social democratic Aftonbladet (33%). While Dagens Nyheter and Svenska Dagbladet use a combination of an objective-analytical and a polemical-
scandalizing style in evaluating the Polish government, *Aftonbladet* is the most outspokenly negative in its evaluation, applying only a polemical-scandalizing style and criticizing the Polish government for its “reactionary” position and its practice of “blackmailing” (Tommy Svenson, *Aftonbladet* 2007-04-19) other countries in the treaty reform process.

All three newspapers emphasize the role of the domestic government in the treaty reform process. Engagement with the Swedish government is nonetheless stronger in the conservative *Svenska Dagbladet* and social democratic *Aftonbladet* than it is in liberal *Dagens Nyheter*. This applies both to the number of references made to the Swedish government and to the stylistic tools used in evaluating the Swedish government’s claims. In the case of Nicolas Sarkozy, the third most quoted speaker in the Swedish sample, the two quality newspapers display relatively similar patterns. In both *Svenska Dagbladet* and *Dagens Nyheter*, Sarkozy’s role is evaluated negatively, frequently through the use of a polemical-scandalizing style, most of all in the articles written by *Svenska Dagbladet*’s EU correspondent Rolf Gustavsson. This latter point has to be viewed in connection with some of Sarkozy’s views on the future of European integration and not least on the future of the constitutional process. It is no overstatement to claim that *Svenska Dagbladet* has argued for a widening of an integration process conceived in primarily intergovernmental terms, if necessary even at the expense of a deepening of the process. Most specifically, *Svenska Dagbladet* – as well as the other Swedish newspapers – has throughout the constitutional process argued in favor of Turkish EU membership. Consequently, the newspaper harshly criticizes Sarkozy for arguments to the contrary.

### The German and Swedish ‘Re-launch’ Debates: Transnational Debate?

Our frame analysis indicated that in their ways of making sense of the re-launch of the constitutional project, our six newspapers largely followed cross-country patterns. While the most salient frames used in the Swedish and German debates were similar, the more important finding is that parallels between newspapers of similar orientation across countries were considerably stronger than similarities between newspapers of contending orientation within countries. This finding supports the notion of a Europeanization of meaning structures, yet not in the sense of any one dominant reading of the implications of the constitutional project, but
rather in the sense of a similar set of *contending* readings that are formulated across countries. Liberal newspapers both in Sweden and Germany thus tended to emphasize particular aspects of the constitutional process, while their left and conservative counterparts chose to focus on other understandings instead. This furthermore indicates that the implications of the constitutional project are not perceived narrowly from a national perspective, but much rather from the respective perspective of a given newspaper.

With regard to the permeability of the Swedish and German debates, the German sample is rich in contributions from non-domestic authors (or interviews with non-domestic respondents), while the Swedish sample lacks this element altogether. In this context, we can therefore speak of strong country-specific divergences. Newspaper orientation in this regard mattered neither in the German nor in the Swedish context, although the inclusion of non-domestic authors in the German conservative *Frankfurter Allgemeine* was limited to the occasion of the Rome Treaties anniversary celebrations and was thus more consistent in the liberal *Süddeutsche Zeitung* and the left-alternative *taz*. By contrast, no differences could be discerned among the Swedish newspapers, which did not manage to live up to the normative expectations prescribed by different visions of EU democracy. Conclusions about the (non-)inclusion of non-domestic authors in the respective debates have to be drawn with caution, however. It appears plausible that opinion articles written by non-domestic authors tend to aim for bigger publications in the bigger member states than for smaller newspapers such as the three Swedish newspapers analyzed here. Newspaper size, in other words, may very well matter in inhibiting the prospect for this direct form of transnational communication in daily newspapers.

On the other hand, this factor does not concern our third indicator for transnational communication. With regard to engagement with non-domestic authors, the empirical record by and large matches our normative expectations both in the German case as well as in the cases of *Dagens Nyheter* and *Svenska Dagbladet*. While engagement with non-domestic speakers is strong in all three of the German newspapers, it is strongest in the liberal *Süddeutsche Zeitung*. The latter broadly lives up to our normative expectation that a newspaper at the supranational/postnational intersection would or should enter into a lively practice of engagement also with non-domestic speakers. In the Swedish case, no major differences could be discerned between conservative *Svenska Dagbladet* and liberal *Dagens Nyheter*, both of which engaged similarly strongly with non-domestic speakers. In this sense, we could say that
engagement with non-domestic speakers lives up to our normative expectations in the case of *Dagens Nyheter*, while it may even exceed these expectation in the case of conservative *Svenska Dagbladet*. However, engagement with non-domestic speakers is only weak in social democratic *Aftonbladet*, although even *Aftonbladet* is firm in its polemical evaluation of the Polish government’s role in the treaty reform process.
PART THREE

CONCLUSION
9 Communication and Community Revisited

Introduction
In this concluding chapter, we want to revisit our initial theoretical question in light of the empirical findings of our study. Does the emergence of a shared communicative space in Europe hinge on the prior existence of a thick sense of collective identity, and if not: how can we then conceptualize the sense of “thin identity” or “identity light” that allows Europeans to engage in transnational debate? Our empirical analysis – both the interview study and the media content analysis – has attempted to bring what may otherwise be considered a metaphysical question out of the clouds by suggesting the following: transnational debate may hinge less on communitarian resources than on particular actors in the public sphere. In this study, we have explored whether daily newspapers have actively contributed to providing forums for transnational debate on EU constitution making. In particular, we have explored whether newspapers with a stronger preference for postnational democracy have been more active in this role than newspapers with more pronounced intergovernmental preferences.

General Review of Findings
Our findings have pointed in different directions with regard to the different indicators we have used for transnational debate, namely frames (as an indicator for a Europeanization of meaning structures) as well as inclusion of non-domestic authors (i.e. permeability) and transnational engagement (as indicators for a Europeanization of interactive structures).

Findings: Choice of Frames
Our frame analysis has yielded clear results suggesting that newspapers’ use of frames follows very strong cross-country patterns: newspapers of similar orientation – both as regards general political orientation and
specific orientations on European integration – also apply similar frames in making sense of EU constitution making. The left and liberal newspapers which favor postnational democracy were correspondingly frequent in applying “postnational” frames, such as foremost the citizenship/democracy frame, but also the EU superstate frame in its positive reading, emphasizing the benefits of a clear division of powers between the union and its member states. For the left and liberal newspapers, EU constitution making represented foremost an historic opportunity for making the EU more democratic and promoting the role of the European citizens in EU decision making. Correspondingly, the elite versus the people frame and the negative reading of the EU superstate frame played only a minor role.

For the two conservative newspapers, on the other hand, EU constitution making represented foremost a case of European integration gone too far: it is a project driven by political elites and/or the Brussels-based political class, whose members have demonstrated a stubborn neglect of the will of the people. Consequently, the conservative newspapers tend to frame EU constitution making in terms of its normatively undesirable implications for the nation-state: the EU superstate frame is frequently applied in its negative reading, as is the elite versus the people frame and the adversarial frame.

This finding is not in itself surprising: we may even say that it is common sense that matters of citizenship and democracy are emphasized more in the liberal and left than in the conservative newspapers, and that the latter emphasize the detrimental impact of European integration on nation-state democracy. At the same time, this finding indicates that meaning structures follow much stronger cross-country patterns (ideological patterns, if you will) than is commonly assumed and than the communitarian perspective would suggest. From this perspective, even this seemingly unsurprising finding is highly relevant: the very notion of affectedness is constructed similarly across countries, portraying EU constitution making as affecting liberals as liberals more than Swedes as Swedes.

**Findings: Permeability**

Our second major finding concerns the role of non-domestic authors/featured speakers in the six newspapers. On this count, our analysis suggests a very strong country-specific pattern: inclusion of non-domestic authors appears to have little (or nothing) to do with newspaper orientation. Non-domestic authors appear very frequently in the German
case (even with the partial exception of the liberal newspaper), and surprisingly rarely in the Swedish newspapers. Where differences between newspapers in the same country can be discerned, they are only marginal. We might argue that this could have something to do with the cases selected. The German finality and re-launch debates were characterized by intense French-German and Polish-German debates, respectively. And while also the German ratification failure debate had a strongly French-German and Dutch-German imprint, at least the Swedish ratification crisis and re-launch debates lacked any such transnational element. But are such “case-specific” patterns merely coincidental, or do they say anything more about the likelihood of transnational debate in big, centrally located member states like Germany? And does the Swedish experience, in turn, say anything about the unlikelihood of direct transnational debate in smaller, more recently acceded and also relatively peripheral member states such as Sweden? The dynamics of the analyzed debates in Germany could of course be coincidental: the heated French-German debate following Jean-Pierre Chevènement’s reaction to Joschka Fischer’s finality speech, the Polish-German dispute on the square root proposal in the spring of 2007, and not least the assessment of ratification failure by French and Dutch political leaders and public intellectuals in the spring of 2005. But these instances of transnational debate are too frequent to be dismissed as mere coincidences. The counterargument could be that French, Dutch and also Polish positions (especially after Eastern enlargement) are common points of reference in any German debate on the future of Europe. In this sense, it appears only natural that EU debates are more transnational here than elsewhere. In addition, newspaper size may very well matter in explaining why German newspapers have an easier time attracting non-domestic authors than their Swedish counterparts: for foreign heads of state, it may simply make more sense to publish in the Frankfurter Allgemeine than in Svenska Dagbladet or Dagens Nyheter.

But what role can community play in exploring differences between the German and Swedish newspapers in this regard? Does the higher frequency of non-domestic authors in the German ratification crisis and re-launch debates support the communitarian logic, i.e. that stronger identification with a European community should facilitate transnational communication? If Germans saw themselves more as part of a European community than Swedes do (as Eurobarometer measurements suggest), then we might have reason to believe that the communitarian logic could help us understand such variations in transnational debate. However, our interview study suggested that all newspapers assume a broadly pro-
European perspective. Moreover, our interview study showed that newspaper orientations beyond a simple pro-/anti-European dichotomy follow cross-country patterns: liberal and left newspapers prefer postnational integration, whereas conservative newspapers prefer limiting supranational integration to a necessary minimum. Consequently, the assumption that Germans are more pro-European (and have a more “European identity”) does not correspond to newspaper orientations. Finally, the communitarian logic implies that transnational debate should be difficult to achieve also in Germany: even here, identification with Europe does not amount to a thick European identity that provides Europeans with a sense of community of fate, experience or memory (cf. Kielmansegg 1996).

Findings: Transnational Engagement

The most surprising finding of our empirical analysis concerns patterns of transnational engagement in the six newspapers. These patterns look very different from the empirical expectations formulated at the outset of our study. At the outset, we had formulated that newspaper orientation could be expected to have an effect on transnational engagement, mostly because from a normative perspective, democracy beyond the nation-state also requires democratic debate beyond the nation-state. We had thus expected transnational engagement to be stronger in newspapers with a more pronounced preference for postnational democracy. In turn, we had expected transnational engagement to be weaker in newspapers with clearer intergovernmental preferences. We had expected newspapers with postnational preferences to perform not only a representative, but also a critical function in their engagement with non-domestic speakers. In turn, we had expected newspapers with intergovernmental preferences to perform primarily representative functions in their evaluations of non-domestic speakers. As indicated, this highly linear pattern was not confirmed in our media content analysis. However, newspaper orientation, in combination with the frames used in making sense of EU constitution making, did result in a distinct pattern: all newspapers perform representative/illustrative as well as critical functions. Yet they differ in their choice of which actors are made the target of critique. Newspapers with intergovernmental preferences tend to criticize actors with positions beyond the intergovernmental/supranational intersection, or whose actions jeopardize the historic achievements of European (market) integration (such as foremost Jacques Chirac). Newspapers with postnational preferences, on the other hand, foremost criticize actors
whose positions *fall short of* the postnational/supranational intersection, or whose actions are thought to have contributed to the failure of the constitutional project. Transnational engagement thus follows a strong cross-country pattern after all.

**Figure 9.1. Newspaper orientations, choice of frames and forms of transnational debate**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspaper orientation</th>
<th>Choice of frames</th>
<th>Transnational Engagement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intergovernmental/delegated democracy</td>
<td>Nation-state frames: ✓ Adversarial frame ✓ Elite vs. the people (negative reading) ✓ EU superstate/federal Europe (negative reading) ✓ Decision-making efficiency</td>
<td>✓ Representative purposes: to <em>inform</em> about positions in other member states ✓ Critical purposes: to <em>criticize</em> positions <em>beyond</em> the supranational/intergovernmental intersection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supranational/community of values*</td>
<td>Postnational frames: ✓ Citizenship/democracy ✓ EU superstate/federal Europe (positive reading) ✓ Postnational union</td>
<td>✓ Representative purposes: to <em>inform</em> about positions in other member states ✓ Critical purposes: to <em>criticize</em> positions <em>falling short of</em> the supranational/postnational intersection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supranational/community of values*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postnational/European-level citizenship rights</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*converges on some points with the intergovernmental, on others with the postnational perspective

Our interview study underlined that newspapers have contending perspectives on European integration. This may appear to be common sense, but it is highly relevant to note that these contending perspectives do not relate to fundamental support for or rejection of European integration per se. All six newspapers in our study welcome European integration, yet they differ on what route they would like European integration to take in the future – and by extension what should mark the
finality of European integration, if the latter can or should in fact be defined. Furthermore, our interview study suggested that none of the six newspapers can be said to fall squarely into any one of the three ideal-typical orientations that respondents were presented with (i.e. intergovernmental, supranational or postnational). All respondents rather held that European integration ought to encompass a mix of either (a) intergovernmental and supranational elements, or a mix of (b) postnational and supranational elements. It was mainly between these two camps that differences in orientation on European integration were notable.

As indicated, this was also reflected in the different newspapers’ choice of frames in their coverage of EU constitution making. Once again, this may appear to be common sense, but it runs counter to the conventional communitarian wisdom that suggests that meaning structures should follow national rather than cross-national lines. While newspapers at the intergovernmental/supranational intersection tended to emphasize nation-state frames (e.g. the adversarial frame and the EU superstate frame), newspapers at the postnational/supranational intersection chose rather to frame EU constitution making as an historic opportunity for achieving more European-level democracy. In this context, the decision-making efficiency frame was applied in a more or less neutral way by both camps: even the conservative newspapers at the intergovernmental/supranational intersection tended to emphasize the necessity for institutional reform in an enlarged EU.

These differences in the use of frames, in combination with the newspapers’ general orientations and their particular views on European integration, correspond to specific patterns of transnational engagement. As figure 9.1 indicates, newspapers at the intergovernmental/supranational intersection perform both representative/illustrative and critical functions in their engagement with non-domestic actors. We had expected that critical engagement would here be confined to the domestic arena, but that expectation was not confirmed. Instead, the pattern is that critical engagement is focused on non-domestic actors whose positions go beyond intergovernmental/supranational integration, or whose actions have contributed to jeopardizing the achievements of European integration. In this context, the Frankfurter Allgemeine, but also Svenska...

In an op-ed article published in Sydsvenska Dagbladet on February 27, 2007, Sverker Gustavsson, argued that European integration cannot and should not define its final goal or destination, foremost because it is a problem-oriented organization and therefore cannot know what problems it will be faced with fifty years from now.
Dagbladet, are highly critical of EU constitution-makers for going too far beyond what citizens in the member states find desirable and tolerable. EU constitution making is seen as much more than necessary institutional reform, and represents rather a strike against the still relevant national identities of the citizens. However, European integration does represent a high normative priority – if in fact it remains intergovernmental in character, serving the interests of the member states. European integration is hailed because it provides a “material value added”, because it has provided peace and prosperity to the European continent. Consequently, those who jeopardize these achievements are evaluated polemically, making Jacques Chirac an easy target even in the conservative newspapers: Chirac is viewed to represent a backwards-oriented protectionism that strikes at the core of what Europe is genuinely good for.

In the left and liberal newspapers at the postnational/supranational intersection, transnational engagement also occurs in a representative/illustrative and in a critical form. Critique is here targeted at actors falling short of the postnational positions held by the respective newspapers, i.e. those actors who have compromised the historic opportunity for establishing European-level democracy. Liberal Dagens Nyheter is emphatic not only in its focus on bringing European integration and EU politics closer to the citizens, but also in arguing that EU constitution making marks the end of the age of nationalism. And while polemically remarking that maybe “this was too grand a dream”, the paper scandalizes those non-domestic actors who have compromised such high ambitions. For the two left newspapers, democratic aspects matter as much as “progressive” elements such as the strengthening of workers’ and labor union rights, both of which are achievements thought difficult to achieve again after the Constitutional Treaty’s ratification failed in France and the Netherlands. Consistent with the frames used in making sense of EU constitution making, the liberal and left newspapers are highly polemical in their evaluation of those actors (both domestic and non-domestic) that are thought responsible for compromising the constitutional project.

**Communication and Community Revisited**

The point of departure in this study has mainly been theoretical: is a European public sphere possible even in the presumed absence of a thick sense of European identity? And if this is the case, as the discourse
theoretical perspective suggests, what constitutes that “thin identity” or “identity light” through which Europeans perceive the need for transnational debate?

Our findings lead us into two directions regarding the possibility of transnational debate in a European public sphere. Transnational engagement in its critical form is strong even in newspapers with more or less intergovernmental preferences. In theoretical perspective, this suggests two alternative interpretations: either a thick sense of collective identity is no precondition for transnational communication after all – or enough of a sense of collective identity is already in place for transnational debate to take place even in newspapers that frame EU politics in terms of its implications for the nation-state and its citizens. As we have seen, conservative newspapers are very active in performing not only a representative, but also a critical function as regards the evaluation of non-domestic speakers, calling into question the communitarian presupposition that communication and public spheres depend on the prior existence of a sense of collective identity. Presuming that Europeans actually do lack a strong sense of collective identity, the level of transnational engagement even in newspapers that see no necessity for forums for transnational debate is striking.

Communitarians would argue that transnational debate in Europe is impossible. There is no European lingua franca (Kielmansegg 1996; Kraus 2004), despite Habermas’s objection that the educational system should be able to furnish European citizens with the language skills necessary to engage in deliberation (Habermas 1998: 155). But more importantly, Europeans are held to lack a sufficient understanding of what norms and values constitute them as a community. Overall, communitarians paint a rather bleak picture of the possibility of communication across difference. But why does transnational engagement then occur also in newspapers with intergovernmental preferences?

The key finding in this respect is that transnational affectedness in the Deweyan sense is constructed also in the conservative newspapers: although European integration ought to be controlled by the member states, all member state citizens are equally (or at least similarly) affected by the process’s benefits as well as by its perceived excesses. The internal market is widely hailed as a benefit for all Europeans, while Europeans are also thought to be vehemently opposed to the creation of an ever more centralized political system characterized by what is considered a complete disregard of the identities and identifications of its citizens. In both contexts, engagement transcends national borders even in the conservative newspapers. From a democratic perspective, this is relevant
because it suggests that even in newspapers with intergovernmental preferences, affectedness can create transnational engagement. The European Union exists as a shared legal space, and that in itself creates a need not only for representing the positions of other member states in public debate, but also for engaging and criticizing (or applauding) these positions and thereby contributing to increasingly European interactive structures. Even if no strong sense of European identity exists, the sense of shared affectedness appears to form a sufficient basis for transnational engagement.

On the other hand, our findings regarding transnational engagement could also be interpreted as indicating the opposite: the strength of transnational engagement in the conservative newspapers could be taken to suggest that a thick European identity already does exist as a basis for deliberation in the public sphere. Given that debates about EU constitution making are characterized by a lively practice of transnational engagement even in conservative newspapers, we might also speculate that the assumption of a European collective identity deficit is wrong. As a counter-argument, however, we have to emphasize the way constitution making has been framed in the conservative newspapers. Constitution making was presented foremost as an infringement on national sovereignty and the identifications of member state citizens. Consequently, EU constitution making was foremost discussed in relation to its implications for member-state citizens, strongly suggesting that whatever sense of European community exists is at best thin or complementary.

Regarding the inclusion of non-domestic authors, finally, our study gives reason for a certain measure of pessimism. Our study suggests that large-circulation newspapers in the union’s bigger countries appear to have a much easier time attracting contributions by non-domestic political leaders, public intellectuals, civil society actors and so on. For small-circulation newspapers such as in Sweden, stimulating transnational debate appears in turn to be premised much more on journalistic initiatives such as Project Syndicate, raising doubt as to whether the outlook for direct transnational debate is actually as promising as the German case in itself would suggest. Obviously, the present study is too limited in scope to answer questions about the viability of a European public sphere characterized by a vital cross-border exchange of ideas and opinions also in this regard. What we can say already now, however, is that a shared European communicative space would be very difficult to imagine if strong country-specific differences regarding the inclusion of non-domestic authors were to persist.
Considering all this, where can we locate the European public sphere between communication and community? Our analysis has shown that community does matter in structuring political communication in debates on EU constitution making. For the conservative newspapers, the national community forms the most relevant frame of reference in discussing the implications of the constitution-making process. But even from this perspective, there is an obvious sense of collective affectedness by European-level processes that transcends the national community. Consequently, contestation does not remain within the nation-state, but targets the postnational perspective also beyond the nation-state. For the liberal and left newspapers, on the other hand, the national community is by no means as natural a frame of reference in the constitutional debate. Here, awareness of the collective affectedness of European-level law-making translates also into demands for European-level democracy and citizenship rights. Contestation therefore obviously occurs also with actors beyond the nation-state. All this indicates that community in the communitarian sense does not explain everything in the public sphere/political community relationship. Especially in regard to where democracy is and should be exercised at the European level – and consequently in assessing what is at stake in EU constitution making –, newspaper orientations matter greatly. But they matter not only in framing debates on EU constitution making. Moreover, they matter in determining the forms and targets of critique in transnational engagement. Most importantly, however, we have seen that transnational engagement also occurs on intergovernmental premises. From the perspective of the communitarian preconditions for European public debate, this is a fundamental insight: transnational debate hinges on (socially constructed) affectedness, not on essential notions of cultural community.

Was the chosen methodological approach sensible?

Having formulated these conclusions, we also need to reflect about whether the chosen methodological approach for this study was sensible. Could anything have been done differently, and how would other methodological choices have affected the empirical analysis and the conclusions drawn from it? Two aspects should be emphasized in this discussion.
To begin with, the most fundamental methodological choice in the present study regards the relationship between the study’s theoretical and empirical questions. The study takes its point of departure in a seemingly metaphysical question: how much community does the transnational public sphere require, and how can a sense of community be imagined in broadly post-communitarian terms? This question is addressed by empirical means, namely by exploring whether and to what extent newspaper orientations have any bearing on different elements of transnational debate in those newspapers. These two perspectives – the theoretical and the empirical – can however be argued to be two sides of the same coin.

An alternative approach could have been the following. The study could have taken its point of departure in a theoretically innocent and predominantly empirical question. Under which conditions does transnational debate occur in daily newspapers, the study could have asked, considering the presumed absence of a thick sense of European identity? But empirical questions of this kind are difficult to separate from theoretical questions about the public sphere/political community relationship. At least, such empirical questions have relevant theoretical implications. Our empirical analysis suggests that transnational debate occurs even in the presumed absence of a European collective identity. And if that is the case, then it has implications for the very possibility of a European public sphere based on transnational communicative exchange. A European public sphere then hinges less (if at all) on communitarian resources and quasi-essential notions of Europe as a community of fate than it does on the social construction of affectedness in public debate. From this perspective, the theoretical and empirical ambitions of this study are two sides of the same coin, and it matters only little if the starting point of the analysis is theoretical, empirical, or a combination of both.

Second, we need to reconsider some of the more concrete methodological choices made. What comes to mind is foremost the choice for newspapers and EU constitution making as a case. A certain sense of controversy seems to persist in this regard, but both choices are highly relevant even in hindsight. Newspapers are good place to analyze public debate, simply because they achieve tremendously high visibility and thereby perform one of the public sphere’s key functions, namely to produce publicity. Despite certain elitist connotations, they are therefore highly relevant for analyses of this kind. As far as constitution making is concerned as a case, it is of course pertinent to point out that the constitutional project represents a most likely scenario for transnational debate. When, if not in
this context, can we expect to see transnational exchange about Europe? But at the same time, it is also a least likely scenario. As conservative critics would remark, the stakes in EU constitution making are high not only from the perspective of the future of European integration, but also from the perspective of the nation-state. Why, one might object, should non-domestic perspectives matter in discussions about the ongoing undermining of the sovereignty of the nation-state? From this perspective, EU constitution making is a relevant case particularly because it highlights such tensions how the process can be understood – and how it is framed in newspaper discourse.

On a more critical note, a somewhat different sampling strategy may have been useful. The size of our sample does not constitute a problem in and of itself. Our attempt at identifying quantitative patterns in transnational engagement become useful only beyond a certain critical mass, however defined. However, the inclusion of analytical background opinion articles in the analysis has created certain problems. Many of them contain only relatively subtle opinions. This has of course had an impact on the results of the empirical analysis. Transnational engagement appeared weaker than it would have if the sample had not contained analytical background opinion articles. In this sense, a more exclusive focus on opinion-making articles may have made sense. The problem is that in practice, the distinction between newspaper opinion-making and news-reporting is by no means as clear-cut as one may assume, not even in democratic-corporatist countries and media systems. While we had assumed these differences to be very clear, there were considerable overlaps or intersections between opinion-making and analysis on the one hand, and analysis and news-reporting on the other hand (see figure 9.2). What we were interested in was opinion-making, an element that appears not only in editorials, signed commentaries and op-ed articles, but at least to some extent also in analytical background opinion articles in which the author expresses an opinion on the topic of the article. But considering the implications that the inclusion of such analytical articles had on the empirical results, it may very well have made sense to analyze only articles from the studied newspapers’ opinion pages, i.e. the editorial and op-ed pages.

Of course, even this choice would have come at a price. The initial review of the material available strongly suggested that a significant part of the debate did not take place on the respective newspapers’ opinion pages. In the case of the Frankfurter Allgemeine, we would have for instance missed a vital part of the debate that took place in the paper’s economy pages, where the implications of ratification for the internal market and for
economic and monetary union were discussed – and on quite different premises than in the newspaper’s editorials. Similarly, much of the debate in *Dagens Nyheter* and the *Süddeutsche Zeitung* took place in the respective newspapers’ cultural pages. All these aspects of the debate would have been missed if the analysis had focused narrowly on the different newspapers’ opinion pages. A choice had to be made here, and this study opted for the more inclusive approach.

Figure 9.2. Styles of coverage of EU constitution making in the newspapers studied.

Despite these reservations, the selected newspapers span a range of contending positions not only ideologically, but also in their perspectives of how intergovernmental, supranational or postnational European integration and democracy should be. From this perspective, they appear well chosen for the kind of analysis carried out here. The occurrence of transnational debate beyond such different orientations indicates that the prospect for a European public sphere by no means seems as unlikely as the communitarian conventional implies.

The Road Ahead: From Communicative Freedom to Communicative Power?

To bring this study to its conclusion, we should engage in one final reflection: what have we learned about a European public sphere now that we have established that transnational debate does not hinge on
communitarian resources and that transnational engagement was very lively in three debates during the EU’s constitution-making process? Does this indicate that there is in fact a European public sphere, as an ever growing body of empirical literature has already concluded and will most likely continue to conclude in the future?

There is reason for modesty as regards the conclusions that can be drawn from empirical studies based on media content analyses. One considerable problem consists in the fact that what we are analyzing is communicative processes, but we are not studying whether and to what extent these processes – whether transnational or not – amount to anything in the direction of a European-wide public opinion – at least as a counterpart to what is considered to be public opinion in the member states. More importantly, we are not investigating what impact (if any) such transnational communicative processes have on institutional decision making in the EU political system. From the discourse theoretical perspective, the public sphere as a counterweight to the institutions of the political systems is difficult – if not outright impossible – to separate from the functions it performs. For Eder & Kantner, as we have seen at the beginning of the book, the public sphere’s function is foremost the generation of publicity. For Habermas, democratic politics itself is nothing less than an interplay between the public sphere and the political system: the political system holds administrative power, whereas the public sphere has to produced communicative power to be able to keep the institutions of the political system in check. Only through the generation of communicative power can there be an ongoing exchange between the institutions and the public sphere. To be able to say anything about the existence of a European public sphere, we therefore have to develop methodological tools that will allow us to understand how this interplay works at the European level – or whether it works at all. From this perspective, European public sphere research is still in its infancy. The present study was foremost an empirical investigation into the preconditions for transnational debate beyond communitarian presuppositions. It will have to be followed by an exploration of the democratic contribution that a European public sphere can make. When and to what extent does the European public sphere matter in EU decision making?
References


Fraser, Nancy (1992) “Rethinking the Public Sphere. A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy”, in Calhoun, Craig (ed.) *Habermas and the Public Sphere*. Cambridge, MA: MIT.


**Official Documents**


German Federal Government (2007b) “Declaration on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the signature of the Treaties of Rome”.

Other Newspaper Articles

APPENDICES
Appendix 1   Interview Guide

1. What kind of organization do you see the EU developing into?
The EU is described, alternatively, as (a) a problem-solving entity, (b) a value-based community, or (c) as a rights-based, postnational union. Do any of these views capture how you would describe the EU? Or would you describe the EU as something different?

Characteristics of the EU as a problem-solving entity:
- EU as a functional organization; cooperation and membership based on cost-benefit calculations
- legitimacy based on the EU’s capacity to solve problems effectively

Characteristics of the EU as a value-based community:
- EU as a geographically delimited entity with (at least the potential for) a shared basis in ethical-cultural values
- legitimacy based on appeals to a European collective identity

Characteristics of the EU as a rights-based, postnational union:
- integration process has moved beyond intergovernmentalism to create a need for direct legitimization
- legitimacy based on popular participation and EU citizenship founded on civil and political rights
- “parliamentarization” of the EU, turning the EP into a full-fledged parliament and co-legislator

2. What is it, in your perspective, that constitutes the EU’s democratic deficit?
Is the EU’s democratic deficit a purely institutional matter in terms of the distribution of powers between the EU institutions and the member states? What other aspects have to be taken into consideration? What can be done to “fix” the democratic deficit?

3. How do you reflect about your own role as a journalist in the context of the democratic deficit?
How does reporting/commenting on EU politics affect the democratic deficit? How would you describe the amount of debate on EU politics taking place in your newspaper? When are EU issues considered worth debating in your newspaper?
4. Is there a European dimension to your newspaper’s coverage of EU issues? (optional)
To what extent is there such a thing as “shared European concerns”? Or are all EU issues always “national concerns”? When should EU issues be discussed across countries? When is input from speakers from other European countries relevant or necessary?

5. How important would you say it is that you follow public debates in other European countries?
Do you read newspapers from other European countries? Which ones?
Appendix 2   Code Book

Author of article

Name of author

Own newspaper journalist, editorialist/editor
Own newspaper journalist, EU correspondent/reporter
Own newspaper journalist, politics pages
Own newspaper journalist, cultural pages
Own newspaper journalist, economy pages
Own newspaper, correspondent, other EU country

External journalist, domestic
External journalist, other EU or candidate country
External journalist, other European country
External journalist, other country

Freelance journalist, domestic
Freelance journalist, other EU country
Freelance journalist, other European country
Freelance journalist, other country

Public intellectual, domestic
Public intellectual, other EU country
Public intellectual, other European country
Public intellectual, other country

European movement/Pro-Camp, domestic
European movement/Pro-Camp, other EU country
European movement/Pro-Camp, other European country
European movement/Pro-Camp, other country

No-Camp, domestic
No-Camp, other EU country
No-Camp, other European country
No-Camp, other country

Other civil society, domestic
Other civil society, other EU country
Other civil society, other European country
Other civil society, other country

Domestic government/cabinet
MP, domestic, government/coalition
MP, domestic, opposition
Extra-parliamentary opposition, domestic

Government/cabinet, other EU country
MP, other EU country, government/coalition
MP, other EU country, opposition
Extra-parliamentary opposition, other EU country

Government/cabinet, other European country
MP, other European country, government/coalition
MP, other European country, opposition
Extra-parliamentary opposition, other European country

Politician, other country

MEP, domestic
MEP, other EU country
Commission/staff, domestic
Commission/staff, other EU country
Council representative, domestic
Council representative, other EU country
Other EU institution, domestic
Other EU institution, other EU country

Other

Newspaper
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung
Süddeutsche Zeitung
die tageszeitung
Svenska Dagbladet
Dagens Nyheter
Aftonbladet
Type of Article
Editorial
Signed commentary
Guest commentary/debate article
Background opinion article
Commented interview
Interview
Moderated debate
Book review
Other kind of article

Section
Editorial pages
Op-ed/debate pages
Politics pages
Cultural pages
Economy pages
Other

Triggering Event
The Finality Debate
Fischer speech at Humboldt University, May 2000
Chirac speech at German Bundestag, June 2000
French-German summit, Rambouillet, May 2000
Chevènement remarks on Humboldt speech
Start of French Council Presidency
Finality debate, unidentifiable
Finality debate, other

Ratification Crisis
CT ratification debate/vote in German Bundestag
CT ratification debate/vote in German Bundesrat
French and/or Dutch referendum
British government suspends referendum
Announcement of period of reflection, June 2005
European Council meeting/budget negotiations, June 2005
Start of British Council Presidency (incl. Blair speech at EP)
CT referendum in Luxembourg
Ratification crisis debate, unidentifiable
Ratification crisis debate, other
Constitutional Re-launch
Brussels European Council (March 2007), general
Rome Treaties anniversary celebrations (March 2007)
Berlin Declaration (March 2007)
Blair proposal for minimal treaty reform
French presidential elections
Brussels European Council, June 2007
End of German Council Presidency, June 2007
Re-launch debate, unidentifiable
Re-launch debate, other

Other, not in context of moments
Unidentifiable

Article’s Primary Topic
The Future of Europe
Future or finality of European integration, general
Joschka Fischer’s Humboldt speech, general
Jacques Chirac’s speech at German Bundestag, general
Core Europe (Lamers/Schäuble, Fischer)
Enhanced integration (Fischer, Chirac)
Gravitational center (Fischer, Chirac)
Pioneer group (Chirac)
Federal Europe/EU as a federal state
Intergovernmental Europe
Hybrid Europe/federation of nation-states
Constitutionalization of Europe/competence catalogue
Parliamentarization of the EU
EU enlargement, widening of integration
Deepening of integration
Institutional reform
European identity
European public sphere
EU symbolism
More public debate
Chevènement remarks on Fischer

Constitutional Treaty, Form and Content
Constitutional Treaty, general/unspecified
Constitutional Treaty, form (i.e. constitution or intergovernmental treaty)
Constitutional Treaty, content, general
Constitutional Treaty, democratic implications (i.e. European citizenship)
Constitutional Treaty, constitutional implications (e.g. undermining of the nation-state)
Constitutional Treaty, social implications (including references to “market Europe” and/or “social Europe”)
Constitutional Treaty, institutional implications (i.e. institutional reform)
Constitutional Treaty, elite project
Constitutional Treaty, content other

Modalities/Procedures of Ratification
Ratification, general/unspecified
Ratification in parliament
Ratification by national referendum
Ratification by European-wide referendum

Ratification Failure, Reasons and Consequences
Ratification failure, reasons, general/unspecified
Ratification failure, reasons: domestic politics, role of domestic actors (e.g. refs to Balkenende, Chirac)
Ratification failure, reasons: CT’s implications
Ratification failure, reasons: CT’s social implications
Ratification failure, reasons: CT’s constitutional implications
Ratification failure, reasons: CT’s democratic implications
Ratification failure, reasons: elite project
Ratification failure, reasons: EU enlargement
Ratification failure, reasons: other

Ratification failure, consequences, general
Ratification failure, consequences: continue ratification
Ratification failure, consequences: abort ratification/abandon constitutional process
Ratification failure, consequences: change/renegotiate treaty text (incl. new convention)
Ratification failure, consequences: strengthen role of European Parliament
Ratification failure, consequences: strengthen role of national parliaments
Ratification failure, consequences: period of reflection, Plan D
Ratification failure, consequences: other
EU policies
Internal market
Regulatory policies
Internal and judicial policies
Foreign policies
Union’s finances
Charter of Fundamental Rights
Economic and Monetary Union
Common Agricultural Policy
EU policies, other

EU’s institutional architecture
Council Presidency
European Parliament
Council of Ministers
European Commission
President of European Commission
Union Minister Foreign Affairs
European Court of Justice
European Central Bank
Role of national parliaments
Institutional set-up, other

Aftermath of the Referenda
EU budget reform: general/unspecified
EU budget reform: French agricultural subsidies
EU budget reform: British rebate
EU budget reform: other

Re-launch of the constitutional process
Berlin Declaration/re-launch of constitutional process
Berlin Declaration, content general
Berlin Declaration, content: Christian values
Berlin Declaration, content: Euro/EMU
Berlin Declaration, content: future enlargement
Berlin Declaration, content: social Europe
Berlin Declaration, content: EU constitution/CT
Berlin Declaration, content: other
Berlin Declaration, other (including drafting process)
Reform Treaty, general
Reform Treaty: Mini-treaty (Sarkozy)
Reform Treaty: Minimal/complementary treaty (Blair)
Reform Treaty: “CT plus” (Merkel, Juncker,...)
Reform Treaty, content general
Reform Treaty, Council voting rules
Reform Treaty, Council voting rules, square root proposal
Reform Treaty, content: role of EP
Reform Treaty, content: role of national parliaments
Reform Treaty, content: role and/or composition of European Commission
Reform Treaty, content: CFSP/ESDP/Union FM
Reform Treaty, content: social Europe
Reform Treaty, content: Charter of Fundamental Rights
Reform Treaty, content: other

Domestic politics
Other

Author’s statement on primary topic
Definitive statement
Designative statement
Evaluative statement: positive
Evaluative statement: negative
Evaluative statement: neutral/no evaluation
Advocative statement: for
Advocative statement: against
Advocative statement: neither
No statement made

Author’s style of evaluating article’s primary topic
Objective-analytical
Ironic/satirical
Dramatizing
Polemical/scandalizing
Advisory/pedagogical
Populist/ demagogical
Acclamatory/applauding
No evaluation
Speaker(s) quoted/referred to
Own newspaper journalist, editorialist/editor
Own newspaper journalist, EU correspondent/reporter
Own newspaper journalist, politics pages
Own newspaper journalist, cultural pages
Own newspaper journalist, economy pages
Own newspaper, correspondent, other EU country
External journalist, domestic
External journalist, other EU or candidate country
External journalist, other European country
External journalist, other country
Freelance journalist, domestic
Freelance journalist, other EU country
Freelance journalist, other European country
Freelance journalist, other country
Public intellectual, domestic
Public intellectual, other EU country
Public intellectual, other European country
Public intellectual, other country
European movement/Pro-Camp, domestic
European movement/Pro-Camp, other EU country
European movement/Pro-Camp, other European country
European movement/Pro-Camp, other country
No-Camp, domestic
No-Camp, other EU country
No-Camp, other European country
No-Camp, other country
Other civil society, domestic
Other civil society, other EU country
Other civil society, other European country
Other civil society, other country
Domestic government/cabinet
MP, domestic, government/coalition
MP, domestic, opposition
Extra-parliamentary opposition, domestic

Government/cabinet, other EU country
MP, other EU country, government/coalition
MP, other EU country, opposition
Extra-parliamentary opposition, other EU country

Government/cabinet, other European country
MP, other European country, government/coalition
MP, other European country, opposition
Extra-parliamentary opposition, other European country

Politician, other country

MEP, domestic
MEP, other EU country
Commission/staff, domestic
Commission/staff, other EU country
Council representative, domestic
Council representative, other EU country
Other EU institution, domestic
Other EU institution, other EU country

Other

**Topic addressed by speaker referred to**
*The Future of Europe*
Future or finality of European integration, general
Joschka Fischer’s Humboldt speech, general
Jacques Chirac’s speech at German Bundestag, general
Core Europe (Lamers/Schäuble, Fischer)
Enhanced integration (Fischer, Chirac)
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Pioneer group (Chirac)
Federal Europe/EU as a federal state
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Constitutional Treaty, institutional implications (i.e. institutional reform)
Constitutional Treaty, elite project
Constitutional Treaty, content other

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Ratification in parliament
Ratification by national referendum
Ratification by European-wide referendum

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Ratification failure, reasons: CT’s constitutional implications
Ratification failure, reasons: CT’s democratic implications
Ratification failure, reasons: elite project
Ratification failure, reasons: EU enlargement
Ratification failure, reasons: other

Ratification failure, consequences, general
Ratification failure, consequences: continue ratification
Ratification failure, consequences: abort ratification/abandon
constitutional process
Ratification failure, consequences: change/renegotiate treaty text (incl. new convention)
Ratification failure, consequences: strengthen role of European Parliament
Ratification failure, consequences: strengthen role of national parliaments
Ratification failure, consequences: period of reflection, Plan D
Ratification failure, consequences: other

EU policies
Internal market
Regulatory policies
Internal and judicial policies
Foreign policies
Union’s finances
Charter of Fundamental Rights
Economic and Monetary Union
Common Agricultural Policy
EU policies, other

EU’s institutional architecture
Council Presidency
European Parliament
Council of Ministers
European Commission
President of European Commission
Union Minister Foreign Affairs
European Court of Justice
European Central Bank
Role of national parliaments
Institutional set-up, other

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EU budget reform: other

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Berlin Declaration, content: EU constitution/CT
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Reform Treaty: Minimal/complementary treaty (Blair)
Reform Treaty: “CT plus” (Merkel, Juncker,...)
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Reform Treaty, content: role of national parliaments
Reform Treaty, content: role and/or composition of European Commission
Reform Treaty, content: CFSP/ESDP/Union FM
Reform Treaty, content: social Europe
Reform Treaty, content: Charter of Fundamental Rights
Reform Treaty, content: other

Domestic politics
Other

**Type of Statement Made**
Definitive statement
Designative statement
Evaluative statement: positive
Evaluative statement: negative
Evaluative statement: neutral/no evaluation
Advocative statement: for
Advocative statement: against
Advocative statement: neither
No statement made

**Reference’s style of evaluation**
Objective-analytical
Ironic/satirical
Dramatizing
Polemical/scandalizing
Advisory/pedagogical
Populist/demagogical
Acclamatory/applauding
No evaluation

**Author’s statement on reference**
Definitive statement
Designative statement
Evaluative statement: positive
Evaluative statement: negative
Evaluative statement: neutral/no evaluation
Advocative statement: for
Advocative statement: against
Advocative statement: neither
No statement made

**Author’s style of evaluating reference’s view**
Objective-analytical
Ironic/satirical
Dramatizing
Polemical/scandalizing
Advisory/pedagogical
Populist/demagogical
Acclamatory/applauding
No evaluation

**Frames**
Heroic frame
Elite versus the people
Big MS versus small MS
New MS versus old MS
Blame game/Brussels bashing
Business as usual/no crisis
Compromise, best possible solution
Lack of/need for leadership
Europe in crisis/need for fresh start
EU superstate; supranational/federal versus intergovernmental Europe
Postnational union
Decision-making efficiency
Citizenship/democracy
Deepening versus widening
Neo-liberal/market versus social Europe
Appendix 3  Examples of coded quotations

Example 1
“Ett nej till Chirac” (“A no to Chirac”)
Source: Aftonbladet May 29, 2005.

“It’s about the future of your children, said President Chirac in a televised speech which was meant to convince French voters to say yes to the EU treaty. Maybe he was thinking more of his own future. Hardly any European leader has as low popular support than the right-wing President. He and his government have failed completely in terms of economy and employment. Protests have been staged throughout the country, led by researchers, workers, high school students.”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Speaker’s name</th>
<th>Jacques Chirac</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Category of speaker</td>
<td>Government/cabinet, other EU country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Topic</td>
<td>Constitutional Treaty, general</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of statement made (by speaker)</td>
<td>Advocative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Style of evaluation used (by speaker)</td>
<td>Advisory-pedagogical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of statement made (by author)</td>
<td>Evaluative-negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Style of evaluation used (by author)</td>
<td>Ironic-satirical</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
“Despite his conservative party membership, Juncker has a reputation for caring about social concerns. He is therefore painfully aware of the fact that the neoliberal Commission will be able to trump the weakened Council of Ministers in the future and act much more unrestrained. ‘We continue to believe that a good and effective answer to accelerated globalization can only be found at the European level,’ he said with a hint of spite on the night of the referenda.”

Example 2
“Motor stottert, Fahrt geht weiter” (“Engine studders, ride continues”).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Speaker’s name</th>
<th>Jean-Claude Juncker</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Category of speaker</td>
<td>Council representative, other EU country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Topic</td>
<td>Constitutional Treaty, social implications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of statement made (by speaker)</td>
<td>Advocative for</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Style of evaluation used (by speaker)</td>
<td>Advisory-pedagogical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of statement made (by author)</td>
<td>Evaluative-positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Style of evaluation used (by author)</td>
<td>Acclamatory-applauding</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 4   Examples of frames

The heroic frame

Positive reading:
“A no in France and Holland would be the beginning of a completely new chapter in the history of the EU. By European standards, the union is a fairytale-like success. But just when it has reached the peak of its development, after our continent’s first peaceful unification of ever, the project is rejected by the citizens.”
Source: “Fråga inte vad EU kan göra för dig” (”Ask not what the EU can do for you”), Dagens Nyheter, May 29, 2005.

Negative reading: Not applicable.

The elite versus the people frame

Positive reading: Not applicable.

Negative reading:
“The treaty benefits an elite of politicians and lobbyists who prefer quick and efficient decision making in a closed circle to dealing with parliaments and public opinions. Because the treaty strengthens institutions like the Commission, whose members are not elected by any sovereign, by any people, and it gives the final say to the Council. Parliaments need not even be asked prior to military operations.”

The adversarial frame

Positive reading: Not applicable.

Negative reading:
“The European terrain is [...] undermined by the contending interests of wealthier and poorer, bigger and smaller, older and younger member states. Even the myths of contradictory national histories drive deep wedges. Politicians have had their reasons for steering clear of any public debate over the goal of European integration.”

Source: „Über die Köpfe hinweggerollt“ (“Rolled away over people’s heads”), Süddeutsche Zeitung, June 6, 2005.

The blame game frame

Positive reading: Not applicable.

Negative reading:
“The second, and at its core political cause of this EU malaise can be diagnosed as the chronic schizophrenia of its national leaders: After every summit, Gerhard Schröder, Jacques Chirac or Wolfgang Schüssel announce the successes they have reached – sometimes with, sometimes against their partners. But when the time comes to implement the own EU decisions at home, the perpetrator becomes the victim: All of a sudden, whatever ‘those over there’ in Europe have decided is entirely unknown or outrageous. No previous chancellor has managed as well as Schröder has to stage himself as a musketeer against Brussels’ alleged foreign rule. But it is Europe that will have to pay the price for this blame game.”

**The compromise/best possible solution frame**

**Positive reading:**
“In reality, this document is neither much more nor much less than the currently attainable compromise between those who strive for a politically integrated Europe and those who basically want no more than a ‘de luxe free trade area’. It contains some new and many modified old rules with the help of which a union of 25 or more members is to remain capable of decision making and action. At the bottom, the constitution is a continuation of the status quo – a more or less successful adjustment to the changed Post-Cold War realities. But it certainly will not go down in history as the document whose acceptance or rejection sealed the fate of Europe.”

**Source:** “Ausflug nach Utopia” (“Road trip to Utopia), Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, May 1, 2005.

**Negative reading:** Not applicable.

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**The ‘business as usual’ frame**

**Positive/neutral reading:**
“Yes, the EU would enter a turbulent phase, a phase of uncertainty in the event that the Constitutional Treaty – which in part points in the right direction, but is pretty unreadable as a whole – should fail first in France and then possibly in the Netherlands. A lot of things would come to a standstill. But a ‘no’ would be no disaster subjecting the union to the forces of disintegration. [...] A French no would certainly have consequences – but it would not mean the end for ‘Europe’.”

**Source:** “Signal! Signal?”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, May 28, 2005.

**Negative reading:** Not applicable.
The ‘Europe in crisis’ frame

“The political project that has provided Europe with half a century of peace and prosperity is in a deep crisis. A critique of aspects of European integration – ranging from agricultural policy to monetary union – has always been there, but it was always weakened by consent to the enterprise’s overarching idea. That has changed in recent years: Today, we don’t complain about this and that anymore, but rather ask questions as to whether the European Union has gone down the wrong path and is developing into a flawed construction.”

Source: “Ausflug nach Utopia” (“Road trip to Utopia), Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, May 1, 2005

The lack of leadership frame

Positive reading: Not applicable.

Negative reading: “Why does [globalization] turn out like this? What’s the good in this development, apart from the problems that it also causes? And what kind of decisions, laws, frameworks and reforms are necessary in order for the transition to – and existence in – the new [constellation] to be characterized by security and predictability? To provide answers to such questions is one of the greatest challenges to the political leaders of the West in today’s situation. As long as these questions remain unanswered, the people will take every opportunity to take a swing at their elites, for instance in any referendum, regardless of the issue. Not because of the matter at hand, but rather because of the lack of leadership.”

Source: Hör väljarnas rop på hjälp, Svenska Dagbladet, June 20, 2005
The EU superstate/federal vs intergovernmental Europe frame

Positive reading:
“The concern that the constitution could turn the European Union into a centralist superstate is thus unfounded. The EU member states each have their own history, their own culture and their own vision of the future. Their interplay bears many similarities a kaleidoscope: Time and again, new patterns emerge, but they always create a harmonious whole. The constitution is not the European Union’s final destination, but rather marks a new, a common departure.”

Source: „Ja zum europäischen Traum“. ("Yes to the European dream"), Süddeutsche Zeitung, May 12, 2005.

Negative reading:
“The goal [has to be] all-European cooperation. The EU of the political elites does not have the support of the people. A European cooperation is necessary, but in a different way to previously. There is a chance to build a different Europe once thoughts of a union have been shelved.”

Source: ”Ompröva EU:s statsbygge” ("Re-assess the EU’s state construction"), Svenska Dagbladet, May 31, 2005.

The postnational union frame

Positive reading:
“The cosmopolitan Europe that I envision is not about a ‘harmonization’ or a Europe that confuses unity with alignment. This cosmopolitan Europe rests first of all on differences, on the recognition of the existence of different identities, on the fact that there are different paths to modernity […]. We travel at different speeds, we have different traditions in art and culture, in literature as well as in cooking. We Europeans love to be different. Why should we not dismiss the uniform Europe, a yes-Europe that we have to say no to in order to defend the Europe we love. Differences are not the problem, but much rather the solution.”

Source: ”Att säga nej är europeiskt” ("To say no is European"), Dagens Nyheter, June 20, 2005.

Negative reading: Not applicable.

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The decision-making efficiency frame

Positive reading
“This constitutional treaty would have extended EU competences only insignificantly. Beyond that, it would have left the basic political and constitutional structures of the member states untouched. It have merely have changed the political-institutional system so as to facilitate the painstaking decision-making processes in the EU-25+.”


Negative reading: Not applicable.

The citizenship/democracy frame

Positive reading
“Despite its shortcomings, the treaty aimed at more transparent decision-making processes. It inscribed important social and human rights. It expanded labor union rights. And it facilitated the possibilities for enlargement. These ambitions are now shattered. Some parts can possibly be rescued when the heads of state and government start searching the ruins following the French referendum. But the thought that a new treaty would be more progressive is illusory: The EU is dominated by the political right.”


Negative reading
“[Hans Alldén] does not have to ability to see that more power to a weakly legitimized European Parliament in practice means less power to the much more deeply legitimized national parliaments. The new voting rules would particularly weaken the influence of small states.”

The deepening versus widening frame

Positive reading
“At the same time, reason tells us that there are limits for how big the differences can be that can be accepted in a union, and that we need a framework for handling the differences that make Europe lovable.”

Source: ”Att säga nej är europeiskt” (“To say no is European”), Dagens Nyheter, June 20, 2005.

Negative reading
That European integration is no longer accompanied by confidence, but rather evokes doubt, if not fear, has to do not least with the contradiction that the EU is willing to give itself a constitution while seeming unable to set boundaries for itself – geographically as well as politically. But there cannot be any ‘inside’ that does not distinguish itself from any ‘outside’. Turkish accession would quite simply overburden the self-understanding of most Europeans. [...] It is ludicrous to argue that Europe [...] would be forced by Turkey’s accession to become a global political actor. Whoever expects such delusions of grandeur of the Europeans and still mocks ‘yesterday’s cuddly Europe’ (Verheugen) ought not to be surprised if the audience refuses to take part in this play and leaves the room.”

The neo-liberal/market versus social Europe frame

Positive reading
“Briefly put, it is about wishing away a united Europe as well as the ‘negative effects’ of any further globalization. And about closing one’s eyes to the fact that it is through the same processes that positive values are created. The line of [the Swedish Trade Union Confederation] has been a dominant topic within the French no-camp, which has strived for a more ‘social Europe’. That hits home. That the constitution contributes rather than takes something away in this respect does not matter. The EU comes across as a vandal in the French welfare state”.

Source: "Europas känsla av främligskap” (“Europe’s feeling of estrangement”), Svenska Dagbladet, May 28, 2005).

Negative reading
In arenas like the European social forum, resistance is growing against the project’s neo-liberal content. In the spring, justice and labor union movements managed to mobilize against the Commission’s ultraliberal services directive. In France, the labor unions and Attac now have a voice for a progressive no to the constitution – a no that at least has the opportunity for a new development.

Source: "Nejsidan växer. Man borde ta deras argument på allvar” (“The no-side is growing. Their arguments should be taken seriously”). DN May 27, 2005.
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Altwegg, Jürg. „Auf geht’s, Joschka!“, FAZ 2000-05-27.
Kemmerer, Alexandra. „Und was kommt jetzt?“, FAZ 2000-06-20.
Nonnenmacher, Günther. „Mehr Mut“, 2000-06-29.
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Vaubel, Roland. „Die Macht der europäischen Mehrheiten“, FAZ 2000-06-17.

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Ulrich, Stefan. „Europas Verfassung“, SZ 2000-07-01.

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Hahn, Dorothea. „Der Motor stottert“, taz 2000-06-09.
Herre, Sabine. „Visionäres Europa“, taz 2000-06-03.
Weingärtner, Daniela. „Deutsches Gewicht im Blick“, taz 2000-06-10.

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Altwegg, Jürg. „Das Nein aus dem Netz“, FAZ 2005-06-03.
Altwegg, Jürg. „Der dritte Mord am Baron“, FAZ 2005-07-23.
Bacia, Horst. „Wer sind die Geohrfeigten?“, FAZ 2005-06-03.
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Doehring, Karl. „Prüfet alles“, FAZ 2005-06-06.
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Frankenberger, Klaus-Dieter. „Aufstand in Europa“, FAZ 2005-06-03.
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Frankenberger, Klaus-Dieter. „Brüssel“, FAZ 2005-06-16.
Richter, Emanuel. „Das Gute behaltet“, FAZ 2005-06-06.
Ross, Andreas. „Im Banne Pim Fortuyns“, FAZ 2005-06-04.
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Hagelüken, Alexander. „In der Haushalts-Zange“, SZ 2005-06-17.
Harprecht, Klaus. „Liebe Freunde!“, SZ 2005-05-03.
Hesse, Martin. „Politik und Währung“, SZ 2005-06-02.
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Kornelius, Stefan. „Der Krisen-Kontinent“, SZ 2005-06-03.
Kläsgen, Michael. „Macht, was ihr wollt“, SZ 2005-06-03.
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Piper, Niklaus. „Euro-Hysterie“, SZ 2005-06-03.
Rubner, Jeanne. „Führung für die Lahmen“, SZ 2005-06-06.
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Ulrich, Stefan. „Der Beitritt der Bürger“, SZ 2005-06-16.
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Aherne, Bertie. „Impuls unserer Entwicklung“, FAZ 2007-03-23.
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Klaus, Vaclav. „Die Frage der Stimmengewichtung ist nicht entscheidend“, FAZ 2007-06-20.
Kohler, Berthold. „Das polnische Menetekel“, FAZ 2007-06-25.
Leithäuser, Johannes. „Dramaturgische Diskretion“, FAZ 2007-03-27.
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Hahn, Dorothea. „Heikles Thema Europa“, taz 2007-05-16.
Lesser, Gabriele. „Angie muss sich warm anziehen“, taz 2007-03-16.
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Weingärtner, Daniela. „Suche nach der verlorenen Mitte“, taz 2007-03-29.
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