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Published in:
国史研究参阅资料

2007

[Link to publication](#)

Citation for published version (APA):

Schoenhals, M. (2007). 国外当代中国史研究的现状与特点—浅论今日欧洲“文革学”的几本新作. *国史研究参阅资料*, 356, 49-64.

Total number of authors:

1

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
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国外当代中国史研究的现状与特点— 浅论今日欧洲“文革学”的几本新作

Michael Schoenhals (瑞典)

The year 2006 saw the fortieth anniversary of the beginning of the “Great Cultural Revolution” come and go in relative silence. Only a handful of conferences and scholarly gatherings on the subject were organized. Given the historical significance of the event – not just in China, but internationally – one might have had a reason to expect more, yet there was surprisingly little. Which is not to say that Mao Zedong’s “mother of all mass movements” has ceased to arouse the curiosity of historians. In Europe, younger Sinologists have begun to turn their attention to it in ways that in the past were simply not possible: they are treating it as the subject of archival research and systematic “oral history” work with participants, aiming to produce new analyses, alternative accounts, and radically different narratives. Their formative years having occurred rather more recently, their imaginations are not any longer constrained by the Cold War paradigm that defined “normal-scientific research” and writing in the 1970s and 80s.¹ In 2006, they may not have made a visible contribution to any “commemorative” event per se, but a number of fairly recent PhDs from continental and northern Europe have ended up publishing work since the end of the 1990s that may well in the long run prove to be far more important and influential than any one-off media event “in memory of...”. On the assumption that this work is a lot less well known to a Chinese audience than, say, what is currently appearing in print in the United States, Japan, Hong Kong or the island



Overview of European research on Cultural Revolution (revised speaking notes) delivered in Chinese at the CASS Contemporary China Research Institute, Beijing, on 21 April 2006 and published in (see image above) the institute’s *Reference Reading Materials on National History*, No. 356, October 2007, pp. 49–64.

¹ The term “normal-scientific research” is borrowed here from Thomas S. Kuhn’s classic *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), p. 24, where it is defined as an “enterprise... directed to the articulation of those phenomena and theories that the paradigm already supplies.”

of Taiwan, I have decided to make it the focus of my talk today and to embark upon what could also be described as a string of extended book-reviews. Because, as it happens, I am talking here not about individual articles, but about some quite hefty and substantial scholarly monographs.

Women in the Cultural Revolution: Discourse and Memory

German Sinologist and political scientist Nora Sausmikat's analysis of the "life stories" of Chinese women in the Cultural Revolution appeared in 2000 (in German) under the title *Cultural Revolution, Discourse, and Memory*.² Presently a professor in the Institute of Asian Studies, Duisburg University, she is the founder of the so-called "Cultural Revolution Round Table" in Berlin, and her expertise ranges from modern social, cultural, and political history to gender and revolution and development policies in Asia. Before and after publishing *Cultural Revolution, Discourse, and Memory* in German she also published articles on the same general subject in English in edited collections appearing in the United Kingdom and the United States.³

Marred by some unfortunate mistakes of a purely factual nature in the first part – in essence an attempt to chronicle the Cultural Revolution with the collective fate of the *lao san jie* "red guard" generation as a focus – *Cultural Revolution, Discourse, and Memory* picks up speed when the author gets to the second part in which she is able to engage in what is clearly the intellectual enterprise in which she feels most comfortable, namely discourse analysis. Subtitled "the State and the Myth of a Generation," part two traces the increasing rigidity of the one-dimensional quality of PRC interpretations of the Cultural Revolution since the spring of 1989 (in particular interpretations of high-level conflicts and, as it were, more "sensitive" political aspects). Having done that, it turns the reader's attention to a field of Chinese writing that to some extent has remained unaffected – the literature by and about the *lao san jie* and the Cultural Revolution's so-called "sent down educated youths." Selecting a few prominent themes recurring in this literature, Sausmikat proceeds to discuss it with insight and sensitivity to detail, carefully avoiding the temptation to "explain" by way of the imposition

² Nora Sausmikat, *Kulturrevolution, Diskurs und Erinnerung: Eine Analyse lebensgeschichtlicher Erzählungen von chinesischen Frauen* (Frankfurt a.M.: Peter Lang, 2000).

³ Nora Sausmikat, "Female autobiographies from the Cultural Revolution: returned *xiaxiang* educated women in the 1990s," in Frank Pieke and Hein Mallee, eds., *Internal and International Migration: Chinese Perspectives* (Richmond, Surrey: Curzon Press, 1998), pp. 297–314; Nora Sausmikat, "Resisting Current Stereotypes: Collective Stigmata and Patterns of Individual Positioning in Autobiographical Accounts of former Rusticated Women," in Woei Lien Chong and Lowell Dittmer, eds., *China's Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution: Master Narratives and Post-Mao Counternarratives* (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002), pp. 255–83.

of crude super-ordinate categories where none are readily to be found. The publication in 1990 of the *Beidahuang fengyun lu (Record of Stormy Times in the Great Northern Wilderness)* is given due prominence as an event which temporarily elevated the now partially mythologized experiences of the *lao san jie* to cult status; it is followed by her discussion not merely of fiction but a broader range of sources. The final sections of part two sets the stage for the introduction, in part three, of the core substance of the book, that of the gendered stories and memories of women – and their recurrent themes of violation, heroism, pathologies, strength, revolution, the self and the female body.

Part three of *Cultural Revolution, Discourse, and Memory* is devoted to three different women's life-stories from the Cultural Revolution as told to the author during her research in China. The structure here is one of a running commentary, in which extended transcripts are followed by attempts at interpretation and at providing the link between the stories and what has been theorised in the earlier parts of the book. What the commentary and analysis sets out to do on one level is simply show how and where the dominant discourse influences the women as they recall their experiences in the Cultural Revolution, tell their stories, and are heard by the recording foreigner. On another level, it also provides testimony to the ability of each story-telling subject to fashion, within the parameters defined by the discursive setting, a meaningful past.

As for the stories, they are those of ms Chong, from an elite PLA family, labelled an active counter-revolutionary in 1968, but quickly rehabilitated, now a business woman – her life an attempt to show that "at first, the Cultural Revolution was all-right, only later did it turn chaotic"; of Ms Luo, from common cadre background, sent from Beijing to work in a factory on the Shaanxi-Hebei border as a teenager, married while there, finally able after twenty years to return to the capital in 1991 – her story one of a life "on hold" for too long, of striking roots in a "backward" part of China while at the same time pretending not to; and of ms Hao, her story certainly striking this reviewer as the most fascinating one all, at least from an alternative Red Guard-politics perspective. The graduate of an elite middle school in Beijing, the young ms Hao (single to this very day) seemingly "did it all" but insists she got little if anything out of it in the end, other than the conviction that her activism had mostly been a "misunderstanding."

Chinese readers are perhaps unlikely to approach this book as if it were a mine of historical “data”. However, if they turn to it in search of inspiration for their own analyses and driven by a concern with memory processes, alienation, invention and forgetting, with personal narrative strategies in a politically charged context – then they will be amply rewarded by what they find between its covers. It is an excellent example of the new kind of scholarship on the Cultural Revolution that is finding a growing audience in Europe, bridging the gap between traditional Sinology and such relatively new fields as gender studies and discourse analysis.

Master Narratives and Counter-Narratives

The last few years has seen not merely the publication of a number of monographs, but of important anthologies as well, on the Cultural Revolution in North America and Europe. The best is undoubtedly *The Chinese Cultural Revolution as History* which appeared at the start of this year, with outstanding contributions by a handful of younger scholars (including from China) working from archive materials on subjects like the movement to “destroy the Four Olds,” the Jiang Qing “model” village of Xiao Jin Zhuang, and science on its own terms in the Cultural Revolution.⁴ Ultimately less satisfying as a scholarly work, but very much worth reading all the same is the edited volume *China’s Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution: Master Narratives and Post-Mao Counternarratives*, edited by Woei Lien Chong, lecturer in contemporary Chinese philosophy and cultural criticism at Leiden University, the Netherlands, and former chief editor of *China Information: A Journal on Contemporary China Studies*.⁵

Billed as an attempt to “move away from the study of China’s ‘Cultural Revolution’ as a purely political event,” this collection of ten essays by authors from the Netherlands, Germany, the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Australia, and the United States, focuses on what the editor in her preface identifies as the “constructed ‘master narrative’” of the Cultural Revolution – a narrative, she explains, with a content that “cannot be officially challenged without jeopardizing the legitimacy of the CCP itself.” The “post-Mao counternarratives” in the title of the collection are the actual discursive moves “away,” as undertaken by the individual authors. As one savours some four hundred pages of inquiries into demonological

⁴ Joseph W. Esherick, Paul G. Pickowicz, and Andrew G. Walder, eds., *The Chinese Cultural Revolution as History* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006).

⁵ Woei Lien Chong, ed., *China’s Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution: Master Narratives and Post-Mao Counternarratives* (New York & Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002).

paradigms, changing features of Mao Zedong Thought, religious imagery and practices, literary conventions, philosophy, and private narrative strategies, one develops a subjective “feel” for what the counternarratives are about. In the end the problem becomes one of understanding how they all relate to events that are known to actually have taken place in China in 1966–76. Empirical knowledge turns out to be of limited use in dealing with the grander claims made by about half of the contributors to *China’s Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution*.

Dutch Historian Barend J. ter Haar’s contribution on the political impact of traditional demonological paradigms on political practice under Mao Zedong is a fascinating, thought-provoking piece that will be warmly welcomed by students of the Cultural Revolution. Australian Mao-scholar Nick Knight’s impressive analysis of the CCP Chairman’s writings argues convincingly that the Cultural Revolution signalled the *demise* of Mao Zedong’s utopianism. Mao launched the Cultural Revolution at a point when, in Knight’s words, his “transition from optimism to pessimism was complete. And all that remained was struggle.” This seemingly counter-intuitive assertion has a lot going for it, and it would be interesting to see it developed more fully in a wider discussion of cultural revolution as a pre-emptive counter-offensive against perceived revisionist threats. Dutch Sinologist Stefan R. Landsberger’s contribution on the deification of Mao is a fine companion piece to ter Haar’s, accounting in meticulously researched detail for the variant ways in which through images, symbols, and rituals, the same Mao who launched a Cultural Revolution to destroy “old ideas, culture, customs, and habits” ultimately ended up, once it was history, “inducted into the ranks of the mythical and legendary Chinese leaders of all times.”

German Sinologist Natascha Vittinghoff contributes a review of three stage dramas about sent-down youths to *China’s Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution*: in these dramas she identifies powerful counternarratives endowed with “model” status. Chinese theatre, she writes, was an arena where the disillusionment with Maoist ideals was powerfully expressed in the late 1970s and early reform era. Given this fact, she notes, it is surprising that the treatment of Red Guards on stage hitherto has been largely ignored by academics, be it by social historians or by those who study and write about the performing arts. Vittinghoff’s countrywoman Monika Gaenssbauer also contributes a study of post-Cultural Revolution writing on the “decade of turmoil” – in her case, the better known and widely read works of Feng Jikai. These, she maintains, represented a major step forward from the “scar”

perspective (which had invariably provided political or ideological closure) and their author showed an appreciation of the complexity of the Cultural Revolution of a kind rarely seen in what was otherwise appearing at the time. By using the medium of reportage literature, Gaenssbauer suggests, Feng Jikai came closer to achieving his aim of serving as the voice of a “lost” generation than he, or many of his contemporaries for that matter, might otherwise have been able to if he were to have sought to work entirely within the discursive and formal parameters of fiction.

As Mao Zedong himself once said in the context of how to judge the achievements of others, there should be praise *and* criticism, but “*mainly* praise.” In a talk like this, one prefers to follow the CCP Chairman’s instructions and concentrate on the fragrant flowers rather than ramble on at length on the weeds and the patches of simple “green stuff” that Mao Zedong once maintained were good because they made the flowers stand out. *China’s Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution* derives a little bit of extra fragrance from excellent bibliographies, a glossary of Chinese terms, and a combined index at the end.

China’s Archives and/in the Cultural Revolution

The Management of Memory in China: State Archives and Politics in the People’s Republic is the massive 750-page product of archetypal German scholarship – thorough and incisive, with a superabundance of footnotes to support every contention and back up every assertion.⁶ Premier Zhou Enlai claimed at the height of the Cultural Revolution on 23 August 1967, that “the way Germans write books” was by “attempting to write something that looks profound but never quite managing to get the hang of it, or trying to cover just about everything but in the end not explaining anything clearly.” Vivian Wagner’s superb work proves that in the case of present-day Sinology for sure, Zhou’s assertion needs very much to be qualified: at their best, “the way Germans write books” shows that they not only *do* “get the hang of it,” but also manage to explain themselves very “clearly.”

Currently Assistant Professor for Chinese Society and Culture at the Universität St. Gallen in Switzerland, Vivian Wagner was educated in Germany and established her place in European Cultural Revolution studies with her masters thesis (in German) *Songs of The Red Guards*, a fine early (1995) “multi-media” work that delved deeper into the subject than any other

⁶ Vivian Wagner, *Erinnerungsverwaltung in China: Staatsarchive und Politik in der Volksrepublik* (Köln: Böhlau Verlag, 2006).

academic work had done at the time.⁷ Most recently, at a 2006 conference in Iceland on the life Mao Zedong, she returned to the subject of the Red Guards with a paper on “Sex, Blood, and Tears: Red Guard Lyrics, Visual Art, and Contemporary Bricolage.”⁸ Her book (in German) *The Management of Memory in China*, however, extends across a far wider cluster of topics. Only one part of it – the most important one, I would however argue – deals directly with the Cultural Revolution.

China, Wagner notes, looks back on an unusual archives tradition characterized by closely intertwined state politics, official historiography, and archive management. In the Mao era and in the Cultural Revolution to an extreme degree, archives served “as instruments of class warfare” supporting primarily the political interests of local power holders. Well into the 1980s, archives were regarded as “confidential institutions” isolated from the public and serving exclusively the state and CCP. Despite the gradual opening up and modernization of China under Deng Xiaoping, they remain to this day still understood as key institutions of “memory management” and legitimacy creation.

In her discussion of archives in the Cultural Revolution, Wagner notes the extent to which the political leadership of the second half of the 1960s (e.g. the Central Cultural Revolution Group) opportunistically supported the “opening up” of a carefully defined *part* of the archives – those whose contents were seen as possibly contributing to the more effective exposure of “class enemies” – yet at the same time imposed severe restrictions on access to anything that might alter popular perceptions of its own members’ past and political credentials. In view of this, it would be to misunderstand completely the praxis of the times if one were to simply note that the early Cultural Revolution in particular resulted in a relaxation of controls. There was, instead, a short-sighted pragmatism whereby for the sake of immediate political goals (“identify and weed out the hidden traitors!”), the long term aspect of the archive as a repository, of historical materials to be preserved with a view toward rather more than facilitating the struggles of the day, was neglected. Whereas in the Republican era and the early years of the PRC, a variant of this European and Soviet concept of the archive had been adopted, it was now negated in the process of a remarkable swift retrogression to a

⁷ A thoroughly revised, updated, and shortened version is available in English on the World Wide Web (together with music download-able in MP3 form). The URL is:

www.indiana.edu/%7Eeasc/resources/working_paper/noframe_10b_song.htm

⁸ Compare the paper abstract www.kim.is/Mao/Wagner%20Abstract.pdf

pre-modern conception. Rather than constitute a “cultural revolution” in this respect, the decade beginning in 1966 was a grotesque attempt at taking China “back to the future.”

Quietly optimistic about the new turn that China’s archive management has taken since the end of the Cultural Revolution, and in particular since the 1990s, Wagner speculates about how the opening up to the public of more and more archive holdings may impact on the “management” of memory. Will it in the future still be possible to maintain the kind of controlled history production regimen characteristic of (and on some level defining) the first five decades of the PRC? Or is liberalization likely to trigger the explosion of countless incendiary “memory time bombs” that have all along been ticking away quietly in the archives? Writing, as she does, from the perspective of re-united Germany, Wagner raises a number of provocative questions based on what happened when the archives of the former German Democratic Republic were made open to the public in the early 1990s.

Mao Zedong and the “Cult of the Individual”

One of the most interesting and intriguing new European analyses on an aspect of the history of Mao Zedong’s China is a study by Dr. Daniel Leese in the Institute of Sinology, Department of Asian Studies, Munich University, Germany. Whereas the institute where Leese is based remains firmly within the mould of classical Sinology – as evidenced in its homepage with its curriculum on offer squarely focused on such timeless subjects as classical art, archaeology, philosophy, ethnology etc. – his own study entitled *Performative Politics and Petrified Image: The Mao Cult during China’s Cultural Revolution* is if anything a bold break with tradition.⁹ Written on the basis of extensive archival research inside China, it makes masterful use of recently declassified archival sources, primarily from the Hebei provincial archive, and unique ephemera from the years 1966–70 in the public domain. Its subtitle would seem to obscure it, but *Performative Politics* is in fact about much more than merely the Cultural Revolution years and its first hundred or so pages include a detailed analytical and meticulously documented account of the CCP’s initial reaction to the CPSU’s 20th Congress in 1956 and the Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev’s “secret speech” – a seminal event, it has long been known, in the history of the personality cult that later surrounded Mao. Scholars working on the 1950s will find much in Leese’s account that challenges our received

⁹ Daniel Leese, *Peformative Politics and Petrified Image: The Mao Cult during China’s Cultural Revolution* (Bremen: International University School of Humanities and Social Sciences, 2006). A revised and corrected text is slated to be posted on the World Wide Web sometime in 2007.

knowledge of the reaction in Chinese society at large and among CCP members to the initial “de-Stalinisation.” Having been in a position to mine archival holdings of Chinese equivalents of the Soviet “mood-assessment reports” (a source well known to and used by students of the Stalin era but still only sporadically encountered by students of Mao’s China and rarely quoted by them), Leese is able to craft an account of some of the earliest origins of the Cultural Revolution that takes the classic story written by Roderick MacFarquhar one step further – challenging the plot here and there, thickening it in places. The reader is treated to excerpts from some remarkable contemporary *dongtai*, such as a report from Zhangjiakou in the spring of 1956 that mentions cadres “not daring to shout ‘Long Live Chairman Mao!’ during the 1 May parade for fear of committing the fault of worshipping the individual.”

Whereas his treatment of the Mao cult during the Great Leap Forward is somewhat cursory and less than fully developed (due to a paucity of primary sources, one is given to understand), Leese’s in-depth treatment of the origins of the *Quotations from Chairman Mao Zedong* entitled the “little red book and the rise of the red vocabulary” provides much that is likely to be new even to the most well-informed student of Mao and the “ism” that bears his name. Much more than simply a chapter that sets the stage for the Mao cult of the Cultural Revolution, it is a skilfully woven account that uses primary archival sources to debunk many myths that for years have been taken as “common knowledge” about who did what and why as far as the *Quotations* were concerned. Much that is widely taken for granted, e.g. concerning Lin Biao’s role and involvement, turns out upon closer scrutiny to be no small distance removed from what actually transpired. The initial compilation and production of the “little red book” is problematized by Leese and discussed in a way that amounts to nothing if not a very thorough “revision of history.”

In his discussion of the remarkable popularity of the *Quotations*, as in the core chapters of *Performative Politics* devoted to the Cultural Revolution, Leese makes an very convincing argument concerning what “shaped and sustained” the cult of Mao, finding answers in “the interactions between elite politics, the intermediary provincial level, and grassroots implementation. By highlighting the different periods of staging and controlling the cult, [its] rhetoric and rituals... regain the historicity that is all too often neglected.” Augmenting his archival sources with the best that present-day electronic resources and research tools have to offer, Leese supports some of his assertions about the public manifestations of the cult with quantitative data based on the CD-rom editions of the *People’s Daily* and *Liberation Army*

Daily, using the findings of an electronic search engine rather than subjective impressions based on the human eye scanning pages upon text to trace the rise and fall of key CCP *tifa* in the media, e.g. those of “*geren chongbai*” and “*geren mixin*.” Perhaps it is precisely because he is a product of the, for want of a better term, *undisciplined* tradition of European Sinology that Leese has no qualms about borrowing research methods eclectically from fields as far apart as statistics and epigraphy.

Revisiting the 1978 “Democracy Wall”

A representative product of research on the history of contemporary China in northern Europe at present is the Finish scholar Dr. Lauri Paltemaa’s *In the Vanguard of History: The Beijing Democracy Wall Movement 1978–1981 and Social Mobilisation of Former Red Guard Dissent*.¹⁰ Dr. Paltemaa has a background in political science and history, was a student at China People’s University in Beijing in 1998–99, and currently teaches in the Centre for East Asian Studies, University of Turku, Finland, one of the most successful and active centres of its kind.

Paltemaa’s work is more explicitly theoretical than the ones discussed above, and sets out to employ a “new social movement” approach to explain and analyse how the so-called “Democracy Wall Movement” in Xidan, Beijing, in the years immediately after the Cultural Revolution and the very start of the “era of reform,” constructed itself as a social actor and thereby justified itself and the reforms it proposed. Earlier foreign research would appear to have neglected this side of the “Democracy Wall Movement” and concentrated more or less exclusively on the issues of the proposed forms of democracy and human rights in the movement’s argumentation. This focus ended up slighting the historical nature of the movement, the protest it represented, and the individual activities of its participants. Paltemaa’s approach helps rectify this and clarifies some questions hitherto left un-answered by scholarship.

The findings of *In the Vanguard of History* may in the end be reduced to three. Firstly, Paltemaa concludes that “Democracy Wall” was not simply connected to the Cultural Revolution as a negation of its policies, but in a more subtle and complex manner through the so called new “trends of thought” (*sichao*) and “theory of a bureaucratic class” that radical

¹⁰ Lauri Paltemaa, *In the Vanguard of History: The Beijing Democracy Wall Movement 1978–1981 and Social Mobilisation of Former Red Guard Dissent* (Turku: Turun Yliopisto, 2005).

Red Guards had developed after 1966. The thinking of these Red Guards went through a notable transformation in the late Cultural Revolution and the years of 1977–79, but the eradication of the structural causes of a bureaucratic class remained the theoretical rationale of democratic reforms for the “Democracy Wall” movement and served as the basis of the movement’s social analysis.

Paltemaa further shows the degree to which activists offered their debates on democratic reform as a contribution to Marxism and a way to solve the problem of political superstructure obstructing the realization of socialism and, finally, communism. Democratic institutions were seen as the necessary condition of realising *socialism* and a great majority of the theoretical articles and essays in the movement’s journals should be understood as voices in a debate to this end. Where much of previous western (most notably American) scholarship and popular media have sought to depict the movement as essentially one of seeking to realize in China a non-socialist notion of democracy, “human rights,” and individual freedoms, Paltemaa argues that a sizeable part of the movement activists returned to Marxist classics and the Paris Commune type of democratic institutions in their proposals. Liberal democracy and human rights also attracted widespread attention, but were mostly used eclectically as providing structural models for socialist democracy. Furthermore the activists founded their defence of these institutions through arguments that they were the historical progressive heritage from earlier developmental phases – a notably Marxist view of world history. Only a small minority of the activists used anti-Marxist arguments when defending democracy.

Finally, Paltemaa shows how the “Democracy Wall Movement” managed to portray itself as a historically progressive and necessary manifestation of the people’s interests and how its activists assumed the role of the “awoken generation” who had the moral stamina, courage and high political awareness to lead the people as the vanguard in their struggle against the “feudal fascist dictatorship” of party bureaucrats. Yet he notes that the CCP did not come under fire as an institution except from a tiny minority of participants in the movement. To define and defend their credentials, the activists constructed a narrative of the Cultural Revolution as a period whence they had grown to political maturity and learned to see through the Maoist doctrines the party “left” used as deception to hide its naked lust for power and privilege. After 1979, “Democracy Wall” was gradually mythologized as a movement of politically aware youth assuming a vanguard position in revolution.

In the Vanguard of History sheds new light on the relations between the Cultural Revolution and post-Mao social protest in China. It shows that at least for the “Democracy Wall,” there was a greater continuity with the Cultural Revolution and discontinuity with subsequent “democracy movements” than has earlier been suggested. It also shows that native Marxist ideas of democracy and communist party lore on protest exerted considerable influence on the construction, by its participants, of “Democracy Wall” as a legitimate social actor, more so than liberal notions of democracy and human rights, although the latter also played a role.

Concluding Words

Some of the authors whose works I have talked about today might well be surprised to find themselves lumped together in this way under the single unifying rubric of European research on the Cultural Revolution. Yet perhaps this illustrates an important point, namely the wide range of approaches that are currently vying for attention: as is also the case in the international community of historians of the Cultural Revolution publishing in Chinese (inside and outside the People’s Republic), there is no one accepted master narrative. Certainly, we do not write in one single “great direction.” We seek to write our own stories – produce our own analyses, highlight what we find important, dispense with what we regard as ridiculous – as we see best from where by chance we happen to stand, rather than attempt to contribute to the positive affirmation of one particular uniform account of the “years of great turmoil.” We may be sadly misinformed in some cases, yet hopefully less so in others: what we are aware of, and take as the point of departure of our work, is the premium importance that needs to be put on setting the “factual record” straight. On this last point – as well as in the more abstract sphere of theorizing and “thinking *about*” what happened – we benefit immensely from the help we receive from our Chinese colleagues, including many of you who are here today. Thank you!