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Strategic Alliance vs. Multisectorial Mobilization: Understanding the Shifting Position of the Youth Revolutionary Movement in Tri-Polar Egypt

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ABSTRACT

This paper stems from an inductive research problem: the support given to the military-deep state by the youth revolutionary movement in Egypt's political upheavals of summer 2013. Why would the youth revolutionary movement choose to support the military-deep state's political maneuverings, and what is the precise nature of this support? To answer these questions, this paper chooses to explore two different analytical frameworks that start with different base assumptions and end with quite different interpretations. The first framework is focused on the concept of strategic choice; here, the position of the youth revolutionary movement is understood as an active decision taken in order to further the achievement of the movement's goals. The second framework emphasizes the concept of multisectorial mobilization; here, the position of the youth revolutionary movement is a product of political crisis and the fleeting unification of social space. Though both frameworks suffer from shortcomings, the inclination is to support the explanation of multisectorial mobilization. In this sense, the position of the youth revolutionary movement in the face of a military coup is less an active choice made to further movement goals than a result of the unpredictable dynamics and associated interpretations of the crisis itself.
INTRODUCTION

The events in Egypt this past summer have profoundly altered the country's transitional path. While the mass protests of non-confidence spearheaded by the Tamarod campaign fell in line with the patterns of contestation that had come to be a hallmark of the political landscape since 2011 (albeit on a much larger scale), the subsequent removal from power of President Morsi by the military, greeted with overwhelming popular support, dramatically reconfigured the political game. This has been compounded by the crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood, including the arrest of virtually all major Brotherhood members and the death of many hundreds of protestors, the violent reprisals against Egypt’s Coptic population, and the departure of key political figures from the interim government, most notably Mohamed ElBaradei – all of which pose critical obstacles to building an inclusive political system.

While the intense political battle for power and moral/legal legitimacy has produced what appears to be a state of bipolarity, Egyptian politics is in fact better understood as tri-polar (Pomegranate, 2013). One pole assembles the military, the bureaucracy, and the security apparatus, or what is usually referred as the “deep state” (Brown, 2013), whose interests lie in the maintenance of structural privileges accrued during the long years of Mubarak’s rule; a second pole consists of the Muslim Brotherhood and its various allies, interested in regaining what is deemed their rightful political authority; the third pole gathers a hodge-podge of leftist-liberal-secular groups, including political parties united in the National Salvation Front coalition, who aspire to rectify what they deem the “true” revolutionary process. What has given the rather stark appearance of bipolarity is the alignment between the military-deep state pole and the leftist-liberal-secular one, which crystallized as early as November 2012 with the political crisis over the country’s constitution and came to its apex with this summer’s coup.

This paper stems from one particularly puzzling dimension of this alignment: the support, ranging from implicit to overt, given to the military-deep state pole by activist youth groups, here understood in their collective as a distinct social movement within the leftist-liberal-secular camp. This movement, who came into the spotlight during the 2011 revolution, was perhaps the most vocally opposed to the rule of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) during their stint at the helm. Moreover, when faced with a presidential run-off election between a representative of the old regime and the Muslim Brotherhood, many activists and organizations within the movement reluctantly voted for the latter rather than see the feloul (“remnants” of the Mubarak regime) return to power. The support this movement has given to the military-deep state pole against the Brotherhood thus comes as a perplexing and perhaps even self-defeating move.

This paper seeks to understand this move: why would the youth revolutionary movement choose to support the military-deep state’s political maneuverings, and what is the precise nature of this support? To answer these questions, this paper chooses to explore two different analytical frameworks that start with different base assumptions and end with quite different interpretations.
The first framework, in vogue in social movement theory, is focused on the concept of *strategy choice*. Here, the support of the youth revolutionary movement to the military-deep state pole is understood as an active decision taken in order to further the achievement of the movement’s goals; the relationship between the movement and the military-deep state pole is in turn understood as some form of alliance. The second framework, offering a sociological analysis of political crises, emphasizes the concept of *multisectoral mobilization*. Here, the support of the youth revolutionary movement to the military-deep state pole is a product of political crisis and the confluence of various streams of mobilization; the relationship between the movement and the military-deep state pole is thus ephemeral and based on the fleeting unification of social space and the exchange of moves.

Using the same empirical data, the paper will conduct its investigation using these two frameworks and their key concepts and analytical tools; an assessment will then be made to determine which model provides a better empirical fit to explain the youth revolutionary movement’s support to the military-deep state pole in this summer’s political upheavals. As such, though the paper commences with an inductive research question, the method of investigation is quite deductive. In the first section, an overview of the empirical delimitations and data collection will be provided. From here, the investigation via the two models will be undertaken, compromising a conceptual overview and analytical application. The final section will entail the discussion of research findings and implications.

**EMPIRICAL DELIMITATIONS, DATA, AND METHODS**

As outlined above, the paper is concerned with what are commonly referred to in press articles and scholarly analyses as “youth groups” or “revolutionary forces” (see for example Shehata, 2011; Abdalla, 2013). Here, these are conceptualized not as atomized organizations but rather a distinct social movement. Although a number of different – and sometimes only slightly varying – definitions of “social movement” exists, there is generally speaking a set of features that are present in most of these definitions. Social movements are by-and-large characterized by: “collective or joint action; change-oriented goals or claims; some extra- or non-institutional collective action; some degree of organization; and some degree of temporal continuity” (Snow et al., 2004:6). To this can be added the existence of a distinctive collective identity linking movement actors (Della Porta and Diani, 1999:20). Social movements are thus understood as one specific form of human behavior or social process falling under the larger rubric of collective action, which may include anything ranging from riots to full-scale revolutions. As a form of collective action, they are defined by both their non-solitary nature (multiple individuals acting together) and their purposeful, directed action (the pursuit of some sort of goals or other form of claim making).

As a social movement, the youth revolutionary movement in Egypt is composed of various organizations and networks of differing degrees of formality that are nonetheless linked by a shared set of grievances and values as well as a common collective identity. The movement advocates for a
new social contract based on the notion of social justice, entailing some form of redistributive social welfare to be maintained by the state. It calls for new practices of power that are free from corruption and abuse, as well as new practices of citizenship based on tolerance and the absence of discrimination with respect to religion and social class. The movement eschews state-society relations that are based either on hierarchy or patriarchy, instead aiming at a model that recognizes and respects individual dignity. Activists and individual organizations within the movement share a common collective identity, based on shared interpretations of the “true” values of the revolution (“bread, freedom, social justice”). They collectively recognize who is part of the movement and who is not, and reinforce these boundaries through practices of solidarity and socialization (the outpouring of support to members who are arrested or killed; the training of new members in the values of the movement). Moreover, these identity borders are institutionalized in the establishment of coalitions (the Coalition of Revolutionary Youth, disbanded in 2012, and the Revolutionary Alliance, still active) that are designed to provide a forum for exchange and decision-making as well as to present a unified public front. As with all social movements, the exact contours are impossible to define, as groups materialize and disappear and as activism waxes and wanes; however, a stable core does exist. For this paper, the movement is delimited to the following organizations and networks: the April 6 Youth Movement, the April 6 Movement-Democratic Front, the Revolutionary Socialists, Salafyo Costa, Masry Hor, and Tamarod.

Data is derived from two sources: semi-structured interviews and documentary texts. 31 semi-structured interviews were carried out with movement leaders and prominent activists in the period of October-December 2012 and April-May 2013 in Cairo, Egypt. These interviews represent a mixture of key informant interviews, where the interviewee is considered as an expert providing crucial information about the movement itself, as well as respondent interviews, where the interviewee's personal experience in the movement is sought. The interview guide is structured to gather information regarding the movement's self-construction. This includes information regarding the movement's internal organization and mobilization of resources, the goals of the movement and its ideational content, the perception of political opportunities for mobilization including how other actors are perceived, and tactics/strategies for achieving objectives via collective action. As these interviews were conducted before this summer's events, specific questions pertinent to the puzzle under investigation here were not asked; however, the type of information gathered is highly relevant for the analyses using the two frameworks proposed. In particular, information regarding the priorities and goals of the movement, as well as the movement's interpretations of the motivations and moves of other players, prove critical to both analytical models.

Data was also collected through documentary texts as produced by the movement, and in particular Facebook pages, Twitter accounts, and statements to the press/interviews from the six organizations that form part of the empirical delimitation from the period of June-August 2013.
These texts were analyzed for particular evidence regarding the support (or non-support) of the military-deep state pole.

**FRAMEWORK 1: STRATEGIC CHOICE AND ALLIANCE**

The first framework to be applied is developed around the notion of strategy and the analytical focus on strategic choice. In recent years, the study of social movement strategy and the processes by which it is arrived at have become fundamental vectors by which to analyze social movement dynamics (Downey and Rohlinger, 2008:4). As defined by Jenkins (1981:135), strategy refers to the “overall plan for action, the blueprint of activities with regard to the mobilization of resources and the series of collective actions that movements designate as necessary for bringing about desired social changes.” Strategy, thus, encompasses the social movement’s claims and collective action frames, tactics and resources, and allies/coalition partners that in turn effect internal operations, external actions, and outcomes (Meyer and Staggenborg, 2007:3-4). In brief, strategy is the link between a social movement’s goals and the actions it undertakes to achieve them.

Analysis within this conceptual model focuses on strategic choice: the process of decision-making by a social movement with regards to its strategy. Research into strategic choice has traditionally used rational actor models and the premise of instrumental logic to explain decision-making processes (Downey and Rohlinger, 2008:5). Such studies, based within the resource mobilization and political process traditions of social movement theory, assume calculations of cost/benefit or means/ends as informed either by available resources (or organizational capacity) or the structure of opportunities and constraints. Over time, however, the concept of strategic choice has evolved into a much more complex notion of decision-making. Choices about strategy are re-conceived as interdependent and non-discrete: past actions, as well as current decisions, affect each strategic choice, and choices regarding one aspect of strategy will necessarily impact choices about others (Meyer and Staggenborg, 2007:13). Moreover, choices about strategy are no longer conceived as a product of instrumental logic and simple calculations of resources or opportunities, but rather as informed as much by beliefs, preferences, and cultural codes as by “rationality” (Polletta and Jasper, 2001:284).

Given this, the analysis of strategic choice has thus involved the development of quite broad models that can explain the various processes influencing decision-making. Downey and Rohlinger (2008) for example, in their theory-advancing work, propose a bi-dimensional framework in which a social movement’s claims (radical or moderate) are mapped against its breadth of appeal (insular or mass) in order to determine its strategic orientation, which in turn guides strategic choices. Moving farther away from rational actor assumptions and towards a constructivist approach, Jasper (2004:5) argues for a much broader model that takes into account the subjectively interpreted cultural and institutional contexts within which social movement actors find themselves, which includes the ensemble of players in the field of action (the social movement as well as its friends and opponents),
the goals attributable to each set of players, the resources and skills available to each, the arenas of potential action (the street, the media, etc...), the perception of opportunities for action, and the audiences of movement action.

One fundamental component of strategic choice as identified by Jasper and confirmed in the literature is the inherent dilemmas and trade-offs associated with each decision. Consider for example the strategic choice of organizational structure (Jasper, 2004:7). Should a social movement opt for a professionalized organizational structure with hierarchical decision-making and salaried staff, or should it work on a volunteer basis with a more horizontal structure? A professionalized social movement may be more efficient in operational tasks but risks losing its grassroots appeal, while a volunteer structure may inspire greater loyalty amongst adherents but could be threatened by lack of sufficient managerial capacities. This decision thus entails inherent trade-offs that will have an impact on the movement's operations and mobilization patterns, as well as the extent to which its goals are achieved. Understanding how a social movement interprets and negotiates these dilemmas illuminates the process of strategic choice.

Within this analytical framework, the support of the youth revolutionary movement to the military-deep state pole is understood as one component of strategy; in this sense, it is deliberate, strategic action designed for the purpose of achieving the movement's goals. This support is embodied in the concept of alliance. Alliances between a social movement and other groups or sets of actors consist, in their basic form, of some degree of cooperation and/or mutual support that, nonetheless, maintains the autonomy of each party or partner. In this sense, they differ from mergers and thus do not require a relinquishing of either organizational structures or ideational materials. A social movement may enact an alliance for a variety of reasons: they can help the movement achieve greater numbers during campaigns or protest events, or diversify/extend the profile of constituents in order to represent a broader cross-section of the population; likewise, alliances may be a means by which a movement compliments gaps in their skills or pools resources in order to more effectively carry out instances of collective action. Boiled down to their essence, however, alliances are formed when partners deem them useful for the achievement of shared goals – whether proximate or long-term. This does not imply that the nature of interactions within an alliance are always friendly; on the contrary, intra-alliance relations may range from the amicable and cooperative to competitive and conflictual (Rucht, 2004).

The term “alliance” is perhaps somewhat misleading, as it implies a form of institutionalized or formal agreement; in fact, alliances can manifest in a variety of formats and degrees of explicitness. Understanding differences in alliance type is important for adding nuance to the concept and thus increasing analytical leverage. Alliance types can be delineated with regards to four key characteristics. First is distinction based on duration: is the alliance established with a short-term purpose in mind, such as the achievement of a specific campaign or protest event (ad-hoc alliance), or instead does it endure with the objective of achieving longer-term objectives (long-range
alliance)? Ad-hoc alliances are generally viewed as less complicated and easier to form, usually involving some form of material or human support, or other tactical work, but ultimately less draining on resources (Gould et al., 2004:102). They are episodic in nature, and often occur in reaction to a crisis or political opportunity; nonetheless, they serve to establish relationships between previously unlinked groups that can be later be converted into more strategic forms of collaboration (Tattersall, 2005:99-100). Long-range alliances, on the other hand, require more work and deeper engagement on the part of partners, and are generally more formally structured (Levi and Murphy, 2006:655).

Second, alliance type can also be drawn with regards to degree of organization: is the alliance institutionalized, for example through the establishment of an umbrella organization or other formal collaborative framework, or does it lack an independent or semi-autonomous organizational structure? This distinction between institutionalized alliances and non-institutionalized alliances has implications on operations. Institutionalized alliances are marked by some degree of joint decision-making as well as procedures for resource sharing. Participatory organizational structures go one step further, and develop systems of power sharing that allow alliance members meaningful opportunities for input and engagement, thereby reducing competition (Staggenborg, 2010:323). Non-institutionalized alliances, on the other hand, lack specific rules or guidelines on cooperation; instead, the relationship is based mostly on mutual trust and reciprocity (Caniglia, 2001:43). As no formal arrangements for resource pooling, membership adhesion, or resolution of conflict are in place, non-institutionalized alliances are by nature more fragile and likely to produce competition between members.

Third, alliances can be differentiated with regards to explicitness: have partners expressly decided to cooperate and acknowledged this publicly (formal alliance), or does cooperation/mutual support remain unofficial and hence non-binding (tacit alliance)? Formal alliances can involve numerous instances of overt cooperation, including the release of joint statements, the organization of events under a common banner, etc. In these cases, alliance members publicly acknowledge shared interests and common goals. Tacit alliances, however, see no such public acknowledgement; they are instead only manifested through acts of support. Such alliances are similar to inter-state alignment as theorized by Snyder (1997:6-16). Alignments identify mutual opponents and friends via perceived interests, capacities, and behaviors. Expectations of support, for their part, are established and reinforced through the “pattern of alignment”(1995:7), which includes a variety of demonstrations of informal, non-binding cooperation. For social movements, tacit alliances can be detected in co-mobilization and the release of statements that demonstrate some degree of support but that fall short of formal alliance.

Finally, alliance type can be drawn with regards to partnership structure: are the members of the alliance located in the same camp (within-movement alliance) or different ones (cross-movement alliance)? This distinction has implications on the opportunities and risks associated with
alliance building. Within-movement coalitions may impact a movement's internal organizational structure and decision-making processes (van Dyke and McAmmon, 2010:xv-xvi), as well as the harmonization of frames and narratives (Croteau and Hicks, 2003). In this sense, within-movement alliances can allow for the consolidation and uniformization of a movement across its various constituent parts; as the existence of common goals and values are a given, less energy needs to be spent on the reconciliation of competing or contradictory claims or narrative (Beamish and Luebbers, 2009). Cross-movement alliances, however, do not necessarily share the same values and/or collective identity, nor is there the same depth of affinity. In some cases, cross-movement alliances occur within "movement families" (della Porta and Rucht, 1995), which share certain values and/or organizational overlaps, even if specific objectives diverge, thereby permitting the formation of alliances without major compromise on ideological points. In other cases, however, cross-movement alliances occur between groups with much larger points of divergence, where the alliance is based only on the existence of one shared, and often short-term, goal. Such alliances are much more fragile and likely to breakdown as a result of irreconcilable ideological differences. Moreover, they also can pose an insidious threat to alliance partners: in allying with ideologically disparate groups, alliance members risks diluting their key ideational or symbolic dimensions (van Dyke, 2013). Indeed, alliance with ideologically opposed groups can compromise identities via association with "tainted" allies (Meyer and Corrigall-Brown, 2005:331), which can in turn weaken a movement’s capacity to recruit or indeed maintain a moral high ground.

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Using the key concepts and analytical tools of this framework, a model can be built to determine to what extent the support of the Egyptian youth revolutionary movement to the military-deep state pole in this summer’s political upheavals represents a strategic choice to establish some form of alliance. As the point of departure, the type of alliance that is under consideration fits the typology "cross-movement, tacit alliance". The cross-movement nature is, of course, a given: the youth revolutionary movement and military-deep state pole do not share ideologies, values, or a shared collective identity. In this case, the alliance is based on what is likely a singular, short-term goal. Moreover, the tacit nature of the alliance must be assumed, given the lack of any official declarations of coalition or formal agreement. As a tacit alliance, cooperation is limited to acts of support, as is based on the perception of shared interest.

Drawing on Jasper’s conceptualization of strategic choice and the various dimensions that must be considered for its analysis, the model proposed here to investigate why a strategic choice would be made to form a cross-movement, tacit alliance involves three dimensions of inquiry. Along the first dimension is the issue of goals. This includes the movement’s assessment of its own goals and priorities, and in particular the priority given to proximate versus non-proximate goals, as well
as the assessment of other players in the field of action, and in particular the goals and motivations attributed to each player. Here, the different players in the field of action can be resumed as the two other poles of Egypt’s tri-polar political scene. For a cross-movement, tacit alliance to emerge out of a strategic choice, we would expect to find some degree of convergence with regards to the movement’s own goals/priorities and those that are attributed to other players in the field (namely, the military-deep state pole). The second dimension relates to capacities, and in particular the movement’s evaluation of its internal capacity to achieve prioritized goals alone, or indeed a recognized need for external resources. For a strategic choice on alliance to be made, we would expect the movement to have deemed its own capacities insufficient to successfully act alone. The third dimension concerns the movement’s assessment of a particular opportunity or threat. The literature on alliances has demonstrated that movements perceiving imminent threat (economic or political) to their ability to achieve goals are pushed to overcome barriers to alliance formation (Meyer and Corrigall-Brown, 2005:332; Staggenborg, 2010:319-322). For the youth revolutionary movement to form an alliance with the military-deep state pole, we would expect to find perception of imminent threat to the movement.

Applying the empirical data to this model demonstrates that the argument of strategic choice to establish a cross-movement, tacit alliance is at least partially satisfactory to explaining the empirical phenomenon under question. Along the first dimension of analysis – internal goals and those attributed to other players – a shift in priority and process of convergence between the movement and the military-deep state pole does indeed become evident from the period of November 2012 onward. For the movement itself, a noticeable re-prioritization from long-term goals to short-term ones does indeed emerge over the period from 2011-2013. The immediate aftermath of the 2011 uprising sees the youth revolutionary movement focus largely on long-term goals, understood as the achievement of the main demands of the revolution: bread, freedom, and social justice (aish, horreya, adala egtema'eya) as well as the overthrow of the regime (isqat al-nizam). For movement activists, these goals cannot simply be fulfilled by stopgap measures, such as increased subsidies or lowered prices, or even the removal of Mubarak from power; rather, they are equivalent to radical changes in state-society relations as well as a total overhaul of the state bureaucracy. For youth revolutionary activists, “bread, freedom, social justice” is understood less as a specific socio-economic system than a profound change in the state’s relationship to its citizens. This is not to imply that specific demands are absent; on the contrary, the movement acknowledges the normative elements of redistributive social welfare such as access to healthcare and education, the right to employment, and reduced costs of living for the poor. However, how these are to be achieved in terms of socio-economic system to be adopted is open to debate and is not the primary focus of ideational battle. For the movement, this slogan includes not only a renewed social contract but is also inextricably linked to values of respect, tolerance, and equality. It is synonymous with a broader demand for human dignity (karama ensaneyya) that includes freedom from discrimination and abuse.
as well as improved standards of living. The demand is thus for a reconceptualization of the state as an institution in the service of its citizens that includes not only the guarantee of quality of life but also the erasure of social classifications and divisions, and the absence of corruption. Similarly, for the movement, “overthrow of the regime” signifies radical change and a complete overhaul of the political structure along with a purging of any vestige of the old regime or National Democratic Party (NDP) members from political life. The entire state apparatus must be dismantled, including the deep state and the role of the military in Egypt’s economy. For many activists in the movement, this also includes Egypt’s foreign policy and in particular the country’s perceived submissiveness towards the United States and Israel (personal interview, 05 May 2013).

The prioritization of these non-proximate objectives greatly affected the manoeuvrings of the movement in the early post-revolution period. For example, movement activists protested the SCAF’s authority but also the proposed electoral calendar for transition to civilian rule. While seemingly contradictory, this duality reflected their belief that a total overhaul of the system could not be achieved either under military tutorship or through the mere imposition of elections onto the existing institutional structure, but rather required a lengthier civilian transitional process. In the aftermath of the June 2012 presidential election and rise of the Muslim Brotherhood to power, however, the achievement of these long-term goals was reprioritized as short-term ones came to the fore. Most importantly, rather than move towards broad and far-reaching changes in state-society relations and the structure of the state generally, the movement became focused instead on rejecting the rule of the Muslim Brotherhood. The movement’s priorities thus became “reactive” as opposed to “pro-active” (personal interview, 08 May 2013). This was crystallized at year’s end 2012 with the simultaneous declaration of far reaching powers by President Morsi as well as the delivery of a highly controversial and non-inclusively drafted constitution. These actions tipped off a major political crisis, marked by continuous mass demonstrations, in November-December 2012. The movement’s priority during this crisis was narrowed to the proximate goals of halting the constitutional referendum and rescinding Morsi’s declaration. In the months that followed this crisis, the priority became increasingly on the ousting of Morsi from power. Indeed, with the launch of the Tamarod campaign, the removal of Morsi from office became the primary goal of the movement, seen as a necessary step in order to achieve the long-term goals of the movement. As stated by one movement leader:

We have to share in this Rebel [the Tamarod campaign] and then we have to make a demonstration for those who are in the prisons of the Muslim Brotherhood. We have 2500 persons who are in the prisons of Mohamed Morsi, and then all of us has to be one hand so as to get [with] force Morsi, and then we have to begin these steps so as to after [achieve] the revolution. [Our] dream is to force Morsi to leave, and then begin with the constitution and then the law of revolution that will have an effect on the life of society, the economical and the [societal] life. And you can say we have to begin from zero. Because of Mohamed Morsi, we get back to the step - not zero, minus. So we have to be one
hand against this regime so as to make the demands of the revolution by using the way of forcing them to leave and then we will start working the steps, we will start the steps after the revolution. (personal interview, 20 May 2013).

Parallel to this shift in priority of internal goals, the movement’s interpretation of other players and the goals/motivations attributed to them also undergoes a degree of shift from the time of the 2011 revolution until summer 2013. The differences between the youth revolutionary movement and the Brotherhood in terms of long-terms goals and vision of the new Egypt were always recognized, and indeed most interviewees state that they were skeptical of the Brotherhood from the outset. Nonetheless, there was a certain preference for the Brotherhood over the military-deep state during much of 2011-2012. Indeed, in the early months after the election of the Muslim Brotherhood to the presidency, certain groups within the movement were even willing to cooperate with the Morsi government (personal interviews, 08 May 2013, 21 May 2013). Ahmed Maher, leader of the April 6 Youth Movement, for example, participated initially in the constituent assembly tasked with drafting a new constitution. Over time, however, the perception of the Brotherhood’s motivations and long-term goals became antithetical to those of the youth revolutionary movement. The Brotherhood came to be seen as more repressive than both Mubarak (personal interview, 16 April 2013), and its political project was interpreted as a blatant attempt to consolidate exclusionary power. The perception of a “Brotherhoodization” of the state became a common narrative within the movement. This is embodied in their categorization of the Brotherhood as islaheen – reformers interested in merely adopting the existing state apparatus, and replacing NDP bureaucrats with their own, rather than changing it. For many within the movement, the Brotherhood came to be seen as more dangerous for the political future of Egypt than the military: whereas the military was merely interested in assuring its own privileges and willing to relinquish power, the Brotherhood was seen as creating permanent structures that actively prevented the achievement of the goals of the revolution.

Yet, although the data does indicate a shift in the perception of the Muslim Brotherhood over the period of 2011-2013, there is less evidence of a shift in the perceived goals and motivations attributed to the military-deep state pole. Most interviewees continued to reject any possible convergence with regards to long-term goals, and indeed even rejected the legitimacy of coalitions such as the National Salvation Front precisely because of its inclusion of important NDP officials in their ranks (personal interviews, 07 November 2012, 14 May 2013). This holds true even around the time of the mass protests and subsequent coup of summer 2013. The April 6 Youth Movement, for example, called for mobilization on June 30th, 2013 under the banner “The March of Freedom 30/6 (against the Muslim Brotherhood, against the military, against the feloul)” (Facebook, 29 June 2013). Likewise, the April 6 Movement – Democratic Front made a similar statement through the equation “Mohamed Morsi is the military is Mubarak” (Facebook, 01 July 2013). That the military-deep state
pole sought the ejection of Morsi from power of course became evident; however, there is no strong evidence that the youth revolutionary movement recognized this as a shared goal.

With regards to the second dimension of analysis, concerning capacities and resources, the movement did recognize the need for some form of coalition with broad cross-sections of society in order to achieve mass numbers at the Tamarod protest of June 30th. By their own accounts, the months leading up to June 2013 saw the decreasing success of movement campaigns and instances of collective action. Interviewees frequently mentioned the movement’s decline in terms of number of adherents and popular legitimacy. For many within the movement, the hope was that the Tamarod protest would mirror those of the 2011 revolution: through focus on economic and social as opposed to political issues, the movement aspired to draw the largest possible popular base to the street, thereby giving it the necessary weight to succeed (personal interview, 28 May 2013). More interestingly, interview data reveals that active discussions were taking place in April/May between members of the movement’s various organizations regarding the potential role the feloul could play in achieving the departure of the Muslim Brotherhood (personal interviews, 13 May 2013, 21 May 2013). Such discussions are also visible on Facebook forums; a lengthy exchange between members of Salafyo Costa, for example, regarding whether or not to exclude the feloul from the protests took place in the lead up to June 30th (Facebook, 28-29 June 2013). For those advocating inclusion of the deep state in the protest movement, there was a recognized need in terms of human resources to extend the constituent base, as well as withdraw material support for the regime from all sectors of society. However, this position was not universally accepted across the movement.

Finally, regarding the third dimension of analysis and the issue of perceived political threat, interview data reveals a strong sentiment of existential threat amongst movement members, especially in spring 2013. The experience of the November 2012 constitution crisis and instances of violence directed against protestors by the regime was interpreted as an important increase in repressive capacity on the part of the regime. This perception of increased repression was further reinforced with the arrest of movement members in March and April 2013. As one interviewee stated:

> We are the enemy now....When the last time I met with you they were arresting like three members of us. Yesterday, they went to one of our member home and they break the door and search for him but they didn’t find him. And this is our future. Black future. The worst is coming... [T]his is worse than Mubarak. If they arrested me in Mubarak days, I was sent for like a normal prison, Tora, if you know Tora, if I was dangerous I go to Tora. Our members now in a prison called Al Aqrab (scorpion), this is worst prison. (personal interview, 21 May 2013).

However, although a perception of threat as posed by the Muslim Brotherhood is detectable in the period leading up to the June 30th protests and military coup, this does not seem to have subsided since the removal of Morsi from power; rather, it has been replaced by a new perceived threat emanating from the military. While certain organizations within the movement – and in
particular the Tamarod organizers – have supported the military’s stance against what is billed as terrorism, many others have expressed in social media forums their fear that the repression experienced by the Brotherhood could also be projected onto the movement. In other words, while the perception of threat was more or less uniform in the period prior to the coup, this has diverged within the movement since the military coup.

**FRAMEWORK 2: MULTISECTORIAL MOBILIZATION**

The second analytical framework to be applied is Michel Dobry’s (1983, 1986) model of political crises and his theoretical understanding of the process of political mobilization. This framework has several points in common with strategic choice as presented above. Both frameworks take a decidedly actor-centric approach, emphasizing in particular the moves and counter-moves made by all actors in the field of action as opposed to placing analytical focus on objective structures and external conditions as the explanatory variables. In this sense, both frameworks place emphasis on relational dynamics in the explanations of social phenomenon. In addition, both frameworks are focused on a non-rational actor notion of strategy that emphasizes non-instrumental logic. It is instead interpretative processes that are favored and largely constructivist approaches that are favored. Where the two frameworks diverge, however, is in the understanding of co-mobilization across different groups. Where as the previous framework sees this phenomenon as a strategic alliance, Dobry’s model understands cross-sector co-mobilization as the defining characteristic of highly fluid, heterogeneous, and unpredictable political crises.

For Dobry, this process of co-mobilization is captured in the larger concept of multisectorial mobilization, or the simultaneous deployment of collective action by different sectors of the polity. Mobilization is understood as strategic moves that produce a range of effects, including the release of new resources and the opening of new political opportunities, within the broader political arena. In this sense, different sectors – including both oppositional groups as well as authorities – make different strategic moves that have an effect both on the context as well as on one another. These strategic moves are determined by the various calculations made by each actor, themselves mediated by interpretations of spatio-specific cultural and institutional contexts and the evolving dynamics of the crisis itself (Dobry, 1983:399-400). In this sense, strategic moves are highly contingent and can fluctuate radically within very short periods of time.

Within this analytical framework, understanding this process of multisectorial mobilization requires differentiating the social space and the manners in which different actors mobilize within it. Here, categories of actors are referred to as “sectors”, each subject to its own specific logic that exercises control over constituents and determines margins of maneuver in the political arena. These sectorial logics impact the perception of reality on constituents through the imposition of social relations and constraints that are perceived as externally objective, a characteristic that is referred to as the “degree of objectivation” (1983:403). This sectorial logic also has an impact on resources.
Resources here are conceptualized not as external objects that can be utilized or converted as needed; rather, they are based on each sector's unique logic and the type of political action that defines the sector. In this sense, resources are relational and determined by social position. Finally, in routine times, sectorial logic determines the type of collective action that each sector sees as permissible: the strategic decisions taken are determined by sectorial logic and the specific “rules of the game” that social position imposes. In normal time, sectors are autonomous; although collusion between them can exist, such forms of cooperation serve to reinforce sectorial autonomy and the degree of objectivation via the reinforcement of sectorial boundaries and the mutual recognition of the sectorial “other”.

The moment of political crisis, however, when multisectorial mobilization is produced, represents a disruption in these characteristics. Indeed, multisectorial mobilization is characterized by fluidity in social relations along three dimensions: the unification of social space, the enlarged tactical interdependence of sectors, and structural uncertainty (Dobry, 1983:409). The unification of social space interferes with independent sectorial logics, thereby effecting strategic calculations. In this way, sectors may make strategic moves that do not correspond with their sectorial logics in force during routine times. Tactical interdependence of sectors, for its part, de-cloisters resources thereby widening those available to each sector. In addition, tactical interdependence changes the calculations of strategic moves: each sector thus no longer operates according to their sectorial logic alone, but also takes into account the strategic moves of other sectors (interpreted, nonetheless, through their subjective lenses and not in any "objective" sense). This creates thus a complex chain of moves/counter-moves that are both unpredictable and evolve in relation to one another and the effects they produce on social space and the crisis itself. Finally, structural uncertainty for its part erases the points of references and perceived parameters that in routine times bound sectorial logic. This co-occurrence in time and space of various streams of mobilization thus should not be interpreted as a synchronization of sectorial logics but rather a result of the political crisis itself.

Multisectorial mobilization disrupts sectorial logics and produces disobjectivation, which in turn influences the perception of social relations (often producing collective feelings of euphoria) and suspends social complexity. This can create forms of “fraternization” that would be unprecedented during routine times, such as cooperation between police forces and protestors (Banegas, 1993:8), and has an effect that is both psychological as well as relational. Social identities and stigmas become relaxed as social complexity is suspended, being replaced by a common collective identity based on the most basic common denominator of the crisis (i.e. shared opposition). However, the exception to this, according to Dobry, is the military, which is able to maintain its degree of objectivation and thus exercise control over the political crisis (1983:417).

If a key characteristic of multisectorial mobilization is the simultaneous co-mobilization of multiple different sectors or groups, what is crucial here is its heterogeneous nature. The process of co-mobilization does not imply a unified mass movement or common goals; on the contrary, different
sectors may imbue different significations into their mobilization, be inspired by different interests or motivations, and indeed have quite diverging strategies behind their collective action. As a result, early initiators may lose control over the demands, the repertoires of action, and the meanings attributed to the mobilization. This heterogeneous nature of co-mobilization is referred to as “dispersed mobilization” (Dobry, 1983:399) and represents one of the largest threats to cohesion of a mass movement. Multisectorial mobilization, however, is by nature ephemeral. As routine political functions return and sectorial logics are resumed, accusations of betrayal or hijacking of the movement can ensue. Indeed, competition for symbolic control and definition of the true meaning of the mobilization often accompany the process of re-objectivation.

In this framework, thus, the siding together or more explicit cooperation of different sectors during an act of mobilization still represents a strategic move. However, rather than being a product of strategic choice designed to further specific goals, it is better understood as a reflection of processes of dispersed mobilization, disobjectivation, and fluid social relations. It should not be mistaken, thus, for unity of purpose.

Empirical applications of Dobry’s analytical framework has ranged from whole-sale application to categories of political phenomenon to partial utilization of key concepts to describe certain instances of mobilization and social movement dynamics. For example, Banegas borrows directly from Dobry to argue in favor of multisectorial mobilization for analysis of democratic transitions (Banegas, 1993). Bennani-Chraibi and Fillieule (2012), for their part, advocate building a sociology of revolutionary situations that is largely inspired by Dobry’s framework and the emphasis placed on relational dynamics, non-predictable and highly contingent moves, as well as the capacity of his model to dissect actors’ decision-making without recourse to assumptions of rationality. In less holisitic applications, Dobry’s framework for understanding moves/counter-moves is utilized by Badimon (2011) in order to explain shifts in rules and transgressions of conventions on the part of a unemployed-graduate activist groups in Morocco, while Cohen and Vauchez (2008) use the concept of unified social space to understand the blending of discourses amongst diverse sectors during the French referendum on the EU constitution. In this sense, the framework of multisectorial mobilization proves quite flexible across different empirical applications.

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The conceptual model of multisectorial mobilization to be built here takes as its point of departure that the support of the youth revolutionary movement to the military-deep state pole is a manifestation of dispersed mobilization. In this sense, it is less an active choice made to further movement goals based on the strategic calculation of shared interest than a result of the unpredictable dynamics and associated interpretations of the crisis itself. Although Dobry’s framework can be utilized to investigate a political phenomenon or event in a global sense, in this
case what is of interest is one particular sector only. As such, the analytical model to be developed here focuses on the mobilization dynamics of the youth revolutionary movement during the Tamarod protests/military coup, and in particular on the breakdown of the movement’s autonomy through fluidity in social relations and the process of disobjectivation. More precisely, this involves exploring the unification of social space during the summer’s political crisis, the arise of tactical interdependence and in particular how the exchange of strategic moves was interpreted and calculated by the movement, and how structural uncertainty modified the movement’s social position and thus its points of reference. Here, we would expect to find a breakdown in the sectorial logic of the movement as well as a favorable interpretation of the moves made by the military-deep state pole. In addition, the models searches for evidence of disobjectivation and in particular the breakdown in social complexity and social identities as well as non-routine fraternization. Finally, the analytical model considers the process of re-objectivation in the aftermath of the political crisis; here we would expect evidence of the return of sectorial logic as well as competition for control over meaning.

Like the previous framework, the application of the analytical model proves at least partially satisfactory. The unification of social space via mass mobilization is of course obvious during the several days of protest starting on June 30th, 2013 and ending four days later with the military’s removal of Morsi and his government from power. While exact numbers are difficult to pinpoint (especially given tendencies to grossly exaggerate), photo and video documents clearly show the mobilization of millions in the streets of Cairo as well as numerous other cities across the country. The participants of these protests represented a variety of different sectors: workers groups and unions, Salafist groups, former NDP bureaucrats, opposition political parties, as well as youth revolutionary groups who actively supported the Tamarod campaign. More importantly here, this unification of social space is detectable within the Tamarod campaign itself, as various groups – including those previously in an opposing role – joined the organizational structure (Saleh and Taylor, 2013). The same holds true for other youth revolutionary groups, such as the Revolutionary Socialists and the April 6 Movement-Democratic Front, who joined the coalition “June 30 Coordination Committee” that included previously rejected political parties (though within the leftist-liberal-secular pole), thus creating new unified social spaces of collective action. These unified social spaces became even more pronounced as the military entered the political contest, throwing its weight behind the protestors and demonstrating its willingness to intervene on behalf of the people.

Accompanying these various dimensions of unified of social space, evidence – though limited – of breakdown in sectorial logic can be detected. The youth revolutionary movement’s sectorial logic since the 2011 revolution has delineated the movement’s arena and repertoire of action, based on street activism as opposed to political organization, and the utilization of a variety of non-violent protest tactics (sit-ins, marches, human chains, etc...). In interviews, representatives of the
movement often speak of their distinct niche outside the political sphere, which they refer to as "revolutionary pureness" (al-naqa’a al-saouri) (personal interview, 08 May 2013). In this vein, the movement refrains from directly entering into party politics and electoral contests, and instead assumes a role of “apolitical” (i.e. non-aligned) opposition that is expressed through protests or other acts of resistance (personal interview, 16 April 2013). This sectorial logic has also defined the content of contestation: the movement sees itself as a watchdog to ensure that the “values of the revolution” are fulfilled, but does not prescribe specific political programs or policies (personal interview, 13 May 2013). The collaborations mentioned above thus represent in themselves a certain breakdown in sectorial logic: such forms of overt cooperation were quite difficult to conceive prior to the political crisis, as youth revolutionary groups have prided themselves on their autonomy and refusal to work with existing political parties. Further evidence of breakdown in sectorial logic can be seen in the political aspirations and discourses of the movement during and after the mass protest and subsequent coup. The Tamarod campaign, for example, assumed a much more political role than had previously been occupied by youth revolutionary groups, making direct political demands and even creating a political organization, the June 30 Front, to manage the transitional period (Tamarod statement, 26 June 2013). This disruption of sectorial logic is even more pronounced with the group’s support of the military’s use of force against “terrorism” (Facebook, 24 July 2013), a position that runs clearly counter with the sectorial logic of non-violence. Such breakdowns in sectorial logic are, however, more difficult to ascertain with other revolutionary groups. The April 6 Movement – Democratic Front as well as the April 6 Youth Movement see the adoption of the military’s anti-terrorism discourse on their Facebook pages and Twitter feeds in July 2013, which is perhaps indicative of blended sectorial logics. The Revolutionary Socialists, however, continued their rejection of both the feloul as well as the military even in the height of the political crisis (Twitter, 01 July 2013).

With regards to tactical interdependence, the type of actions that were proposed by the youth revolutionary movement benefitted from the increased resources that multisectorial mobilization promoted. Although the signature campaign in the lead-up to June 30th had garnered enormous support and attention, the number of participants at the actual protests could not be known beforehand, nor could the reaction of either the military or the Muslim Brotherhood. Interview data in fact indicates that many were apprehensive of potential reprisals from the security apparatus as well as violent confrontations with the Brotherhood. The massive turn-out on June 30th, however, allowed for a rapid re-calculation in tactics on the part of the youth revolutionary movement. By the next day, Tamarod and the April 6 Youth Movement both made statements to the press calling for mass civil disobedience should Morsi not heed the demand for resignation and early presidential elections; likewise, the Revolutionary Socialists released a statement calling for a general strike until the fall of the regime. More importantly, however, was the exchange of moves with the military and how this was interpreted by the movement. In their July 1st statement, Tamarod also
appealed to the military and the deep-state to side with the protesters, calling for "state institutions including the army, the police and the judiciary, to clearly side with the popular will as represented by the crowds". The statement by the military later that day to give Morsi 48 hours to resolve the situation or face forceful removal seemed a direct response; indeed, the Tamarod campaign interpreted this move as proof of unity of purpose, with the group's spokespersons repeating the oft-heard phrase "the army and the people are one hand". The April 6 Youth Movement also supported the military's statement, stating that it matched the demands of the people (Twitter, 02 July 2013) and was a continuation of the 2011 revolution (Twitter, 04 July 2013). However, this strategic move by the military was not universally interpreted as evidence of shared goals. The Revolutionary Socialists, for example, rejected the army's statement as early as July 2nd, calling instead for continued protests and a uniquely civilian transitional path (Facebook, 02 July 2013).

The state of fluid social relations and its impact on sectorial autonomy can also be identified in the structural uncertainty provoked during the June 30th protests and ensuing political upheavals. This is most clearly demonstrated with regards to Tamarod. A group who came into existence only two months earlier, the success of the protests and the military's subsequent intervention suddenly lifted the unknown organizers into a leadership role. On July 3rd, the group's spokesperson met with General Al-Sisi to discuss the deposing of Morsi, thereby placing the group in a powerful position as representative of the people's demands and granting the group decision-making powers (Saleh and Taylor, 2013). Even beyond Tamarod, however, the structural uncertainty of the moment of crisis dramatically transformed the social position of the youth revolutionary movement. As mentioned in the previous section, the movement was in decline since the election of Morsi, having lost a good deal of its popular appeal as well as internal cohesion by spring 2012. The summer protests reversed these dwindling fortunes and indeed breathed new life into the movement. Discussions on Facebook and Twitter indicate that activists experienced the protests and deposing of Morsi as a re-setting of the revolutionary clock, an almost return to the immediate post-Mubarak days of 2011, and as such as certain de-contextualization from the events over the past two years and the inherited relationship between the military-deep state pole and the youth revolutionary movement. This loss of normal sectorial points of reference – and an almost willful ignoring of the past – is in fact alluded to in an interview with movement leaders who opposed the military's intervention and its popular support (van Lagendonck, 2013).

In addition to fluidity in social relations, there seems to be strong evidence of disobjectivation during the summer's political upheavals. The suspension of social complexity, marked by the suppression of social identities and stigmas, seems obvious in the discussions advocating inclusiveness as mentioned in the analysis in the previous section (p.12). Moreover, non-routine fraternization was clearly on display in the early days of the military's intervention and establishment of the interim government. The collaboration of youth revolutionary groups with the Al-Nour Salafist party (albeit short-lived) is a prime example. Though these two groups had found
themselves bitterly divided in opposing camps during the November 2012 constitution crisis, the suspension of social complexity succeeded in reducing their social identities to the minimum common denominator: opposition to the Muslim Brotherhood. This process of disobjectivation was also accompanied by the feeling of euphoria that Dobry’s model predicts. Members of the youth revolutionary movement express in social media their overwhelming joy with the overthrow of Morsi, frequently using words such as “glorious” to describe the situation.

Following this ephemeral moment of joy, however, a return of sectorial logic has become evident, especially as many organizations within the youth revolutionary movement have expressed their opposition to the interim government, the transitional roadmap, and the violence carried out by the military. The April 6 Youth Movement, for example, has become increasingly disillusioned, and now rejects both the military’s intervention as the transitional government put into place as being against the stated goals of the youth revolutionary movement. Ahmed Maher, the organization’s leader, published an opinion piece stating:

> We gave them our confidence and support, and all we received in return was a coup against the goals of the revolution and a reproduction of Hosni Mubarak’s policies... Despite my support for the June 30 revolutionary wave, and despite the fact that it was a people’s movement before it was a military intervention, I now see much to fear. I fear the insurrection against the principles of the Jan. 25 revolution, the continued trampling of human rights and the expansion of restrictive measures in the name of the war on terror — lest any opponent of the authorities be branded a terrorist. (Maher, 2013).

Indeed, this return of sectorial logic has led the creation of the Third Square, a new coalition of youth revolutionary activists, including the April 6 Youth Movement and the Revolutionary Socialists, that stands against both the Muslim Brotherhood as well as the military-deep state pole. Founded in late July, the group rejects the political process led by the interim government and the military as being anti-revolutionary, while at the same time refusing to support the pro-Morsi camp and its Anti-Coup Alliance. This position is perfectly reflective of the sectorial autonomy that bounded the movement prior to the June 30th protests. This process of re-objectivation, however, has also provoked contests within the movement. Tamarod has issued statements attacking the Third Square initiative as counter-productive to the transitional process. At the heart of this internal contest is profound disagreement over the nature of the political transition and the role of the military in Egyptian politics. While some groups such as Tamarod and the April 6 Movement – Democratic Front support the military’s actions as both necessary for security reasons and non-threatening to revolutionary aims, others such as the April 6 Youth Movement, Salafyo Costa, and the Revolutionary Socialists have come full circle, seeing in the political developments a successful counter-revolution.
**DISCUSSION**

The two analytical frameworks utilized here to explore why the youth revolutionary movement would support the military-deep state pole in the mass protests and military coup of summer 2013 each demonstrate a certain degree of empirical fit. With regards to the first model, based on the analysis of strategic choice and the establishment of a cross-movement, tacit alliance, there is fairly strong empirical evidence to correspond with the various dimensions of analysis proposed. There is strong evidence of a shift in the movement’s goals and priorities, from long-term objectives advocating profound societal and political change to a much more proximate goal of removing the Muslim Brotherhood from power. There is also strong evidence of an assessed need for extended human and tactical resources in order to achieve the necessary weight for the June 30th protests to succeed, as well as a perceived existential threat on the part of the movement. There is, however, no strong evidence of a recognized shared goal with the military-deep state pole, nor even any shift in the way the military was perceived in the lead-up to the protests/coup. The bigger problem with this model, however, is the lack of any hard evidence of an actual decision-making process on the part of the movement to support the military-deep state pole – even through the quite flimsy guise of a tacit alliance. While the analytical model and its application to empirical data as developed here can provide at least a partial explanation for this decision, whether or not such a decision was even actively made is strikingly absent. To verify this model’s proposed explanation, and thus conclude that the movement’s support represents some form of strategic alliance, further empirical data is necessary. This could most easily be achieved through new semi-structured interviews with movement leaders, and in particular Tamarod, in order to determine whether such a decision was actively made or not. Semi-structured interviews would also shed light on the inherent dilemma that this strategic choice entailed, and how these trade-offs were understood and negotiated by the movement. Such an approach would greatly enhance the understanding of this particular strategic choice.

With regards to the second model, there is also strong empirical evidence to support its various analytical dimensions, including the fluidity in social relations as well as disobectivation/re-objectivation. The phenomenon of tactical interdependence and structural uncertainty, as well as the suspension of social complexity and the contests for meaning, all appear easily when applied to the empirical data. What is less obvious, however, is the breakdown in sectorial logic. While certain evidence does indicate a degree of loss in the normal strategic parameters and bounds of action of the movement, how this is specifically tied to the unification of social space is somewhat less obvious. At best, what appears is a very fragmented and at times contradictory breakdown/re-appearance of sectorial logic, both across the movement and within individual movement organizations themselves; however, this is perhaps a reflection of the immensely rapid pace at which the protests and military intervention took place. In this sense, the uncertainty of the movement and its tactical positioning seems to fit quite nicely with Dobry’s own assertions of the unpredictability and contingency of
political crises. This analytical framework could benefit in a global sense from increased field interviews with movement leaders and rank-and-file activists alike in order to better understand how they interpreted these crucial days in late-June/early-July and the exchange of moves between their movement and the military-deep state pole.

Despite these shortcomings, having spent multiple months interviewing movement leaders, witnessing their protests, attending their meetings, and reading their documentary texts, my inclination is to support the explanation of multisectorial mobilization. Though the movement had become increasingly desperate, in terms of outlook but also tactical innovation, by spring 2013, the vitriol expressed when talking about the SCAF or feloul reduces in my mind the likelihood that a strategic choice to form an alliance – even tacit – was made. The supposition that the very quickly evolving dynamics, the suspension of social complexity, the desire to believe in unity of purpose, and most of all, the joyous feeling of a recaptured revolution, seems a more likely explanation of the movement’s support to the military-deep state pole.

What can be more strongly concluded, however, is that the support of the youth revolutionary movement to the military’s intervention and interim government has been at best tenuous, controversial, and internally-contested. Indeed, the empirical data demonstrates that many within the movement, such as the Revolutionary Socialists, never provided their support at all, while others, such as the April 6 Youth Movement, have largely backpedalled from their original position. The impression of universal support may in fact stem from the excessive attention placed on the Tamarod campaign and its organizers, who in fact were never representatives of the movement. This empirical reality renders the understanding of the movement’s position in tri-polar Egypt less neat and concise, but does add important nuance to the simplified image of bipolarity.
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