

Understanding the Processes of Asymmetric Warfare

The plight of the strong:

Actors, Dynamics and Strategy

Abstract

Asymmetric warfare has gradually become a common occurrence in an increasingly interconnected world, as the interactions between militarily unequal adversaries grow ever more frequent. Because the strong do not always emerge victorious, which we presume they would, the following question is warranted: *how can asymmetric warfare be understood?* In other words: how are we to understand the processes which enable weak actors to win against vastly superior adversaries.

To understand asymmetric warfare – in terms of acting, organising and thinking differently – the military strategic-interaction is examined, since strategy channels the means towards the desired goal.

Through the chosen theoretical approach and the examples – the French-Algerian war 1954-1962 and the Sunni-insurgency in Iraq 2003-2005 – it can be concluded that the cooperation of the local population is vital to avoid failure. War-winning strategies where the military matter gain primacy over political have proven less viable, as the unavoidable collateral damage generates a downward spiral ending in a loss of legitimacy or moral decay.

War-terminating strategies, providing incentive for cooperation are theoretically a better option but only if the civilians are not harmed. These strategies are still very fragile as they have not only an extensive set of goals making them complex but also because strong actors have large and accessible contact surfaces. As such it is easy to target and disrupt the goals of the strong actor *i.e.* generating a similar result as a failed war-winning strategy.

Keywords: Asymmetric warfare, Conflict outcome, Strategy, Algeria, Iraq


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Abbreviations

ACF – Anti-Coalition Force
CCE – Comité de Coordination et d’Exécution
CF – Coalition Force
COIN – Counterinsurgency
CPA – Coalition Provisional Authority
CRUA – Comité Révolutionnaire d’Unité et d’Action
DA – Direct Attack
FLN – Front de Libération Nationale
FRE – Former Regime Element
GWS – Guerrilla Warfare Strategy
IED – Improvised Explosive Device
IGC – Interim Governing Council
MTLD – Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Libertés Démocratiques
NCO – Non-Commission Officer
NGO – Non-Governmental Organisation
OPA – Organisation Politico-Administrative
RG – Republican Guard
RoE – Rules of Engagement
RPG – Rocket Propelled Grenade
SAR – Sunni-Arab Rejectionist
SAS – Section Administrative Spécialisée
SRG – Special Republican Guard
UCW – Unconventional Warfare
UDMA – Union Démocratique du Manifeste Algérien
UN – United Nations
UNSC – United Nations Security Council
U.S. – United States
WWI – World War I
WWII – World War II
3GW – Third Generation Warfare
4GW – Fourth Generation Warfare



MAP 3
FRENCH OPERATIONS 1959-60



Source: Maurice Challe, *Notre revolte* (Paris: Plon 1974).

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
GEOGRAPHY:

- MAP
- PLACE NAMES

FATALITIES, BY COUNTRY:

- U.S.A.
- UNITED KINGDOM
- ITALY
- UKRAINE
- POLAND
- SPAIN
- BULGARIA
- SLOVAKIA
- NETHERLANDS
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- THAILAND
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1 Preface

As the world gets ever more interconnected there is a growing tendency for interactions between highly unequal adversaries, unequal in the sense of a disparity in military power. The United Nations as well as the United States and various coalitions have become more and more involved in local crises.

In the light of history, this type of interaction has not been entirely favourable for the strong actor. Ever since the emergence of revolutionary warfare, *i.e.* guerrilla warfare, in the 1940s these small wars have been occupying the minds of most liberal-governments. This of course is merely a part of a much wider and older phenomenon dating back to Sun Tzu 400 B.C., and is also very much prevalent today, in the form of insurgencies and global terrorism.

The discrepancy in power, which we assume between the actors and believe to have an impact, has actually proven less vital for strong actors' ability to achieve their goals. As there have been vast increases in the interactions, and given the frequency of the occurrence of what is known as asymmetric conflicts, there is a need to understand the relations on which this type of war is based and the processes that occur.

On this broad concept of asymmetric warfare there are numerous books written. Yet these often get entangled in specific cases or subcategories of the concept such as guerrilla warfare or terrorism, which most likely are results of the desire possessed by the United States to counter the phenomenon it faces. But these approaches are not enough since they only deal with specific occurrences depending on local conditions. There is therefore a need to view the problem from a broader perspective, which has yet to be thoroughly examined, as few books have been published on the topic.

Thus my primary question is: *how can asymmetric warfare be understood?* By asymmetric warfare I mean the processes which enable weak actors to win wars against vastly superior adversaries. The purpose of this thesis is therefore to provide an understanding of asymmetric warfare and its processes in general and of asymmetric outcome in particular.

1.1 Method and limitations

In order to pursue these questions and unveil the processes of asymmetric warfare, I choose to approach the problem at a conceptual level. Thus the first part of the thesis is aimed at defining and framing the general traits of asymmetry (*chapter 2*). In doing so, I avoid the lure which the focus on methods, such as guerrilla warfare and terrorism, poses. These methods are only subparts of the wider

concept, a focus upon them would therefore not adequately contribute to the understanding of the concept as a whole.

I have used the part – *Defining asymmetry as a concept* – before in a thesis on the topic of *Intelligence analysis*, which focused on the intelligence aspect of asymmetry. The conclusions displayed not only an asymmetry in material power favouring the strong, but also an opposite asymmetry in actual intelligence capabilities in terms of acquiring intelligence through various sources. The definition was however intended for this thesis, which was unfinished at the time.

Why I use or re-use this definition is because it provides the reader with an introduction to the conceptual level and narrows down the rather vague term asymmetric warfare. Throughout *chapter 2* I will define strong and weak actors in terms of power relation, because they by no means are confined to states respectively non-state actors.

The next step is to understand asymmetric conflict-outcome. On this there is basically no or little viable research. Thomas X. Hammes for example, provides an understanding of the different types of warfare used by strong and weak actors. The problem is that it cannot be scientifically tested in regards to conflict-outcomes, which also applies to other research done on the topic.

I therefore used Ivan Arreguin-Toft's strategic-interaction theory (2.1.1). To him the strategic-interaction between actors is what generates political vulnerability, which in turn explains conflict-outcome. In his research he has already critically assessed and rejected four competing theories: *nature of actor*, *arms-diffusion*, Gil Merom's *democratic social squeamishness* and Andrew Mack's *interest asymmetry*. These are according to Arreguin-Toft important, yet not sufficient to explain asymmetric conflict-outcome.¹

Strategy could be defined as the guideline which channels an actor's means towards a desired goal. Within the concept of strategy both military and political power is included, as they are closely related. Arreguin-Toft temporarily disconnects military power from political for the purpose of understanding the interaction between actors. It is a fruitful approach because military power is more tangible than the complex nature of political power, hence easier to measure.

Like many theoretical models it is not without its problems, as Arreguin-Toft notes. Many factors influence any given situation and thus pose a problem to the simplicity of it, which also validates my use of relative power to connect it with the actual outcome of the conflict as it in the end is political.

The forms and dimensions of strategic-asymmetry provided by Steven Metz & Douglas Johnson II (2.1.2) will not only be used throughout the thesis as a terminology, but will also serve as a help in order to relate the asymmetric processes in the examples to the wider context, *i.e.* strategy. Metz & Johnson II's discussion is centred on the asymmetry in actors chosen strategies.

In *chapter 3*, two examples are introduced – the French-Algerian war 1954-1962 and the Sunni-insurgency in Iraq 2003-2005, with a focus on the United

¹ Arreguin-Toft (2005), p. 202; For further reading regarding the other theories and the conclusions, see: Chapter 2 & 8

States. These will serve the purpose of illustrating different aspects and processes of asymmetric warfare. I focus on the strategic-interaction, which is based on the way the war was fought in general, but also some of its distinctive features. The thesis should not be read as a case study, since it falls beyond the scope to study and evaluate different cases thoroughly. The focus is on the underlying processes.

The examples were chosen with three prerequisites: a confined area with a weak non-state actor and a strong external actor – France being an external colonial power, yet considered Algeria as an integral part of France. As such I exclude global terrorism which displays the same dynamics and traits but in a more vague manner. The two latter conditions entail a vast power-discrepancy between the actors, which are exacerbated by the fact that the armed forces were already defeated. They are therefore extreme examples which should validate the theories' applicability to examples with a lesser power-discrepancy as well.

The choice of two Arab countries seems to entail a limitation. On the contrary, fractioned societies are prevalent all over the world, not different from Algeria and Iraq during the occupations. Furthermore, the examples in the study are separated by 40 years of global processes, which presumably would add credibility to the validity and the comprehensiveness of the theories used.

Chapter 3 begins with an actor-analysis (3-3.1.2) which is based partly on Thomas X. Hammes' theory on the evolution of warfare. It comprises important aspects of the actors that contribute to the understanding of how they wage war. Throughout *chapter 3* weak actors will be understood as non-state actors and strong actors as states or coalitions of states.

An analysis of the interaction between the actors and of the outcome is provided for in part 3.2-3.3. I will provide a general outline of the strategic-approach adopted by the weak actor and the measures taken by the strong actor to counter it, hence using the theories of Arreguin-Toft and Metz & Johnson II.

More specific cases will be used to indicate and illustrate the strategies chosen. Most military encounters in Iraq took place in the cities and I have therefore chosen Fallujah to illustrate the interactions between the actors. As for Algeria, I will use the most common scenes for the skirmishes: rural and urban areas. Because the weak actors did not change their general strategy these "cases" will serve as good indicators for the interaction between the actors.

I stopped collecting material in June 2007. However, as the conflict in Iraq is an ongoing conflict I restricted the timeframe to the beginning of 2005 due to limitations concerning the availability of quality material.

Chapter 2 focuses on the general theoretical approach towards asymmetry: the definitions (2), the importance of strategy (2.1), the strategic-interaction theory (2.1.1), and finally the forms and dimensions of strategic-asymmetry (2.1.2). *Chapter 3* illustrates the processes explained in *chapter 2*. The first part (3-3.1.2) is an introduction to the actors, which is followed by the interactions (3.2-3.3). Even though it is not a case study, a comprehensive analysis of the processes which preceded the wars will be given in *appendix A* as well as chronologies of the respective history and the interactions: *appendix B* (Algeria) and *appendix C* (Iraq). These parts are added as a complement, since conflicts never occur in a void, but almost always as a result of a complicated and complex set of relations.

1.1.1 Authors

The composition of the theoretical approach is a product of thorough study on available material within the realm of asymmetric warfare. I found only minor variations concerning the general definition of asymmetric warfare.

The primary books used in the thesis were written by authors who are considered prominent within their respective fields of research. They were however complemented with books and articles written by authors of various backgrounds and academic disciplines, which will be presented in the text. All literature used concerning the definitions, the actors and the examples were cross-referenced to enhance the reliability. This was possible in almost all cases.

Ivan Arreguin-Toft's theory is a compilation of previous articles written by the author. Political scientist Arreguin-Toft has a background as an intelligence officer in the U.S. army and he is a Fellow of the International Security Programme at the John F. Kennedy school of Government at Harvard University.

The terminology used in the thesis is based on the report written by political scientist Steven Metz, and Douglas V. Johnson II. Both have held several important positions within various War Colleges and institutions in America. The report was compiled on behalf of the U.S. Army and Marine Corps; consequently they argue from the perspective of U.S. national security.

Regarding the actors, I used the concept of fourth generation warfare. Retired Colonel Thomas X. Hammes of the U.S. Marine Corps provides good insight into the actors in asymmetric warfare. His conclusions do however deviate from William S. Lind's – one of the founders of the concept. Yet this does not concern this thesis, since the parts used are consistent with the views of both authors.

For the cases I usually turned to a different type of authors. Regarding Algeria the thesis relies heavily on Alistair Horne, who is a renowned British historian of modern France. Especially celebrated is his book *A Savage War of Peace* which I used in order to identify the strategy adopted by the actors.

Authors who participated in Algeria on behalf of the French were also used, bearing in mind that their accounts may be biased and flawed as they are based on memories. The book by David Galula, a French military officer, is a reissue of a document on counterinsurgency written for the RAND Corporation in 1963, upon which his concise and celebrated book *Counterinsurgency Warfare* is based.

The book by intelligence officer Paul Aussaresses is rather controversial as it deals with the atrocities committed, yet I do not doubt the extent described as he admits his own participation. It is however questionable whether they occurred on behalf of the authorities in Algeria as he claims, thus being state-sanctioned which is something the French government never has admitted. Regarding the strategy used – being relevant for this thesis – his book is coherent with Horne's.

Concerning the Iraqi example, I rely primarily on Ahmed S. Hashim, who is a professor of strategic studies at the U.S. Naval War College. There are questionable parts of the book since all the facts on the war have yet to surface, but from the perspective of the thesis it is excellent. Another author used is Richard H. Shultz Jr. – an American professor of political science with more than 20 years of experience from war studies. He specializes on low-intensity warfare.

2 Defining asymmetry as a concept

Of what does asymmetry comprise? A somewhat common though inaccurate definition would be disproportionate strengths, even though it is one of the premises. Asymmetry by definition has to be viewed in relation to symmetry which it cannot exist without, yet always is the opposite of.

Symmetry is what *Rod Thornton*, British professor in International Security, calls mirror imaging, which means likeness, however with the possibility of being a smaller image. Disproportionate strength is a constant factor in war according to *M. L. R. Smith*, British lecturer at Kings College. Symmetric wars are commonly referred to as conventional, as this is the type of warfare waged by states. *Patrick Porter*, another lecturer at Kings College, define them as wars fought by large-scale, regular, uniformed and state-owned forces which are engaged in direct and concentrated conflicts seeking to destroy the enemy's capacity to wage war.²

However, the definition of conventional warfare made by western theorists is rather inaccurate since it does not solely involve state actors, just as one cannot assume that asymmetric wars always include a non-state actor. Smith further states that the definition was never the convention, but instead was considered as more important due to the disastrous effect of wars between great powers. Thus a degree of ethnocentrism as well lay behind the definition. This type of warfare has never been the prevalent form. Since 1945 only 18-20% of the wars fought constituted interstate wars, as political scientist *Kalevi J. Holsti* concludes, which reaffirms the study by political scientists *James D. Fearon & David D. Laitin*.³

Instead of confining asymmetric warfare to the interaction between states and non-state actors it should be viewed as something vastly different, not alike, and in the western view unethical or unfair. As Thornton explains, the methods should be radically different, being outside the norms of warfare and including actions which you cannot or will not perform. It is as a result also based on what is considered to be the convention at a given time.

I believe *Steven Metz & Douglas V. Johnson II*, through their extensive experience on the topic, have developed the best working definition of what they define as strategic-asymmetry which means that asymmetry reside in strategy. They explain it to be acting, organising and thinking differently in order to maximize one's own advantages and exploit the weakness of the enemy.⁴

The definition contains premises of a perceived weak actor, which due to a lack of capacity needs to turn to other means. By definition it is born as a reaction

² Porter (2006), p. 552; Smith (2003), pp. 21-22; Thornton (2007), p. 4

³ Fearon & Laitin (2003), p. 75; Holsti (1998), p. 23; Smith (2003), pp. 30-31

⁴ Metz & Johnson II (2001), p. 5; Thornton (2007), p. 4

against a superior enemy. Thornton explains by quoting Isaac Newton's third rule of movement, "for every action is an equal opposite reaction". Often though, the strong do not believe that iron rules apply to them. He further quotes a passage in Thucydides' *Melian Dialogue* where an Athenian general states – "the strong do what they will, the weak do what they must".⁵

How then does the definition apply to warfare? The world has changed since the end of *World War II* (WWII) and with it the sovereignty of the nation-state has declined. This process has, according to retired colonel *Thomas X. Hammes*, taken place on political, economic and social levels and at different rates for different aspects of society. Yet they do not necessarily go in the same direction.

What has happened is that the numbers of actors on the international arena have increased. The amount of states, international organisations, *non-governmental organisations* (NGO) and sub-state actors has made international relations more complex. The borders of the state have declined as nations with demands are able to make themselves heard while international and transnational organisations are able to infringe on the sovereignty of the nation-state. One of the factors causing this is the increased interconnectedness enabled by the evolution in communication technology which has made the borders more transparent, duly noted by senior analyst *Gregory F. Treverton* of the RAND Corporation.⁶

In short, the world has become "smaller" – less state-controlled or in the popular term more globalized – which has its implications since the interconnectedness generates vulnerabilities. By force is not the only way to defeat an adversary, since it is possible to influence actors by subtler means.

Richard N. Haass, author of numerous books and articles on the topic, explains that there are different kinds of power: military, economic, social, cultural and diplomatic, all being relative. Power in itself stands for potential and capacity which needs to be translated into influence. This, basically, corresponds to the old and well-quoted statement by the classic German military theorist *Carl von Clausewitz* that war is a continuation of politics by other means and should never be something autonomous.⁷

Smith contributes by stating that the course of the war will partially be determined by the relative powers of each combatant, influencing how they choose to engage the enemy in order to maximise their strengths. The actions and tactics pursued in war will, consequently, affect its direction and duration.

The idea of relative power is very important since weaker actors may wish to alter the influence of the adversary, hence compensating for military inferiority in order to achieve their political goals. As Smith puts it, viewing war as a bargaining process helps us understand conflicts and their outcome between highly unequal adversaries. War, thus, is a full spectrum activity ranging across all aspects of human endeavour.⁸

⁵ Thornton, Rod, 2007. *Asymmetric Warfare: Threat and Responses in the Twenty-First Century*, p. 23

⁶ Hammes (2006), pp. 33-39; Treverton (2001), p. 19

⁷ Haass (2005), pp. 60-64; Von Clausewitz (1982), pp. 402-410

⁸ Smith (2003), pp. 35-36

2.1 Strategy's importance for the outcome of asymmetric conflicts

Defining asymmetry is the first step towards understanding these conflicts and their outcome. As Smith portrayed it, viewing war as a bargaining process with relative power as the prime variable enables us to get a first insight into the strength of different actors. Power in war is primarily viewed as military power, and power in itself is the key to understanding war in general. As suggested above, using a different focus than the opponent could enable an actor to equalise the seemingly superior power of the opponent.

But power in itself is not sufficient as an explanation of asymmetric conflict outcomes, as political scientist *Ivan Arreguin-Toft* points out. His research suggests that between 1800 and 2003 the strong actor has lost 28% of the engagements where they enjoyed a minimal 5:1 superiority in power. Even more interesting, the strong actors have with time lost more and more engagements; 1800-1849 they won 88%, 1900-1949 (65%) and 1950-1999 (48%).⁹

Arreguin-Toft focuses his attention on strategy, which according to him is the key in explaining asymmetric conflict outcomes. Strategy can be understood as the guideline which channel an actor's means and effort in order to achieve its overarching objective. Both Arreguin-Toft and the prominent professor of war studies, *Michael I. Handel*, point out that by choosing a strategy the ultimate goal is to win by the lowest cost possible, as strategy can act as a force multiplier. To quote the famous Chinese military theorist *Sun Tzu*: "to subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill".¹⁰

For his purpose Arreguin-Toft separates grand strategy – described by Haass above – from mere strategy. Grand strategy is the totality of an actor's resources which are directed toward military, political or economical objectives. Arreguin-Toft defines strategy as an "actor's plan for using armed forces to achieve military or political goals". These two are of course intimately related as an actor strives towards an objective.¹¹ As such war should be understood as the continuation of politics, and the understanding of the outcome in an asymmetric conflict needs to be viewed in light of strategy since it guides the actor's effort.

2.1.1 The strategic-interaction theory

Arreguin-Toft presumes that every strategy has an ideal counterstrategy and if an actor can guess the right strategy he can execute a counterstrategy to win. His study reveals that in 78% of the asymmetric conflicts examined, the actor that lost

⁹ Arreguin-Toft (2005), pp. 2-4

¹⁰ Arreguin-Toft (2005), p. 200; Handel (1989), p. 364; Tzu, Sun, 1990. *The Art of War*, p. 77

¹¹ Arreguin-Toft, Ivan, 2005. *How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict*, pp. 29-30

did not switch strategy. Naturally there are constraints in choosing strategy, such as the availability of forces, equipment, training, technology, the perception of the enemy as well as blocked desires by the interests of internal actors.

To prove his point, Arreguin-Toft divides strategy into two categories: offensive strategy and defensive strategy. In doing so he makes two assumptions: 1. Strong actors initiate the asymmetric conflict and 2. The strategies are war-winning rather than war-terminating, which means he isolates the military approach *i.e.* strategy. He presumes that the strong actor is always on the offensive and that both the strong and the weak actor have two available approaches: the direct and the indirect.

The direct approach targets the adversary's armed forces. *Conventional attack* thus means to use armed forces to capture or destroy an adversary's forces and thereby gaining control of the opponent's value (population, territory, cities, vital industries or communication centres). The objective is to win by destroying the enemy's physical capacity to resist through one or a series of decisive battles. *Conventional defence* therefore implies the use of armed forces to prevent the adversary's army from capturing or destroying values and strategic resources.

The indirect approach targets the will to resist. As Arreguin-Toft's outset is war-winning strategies, the strong actor only has *barbarism* as a choice. This approach means the deliberate or systematic harm of non-combatants in pursuit of political objectives. The examples he lists are strategic bombing-campaigns, the use of concentration-camps and *Counterinsurgency* (COIN). These are barbarian when they target non-combatants indiscriminately to destroy the opponent's will and capacity to fight. It does however imply an acceptance of collateral damage, and consequently considered to be high-risk strategic-asymmetry.

Yet, COIN can, as Norwegian professor of War Studies *Nils Marius Rekkedal* states, also entail *Direct Attack* (DA) targeting the opponent's military capacity to fight as well as its will by applying incentive for the opponent and the population to stop resisting – referred to as *Unconventional Warfare* (UCW). As such it is a war-terminating strategy and falls beyond the scope of Arreguin-Toft's study.

Likewise the *Guerrilla Warfare Strategy* (GWS) targets the strong actors' will by imposing costs from using force without direct confrontations. These costs include the loss of soldiers, their supply infrastructure, peace of mind and time. Two elements are necessary: sanctuary and a supportive population which can provide intelligence, supplies and recruitment.

It is very similar to using *terrorism*, which just as GWS is a sub-group of the indirect approach. Terrorism however is a high-risk strategy that can result in a backlash as the population could withdraw their support. Using indirect defence implies a reliance on the restraint of the opponent, as key-values, which cannot be defended, are sacrificed for time. Another sub-group is *non-violent resistance*.

The interaction between *direct offence* and *direct defence* implies a shared view on the values over which the war is fought. In essence, the view on the implications of a defeat, the rules of war or the capture of values are shared.

When the strategy of *direct offence* is adopted against *indirect defence* there is a discrepancy over key values as the weak actor sacrifices the conventional ones for time. Targeting the weak actor's physical capacity will have implications due

to the indirect defence adopted by the weak. The strong will have difficulty distinguishing non-combatants from combatants which yields collateral damage.

If a strong actor adopts *indirect offence* when facing *direct defence*, the strategic bombing campaigns, blockades and economic sanctions can according to Arreguin-Toft go either way. It will mainly affect non-combatants, which could change the behaviour of the weak actor as people turn against the defenders. He assumes that strong actors will lose since it is time-consuming and leans toward barbarism. These last two interactions are strategically asymmetric.

If the strong actor engages a weak by using *indirect offence* when facing *indirect defence* he ignores the restraints that indirect defence relies on. Thus the weak actor is unlikely to win since it relies on the networks of social support which is targeted by the strong actor. Barbarism in the last two examples is not a viable option since it tends to be both militarily and politically counterproductive. It will most likely yield a stronger resistance among the population as well as political costs due to international and domestic criticism.¹²

Arreguin-Toft comes to the conclusion after testing his theory on 202 cases that strong powers are more likely to win interactions when the same type of strategy is adopted (78.6% of the cases). They are also likely to lose an opposite-approach (63%) (an asymmetry in strategies), which tends to last longer: 2.27 years in contrast to 1.57 years.

The frequency of the opposite-interaction has increased over the years, which according to Arreguin-Toft stands in rough proportion to the strong actor failure over time. This could be a sign of the globalization process as the possibility to affect the strong actor increases as well as the ability to learn from other cases. The importance of arms-diffusion can neither be excluded as Arreguin-Toft concludes, since weak actors gain more power and therefore get more options for strategies, yet the effect of it will still be absent if the wrong strategy is adopted.

Basically he concludes that strong actors who have not fought small wars recently are more inclined to lose since they have adapted to conventional warfare. Their doctrine and equipment are designed to fight conventional wars and not asymmetric. This does not necessarily mean that they will lose the war, as both Arreguin-Toft and Handel clarify, but that their initial cost will be higher than anticipated and will yield political costs if the conflict lingers on. They can however still lose the war as remarked by Arreguin-Toft if they adopt the wrong strategy. As seen above barbarism is not a viable option, which suggests that the weak can use an indirect strategy successfully.¹³

2.1.2 The dimensions and forms of strategic-asymmetry

The strategic-asymmetry described by Arreguin-Toft, between states as well as between states and non-state actors, assumes different forms and dimensions as

¹² Arreguin-Toft (2005), pp. 30-33, 36-41 & 203; Rekkedal (2006), pp. 356-359

¹³ Arreguin-Toft (2005), pp. 44-47 & 217-222; Handel (1989), pp. 229-230

Metz & Johnson II concludes. The forms could be explained as the various ways to gain an advantage over the enemy. The two most common forms are *methods* and *technology*. Asymmetry in methods entails using different operational concepts and tactical doctrines than the enemy, in which guerrilla war is included.

Asymmetry of *will* is an important aspect and most common if an actor sees his survival or vital interest at stake. This implies a lesser commitment to conform to moral and legal grounds and a willingness to accept greater costs due to desperation. It is thus connected to a *normative* asymmetry which implies incompatible ethical and legal principles. Ethnic cleansing, human-shields and terrorism are the opposite of what a foreign power – who needs to uphold a high moral ground – would deem ethical, as the interactions in Bosnia proved.

Metz & Johnson II also mentions asymmetry of *organisation*. By this they mean organisational innovations of existing technology which can generate an advantage. Blitzkrieg, being a conventional approach based on military power, used operational innovations as well organisational by combining tanks, aircrafts and troop transportation to achieve an advantage. Finally asymmetry of *time* can be of crucial importance. This occurs when one actor is willing to fight a long war while the other only can sustain the will for a short period of time. *United States* (U.S.) for example prefers short wars as they enjoy strategic mobility.¹⁴

The different dimensions of strategic-asymmetry are inherent in its nature. It could be *positive* or *negative*, meaning the ability to utilize superiority to gain an advantage or the opposite, exploiting the opponent's weaknesses and vulnerabilities. Most strategic-asymmetries are *short term*, as the opponent sooner or later will adapt or else risk a defeat as Arreguin-Toft concludes. In the words of the 16th century Italian author *Niccolo Machiavelli*, success can be maintained over time by changing behaviour.¹⁵ The blitzkrieg serves as a good example of a short-term positive asymmetry, as the Russians in the end were able to counter it.

Low risk asymmetry such as superior training or leadership may entail costs to develop and maintain, but yields a lower strategic and operational risk. Terrorism on the other hand may be low cost but fairly experimental as the desired effects may not be achieved and can even result in a backlash. The *material* and *psychological* asymmetry are interrelated as a material advantage often results in a psychological. Propagating an image of fierceness can also obtain a psychological advantage, which is a cheaper alternative yet harder to maintain.

Lastly strategic-asymmetry is most often attained *by default*, which means that it is not a conscious act. Strong actors rarely reflect upon asymmetry as they are in no need to do so. Weak actors by contrast often enter the asymmetric path as they have a limited amount of resources. There are of course exceptions, *Mao Tse-Tung's* guerrilla war being one, although it used relative power to equalise the enemy's military advantage with the goal of ultimately engaging the enemy by conventional means.¹⁶

¹⁴ Metz & Johnson II (2001), pp. 9-12

¹⁵ Arreguin-Toft, see page 7-8; Machiavelli (1961), p. 35; Metz & Johnson II (2001), pp. 6-7

¹⁶ Metz & Johnson II (2001), pp. 7-8; Tse-Tung (2000), pp. 21-22

3 To loose peace after a successful war: French-Algeria (1954-1962) and the U.S. occupation of Iraq (2003-2005)

External interventions are in one way or another almost solely performed by states, either as single actors or in forms of coalitions. Some of the most important traits of states are illustrated in Hammes' theories of the four generations of warfare. I will however proceed to the *third generation* (3GW), as it currently is the prevalent type among states.

In 3GW the war of movement was reintroduced with the use of tanks, aircrafts and long-range artillery in combination with tactical innovations and radio for improved coordination. The new objectives were to strike at key points such as command centres. As the dependency on heavy mechanics increased so did the reliance on a national effort to produce the economic means as well as educated personnel to build, equip and sustain a modern army.¹⁷

The military power of the state is hence based on its society as a whole. The military, just as its government, is comprised of the huge and often sluggish centralized bureaucracy needed to manage the logistical support and coordination of a large and mobile army. Thornton suggests that these traits often incline reluctance against implementing changes.

As Porter stated, the army of the state is based on conventional warfare as this is the type that generally threatens the state. These armies are trained to fight short wars with superior precision-weapons. Rekkedal underlines that strong actors favour conventional wars as they benefit from their technological advantage.¹⁸

Being a state, France possessed military resources vastly superior to anything the *Front de Libération Nationale* (FLN) could muster. It possessed a navy which conducted maritime surveillance that intercepted large quantities of weapons and an air force which could transport infantry and conduct air strikes against potential insurgent's nests, as argued by the professors of international relations respectively history *Martin S. Alexander and J. F. V. Keiger*.¹⁹

Like France, the U.S. possesses, according to Thornton, an air force and navy which currently cannot be matched by any other country and land-based conventional forces with superior firepower. As the strongest economic power it also has the kind of resources which are valuable when engaging in COIN, as they according to Hammes can be very useful for rebuilding the country and gaining

¹⁷ Hammes (2006), pp. 23-31

¹⁸ Porter, see page 5; Rekkedal (2006), p. 48; Thornton (2007), pp. 172-173

¹⁹ Alexander & Keiger (2002), chapter 1

the trust of the people.²⁰ Both France and the U.S. therefore enjoyed an asymmetric advantage in *material* and *technology*.

Both actors have been engaged in small wars, even though both have focused their resources on preparations for conventional ones. The U.S. did engage in and lose the war in Vietnam, as did France. Neither is a novice in small wars, as Professor *Ahmed S. Hashim* argues when referring to the U.S.²¹

France did however not perceive the gravity of the insurgency initially, as stressed by French military officer *David Galula*. Historian *Alistair Horne* and journalist *Michael Kettle* points out that it was not until 1956-1958 that the army began to defeat the insurgents on a purely military level. The explanation for this was the political reaction to the military success of the FLN, as well as the sudden influx of elite forces ending their tours in Indochina and Suez.²²

In the case of Iraq, Hammes explains that providing security primarily rests on the amount of troops deployed. The percentage of the coalition forces to the total number of inhabitants was very low, probably due to the commitment in Afghanistan. During the first year in Bosnia there were 19 troops per 1 000 inhabitants, in Iraq there were seven per 1 000. This means there were too few troops to provide security and nation-building assistance.²³ It indicates a light-hearted attitude towards the tasks and in effect also inadequate planning.

An issue concerning the U.S. more than France is the over-reliance on technical performances and firepower, which according to Handel leads to a neglect in non-material quality such as strategic planning. *John Gentry*, a retired lieutenant colonel at the U.S. Army Reserve, adds that it also heightens the expectation of the population on quick and decisive victories with minimal cost and casualties. This in turn results in force protection, which actually inhibits the military from doing their job and increases the reliance on technology.²⁴

Seeking to avoid casualties by using technological solutions based on mirror-imaging to solve non-material problems when facing insurgency actually enhances the former. *Steven Lee*, who is a professor of military ethics, concludes that weapons are only discriminate when used in a discriminate way. As the casualty risks of the intervening power increases so does the probability that it will retort to indiscriminate use of violence. This in effect will yield political costs, as pointed out by the Swiss professor *Albert A. Stahel*.²⁵

Regarding the condition of the state, France's economy was, according to Horne, drained by WWII and the engagements in Indochina. Politically, France could at best be described as unstable. During the war in Algeria the office of the Prime Minister was held generally only one year, with the exception of when General Charles de Gaulle returned to power 1958, in what has been described as a *coup d'état*. Galula underlines that the domestic public was satisfied with the

²⁰ Hammes (2006), p. 185; Thornton (2007), chapter 4-6

²¹ Hashim (2006), p. 271

²² Galula (2006), pp. 11 & 13; Horne (1977), p. 166; Kettle (1993), pp. 153-154

²³ Hammes (2006), p. 186

²⁴ Gentry (1998); Handel (1989), pp. 95-96 & 99

²⁵ Lee (2004), pp. 247-249; Stahel (2004), p. 442

peace in Indochina as colonies by that time were considered a liability, and thus not happy about another prospect of a protracted war in Algeria.²⁶

The *Coalition Forces* (CF) which entered Iraq on Operation Iraqi Freedom was led by the U.S. with Britain as the second largest force contributor. Since the U.S. could not get the approval of the *United Nation's Security Council* (UNSC) to perform an intervention in Iraq, it lacked legitimacy and was consequently basically forced to form a coalition. The legitimacy of the intervention and its outcome thus rested on the stability of the coalition in regards to the international community, as noted by Hammes and Professor *Robert Mandel*.²⁷

States are furthermore bound by conventions which regulate international relations. One example given by Thornton is the laws of war, which regulate the conduct in war (*jus in bello*) and what is perceived to be a just and necessary war (*jus ad bellum*). Western powers created and formulated the international legal system since they enjoyed being powers and thus wanted to keep the status quo.

But, as Thornton explains, the problem with laws is that you have to conform to them and abide by them. States are bound to ensure peace and to conduct war in a clinical way limiting the collateral damage, as the principles of discrimination and proportionality solicits. Proper conduct in war is essential for obtaining the legitimacy of the local population. It is however complex by nature as it depends on cultural factors, basically transcending the legal definitions. Other prerequisites for legitimacy added by Mandel are the provision of security, the recovery of the economic infrastructure and the reduction of post-war turmoil.²⁸

The interest of France in Algeria went beyond the restoration of the military honour following the setbacks in WWII, Indochina 1954, the liberation of Morocco and Tunisia 1956 and the Suez-humiliation in 1956. The view, according to Galula, that it was considered an integral part of France despite being a burden, remained adamant until the last days of the war.

Horne relates it to the fact that the million deeply rooted *pieds-noir* (colonists) had their own representative body in the Parliament and a sizeable body of supporters in France. Kettle argues that France was therefore in need to attain the cooperation of Algerian inhabitants in order to effectively administer the vast country, which implied a need to develop it.²⁹

Regarding Iraq, the CF was deemed to engage in nation building, reconstruction and the transforming of Iraq into a democracy, as Hashim stresses. When the previous regime was removed, Iraq fell under U.S. and British occupation as recognized by the UNSC through resolution 1483 (22nd May 2003). It specified the authorities, obligations and responsibilities of the CF according to international law. The coalition was regarded as the temporary custodians of the status quo, according to *Kaiyan Homi Kaikobad* who specializes on international law. Thus the commitment was a necessity regardless of whether the perception

²⁶ Galula (2006), p. 10; Horne (1977), pp. 65-66, 105-107, 147-152, 238-240 & 297-298

²⁷ Hammes (2006), p. 187; Mandel (2007), p. 39

²⁸ Mandel (2007), pp. 22-28; Thornton (2007), pp. 16-18

²⁹ Galula (2006), pp. 10-11; Horne (1977), pp. 51-54, 162, 164 & 174-176; Kettle (1993), p. 45

was true or not, as Hashim points out, that Iraq were harbouring terrorists and weapons of mass destruction which validated the pre-emptive strike.³⁰

It is clear that both France and the U.S. had complex goals. *Richard K. Betts* argues that, strategies (goals) need to be kept simple, which *per se* does not guarantee success, but complexity by contrast enhances the possibilities of failure. *Ian F. W. Beckett*, agreeing with Betts, states that aims are best kept limited and vague since the chances that the end-state is perceived as a failure is reduced. Yet, vague goals also hamper the efforts to achieve them, as they are not tangible. Both Beckett and Betts are well recognized within war studies in the academic world.³¹

3.1 The weak actors

States have lost their monopoly on war, according to Thornton, yet the power-disparity between states and the new actors (non-state actors) remain vast. The newcomers therefore often rely on asymmetric advantages, which also constitute Hammes' *fourth generation warfare* (4GW).³²

As Fearon & Laitin mentioned, the best indicator for insurgency is a weak state. Hammes argues that people are aligning by interest or by entities such as clans, tribes and nations, since these enjoy a higher degree of loyalty than the state. The prior constitutes a cosmopolitan-elite while the latter are entities often left behind in the globalization process.

The motivations of these groups may vary, as Rekkedal points out, yet it is common that small elites of devoted cadres take advantage of what Rekkedal – referring to Professor *Robert Ted Gurr's* theories regarding civil conflicts – calls the gap between individuals' aspirations and the ability of the state to realise them. This means that in some cases the globalized elites are able to mobilize the masses, just as in Bosnia, in order to realize their own goals.³³

Thornton, *Richard H. Shultz Jr.* – an American professor within the field of security studies – and his research associate *Andrea J. Dew* indicate that the nature of the insurgents are often: small, mobile and flexible, unrestricted by logistical problems with a lack of formal hierarchy and clear order of battle. They are also often tightly knit due to blood ties and loyalty.

Insurgents in general are unrestricted by international conventions, but may choose to limit their conduct to the legal frames to be perceived as a legitimate diplomatic and military actor. Yet, collateral damage and civilian casualties may benefit them if being directed, as Lee and Shultz Jr. & Dew stress, and could serve to undermine the effort of the strong actor.³⁴ It implies a *normative* asymmetry.

³⁰ Hashim (2006), pp. 276-277; Kaikobad (2005), p. 254

³¹ Beckett (2007), p. 79; Betts (2000), pp. 48-49

³² Hammes (2006), pp. 207-222; Thornton (2007), p. 5

³³ Fearon & Laitin (2003), p. 88; Hammes (2006), p. 42; Rekkedal (2006), pp. 30-35

³⁴ Lee (2004), p. 248; Shultz Jr. & Dew (2006), pp. 261-263 & 268; Thornton (2007), pp. 155-157

As a reaction to/against the inability by force to defeat the superior enemy, the 4GW insurgents use all available networks, such as political, economic, social and military to gain a relative advantage. Hammes concludes that “the goal is to convince the adversary’s decision-maker that their strategic goals are unattainable or too costly in comparison to the perceived benefits”.³⁵ Their goals are limited to obstruct and harass the strong actor, which can be attained by merely staying alive implying an asymmetry in *time*. A quote by Henry Kissinger concerning the Vietnam War serves as a good summary: “the conventional army loses by not winning; guerrillas, on the other hand, win by not losing.”³⁶

Beckett points out that the perception of who is winning or losing largely rests upon the degree of violence the insurgents can bring to bear. The aim of the actions is to generate impact. Thornton’s equation: shock * damage * visibility = impact, serves as a good explanation.

Impact is primarily *psychological* and could be achieved either by afflicting costly blows or compelling the strong actor to use force indiscriminately. It can also be derived from *material* loss, as Thornton explains referring to the case of “Black Hawk down” in Somalia. Media-captured beheadings or suicide bombings also generate *psychological* impacts.³⁷

3.1.1 The FLN

Described by both Horne and Kettle, the FLN sprung and evolved from Messali Hadjs nationalist movement *Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Libertés Démocratiques* (MTLD) through a series of separations, due to incompatible interests. The Arab Ahmed Ben Bella, a former *Non-Commission Officers* (NCO) of the French army, formed the *Comité Révolutionnaire d’Unité et d’Action* (CRUA) with nine other members of whom Larbi Ben M’hidi and the Kabyle Belkacem Krim will reappear later on in the thesis. The group consisted of a varying breed of young middle class Algerian Muslims, mainly NCOs followed by a small number of politicians. According to Galula, it was during the meeting in Switzerland in July 1954 that FLN was created in order to mobilize what Kettle refers to as bandits, for the uprising set for All-saints day, 1st of November 1954.³⁸

Galula provides an extensive picture of the organisation, but for my purpose I settle for a general explanation. FLN divided Algeria into six wilyas or provinces of which wilyas 1-4 are the most famous (Aurès, Constantine, Kabylia and Algerois). By the early stages the insurgency had not yet developed beyond the levels of loosely organised and equipped bands. The system consisted of fellaghas (full-time) and mousseblines (part-time) insurgents. The *Organisation Politico-Administrative* (OPA) was a parallel organisation with tasks of controlling the

³⁵ Hammes, Thomas X., 2006. *The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century*, p. 208

³⁶ Thornton, Rod, 2007. *Asymmetric Warfare: Threat and Responses in the Twenty-First Century*, pp. 71-72

³⁷ Beckett (2007), p. 87; Thornton (2007), pp. 10-12 & 70-71

³⁸ Galula (2006), pp. 14-15; Horne (1977), pp. 75-77; Kettle (1993), pp. 32-37

population, mobilizing support and replacing the French administration. During the Battle of Algiers the FLN was organised as a network, implying an *organisational* asymmetry, which is harder to disrupt.

The leadership within the CRUA and the wilyas changed several times during the war; due to casualties and purges as rivalry was a prominent feature between: the wilyas, Arabs and Kabyles as well as exile- and internal leaders. It also meant, according to Kettle, that their extensive set of goals changed over time, leaving only the primary one unchanged: the total independence of Algeria.

Because Algeria was grossly under-administered, enrolment and evading French forces was easy during the initial stages of the insurgency. About 40 000 policemen were supposed to uphold law and order over 10 million inhabitants on an area of 115 000 square miles. Galula actually states that he thought the shortage of weapons was the only obstacle to the expansion of FLN.³⁹

Besides the “taxes” collected, FLN was heavily relying on external funding and the arms offloaded on the coast or supplied across the borders of Morocco and Tunisia. Horne notes that these countries also served as sanctuaries for FLN after France granted them independence in March 1956. Galula stresses that FLN also enjoyed important moral support from Arab countries and the communist bloc.⁴⁰

3.1.2 Iraqi insurgents

The group that initiated the resistance against the CF after the formal defeat of the Iraqi armed forces on the 14th of April 2003 was by no means homogeneous. Hammes calls them *Anti-Coalition Forces* (ACF) and states that this temporary alliance constituted a loosely connected network which *per se* implies an *organisational* asymmetry which is hard to counter.⁴¹

Former Regime Element (FRE) was a group of dedicated Ba’thists whom, according to Shultz Jr. & Dew, consisted of Sunnis from the intelligence service Mukhabarat, security organisations, *Special Republican Guards* (SRG) and Saddam Fedayeen.⁴² The second and widely fragmented group was what Shultz Jr. & Dew calls *Sunni Arab Rejectionists* (SAR). It was composed of Sunnis who did not necessarily support Saddam, but neither agreed on the occupation and feared the Shiite rule, as Hashim points out.

Nationalism, rage against the sanctions enacted (1990-2003) or against the indiscriminate use of violence exercised by the CF are all probable motifs of the group. Support for the extended family due to blood vengeance or the loss of status or income are also plausible motifs. Hashim notes that tribes are influential and have a history of resisting central authority, yet were still armed by Saddam to maintain law and order after 1993 when his forces were decimated, as Shultz Jr. &

³⁹ Galula (2006), pp. 19-21, 22-23 & 30; Kettle (1993), p. 37

⁴⁰ Galula (2006), p. 6; Horne (1977), pp. 129-130 & 158

⁴¹ Hammes (2006), pp. 177-179

⁴² Shultz Jr. & Dew (2006), p. 232

Dew point out. Former military personnel constituted another large group within SAR, as they lost their jobs when the army was disbanded in May 2003.⁴³

The last actor was what Shultz Jr. & Dew define as Radical Islamists. This group consisted both of home-grown and foreign Islamists. According to Hashim, the prior acted as facilitator for the latter due to their lack of logistics, safe-areas and supplies. The foreign Islamists – only constituting 10% of the insurgency – spurred the home-grown elements and had a greater impact due to their ferocity.

Shultz Jr. & Dew state that the Islamists arrived with the second wave of foreign fighters around summer 2003 through underground networks established with Iraqi Islamists. The foreigners included both experienced and inexperienced Salafi-fighters belonging to Osama bin Laden's loosely connected global Salafist Jihad movement. One such connection was, according to Hashim, established by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi with domestic Islamic radicals known as Ansar al-Islam.⁴⁴

Hammes concludes that the only credible common denominator of the ACF was the will to oust the CF. Their lack of a unified post-occupation plan inhibited them from appearing as a political actor, but as Hashim explains this was of little importance because they were primarily concerned with their survival and also because they had already attained support from parts of the population.⁴⁵

Central Iraq is flat, which means that the ACF tended to focus on urban areas. Large and densely populated urban areas are hard to control and thus ideal for survival, concealment, recruitment and intelligence as Hammes argues. The fact that roughly 70% of the Iraqi populace reside in urban areas only supports this approach, as Shultz Jr. & Dew recognize. Rekkedal however point out that the insurgency was mainly confined to Sunni-dominated areas such as Fallujah, Baghdad and Mosul, which validates the significance of a "friendly" population.⁴⁶

Hammes underlines that ACF had a great recruitment potential since the unemployment rate was high and since Iraq seemed to be a magnet for fundamentalists. Weapons were also easy to obtain because mainly light weapons such as *Rocket-Propelled Grenades* (RPG), mortars, Kalashnikovs, time-detonators and *Improvised Explosive Devices* (IED) were used. Rekkedal stresses that this was to some extent a result of the CF's inability to destroy weapons caches in the beginning of the occupation.⁴⁷

Funding was neither a problem, according to Hashim and Shultz Jr. & Dew. Saddam and his sons withdrew over a billion dollars before the invasion. Some were supposedly managed in Syria and others stored in Iraq by officials. Additional funding was provided by rich Saudi-families and families in the Anbar-sector. The smuggling networks, established by the Ba'th-regime during the *United Nations'* (UN) sanctions, were allegedly operated by FRE-elements.⁴⁸

⁴³ Hashim (2006), pp. 26-27, 71, 99-100 & 104-105; Shultz Jr. & Dew (2006), pp. 224-225, 233-235 & 250-251

⁴⁴ Hashim (2006), pp. 25-26, 108-110, 113-114 & 149; Shultz Jr. & Dew (2006), pp. 235-239

⁴⁵ Hammes (2006), pp. 183-184; Hashim (2006), pp. 121-123

⁴⁶ Hammes (2006), p. 184; Shultz Jr. & Dew (2006), pp. 253-254; Rekkedal (2006), pp. 311-312

⁴⁷ Hammes (2006), pp. 183-184; Rekkedal (2006), p. 312

⁴⁸ Hashim (2006), pp. 135-138; Shultz Jr. & Dew (2006), pp. 240-242

3.2 The end of French colonial power in Algeria

Galula summarizes the *high-risk* indirect strategy used by FLN as 1. general terrorism and 2. selective terrorism. The former includes harassing military garrisons, sabotage, bombs and random assassinations. This method was used during the initial phases of the conflict to attract attention and spread insecurity.

Selective terrorism on the other hand lasted throughout the war with the purpose of controlling the population. The aim of this method was to: terrorise or eliminate pro-French Muslims, sow distrust between the European community and the Muslim, involve Muslims by force in order to attract reprisals from the government against Muslim communities, and lastly raise the political consciousness of Muslims in order to force them to participate passively or actively – passively by the use of threats and the collection of taxes. This was complemented by propaganda broadcasted from foremost Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia.⁴⁹ It was a *deliberate* attempt to achieve a *psychological* advantage and to undermine the legitimacy of the French by lowering the *normative* standards.

FLN was immensely successful during the initial phase of the war, mainly due to the inactivity of the French government and the inadequate reservists in place. Galula states that from 1954 to April 1956 the insurgency expanded to near victory. At All-saints Day in 1954 FLN launched an all out attack across Algeria to raise attention. Though as Horne stresses, only the wilya in Kabylia under Krim was successful in cutting communications, attacking barracks and gendarmeries as well as burning cork and tobacco properties.⁵⁰

It did not attract much attention in France, as pointed out by Horne, but in Algeria massive reprisals were called for by the pieds-noir and carried out by rather inexperienced and unqualified reserves and police. Villages suffered from bombardment and many innocent Muslims were rounded-up, harassed and put in prison. One example is the pharmacist from Algiers, Ben Youssef Ben Khedda, who later became a notorious leader for the FLN.

The real insurgents were however able to evade the French by using guerrilla methods. With the heroic survival of the winter 1954-1955 new followers were attracted from previously uncommitted Muslims, rivalling nationalist movements, deserters from Muslim units, pro-Muslim Europeans and Jews, as well as support from the regime in Egypt led by Gamal Abdel Nasser.⁵¹

With a new government in France, Jacques Soustelle arrived as Governor General of Algeria in February 1955. He introduced the first economic plan for integrating the Muslims and fight poverty. Yet already by summer 1955 the plan was halted due to a problem in procuring funds. During this period the *Section Administrative Spécialisée* (SAS) was created to act as a buffer between the FLN

⁴⁹ Galula (2006), pp. 15-17

⁵⁰ Galula (2006), p. 1; Horne (1977), pp. 83 & 89-94

⁵¹ Horne (1977), pp. 96-97, 101 & 128-129

and the army by performing administrative tasks favouring the Muslim civilians. Yet as Horne points out, some turned into intelligence cells and utilized torture.

Collective responsibility was also enacted and civilians were held responsible for the actions of the FLN. It sparked a reaction which eventually led up to the Battle of Algiers. In Constantine, Youssef Zighout and Lakhdar Ben Tobbal decided that collective reprisals were going to be performed as a response to the collective repression, and as a result a total war commenced in June 1955.⁵²

In 1958, de Gaulle returned to power and introduced the Constantine-plan which was not different from the earlier attempts to industrialize and redistribute land, aside from de Gaulle's name on it, as Horne argues.

Galula states that during 1956 and 1958 France stepped up the COIN-efforts and according to Horne, the FLN was by May 1958 severely damaged. The group suffered from shortage of supplies and low morale causing a defection rate which in combination with purges in wilyas 2, 3 and 4 was depleting their ranks.⁵³

By 1958 all other major French military commitment overseas had ceased, leaving Algeria as the last front. As confirmed by both Horne and Alexander & Keiger, General Maurice Challe introduced a new system in which superior power were concentrated to a particular area. Elite forces, tanks and aircrafts were guided by local indigenous soldiers in order to pursue the insurgents while helicopters were used for transportation, coordination and air strikes.

In February 1959 Challe launched *Operation Oranie* around Oran and then in April *Operation Courroie* in the eastern end of Ouarsenis behind Algiers. Finally *Operation Jumelles* was launched in July against wilya 3 and continued onwards to the Hodna Mountains between Kabylia and Aurès. Challe thus succeeded in cutting off Kabylia and Constantine from wilya 1 in the Aurès. He enjoyed an immense military success as the FLN-structures were almost totally destroyed.⁵⁴

Infrastructure, schools and clinics were built in the "pacified" areas. During this period 242 billion francs were spent on industrialisation, agrarian land, schools and oil-pipelines as well as gas-lines.

It came with a cost, as Horne remarks. The military success was achieved by destroying villages and sending the villagers to re-groupment camps – in essence concentration camps. By mid 1959 a million villagers were confined to these camps under abysmal standards. In July the newspaper Figaro published a report on the camps. It resulted in an uproar from the left- and right-wings in France and Challe was relieved of his post.⁵⁵

General Paul Aussaresses explains that the plans for urban terrorism and the Battle of Algiers were drawn up at the meeting on the 20th of August 1956 at Soummam valley in Kabylia, using the total war of Zighout and Ben Tobbal as a blueprint. Horne and Kettle note that the internal leadership of the FLN established the *Comité de Coordination et d'Exécution* (CCE), an operative body

⁵² Horne (1977), pp. 105-109 & 116-119

⁵³ Galula (2006), p. 1; Horne (1977), pp. 297-298, 304-305 & 322-323

⁵⁴ Alexander & Keiger (2002), pp. 13-17; Horne (1977), pp. 330-331 & 333-338

⁵⁵ Horne (1977), pp. 338-341

which was to reside in Algiers and be headed by the Kabyles Ramdane Abane, Krim and the Arab Ben M'hidi. Galula points out that they realised that a greater *psychological* impact could be achieved by stepping up the terror than by performing obscure ambush in the mountains.⁵⁶

Horne states that the network of Ben M'hidi's deputy Saadi Yacef, consisting of 1 400 operators of various kinds, performed bombings all over Algiers. As the methods used by the FLN remained somewhat constant, the reactions of the French are more interesting. In January 1957 General Jacques Massu was elected super-prefect of Algiers. His paratroopers were given executive powers to fight terrorism, which in the mind of Aussaresses in reality meant they were to be both police and judges. According to him the paratroopers had to be more extreme than the FLN to be able to acquire credibility.⁵⁷

In order to end the terror-campaign, the paratroopers took control of the cashbah – the sanctuary for the FLN – by sealing it off and thoroughly searching anybody leaving it. This eventually broke down Yacef's network and resulted in the capture of Ben M'hidi around the 15th-25th of February – the dates provided by Aussaresses and Horne differs. Being present at the time, Aussaresses remarks that as an important man, Ben M'hidi could not risk being put on trial or simply killed. He therefore committed suicide “by the hands” of the French on the 6th of March 1957, which led to complaints by the district attorney.

Ali Boumendjel, responsible for the contact with foreign countries supporting the FLN, was also an attorney with contacts within the French government. His suicide “by the hands” of the French on March the 23rd raised suspicions among the media and intelligentsia in France, as did Ben M'hidi's case. Aussaresses, however, claims that torture was not used in either of the two cases.⁵⁸

Other incidents which made headlines were the summary execution of a fellagha in front of the eyes of the Dean of the Algerian law school, and the killings of 80 Muslims at a Turkish bath.⁵⁹ On the 24th of September the paratroopers captured Yacef after infiltrating the FLN. It also led to the death of the notorious Ali-la-Pointe on the 8th of October, and with his death ending the Battle of Algiers. Most of the other FLN-leaders had by then already retreated either to the Atlas Mountains or Tunisia.⁶⁰

3.2.1 Summary of the interaction in Algeria

The interactions between the French and FLN indicate some interesting problems. By 1960 when de Gaulle announced that France was to leave Algeria the FLN was basically militarily defeated, as was France politically. What can be

⁵⁶ Aussaresses (2006), p. 27; Galula (2006), p. 62; Horne (1977), pp. 144-146; Kettle (1993), p. 68

⁵⁷ Aussaresses (2006), pp. 66-69 & 88; Horne (1977), pp. 183-184

⁵⁸ Aussaresses (2006), pp. 135, 140-149; Horne (1977), pp. 192-195

⁵⁹ Aussaresses (2006), p. 89; Horne (1977), pp. 208-209

⁶⁰ Horne (1977), pp. 217-219 & 259-261

concluded by the dynamics of the interactions is that the longer the conflict lasted the less support France enjoyed.

The reason for this is twofold. Because France considered Algeria as an integral part, no asymmetry of *will* existed since both actors saw their “survival” at stake. As a result, there was also a willingness on behalf of the French to lower the *normative* standards. The will to equalise the *psychological* asymmetry meant that France succumbed to *barbarism* and thus managed to alienate the population.

During the initial stage of the war, barbarism was adopted unintentionally due to the ignorance of the French government. Inadequately trained soldiers, not being able to identify the opponent, relied on brute force and their material advantage to deal with the insurgents. This validates Handel’s and Lee’s statements since it also led to collateral damage of vital importance.⁶¹

During the second phase when UCW was initiated, the problems from the initial stage was exacerbated as the lack of funds and indiscriminate use of force further reduced the incentives for the population to cooperate. It also resulted in an escalation of the violence by the FLN, which gained more supporters.

The third phase demonstrates that even if the government would have supported the UCW-approach, it would probably still have failed since it was combined with barbarism. De Gaulle’s UCW-approach proved to be a futile endeavour, even though the FLN-forces were at the outset almost depleted. Challe’s militarily successful DA-attempt undermined the former, increased the international and domestic criticism as well as further reduced the incentive for the locals to cooperate. This leads me to suggest that strategies are *barbaric* if military matters get precedence over political.

The Battle of Algiers proved to be something of a turning point as France managed to defeat the FLN militarily, but at the same time lost the war politically. The urban terrorism enacted by the FLN was countered by what I would regard as DA or successful COIN. It did lean towards barbarism, but in contrast to the earlier attempts collateral damage was reduced.

This leads me to the second reason. In the beginning of the conflict the Algerian “issue” had been regarded as an internal matter of France’s. The impact of the violence generated by the FLN not only undermined the meagre local legitimacy France enjoyed but also attracted international attention. This was further exacerbated by the change in the political climate during the global decolonisation process and the emergence of the Third World after WWII.

While the legitimacy of the French claim on Algeria diminished in regards to the domestic- and international community, the failure to provide the Algerian population with an incentive to cooperate made the country uncontrollable. Thus it is quite clear that the support of the local population is essential and the commitment to providing them with incentive to cooperate is invaluable, both in forms of UCW and refraining from harming them.

⁶¹ Handel & Lee, see page 12

3.3 United States' occupation of Iraq

Because the U.S. lacked an adequate post-liberation plan the UCW-attempt became rather problematic, as Hashim confirms. In July the *Interim Government Council* (IGC) was created from handpicked exiled political figures and consequently lacked popular support.⁶²

The rebuilding process and hence the legitimacy of the *Coalition Provisional Authority* (CPA) and the IGC were targeted in several ways. The ACF attacked political figures, as Hashim and Shultz & Dew states. One was the president of IGC, Ezzedne Salim, who was assassinated by a suicide car-bomber.

Besides top-political figures, workers associated with the CPA and IGC also constituted targets. Hashim further notes that in combination with the attacks on and sabotage of critical infrastructure, such as power stations and oils installations, the indirect strategy proved fruitful since the attempts to create incentive for cooperation were obstructed.⁶³

Hashim underlines that the rebuilding effort was hampered already in summer 2003, due to the dire security situation. By the end of 2003 the demands on the CPA was overwhelming and further escalated during 2004 as Shultz Jr. & Dew recalls. The inability of the CPA to provide acceptable living standards was indicated in the Iraqi living condition survey, conducted by the UN Development Programme and the Iraqi-ministry of planning and development in 2004.⁶⁴ The fact that al-Zarqawi's group targeted the 2005 election only further hampered the political process, duly noted by Hashim and Shultz Jr. & Dew.⁶⁵

The attempts to create legitimate state coercive-apparatuses also proved to be problematic, not only because of insufficient training as Hashim pointed out but also because the recruitment processes were hampered. The ACF targeted police headquarters and families of recruits, a problem since most of them were enlisting to support their families. Shultz Jr. & Dew states that on February 10th and 11th nearly 200 new police recruits were killed in suicide car bombs.⁶⁶

The cohesion of the coalition was also targeted. As Hammes notes, by August and October 2003 the ACF attacked the Jordanian and Turkish embassies and bombed the UN Headquarter killing the UN-chief in Iraq Sergio de Mello. These were high profile targets which attracted media attention. While it is uncertain if it really was al-Qaeda that performed the Madrid-bombings on the 11th March 2004, the message was clear: withdraw from Iraq.

Hammes continues by adding that NGOs and foreign civil contractors were also targeted. One example given by Shultz Jr. & Dew is the supposed kidnapping and subsequent beheading of contractor Nick Berg in April-May 2004, performed

⁶² Hashim (2006), pp. 29-31

⁶³ Hashim (2006), pp. 33, 126-127, 194 & 197-198; Shultz Jr. & Dew (2006), p. 244

⁶⁴ Hashim (2006), pp. 29-31 & 297-298; Shultz Jr. & Dew (2006), p. 243

⁶⁵ Hashim (2006), pp. 47-48; Shultz Jr. & Dew (2006), pp. 245-246

⁶⁶ Hashim (2006), pp. 299, 303-305 & 310-311; Shultz Jr. & Dew (2006), p. 243

by al-Zarqawi and aired in al-Jazeera. Thus it was highly visible and shocking, generating an impact based on *normative* and *psychological* asymmetry.⁶⁷

Attacks on U.S. forces also occurred but were primarily limited to guerrilla methods such as ambushes, hit-and-runs and IEDs. The last have, according to Hashim, been the most deadly. Conventional encounters did occur – most likely performed by FRE – yet always won by the Marines, mainly since nothing equalises the disparities in firepower and training.⁶⁸

3.3.1 The second round in Fallujah

The second round in Fallujah may be well known by now. It serves as a good indicator of the strategy used by the U.S. even though it is an extreme example. The first assault on Fallujah was a response to American security contractors being murdered near Fallujah in April 2004, and it ended in a stalemate. There were, as Hashim points out, basically no viable option to target the 100 insurgents hiding among 30 000 residents without risking casualties or international criticism. The U.S. reluctance of engaging in combat became a political and military victory for the insurgents.⁶⁹

Rekkedal states that after the first round the city developed into an important base of operations for the ACF, and foreign Islamists imposed strict theocratic-rule on the inhabitants. Hashim and Rekkedal both stress it was an intolerable situation for the U.S. and so the second battle commenced in November 2004.⁷⁰

The inhabitants had been warned two months in advance, which is why the city was practically empty when the battle commenced. According to Rekkedal the 6 000 Marines, the six Iraqi battalions and the British mechanized battalion which performed the assault on the city, were ill-prepared for urban warfare.⁷¹

Hashim states that about 50% of the insurgents' force left before the attack. The CF faced insurgents with varying abilities and proficiencies; in some places they were disciplined and cohesive while in others fairly unprofessional. Fallujah was divided into four areas of which the northern-part was controlled by former military personnel: Special Forces and *Republican Guards* (RG). These were heavily equipped using medium and heavy machineguns, RPGs, snipers, and grenade launchers. Both Hashim and Thornton confirm that the CF's superiority in manpower as well as firepower – by using tanks, air strikes and artillery-fire – made itself heard. After two days of fighting 2/3 of the city was under control.⁷²

After two weeks of fighting the friendly casualties were low and the civilian casualties minimal, only because many fled before the fight. When the city was re-taken the terrorist attacks was reduced by 40%, which actually depended on the

⁶⁷ Hammes (2006), pp. 174-175 & 178; Shultz Jr. & Dew (2006), p. 244

⁶⁸ Hashim (2006), pp. 188-192

⁶⁹ Hashim (2006), pp. 35-37

⁷⁰ Hashim (2006), pp. 40-44; Rekkedal (2006), pp. 253 & 255

⁷¹ Rekkedal (2006), pp. 256-257

⁷² Hashim (2006), pp. 45-46; Thornton (2007), p. 137

fact that the insurgents fled westward, as Rekkedal notes. The assault did destroy the insurgent's safe-haven, but in doing so the city was demolished as Shultz Jr. & Dew stresses. The military victory hence turned into a political defeat, as Hashim and Thornton point out. Not only did the excessive use of force spread through the media and raised international attention, it also alienated more Sunnis.⁷³

3.3.2 Summary of the interaction in Iraq

The lack of an adequate post-liberation plan and the abysmal UCW-attempt by the U.S. only served to exacerbate the lack of support from the Sunni-population which partly was a result of the conduct while targeting the Saddam-regime.

After having assessed the interactions between the coalition and the insurgents, it is clear that the legitimacy of the coalition was targeted. This occurred both in an indirect manner through hampering the rebuilding process and the ability to uphold law and order, but also directly against the cohesion of the coalition. Thus the goal was to destroy incentives for cooperation and support for the CF as well as damage the local and international legitimacy of the coalition.

The dynamics of the interactions was driven by at least three important aspects which made the U.S. succumb to a barbaric strategy. The first one is the lack of quality intelligence, which in this case meant a lack of understanding who the enemy was. According to Hashim, by fall 2003 the U.S. was still not aware of whom they were fighting, which meant they had to search wide and act tougher just like the French. He also stresses that strict *Rules of Engagement* (RoE) regulating the use of force was not adhered to, which in combination with the prior basically alienated the already cautious civilians.⁷⁴

The second aspect, which Hashim also mentions, is the lack of manpower. Since the U.S. did not have enough manpower to keep a presence and control areas, they needed to sweep those more which further increased the friction.⁷⁵

A third aspect is the reliance on firepower and technology which, according to Lee, tends to be used indiscriminately. It is a result of casualty aversion and a lack in non-material qualities, as Gentry and Handel mention.⁷⁶ Urban warfare in general is a hazardous project and requires manpower. In the example of Fallujah manpower was available, but casualty aversion and the lack in training for the urban warfare (non-material quality) resulted in the excessive use of force, which further alienated the Sunni-population and attracted international criticism.

Basically, the poor outset was exacerbated by the lack of incentive for the population to cooperate and neglect of non-material qualities such as adequate training, strategic or political considerations and quality intelligence, all yielding excessive and indiscriminate use of force.

⁷³ Hashim (2006), pp. 46 & 309; Rekkedal (2006), pp. 256-257; Shultz Jr. & Dew (2006), p. 245; Thornton (2007), p. 137

⁷⁴ Hashim (2006), pp. 29 & 321

⁷⁵ Hashim (2006), pp. 334-337

⁷⁶ Gentry, Handel & Lee, see page 12

3.4 Final considerations

The thesis started with the rather extensive question: *how can asymmetric warfare be understood?* That is, how the processes behind it can be explained. Asymmetric warfare understood as acting, organising and thinking differently, needs to be viewed in relation to the current warfare paradigm or the convention.

If we are to comprehend asymmetric conflict outcome we need to look beyond the methods and the various forms mentioned by Metz & Johnson II. These are important to understand the processes, yet only aspects of it and consequently not sufficient by themselves as an explanation if they are not “directed”. Strategy hence should be the focus when examining asymmetric conflict outcome.

There are three aspects which need to be considered if we are to understand asymmetric warfare. The first is that an actor’s total power is relative as it spans over several different areas of interest. Military power in war is on the other hand considered absolute. It does however rest on quantity *and* quality and as Handel pointed out there are material quality and non-material quality.

The actor which is considered strong often possesses an advantage in quantity as well as material quality and even in non-material qualities such as training. But it is also a weakness since an over-reliance on military power often results in a neglect of non-material qualities, especially strategy.

The second aspect, related to the former, is the inherent asymmetric potential in the interaction between a strong actor and a weak, in particular a non-state actor. It is basically an actor-analysis like Hammes’, but in terms of the various forms of asymmetry mentioned by Metz & Johnson.

The first feature is related to relative power, as a state or a coalition of states have a larger contact surface due to the numerous interests in economic, military, political, social and cultural spheres. It also implies large organizations in order to function, meaning a large contact surface containing many vulnerable areas. By contrast, the insurgents are often small, mobile and organised in a rather different manner which entails a difficulty to locate and separate them from civilians.

The implications of the former are connected to the inherent normative asymmetry. States, unlike insurgents in general need to adhere to international legal conventions to avoid criticism. War, for states, depends on legality and legitimacy and therefore not only on the perception of international and domestic community, but also of the local population. Thus the state is in need of high-quality intelligence and strict RoE in order to avoid collateral damage, both being non-material qualities. The insurgents on the other hand prosper from collateral damage generated by the strong actor and sometimes even by themselves.

Finally, an asymmetry in will which is most likely to occur if: there is a vast power disparity, the strong actor is foreign and the strategy adopted is aimed at the total destruction of the weak. It is likely that the greater the power disparity, the more of the asymmetric potential will be utilized to equalize it and the greater the will, the lesser adherence to normative standards. Another feature of this asymmetry is that the political and military will of a foreign strong actor is often low due to a lack of- or internally contradicting interests, thus also hard to sustain.

The third and final aspect, which needs to be emphasised, is an asymmetry in goals. Strategy is the component which channels the means towards the goal and therefore encompasses all the aspects already mentioned. It is what Metz & Johnson II indirectly refers to as strategic-asymmetry and is a non-material quality.

The result of the dependency on legality and legitimacy generates an extensive set of goals which needs to be achieved. As such there is an asymmetry in goals as those of the insurgencies are quite simple: to survive and disrupt the strong actor. With extensive goals come complex strategies. This is a problem since the more complex the strategies are, the easier it is to disrupt them and to convince the policymakers that their goals are not worth the effort, as Beckett and Betts argues.

Given the above stated aspects, the effort of the strong actor is easier to target and to disrupt, which often means a loss of legitimacy, loss in will or moral decay depending on which comes first. This illustrates a meagre prospect of success which is only exacerbated by the examples used in this thesis, as some kind of path-dependent dynamic seem to be present.

The downward spiral illustrated in the examples, where violence instigated by the insurgents is met with indiscriminate violence, is however only a result of neglecting non-material qualities such as training (initially France) and strategies which focused on the military matter, not the political.

As Arreguin-Toft's theory concludes, war-winning strategies implying a focus on the military matter have proven a less viable option, since the direct approach – the only feasible alternative – have a 63% failure-rate according to his research. Military superiority often generates a perception in which the capacity of the militarily weak is underestimated.

War-terminating strategies seem to me more effective, combining DA to force negotiations by partial destruction and UCW to isolate the insurgents by providing the locals with incentives for cooperation as well as influencing the insurgents to lay down their arms. This, however, implies a complex strategy which is easy to hamper and will not be effective if the UCW-approach lacks commitment or if it is combined with barbarism as the examples illustrated. Yet it is demanded by international law, making it almost impossible to legitimately engage in small wars without having a complex set of goals.

Also apparent in the examples is the importance of achieving legitimacy from the local population and sustaining it. If the support is lost it is almost impossible to reverse the spiral and break the negative dynamics. It is therefore crucial in the initial phases of the war to be sensitive to the military and the political situation, yet also to act firmly with full commitment – in terms of a sufficient amount of economic resources and well trained soldiers. Legitimacy in its crudest form relies on the provision of security and an unhampered UCW-effort.

Strategy, it can be concluded, needs to be carefully considered with the awareness of its complex nature and its effects, since it also is the most fundamental expression of asymmetry. Furthermore, it needs to be guided by clear political goals with a high will and normative standard, as the military is neither the only target nor solely affected by the outcome of the war. Von Clausewitz' axiom that military matter can never be totally severed from politics seems to be more valid than ever when engaging in asymmetric conflicts.

4 Appendix A: Analysis of the processes which preceded the conflicts

The entities Algeria and Iraq are both artificial creations and constituted administrative areas of the Ottoman Empire. According to political scientist *Kjell H. Halvorsen* Algeria was divided into three administrative areas – Constantine, Medea and Oran – governed by the Dey of Algiers. These areas (situated along the coast) were rather secluded, which meant that the vast surrounding areas lacking Turkish military presence and inhabited by tribes needed to be governed through some favoured local tribes. This construction lasted 300 years until the French defeated the Dey and the rest of the tribal societies in 1830 (although Kabylia revolted again around 1870).⁷⁷

Iraq as an entity was created in the aftermath of *World War I* (WWI), as a result of the fall of the Ottoman Empire. The British rallied Arab support with a promise of a country of their own, and defeated the Turks on the Arab-territory. At the post-war negotiations in Paris 1919 they deviated from their promise, as noted by Shultz Jr. & Dew, and the entity which would become Iraq was through the League of Nations proclaimed a class A mandate, to be administrated by the British.

The boundaries were drawn in the interest of Britain and included the three provinces Mosul, Baghdad and Basra as well as the oil-rich Kurdish territory. Political scientist *Toby Dodge* refers the term mandate to the attempt of achieving a balance between the national and colonial interest and the needs of the “backward” people.⁷⁸

Due to the composition of the entities, Algeria and Iraq encompassed several contending identities. Sociologist *Charles Tilly* defines identity after its components. According to him these are: relation, boundaries and stories. Identity resides in the stories which explain the relation or transaction with others, as well as the boundaries which separate us. Identities hence emanate from interpersonal relations meaning that the social ties grow stronger through the frequency, intensity and range of behaviour of the transaction. Both Tilly and the Indian economist and philosopher *Amartya Sen* stress the possibility of possessing multiple identities and belonging to multiple social categories.⁷⁹

Algeria consisted and consists, according to *Dorothy Good*, of mainly two ethnicities, Berbers and Arabs. She also emphasises the lack of a real challenge to

⁷⁷ Halvorsen (1978), pp. 326-327

⁷⁸ Dodge (2003), p. 12; Shultz Jr. & Dew (2006), pp. 208-211 & 213

⁷⁹ Sen (2006), pp. 4-5; Tilly (2002), pp. 12, 19, & 48-49

Islam, which does not exclude complexity of the social composition due to their tribal and regional nature. According to the previous statement by Sen and Tilly this means one's identity could be Muslim, yet a Berber from the region Kabylia who identifies primarily with ones tribe and clan.

During the pre-French period as well as during the French presence tribal conflicts were common, primarily as a result of favouring certain tribes for tax collection but also due to land-conflicts. Halvorsen argues that conquering Algeria also meant the destruction of the social structures as the traditional leadership was erased. The new leadership was bound by economical and political ties with the French, which alienated them from their own communities as they lost their lands.⁸⁰

Iraq in its given composition consists of Arabs and Kurds generally belonging to the two Islamic sects, Shiite and Sunni. However, as Shultz Jr. & Dew remark, the tribal identities are also split into clans (*fakhidhs*), sub-clans (*hamoulas*) and families (*bayts*).⁸¹ This reaffirms Sen's and Tilly's argument that identity is not one-sided.

A prominent feature throughout the existence of an Iraqi state pointed out by Shultz & Dew, has been the political and military domination of the Sunnis. This domination was instigated by the British in an attempt to indirectly govern the country and it lasted throughout the various military coups between 1936 and 1968. The feature also survived when members of the clan's from Tikrit captured the state through the Ba'th-party, until it was finally brought to an end as the U.S. invasion deposed Saddam Hussein in 2003.

Beside the ethnic tension between the Sunni dominated government and the Shiite and Kurd communities, an urban-rural tension existed. Dodge attributes this urban-rural tension to a feature which repeats itself throughout Iraqi history. Britain empowered the tribal sheikhs by granting them ownership of the land, in order to make the ruler King Faisal dependent on British support to counterbalance the strength of the tribal confederations.⁸²

There are some prevalent features of Saddam's reign after 1972 when he became number one in Ba'th-party after having deposed Ahmad Hassan al-Bakr. The first was modernization through socialism, which meant that peasant associations would replace tribal ties, although *Amatzia Baram* who is a professor in Middle East history specializing on Iraqi history, states that the tribes were never regarded as an imminent threat.

In his article about Saddam's return to tribalism Baram depicts the view of tribes as backward, as being two-faced. Ba'th, stating in its communiqué no. 1 that they were against sectarianism and tribalism, acted accordingly in 1969 through land reforms which deprived Shiite tribal sheikhs of land in favour of Shiite peasants, hence deepening the rift between them. Yet the party continued in

⁸⁰ Good (1961), p. 3; Halvorsen (1978), pp. 327 & 332-333

⁸¹ Shultz Jr. & Dew (2006), p. 203

⁸² Dodge (2003), pp. 83-86; Shultz Jr. & Dew (2006), pp. 213-214

using favoured tribes for policing jobs throughout the country. A practise inherited from the Ottomans and British.

This practice did change for several reasons. Baram speculates that since the tribes were not adequately integrated in the political life it was a low cost to empower them, since they could serve as a buffer between the Shiites in Iraq and the Shiite government in Iran.

The tribes would also contribute with manpower to the war-effort against Iran (1980-1988), to keep tribes under control and to bridging the abyss between Shiites and Sunnis using the tribes as a common denominator. With the military reduction/loss after the two Gulf Wars, Saddam supplied favoured tribes with weapons to serve as paramilitary forces which also deepened the rift between tribes, with the result of a heavy toll in casualties due to the new weapons supplied.

Another feature of Saddam's rule was the etatist-tribalism. Not a new feature – employed during the various coups during 1958-1968 – it was however brought to a new level. Baram states that Saddam's bodyguards, security personnel, the intelligence apparatus Mukhabarat, RG and the SRG were all recruited from his tribe (Abu Nasir) or the same geographical area like the tribes Jubbur and 'Ubayd. These loyal units served the purpose of "protecting" Saddam from the military.⁸³

Pre-occupational Iraq was in fact a captured state. Dodge gives the image of a state which through a shadow state was based on flexible networks of violence and patronage, penetrating almost all aspects of society. Both the military and the security apparatus Mukhabarat held a strong position in order to uphold security and crush temporary rebellions.

The patron-client relationship established between the regime and its subjects penetrated all areas of the country: Shiite, Kurds, rural, urban, north, central and south. Dodge points out that this relationship was based on wealth accumulated from oil resources. Around 1990-1991 about 40% of the households were depending on various forms of payment from the government. After 1991 and the second Gulf War this number was raised to include about 60% of the people. The ration system, which provided the people in the south and the centre of the country with food on a day to day basis, was controlled by the mentioned clans.⁸⁴

As the state (Saddam) relied more on a patron-client relationship as a basis for policy rather than a legal-rational, it alienated people from the regime. It basically enjoyed a weak infrastructural power yet remained strongly despotic. The internal processes which could have deposed the regime were however severely hampered in Iraq due mainly to:

- The fact that Saddam was not a foreign ruler.
- The despotic power of the regime.
- The animosity between the sects and within them (rural – urban), as a result of the divide and rule policy.

⁸³ Baram (1997), pp. 2-7, 9-11 & 19-22

⁸⁴ Dodge (2003), pp. 159-161

In the light of history this regime could only be deposed by a foreign power, which also occurred. Regardless of whether or not the war was righteous, the coalition of U.S. and Britain “officially” defeated the entity that constituted the Iraqi army on the 14th of April 2003, after barely three weeks of fighting, as noted by *Gregory H. Fox* who specializes on international law.⁸⁵ Kaikobad explains that, Iraq fell under American and British occupation, whom were recognized as occupying powers by the UNSC through resolution 1483 (22nd May 2003) which stated the responsibilities and authority under international law in which the unified command would reside.⁸⁶

Political scientist *David M. Edelstein* states that occupation is of a transitional character and should on the onset have an intention on returning power to an indigenous government. Fox adds that there is no law of the liberators, just occupation law, and they are as such the temporary custodians of the status quo in the territory they control. Edelstein continues and adds that for occupation to be successful it is vital that it enjoys the legitimacy of the occupied population and thus overcome the perception of being a military conqueror. Finally he concludes that legitimacy is at the crudest level attained by providing a safe environment.⁸⁷

4.1 French-Algeria and the occupation of Iraq

Both pre-colonial Algeria and pre-occupation Iraq could be considered what Holsti describes as weak entities/states. In their article, Fearon & Laitin concludes that the best indicator for insurgency is weak states, marked by poverty, instability and a large population. The prominent feature of a weak entity/state is numerous communities, but only if friction between the communities is added to the equation.

Oppression, exploitation and domination could constitute forms of friction. This is what Holsti refers to as a lack of horizontal legitimacy, meaning that the problems with coexistences ultimately will affect the state within whose borders the communities reside. Friction understood as inequality erodes legitimacy. Holsti writes that the primary measures to uphold legitimacy are: security, social services such as health and education, economic progress and allocation of resources.⁸⁸

Friction was prevalent both in Algeria and Iraq, but was not confined to the pre-colonial and pre-occupation period. This feature was exacerbated during the French reign over Algeria where the Muslim majority constituted second-class citizens. As historian *Todd Shepard* points out, Algerian inhabitants officially

⁸⁵ Fox (2005), p. 202

⁸⁶ Kaikobad (2005), p. 254

⁸⁷ Fox (2005), p. 198; Edelstein (2004), pp. 52 & 58

⁸⁸ Fearon & Laitin (2003), p. 88; Holsti (1998), pp. 104-111

gained full citizenship as of 1944, yet inequality between the pieds-noir and the Muslim population persisted in virtually every sphere of what can only be referred to as the colonial life. The repression was codified in laws. This position is supported by Kettle who reaffirms that indigenous practices were prohibited under French law, under whose jurisdiction Algeria resided.⁸⁹

Furthermore, Halvorsen concludes that the practised subsistence-system had to make way for specialized cultivation, which meant that farmers got deprived of access to land. Halvorsen further adds that colonial land increased by 20 times between 1830 and 1940.⁹⁰ Finally, a quotation by the French philosopher *Jean-Paul Sartre* sums up the situation quite well: “maltreated, malnourished, illiterate, the Algerian has an inferiority complex with regard to his master”.⁹¹

In the attempt to provide a secure environment in Iraq as well as ensuring the long-term prospective of returning the power to an acceptable government a major error was committed, as duly noted by Fox. By May 2003 the army was disbanded and in November 2003 officials and officers with ties to Ba’th were removed which in fact crippled both the government and the military, since all important positions were held by Sunnis with “sworn” loyalty to Saddam.

Moreover, the firing of the large and capable Sunni-workforce only alienated the Sunni-community from the state, which also reflects the military, as American Institute Scholar *Vance Serchuck* confirms. Participation in both is according to him a prerequisite for nationalism at the crudest level.⁹²

As Hashim and Shultz Jr. & Dew points out, many of the would-be insurgents feared the Shiite rule but also felt that they were being targeted by the CF and discriminated against as they lost their jobs and experienced a loss of status and income.⁹³

Thus when the occupation formally ended on the 28th of June 2004 with the transition of power from the CPA to the Iraqi Interim Government, the government consisted of a mere shell, as did the Iraqi security forces, both lacking definite participation from the Sunni-population, as Fox notes.⁹⁴

Dieter Senghaas who have earned a PhD. in peace, conflict and development studies, explains that socioeconomic problems and a lack of prospect for a solution in regards to conflicts, is a more important factor than for example culture. Economically and socially marginalized entities get deprived of the chance of participate in modern society. Furthermore, Senghaas claims that only if the discrepancy between education and blocked chances is felt as a collective problem, will identity serve as a force for mobilization. This is what happened to some extent in Iraq.

He continues by stating that identity can become an independent factor for social mobilization, but only if faultlines are running through the society.

⁸⁹ Kettle (1993), p. 14; Shepard (2006), pp. 20-21 & 31

⁹⁰ Halvorsen (1978), pp. 334-339

⁹¹ Sartre, Jean Paul, 2001. *Colonialism and Neocolonialism*, p. 6

⁹² Fox (2005), pp. 208-209; Serchuck (2006)

⁹³ Hashim (2006), chapter 2; Shultz Jr. & Dew (2006), pp. 233-235

⁹⁴ Fox (2005), p. 202

Faultlines roughly corresponds to the issue of horizontal legitimacy and friction. Issues which cultivate the process, as stated by Senghaas, are demographic explosion and social mobilization in forms of urbanization and literacy which is exactly what occurred in Algeria, according to Horne.

The Muslim population more than doubled from approximately four millions (1906) to nine millions (1954), as did the education rate. Only one out of five Muslim boys attended school, which was moulded after a French model. Yet the possibilities remained hampered by heavy taxation, famine, and the lack of industrialization (as in many colonies). Algeria did in fact become an integral part of France in 1848, yet all the traits of a colony remained.⁹⁵

4.2 Nationalism

French-Algeria and occupied Iraq share two distinctive and interrelating features which distinguish them from states, as understood by political philosophers with a western liberal view, like *John D. Mabbott*.

- The lack of monopoly of force within its border, despite the ability to prevent armed resistance from occurring or succeeding.
- The lack of inclusiveness regarding the ability and will to provide its citizens with the foundation of a good life, which according to political philosopher *David Runciman* could involve freedom, identity, justice, laws, rights and security.⁹⁶

Since the foundations for a good life mentioned above are liberal-political constructions, they stress the rights of the people. As Senghaas points out, this does roughly correspond to the traditional Islamic ideals of legitimate rule which emphasizes the duty of the ruler. He also claims that every society has a concept of what constitutes a failed ruler, hence an option to depose the very same.⁹⁷

The state is just one association among many and since both French-Algeria and occupied-Iraq contained several communities, some kind of nationalism had to exist as societal glue. Tilly identifies two types of approaches towards nationalism, top-down and bottom-up. The first occurs when the state creates its nation, socializing the citizens into identifying with the nation. The second type could be described as creating a state from the state. A failure or lack of a top-down approach breeds the bottom-up.⁹⁸

The top-down approach did in a naive way occur in Algeria with the offering of French citizenship if fighting for France in WWI. As Holsti states, colonies as a

⁹⁵ Horne (1977), pp. 60-64; Senghaas (2003), pp. 74-75

⁹⁶ Mabbott (1947), pp. 100-101 & 162; Runciman (2003), p. 30

⁹⁷ Senghaas (2003), p. 65

⁹⁸ Tilly (2002), pp. 95-96

concept were not created to become participatory democracies; the inhabitants were supposed to be kept under control and dominated. This could explain the initial problems in Algeria.⁹⁹

Alienation by 100 years of socioeconomic inequalities is not overcome by receiving a foreign citizenship. This alienation in combination with socioeconomic inequalities gave rise to an Us-Them relationship in Algeria and resulted in a rise of nationalist parties, hence a bottom-up approach. As both Horne and Kettle establishes, the two most prominent parties were the MTLD and the *Union Démocratique du Manifeste Algérien* (UDMA).

The group which would eventually become the prime military opponent of the French evolved from this temporary coalition through a series of partitions within MTLD. This was caused by both irreconcilable differences and the old tension between urban Arabs and rural Berbers (mainly Kabyles), as described by both Horne and Kettle. Shepard adds that FLN acted in the name of an Algerian nation defined as Berber heritage, Arab-speaking and with Islamic traditions.¹⁰⁰

Removing almost all Sunni-officials and officers did not only alienate the Sunnis from the CPA, it also alienated them from the attempts to create a participatory democracy. As Serchuck stated, participation is a prerequisite for top-down nationalism at the crudest level.¹⁰¹

Excluding the Sunnis in the early stages of the process thus created bottom-up nationalism, according to Shultz & Dew, closing their ranks to some extent among their identity. The election of a democratic Iraqi Government for the drafting of a constitution was therefore boycotted by Sunnis, which facilitated the failure of an attempt to create top-down nationalism through a unified constitution.¹⁰²

Another issue, which exacerbated the process of the emergence of an insurgency, was what Tilly calls movement cycles. It occurs when the state's control over economic, political and social life relaxes after the exceptional control needed during a state of war. In Algeria, I suggest this happened after WWII 1939-1945 and Indochina 1945-1954 where many Muslims participated. In Iraq it occurred after Saddam was deposed in 2003, because of the state of war from 1988 and the first gulf war and the sanctions from 1991 to 2003.

Once the war is over and the workforce is demobilized from war production and the military reintegrates into civilian life, a relaxation of central control can result in an explosion of inhibited claims. Tilly further adds that the more credibility the state loses during the war the greater the chance of an overflow in claims.¹⁰³ What I suggest here is that the availability of disgruntled Algerian NCOs and former Iraqi militaries speeded up the process due to their military abilities.

This is a short analysis of the evolution which preceded the wars against the occupiers, France and USA. Although separated by nearly 40 years and in spite of

⁹⁹ Holsti (1998), p. 100

¹⁰⁰ Horne (1977), chapter 3; Kettle (1993), chapter 1; Shepard (2006), p. 46

¹⁰¹ Serchuck (2006)

¹⁰² Shultz Jr. & Dew (2006), pp. 233-235 & 246-247

¹⁰³ Tilly (2002), pp. 105-108

all the global processes that have taken place, they display a lot of similarities. Yet the pace of the processes leading up to the conflicts are quite different. In Iraq all processes happened much faster probably due to higher living standards, higher education, claims on the state and the communication technology as enabler of interconnectedness.

It was during these circumstances that the various rebellious movements were founded. Yet they do not provide any separable indicators hinting a specific type of warfare. The summary does however demonstrate the foundations for a will to fight as well as two or more parties of unequal strength which does not *per se* indicate employment of a specific type of strategy.

My point here is that a strong state would not crumble as much as a weak. Therefore, defeating the opponent's army would include crushing the resistance and defeating the enemy, similar to the processes in Germany and Japan during and after WWII as historian *Andrew Arato* argues.¹⁰⁴ Since the state and its coercive apparatus do not constitute the will of the total population, defeating the army of a weak state does not imply crushing the resistance of the people.

An interesting question would then be: *are small wars worth engaging in?* By small I refer to the view of strong actors on wars not involving a conventional adversary. It is of course an inevitability that states, coalitions, UN and other supposedly strong actors (materially) will interact with the weak. The fact that the world has become ever more connected means among other things that local wars have regional implications forcing states to act.

If the conclusions of Fearon & Laitin are correct regarding the tendency of weak states to succumb to insurgency, and if Holsti's definition of weak states is correct, then it would be unwise – according to my own conclusions – for foreign powers to perform interventions, as many states in the world of today meets Holsti's criterions. But this is of course only a problem if these insurgencies have the capacity to carry out a successful asymmetric strategy.

¹⁰⁴ Arato (2003), p. 414

5 Appendix B: Chronology of the Algerian War of Independence 1954-1962 and its prehistory

1517-1830	The entity which would become Algeria constitutes administrative areas of the Ottoman Empire.
1830	France defeats the Dey of Algiers .
1870	Serious uprising in Kabylia resulting in massive reprisals from the French.
1911	Compulsory military conscription extended to the Muslims of Algeria.
1919	French citizenship could get acquired if having served or if currently serving in the French army.
26th September 1939	The onset of World War II is used as a pretext for arresting Algerian nationalists.
1944	Algerian inhabitants officially gained French citizenship.
8th of May 1945	Inter-communal massacre at Setif and Guelma ends with 1 000 Europeans dead and up to 3 000 Muslims.
20th October 1946	Messali Hajd forms his MTLD.
March 1954	The fighting in Indochina ends with a French defeat.
March 1954	CRUA is set up.
1st November 1954	CRUA evolves into the FLN.
1st November 1954	Uprising across Algeria launched by FLN.
November 1954 – April 1956	The insurgency expands to near victory.
25th January 1955	Jacques Soustelle is appointed Governor-General.
18th-24th April 1955	FLN attend the Bandung Conference of the “Third World”.
May 1955	Soustelle forms the SAS.
20th August 1955	FLN massacre pieds-noir at Philippeville.
20th-25th August 1955	Inter-communal massacres following Philippeville.
2 February 1956	Soustelle is replaced by Robert Lacoste.
2nd March 1956	Morocco is granted independence.

20 th March 1956	Tunisia is granted independence.
18 th May 1956	The Palestro-massacre of French conscripts.
May 1956 – May 1958	The counterinsurgency effort increases rapidly.
20 August 1956	The Soummam Conference in Kabylia.
30 th September 1956	The Battle of Algiers begins with bombings performed by Saadi Yacef's network.
16 th October 1956	The ship Athos is intercepted.
22 nd October 1956	Ahmed Ben Bella is hijacked and imprisoned by the French.
5 th November 1956	Anglo-French landing at Suez.
14 th December 1956	Raoul Salan is appointed Commander-in-Chief in Algeria.
7 th January 1957	General Massu's paratroopers take over Algiers.
28 th of January 1957	The general strike ordered by FLN commences and is subsequently broken by the paratroopers.
15 th -25 th February 1957	Larbi Ben M'hidi is captured.
6 th March 1957	Ben M'hidi commits "suicide".
23 rd March 1957	Ali Boumedjel commits "suicide".
2 nd July 1957	John F. Kennedy's speech supporting Algerian independence.
24 th September 1957	Saadi Yacef is captured.
8 th October 1957	Ali-la-Pointe is killed.
8 th February 1958	French bomb FLN-positions in Sakiet, Tunisia.
March-May 1958	Battle of the Morice-line confines 10 000 FLN to Tunisia.
May 1958 – January 1960	France grabs the military initiative.
13 th May 1958	Pieds-noir mob seizes government buildings and demands Charles de Gaulle.
1 st June 1958	De Gaulle becomes prime minister.
12 th December 1958	General Maurice Challe replaces Salan.
21 st December 1958	De Gaulle is elected president of France.
February-March 1959	Operation <i>Oranie</i> around Oran.
April-June 1959	Operation <i>Courroie</i> in Ouarsenis.
22 nd July 1959	Operation <i>Jumelle</i> in Kabylia.
16 th September 1959	De Gaulle offers Algeria "self-determination".

January 1960 – February 1962	The military victory is imminent but the deterioration in the political fields accelerates in June 1961 when the negotiations starts.
24th January 1960	“Barricades Week” by armed pieds-noir.
29th January 1960	De Gaulle speaks and the revolt collapses.
24th February 1960	Francis Jeanson’s network of mainland helpers for the FLN is uncovered (suitcase carriers).
23rd April 1960	Challe is “promoted” away from Algeria.
25th-29th June 1960	French peace talks with FLN at Melun ends in a failure.
20th December 1960	UN recognizes Algeria’s right to self-determination.
25th January 1961	The pieds-noir forms the Organisation Armée Secrète.
20th-26th April 1961	The generals’ putsch in Algiers: de Gaulle triumphs.
19th May 1961	Organisation Armée Secrète explodes bombs in Algiers.
20th-28th May 1961	First peace talks at Evian fails.
7th February 1962	Organisation Armée Secrète blasts bombs in Paris.
7th-18th March 1962	Second Evian leading to an agreement is signed.
19th March 1962	Cease-fire is signed between the French and FLN.
17th June 1962	Truce between FLN and Organisation Armée Secrète, and the exodus of the pieds-noir.

6 Appendix C: Chronology of the history of Iraq and the Iraqi insurgency 2003-2005

1638-1918	The entity which would become Iraq constitutes administrative areas of the Ottoman Empire.
June 1916-late 1918	With promises from the British of support for independence sparks the Great Arab Revolt against the Turks.
1919	At the Peace Conference in Paris Iraq is by the League of Nations proclaimed a Class A Mandate to be administered by Britain.
1920	Countrywide rebellion against the foreign rule.
June 1921	At the Cairo Conference the Hashemite Faisal is selected to become King of Iraq and the Anglo-Iraqi treaty was drafted.
1932	The mandate ends and the formal power is transferred to king Faisal whom still rests on the support from the British.
1936-1968	Three decades of military coups.
1963	The first Ba'th coup performed with support from Arab nationalist officers led by Abdel Salam Arif, whom also participated in the previous coup. Due to inexperience on behalf of the Ba'th, Arif oust them and seizes power alone.
1968	Arif's successor is toppled by another coup which Ba'th takes advantage of. Ba'th-party led by Ahmad Hassan al-Bakr is more successful thanks to its own militia and intelligence organisations built with tribal ties.
1972	Al-Bakr and Saddam takes complete control over the party, with the powerbase in key members from the Tikrit area.
1979	Saddam outmanoeuvre al-Bakr whom retires and thus Saddam is in complete control of Iraq. Through purges all important posts are held by his kin.

1980-1988	Saddam commences the war against Iran and takes back the Shatt al-Arab waterway.
2nd August 1990	Saddam launches an attack on Kuwait.
6th August 1990	UN enacts sanctions on Iraq for the act of aggression against Kuwait.
January 1991	UN backs the U.S. led coalition which launches an intervention and ousts the Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Saddam is however not deposed as this falls beyond the scope of the mandate. He launches attacks against on Kurd- and Shiite-communities which ends in massacres.
3rd April 1991- March 2003	UN-resolution 687 demands a supervision of the destruction of weapons of mass destruction, resulting in a cat and mouse game and renewed sanctions.
1993	The tribes are armed and empowered by Saddam, as a complement to his own forces.
2000	A sanction-fatigue among the members of UN results in an attempt by the U.S. to enact “smart sanctions” connected to the weapons of mass destruction programme.
20th March 2003	Operation Iraqi Freedom commences.
14th April 2003	The Coalition defeats the Iraqi army.
28th April 2003	U.S. soldiers shoot and kill 15 people at Fallujah during an anti-U.S. rally.
Late April 2004	Outbreak of the insurgency in the Sunni-triangle.
April-October 2003	1 st wave of foreign fighters from neighbouring countries.
1st May 2003	Bush declares the war to be over.
1st May 2003	The CPA is formed and is headed by Paul Bremer III.
27th May 2003	Fallujah – an imam pledges U.S. to be occupiers and is subsequently arrested in October.
May 2003	Fallujah – U.S. forces affronts tribal pride and honour, which is heightened by the dishonour of tribal sheikhs.
May 2003	The CPA disbands the army.
30th May 2003	Baji – U.S. patrols caught in three consecutive ambushes, committed most likely by former military personnel.

Summer-onward 2003	Second wave of foreign fighters comprised of mainly Salafists and Islamic militants recruited in Europe and the Middle East, with experience from the Balkans, Chechnya and Afghanistan
Early June 2003	Baghdad – an imam denounces the liberation as an occupation.
Early June 2003	Ramadi – clerics in mosques preaches resistance against the occupation.
Early June 2003	The insurgents’ targets infrastructure which is crucial to the coalition forces.
12th June 2003	Kirkuk – sabotage against oil facilities to cripple economy.
Early July 2003	Al-Tawid wa al-Jihad under al-Zarqawi begins its indiscriminate attacks.
13th July 2003	The IGC is formed.
Early July 2003	Attack on “collaborators” associated with the CPA or the IGC.
22nd July 2003	Mosul – Saddam’s sons Uday and Qusay are killed in a fire fight.
Late July 2003	Establishing an Iraqi army and the Iraqi Civil Defence Corps commence.
Mid-August 2003	Rebuilding efforts are hampered by the security situation which worsens during the fall and it discredits the efforts by the U.S.
7th August 2003	Baghdad – bombing of the Jordanian Embassy.
19th August 2003	Baghdad – bombings of the UN-headquarter at the Canal Hotel and UN-chief Sergio de Mello killed.
29th August 2003	Shiite ayatollah Muhammed Bakr al-Hakim is killed in a car bomb attack.
October 2003	Baghdad – the al-Rashid hotel is attacked as it is a high-profile target due to the media presence.
14th October 2003	Baghdad – the Turkish embassy is attacked with car bombs.
27th October 2003	Baghdad – the headquarters of the International Committee of the Red Cross is attacked.
27th October 2003	Baghdad – police stations around the city are targeted with car bombs and suicide attacks.
November 2003	The CPA begins the de-ba’thification process.
Early November 2003	Nasiriyah – the insurgents attack the headquarters of the Italians’ paramilitary force.

November 2003	Baghdad – <i>Operation Iron Hammer</i> targets the insurgency and its sympathizers, and is temporarily successful. Because of rough treatment the sympathy for the coalition forces decreases.
20th November 2003	Kirkuk – the headquarters of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan is attacked with suicide truck bombs.
Late November 2003	Latifiyah – 18 miles south of Baghdad, six Spanish intelligence officials are killed in an ambush.
Late November	Two Japanese diplomats are killed to prevent the country from deploying a contingent of the Japanese Self-Defence Forces.
Mid-December 2003	Tikrit – Saddam Hussein is captured near the city.
2nd November 2003	Baghdad – Fallujah – a Chinook helicopter is shot down killing 15 U.S. soldiers.
February 10th-11th 2004	Baghdad – two suicide car bombs attack on 10 th and 11 th February near the city kills nearly 100 new police recruits.
March-June 2004	Ramadi – heavily armed insurgents’ attacks fortified positions performs ambushes, suicide attacks and roadside bombs killing 31 and wounds 200.
11th March 2004	Madrid – bombs against the subway system kills 201 and wounds 1 400, with the results of a withdrawal of Spanish troops.
March 2004	Karbalah – suicide bombers targets Shiites in observing the Ashura rites.
6th April 2004	Ramadi – 12 Marines were killed.
April 2004	Husaybah – an ambush ends after a 14 hours fire-fight resulting in 13 dead insurgents and several wounded.
April 2004	Fallujah – the first battle which ends in a failure for the CF.
17th May 2004	Baghdad – Ezzedine Salim, the president of the IGC, is assassinated in a suicide bomb attack.
Summer 2004	Foreign companies are targeted by using abductions in order to force countries to withdraw from Iraq and to hamper the reconstruction effort as well as to increase the security cost. Four Jordanian truck drivers are kidnapped.

May 2004	The American contractor Nick Berg is supposedly kidnapped and beheaded by al-Zarqawi. Al-Jazeera airs the beheading.
May 2004	60 minutes report on the abuse of prisoner at Abu Ghraib, which also was confirmed by International Committee of the Red Cross.
28th of June 2004	The transition of power from the CPA to the Iraqi Interim Government headed by Iyad Allawi.
July 2004	Mosul – Governor Kashmoula is assassinated.
Late July 2004	Baghdad – the third highest official at the Egyptian embassy is kidnapped.
August 2004	Najaf and Madinat al-Sadr (Sadr City) – major fighting against the second front established by Muqtada al-Sadr’s militia.
Mid-September 2004	Baghdad – a car bomb outside the al-Karkh police station kills 47 and injures 114.
Fall 2004	Counterinsurgency tactics is adopted to split the mainstream insurgents from the FRE and the Islamite extremist, which are targeted for destruction. This in order to create an incentive for political participation for the coming election.
Early October 2004	Samarra – a rehearsal attack by U.S. and Iraqi security forces for the coming assault on Fallujah.
8th November 2004	Fallujah – the second battle ends with an ousting of the insurgents and the destruction of the city.
Mid-November 2004	Mosul – U.S. Marines oust the insurgents through small-unit operations.
21st December 2004	Mosul – the insurgents counter by suicide attacks killing 13 soldiers, five civilian contractor and four Iraqis at the base in Mosul. The city is put on curfew.
January 2005	The elections are targeted by al-Zarqawi, whose group performs more than 100 attacks in January.
19th January 2005	Karbalah and Najaf – bombs kills 60.
21st January 2005	Baghdad – 14 people killed in a car bomb attack outside the Shiite’s al-Taf Mosque.
30th January 2005	Al-Zarqawi and other factions increases attacks on Iraqi security forces and polling stations. Attacks are also launched against Shiites in Numaniyah, Kut and Basra .

2nd and 6th February 2005 Late February 2005	The insurgents' target Iraqi security forces with suicide bombers. Bombings against the Shiite celebration of Ashura.
2nd April 2005 Late April 2005	Symbolic attack on the Abu Ghraib prison. A new government is formed under elected prime minister Ibrahim al-Jafaari.
May 2005	151 security personnel killed and 434 civilians in contrast to 86 and 299 in April 2005.
25th May 2005	Haditha – <i>Operation New Market</i> cleans up the town, yet the inadequate presence of soldiers allows the insurgents to return.
26th May 2005	Baghdad and western Iraq – <i>Operation Lightning</i> is launched by U.S. and Iraqi forces in raids against largely Sunni populated neighbourhoods in order to halt the suicide bombings. Thousands are arrested and many complaints about the use of torture by Iraqi security forces are reported.
11th June 2005	Baghdad – insurgents using Wolf Brigade police commando's uniforms infiltrate the compounds and blow their payload in the barracks killing a dozen.
August 2005	Haditha – 20 Marines were killed outside the city in an ambush and a roadside bomb.

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3. Map of Iraq with the casualties suffered by U.S. and British forces from March 20th 2003 until October 5th 2007 – Obleek.com
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