

Department of Political Science

Writing identity

A postmodernist study on how swedish identity was built
through difference

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Abstract

Today the word identity is filled with many different contents. Depending from which perspective one tries to examine a scientific research-question, there is a variety of interpretations of the problem.

In this thesis the aim is to prove with help of postmodernist theory how the Swedish identity was built by the articulation of difference towards the other over decades. The analysis is conducted to explore how the Swedish identity was affected and self-constructed by the foreign policy of the state in the three decades after the end of World War two. According to the chosen theory, the gist of the matter is to focus on how differentiation was produced through discursive actions. Differentiation builds the basis for developing an identity and it is assumed that those differentiations can help defining a certain state-identity. A number of case studies are made to see if these assumptions are correct. Concretely the author chose some promising quotations and a picture and analyzed this material on the basis of if difference was articulated.

Key words Sweden, identity, postmodernism, foreign policy, differentiation

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1 Introduction

Why can a study on identity be of importance? The end of World War two represented the beginning of a new era. The confusion of the war was over and every country in the world, but mainly the ones in Europe, took a breath of relief. For Sweden this period opened up a new possibility for the country to reposition itself within the flux of the young peace. With that a new self-conception took place, in which identity played a decisive role: To be aware of its identity is an important precondition in order to know where to be positioned within the changed interactions and negotiations of the political arena.

WW II changed both the european and the global situation as a whole. The end of the war brought an evident change for Sweden's strategical situation. The pressure against the frontiers of the country relieved, Denmark and Norway recovered their independence. The former balance of power in the Baltic Sea between the Soviet Union and Germany had dispersed and only the SU remained. The Swedish policy of non-alignment passed the test despite many difficulties. It was the gist of the matter in a policy which kept Sweden out of the war.

Because Sweden refused to follow the coalition in war, the United Nations, they were not allowed to get member of the UN from the beginning of its establishment. How ought Sweden to position itself within this new force field? In which way would the state-identity become biased? Therefore, an essay with the aim to examine identity, defining and differentiate this topic is needful if not intriguing.

2 Research-question and the objective of the study

In this study it will be theoretically examined, if identity was formulated in the three decades after WW II through certain discursive actions concerning the Swedish foreign policy. This consideration is based on a certain theory of postmodernism which assumes that it is possible to characterize state-identity by the articulation of difference. This study does neither try to put a certain character of identity over Sweden nor devise a Swedish identity out of texts. It is not the aim of this study to specify a typology of a certain state-identity because the theoretical background of this study assumes that there is no such thing as one objective truth, or a possibility to categorize identity. Hence, the author has the opinion that this is infeasible within the scope of this essay.

Out of the above I have formulated a main-problem which will summarize the comprehensive purpose of this study:

“Has a state-identity been established in Sweden?”

To the author's knowledge there is little or no literature on this research question. For this reason the goal of this study is mainly to contribute to the academic discussion on the establishment of Swedish state-identity. The contribution of this study reaches until the end of the 1960s to give starting-points for further studies which could investigate the impossibility mentioned above and could discuss a feasible typology.

2.1 Outline of the Study

First the paper will start with a definition of the different faces of identity. This includes the personal identity, the national identity and identity seen in a broader context. With this, the aim is to enable a basic understanding of which approaches on identity exist. Also it can be seen as a link to the theoretical heart of the study. Second, the theoretical background will be described more closely, as well as a critical separation towards other theories will be made. Third, the theoretical implement will be completed by the methodological part, which enables us to analyze the research-question. Fourth, we will then conclude if and how difference was articulated in Swedish foreign policy and a conclusion will be drawn of how this could be interpreted.

3 Theory

*Grau, teurer Freund, ist alle Theorie,
Und grün des Lebens goldner Baum.*

-J.W. von Goethe, 1808

In this chapter the aim is to examine the etymology of identity. Three main drifts are going to be examined which in the end leads us to a proper fundament for further theoretical thoughts.

3.1 Identity per se

According to Ekman "the concept of 'identity' is multidimensional" (Ekman 2001:73; or see Smith 1991:3ff for further reading). In every day life, the term is often connected to personal identity. At least, we can assume this would be the most frequent answer asking a number of people how they understand the notion of identity. Derived from the Latin term *idem* ('identical'), the expression "refers to the possibility of identifying somebody as a unique individual, over time and in different social contexts" (Ekman 2001:73). Thus, identity is mainly a term with positive connotations. It has something to do with knowing yourself, finding a place in society, and within the social environment. Belonging somewhere implies individuality, not meaning to stay alone. It is clearly the contrary of segregate oneself but being a (individual) member of a collective.

On contrary, the historian Bo Stråth, who is engaged a lot in the field of national integration, stresses that identity is a means to categorize and divide people into different groups. He claims that this classification is based on a negative connotation (Stråth 1993:116). The notion indicates a difference between "we" and "them" while the definition of the differences can be more or less sharp and is changing over time in combination with the historical background. Identity can relate to family, nation, region, gender, religion, class and so forth. Since the notion can relate to many different aspects and things it runs the risk of loosing its sharpness because of the amount of its content (Stråth 1993:116f).

3.2 National identity

National identity will now be the second etymological derivation of identity. What is then national identity? To draw a picture of *'the'* national identity as a prototype is not possible. Anthony D. Smith, a well known social scientist of the London School of Economics, released in 1991 a remarkable position on this field. In his book *'National Identity'* he mentions five preconditions of national identity:

1. an historic territory, or homeland
2. common myths and historical memories
3. a common, mass public culture
4. common legal rights and duties for all members
5. a common economy with territorial mobility for members (Smith 1991:14).

This angle is in line with those historic-cultural definitions, for instance, represented by German historian and philosopher Johann Gottfried Herder. In his historical-cultural definition, nation is defined by the culture, developed during a long period of time (Ekman 2001).

In this definition, territory is the central constituent, however the notion *'territory'* is not necessarily congruent to *'nation'* (Ekman 2001:75). But without a common territory, national identity can not be described properly. This approach can also be characterized as an essentialist one, which is quite the opposite of what the constructivist school refers to as national identity. Also, the classification of singularities as those mentioned above, does not seem to take modern state formations like the European Union into consideration. It can be assumed that such formations influences countries due to the existing structure. Therefor this approach on identity seems not to cover enough resources to get a grip on the gist of the matter. At the most it can be seen as a particular type of social/ collective identity. According to Smith the best example of why national identity is a such particular type is that identity on a national level imply some sense of political community (Smith 1991:9). This leads us to the next chapter in which identity is seen from a non-centric point of view.

3.3 Identity in context

In this approach identity is seen from a broader view or, in other words, within a social context. Identity is not about qualities of one individual but about expressions, and is situated within a context that is constantly shifting (See Barker and Petersson for further reading). This context or process is forming an understanding of ourselves, of others and our identities. On the other hand, the understanding of what influences the way we look at the society and how society works is affected. This is also the case on how our understanding of other peoples behavior is influenced (Kinnvall 2003:11). Thus, there is a permanent identity-process going on, involving both parts interacting with each-other in an ambivalent way.¹

Identities are designed, reconstructed or redesigned by social relations and actions. However, nations and national identities socially designed are not of less historical importance. They are constantly subject for new social construction. This means that national existences are nothing that is given. In fact this existence has to be constantly reconstructed by itself (Hall 2003:111). This study follows this reasoning and applies the above mentioned theoretical considerations.

The next step will be to define the socially designed framework. What is the foundation of social construction in Sweden? If we would follow the historical-cultural reasoning, we would answer this question with the most common and classical answers. For centuries, Sweden has grown as a cultural and territorial unit, dominated by a uniform language², with common myths and a common historical experience.³ Every generation was shaping this development, in which identity was formed. Hence, on the one hand identity is about individuals, but noticing an identity does neither have anything to do with a subjective will-act nor with building a social construction. This may be the case if nations (or rather communities) were founded by a social contract⁴ which is not the case here.

Rather the author would argue that social construction is more about an interaction of communities. Within a such community those who are positioned best are able to express their thoughts and to shape the agenda. Thus it is in a sense a question of power. As Hall formulates it forcefully: “one forgets easily that the constantly renewed experience of national identity contains also a constantly renewed power practice” (Hall 2003:112). If one takes nations as given objective units, one denies at the same time the power relations, which contribute to form the constantly changeable social constructions. This is the case too, if one assumes that nations are created subjectively. By individualizing the process of

¹The debate on how human behavior is influenced of structure and agency (and vice versa) is one of the central issues in sociology.

²However Swedish is not official language by law but merely de facto.

³I proceed from basic knowledge of the reader and do without a detailed description of Swedish history.

⁴Here it is referred on Thomas Hobbes *Leviathan*, or *The Matter, Forme and Power of a Common Wealth Ecclesiasticall and Civil*, commonly called *Leviathan*.

how identity is donated one ignores that there is power over subjectivity. There is a constant decision-making process under way, especially in the democracies of our time. Every person or group tries to shape the agenda after their interests and those who succeed to influence are probably the ones with the most resources and power. And power develops not subjectively, but from a collective connection (ibid.).

The theory, which will be used in this study as a tool to examine the research question, can be marked as a postmodern approach. In his book “Writing security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity” the Australian political scientist David Campbell examines the role which foreign policy plays in the governmental construction of identity. His work is one of the most noted studies in the field of postmodernism. In this study, the author uses Campbell's literature as a framework of reference.

3.4 Postmodernism

In international relations, postmodernist approaches are no grand theories in comparison with for instance realism or liberalism. Hence, a short overview of what these theories stand for are useful to enable a convenient orientation.

Postmodernist approaches have two central characteristics: On the one hand they focus on texts and other representations of events (like pictures or symbols) instead of focusing on the events themselves – one of the first benchmarks in postmodern international relations was the title “International/Intertextual Relations by Der Derian/Shapiro 1989, in which the focus was exactly on those postmodernist characteristics. On the other hand, the skepticism towards “objective” truths which comes along with categorizations, as i mentioned above. If the knowledge of an event was acquired discursively, there will be always more than one version of this event (Diez 2003:451f).

As i mentioned above, which version of discourse succeeds is a question of power. In other theoretical approaches power is quite often linked to certain players (for instance the realistic approach in which the main actors are states): the one who is positioned better due to resources or its position in the international society dominates at least in the official perception. From a postmodernist perspective discursive representations are not only expressions of power, but even the discourse itself is power (ibid:452). In other words: power is not justified in the individual participant, but in the discursive context, in which the (speech-) action takes place and from which we never can free ourselves completely (Guzzini 1993:472).

3.5 Differentiation

Postmodernist approaches define themselves as critical especially towards the big or rather more established theories. Neo-realists like Kenneth Waltz are located in the focus of the criticism. In his essay on “The poverty of Neorealism” Richard K. Ashley (1986) criticizes Kenneth Waltz’ (1979) “Theory of International Politics” concerning its state-centered view, its utilitarianism, its positivism and its structuralism. According to Ashley the “poverty of Neorealism” is founded in its determinism, for instance the codifying of the international system as a state-system, which not tolerated political alternatives.

Also the constructivist approach, for instance by Alexander Wendt, offers little advice, because Wendt’s theory of identity formation is, like the neorealist one, one-sided. “The problem of identity formation [in constructivist approaches, the author] is constantly seen from the perspective of the system and never as a problem each state and each statesman has to grapple with” (Ringmar 1997:283 in Wæver 2002:21).

In contrast, the postmodernist point of view is indeed state-focused. But there it tries to establish contact between (anarchic) international relations and the more regulated domestic policies by taking them into consideration. In postmodernism the sovereignty of states and the international anarchy, the inside-regularity and threat from the outside are determining each other. The State itself cannot be presumed but is gaining its identity by demarcating the inside from the outside. This facilitates a so called state-identity towards the external (Diez 2003:454 f) by a discursive representation and a construction of identity through separation from the outside (ibid. 458). Thus, postmodern approaches can be seen as a link between domestic policy and international relations.

3.6 The core of Campbell's approach

If we now take a look at the actual approach of David Campbell, the title of his book is striking. “Writing security” makes no sense from a traditional point of view because security would be a static condition. For Campbell, security is not an objective status and can for this reason not be equated with, for instance, the protection of military threat. Concentrating on discursive representation in official documents for instance and particularly on the construction of identity by difference, *security* is not presumed but is to be written through time. For Campbell the location where security is to be written is the foreign policy on the basis of a combination between identity and difference to others (ibid. 459). In “Writing security” Campbell describes the example of the United States, where over centuries identity was reproduced by a chain of foreign policies which consisted of a chain of separations from all foreign respectively alien: From the encounter with the natives over the “Frontier”-myth to the east-west conflict that

resulted in the centurylong Cold War (Campbell 1998:133-189). There has always to be an articulated difference to shape identity. On this point the approach obviously goes back to so called “post-structuralists” like Jacques Derrida. We can not speak about “A” without differ “A” from “B” and vice versa, because if “A” were varied to nothing, “A” would be anywhere and with that getting more or less senseless.

This study takes the same procedure into consideration, though already the title of Campbell's work (“writing security”) suggests a different focus. Whereas Campbell seeks to write about security, my impulse is to concentrate only on differentiation itself. Hence one can argue that this study displays a “postmodernist-light-version” of the approach expounded by David Campbell. To get to the goal of “writing identity”, the author will not describe where Swedish foreign policy tried to seek “security” but where difference was expressed, also to keep this study as less as abstract as possible. I will examine how identity was (re-)produced in the case of Sweden through the articulation of “difference” by Swedish foreign policy through the three post-war decades, from 1945 till the End of the 1960s. The following chapter will provide the reader with the necessary methodological knowledge of this study.

4 Methodological considerations

To approach the aim of this study - to demonstrate that difference towards others (“B’s”) has been positioned and to show that these differences were articulated in the Swedish foreign policy - the author has chosen a qualified text-analysis as an instrument. With help of this tool the content is both systematized and critically scrutinized (Esaiasson et al. 2003:233). The subject of analysis are primary sources such as governmental documents and speeches which the author assumes to contain the gist of the matter in discursive interaction of Swedish foreign policy. Since postmodernist works have an inherent skepticism towards the opinion that “political” documents are “per se” more relevant than texts and objects (Diez 2003:456), the author has also chosen to analyze a picture, which is in line with the postmodernist claim of this study.

The motivation to choose a text-analysis is the advantage that the focus does lie not only on certain passages of a book or a text, but also on the whole context itself and the interaction within. According to Esaiasson et al. his type of proceeding is also the most common in academic works (Esaiasson et al. 2003:233). The author chose not to work with a discourse analysis because he assumed that the level of abstractness would have increased further. However, since certain discourses will be examined one can speak of a “discourse analysis light”.

In this analysis citations and speech-acts will be examined and will be considered in a broader context. At this point, it is important to mention that this analyzed examination concentrates on some of the most important discourses in the three decades. This essay does neither claim a completeness within the examined material nor within the chronology itself, because this study had to limit itself on a small scale of material. Furthermore, it is highly questionable if a complete capture of “discursive data” is possible. Due to the fact that every articulation relates to each-other, the effort would be enormous and the complexity and level of abstractness would increase considerably. The discourses were examined within a chronological context. With that the author tried to restrain the abstractness as well as to simplify the procedure. However, the abstractness can not be dispelled as a whole.

4.1 Material

The work will examine only primary material which consists of official speeches and statements of the Swedish government and prime ministers as well as a picture and a quotation from the central organ of the Swedish social democratic party *Tiden*. Because of the long tradition of social democratic politics in Sweden, *Tiden* is assumed as a central organ which had a enormous impact on the opinion-forming process. It is therefore taken into consideration. Furthermore, the examined material is chronologically limited from the end of WW II until the end of the 1960s. The reason for this is that the post-war period particularly played an important role for Sweden to reposition itself in Europe and the World.

Second sources are rarely used and applied to shape the methodological respectively the theoretical framework. To get a grip on the gist of the matter it is not helpful to examine something which already was examined by someone else. Therefor the focus of the examination was on primary sources.

4.2 Criticism of Method and Material

The author is aware of the fact that the methodological proceeding of this study will not be shared by every reader. Indeed, the application of a postmodernist approach contains some possibilities of criticism. One could argue that the examination of discursive action is nothing else than fooling around with language. Furthermore, the equation of articulated difference with the developing of a certain state-identity can be retorted with the allegation of relativism. Both may derive from the same origin, namely from the postmodernist rejection of one single and veritable ascertainment of reality. Hence, in the conceptualization of the power of discourses and not of the actors which are expressing them.

Additionally, the chosen timeframe can be criticized as well. One could rightly ask the question if a timeframe of only thirty years until the end of the 1960s covers enough suitable data to examine the expression of the Swedish state-identity. A longer period is absolutely thinkable. However, as i already addressed above, the limitation on a relatively short period of time decreases the danger of getting too abstract. With scrutinizing the thirty years after WW II, the author fluffed himself to examine an important and interesting period in Swedish history. In the end, one could argue that this is a historical study more than a study of political science. Indeed, the analysis takes place within a historical timeframe. But the subject to be examined is not history but discourses which have taken place in history. Also, the used theory is a theory of international relations, which underlines the aim of this study.

5 Analysis

If one looks back in Swedish foreign- and security-policy after the end of WW II, the development appears quite obvious. The neutrality under two world wars and the previously freedom which lasted hundred years was followed by the so called alliance-free policy of neutrality. This was conducted mainly with assertiveness and consequence. The domestic stability itself was not disturbed even if sometimes dissonance prevailed on what requirements were demanded on the Swedish foreign policy. In certain situations the question on whether the policy of neutrality already is, or can become an obstacle to realize other goals of national importance was made pivotal. According to Andrén and Landqvist (1965:64), the problem of Swedish foreign policy was to balance the policy between the neutrality's need of *distance* and the need of cooperation to force other interests than the safety policy and for instance to benefit economically. In this chapter, the aim is to offer some of the numerous examples of this balancing-act and to analyze in which way the discourse in Swedish foreign policy unveils aspects of distance towards the outside, which is crucial for state-identity to be emerged. The very first fork for Swedish foreign- and security-policy in the postwar period was about *rollvalet* (choice of roles) concerning the dividing of the world into two blocs and the behavior within the new arrangement in Europe.

5.1 Continuity

The question on an association to the Council of Europe was examined in 1949. In the very same year the Scandinavian defense negotiations had crocked up and Sweden marked its denial towards the block-building policies of both the United States and the Soviet Union, as well as its unconditioned conventionalism for neutrality. In contrast the association with the Council offered a possibility to mark the ideological-founded affinity towards the democratic countries without seceding the principles of the Swedish "*alliansfrihet*" (Andrén & Möller 1990:65). The mission of the Council from the Swedish point of view has had to be on the economic, social, cultural, scientific, juridical and administrative level. The goal was to protect and to establish values such as human rights and political freedom and to force the economic growth.

From a government-statement on Swedish foreign policy in *riksdagen* 22th of march 1950, the adherence of a neutral policy - even as a member of the Council - was articulated:

“Den svenska utrikespolitiken är lika litet nu en isolationspolitik som den var detta under mellankrigstiden. Vårt land håller sig utanför militära blockbildningar men det har vi gjort också tidigare under innevarande århundrade och långt dessförinnan, utan att detta karakteriserats som isolationspolitik.” (in Andrén & Landqvist 1965:113).

In this statement, the difference is perceived as connected to the historic conditions of the old days. It contains two values such as common history or culture. The statement does not respond to the Council of Europe which was the counterpart it describes. After all it was only about one year ago, the Council of Europe was established with Sweden as a Member. But this speech ascertains one-sided how the Swedish foreign policy has to be accepted from other countries. Also, the Swedish government showed, that participation in the European integration (or economic) process was strictly separated from concessions towards both superpowers.

5.2 Isolation

The self chosen isolation was commented once-more by foreign minister Östen Undén about four years later. In his comment, Undén assumes not only the historical differences Sweden deals with apart from the defense-policy itself, but also that Sweden's geographical position requires a different policy which makes it impossible to engage one-sided only:

“Den historiska erfarenheten är givetvis inte enbart bestämmande för vår nutida utrikespolitik: Sveriges geografiska och försvarspolitiska läge anvisar oss en politik som inte engagerar landet på ena sidan i vår delade värld.” (in Andrén & Möller 1990:66).

Besides the articulated ‘historic needs’, the geographic argumentation implies an insuperable difference towards other countries policies. It is not a matter of negotiations because this matter (of fact) was or is not negotiable, but it consolidated the Swedish non-engagement policy in a way from which it was very difficult to arrange further negotiations.

The tension between East and West has always been double-sighted. It has been commanded by both the antagonism of the great powers and the rivalry of two different social systems, between strategy and ideology. This put countries like Sweden in front of a permanent dilemma: They belonged ideologically to one side but for strategic reasons they chose a non-alignment or neutral policy. The problem was certainly not new to Sweden when the winning alliance of the WW II. fell apart into two blocs which rivaled and were reciprocally highly suspicious to each other. Sweden had the same problem under WW II when the government turned down the possibility of the “ideologic-neutrality” in 1949 this happened in connection to the experiences during the war:

“Neutralitet i politisk och folkrättslig bemärkelse innebär ingalunda, att en nation avstår från rätten för dess medborgare att ta parti i debatten om internationella frågor eller att föra demokratins och fri hetens talan.” (in *ibid.*:69).

Initially, one could discern a certain ambition to motivate the Swedish choice of the alternative as well ideologically. The “Swedish model” was introduced as an alternative with certain values as a pattern. It illustrates as well a certain connection between the domestic debate and the ambition of the foreign policy to mark the Swedish wish to contribute in different manners to remove the tension between the two blocs. The question was whether the non-alignment-policy had the unambiguous aim to put “*neutralitet i krig*” (neutrality in war) under an obligation, or that difference was only articulated to have a free hand for further negotiations.

5.3 Korean War

The Korean War put Sweden face-to-face with unexpected diplomatic challenges. The Soviet Union was boycotting the UNSC, in protest towards the support of the (Vietnamese) nationalistic government by the Western bloc. Hence, they were absent when the council decided to recommend South Korea as associate to the member-countries. That involved a situation for Sweden considered to be practically unthinkable because South Korea decided to apply for membership in the U.N. The veto power – which the SU not performed due to its absence – was considered to be an effective obstacle against decisions about sanctions from which a potential war between the super powers could have evolved. The U.N. therefore presented a proposal to condemn China as a punishment for its intervention to support North Korea. The Swedish neutral-political reaction was to abandon its vote.

On February 11th 1951, Prime Minister Tage Erlander commented the actual state. At that point, Sweden had been a member of the United Nations for over four years – the membership was one of the first political activities of his cabinet in November 1946 – and Erlander responded to the domestically critics caused by the abstention from voting to sanctions:

“Vi är förvisso angelägna om samarbete med dem som står oss nära, men vi har valt att avböja samarbete på det militära området, trots att självfallet detta avböjande kan utsätta oss för risken av isolering i farans ögonblick.” (in *Andrén & Landqvist 1965:116*).

One more espousal for neutrality even if Erlander self speaks of “isolation”. The delimitation towards the community of states occurs with referencing to the “greater good”, the Swedish foreign policy and the prime minister elaborates further:

“Det är inte många länder som anser sig kunna välja den alliansfria linjen. De stater som tvingades med i kriget, har samtliga nöfgats att ta position mellan öst- och västblocken. Sverige och Schweiz förunnades att få leva i fred under båda världskrigen. Det var en isolering i Europa, som vi ansträngande oss att bevara. När kriget var över bestämde sig både Sverige och Schweiz för att föra en politik i fredstid, som skulle möjliggöra neutralitet i krig. (ibid.)

By implicating Switzerland in this context the difference towards the United Nations and its policy loosens sharpness. However but it gets not blurry as a whole. Here, Sweden perceives itself not as the only one to be (self-chosen) isolated. Rather, it legitimizes its isolation by referring to other countries that have a reputation as righteous neutral powers. Due to the fact that Switzerland did not access the U.N. until 2002, this depicts a proper appraisal. Is remarkable that in the citation, Erlander speaks about Sweden and Switzerland after World War II which decided to make policy in peace. He does not assume, that the United Nations' intention is to achieve a peaceful world. At least, he does not mention it.

5.4 Suez Crisis

Two Years later on April 7th 1953, Dag Hammarskjöld was appointed the second Secretary-General of the United Nations. A nomination that was certainly related to the Swedish policy of isolation, and which strengthens this approach. While Hammarskjöld was in office, crucial events like the Suez crisis from October 1956 till March 1957 occurred. The act of war against Egypt commented foreign minister Östen Undén in September 1958 as follows:

“Aktionen med Egypten 1956 företogs som en fientlig åtgärd mot detta land och [...] företogs utanför FN:s ram av enskilda stater, som ansåg sig kallade handla i moralens eller den kränkta rättens namn.” (in: Tiden 3/1958).

Consistent with the Swedish foreign policy, Undén arraigns the foreign policies of particularly France, Great Britain and Israel, which acted non-compliant with the official rules of the United Nations. Here, the differentiation as put forward by Undén is directed against the three countries, which is likely to be a characteristic for a neutral-isolated country like Sweden. Sweden as a state with sufficient leeway on the international level, appears as a moral instance that points the finger at other states that stray from the fold. At the same time, escaping potential difficulties in domestic and/or foreign policy are convenient spin-offs.

5.5 European Policy

In the early 1960s the European policy was in focus of the Swedish foreign policy. The European cooperation at this point had evolved from two different perspectives: The first perspective, was characterized, as already mentioned above, by the European Council in which Sweden was a member since 1949. It represented a broad European movement, delineated culturally, ideologically and by the common policy. The second perspective focussed on the European Economic Community (EEC) and favored primarily a safety- and economic-policy, which evolved gradually in a pure economic cooperation. To the European countries and areas outside the EEC, like Scandinavia it appeared as a big duty-free market with a high tariff wall and so, the EEC was recognized more as a threat.

In the so called *Metalltalet* of 1961, Tage Erlander categorically laid down the opinion of the Swedish government that a membership in the EEC was contradicting the policy of non-alignment. He pointed out that the Swedish foreign policy interests demands freedom of movement. Erlander argued, an application (to the EEC)

“skulle i dagens läge kunna vara direkt skadlig för våra vitala intressen eftersom den kunde uppfattas som en politisk handling med den innebörden att vi var beredda att avvika från vår neutralitetspolitik och söka anknytning till Atlantpakten.” (in: Andrén & Möller 1990:164).

Erlander connected the membership of the EEC with the inevitable consequence of an association in the NATO, irrespectively to the economic benefits of the entry, which particularly the Swedish heavy industry was attracted of (ibid.:159).

The speech furthermore contained criticism towards the community both from a community-economic, -social and an ideological point of view. It was implicated that Sweden had a certain freedom of action because of its outstanding economic position: Sweden was economically powerful and knew about its strengths. *Metalltalets* message partly was declaimed quite aggressive, which concealed that it also contained an answer to the affirmation towards economic cooperation in Europe. In that respect, the statement was quite optimistic:

“Det finns ingen anledning att se med pessimism på läget, att utbreda den föreställningen att det skulle vara omöjligt för de neutrala länderna att nå fram till ett tillfredsställande ekonomiskt arrangemang med Europamarknaden.” (ibid. 164).

The quotation implies a relativization of the difference articulated before. Especially compared to the domestic critics in Swedish European policy. In fact the mutual consent in Swedish debate on Europe did not exist any longer after this

speech (ibid. 164). Thus, this speech not only articulat difference to the outside but also to the inside.

•)) REFLEXER OCH REPLIKER (((•



Den romerska varginnan med Romulus och Remus i EEC-version

The picture shown above, published in the central organ of the Swedish social democratic party, “Tiden” in 1962 (Tiden 4/1962:240). It illustrates the members of the EEC, among others Germans chancellor Konrad Adenauer and French President de Gaulle in the front. The all benefit from the Treaty of Rome which was established through the EEC in the late 1950s. The Treaty itself is allegorized as a wild carnivore keeping other countries in distance in order to preserve its protectionist status quo.

The background of this picture is the inner-swedish debate on the so called *anslutningspolitiken* towards an accession in the EEC, which had already been mentioned above. In the general debate, a membership to the European Union forerunner model would have been contradicting the Swedish policy of neutrality. To be able to stand effectively beyond its foreign policy, it was impractically to subordinate to a committed economic system, ruled by non-neutral countries. It is therefore not astonishing that this allegory is depicted in this way. Referring to the picture, Sweden is an outsider, with no chance (or will) to benefit from a membership, having even to struggle with domestic policy difficulties in the way. Interpreted in this manner, the burlesque shows how the difference between domestic and the foreign policy is perceived. Moreover, it represents the EEC as the counterpart, threatening other countries and their policies outside “the club” like Sweden, unwilling to become members. Here, the neutrality was more important than the european integration movement.

5.6 Vietnam War

In the middle of the 1960s Sweden adpted the War in Vietnam as a foreign policy problem (Andrén & Möller 1990:80). In a declaration within a debate on foreign policy in the *Riksdagen* in March 1965, the government expressed the opinion that the progress in Vietnam “would imply risks of a conflict-change that could have serious consequences to universal peace” (ibid.). A few months later Olof Palme, at that point minister of communications, expressed the existing difference towards this policy in his first speech on foreign issues with a direct criticism targeted towards the United States. At the *Bröderskapsrörelsens kongress* in July 1965, he expressed his apprehension:

“Det är en illusion att tro att man kan möta krav på social rättvisa med våld och militära maktmedel. Det är ytterligt svårt att vinna människors engagemang med löften om att försvara en frihet som de i verkligheten aldrig fått uppleva.” (July 1965,) (in Andrén & Möller 1990:80).

At that time Sweden tried to delimit his foreign policy from the United States which were the biggest counterpart. One month later foreign minister Torsten Nilsson animadverted that increasing the “level of war” in Vietnam by the U.S. “through the effort of more devastating weapons in a larger area” (ibid.) could lead to the possibility that other states react with the same measures. The Vietnam-conflict could therefore lead to a much more serious international conflict.

The unexpected harsh criticism towards the U.S. awaked a new debate within the discourse, which displays a good example on how discursive action is always fluctuating: The debate which was primarily about the freedom of action of an alliance-free state within international matters, originated in the end in criticism towards how the government was acting. Bertil Ohlin, the leader of the *Folkpartiet*, claimed a more restrained proceeding. In a subsequent declaration of the government, more conciliable words had been selected:

“Konflikten där [...] försvarar dessutom den utjämning av motsättningarna mellan stormakterna...” (ibid.:81.).

This shows that the official position and the articulated difference was in a sense deconstructed. The critics of an egoistic and violent act have once more been replaced by the morally-exhorting voice of the misfit. Sweden gradually assumed to accept the role as a protector of the international moral (ibid.:82).

Olof Palme constructed the self-chosen differentiation further. In a self-explanatory speech with the title “den svenska neutralitetspolitiken bestämmer vi själva” (ibid.:82.) he tied the basic goal of a policy of neutrality together with a strong moral pathos:

“Neutralitetspolitiken innebär ingen strävan till isolering. Våra möjligheter att påverka utvecklingen i världen är små. Men det minskar inte den lilla nationens förpliktelse att verka för fred och försoning mellan folken, för demokrati och social rättvisa.” (ibid.:82f.).

This subject can be interpreted as one of the core statements in Swedish foreign policy and in the delimitation towards others. It is the advice to the divided world and especially to the U.S. as the leader of the western world that Sweden will not be part of any policy motivated by single state-focussed needs or ambitions. At the same time it is the declaration of a certain state-identity from which Sweden is willing to influence the political dilemmas of the time.

6 Conclusion

In this work the author examined if and how difference was articulated during the three decades after the end of WW II. It could be determined that difference was expressed numerously in this period. This expression, however, was double sided: On the one hand it was directed towards countries, like the two superpowers U.S. and SU. But it was also expressed towards political bodies like the EEC or the UN. The reasons for those actions were diversified. From a political belief, from a greater (morally) good or because of traditional habit and geographical location, Sweden tried to delimitate from others. Furthermore, it is notable that the articulation of difference was also used to cover domestic tension even if some expressions caused inner-swedish dissensions in the first place.

Since the expression of difference was the main precondition of building or establishing a state-identity, the author assesses this requirement to be fulfilled. During the three decades after WW II a swedish state-identity has been established. However, a certain definition of this identity is not possible. The chosen theory and the used methodological fundament can only describe an abstract picture of this Swedish state-identity. Additionally, it can be mentioned that the period after WW II was not a starting point of a quite new identity, consistency for instance in swedish isolation-policy is a variable that affected the analysis.

As mentioned above, a categorization or a definition of a certain typology is not possible within the scope of this study. However this approach offers a quite unusual insight on such a research-question by among other things offering a link between domestic policy and international relations. The possibility to examine state-identity gives starting-points for further studies which could investigate the impossibility mentioned above and could discuss a feasible typology.

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