

India, Russia, and the Iranian Nuclear Crisis

An analysis of Indian and Russian foreign policy towards Iran

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Preface

The writing process has taken place in an eventful time for the topic at issue. Indian and Russian leaders have met during a summit, election in Russia resulting in a landslide victory for United Russia has confirmed Putin's powerful position on Russia's political scene, and an American intelligence estimate has been published, suggesting that Iran has abandoned its program to develop nuclear weapons. These and other news related to the topic have been inspiring to the research process. I have almost on daily basis read relevant news articles during the writing process. The material was partly collected on a two-month field study in India. The trip was financially supported by the Ekvall foundation, to which I am warmly grateful. During the sojourn I met several people to whom I owe thanks. I also want to thank my tutor Anders Uhlin for showing flexibility in supervision and good advices.

Abstract

Nuclear activity in Iran has during last years been a widely discussed topic worldwide, as well as an important element in international relations. United States has looked for allies in attempts to isolate Iran politically and economically. India and Russia are powers of growing importance with interests in Iran. So far, both countries have cooperated with the US in IAEA although not completely followed the US policy. The purpose of this essay is to explain the countries ambivalent policies on Iran by using James N. Rosenau's model of pre-theories categorised in five sets on variables – individual, role, governmental, societal, and systemic. They are also analysed through Peter Wallensteen's classification of policies – Geopolitik, Realpolitik, Idealpolitik, and Kapitalpolitik. By applying this theoretical framework on empirical material, India's and Russia's policies towards Iran are explained, respectively. The study suggests Indian policy to be a result of mainly systemic and societal variables and can be categorised as Kapitalpolitik, Geopolitik, and Idealpolitik, while Russian policy primarily can be explained by systemic and individual factors and primarily is characterised by Realpolitik.

Keywords: Energy, foreign policy analysis, India, Iran, nuclear weapon, Rosenau, Russia

List of abbreviations

BJP	Bharatiya Janata Party
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CTBT	Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
EU	European Union
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INC	Indian National Congress Party
NPT	Non-Proliferation Treaty
OPEC	Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
SCO	Shanghai Cooperation Organisation
UN	United Nations
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
US	United States

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1 Introduction

Since US president George W. Bush in 2002 described Iran, along with North Korea and Iraq, as an axis of evil of great danger, the country has been in spotlight in international politics. Economical sanctions have been imposed and several discussions have taken place in the *International Atomic Energy Agency* (IAEA). The US is however in need of support from other countries in these issues. Russia and India are two huge states of growing importance that both are interested in good relations with Iran, for somewhat different reasons. Even though both of these countries have been voting with the US in IAEA, they have clearly shown that they are not completely supporting the US policy on Iran. India hosts the second largest population of the world and has experienced an economic boom during last years and Russia is re-establishing itself as a great power after the chaotic 1990s characterized by economic and political chaos. The nuclear crisis in Iran is an example of how players on the international arena show their power and a new world order is emerging. India and Russia, both nuclear powers, have different motives for acting in a certain way.

1.1 Statement of purpose

I aim to chart the deliberate considerations done by Indian and Russian leaders, respectively, before arriving at a decision with regard to the countries' policy on Iran. Objective conditions in the society that decision makers have to take into consideration, such as historical ties, economic interests, and domestic politics, are relevant to this study. The study means to involve an intentional analysis, which is mapping intentions, as well as a rational one, which rather investigates a calculation of decisions. My research question is:

How can the foreign policies of Russia and India as regards the Iranian nuclear crisis be explained?

Except for a brief historical background, necessary to understand the situation of today, the analysis is limited to the 21st century, in particular the last few years. Due to the acute nature of the topic several new facts and circumstances have occurred during the writing process. These have been taken into consideration as much as possible, although little news after mid-December 2007 have been used.

1.2 Organisation of the paper

The paper is organised as follows: In chapter two the methods and materials used in the study are presented and discussed. Chapter three presents the theoretical framework used in the study. Chapter four provides background information to the Iranian nuclear crisis. Chapter five consists of analyses of the Indian and Russian policies in the Iranian nuclear crisis. Finally, chapter six summarises the paper and its conclusions.

2 Method and material

2.1 Analysis of motives in foreign policy

This paper is an attempt to explain India's and Russia's foreign policies with regard to the current Iranian nuclear crisis. In quest of this, I am analysing motives, an area of study infamous for its margin of error, meaning that the results are vague. It is therefore necessary to carefully present the method chosen. I have used concepts from different scholars I find relevant to apply on my area of study to understand the background to India's and Russia's chosen policies towards Iran.

Politicians' and decision-makers' motivations for a specific decision are indisputably interesting, especially in research concerning domestic policies or normative analyses. Nevertheless, it is important distinguishing *motivations* from *motives*. There is a possible difference between these two conceptions, common in the game of politics and diplomacy. Motivations are obviously very simple to find just by following the newspapers, while the actual motives are somewhat trickier to distinguish. In this paper, I am focusing on the latter (Esaiasson et al 2004:319).

Motives and intentions can be perceived and examined by different methods. There is a difference between a motive behind a factual matter or specific decision and motives behind general strategies, such as foreign policy doctrines, although they might be connected (Ibid 322). How the research object has acted in other cases can be used as motive intention (Ibid 326).

In this essay, predefined motives are my point of departure, although some of them have been recognised during the research process. Hence, the complex of problems associated to predefined motives, that they possibly not may be relevant in the analysis at issue, diminish. Those predefined motives include both motives adapted to situations (*situationsanpassade*) as well as generally applicable (*allmångiltiga*) motives (Ibid 320-321).

Nevertheless, the actors whose motives are to be analysed first have to be identified. The actors at issue analysed in this paper are the governments of India and Russia, respectively. A more precise presentation and definition of the concept can be found in the analysis of individual variables in chapter 5. Second, the specific decisions or policies to be scrutinised in the survey have to be identified and limited. The decisions and policies I in particular am analysing in this paper are:

- India's recent policy change towards Iran, including voting with the US in IAEA against Iranian interests, and the country's possible wish to disguise this policy change.
- Development of Russian-Iranian partnership and Russia's ambivalent policy in Iran related issues, such as officially defending the country while voting against Iranian interests in IAEA.

Third, motives are to be mapped and analysed. Finally, the analysis should result in motives being elucidated and valued, if possible in an ordinal scale.

2.2 Methodological discussion

A range of methods exists for mapping and analysing methods. One way of doing motive analysis is studying the ways of decisions. For obvious reasons, this has been out of question in this paper. Getting to know the decision-making procedures in Kremlin in the specific case of Iran, as well as in the Indian government, is not realistic. Instead, the foreign policies have to be analysed by focusing on different factors that might have influenced the decision-makers. Analysis from different perspectives helps to give a relevant picture. Also within this field a range of methods are used. In *"How should we study foreign policy change?"* (1999) Gustavsson contributes with a well-disposed review of six widespread models used in the research field and suggest an own method of analysis. He points out that the research on foreign policy change increased substantially as the phenomenon occurred widely over the world in the wake of the cold war, and that no academic models were acclimated to the new world order. Gustavsson's model focuses on changes in fundamental structural conditions, strategic political leadership, and the presence of a crisis of some kind (Ibid 74). In this paper, the Iran-policies of India and Russia are examined, but it can be discussed whether an actual policy change has occurred in both countries. It is also questionable whether there is a crisis present of the kind Gustavsson has in mind¹, and I do not value the decision-making process as crucial in this topic. Hence, the model is not a preferable one in this case.

I find it suitable to instead use a levels-of-analysis-model, which normally analyses state behaviour on individual, domestic/organisational, interstate, and system level, respectively (see for example Singer 1961). I have in this paper, however, chosen to use a related method developed by James N. Rosenau.² The model is based on pre-theories of foreign policy research that can be clustered into

¹ Furthermore, I find it questionable whether it, as this model indirectly suggests, always is some kind of crisis connected to a foreign policy change.

² James N. Rosenau (b. 1924) is an American political theorist (currently serving on George Washington University) whose scholarship has focused on the dynamics of change in world politics.

five sections (further developed in chapter three). Despite some similarities with the levels-of-analysis-model, Rosenau writes: "We are not talking about levels of analysis but about philosophies of analysis" (2006:173). The pre-theories-model is rather behaviouristic (Huluban 11) that can be compared to more positivistic models, like rational choice, which nowadays is dominating the discipline, particularly in the Anglo-Saxon world.

I believe every method has its advantages and disadvantages. Analysis of methods includes great uncertainties, and it is very difficult to prove that your results actually reflect what the decision makers at question had in mind. Hence, my results can be discussed and should be interpreted with carefulness. With this in mind the goal nonetheless remains: to better understand the Russian and Indian policies in the Iran nuclear crisis.

2.3 Collection of material

The fact that the topic studied is of current interest and reports as well as discussions in media continuously are published has certainly affected my collection of material. No doubt the Iranian nuclear crisis in the early 21st century and how it affected relations between other countries will be the subject of several books in the future, but at the time being this is however not the case (at least I have not found them yet).

With this in mind I have primarily used articles and reports. I have mostly used reports from research institutes, think-tanks, and other organisations, rather than ordinary scientific articles. I have also used other official documents, such as reports from the Congress of the US, IAEA and other bodies. Ordinary news articles, which there are an abundance of, from international as well as local news sources, have been useful. In addition, I have used some primary sources, including one interview. The sources have been carefully chosen in sense of its reliability.

Within a topic where things are changing so fast, it has sometimes been hard to know how the situation for the moment right now is, and what was true when I started the study might not be true anymore when I am finishing the paper. However, the motives behind India and Russia's foreign policies towards Iran, which after all is my main research target, have not changed that fast.

3 Theoretical framework

3.1 Pre-theories and philosophies of analysis

Rosenau distinguishes between theories and pre-theories and means that the latter are compulsory bases to the former, although many researchers, foreign policy analysts in particular, not are conscious about them (2006:171). Furthermore, according to Rosenau, all pre-theories of foreign policy consists of either five sets of variables:

The *individual* cluster includes the personal qualities of relevant decision makers. Their values, talents, personal contacts, and prior experiences are relevant variables here.

The *role* is rather the contrary, i.e. what is indifferent to the individual and idiosyncratic, what would be likely to occur irrespective of the individual making the decision. No matter the individual, an American UN-ambassador is likely to defend Israel and accuse Cuba.

The *governmental* cluster includes frames in the government that decision makers have to stick to, structures that limit the freedom of action of a particular decision maker, it might enhance the possible choices in foreign policy.

Societal includes non-governmental aspects of a society, such as values and national unity, which influence the decision makers.

Systemic consists of geographical realities, ideological challenges from foreign countries, and interaction between states (Ibid 172-173).

Since Rosenau developed this classification of pre-theories in the 1960s, the world and foreign policies of nations have changed. Nevertheless, his model is still applicable even though the relative importance between the different variables may have changed. Rosenau finds that the globalisation has reduced the relevance of foreign policy, and much in world politics can be explained without it (Ibid 202). Nevertheless, I find that foreign policy is very relevant in my case of study.

In the globalised world of the 21st century, the impact of individual factors is immense because different persons have their own agenda, networks etc. Hence, this cluster of variables has swollen. On the contrary, the role factor has lost impact as international politics nowadays is more complex and moves on the trans-national arena are harder to anticipate. Likewise, the potency of governmental variables has declined, as result of a declining relevance of states and territories in the era of globalisation. With new technology and communication channels, skilful individuals, and stronger role of organisations

and enterprises follows that the relevance of societies are greater now than ever before. Also the systemic level has grown substantially as the role of nations has declined and capital, people, ideas, criminality, goods, and pollution freely can move across borders. The number of actors in the trans-national arena has increased and the global aspect is present in most decisions on foreign policy (Ibid 203-204).

3.2 Classification of policies

Professor Peter Wallensteen has in his quantitative research classified conflicts, especially those of interstate kind, by using four categories according to their underlying causes: *Geopolitik*, *Realpolitik*, *Idealpolitik* and *Kapitalpolitik*. Although I am not primarily studying conflicts, I find these concepts useful also in my analysis to instead classify foreign policies, and I use Wallensteen's definition of these German terms:

Geopolitik is connected to territory, which through history has been a common reason to war. Nowadays, the term often signifies a strategic target, rather than a territory to invade, on regional, continental or even global level.

Realpolitik emphasises power as a driving force behind conflicts, and is thereby a traditional factor of conflicts as well as a relevant part of realistic theory. Power of or influence in a region is an example, which, just like *Realpolitik* in general, is closely related to *Geopolitik*.

Idealpolitik rather emphasises ideological and legitimacy matters. During cold war it was very widespread, and it still is. Conflicts often occur between democracies and non-democracies, or between different religions.

Kapitalpolitik is, according to Wallensteen, probably not given as much prominence as it deserves. It emphasises economic issues, which of course are important in a capitalistic world, and includes interests in trade, natural resources, oil pipelines, as well as relations between rich and poor (Wallensteen 2002:95-96).

4 Iran and the nuclear crisis

United States strongly opposed the Islamic revolution 1979 and shortly thereafter broke its diplomatic relations with Iran. President Clinton imposed economic sanctions against Iran in 1995, which have been renewed by president Bush. The latter has taken several actions against Iran since he came to power in 2001. In 2002, he described Iran, along with North Korea and Iraq, as an axis of evil of great danger to the US and encouraging terrorism. Since 2003, nuclear activity has been in focus of Iran's international relations as United States claimed that Iran has a program to develop nuclear weapons (Keddie 2003:265).

Iran signed the *Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty* (NPT) in 1968, but already during the Iranian monarchy of the Shah, plans for a civil nuclear program was launched. In 1972, the German company Siemens started the construction of a nuclear power plant in Bushehr. The project was supported by Iran's then close ally the US, which is a somewhat complicating matter for the latter's current policy towards Iran. Siemens left Iran as the Islamic Revolution, led by Ayatollah Khomeini, took place in 1979 (Arbatov 2006). The interest in Iran for a nuclear program reoccurred in the mid-eighties. Domestic mining of uranium began and small experimental reactor units were back in operation in research centres. In 1995 an agreement with Russia was signed on installation of a reactor in Bushehr, which has opposed the US and its allies ever since. Today, 2000 Russian specialists are in Bushehr, but no reactor has as yet been completed (Sanaie 2007)³.

It has continuously been denied by Iran that the country is developing nuclear weapons. Albeit, Iran has claimed its legal right to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes, and according to NPT, states have right to control a complete nuclear cycle. This would however mean that Iran had the technology and knowledge required to develop nuclear weapons.

The issue has been frequently discussed in IAEA (which is responsible for controlling that the NPT-members follow the treaty) and in UN, mainly on US initiative, as well as in mass media all over the world. The US means that Iran is supporting terrorism and disguising the development of a nuclear weapon program and thereby does not have the right to enrich uranium. IAEA has made inspections in Iran and United Kingdom, France, and Germany, known as EU-3 or the EU troika, have acted as negotiators. Since conservative Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was elected in 2005 and succeeded the reformist and more West

³ While Iran complains about the delay, Russia says that Iran has not paid according to the contract, and according to Imani K., Russia will probably not finalise the construction before "having a green light from the West" (interview, 2007-12-12).

friendly Mohammad Khatami, Iran's relations with the West have worsened. Ahmadinejad has made many strong statements concerning Iran's nuclear program, as well as Israel, and homosexuals. Those statements and his tougher attitude towards the West have attracted attention worldwide and increased Iran's isolation.

After two and a half years of investigations of Iran's nuclear program and several resolutions claiming Iran to not fully comply with its obligations, the IAEA 35-member Board of Governors in September 2005, for the first time stated Iran to be in non-compliance with the safeguard obligations in the NPT (IAEA GOV/2005/77). In the vote 22 states were in favour, among them India, whereas 12 states were abstaining, among them Russia and China. Venezuela voted against. The Iranians were upset by the turnout as well as India and Russia not supporting them (Langenbach et al 2005). In February 2006 another vote in IAEA decided to report Iran to the UN Security Council (UNSC). Venezuela, Syria, and Cuba were the only states that voted against. Among the majority voting for reporting Iran were India and Russia, even though the latter agreed only under the condition that the Security Council would not take action before March 2006 (IAEA GOV/2006/14).

In March 2006 the Director General of the IAEA, Mohamed El Baradei announced that there was no indication of any nuclear weapon development although some uncertainties remained. Nevertheless, the pressure on Iran increased, and in June 2006, UNSC together with Germany offered Iran a package of economic incentives and civil nuclear technology transfer, in exchange to permanent abortion of the uranium enrichment programme. Iran did not accept the offer, and referred to its right to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes and justified its position with accords signed when the Shah was in power. UNSC imposed a first series of sanctions against Iran in December 2006. In March 2007 the sanctions tightened by adoption of Resolution 1747 in the council.

In October 2007, president Bush, referring to Iran, said "if you're interested in avoiding world war III, it seems like you ought to be interested in preventing them from the knowledge necessary to make a nuclear weapon" (The Hindu 2007-12-05a). However, on December 4, 2007, a US national intelligence estimate was published declaring that Iran not has been pursuing a nuclear weapon development programme since 2003. "Tehran's decision to halt its nuclear weapons programme suggests it is less determined to develop nuclear weapons than we have been judging since 2005" said the report, which made it harder, domestically as well as internationally, for the Bush administration to defend a possible military strike against Iran (Ibid). Mohamed ElBaradei "recieved [the US estimate about Iran's nuclear program] with great interest... [and] believes that this new assessment by the U.S. should help to defuse the current crisis" (IAEA Press Release 2007/22). The report was welcomed and celebrated in Iran, described as a "victory" proving that Iran had been "honest" (The Hindu 2007-12-05a).

5 Analysis

5.1 Individual variables

The prime minister of India, Manmohan Singh, is sometimes said to be a robot of the widely popular Sonia Gandhi, chairman of the ruling Congress party (INC) and Italian born widow of Rajiv Gandhi. Thus, possibly it would be more relevant to make an analysis of Mrs. Gandhi instead. Nevertheless, the Cambridge and Oxford educated PhD economist Singh is probably well aware of the consequences of his acts, no matter whether he works on someone's behalf or not. His career in UN, IMF etc. has provided him with a huge international contact net. Theoretically, he could have a personal will to ally with the west, just like Sonia Gandhi. Europe has had a great influence on the two of them and they might in some aspects feel more connected to the West than Iran. This, however, I have never read about, and there is no indication that this would have affected the policy. Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), the second largest and main opposition party, is criticising the Iran policy of the government, although they launched the new partnership with the US as Atal Bihari Vajpayee was prime minister. There does not seem to be a particularly strong focus on the individual level in the Indian case.

On the contrary, the individual level of Russian politics has during last years been a matter of discussions and analyses in international media. The actor in focus in Russia is president Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin, who in just a few years has become a major world politician as he has lead his country through a impressive development. Putin, appointed Person of the Year 2007 by the American newspaper Time, has since he succeeded Yeltsin in 2000 retransformed Russia to a major power, and the country's impressing economic annual growth of about 7% is among many considered to merit him (Time 2007-12-31) (although it corresponds well with increased prices of oil on the world market).

Putin will follow the constitution and retire from the president post after elections in March 2008. However he has declared that he will not retire from Russian politics. He say it is his 'moral right' to let Russian politics continue on the path he has started after the election in December 2007, when his supporting party United Russia swept polls. Putin will probably remain a central figure in Russian politics either as prime minister, leader of United Russia or chairman of the Duma. In December 2007 he announced that he is supporting the loyal deputy prime minister and former chief of staff Dmitri Medvedev as president candidate, which in practice means that Mr Medvedev will be the next president of Russia.

There are close connections between Kremlin and the energy sector. This is specially the case in the semi state-owned gas monopoly Gazprom. Putin works very closely to the company and follows its development (DN 2006-11-25). The company is one of the world's largest corporations and increases its investments abroad aggressively. The interesting market of Iran is an interesting target, something which Putin and his friends at Gazprom are well aware of.

The individual level is very important in the Russian case. There is a huge possibility that the former president Boris Yeltsin, if alive and in health, would have acted differently. As Simon Sebag Montefiore puts it: "Putin is a unique combination of styles: the sumptuous majesty of the Tsars and the distant power of the Soviet General Secretaries, combined with nationalist populism" (Time 2007-12-31). The importance of the individual level in Russian politics, just like the personal power and influence on foreign politics of Vladimir Putin, is unlikely to change after next president election.

5.2 Role variables

India's and Russia's roles in international politics are today not what they used to be. As suggested by Rosenau, the roles of nations are hard to anticipate in a globalised world, and the relevance of role variables, hence, is less important nowadays.

Both India and Russia's roles in world politics are about to change. The quasi-socialistic India used to be left-oriented and defend self-dependence in development countries. Russia played a relatively modest role on the international arena during the 1990s, although the country to some extent inherited the mighty role of the Soviet Union.

In this study issue, the border between role and systemic variables is sometimes hard to distinguish. For example, I have hesitated to classify *Historical relations with Iran* (section 5.5.4), *Visions of a multipolar world* (5.5.5), as well as *India's balance between Iran and the US* (5.5.6) as role variables for the following reasons: The first section can be crucial to the ambivalent role India plays in the current international game on Iran. The second discusses India's role in world politics, how the government is anticipated to act. The third section discusses the roles which India and Russia, respectively want to play in world politics, and which role they want the US, the current hegemony, to play.

India's role in world politics in the future is uncertain. In Samuel P Huntington's often quoted and debated "*The Clash of Civilizations and the making of a new world order*" (1997), India and the Hindu civilisation is not paid much attention. Likewise, Henry Kissinger has predicted the 21st century to be dominated by six major powers – the United States, Europe, Russia, Japan, China, and probably India (Varma 2004:15). Why India sometimes not is given a major role in the 21st century is not part of this paper to investigate, but I find it difficult to despise India and its fully 1.1 billion population from a powerful role in the future.

Some might see the Iranian nuclear crisis as a clash of civilisations where West opposes the Muslim Iran and its attempt to develop a civil nuclear program, which hypothetically could be developed to a nuclear weapon program in the future. However, it is difficult to place India and Russia in such a model, especially the former which like few states have succeeded to unite an extremely heterogenic population in terms of religion, ethnic groups, history, languages etc., although problems between the groups not are to be underestimated.

5.3 Governmental variables

The governmental variables have lost influence in the globalised world, and the border between them and those belonging to societal and individual variables is sometimes liquid.

In the case of Russia, there are no substantial governmental structures that limit the government's and president Putin's freedom of decision. In the Indian case, where the democracy is more stable, there are more possible limits. Some of these are scrutinised below as the societal variables, such as opposition, discussions in media, and opinion of common people.

5.4 Societal variables

The policy change in Indian foreign affairs has not been left unnoticed in Indian media. There has been reluctance in India to oppose the Iranian government more than necessary to keep the relations to United States good and stable. India's vote with the US in IAEA in September 2005 was followed by massive domestic criticism. According to Imani K., the Indian vote was a surprise to many Iranians as well as Indians (interview, 2007-12-12). Opposition parties and independent analytics emphasized that the government betrayed a friendly country after US pressure (Kronstadt & Katzman 2006:3). In February 2006, after a second vote in IAEA, United States expressed satisfaction over India's will to "cooperate", even though the Indian government insisted on that the IAEA vote not should be seen as change of policy toward the traditional ally Iran. However, also independent international observers interpreted the act as a demonstration of Washington being a more important partner than Tehran (Ibid 3-4).

In mass media it has been widely discussed and criticised to vote against Iran in IAEA since no prohibited nuclear activity had been revealed. Amongst student and left-oriented movements it has been very unpopular to abandon India's Iranian brothers. As the American intelligence estimate was published in December 2007 saying that no forbidden nuclear activity was found in Iran, Indian newspapers criticised its government (The Hindu 2007-12-05b). However,

I find it difficult to distinguish whether pro-Iranism or anti-Americanism has been the main driving force among leftists.

The ruling INC lies behind the votes in IAEA. The votes have been criticised by the relatively strong Communist Party of India (Marxist), as well as BJP (The Hindu 2007-12-04a). The latter, however, has had huge impact on the policy changes since the BJP prime minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee introduced the new era of India-US relations during his time in office. Criticising the government's policy is therefore probably for domestic sakes other than ideological. On the contrary, the Hindu BJP is often strongly opposing Muslims, and made the nuclear tests in 1998, sometimes called "the Hindu bomb". The ideological incitements for BJP to keep good relations to Iran are therefore probably lower than for INC.

The domestic level is important in the Indian case as the government is freely criticised by opposition and in media. If the support of the US policy continues without proof of nuclear activity violating NPT in Iran, it can have negative consequences for INC in future elections.

Political stabilisers probably work more efficiently in India than in Russia. In Russia there is nowadays not much opposition, and the ones that nonetheless exist, for natural reasons focus on domestic matters such as fair elections, freedom of speech, and liberty of the press rather than Russia's foreign affairs. Putin has effectively reduced the free media by nationalising TV-channels, muting the opposition, putting troublesome oligarchs in jail, and changing election laws.

The new aggressive tone of Putin in foreign affairs seems to be popular among Russian citizens as well as most of the politicians and the media. He has put Russia on the world map again, embodying the spirit of "Mother Russia." Furthermore, the policy on Iran is just one out of all Russian activities abroad. This tendency is unlikely to be changed with a new president following the election in 2008. Hence, the domestic level is in this case not an important one.

5.5 Systemic variables

Explaining Indian and Russian policies in the Iranian nuclear crisis requires analysis on a high level, discussing new alliances in world politics and a possible emerging new world order. Several international stabilisers have to be taken into account and both India and Russia are in a phase of growth to become even more powerful actors on the international arena – a development that affects the countries' foreign policies. The systematic variables are by far the most important ones in this analysis.

5.5.1 Nuclear weapons, military cooperation and trade

India's government has made clear that it does not want to see Iran in possession of nuclear weapons, and have aligned with international efforts to abort a possible

development of these weapons in Iran (Kronstadt & Katzman 2006:3). There are no reasons for India to support development of nuclear weapons in Iran. Even though the countries have a long history of cooperation, the Hindu-Muslim conflict within India as well as with Pakistan, is far too delicate to be disregarded when the Muslim Republic of Iran is discussed (Imani K., interview, 2007-12-12).

However, since the launch of the Indo-Iran Joint Commission in 1983 India and Iran have had a – currently on-going – military cooperation albeit on a low level. Even after the bilateral agreement in January 2003 where it was “decided to explore opportunities for cooperation in defence and agreed areas, including training and exchange of visits“ the cooperation has been in relatively minor scale (Kronstadt & Katzman 2006:5). During recent years technology possibly useful for developing of weapons of mass destructions has occasionally been exported from India to Iran. However, this has not been part of a government policy, but rather from the private sector or nuclear scientists. A few companies as well as scientists have been sanctioned by the US government under the Iran Non-Proliferation Act (Ibid:4). Iranian naval ships have visited the Indian port of Kochi in the southern state of Kerala for training, and other cooperation has been done. There are prospects for an increased military export from India to Iran as the latter country currently is in a phase of changing much of its mostly Russian military inventory. (Kapila 2005). However, I find this of minor relevance to Indian Iran-policy.

Although Russia has no interest in Iran possessing nuclear weapons, the issue is more complex here than for India. Peaceful nuclear technology along with arms is an important Russian export sector to Iran, and with this in mind, Russia does not want Iran to abandon its nuclear power program (Beehner 2006). Iranian energy is also a lucrative target for Russian investments.

5.5.2 Energy

India is the sixth largest energy consumer worldwide, and the country’s rapid economical growth increases its demand for energy. Despite domestic coal reserves, India’s modest resources in oil and gas force the country to huge imports of energy. Nuclear power currently accounts for 2,6% of India’s electricity, and although there are plans for expansion of this sector greatly in the near future, the demand of energy is expected to increase even more (Haté & Mitra 2006). Thus, the annual growth in energy demand by eight percent has to be covered by oil and gas import to a large extent (Business Standard 2007-12-13). Iran, OPEC’s second largest oil producer and holder of the world’s largest gas reserves, is therefore a relevant partner. 85% of India’s import from Iran consists of crude oil, which constitutes about 7,5% of Iran’s oil export (Kronstadt & Katzman 2006:5).

Since more than a decade there have been discussions about constructing a pipeline transporting gas from the South Pars fields in Iran through Pakistan to India. This is the closest and cheapest way to transport gas to India from the Gulf region (Perkovich & Revati 2006), but the US is opposing the project in its attempts to isolate Iran. (Kronstadt & Katzman 2006:6). A pipeline would

strongly benefit Pakistan, who then could take advantage of gas as well as benefit from transit money (Imani K., interview, 2007-12-12). Despite the US point of view, there is international support for this so called “peace pipeline” that can improve relations between India and Pakistan, bring security to the region and satisfy the South Asian hunger for energy in a cheap and relatively environmental way just by *laissez-faire* market forces act (Perkovich & Revati 2005). As Masoud Imani K. puts it, “If it wouldn’t be for the US, this pipeline would have been completed long time ago” (interview, 2007-12-12), both India and Iran are very interested in bringing the project to a successful close.

There are also prospects of construction of a pipeline transporting natural gas from the Caspian Sea to India. This so-called *Trans-Afghanistan Pipeline* would go from Turkmenistan, through Afghanistan and Pakistan, to India has been partly developed by the Asian Development Bank and engaged several international companies. However, since the Taliban regime in Afghanistan was overthrown by the US, the project has been stalled, even though plans for restarting have been launched (BBC 2002-12-27). Even though this does not affect Iran, it is important from a regional point of view. The US surely prefers this pipeline, that also brings the enemy states India and Pakistan together, as well as entailing incomes to Afghanistan.

Russian interest in Iranian energy is of another character. Having one of the world’s largest resources in oil and gas, Russia has no need to import Iranian energy. The sector, however, is a lucrative target for Russian investments, which are prospected to increase in the future (Beehner 2006).

In 2005 the first stage of a pipeline that will run from the Caspian Sea to the Mediterranean was opened. The pipeline will carry oil from Azerbaijan, through Georgia, to the Mediterranean port of Ceyhan, Turkey, and is built by a consortium lead by British Petroleum. Russia opposed the construction and tried to persuade Azerbaijan not to sign the contract (Guardian Unlimited 2005-05-26). This so-called Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline has been favoured by the West since it decreases the European dependence on oil from Russia and West Asia, including Iran, and can therefore be seen as a failure for both Russia and Iran.

Imani K. points out that Russia and Iran are rivals in energy and transport of it in the Caspian region, both desiring pipelines to be built to export their energy (interview, 2007-12-12). One can therefore say, that Russia’s energy interests in Iran primary is of an economical character, but in the long run also a strategic one – Russia wants to control the transport of energy in Central Asia.

5.5.3 Central Asia

For several reasons Central Asia is an important region for India. The mentioned Trans-Afghanistan pipeline proposed to transport natural gas from Turkmenistan to India is one obvious reason. Central Asia is in India sometimes referred to as “Pakistan’s backyard” and has been difficult for India to gain influence in. Iran can possibly provide access for India to these countries and their markets, and in contrast to Russia, India is interested in common Central Asia policy with Iran

(Haté & Mitra 2006). Both Iran and India have interests in Afghanistan and cooperate for peace in the country. Separately, they have both financially supported the US backed government of president Hamid Karzai (Kronstadt & Katzman 2006:6).

Anyway, my research suggests Geopolitik being the determinant and most important factor in India's strategy concerning Central Asia. Energy and interesting markets are relevant, but I find security being the main factor. Although the relations with Pakistan are rather stable for the moment, in the political turbulence in the neighbouring country recently exemplified by Musharraf stepping down as army chief and the murder of Benazir Butto in December 2007, an aggressive tone towards India can emerge fast. Imani K. calls attention to an Indian fear of Islam fundamentalism in Central Asia, that in the future could cause trouble in the Kashmir conflict. Therefore, India wants to reduce Pakistan interests in Central Asia (interview, 2007-12-12). The theory about security is supported by the fact that India has its only overseas military base in Tajikistan (The Guardian 2006-04-26).

During 19th century there was a competition between Great Britain and Russia over influence in Central Asia, a struggle often referred to as *The Great Game*.⁴ The breakdown of the Soviet Union and the birth of 15 new states meant a "loss" of vast land for Russia, including most of the area occupied in Central Asia. Although Russia has lost influence in many states in Europe, e.g. the Baltic, the control of and cooperation with former Soviet states in Central Asia has generally been more successful. These states have not turned themselves to the West to the same extent. American activity and influence in the region is a pile in the eye for Russia, who wants to keep the control of its own "backyard". Vladimir Putin has stated that he considers the dissolution of the Soviet Union to be a tragedy, particularly since 25 million ethnic Russian overnight found themselves on foreign land (Time 2007-12-31). Russia today has military bases in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, while the US has one base in Kyrgyzstan and Germany one in Uzbekistan. The two latter have assisted operations in Afghanistan (The Guardian 2006-04-26).

Like India, Russia wants to solve the situation in Iran, and a peaceful Central Asia, where it can act as regional hegemony, or at least have economical and political influence. Iran is a geopolitical interesting partner for Russia in a region where Turkey and the US among others want to increase their influence (Arbatov 2006). Furthermore, Shiite Iran can possibly be seen as a counterbalance to the expanding influence Wahhabism⁵ in Caucasus and Central Asia, which is of domestic relevance for Russia.

⁴ The name was coined by Arthur Conolly - an intelligence officer of the British East India Company participating in several expeditions in Central Asia in the 19th century.

⁵ Strictly orthodox Sunni Muslim wing advocating return to early Islam of the Koran and Sunna. Founded by Muhammad ibn Adb al-Wahhab (1703-92) and predominant religious force in Saudi Arabia today.

5.5.4 Historical relations with Iran

India and Iran have a long tradition of cooperation and cultural exchange. Until the mid 19th century, Persian was the court language of the Indian Muslim Mughals, as well as the official language in the British administration of local language. Good relations have remained, except for a few isolated events, such as when the Shah of Iran provided military sanctuaries to the Pakistan air force during the Indo-Pakistan war (Kapila 2005). The cooperation has tightened during this decade, thus, a strategic partnership between the countries was launched and energy trade contracts were signed during the Tehran declaration in 2001 and in a summit in Delhi in 2003, when the Iranian president at the time, Mohammed Khatami, was invited as the chief guest at India's Republic Day parade (Haté & Mitra 2006). Since then, however, the relation has been crackling as India has approached the US and supported them in IAEA.

Russia and Iran established diplomatic relations in the 15th century, when the latter still was called Persia. The Russian Tsars' aggressive expansionist policies of the 19th century lead to wars where Persia lost vast land in Central Asia, which became independent states following the breakdown of the Soviet Union. This resulted in widespread anti-Russian sentiments in Persia, and during the Soviet era the relation between the countries stayed rather icy, even though this to some extent melted in the late eighties. As the Soviet empire had torn down and the successor Russia had lost much of its power in global politics a mutual understanding between the states developed. Instead of distrust the relation was characterised by mutual respect and common views on dangers facing both of them. This was a milestone in Iranian-Russian relations (Senaie 2007).

In 1998 the Russian attitude towards Iran changed as prime minister Yevgeny Primakov came into office, working under the weak president of Boris Yeltsin, and softly abandoned its pro-Western policy in foreign policies. As Vladimir Putin replaced Yeltsin in 2000 this process intensified, going along well with the goal of a multipolar world without US hegemony, an idea supported by Iran.

Russia has approached the Islam world in different ways and gained status as observer in the Organisation of the Islamic Conference. This has included a rapprochement with Iran. Putin is the first leader from Kremlin to visit Iran since 1943 when Stalin went there to a meeting with Churchill and Roosevelt (NY Times 2007-10-16). Nevertheless, there are no deeply rooted ties between Iran and Russia, and the historical factor should therefore not be seen as very important for today's relations between the countries. As Imani K. puts it: "We⁶ are old enemies, but today there are mutual interests and Iran supports Russia in regional issues while Moscow supports Iran in international matters. This will however probably end if there are other and better choices of partnership".

⁶ Masoud Imani K. is an Iranian citizen.

5.5.5 Visions of a multipolar world order

After the fall of the Soviet empire and the 1990s, characterised by political and economical instability, the situation in Russia has now stabilized. In the 1990s Russia opened up towards market economy and the West in foreign relations. If Boris Yeltsin could be rather embarrassing while visiting foreign countries, Vladimir Putin has succeeded in making Russia a major and impressive player on the international arena. With the help of increased oil prices the Russian economy has been growing enormously. Russia is one of the great powers of energy, and countries from several continents are dependent on their supply. Compared to just a few years ago, the country is much more confident and aggressive in their foreign affairs today. Russia wants to show that their allies can have civil nuclear programs, just like American allies.

If ideology was characterising international relations during the cold war, the forces behind foreign policies in post cold war era is more difficult to distinguish. Ideology doubtlessly still is present, but economics and trade have become a major matter in international politics, maybe the main factor. As booming economies are moving countries from the periphery to central positions in the international game, their self esteem grow. Today, focus is on China and the rise of the Middle Kingdom. This, along with other growing powers such as India and Russia, will change the world order and increase the number of centres of power. Both India and Russia are interested in a multipolar world although Russia is far more progressive in this view. In a speech held in Munich in February 2007, Putin formulated Russia's position in foreign policy, saying that the country supports the establishment of a multipolar world and does not accept US hegemony (Sanaie 2007). The speech attracted much attention and has been seen as a point of departure of Russia's more aggressive tone in foreign affairs.

An actor of increased importance in Asia is the *Shanghai Cooperation Organisation* (SCO) founded in 2001 by China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan⁷. Since then, India, Iran, Mongolia, and Pakistan have received observer status that might lead to full membership in the future. The organisation, with headquarter in Beijing, focuses on security in Central Asia, but also includes cooperation on an economical and cultural level (SCO Homepage). The full members and observers together comprise 25% of land on earth, a third of its population, and is an enormous and growing power of economics, energy and military. The SCO members are far from perfect democracies, and the phenomenon does not pervade the organisation. As many Western observers found democratic problems in the parliamentary vote in Russia in December 2007, SCO-observers found that it followed western standard (The Hindu 2007-12-04b).

⁷ SCO was created on the basis of Shanghai Five, an organisation founded in 1996 consisting of SCO's current full members except Uzbekistan.

SCO is seen as a way for China and Russia to limit US influence in Central Asia. In June 2005, the SCO officially called for a deadline to be set for the withdrawal of US military bases in Kyrgyzstan (BBC 2006-06-14). United States had loose plans to set up a concurrent rival security organisation for Central Asia and the Caspian region. The project however lost ground as Pakistan received observer status in SCO in 2005 (The Hindu 2005-06-05). The organisation surely shows that a multipolar world is possible, and maybe already present.

Iran is eager to gain full membership, and the country is interesting for SCO. China is hungry for energy, and Iran can be a relevant prolonging of the organisations influence to West Asia – a strategic region for affecting US hegemony (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 2006-05-15).

5.5.6 India's balance between the US and Iran

India's possession of nuclear weapons used to be an obstacle to relations with the US. On American initiative, the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was established in 1995, saying that India forever would be outside the elite group of treaty-legitimized nuclear weapon states (Tellis 2006:121). In 1996 the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was launched, but not signed by India. Instead India did nuclear tests in conflict with CTBT in 1998, which not was popular in the West (Mediala 2007:2). They were first answered by Pakistani nuclear tests and then by international sanctions.

Nevertheless, Bill Clinton visited Delhi in 2000 as the first American president in India for 22 years. This was the beginning of a new strategic partnership officially called "Indo-US relations: A Vision for the 21st century". A few months later Atal Bihari Vajpayee, the Indian prime minister at the time, visited the US and referred to it as "a natural ally". In the aftermath of 9/11 2001 India proposed support to the US in war against terrorism, and shortly afterwards president Bush annulled the sanctions that were implemented in 1998 (Guihong 2005:278). In 2004 the "Next Steps in Strategic Partnership"-program (NSSP) was launched, which included civil nuclear power, civil space programs and trade as well as discussions about defence against nuclear robots (Bureau of Public Affairs 2006). The cooperation deepened further in 2005 as a US-India "global partnership" was established with the aim to increase cooperation in the fields of economy and trade, energy, environment, democracy and development, non-proliferation and security, and space. (Kronstadt & Katzman 2006:1). The civil nuclear program was placed under supervision of IAEA (Dormandy & Green 2006:1).

As relations to the US have ameliorated and deepened, India's policy on Iran have somewhat changed to partly correspond with the criticism of the international community. Some mean that India meanwhile has refrained from criticising the Bush administration and the US (Haté & Mitra 2006). Nevertheless, India has not completely followed US' strategy in its foreign policies. For instance, India neither complied with US appeal on sending troops to Iraq, nor supporting the war. Furthermore, India has not yet signed CTBT (Mediala

2007:7). Although changing the tone towards Iran, India has not yet accorded on the US assessment of Iran being an aggressive power looking for regional dominance and weapons of mass destruction. India also avoids to directly criticise Mahmod Abmdinejad's government of Iran and were welcoming Russia as it took initiative in the crisis. It should also be said that both Russia and China voted with the US in IAEA, so India was not alone among Iran's "friends" in voting against a nuclear program in the country (Haté & Mitra 2006).

Most seem to agree that India is balancing between the US and Iran in their foreign affairs, and that during recent years India has approached the US, at the expense of the relations with Iran.

5.6 Comparison and conclusions

5.6.1 Summary of Indian policy

According to my research, I have ranked the motives and causes behind India's Iran policy after it's importance. However, the most important is not my rating of the different motives, although it certainly is interesting to speculate, but rather analysis of the motives.

Most important I consider the will to please the US. USA is a partner of great importance in trade as well as military, space, and civil nuclear power. I consider the economic parts of their cooperation being most important. Second, creating the difficult balance between the US and Iran, I consider India's hunger for Iranian energy and the prospects of constructing the desired "peace pipeline". It should be stressed that India is in desperate need of energy to continue its growth and development.

The traditional ties with Iran have to be taken seriously into consideration, and I believe that these also are important reasons to India's relatively friendly attitude towards Iran. Among the population and the political parties, there has been strong opposition against the votes at issue in IAEA. I find the traditional ties to Iran being an important factor behind the foreign policies. India also wants to keep good relations to the Muslim world, although this is complex due to huge domestic Muslim population on the one hand, and a long lasting "religious dispute" with Pakistan on the other. Hence, desired good relations to the Muslim world has in this case it have less impact on the policy on Iran.

Hereafter I value India's interests in Central Asia. The region is of great strategic importance, which probably will grow during coming years. Being a great power here can be vital from an economic and security point of view, taking the still ongoing problems with Pakistan into consideration. Iran is an important and well-situated partner in this aspect.

Less important I find motives for visions of a multipolar world. Even though this certainly is interesting for India, the Iranian nuclear crisis is a bad moment to

put the subject on the table. Iran and the US are enemies, and India stays neutral, keeping good relations to both states. If possible, India's government would probably prefer not to choose side.

5.6.2 Summary of Russian policy

In a similar way to the Indian case above, I here suggest a loose ordinal scale of importance of the Russian motives behind its policy on Iran. What I regard as the most important motive is Russia's will to demonstrate itself as a player of consideration in international relations. From the wake of the cold war where Russia not could bear the Soviet heritage as a superpower, which thereby left United States alone as hegemony, the country has grown under the leadership of Vladimir Putin. Russia wants the world to know that it is a mighty power whose opinion cannot be ignored in important world political issues in general, and in Central Asia politics in particular. This goes hand-in-hand with a vision of a multipolar world. Russia desires a development where the US influence in world politics declines in favour of other powers, among them Russia, to create a multipolar world. As I see it, these are the main reasons behind Russia's relative (although ambivalent) support to Iran, compared with Western powers. In this regard, it is of less importance that it is Iran being on the table. These interests are not directly connected to Iran or any other country.

Almost as important I value the matter of geography. Central Asia is from a Russian point of view a region of great strategic importance. As was the case in the 19th century, Russia is now in search for influence in Central Asia, in particular in the former Soviet states. Russia does not want to see other major powers grow their influence in the region, especially not the US. Although there are relatively few inhabitants in the region, there are vast resources of energy and it is geographical interest.

Russia's particular interests in Iran I consider less important. Nonetheless, Iran is an interesting and important export market for Russian arms and nuclear equipment, as well as a target for investments in the energy sector. Although Russia during last years has been approaching the Muslim world, I find this aspect of friendly relations towards the Islamic republic of Iran to be of relatively minor importance. There are other possibilities and occasions to show understanding with the Muslim world, in this conflict even Muslim countries are divided.

The fact that Russia in IAEA-votes concerning Iran once abstained and once voted against Iran interests (although with a special condition) is because Russia has no interest in another nuclear power in the region and that there is no need to mess too much with the US: Iran is not that important for Russia after all. The friendship between the countries is fragile, and to demonstrate a will to cooperate and please the US in this case can be rewarding in the future when issues may matter more to Russia. Horse-trading capabilities is a part of diplomacy, which thereby goes well with the more important motive of showing the world that Russia again is a major power on the international scene.

The margin of error in my reasoning may be considerable; what I present is mainly my idea of what I, according to my research, define as main motives behind the official policy.

5.6.3 Comparison

Above, motives that can explain the foreign policies of India and Russia, respectively, towards Iran have been presented and scrutinised. This part will compare the motives of the countries, make a cross-analysis of the results, and finally draw some conclusions.

Table 5.1 presents Russian and Indian interests in the Iranian nuclear crisis. The main motives behind their actions, according to my research, are presented and compared. My classification can be discussed, and since reality not is black and white, there is a huge scale between yes and no. Nonetheless, this is what I suggest.

Table 5.1 - Indian and Russian interests in the Iran nuclear crisis

	India	Russia
Interest in Iran possessing nuclear weapons	NO	NO
Interest in Iranian energy	YES	NO
Desire good relations with the US	YES	NO
Traditional good relations to Iran	YES	NO
Economic interests in Iran	YES	YES
Interest in access to and influence in Central Asia	YES	YES
Domestic opinion of relevance	YES	NO
Desiring multipolar world order	YES	YES
Show power on the international arena	NO	YES
Desire good relation to the Muslim world	YES	YES

Neither India nor Russia has a particular interest in another nuclear power in the region, Iran not being an exception. India has direct interest in Iranian energy. Russia indeed is interested in Iranian energy, but more from an economical point of view than from imports. Russia for sure is not interested in bad relations to the US, but they are not in need of it in the same way as India is. India has, in comparison with Russia, good traditional ties with Iran and the Persian Empire, which is one reason to the support among Indians to Iran. Both countries have economic interests in Iran as well as in Central Asia. The fact that India voted with the US in IAEA has attracted much attention in India and has had reactions among opposition parties, common people, and in media, claiming that India is abandoning Iran, a country to whom they have old ties of friendship. In Russia, similar reactions have not occurred. The weak opposition (political as well as medial) is instead focusing on internal affairs.

Russia and India share the view of that a multipolar world is desirable. However, Russia to a higher extent takes the nuclear crisis as an opportunity to show their power on the international arena, in Central Asia in particular. Balancing between US and Iran, India rather wants to disguise in this affair, not making much noise nor harming any relation.

The final issue concerns civilisations and relation to the nowadays frequently discussed Islam world. Russia has lately done efforts to enclose the Muslim world, to which they do not have any particular traditional ties. This is interesting in a world where Islam has become something like major enemy to the West. India, on the other hand, is very interested in keeping good relations to the Muslim world. Despite the long going conflict with neighbouring enemy Pakistan and domestic religious conflicts, India is always seen as a multicultural melting pot, and hosting e.g. one of the largest Muslim populations in the world.

The importance of the policy on Iran from a pre-theory perspective differs between the countries analysed. In table 5.2 I show the impact of different variables on the countries' foreign policies in the Iranian nuclear crisis according to my research. I use "less important", "important" and "very important" to value the importance of the level at issue for the relevant country's foreign policy.

Table 5.2 – Pre-theory variables' impact on foreign policies

	India	Russia
Individual variables	Less important	Very important
Role variables	Important	Important
Governmental variables	Less important	Less important
Societal variables	Important	Less important
Systemic variables	Very important	Very important

As seen in the matrix, systemic variables are most relevant to analyse in this topic. Economy, strategy, energy and security are all important matters, analysed in here. On the other hand, the governmental variables are important for neither India nor Russia. The role variables, which are in process of development in both cases, are rather important for both countries. Societal variables, including the Indo-Iranian historical ties, are important for India's foreign policy on Iran. In stark contrast to India, where the individual level is of less relevance in this case, the person of Putin and his administration has been very important for creating Russia's present policy towards Iran. The democracy in Russia is still weak, and during last years the development has been towards a more authoritarian rule by Putin. I think that the individual variables generally have more impact on the country's policy in less democratic states than in well-developed democracies. However, I know several empirical examples suggesting the contrary, and I have no literature supporting my thesis. Nonetheless, the pre-theory variables impact on the foreign policy in these cases supports Rosenau's theory of how the impact of these variables have changed with globalisation, discussed in section 3.2.

In table 5.3 I value the impact of policy kind on India's and Russia's foreign policies from "less important" to "very important". I use Geopolitik, Realpolitik,

Idealpolitik, and Kapitalpolitik, which makes the result very uncertain since the borders between the models are fine and it is difficult to classify to which model a certain variable belong. Furthermore, the impact is uncertain to value.

Table 5.3 – Policy kind’s impact on foreign strategy

	India	Russia
Geopolitik	Important	Important
Realpolitik	Less important	Very important
Idealpolitik	Important	Important
Kapitalpolitik	Very important	Important

The matrix shows that Kapitalpolitik and Idealpolitik have characterised India’s foreign policy on Iran, while Russia’s policy been a blend of all kinds with a focus on Realpolitik. This is however very vague, just like the concepts themselves. India wants to cooperate and trade with the US, but also import Iranian energy, hence Kapitalpolitik. However, India also use Idealpolitik due to its historical ties with Iran. Despite interests in Central Asia, I find Geopolitik and Realpolitik not as weighty in the Indian case. Russian policy is dominated by Realpolitik (although hard to distinguish from Geopolitik) due to its strategical interests in Central Asia. Idealpolitik, the vision of a multipolar world, and Kapitalpolitik, the economic interests in Iran, are however also crucial to Russian policy towards Iran.

6 Summary and concluding remarks

Using Rosenau's model of philosophies of analysis has been an interesting approach to foreign policy analysis. It comprises several variables at different levels and therefore explains the policies at issue on a broad basis.

The individual variables have significant impact on the foreign policy in the Russian case. Putin has transformed his country, its role in world politics, and its foreign policy. The Russian energy sector, which has interests in Iran, also has close ties to the president, and neither the policy nor Putin's personal influence on Russia's foreign politics is likely to change as Putin retires from the president post in 2008, presumably succeeded by Dmitri Medvedev. In India these variables are not as important for the policy towards Iran. Concerning the second cluster, roles are nowadays more difficult to anticipate, and such variables have to some degree lost influence on foreign policies. Nevertheless, it is still a topic at issue as both India and Russia are transforming their roles on the international arena as their economical and political power grows. The governmental variables have generally lost influence with globalisation, which is the case also in this topic. On the contrary, societal variables, especially in India, have considerable impact on the policies on Iran. There is in India a significant domestic criticism towards the policy change towards Iran and the rapprochement to the US. Opposition parties, media, and several organisations are criticising the government for the "betrayal" of the Iranian "brothers". In some cases, however, it is a fine line between pro-Iranism and anti-Americanism, and it is difficult to distinguish the two.

The final cluster, systemic variables, is by far the most important one in the politics concerning Iranian nuclear crisis: economy, strategy, energy, and security are all critical issues in this topic. India has traditional ties to Iran as well as interests in Iranian energy; notably, a reliable energy partner is crucial for India's future economic growth. On the other hand, India desires good relations to the US, which is important regarding security and trade. Russia is eager to show its power on the international arena and to act as hegemony in the region. Putin is supporting a development towards a multipolar world, and also India has interests in this, albeit to a smaller extent. Iran is an importer of Russian arms, nuclear technology, and expertise, and the energy sector is an interesting target for investments for swelling Russian energy companies. However, Russia is not in direct need for Iranian energy, meaning that the topic probably is more delicate for India. If India would secure a reliable source to meet their demand of energy the Iran nuclear crises would probably lose much of its gravity.

Although just analysing it superficially, applying Wallensteen's policy classification has been interesting. It gives a notion about what India and Russia's policies are characterised by. My results show that a wide range of policies are used, and that India's policy on Iran can be characterised by Kapitalpolitik,

Idealpolitik, and Geopolitik, while Russia's policy consists of all four concepts with a focus on Realpolitik.

2008 holds much in store regarding the Iranian nuclear crises and how it concerns India and Russia. United States' population will elect a new president, which might bring a change in the policy towards Iran. The Iraq war is a "hot potato" in the campaign, and although hardly mentioned in this paper, the Iran issue is closely related. Since the US intelligence estimate was released in December 2007, suggesting that Iran has no development of nuclear weapon, a military intervention in Iran is unlikely. Bush and Cheney will have few allies in the world for such an operation as matters stand, and also domestically it may be difficult as the ongoing war in Iraq is far from a success.

India will not unbiased support US in critics towards Iran in the near future. Currently there is not enough domestic support for such a policy, and it could pose a threat to the relations with Iran. Russians will go to vote for a new president in March 2008, although the turnout in this case is more predictable than in the US and Russia is unlikely to change its policy towards Iran. Nevertheless, if the US would call for a resolution or inspections in IAEA, it is possible that both India and Russia would vote against Iranian interests another time.

The topic touches many subjects of current relevance, which will be crucial for the coming decades. It is obvious that Central Asia, with its few inhabitants but vast natural resources, is a region of growing strategic interest not only for the neighbouring countries. It might well be that a modern Great Game, a struggle for influence by major powers, will be seen in the region during coming years.

Mentioning major powers interested in Central Asia touches another topic of great current interest: the (possible) emergence of a new world order. Vladimir Putin stresses that Russia not will accept US hegemony, and China, India, and the SCO, with potential enormous power, have vast ambitions as well. During the writing process I met countless referrals to the Moscow-Delhi-Beijing link, which indisputably will be an influential triangle in the 21st century.

Through out the paper, I discuss the state of democracy in the states at issue. Putin, sometimes called *the Tsar of new Russia*, has stabilised a turbulent Russia, but by no means transformed it to a vivid democracy – rather the contrary. India is a democratic exception in a rather non-democratic continent. Non-democratic states do not take democracy (or the lack of it) into consideration in foreign affairs, and as the power of these states grows, so do their voices in world politics. A recent example is when SCO-observers found the parliamentary election in Russia in December 2007 to be fair according to Western standards, while Western observers found immense democratic problems. Although the exceptions are numerous there has, in a world led by the democratic West, been pressure on democratisation on other parts of the world in international relations. Will a relatively weakened West loose the possibilities to continue this? Recent massive Chinese investments in Africa have attracted attention to the issue.

Furthermore, energy is a central issue in the topic. Iran has one of the world's largest resources in oil and gas, which makes it an interesting partner for India, whose further development is dependent on reliable energy suppliers. The huge energy resources of Iran are by the US said to be a proof of why Iran is

developing nuclear weapons, since there is no need of civil nuclear power. Some, on the other hand, mean that the US not would care at all about Iran if it would no be for the huge reserves in energy, which the country wants to control. Russia is not interested in Iran for the sake of energy, since it has immense resources of gas itself. However, the increases in oil and gas prices during last years is the base of the Russian economic boom, which further has been of great importance to the country's new tone in foreign politics. Energy still is one of the most important issues in international relations, and as long as demand rises while supply is declining, this status will remain. As the American oil magnate John Rockefeller (1839 – 1937) stressed: “He, who controls oil transport, has his hands over both extraction and refining of oil”.

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