Department of Political Science

India Changing

Horizontal mobilization, patronage, and socioeconomic development among the states of India

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Abstract

Two schematic modes of political mobilization of the electorate, and patterns of patronage, have been historically common in Indian politics; indirect vertical mobilization and broad horizontal mobilization.

This thesis examines the impact of these modes of mobilization on socioeconomic development among the larger states of India. It also attempts to put this impact in relation to other factors.

Those states generally achieving higher levels of socioeconomic development has experienced horizontal mobilization early on, correspondence is however imperfect. In analysis of causal linkages studies are presented that claim some causality, but these results are not easily generalized to all states.

The study concludes that economic strength, history of human development, and pursued policy are more important determinants of current socioeconomic development. However the substantial correspondence together with case studies implying a causal linkage is sufficient to state that broad horizontal mobilization has contributed to socioeconomic development.

Key words: India, state politics, socioeconomic development, patronage, horizontal mobilization

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1 Introduction

August 15th last year India celebrated sixty years of Independence. The country has come long since the days of the *Raj*, and although the road has been treacherous and great obstacles lie ahead, the future seems ever brighter for the world's largest democracy and its over one billion people.

With an economy expanding at a staggering 9.3 per cent last year (The Economist, Dec 8th 2007: 105), predictions of India as a global power are legion, even though gains are unevenly distributed across regions and population.

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and the *Indian National Congress*, led by Sonia Gandhi, currently form the central government. But the grip of the once omnipotent *Congress* has gradually been slipping since the late 1960's, especially at state level (Hardgrave & Kochanek 2000: 234, 317-324).

Regionalism has never quite ceased, and the Hindu nationalist *Bharatiya Janata Party* is an ever present competitor. Furthermore parties mobilizing in accordance with caste have reshaped the political scene in recent decades (ibid: 197-203). This study focuses on the societal implications of these events.

1.1 Problem

As Indian democracy has matured during sixty years, old alliances have become obsolete and new have emerged. And as Indian economy evolves politicians need to satisfy growing demands from new parts of the electorate.

This study focuses on three phenomena in Indian politics; the difference among states in crucial areas of socioeconomic development, political mobilization along horizontal lines of community or caste, and shifts in patterns of patronage. Other factors that also affect development also have to be taken into account. Consequently, the questions posed in this study are:

Has horizontal mobilization in Indian politics changed patterns of patronage, and affected socioeconomic development in the states of India? And how should we perceive any such effect in relation to other factors?

1.2 Previous Research

Studies concerning political clientelism tend to be cross-national (Holmes 2006, Quah ed., 2003). But comparative studies concerning development among Indian states are not uncommon. An extensive study with focus on economic

development was conducted by Jeffrey Sachs, Nirupam Baipaj, and Ananthi Ramiah (2002). And the magazine India Today presents annual comparisons of economic and social performance among the states of India (Sept 24th 2007).

Furthermore reports from SIDA (2003) or the Planning Commission's National Human Development Report (2002) are largely comparative in nature, although they offer little analysis. In addition some case studies concerning individual states inevitably have comparative elements (Desai 2005).

Comparative case studies concerning shift in politico-economic dominance, but without the purpose of discussing the consequences are presented in the two volumes of "Dominance and State Power in Modern India: Decline of a Social Order" (Frankel & Rao eds. 1989).

1.3 Motivation and Purpose

There are merits with studying one federal polity; all states must abide by the same constitution, face similar responsibilities, and the same electoral institutions. Henry Hale (2007: 227) presents regional variations in his quantitative study on Russian regions, and Judith Tendler (1997) stresses the merit of intra-state studies in her case study of Ceara in Brazil.

In this study I hope, to the best of my abilities and given the methodological delimitations and limited timeframe, to answer the questions posed above.

The results might complement previous research done in the field of comparative research regarding the states of India. Moreover, it should enhance my understanding and hopefully that of others concerning the complex political forces changing contemporary India.

1.4 Language

Words that are non-English, or in English that needs explanation, will be written in *italics* and included in the glossary, Appendix I. The glossary also includes abbreviations (marked with brackets) and spelled out only when first mentioned.

2   Theory

This study draws theoretical substance from previous studies concerning clientelism and the consequences of shifts within and away from patronage (Kitschelt & Wilkinson eds. 2007), modes of mobilization (Ganguly & DeVotta eds. 2003), and caste (Stuligross & Varshney 2002). Meanwhile, socioeconomic development is largely defined by conventional praxis and the context of state responsibilities.

2.1   Caste and Class

First we need to conceptualize caste and class, and their interrelatedness. Caste is not the only, nor always the most important, vehicle of political mobilization. But its centrality in Indian society and politics, and complexity, necessitates conceptualization.

Caste is the socio-religious Hindu categorization in *varna* and *jati*, determined by ones birth. *Varnas* are the main castes in a hierarchy encompassing all, highly endogamous groups, called *jatis*. Caste Hindus are divided into the upper castes of *brahmans*, *kshatriyas*, *vaishyas*, and the far more numerous, but lower caste *shudras*. Outside this order are the ex-untouchables, now called *dalits*, as well as India's various tribes (Pinglé 2003: 232- 234, 237). The religious minorities of Muslims, Sikhs and Christians, are also excluded, but even they are affected by caste structures (ibid: 231).

The order of upper caste, lower caste, and *dalits*, has been translated, but is not totally identical with, the institutionalized groups defined by the Indian government: *Forward Castes* (FC)[1] coincide with upper castes, *Backward Classes* or *Other Backward Classes* (BC or OBC) with *shudras*, *Scheduled Castes* (SC) with *dalits*, and *Scheduled Tribes* (ST) encompass most tribes (Stuligross & Varshney 2002: 443-445).

Class as concept is a socioeconomic hierarchy linked to ownership and income. But there also is a significant class dimension to caste (Manor 1989: 335-336). And though caste is no longer connected to occupation, white collar and high status employment is dominated by upper caste, while physical labour and low status jobs are mostly performed by lower caste or *dalit*. Income disparity according to caste remains pronounced (India Today, 24th Sept. 2007: 21).

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[1] Note that Stuligross & Varshney in Reynolds uses the term Upper Caste (2002: 444), while I use the term Forward Caste (Frankel 1989: 47).

Thus, caste and class are separate but interconnected phenomena. I have tried to illustrate the intricate relationship in Figure 1, mind that it is highly simplified.

Figure 1: Interconnection of caste and class

Class   Varna

Upper/Middle Income   Brahman Kshatriya

                              Vaishya
                              Shudra

Low Income

Poor   Dalit

Caste is diagonal in relation to class, illustrated by broken lines. The upper castes dominate upper/middle class, but some are poor. And the mainly poor *shudra* and *dalit* are represented in higher echelons of income.

Caste in this study is interesting in relation to entrenchment of caste hierarchy, as it often constitutes the framework of patronage and thus determines how high any obstacle to overcome traditional clientelism would be.

2.2   Conceptualization

In order to investigate horizontal mobilization's impact on patterns of patronage, and socioeconomic development in India, I need to define the concepts of; patronage, horizontal and vertical mobilization, and socioeconomic development.

2.2.1 Patronage

Patronage, in this study used interchangeably with clientelism, in democracies is not the easiest field of study. Its legal status makes it hard to observe (Kitschelt & Wilkinson 2007b: 322). Neither is its theoretical definition a matter of total consensus. But here patronage implies the asymmetric, reciprocal (Schaffer 2007: 5), direct, and conditional relationship between principals and the agents (Kitschelt & Wilkinson 2007a: 10). And since votes are the most valuable currency in democracy-patronage: Patronage is a selective relationship where voters promise to support a candidate in exchange for various benefits (Chandra 2007: 88).

By contrast, in programmatic politics; party policies might be asymmetric, often directed at swing votes, but indirect (Kitschelt & Wilkinson 2007a: 9-10, 12) and unconditional (ibid.: 22), as programmatic parties do not rely on reciprocal political support.

Note that patronage is linked, but separate to corruption, which can constitute patronage, but also; deliberate inactivity, bribes, vote rigging, and extortion, to name a few (Holmes 2006: 36-37). Vote buying in turn is separate from

patronage. Direct and reciprocal, but does not require a continuous relationship (Schaffer 2007: 5-6), in repeated elections, as do patronage.

In India, traditional patronage is strongly connected with vertical mobilization manifested in the *Congress* system (Wilkinson 2007: 113, Frankel 1989b: 502-504). And the emergence of alternative mobilization has prompted new channels of patronage.

2.2.2 Vertical and Horizontal Mobilization

This study deals with two simplified modes of mobilization; vertical and horizontal. Vertical mobilization implies activation of small number of voters that in turn influence their identity group (Figure 2). Kanchan Chandra refers to this phenomenon as "mediated democracy" (2007: 106-107). In India large scale vertical mobilization of low caste leaders into the *Congress* ranks, (Pinglé 2003: 240), is the most striking example. Invitation also extended to ex-untouchables, the tribes and Muslims, with variation across the country (Frankel 1989b: 503).

Figure 2: Vertical Mobilization

Elites are co-opted through patronage, providing the votes of their castes. Primary beneficiaries in grey.

Horizontal mobilization implies broad political activity (Figure 3); often along the lines of caste (Pinglé 2003: 240-241), class, language, or religion.

Figure 3: Horizontal Mobilization

Horizontal mobilization, here illustrated with caste mobilization of mainly *shudra* channelling benefits to their constituents.

A major, though not insurmountable, obstacle is that; despite the neat theoretical division between vertical and horizontal mobilization, the observable reality is all but clear cut.

The relationship between mode of mobilization and patronage in this study is not to be understood as a matter of patronage or not. But horizontal mobilization is linked to broad patronage and vertical mobilization as more selective patronage. Vertical mobilization requires only limited patronage to an exclusive few. Meanwhile horizontal mobilization will ultimately necessitate satisfaction of some of the demands from those communal groups or castes mobilized.

2.2.3 Socioeconomic Development

Socioeconomic development can encompass everything from female literacy to highway construction. But in order to fit the purpose of this study, emphasis is put on the responsibilities of states; defined by the Constitution of India as public health, education, public order, local government, state finances and other local administrative issues (Constitution of India, Seventh Schedule, Lists II & III, Sharma 2003: 68). The first two areas are worthy of special attention from this studies point of view (Table 2-3).

It is however the widely utilized Human Development Index (HDI) that holds the most central position in this study as it encompasses both economic and social development (Table 1). Even if economic development is not this study's focus, State Domestic Product (SDP) growth rates serve to complement societal development (Appendix IV).

The variables above should together help to create a broad sense about the differences in socioeconomic development among the states of India.

3   Methodology

This study's analysis is divided into two parts. In Chapter 4, I will account correspondence between the historical entrenchment of caste hierarchy, mode of mobilizations, and socioeconomic development in the last twenty to thirty years, building on data and literature presented in section 3.3.

In Chapter 5, I attempt to establish whether correspondence implies causality. Due to the lack of comparative studies implying that this would be the case, that chapter builds on case studies, and discusses possible generalization of these findings in the light of what is discovered about correspondence.

3.1   Delimitations

The study focuses on post-Independence India, with special attention given to the last two decades. The availability of recent data, or lack of it, has shifted focus to the beginning of the millennium.

The study on states, automatically excludes the Union Territories, motivated by the fact that most of them are governed centrally. But neither are all twenty eight states subjects of this study.

The first delimitation is a population above ten million (india.gov.in), secondly the three states created in year 2000 are disqualified (ibid., Appendix II), as their achievements are legacies of earlier states. Third the constant conflict and special provisions given to Jammu & Kashmir in the Constitution disqualifies it (Hardgrave & Kochanek 2000: 167-169). The selected states are individually presented in Chapter 4, and listed in Appendix II.

3.2   Employing Defined Concepts

Employing the concept of socioeconomic development requires a quantitative data collecting approach. HDI is an employable measurement in itself (Table 1). To capture education and health care, literacy rate (Table 2) and life expectancy (Table 3) are employed.

As these measurements can be a bit too simple the latest rankings in magazine India Today (24th Sept. 2007: 9, 11) of primary education and primary healthcare (Appendix III) are presented to complement and better capture the concepts of education and healthcare.

In contrast to development, employing the concepts of caste entrenchment mode of mobilization requires qualitative tools. This is achieved by categorization, based on evidence found in the literature used. Categorization is preferable to rigid quantification, where nuances are given a specific value on a scale. The main reason being; I did not manage to find any framework for quantifying these phenomena.

3.3   Material

Theoretical assumptions about linkage between patronage and development rest on research presented by the contributors to the theoretically oriented "Patron, Clients and Politics" (Herbert Kitschelt and Steven Wilkinson, eds. 2007) and Sumit Ganguly and Neil DeVotta (eds. 2003). And with assistance of the two volumes of "Dominance and State Power in Modern India: Decline of a Social Order" (Frankel & Rao eds. 1989), placed it in an Indian context.

The quantitative data, retrieved through Internet, comprises of official sources of the Indian Planning Commission Report on Human Development (2002), Krishna (2004), but also the rankings of India Today (24th Sept. 2007).

The qualitative material is secondary material; literature, articles, and working papers. The backbone of analysis of structural socio-political dominance has been the above mentioned volumes edited by Francine R. Frankel and M. S. A. Rao, and "India: Government and Politics in a Developing Nation" (Hardgrave & Kochanek 2000).

4   Analysis of Correspondence

The Indian federation is somewhat unique. Due to the British legacy of unitary administration, and external and internal pressure once independent, the constitution was highly biased towards the federal Centre (Hardgrave & Kochanek 2000: 133-134). The Centre still holds a paramount position largely due to its financial role. And of course national legislation has preference over state legislation (Sharma 2003: 67-68). But state responsibilities described in the Constitution of India are exclusively state matters (Seventh Schedule). Power has gradually been decentralized, and in 1992 elections to the local governmental bodies, the *panchayati raj*, was codified (Sharma 2003: 68-69).

India is a highly diverse country, were exception is the rule. Caste is an all-Indian phenomenon, but has different substance in different regions. In this chapter I will examine the correspondence between caste entrenchment, and mode of mobilization with socioeconomic development.

The heterogeneity of India offers many opportunities for division and communal mobilization. The first challenge facing the founders of India was the demands from Muhammed Ali Jinnah's *Muslim League* for an independent state with a Muslim majority. This demand was met by the Partition with Pakistan in 1947 (Stuligross & Varshney 2002: 434).

4.1   Ethno-Linguistic Mobilization in the South

Following Partition the main divide was to be linguistically. Demands arose for separate, and sometimes independent, states according to language. The Constitution accommodated these demands as language became the determinant factor of state division within the federation, and eventually linguistic identity wavered (ibid: 437-439, 448). But in some states parties based on linguistic mobilization remained.

4.1.1 Tamil Nadu

In the Southernmost state of Tamil Nadu the *Dravida Munnetra Kazagham* (DMK) and the *All-India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazagham* (AIADMK) continue to dominate politics (Hardgrave & Kochanek 2000: 318-319), both are remnants of the Tamil or Dravidian ethnic/linguistic mobilization from the 1920's to the 1960's.

Historically in South India conventional definition of caste, as in Figure 1, does not suffice. *Brahmans* form only a small portion of upper economic strata, *kshatriyas* and *vaishyas* are absent, while the upper *shudra vellalas* were often agriculturally influential. (Washbrook 1989: 204-205)

In Tamil Nadu caste status did not emanate from *brahman* priests, as customary, but from allegiance to kings, who returned gifts and honours (ibid: 234-235). The British believed caste to be all-Indian vested powers in accordance with caste (ibid: 241), undermining Tamil traditions and aiding *brahmans*.

Subsequently *brahmans* became political targets for the upper *shudras* of the Dravidian movement; comprising the non-*Brahman* movements of the 1920's, the radical anti-Aryan in 1930's (ibid: 208), and institutionalized in the DMK (ibid: 207-208).

After Independence Tamil politics was dominated by *Congress*, through patronage network of elite (ibid: 250), however *Congress* was immediately challenged by and the DMK, which won the vote in 1967 (ibid: 252).

In DMK rhetoric, caste was to be dismantled, in the caste ridden society of Tamil Nadu. But reservations and benefits implemented in order to achieve this, BC reservations for advanced education were up to 70 per cent (ibid: 255), actually heightened tension between castes (ibid: 207).

Elites were soon incorporated into the DMK, as it became the dominant state party (ibid: 253), although *Congress*-style patronage was a thing of the past (ibid: 256). In response to consequential critique the AIADMK, was launched by an ex-movie star (ibid: 257).

Both the DMK and the AIADMK pursued populist strategies and generous welfare politics. And though the Centre often had to assist in financing programs, it was ungratefully accused by the state of neglecting Tamil Nadu. The state ranks high in terms of HDI, and fairly well in terms of SDP (Table 1).

Dalits were never equally incorporated in the BC dominated Dravidian movement, and a separate political movement was launched in the 1990's (Gorringe 2007: 52-54). But it seems that they have not succeeded in overthrowing institutions, instead becoming institutionalized into alliances with either the DMK or the AIADMK (ibid: 62-64).

4.1.2 Andhra Pradesh

The Telugu speaking areas of inland Hyderabad, ruled by the Muslim *Nizam* until 1948, and coastal Andhra, formed the heterogeneous entity Andhra Pradesh (AP) in 1956 (Reddy 1989: 266, 279-280). Historically FC dominated landholding and especially *brahmans* dominated the literati (ibid: 268-274).

After warding of the Communists, *Congress* became the dominant post-Independence party in the state (ibid: 280). Power rested on accommodation of the public and co-opting of local elites, and following the annexation of Hyderabad, Muslims were gradually won over (ibid: 282, 292). Accommodation was maintained through agricultural reform, small farm development, industrial development and reservation politics (ibid: 292-302). But *Congress* never achieved horizontal mobilization of the poor (ibid: 287).

Through the 1970's Prime Minister Indira Gandhi tied power and appointment of officials to herself, she weakened patronage of the local elites. But once the appeal of Mrs. Gandhi had faded, this prompted the emergence of challengers to Congress. (ibid: 286-287)

The *Telugu Desam Party* (TDP) first came into power after the 1983 Assembly election (ibid: 288). Movie star N. T. Rama Rao became TDP Chief Minister (CM), after a campaign focusing on clean government, rights of women, fighting black market, etc. (ibid: 286).

TDP provided a break with the patronage of *Congress* in favour of a populist agenda revolving around a strong leader (ibid: 291-292). However, many within TDP became disillusioned with Rama Rao's "caesarean rule", and he was ousted in an internal coup (ibid: 288). Despite *Congress* sweeping the national polls in 1985, AP sympathy lay with the "unfairly" ousted Rao (ibid: 291).

Reservation has been part of both parties' strategies, quotas in education to name one (ibid.: 302). And by 1986 many state employees were SC and BC, but those within the highest stratum of power are still from FC (ibid.: 310-311).

AP is poor but improving steadily in terms of social and economic development, although immensely poor and still a low achiever (Appendix IV, Table 1). The success of the states IT-industry is probably one of the most important determinants of growth, some claim it has come at the expense of the countryside (The Economist, Mar 22nd 2003).

4.2   Northern Brahman Heartland

Dating back pre-*Mughal*, *zamindars* collected taxes, normally half the produce, and kept a share of the revenue (Hasan 1989: 135). Congress imposed the *Zamindari Abolition*, without radically changing land distribution in northern India (ibid.: 160-162, Frankel 1989a: 91-93), FCs dominance remained.

4.2.1 Uttar Pradesh

Assembly elections in Uttar Pradesh (UP) in May 2007 resulted in landslide victory for Mayawati and her *dalit*-dominated *Bahajun Samaj Party* (BSP). What consequences this will have for India's largest state remains to be seen (Lindberg 2007: 20-21).

UP has historically been dominated by upper caste *zamindars*. *Zamindari Abolition* did not radically change land distribution, though it did removed many large *zamindars*, robbing opposition of arguments, and strengthened the *Congress* support base (Hasan 1989: 157-159, 175).

From 1952 to 1967 *Congress* ruled UP. Trying to appease all; ex-*zamindars*, Muslims, and SC leaders to gain support, but organization and leadership remained dominated by the upper castes (ibid: 170-175).

The BCs were left out from much of the reservation politics, and especially the rich BCs where frustrated (ibid: 180). An ex-Congressman formed an opposition party, increasing BC political participation. But this party emulated *Congress* in vertical mobilization. It merged with Socialists into *Bharatiya Lok Dal* (BDL) in 1974 (ibid: 176-177, 180-181). BDL attempted horizontal mobilization, but its association with the landowning BC made this difficult. And *Congress* appealed more to the poor and the SC (ibid: 184).

Due to the unpopularity of the Emergency imposed by *Congress* Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, the *Janata Party* (the BDL, Socialists and *Jan Sangh*) came into power in 1977 (ibid: 185). Caste conflict within *Janata*, contributed to the breakdown of the coalition, while *Congress* successfully co-opted many BC leaders with promise of party tickets (ibid: 187-189).

In the 1980's Congress returned to government (ibid: 187-188), only to be swept away by the Hindu nationalist *Bharatiya Janata Party* (BJP, heir to *Jan Sangh*)*,* after the *Ayodhya* agitation in 1991 (Hardgrave & Kochanek 2000: 305).

In contemporary UP politics the OBC-dominated *Samajwadi Party* of Mulayam Singh Yadav, and the *dalit*-dominated BSP of Mayawati, are the main competitors for power (Luce 2006: 128-131).

Caste is important as Muslims and *yadavs* of the *Samajwadi* goes head to head with the FC and *dalit* alliance of the BSP. This odd alliance has come to be as *dalits* fear the relatively powerful *yadavs* and *brahmans* feel power is being taken from them (ibid.: 133-134).

UP has a population of 160 million people, the world's sixth most populous country, were it sovereign. This makes the states poor achievements even more depressing (Table 1). The effects of Mayawati's victory remains to be seen, but in her campaign reservations held prominence over governance and development, this time *dalits* offer reservations to high caste poor (Lindberg 2007: 21).

4.2.2 Bihar

Bihar has a history of upper caste dominance, caste polarization and violence (Frankel 1989a: 47, 123-124). And the result of the land distribution by *Congress* imposed, *Zamindari Abolition* was ambiguous to say the least, though it had an impact on the status of FCs (ibid: 91-95).

From Independence to 1967 the upper castes led *Congress*-ruled Bihar unchallenged (ibid: 82), supported by Muslims and SC vote banks, and efficiently co-opting BC leaders (ibid: 83-84). In the Socialist led government of 1967, caste composition was largely identical (ibid: 89-90).

Congress again faced the Socialists in 1974, but their leader was arrested during the 1975 Emergency declared by Mrs. Gandhi (ibid: 103-104), who installed a corrupt *brahman* Chief Minister. He opposed introduction of reservations for OBCs, but introduced reforms benefiting *dalits* (ibid: 104, 123). The anti-*Congress* wave following the Emergency swept the *Janata* alliance into power 1977 (ibid: 106-107).

Emergence of the BC *yadavs* prohibited further reservation, proposed by the *Janata's* Kampoori Thankur, and attempts sparked riots (ibid: 108-110). The FC

and *dalit* alliance prevailed to hinder further BC reservations (ibid: 111-112), and Thankur discovered the difficulties in achieving BC unity. *Congress* returned to power in 1980, largely due to its vast resources enabling co-option of *yadav* leaders (ibid: 113-114). In addition *dalits* tended to follow their caste leaders, and tribals either voted *Congress* or a party championing a separate tribal Jharkhand (ibid: 115).

In 1985 election *Congress* had a larger portion of candidates being *shudras*, but FCs still had grip over power (ibid: 116-119), and corruption, bribery, coercion, violence, polarization and plagues Bihari politics (ibid: 123-124).

But the breakthrough of *yadav* mobilization did not wait. From 1990 to 2005, Bihar has been run by Lalu Prasad Yadav through an alliance between Muslims and *yadavs*. After alleged corruption regarding fodder subsidies in the late 1990's he was briefly imprisoned and stepped down in favour of his wife Rabri Devi (Luce 2006: 116-119).

His party is often associated with the criminalization of politics (The Economist, Nov 26th 2005). But as Lalu's party is also the second-largest supporter of the incumbent national government he became Railway Minister of India in 2004 (Luce 2006: 119).

Bihar is the worst achiever in nearly every category (Table 1, Appendix III), it is the poorest and most illiterate among all states of India. Lalu's eviction as CM has been hailed as a vote for good governance, but the new government is not free from criminalization plaguing Bihari politics.

4.2.3 Madhya Pradesh

Madhya Pradesh (MP) was created in 1956. The landlocked central state has a large upper caste population and a numerous tribal population. Urban MP was largely situated within princely states, and their patronage networks dominated the cities (Gupta 2005: 5096). Rural MP has traditionally been dominated by upper caste landlords, mostly *ryotwari* instead of intermediate *zamindari*, but the situation of the poor no less oppressive. But the absence of a rural patron-client relationship actually hampered peasant mobilization (ibid: 5095).

Congress has remained largely unchallenged in MP, only periodically challenged by Socialists and BJP, and its power rested on traditional methods of accommodation and vertical mobilization (ibid: 5094, Banerjee 2006).

Arjun Singh, and to even larger extent his successor Digvijay Singh, began a strategy of widening the *Congress* social base by extended accommodation and social reform (Gupta 2005: 5096). Digvijay Singh efficiently circumvented traditional patronage links (Manor, unpublished), keeping them occupied while implementing his programmes. He also built an alliance between Rajput and STs, similar, but different to the traditional brahman/SC alliance (Gupta 2005: 5098).

MP generally performs poorly in terms of socioeconomic development (Table 1), but literacy has risen sharply (Table 2), and helped empower the SC and ST of the state. The Education Guarantee Programme was especially efficient in reducing illiteracy (Manor, unpublished). The MP *Congress* has managed to improve social conditions for the lower population strata from above.

4.2.4 Orissa

In Orissa upper castes has dominated both in economy and society, land ownership and education (Mohanty 1989: 332-335), both coastal Orissa and in the tribal inland (ibid: 336). *Brahman* power was further entrenched in the local *Jagannath* cult (ibid: 360). They were successful in co-opting challenging castes and if necessary expand their network (ibid: 322).

Congress dominated the state politics until 1977, and since then competed with *Janata* factions. Its leadership mostly consisted of upper caste and educated, as were those of the Socialists and Communists (ibid: 339-340). Land reforms had little result, and did not benefit the poorest (ibid: 341-342).

Biju Patnaik revived *Congress* in 1961, but left it in 1971, and joined forces with the *Janata* which prevailed in 1977 (ibid: 354-355). The Patnaik led coalition operated along same social lines as *Congress* (ibid: 356).

Lack of caste mobilization not so much a matter of upper caste conspiracy, as the inability of the rural impoverished (ibid: 322). Orissa is rich in natural resources, but this has not benefited regional business or industry. Neither low caste nor unions have challenged upper caste dominance, and Orissa is an industrially backward, poor, and corrupt state (ibid: 362-363).

Currently, and since 2000, the BJP and the *Biju Janata Dal* forms the government, mostly consists of upper caste and BC. Led by Naveen Patnaik, son of Biju seen as able corruption fighting leader, the lack of religious or caste mobilization in the state has assisted him. (www.hinduonnet.com)

4.3   Class Struggle Strongholds

The Communists class struggle never became a movement of national importance, in post-Independent India. Internal differences heightened tensions and in 1964 the *Communist Party of India Marxists* (CPM) left the Communist Party of India (Hardgrave & Kochanek 2000: 311). Currently the CPM is an important member of the *Congress*-led national government (The Economist, Oct. 27th 2007: 65), but its political support is regional. The states of West Bengal and Kerala are the only two contemporary reliable sources of Communist support today (Hardgrave & Kochanek 2000: 312).

4.3.1   West Bengal

The CPM stronghold of West Bengal and its capital Kolkata, former Calcutta, was once the centre of the imperialist *Raj*. The state is a part of what once was pre-Partition Bengal.

Caste and Brahmanism has never been politically important in Bengal history (Kohli 1989: 367, 375, 395), in part due to the major role played by Islam in

undivided Bengal. Tension between Hindus and Muslims before Partition left little room for intra-Hindu conflict (ibid: 397). And *Congress'* efforts to appease Muslims made it weaker in Bengal (ibid: 392).

After Independence *Congress* governed, but never got a popular foothold. Meanwhile the Communists strengthened their positions. In addition to ideological strength, the CPM could also play on Bengal regionalism, as *Congress* was seen as a Hindi dominated party (ibid: 375).

The Communists have since the 1930's relied on ideological cohesion and internal discipline (ibid: 370-371). CPM leadership was, just as *Congress*, primarily upper caste, but never mobilized according to caste (ibid: 369-370), but agitated in terms of class. Their support came from the middle and lower income groups, but not from the very poorest (ibid: 380). Candidates were not chosen by caste, but by ideological commitment. And Communist patronage was channelled to various support groups (ibid: 372).

The Emergency in 1975 lifted Communists, and they came into power in 1977 (ibid: 371, 411). They implemented a vast array of programs and reforms to increase employment and reduce landlordism and sharecropper dependency. They were largely successful, as the economically powerful never could translate wealth into political power (ibid: 385).

The low income stratum that supports the Communists has also been the once benefiting from their time in power (ibid: 413), but the most destitute has yet to mobilize. And although not among the worst achievers in development (Appendix III), with the city of Kolkata and the traditionally fertile Bengal one might expect the state to perform better.

But the states potential might finally be utilized as the CPM has come to embrace the opportunities of foreign investment. The current CM Buddhadeb Bhattarcharjee is sometimes described as Deng Xiaoping of West Bengal (The Economist, Nov 24th 2007: 76). Establishing Special Economic Zones (SEZ) and inviting foreign investors has improved the states economy, but this has also heightened tension between the government and the rural poor.

4.3.2 Kerala

Caste hierarchy in Kerala was most rigid in all South India. Landowners usually were upper castes, tenants were intermediate, and the landless laboured on their fields BC or SC. The relationship between them was most unequal, serfdom or slave like conditions were historically common (Alexander 1989: 368-369).

British presence from the 18th century undermined traditional hierarchies, and some lower caste strived for social reform, making Kerala somewhat of a pioneer (ibid: 370-371).

Syrian Christianity has a long local history, and European missionaries brought new ideas. Inspired, the untouchables started to demand education and access to temples and public roads, which sparked clashes with upper castes (ibid: 372-373). Some threatened to convert, and many did, although it did not result in any upward mobility. (ibid: 373)

Tenant organizations were successful on the Malabar Coast, both assisting and being assisted by the Communist Party. In the progressive princely state of Travancore, many tenant issues were already solved (ibid: 379-380). Instead agricultural labour organizations rose in Travancore, demanding fixed working hours and increased share in produce (ibid: 381-382).

The Communist Party came into power in 1957. They cooperated with the tenant and labour unions, and provided legal support for many of their demands (ibid.: 382). The focus on tenants in Malabar fuelled tension, and in 1969 an agricultural labourers' union for all of Kerala was founded (ibid: 383).

Communist mobilization aided low caste poor (ibid: 390), and their presence changed attitudes towards caste and traditional rules (ibid: 393-396). Reforms have reduced land under tenancy, its size (ibid: 400-401), but also efficiency. Patronage between farmers and labourers has eroded (ibid: 403). But high wages also fuelled inflation during the 1980's, and poverty rates were high (ibid: 404-405). Communists gradually lost support in the 1970's and 1980's (ibid: 406), but are still influential, and often in government through various alliances.

Literacy rate has historically been high in Kerala, and HDI is the highest in India, and has been so for since at least the 1980's (Table 1). The poverty of and high welfare paradox of Kerala posed somewhat of a paradox (www.ashanet.org), lately this paradox has been eroded by the rapid growth of Kerala's economy (www.rediff.com).

4.4   The Prosperous West

The western coastal states of Gujarat and Maharashtra have long been the industrial hub of India (Shah 1989, Lele 1989). In the same sense the two north-eastern states of Punjab and Haryana has been the granaries (Wallace 1989). I was however not able to retrieve any suitable information on Haryana, see section 4.6.

4.4.1 Gujarat

In the home state of Mahatma Mohandas K. Gandhi assembly election was recently held. Victor was the praised and criticised BJP Chief Minister Narenda Modi, defying the anti-incumbency factor (news.bbc.co.uk).

Historically upper caste *zamindars* dominated landholding, while *Jains* and upper caste *vania* dominated industry and trade (Shah 1989, p. 62-64, 76), and low castes constituted the bulk of workers and SC mainly landless agricultural labourers (ibid: 64-65). Besides Maharashtra, Gujarat is traditionally the largest industry state of India (ibid: 94-95).

Congress was the dominant party post-Independence; its leaders were traditionally *brahman* and *vania* (ibid: 73), and supporters came from SC and the backwards (ibid: 88). Attempted reservation policies sparked violent protests from the FC, which were far better organized than the ST, SC and OBCs. These clashes

cut though classes, divided according to caste (ibid: 98-99). The Hindu castes however have little trouble uniting against the 8 per cent Gujarati Muslims (ibid: 64-65, 101). Communal violence has been a common feature in Gujarat (ibid: 101), and clashes culminated in the 2002 pogroms in which some two thousand Muslims were brutally killed (Economist, Dec 8th 2007: 63).

Though the state is fairly industrialized, class based struggle has little part in its politics (Shah 1989: 111). The *Congress*, the *Janata*, and the successive BJP all relied on different caste constellations (ibid.: 105-107), whose elites share the interests of rich upper caste and pay little attention to their poorer caste fellows (ibid.: 109-110). The *Ayodhya* agitation lifted the BJP to nationwide success (Hardgrave & Kochanek 2000: 305). And in Gujarat the controversial BJP Narenda Modi has governed since.

During his government industrial development has flourished, and Gujarat was in the forefront of establishing the newly approved SEZs (India Today Sept 24th 2007: 19). But while Mr. Modi treats investors with the silk gloves of free trade, he does not think twice about letting his Muslim population feel the iron fist of hard line *Hindutva*.

4.4.2 Maharashtra

The metropolis of Mumbai, former Bombay, capital of Maharashtra, is India's financial capital and home to the massive Bollywood film industry. Maharashtra is India's leading industrial state, and attracts large sums of investment from within and abroad.

Politically dominant castes in Maharashtra are the *brahmans*, but to even larger extent the *maratha* caste cluster (Lele 1989: 115). *Marathas* were tribal groups, whose elite became kings and claimed *kshatriya* status. The *marathas* displayed an internal flexibility mobilizing the *kunbis* when necessary (ibid: 159).

The *Maratha Confederacy* became a dominant force on the sub-continent challenging *Mughals* and British. The animosity between the *Maratha* kings and the *brahman peshwas* ministers, in addition to the many external threats, eroded the power of the Confederacy and Maharastra came under the British (ibid: 132-138). *Company Raj* and the rise of Bombay offered new opportunities for mercantile caste migrants to Maharashtra, and *brahman* literati (ibid: 148, 154). Meanwhile the *marathas* dominated much of the countryside (ibid: 178).

After the state's creation in 1960 *Congress* became the ruling party. And as in many other states in India it formed the patronage party, dominated by *brahmans* (ibid: 149-150).

The *marathas* spearheaded the non-*Brahman* movement (ibid: 153-154), though this movement was upper caste and far from egalitarian (ibid: 166). The *marathas* were soon to realize the benefits of being connected to the state through Congress and opted for joined to gain influence (ibid: 164-165). This strategy was successful, as land reform and reservation policies largely benefited the *maratha/kunbi* caste cluster (ibid: 178). Whenever potential challenge arose the *marathas* saw to accommodate these interests, not at expense of their own dominance, but still quite generously (ibid: 188).

Figure 4: Maratha/kunbi hybrid mobilization

The Marathas used a hybrid form of vertical and horizontal mobilization.

Earlier the main political struggle was within the Congress. Current challenges come from the BJP in alliance with the extreme Hindu nationalist *Shiv Sena* (www.frontlineonnet.com). About the caste structure of these parties I dare not make any statement, but it would be surprising if the numerous *marathas* did not play a central role even within these.

Maharashtra stands out as a rich state, largely thanks to the economic hub that Mumbai constitutes. Its socioeconomic achievements are good (Table 1-3), but not surprisingly so with regard to its economic resources (Appendix IV).

4.4.3 The Punjab

Historical Punjab consisted of contemporary Punjab, Haryana, parts of Himachal Pradesh and Pakistani Punjab. With Partition half the Punjab and most Punjabi Muslims, previously politically influential, went to Pakistan (Wallace 1989: 434-435). Later Sikh led agitation resulted in the trifurcation (ibid: 421).

In the Punjab caste and class are secondary to the importance of religion as the main communal divide between; Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs, and to lesser extent Christians (ibid: 430-431). The *Akali Dal* party became the political dominant within the Sikh movement (ibid: 434).

Punjab has since long been the granary of India (ibid: 466-468). Following the trifurcation Sikhs became numerically dominant, but Hindus were strong in the urban areas. This division is however obscured by the concept of *Jats*.

The agriculturally dominant *Jats* are more tribes than castes; in fact they cut across communal, caste and class lines and form an internally egalitarian community. Intermarriage between caste and community are common, but mostly within the *Jat*-community. (ibid: 425)

After Partition, *Congress* became the dominant party. Meanwhile the *Akali Dal* supported various fractions, but never gained enough support to achieve a political majority (ibid: 438), not even after the current Punjab separated from the other territories (ibid: 446-447).

An *Akali Dal* alliance with *Janata* formed government in 1977, but this fragile construction collapsed due to *Akali Dal's* inability to accommodate the Hindus

(ibid.: 448). The second alliance in 1979 far more successful but brief, only lasting until 1981 (ibid: 449).

Sikh identity and perception of marginalization remained. And in 1981 the concept of a separate Sikh state, Khalistan, saw daylight. The *Akali Dal* however settled for extended autonomy (ibid: 453). Bhindranwale occupied the temple complex surrounding the Golden Temple, Sikhism's holiest site. *Operation Bluestar* in 1984 and the assassination of Indira Gandhi sparked fierce communal violence across India, mainly aimed at Sikhs (ibid: 459).

Figure 5: Sikh mobilization in the Punjab

Sikh mobilization has failed to encompass all Sikhs and has not managed to co-opt any Hindu castes, which is fairly unimportant in Punjabi politics.

Congress tried a strategy of compromise during and after Rajiv Gandhi, and made a conscious effort to get Longowal and the *Akali Dal* into power, economic packages were offered as well (ibid: 460-462).

The Punjab remains the most important agricultural state of India (India Today 24th Sept. 2007: 8), it is rich and achieves well in terms of socioeconomic development (Appendix IV, Table 1).

4.5   Conservative Tolerance

In the following two states, with little else in common, society has been accommodative in nature. Caste has not been as entrenched as other parts in India. This relative harmony has led to conservative attitudes making political mobilization unwanted, though there have been some changes that are of interest.

4.5.1 Karnataka

During the *Raj*, Karnataka was governed by six different authorities; two *presidencies*, the princely states of Hyderabad and Mysore, and two smaller entities. In spite of this, Karnataka is a fairly cohesive society, and communal violence is uncommon (Manor 1989: 322). Land distribution has been relatively equal (ibid.: 323), but tended to be in the hands of *vokkaligas* and *lingayats* (ibid.: 331), while *brahmans* dominated urban administration (ibid.: 338-339). Caste in

Karnataka is important, but less oppressive than in most other parts of rural India, and relatively flexible (ibid.: 333, 358).

Congress dominated politics from 1956 to 1983; it depended on, and strengthened *vokkaligas* and *lingayats*, but also concessions and tokenism towards marginalized groups (ibid.: 342-343). Moreover, land reform was implemented to accommodate the masses (ibid.: 343-344). As other castes sought patronage, the two dominant became defensive and solidarity between them and within them eroded (ibid.: 347-348).

This aided Congressman Devaraj Urs, as he after 1969 built a broad network of people not tied to traditional *Congress* patronage. Growing awareness among the disadvantaged, and support from Indira Gandhi aided him further (ibid.: 348-349). Up to the 1972 election, he had higher proportions of BC candidates than any before. Once in office he implemented programs for employment, health care, education, minimum wage, and banned degrading tasks performed by the SC (ibid.: 349).

These reforms did not survive Urs' successor, as commitment declined and civil service ruled. Many groups became disaffected, and by 1983 the *Janata Party* came into power. And because of broad support, *Janata* also had to satisfy all groups. The *vokkaliga/lingayat* dominance was something of the past. (ibid.: 356-357)

Karnataka has been improving steadily since the 1980's, in terms of socioeconomic development, and especially strictly economically (Appendix IV), with the booming IT-sector in Bengaluuro as centre (finance.indiainfo.com).

4.5.2 Rajasthan

In the cluster of ex-princely states comprising Rajasthan, it is not *brahmans* but *Rajputs* who are traditionally dominant (Narain & Mathur 1989:17-18). *Rajputs* were *kshatriya* rulers and literary means "Son of King", but many *Rajput* princesses became famous mothers to emperors. Marriage with the Muslim *Mughal* dynasty was common, and emperors like Jahangir and Shahjahan had *Rajput* maternal heritage (timesofindia.indiatimes.com). Not all *Rajputs* were rulers; most were peasants (Narain & Mathur 1989: 29).

The tolerance of the *Rajput* is reflected in communal relations in Rajasthan. War "kshatriyized" society, and caste mobility through valour was historically possible (ibid.: 17-18). Moreover the STs did not face the discrimination common elsewhere (ibid.: 34). The same can not be said for the SCs, but oppression was still more moderate than in many other parts of India (ibid.: 34-35). Another feature in Rajasthan has been the strength of the mercantile castes. *Vaishya Jains* were moneylenders and traders, and the first to embrace Western education, not *brahmans* as elsewhere (ibid.: 36-37).

The west of Rajasthan consists of desert, while the east constitutes irrigated farmland. And although land distribution is uneven, the large estates are found in the west, while the smaller are also the highest yielding (ibid.: 11).

Congress rose to power after Independence, relying on urban and high caste support (ibid.: 25-26). The *Rajput* rulers were usually anti-*Congress*, and once

they had learnt democracy they challenged the dominant party (ibid.: 26). Their strategy was not one of horizontal mobilization, most voter were former subject and non-*Rajput* (ibid.: 42-43). *Rajput* internal disunity was exploited by *Congress*, and solidarity with their poorer caste brethren was weak (ibid.: 46).

Today Rajasthan is experiencing some economic growth and impressive performance in literacy rates (Appendix IV, Table 2), but whether or not this can be linked to any policy or political mobilization I have not been able to find out.

4.6   The Missing Two

Due to lack of relevant material I regretfully must admit that I could not find any substantial information concerning the states of Haryana and Assam. As Haryana shares a common history with Punjab (Wallace 1989), it was also a winner of the Green Revolution. And Haryana is a high achiever regarding economy and socioeconomic factors (Table 1, Appendix IV).

The case of is Assam one of separatism and ethnic conflict (Hardgrave & Kochanek 2000: 156-157), though I dare not say how this has effected state politics. Assam is poor and a poor achiever in most areas of socioeconomic development (Table 1-3). Interesting to note is that Assam is ranked as the fastest achiever by India Today (24th Sept. 2007), though from a very low starting point.

4.7   Results of Correspondence Analysis

Continuing the analysis it seems evident that one has to take time and space into consideration, i.e. when mobilization took place and how entrenched caste structure historically has been in that state. In the tables below the results from the analysis is summarised.

Before drawing any final conclusions about correspondence from the tables below, problems about classification prompts further specifications treated in the following points:

1) The case of Karnataka is classified as vertical mobilization, but the policy of Devaraj Urs' included many elements of the horizontal ditto, and differs from the patronage and co-option of previous administrations. (Manor 1989)

2) The same can be said about Madhya Pradesh and Digvijay Singh. He efficiently circumvented traditional patterns of patronage in order to implement wide programs, among which the educational program is praised as a success. (Manor, unpublished)

3) Similar but in opposite direction, the CPI(M) in West Bengal form another problem of classification. It has long pushed a class struggle agenda, and pro-poor peasants. But it has always consisted of educated upper caste, and rested on patronage not all that different to traditional Congress. (Kohli 1989: 369-370)

Table 1: Correspondence between caste entrenchment, mode of mobilization and human development in 2001, ranked after the latter. Abbreviations; Vertical = V, Horizontal = H

States	Caste Entrench-ment	Mode of Mobilization	Socio-economic Development HDI 2001	Net SDP per cap* 1997-1998
Kerala	Rigid	Horizontal 1957	0.638	2,490
Punjab[4]	Flexible	Communal	0.537	4,389
Tamil Nadu	Rigid	Horizontal 1967	0.531	3,141
Maharashtra[5]	Medium	Dual	0.523	5,032
Haryana	------	----------	0.509	4,025
Gujarat		Vertical	0.479	3,918
Karnataka[1]	Medium	Vertical	0.478	2,866
West Bengal[3]	Flexible	Horizontal 1977	0.472	2,977
Rajasthan	Medium	Vertical	0.424	2,226
AP	Rigid	V – H 1983	0.416	2,550
Orissa	Rigid	Vertical	0.404	1,666
MP[2]	Rigid	Vertical	0.394	1,922
Assam	------	----------	0.386	1,675
Bihar	Rigid	V – H 1990's	0.367	1,126
UP	Rigid	V – H 1990's	0.338	1,725
India	------	----------	**0.472**	**2840**

*) Rupees at 1980-81 prices

Sources: Frankel & Rao, eds., 1989, Planning Commission 2002: 25, 146, Table 2.1

4) The cases above strengthen any statement about correlation. On the other hand, the Sikh mobilization in the Punjab can not be said to be horizontal, communal mobilization is a more fitting description. And it is hard to maintain that the Sikh mobilization was internally horizontal (Wallace 1989). The *Akali Dal* only sporadically held office. So communal mobilization main contribution perhaps is to find indirectly, as it forces other parties to give more substantial and broader patronage, if at all?

5) In Maharashtra the elite of the dominant caste *maratha* has mobilized their poorer brethren the *kunbi* through a strategy that can be said to be horizontal. But they have also co-opted the other BCs and SCs with a vertical strategy. The wealth of Maharashtra might be a better determinant of development.

Caste entrenchment does not determine the performance of the states, but the combination of long periods of vertical mobilization, and rigid caste structure seems to be particularly devastating.

Note that most of the states with more flexible caste structure perform moderately well. This only implies that social history has an impact on

socioeconomic performance, which is not at all surprising, but flexibility is neither sufficient nor necessary for high performance.

Table 2: Correspondence between mode of mobilization and literacy 1981, 1991, and 2001, ranked after the latter.

States	Mode of Mobilization	Literacy 1981	Literacy 1991	Literacy 2001
Kerala	Horizontal 1957	81.56	89.81	90.92
Maharashtra[5]	Dual	55.83	64.87	77.27
Tamil Nadu	Horizontal 1967	54.39	62.66	73.47
Punjab[4]	Communal	48.17	58.51	69.95
West Bengal[3]	Horizontal 1977	48.65	57.70	69.22
Haryana	----------	43.88	55.85	68.59
Karnataka[1]	Vertical	46.21	56.04	67.04
Gujarat	Vertical	52.21	61.29	66.43
Assam	----------	------	52.89	64.28
MP[2]	Vertical	36.63	44.20	64.09
Orissa	Vertical	40.97	49.09	63.61
AP	V – H 1983	35.66	44.09	61.11
Rajasthan	Vertical	30.11	38.55	61.03
UP	V – H 1990's	33.35	41.60	57.36
Bihar	V – H 1990's	32.05	38.48	47.53
India	----------	**43.57**	**52.21**	**65.20**

Source: Planning Commission 2002: 186, Table 4.1

Table 3: Correspondence between mode of mobilization and life expectancy at birth 1981-85, 1991-95, and 1992-1996, ranked after the latter.

States	Mode of Mobilization	Life expec. 1981-85	Life expec. 1991-1995	Life expec. 1992-1996
Kerala	Horizontal 1957	68.4	72.9	73.1
Punjab[4]	Communal	63.1	67.2	67.4
Maharashtra[5]	Dual	60.7	64.8	65.2
Haryana	----------	60.3	63.4	63.8
Tamil Nadu	Horizontal 1967	56.9	63.3	63.7
Karnataka[1]	Vertical	60.7	62.5	62.9
West Bengal[3]	Horizontal 1977	57.4	62.1	62.4
AP	V – H 1983	58.4	61.8	62.0
Gujarat	Vertical	57.6	61.0	61.4
Rajasthan	Vertical	53.5	59.1	59.5
Bihar	V – H 1990's	52.9	59.3	59.4
UP	V – H 1990's	50.0	56.8	57.2
Orissa	Vertical	53.0	56.5	56.9
Assam	----------	51.9	55.7	56.2
MP[2]	Vertical	51.6	54.7	55.2
India	----------	**55.5**	**60.3**	**60.7**

Source: Planning Commission 2002: 218, Table 5.1

From the discussion and tables above we can conclude that states with experience of horizontal mobilization before 1980 generally achieve higher levels of HDI, literacy and life expectancy, while those experiencing it later or not at all generally achieve lower levels. But high achieving Maharashtra and Gujarat prove that there would be major flaws in any general statement about the impact of modes of mobilization and patterns of patronage on socioeconomic development.

Therefore the conclusion regarding correspondence must be that there is a substantial tendency towards correspondence between the phenomena of horizontal mobilization and higher degrees of socioeconomic development, but it is by no means perfect or unambiguous.

Obvious is also the substantial correspondence between SDP and HDI (Table 1), and it is in this context that Gujarat and Maharashtra fit in. Those producing below average are those ranking below average HDI.

The only major exception is Kerala. But also note, that Tamil Nadu achieves better than should be expected from its SDP, and that the far richer Maharashtra and nearly as rich Gujarat perform worse. This is however not enough to suggest that horizontal mobilization is the most important factor explaining the deviation.

5 Analysis of Causality

Establishing that there is a tendency for early horizontal mobilization to correspond with high levels of socioeconomic development is not enough to draw any conclusions definite, causality needs to be addressed.

To the best of my knowledge there are no previous comparative or quantitative studies linking horizontal mobilization and in patterns of patronage to effects on development. In the absence of large scale studies I turned to case studies in order to examine causal links between the phenomena, with the following question in mind: Has horizontal mobilization been necessary and/or sufficient for high levels of socioeconomic performance?

5.1 Necessity of Horizontal Mobilization

We would expect to find some support for causal links in Kerala. One can not ignore that Kerala has had a long tradition of high literacy rates, but equally true is that most improvement where made post-Independence, after popular mobilization (Desai 2005: 476, Table 7). And the conscious effort from the lower caste movement in Kerala to improve literacy was important (Sen 2005: 116). Manali Desai (2005) claims that Kerala's lower caste mobilization and the legacy of the princely Travancore state in south Kerala, in concert, are crucial in explaining welfare policies.

A much less likely case to find any evidence of causal circumstances is that of worst performer, Bihar. The administration of Lalu Prasad Yadav has been considered a prime example of criminalization of politics (Economist, Nov 24th 2005). But Jeffrey Witsoe claims that the *yadav* mobilization in Bihar actually had some positive effects on development. Poverty has been dramatically reduced since 1993-1994, by 14 per cent in comparison with all-Indian 8 per cent. Especially the number of very poor has declined (casi.ssc.upenn.edu). Although it is hard to link improvement to policy and Bihar still lags in most other respects.

Following the *yadav* and *dalit* mobilizations of Uttar Pradesh, primary education has improved (India Today, Sept 24th 2007: 11). Both Bihar and UP has experienced improvements in literacy (SIDA 2003: 25), but whether this is circumstantial or a direct effect of mobilization I dare not make any statement.

Two states that have made immense improvements in literacy in the last decade are Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan. In Madhya Pradesh this can be directly attributed to the social reforms by Digvijay Singh. His policies are both a continuum and a significant break with the patronage politics of vertical mobilization. Singh widened accommodation, while appealing directly to the

masses, circumventing the traditional party elite, and implementing development policies benefiting the masses (Manor, unpublished).

Due to lack of material, I have found no similar evidence of popular appeal or mobilization in Rajasthan.

Maharashtra, the Punjab, and Gujarat should be witnesses to the fact that horizontal mobilization is not a necessity for socioeconomic development. Instead the historical wealth and urbanization of these regions may prove to be better explanations. And causality of economic development can be found in totally different areas, discussed by Sachs et. al. (2002) and K. L. Krishna (2004).

Furthermore, Tamil Nadu experienced a period of rapid growth before the horizontal mobilization of the DMK, when *Congress* ruled with a vertical approach and patronage through the Centre. While the DMK showed considerable incompetence in the decade following its first victory (Washbrook 1989: 216)

5.2 Sufficiency of Horizontal Mobilization

Claiming that horizontal mobilization is sufficient in order to achieve socioeconomic development has more relevance with the previous chapter in mind. But even if correlation is more conclusive, it does not support any causality.

And note that the case of West Bengal stands out as a testimony that horizontal mobilization is not sufficient for high human development. A comparison between the two communist influenced states Kerala and West Bengal, and the origin of their parties might be useful.

In West Bengal the upper caste has dominated and there has been no competition or alternative mobilization, the Communist was the only option for the poor, whereas in Kerala the Congress has always posed a serious threat and the various Communist parties have never achieved hegemony.

The sufficiency of horizontal mobilization for development may be a premature question, and any attempted answers equally premature. Long term effects of BC and SC mobilization in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh are still to be revealed, but so far no major catch up trend can be seen, laggards continue to lag.

5.3 Alternatives and Complementary Discussion

Turning to alternative explanations within the frame of this study, the first question that comes to mind is the direction of causality. This study implies that mode of mobilization has affected socioeconomic conditions, but another possibility is that socioeconomic conditions have impacted patterns of patronage and mode of mobilization.

5.3.1 Direction of causality

Of course caste-entrenched states like UP and Bihar presented more fertile soil for both vertical mobilization and caste mobilization than the more flexible West Bengal, Karnataka or Rajasthan.

On the other hand Kerala and Tamil Nadu present cases where mobilization affected pursued policy and thereby socioeconomic conditions. And while we have yet to see the whole effect of BC and SC mobilization in the northern states, there are some indications that mobilization affects society even in these cases.

Kerala also serves as a reminder of the importance of history, i.e. its long tradition of high literacy rates (Desai 2005: 476, Table 7). The educated and competitive, but also highly caste ridden society of Kerala had an impact mobilization, which in turn put emphasis on education and health care.

Although not put forward as a hypothesis in this study, from the logic above it is not unreasonable to characterize the relationship between mode of political mobilization and socioeconomic development as one of duality and dynamism.

Strategies pursued take place within a societal context, but could also influence it. For instance, caste leaders can seek to mobilize their brethren where such strategies are viable, prompting other castes to organize. But leaders could also choose to join powerful parties of patronage, if horizontal mobilization was not an option, thereby enforcing those vertical networks.

5.3.2 Intermediate factors

Presenting some intermediate factors outside of this study I shortly discuss economic policy, actors, central policy and changes within society.

Economic liberalization and the global process of division of labour have benefited industrial states like Maharashtra and Gujarat. But benefits of globalization are not automatic; it requires policies for infrastructure, slimmer bureaucracy, etc. Similarly the IT-industry in Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka are effects of state politicians taking advantage of global trends.

Leaders are immensely important in Indian state politics; and no one can deny the impact of leaders such as Urs in Karnataka, Modi in Gujarat, Bhattacharjee in West Bengal, and Singh in Madhya Pradesh.

The Central policy certainly impact socioeconomic development, if not directly through legislation, then through the intermediation of resource distribution.

Changes within society are of course of a major importance. For instance, Anirudh Krishna (2007) observes the rise of new mid-level leaders, *naya netas* in Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh, serving their communities and cutting across traditional lines of identity. This constitutes an innovative form of horizontal mobilization.

6 Conclusion

The analysis of correspondence between the phenomena shows that horizontal mobilization is likely to have broadened patronage to new groups in society. But the subsequent linkage of these phenomena to socioeconomic development is another matter.

There is a substantial correspondence between horizontal mobilization and high levels of socioeconomic development among the states of India, though not unambiguous. In any case such correlation does not suffice to draw general conclusions about the effects of horizontal mobilization and changing patterns of patronage on socioeconomic development.

And a more detailed analysis of correspondence shows that horizontal mobilization is neither necessary nor sufficient for high levels of socioeconomic development. But this conclusion is neither devastating nor even discouraging. Though horizontal mobilization is neither necessary nor sufficient, it seems highly likely that it has contributed to socioeconomic development.

Economic strength, a history of strong socioeconomic development, and policies pursued by individual leaders are probably more important determinants of socioeconomic development.

However the substantial correspondence, together with the case studies stressing the direct positive effect within certain areas of socioeconomic development from horizontal mobilization, suffice to state that horizontal mobilization has been a contributing factor in changing patterns of patronage and improving socioeconomic development in the states of India.

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Appendix I

Glossary

All-India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazagham: Powerful party in Tamil Nadu, fraction of the Dravida Munnetra Kazagham

Akali Dal Party: Sikh party in Punjab

Assembly: Also Legislative Assembly: State equivalent to Parliament

Ayodhya: Hindu nationalist rallied to dismantle a mosque allegedly standing on a temple to Rama

Bahajun Samaj Party: Dalit dominated party in Uttar Pradesh

Biju Janata Dal: Orissa fraction of the Janata alliance

Bharatiya Janata Party: Indian People's Party, a Hindu nationalist reformist political party at centre and state level

Bharatiya Lok Dal: Political party in Uttar Pradesh important in the 1970's

Brahman: The first varna, upper castes, traditionally comprising priests

Raj (the): or British Raj: (1857-1947) Colonial rule of subcontinent under British executive government, through the Viceroy of India and General Governor.

Communist Party of India Marxists: One of the main communist parties in India.

Company Raj: (1757-1857) Colonial rule of subcontinent under the British private enterprise known as the Honourable East India Company.

Congress: or Indian National Congress: Party of Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru, totally dominant at national level from 1947-1967. Heir is the Indian National Congress (I), the Congress of Indira, but it is just one of many offshoots from the original Congress.

Dalit: Literally; the Oppressed, ex-untouchables, outside the caste hierarchy

Dravida Munnetra Kazagham: Powerful party in Tamil Nadu, managed to challenge Congress in 1967

Hindutva: Literally; Hinduness. Movement stressing the precedence of Hindus in the Indian society

Jagannath: Regional temple culture in Orissa

Jain: Indigenous religious minority in India

Jan Sangh: Hindu nationalist predecessor to Bharatiya Janata Party

Janata: Anti-Congress alliance in the 1970's

Jat: Tribal constellation, displays internal equality and caste intermarriage.

Jati: Castes, sub-castes. Largely endogamous groups

Kshatriya: The second varna, upper castes, traditionally comprising warriors and kings

Kunbi: A low caste. Lower part of the maratha/kunbi caste cluster.

Lingayat: Upper shudra caste in Karnataka

Maratha: Rulers claiming kshatriya status, upper part of the maratha/kunbi caste cluster.

Maratha Confederation: Political plural entity challenging the British in the 18th and early 19th century

Mughal: Muslim dynasty dominant in northern India, ruled most of the subcontinent in the beginning of the 18th century.

Muslim League: The movement championed a separate state for Muslims, resulting in the nation of Pakistan in 1947

Naya netas: Literally; new leaders, unattached to traditional networks of patronage (Kitschelt & Wilkinson, eds. 2007, p. 142)

Nizam: Ruler of Hyderabad, historically a feudal title given by the Mughals

Operation Bluestar: Action by the Indian Army to capture Bhirandwale's extremist Sikhs in the Golden Temple Complex in 1984, ended in bloodshed.

Panchayati raj: Local level administration

Peshwas: Ministers, often brahmans within the powerful Maratha Confederation

Rajput: Literally; Son of King. Some are rulers claiming kshatriya status, but most are farmers.

Ryotwar: Landowners paying taxes directly to government.

Shiv Sena: Hindu nationalist, extremist party, with Mumbai as stronghold

Shudra: The fourth varna, lower castes, traditionally peasants, manual labourers

Telugu Desam Party: Powerful party in Andhra Pradesh

Vaishya: The third varna, upper/middle castes, traditionally comprising merchants

Vania: Upper caste, powerful in Gujarat

Varna: Main castes in the hierarchical caste structure

Vellalas: Upper shudra caste in Tamil Nadu

Vokkaliga: Upper shudra caste in Karnataka

Yadav: Shudra caste, common in northern India

Zamindar: Intermediate landowners, collecting taxes on behalf of the state and keeping part of revenue.

Zamindari Abolition: Attempt by Congress to abolish the feudal praxis of zamindari landlordism, mixed results.

Abbreviations
AIADMK: All-India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazagham
AP: Andhra Pradesh
BC: Backward Classes
BDL: Bharatiya Lok Dal
BJP: Bharatiya Janata Party
BSP: Bahajun Samaj Party
CM: Chief Minister, state equivalent to Prime Minister
CPM: Communist Party of India Marxists
DMK: Dravida Munnetra Kazagham
FC: Forward Classes
HDI: Human Development Index
MP: Madhya Pradesh
OBC: Other Backward Classes
SC: Scheduled Castes
SDP: State Domestic Product, state equivalent of Gross Domestic Product
SEZ: Special Economic Zones
ST: Scheduled Tribes
TDP: Telugu Desam Party
UP: Uttar Pradesh

Appendix II

Map: States of India

Source: http://content.answers.com

States

Andhra Pradesh	Haryana	Maharashtra	Rajasthan
Arunachal Pradesh	Himachal Pradesh	Manipur	Sikkim
Assam	Jammu & Kashmir	Meghalaya	**Tamil Nadu**
Bihar	Jharkhand (2000)	Mizoram	Tripura
Chattisgarh (2000)	**Karnataka**	Nagaland	Uttarkhand (2000)
Goa	**Kerala**	**Orissa**	**Uttar Pradesh**
Gujarat	**Madhya Pradesh**	**Punjab**	**West Bengal**

Union Territories

Adamand & Nikobar Islands	Dadra & Nagar Havell	Lakshadweep
Chandigarh	Delhi	Puducherry
Daman & Diu		

Source: india.gov.in

Appendix III

Complementary data

Correspondence between modes of mobilization the 2007 and education ranking.

States	Mode of Mobilization	Edu-cation	States	Mode of Mobilization	Edu-cation
Kerala	H 1957	1	Haryana	----------	11
Himachal Pradesh	Not included	2	AP	V – H 1983	12
Uttarkhand	Not included	3	West Bengal[3]	H 1977	13
Maharashtra[5]	Dual	4	Chattisgarh	Not included	14
Assam	----------	5	Orissa	Vertical	15
Tamil Nadu	H 1967	6	MP[2]	Vertical	16
Punjab[4]	Communal	7	Rajasthan	Vertical	17
Jammu & Kashmir	Not included	8	UP	V – H 1990's	18
Karnataka[1]	Vertical	9	Jharkhand	Not included	19
Gujarat	Vertical	10	Bihar	V – H 1990's	20

Source: India Today 24th Sept. 2007: 9

Correspondence between modes of mobilization and the health ranking.

States	Mode of Mobilization	Health	States	Mode of Mobilization	Health
Kerala	H 1957	1	West Bengal[3]	H 1977	11
Himachal Pradesh	Not included	2	Rajasthan	Vertical	12
Tamil Nadu	H 1967	3	Assam	----------	13
Karnataka[1]	Vertical	4	MP[2]	Vertical	14
Punjab[4]	Communal	5	Orissa	Vertical	15
Maharashtra[5]	Dual	6	Haryana	----------	16
Jammu & Kashmir	Not included	7	UP	V – H 1990's	17
Gujarat	Vertical	8	Bihar	V – H 1990's	18
AP	V – H 1983	9	Chattisgarh	Not included	19
Uttarkhand	Not included	10	Jharkhand	Not included	20

Source: India Today 24th Sept. 2007: 11

Appendix IV

Economic data

Correspondence between modes of mobilization and annual growth rates of SDP per capita from 1960's to 2000, listed after mobilization

States	Mode of Mobilization	1960-61 to 1969-70	1970-71-to 1979-80	1996-97 to 1999-2000
Kerala	Horizontal 1957	1.2	-0.2	4.2
Tamil Nadu	Horizontal 1967	0.1	1.6	5.1
West Bengal	Horizontal 1977	0.0	0.7	5.7
AP	V – H 1983	-0.4	1.1	4.0
Bihar	V – H 1990's	-1.3	0.6	4.0
UP	V – H 1990's	-0.2	0.4	3.4
Maharashtra	Dual	0.4	3.3	3.8
Punjab	Communal	3.5	3.2	3.5
Karnataka	Vertical	1.2	1.8	6.7
MP	Vertical	-1.1	-1.0	2.9
Rajasthan	Vertical	-1.1	0.2	3.0
Haryana	----------	2.6	2.2	3.8
Gujarat	Vertical	0.1	2.0	3.2
Orissa	Vertical	7.3	0.3	1.6
Assam	----------	----------	----------	----------
India	----------	**0.8**	**1.2**	**4.4**

Source: Krishna 2004: 15, Table 3

Note that the impressive result of Orissa in the 1960's might be partly due to poor data (ibid.: 14).