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Environment versus Transport?

The Cooperation between DG ENV and DG TREN on the Trans-European Transport Network

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Abstract

The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the state of play between environment and transport in the European Union, and an area that has been notably problematic during the years is chosen as case study: the cooperation between the Directorates-General of Environment and Transport and Energy on the Trans-European Transport Network. The two Directorates-General constitute the units of analysis, and theories on bureaucratic competition, together with reports on the relation between environment and transport within the European Union, form the outset. Interviews are conducted with the relevant officials in order to access underlying beliefs and their conception of the cooperation. The analysis is able to verify several of the theories and it pinpoints the areas that are most problematic in the cooperation: different administrative culture and policy core beliefs, different degrees of political approach and political weight, different policy solutions and methods, lack of communication and resources, and problems in finding the right balance between economical and environmental concerns. Almost all of the officials feel a certain degree of dissatisfaction with the cooperation, and they suggest more thorough contacts between the DGs, with meetings and teams working together, in order to achieve more common thinking and to avoid future conflicts.

Keywords: Bureaucratic competition, European Commission, Trans-European Transport Network, Transport, Environment

Foreword

I once stated that there is nothing as interesting and intriguing as administration, and I hold this even truer today. The last months work with this thesis has been an extraordinary time, with a trip to Brussels and with the ability of meeting all those open-hearted and friendly officials without whom this analysis would not have been possible to accomplish. Unfortunately all fascinating construes and thoughts can not be demonstrated here, due to limitations in space. I am deeply grateful to all the involved persons for their time and trust.

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List of Abbreviations

DG   Directorate-General

DG ENV   Directorate-General for Environment

DG TREN   Directorate-General for Transport and Energy

EC   European Communities

EEA   European Environment Agency

EIA   Environment Impact Assessment

EU   European Union

GDP   Gross Domestic Product

NGO   Non-Governmental Organization

SEA   Strategic Environment Assessment

TEN-T   Trans-European Transport Network

1   Introduction

The issue of climate change can hardly be ignored by anyone today and environmental concerns are gaining greater latitude, but there is also the notion that the policies of environmental sustainability have to be balanced with the concerns of the economical and social elements of the sustainability concept. The European Union has been developed as a mainly economical and social cooperation, promoting peace and economic prosperity in Europe, but during the last twenty years there has also been great emphasis on environmental concerns. Since the adoption of the Amsterdam Treaty in 1999 it is required that environmental issues are integrated in all other policies of the Union, and it is determined that sustainability is one of the Union's most important policies, which in the 2000 Lisbon Agenda was defined to focus on environmental protection, economical competitiveness and social inclusion. Six priorities have been settled – climate change, health, social exclusion, sustainable transport, natural resources and global poverty – but facing the effects of globalization, the issue of Europe's economic competitiveness has come to dominate the political agenda (EurActiv 2006). What does this imply for the environment?

1.1   Purpose and Problem Formulation

There is a perception that rivalry within the Commission is more prominent in the environmental field than in other sectors, since most environmental issues cross over several policy areas and Directorates-Generals (DGs) (Bomberg – Peterson 1999:190). A clear tendency is that integration of environmental concerns is easier where the approach towards addressing the environmental issues is shared between the DGs concerned, and more conflicting in the area of transport and environment (Kronsell 1997:137). This awakens my interest on the cases where DG Environment (ENV) and DG Transport and Energy (TREN) have to collaborate, also because sustainable transport is defined as one of the EU's most important policies by the Lisbon Agenda. The purpose of this thesis is fixed on analyzing the collaboration between DG ENV and DG TREN from the outset of theories on bureaucratic competition and turf battles. A notably problematic area has been the project of establishing a Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T), where the aim of linking Europe through more efficient and expanded transportation systems has neglected the re-evaluation of the increase in road traffic and its environmental impacts (Kronsell 1997:136). The cooperation on this project will thus be the focus of the thesis, and the problem formulation consists of the following questions: *What are the difficulties in the cooperation*

between DG ENV and DG TREN concerning the cooperation on the TEN-T, and is the balance as of today tipping in the direction of infrastructure and economic competitiveness on the expense of environmental concerns? What are the involved parties' perceptions of the cooperation?

1.2 Theoretical Starting Points

Emphasis will be on theories that consider the policy process – theories strictly focused on economical aspects, such as Niskanen's, will not be applied.

1.2.1 Allocational and Functional Rivalries

The source of competition between agencies can be viewed as a struggle for bureaucratic autonomy and authority, often with a territorial aspect of the competition where multiple agencies occupy the same policy space and compete with each other in order to maintain their autonomy. Territory can be defined as "the area in the policy space that best matches the organization's policy preferences and where the agency controls a substantial portion of the expertise or resources necessary for implementation" (Downs according to Nicholson-Crotty 2005:343). The nature and intensity of these disputes is partly determined by the relations between the agencies involved, and two types of rivalry can be discerned – *allocational* rivalries, where the resources in the implementation process are at the heart of the competition, and *functional* rivalries, where the agencies advocate different policy solutions for problems (ibid).

Nicholson-Crotty adds (2005:343ff) to Down's starting-points the Advocacy Coalition Framework developed by Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith in 1988. It is a framework aiming at explaining policymaking and states that it is agencies' policy core beliefs – defined as basic normative commitments and casual perceptions – that function as an adhesive between coalitions, holding them together while also acting as a basis for competition between them. The core values are quite resistant to change and are often at the centre of coalitions with particular policy objectives, since those beliefs are shared with legislator and interest groups, that together with the agency itself constitute the coalition. In the case of allocational rivalries, there is agreement over the normative elements of the policy and the goals, and the territories that the rivals are occupying can be closely linked. The competition concerns resources – the budget and personnel – and also the legal jurisdiction in the implementation process, thus who should be in lead when it comes to implementing the policy. Disputes can also take the form of issue conflicts regarding whether a problem exists, what the best solution is, and what the best means of implementation are.

Siek and Hague claim (1992:6) that there are two basic dimensions when it comes to group conflicts: i) the *substantive* dimension, which refers to conflicts that are mainly related to task; turf battles concerning goals, methods and

resources fall within this category, and ii) the *affective* dimension, which focus on interpersonal or socio-emotional relations. Turf issues regarding identity or personality represent conflicts of this type. Disputes in the affective dimension can also arise over beliefs, preferences, values and the nature of relationships.

1.2.2   Administrative Culture, Communication and Leadership

The sociological version of the new institutionalism will be the starting point in this thesis due to its character as an effective tool in analyzing institutions and their identities. Cini notes (1996:3ff) that it involves to go beyond the view on institutions as mere arenas where political activity occurs, or as instruments used by groups and individuals. Institutions are rather seen as political actors in their own right. Focus is no longer on formal aspects of the institutions, but rather on matters such as leadership, informal structures, decisional processes, norms and environment. The European Commission can be considered as a dynamic set of arenas for structures that define and defend beliefs, identities, interests, norms and values. Important internal aspects underlying the Commission's behavior can be narrowed down to i) leadership: individuals, not only those in leadership positions, act collectively within the institutional context, and interests, personality and personal motivations are equally important, ii) socio-structural aspects: the structures within the institution and the latter's organization, including informal channels of communication, working practices and decisions, and iii) administrative culture: providing shared interpretations of the world and of the work done, shaping the communication between the officials and how they perform their tasks, and ideology is an important component. Administrative culture can be defined as a factor that "underpins all activity within the institution, creating a foundation of shared meaning, interpretation and values upon which all institutional activity rests" (Cini 1995:5). Leadership is seen as: "Directly or indirectly influencing others, by means of formal authority or personal attributes, to act in accordance with one's intent or a shared purpose" (Wenek 2003:1).

This approach is thus very useful in the task of analyzing the cooperation between DG ENV and DG TREN. Beetham emphasizes (1996:45f) that if theories aiming at explaining political outcomes in terms of competition between involved parties and their interest are to be plausible, the structures setting the different groups' interests in conflict with each other, and their relative political weight, must be scrutinized. Bureaucracies often have well-developed cultures, and the more developed the culture is, the more self-enclosed their elite.

1.3   Method and Material

Analyzing the cooperation between DG ENV and DG TREN is best accomplished utilizing a case study, with the cooperation on the TEN-T constituting the framework and with DG ENV and DG TREN constituting the units of the

analysis. In order to get the relevant information needed interviews are required, and I thus conducted a primary data enquiry (compare Dahmström 2000:75). The variables being scrutinized are administrative culture, communication, cooperation with external forces, leadership, policy core beliefs, policy solutions and methods, and resource allocation. The definitions of the concepts have been defined and will be elaborated in the relevant chapters and with reference to the respondents' considerations. The selection of participants consists of 18 officials, ten from DG TREN and eight from DG ENV, who are involved in the cooperation on the TEN-T. There are only about 10-15 officials in each of the two DGs that are working on the TEN-T, and considering that I got hold of so many of them hence implies a strong validity. The interviews are all except one recorded and printed, and the respondents are ensured anonymity concerning their answers – their names will thus not be linked to the quotes but instead be replaced by a number. A qualitative method with open interview answers is utilized, since this allows greater room for a generous material where underlying attitudes, beliefs and cultural aspects are easier to discern (compare Jacobsen 1993:19 and McCracken 1988:7). This also enhances the validity. There are two problems with open-answer interviews though – the risk of the interviewer effect, where the respondent can be affected by the interviewer's tone and choice of words – and the prestige bias, where the respondent can feel the pressure to answer according to social norms and expectations (Dahmström 2005:94). These aspects can of course affect the reliability, but they have been kept in mind: the respondents are approached in an equal manner with rather neutral questions and they can speak freely without interruptions and with little steering. The anonymity factor also grants that the respondents can be more relaxed in their replies.

The material applied is mainly constituted by literature analyzing bureaucratic behaviour and reports on the interplay between environment and transport within the European Union. A striking feature in my search for relevant material was the lack of analyses on actual cases where agencies landed in competition. Finding research where the theories and hypotheses were applied in the case of the European Union's DGs was close to impossible, even though it seems to be a well known fact in literature on the Commission that this kind of competition happens relatively often. I have however had great use of Cini's brief article on cultural differences between DG ENV and DG TRADE.

The disposition of this thesis is as follows: Chapter two gives a brief description of the interplay between environment and transport in the European Union, with the TEN-T in focus, and chapter three investigates the relevant elements forming bureaucratic behaviour in DG ENV and DG TREN – culture, beliefs, norms and communication. Chapter four deals with policy beliefs, policy solutions and methods, whereas chapter five focus more thoroughly on the cooperation on the TEN-T from the point of view of bureaucratic conflicts and their solutions, referring to all the aspects discussed in chapter three and four. By way of conclusion, in chapter six there will be a concluding discussion on the results derived in the thesis, and suggestions on continued research will be given. In appendix 3 tables demonstrate the answers to most of the questions.

2 The State of Play Between Environment and Transport in the TEN-T

Article 6 of the EC Treaty states that environmental protection requirements have to be integrated into the definition and implementation of the Community policies, and that sustainable development must be promoted. The purpose of integrating environmental protection into the other policies of the Union implies that the actors in those sectors give environmental concerns the same weight as economic and social aspects (European Commission 2002). Although a comprehensive set of environmental legislation is in place, the achievement of key environmental objectives has often failed, since the EU promotes policies which contradict environmental objectives and also because of the failure of Member States to apply the right measures. Furthermore, the environmental efficiency gains have been much slower than the economic growth based on increasing material and natural resource use and consumption (Scheuer 2005:158).

It was in conjunction with the proposed Single Market that the idea of a Trans-European Transport Network first was launched.[1] The aims are to enhance the four freedoms (goods, persons, capital and services) by better linking the Unions regions and national networks by enhancing interconnection and interoperability as well as access to those networks. Articles 154-156 of the EC Treaty state that the EU is obliged to promote the development of TEN-T as an important aspect of the Internal Market as well as of the Economic and Social Cohesion (European Commission 2007a). The TEN-T also aims to be a key element in economic competitiveness and at the same time a balanced and sustainable development of the Union (European Commission 2007b and 2007c). It is the Member States that proposes projects for EU funding, but only a few of the projects are chosen as priority projects. The EU contributes some of the funding, but the majority of the funding comes from national and regional governments and also from the private sector (European Communities 2005:8).

Environmental NGOs – Non-Governmental Organizations – are concerned about the direction of the TEN-T so far, claiming that the efforts towards sustainable transport have been flawed in a number of aspects. Firstly, one of the most important requirements pointed out by the Community's Sixth Environmental Action Program and the conclusions of the Gothenburg EU Council of 2001 – decoupling of transport volume growth from economic growth

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[1] There are also Trans-European Networks for Energy and for Telecommunications, but those are not relevant here.

– is problematic, since there is an assumption in the High-Level Group Report[2] that the transport volumes will grow in the future. More investments in the form of infrastructure are needed in order to address the problems of bottlenecks, congestion and the effort of providing enhanced connections for peripheral areas. The link between transport volume growth and GDP growth is thus not decoupled, but rather reinforced. Secondly, the selection procedure for choosing prioritized areas is unclear. Thirdly, the principle of sustainability is not given sufficient attention, and focus is also on investments of trans-national transport infrastructure on the expense of maintenance and improvement of existing local and regional transport systems (CEE Bankwatch Network 2003:1ff).

These remarks are made by the environmental NGOs in 2003, and three years later the European Environment Agency (EEA) emphasizes that the problems still remains, and that new issues are equally problematic: air passenger transport grows while the shares of road and rail remain constant (EEA 2006:4), freight transport volume growth outpaces economic growth and both passenger transport and Greenhouse gas emissions from transport are steadily increasing. Even though the improvement of the environmental performance of vehicles has been a success, there is little achieved concerning the ever increasing transport demand. Building new rail infrastructure runs the risk of boosting the rail transport volume, without having the effects of reducing the transport volumes for road (EEA 2007:4ff).

Looking at the results with reference to the ambitions, the TEN-T project is not successful: not even one third of the projects had been built by 2003, and the fact that the growth in traffic between the Member States is expected to be doubled by the year 2020, when the project is supposed to be completed, means that the investments needed to complete and to modernize the network amounts to EUR 600 billion. This is an increase with EUR 225 billion since the start and very difficult to gather. Without it, however, there is a serious risk that the network will not be fully completed (European Communities 2005:3).

The background has now been depicted with reports stating that the environmental concerns are widely overlooked in the implementation of the TEN-T, and with research proposing that the collaboration between the environment side and the transport side of the Commission by nature indeed is a difficult one.

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[2] The High-level Group on the Trans-European Transport Network consists of one representative from each Member State, one observer from each acceding country and an observer from the European Investment Bank.

3 Organization and Culture in DG ENV and DG TREN

It is often stated that the European Commission is a quite fragmented body which can be referred to as either a "multi-organization" or as a "set of institutions", with the Directors-General within the Commission having their own policy styles and ways of working, and with the different DGs having diverse identities (see for example Cini 1995:6, Nugent 2001:8, Stevens 2001:196). The fact that the DGs have been geographically scattered in Brussels has also reinforced their tendency to act as if they were autonomous ministries. Turf wars between the Commission's DGs often arise due to the ambition of Directors-General to increase their status and prestige, and those Directors are influenced by the nature of the sector they are working in, and by the beliefs, interpretations and understandings they encounter in agencies, interest groups, lobby groups and national government ministries that are active in the policy area (Stevens 2001:197ff). There is also a notion that the substance of the DGs activity constructs the identity of it, together with the personality of its leaders and the relations within the relevant policy area. By looking at the differences between the DGs one can thus unveil their identities (Bellier according to Cini 1995:6). The focus here will be on the perceptions of the own DG's culture and climate compared with the perception of how the culture and climate looks in the DG they are cooperating with, as well as the impact leadership and communication can have on the cooperation. The contacts with external forces will also be scrutinized.

3.1 Work Climate and Culture

In order to achieve information on the different styles of the DGs and on the effect the leadership has, several questions are used: *Can you describe your DG's culture and climate? Do you think it is affected by the leadership within the DG?*
Do you believe that this culture and climate differ from the culture and climate in DG ENV/DG TREN?

By way of introduction, all but one of the interviewed officials confirm that the style of the leader really sets the trend in the DG. They all agree that every DG has its own style, and its own culture and climate, or working attitude as one official calls it.

3.1.1   The Perception of the Own DG's Work Climate and Culture

Between the years of 2000 and 2005 DG TREN experienced how leadership can affect the organization's culture and climate in a very negative way. Many of the officials characterize that leadership as very centralistic, some even claim it was close to dictatorship, with a negative impact on the DG's spirit. One official describes it with an apt choice of words:

> We had a French Director-General with a sort of autocratic approach to things, and my personal reading is that the leadership was using the services to disseminate their thinking. […] These are two different types of governance – one is either you use your services to collect information and to meet with the stakeholders so they can inform you, so you can make informed decisions – or you use your services to disseminate what you need. In the first you need people who know their subject, in the other you basically need parrots (#4).

Another official adds that all the coveted files in the DG were at that time appointed by French officials and that the style was very French-oriented as well, and admits that the culture in the DG has changed tremendously during the last two years with the present Director-General, who is on the other end of the democracy-dictatorship scale; very open-minded. But this also has negative impacts since it "in some cases has led to very bottom-up approach with people not knowing what the other people are doing and proposing very different things. […] You need a very strong person to really push for something to change, and now that you have so many people in this whole system which is so open, I am not sure that that is happening" (#6). The previous leadership was thus quite disliked but effective in achieving results, and the present leadership is considered as much more open and participatory but somewhat less effective.

In DG ENV, the officials general perception of the own DG is that it is populated by very enthusiastic and idealistic people who generally have a more personal commitment to the subject. One official says that "environment is something where it might be easier to get substantial but also emotional identification" (#18) and another states that "maybe DG Environment is a little bit more informal than other DGs in the sense that there is probably more consultation across the ranks here" (#2). It is also acknowledged that people in DG ENV are in average younger than in other DGs, with a quite strong team feeling, and that there is a great penetration of women in all of the grades.

3.1.2   The Perception of the Other

All of the respondents believe that the cultures and climates differ between the DGs. The general conception in DG TREN is that DG ENV is very idealistic and quite absorbed with strictly environmental issues. One official says:

I think they are less concerned with the European integration process *per se*. […] They have a more missionary approach and a mixture of NGO-type people and professionals, sometimes the same person having both facets. So that does distinguish them quite strongly in the Commission. The ideology, idealism and theology that exists in some policy areas in the world, only exists in two of the DGs in the Commission, and DG ENV is clearly one of them (#8).

Another official emphasizes that economical aspects are not given very much attention in DG ENV:

DG ENV has different tasks, while we have to produce solutions for the potentially most effective and economically most viable alternatives, in their case they don't have to care about it, they have to care about the environment – how to protect it – which means that they don't have the type of obstacles that we have. At the same time their task is sometimes more difficult, because they have to go against economical considerations. […] DG ENV has to work in an environment where they have rather enthusiastic partners, we have oftentimes more cold-minded partners. It is quite obvious that they follow a different attitude, a different approach in the same subject than we do" (#1).

DG ENV is also seen as very focused and ideal driven and that they "want to have their saying in everything" (#15). Most of the officials in DG ENV do not have clear perceptions of the culture and climate in DG TREN, but several of them state that they find DG ENV more friendly, open and informal, and more relaxed than DG TREN. One official underlines that: "In DG TREN people are in average older and more technically experienced in the sector, often people have come from the industry themselves so this affects things. There's a more masculine culture, more conservative and more cautious about change" (#5).

3.2 Contacts with External Forces

According to McCormick (2001:95ff) the environmental lobby in Brussels is small, and the perception inside as well as outside the Commission is that the technical experts of NGOs – mostly due to their lack of resources – do not measure up to that of industrial groups. He claims that the environmental lobby and national enforcement agencies by tradition have been very weak actors in the process of policy proposals and policy development. The fact that much of the staff in DG TREN has a background in the relatively powerful industry sector can thus be significant. In addition to this there is a notion that in traditional policy-making, consulting the stakeholders – the groups that will be affected by the measures – is not by any means a norm, and involving stakeholders such as transport organisations poses a potential risk regarding the degree of power over politics that they might get (Commission Expert Group on Transport and Environment 2000:19). To determine the level of external contacts the officials

are asked: *How are you working with forces outside the institution such as lobby groups and NGOs?*

Many of the officials in DG TREN say that the relation with the industry is good, and that consultation is important. One person describes the open-channeled relation as a cultural aspect of the leadership – "la methode du Barrot": "Our Commissioner, Mr Jaques Barrot, believes very strongly in dialogue and consultation […] and he very much enjoys having discussions with stakeholders" (#13). The contacts with lobby groups are also intense: "In general whenever an organization wishes to talk to us, we usually let them come and we have discussions" (#11). Lobby groups and stakeholders can definitely affect the actual policies:

> In 2005 when we published the mid-term review of our white paper some people thought that we would no longer go as much for the environmentally friendly modes as we announced in the 2000 white paper itself, which was very much directed at modal shift towards rail and inland waterways. […] We are subject of lobbying from the outside world, the outside world indicated to us. "You are investing almost all on, and putting almost all effort in, environmental friendly modes when almost all traffic in the world is done by road – are you completely mad?", and we think: "No". But the outside world has been lobbying a lot for getting a more equilibrated approach for their opinion. Within DG ENV, they have been looking with some suspicion to this, because we were less their allies than perhaps before (#17).

The same official also thinks that external forces have too big influence on DG ENV's policies: "When I look from our side at what DG ENV is doing I sometimes have the feeling that they follow the lobbyist's groups. And I think that both DG ENV and DG TREN should be working impartially".

Also DG ENV has very broad consultations with governments, local groups, NGOs and stakeholders, but the contacts with external forces are somewhat haphazard: "We very rarely have a regular contact with anyone – it is irregular – but it is very frequent (#12)". The DG also has activities, such as Green Week with different seminars concerning environmental issues and there are also expert groups with representatives from the Member States which meet every six months, where there are attempts to achieve coordination in the work, and where the Member States' thoughts and opinions are taken into account. Research is conducted, also in cooperation with EEA and other consultants, often concerning analyses of the functioning of different processes.

The case of DG TREN's close contacts with stakeholders and the industry does thus distinguish them somewhat and can pose a political element that may be problematic in the collaboration with DG ENV. This will be discussed in chapter four.

3.3   Intra-Institutional Communication

Another reason for turf battles stems from lack of knowledge or even mistrust of the other organizations (Siek – Hague 1992:3), which indeed is applicable to the European Commission, where a continuous problem has been that of coordination, and of making sure that different Commissioners and DGs know what the others are doing. The communication between the two DGs, or rather the lack of it, is a source of irritation and even a basis for conflicts between them. One official says that one reason can be their differing working languages – DG TREN's working language is French while the main language in DG ENV is English. The same official also says that "of course it is easier to cooperate with people you know and sit closer to, if you communicate via e-mail there is always much more room for problems" (#10). Even telephone contacts can be a source for misunderstandings that are causing problems: "We are always finding problems that also depend on the part in DG TREN, because the person on the other side of the telephone doesn't understand what you want" (#7). Another aspect is the sense of distrust between the two DGs. One official underlines that DG TREN has not sent them, even internally, some of the information since they are worried that it might fall in the wrong hands. The conclusion here is that the DG's different cultures and approaches affect the organizational structure as well as the communication and trust between them. These aspects can affect the way the policies are formulated and what methods are chosen, which will be the focus in the following chapter.

4 DG ENV's and DG TREN's Policies and Methods

Ideological conflict over the policy approaches and solutions is an important element in analyzing turf battles (Stevens 2001:196ff), and Christiansen points out (1997:78ff) that disputes between DGs can occur on the basis of one DG being more bureaucratic oriented in its mode of operation, whereas the other is more politically oriented. This implies that conflict within the Commission is not always an example of institutionalized contradiction. Also the size of a DG can tell us something about the political weight it receives (Cini 1995:8). This chapter focus on DG ENV's and DG TREN's perception of their own and of the partner DG's policy core belief, and on their methods to achieve their policy goals.

4.1 Policy Core Beliefs

Nicholson-Crotty proceeds from the starting point that it is agencies' policy core beliefs, basic normative commitments and casual perceptions that holds them together and thus also acts as a basis for competition between them. He raises two hypotheses and lands in the conclusion that: Bureaucratic agencies will compete with each other over public policy when they hold different policy core beliefs and thus belong to different advocacy coalitions, and that functional rivals will be highly reluctant to compromise with each other over key aspects of policy, since it will constitute an abandonment of or a hasty change in core beliefs (Nicholson-Crotty 2005:343f). In order to see whether this is the case between DG TREN and DG ENV, the following questions are formulated: *What is your assertion of your DG's policy core belief?*

Do you believe that your DG's policy core belief conflicts with what you consider to be DG ENV's/DG TREN's policy core belief? If so: in what way?

In DG TREN the general assertion of the policy core belief is sustainable mobility with focus on liberal and economic aspects. 50% of the respondents experience that this belief is in accord with DG ENV's policy core belief, since sustainability is acknowledged. One person emphasizes that awareness of the economical impacts on the efforts of slowing down climate change is very important, since every action of this type will make the transport activities more expensive. If the transport sector is too expensive some of the people are going to lose their jobs, which is an extra burden on the society. There is thus an argument that economical and social needs are in cases more important than environmental

needs, which is not entirely in line with the requirement of Article 3 TEU. This argument is underlined by another official stating that the focus is on "how we can meet mobility needs without harming the environment too much or costs too much" (#6).

All the interviewed officials from DG ENV claim that climate change and the environment pillar of sustainable development is the policy core belief there. Half of them think that this belief is very divergent from DG TREN's policy core belief, and another two thinks that the beliefs are not necessarily in conflict in general, but rather in specific cases. Natura 2000[3] is one case: "It is true that the main problems environment finds with the infrastructure is normally transport infrastructure; they are crossing Natura 2000 Networks or they can affect many other things, it is always the same. Sometimes it is not so easy to find a good balance between transport and environment" (#7). One official thinks that DG TREN is not taking the environmental aspect fully into account concerning sustainable social development and another official states that DG TREN is so big and powerful that it can more or less do as it wishes:

> The main thing in the past has been the liberalization of the transport sector – that was a clear policy thing – but now I think it is really a challenge for them, I think there is no coherence. And that is another interesting thing, because the power of transport and energy politically and in terms of economy and influence they are relatively isolated from other DGs. Because of their size and power they can go on with what they want; they have a large budget, they have well qualified staff, they have strong support outside so they are kind of just going ahead, rather than being well imbedded in the whole Commission system (#5).

The opinions are thus sprawling in the case of the presence of a conflict between the DG's policy core beliefs, the tendency is though that there is a higher percentage of the officials from DG ENV that considers the beliefs to be conflicting.

4.2 Policy Solutions for Environmental Problems and Methods for Achieving Goals

Siek and Hague state (1992:3f) that turf battles often stem from one party feeling that the exchange in a proposed relationship will be unequal, and two important elements are i) over goals – a proposal for joint action often work contrary to the interest of one of the partners or against limited goals, and ii) over methods – there may be an agreement on the goals, but one of the parties can feel that the

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[3] Natura 2000 is a network in EU with the purpose of protecting and sustaining the biological diversity. Natura 2000 areas have valuable nature and are classified as areas with distinguished protection or conservation values.

proposed approach to reach the goals is ineffective or counterproductive to other interests. In order to find out if any of these two elements are present in the TEN-T cooperation, two questions are raised: *Do you feel that DG ENV and DG TREN advocate different policy solutions for environmental problems, or do you consider the policy solutions to be in accord?*

Do you consider that DG ENV's and DG TREN's methods to achieve their respective goals are divergent in any way?

In DG TREN 60% of the respondents think that the two DG's methods to achieve their goals are in accord, but when it comes to the policy solutions there is only one who considers them to be in accord – all the others acknowledge oftentimes severe differences. One official pinpoints the problem:

> We are advocating different solutions, we have different issues to deal with and our aim is not to promote the environment – our aim is to promote transport. Sometimes you have different views on what the use of a transport system is in global terms, and we see the use of that transport system in transportation terms and they see the advantages or disadvantages in environmental terms. That is where our disagreements can come about – it is on very practical issues, not on global issues, we all agree for instance on sustainable mobility. […] The problem is when it comes to the specific issues, then we sometimes have problems in terms of substance, but many times it is only form, it is bureaucracy – our forms are different, our languages are different, our stakeholders are different, the way we use technical and scientific terms are different (#4).

The biggest problem for the two DGs seems to be finding the right balance:

> I sometimes have the feeling that they push for one objective which surely is important, without them taking into account the other objectives that we have – economic well-being of our citizens and all this – so what we are trying to do is to balance this, probably from DG ENV's point of view giving to much emphasis to the economic dimension. But at least we try to balance, whereas I sometimes see them as pushing for just environment and forgetting about all the rest (#6).

In DG ENV the perceptions of the policy solutions and methods are more consistent: six out of eight respondents think that both the policy solutions and the methods are more or less divergent. One official suspects that DG TREN's faiblesse of building networks can stem from the fact that the budget must be spent: "My experience is that they are more concentrated on constructing, and they don't see the overall picture. […] If you are a desk officer in DG TREN and have received an amount of money, then I think you could easily be willing to spend that money, regardless if all the projects are good or not" (#10). One respondent even thinks that the coherence and initiative in DG TREN can be put into question, saying that:

If you are talking about the policy process, I think things here are more bottom-up, people here will take problems and propose solutions, I think TREN will definitely wait until someone tells them that they have to do something. I'd say here it is more science-based and there it's more needs-based. Here it might be a more rational analysis of a problem scientifically based on data or feedback, which would then lead to a proposal, whereas I think that there is something in transport and energy that is coming more from the feeling of things, rather than a science-based approach (#5).

It is thus clear that when it comes to the policy solutions and the methods, DG TREN and DG ENV are miles apart, and they are also divergent regarding the policy core beliefs. This can certainly have an impact on their perceptions of each other. On both sides there is the feeling that the other is too focused on its own perspective, be it infrastructure and economical concerns or environmental concerns, and that it can be difficult to find a balance. Referring back to chapter three and the discussion on the DG's structures and cultures, it seems that DG TREN's culture is more politically oriented with close contacts with the industry and stakeholders, and also French-oriented in its style and approach, whereas DG ENV's culture is more idealistic or ideological oriented, more informal but also more bureaucratic and Anglo-Saxon in its approach. It should thus come as no surprise that due to these considerably big differences there can be cases of turf battles and policy disputes.

5 The Cooperation on the TEN-T

The focus in this chapter is on the conflicts that have emerged during the cooperation, how they are solved, and what the ideal way to work with the TEN-T could look like. The distribution of resources and the perception of the cooperation as either balanced or unbalanced are elements that are important in understanding why conflicts evolve.

5.1 The Allocation of Resources and Accomplishment of Goals

Stevens emphasizes (2001:201) that one important aspect that can spur bureaucratic competition is conflict over the distribution of scarce resources, in this case staffing and money. To find out what the officials think about their quantum the following questions are asked: *Do you consider that the allocation of resources to your DG is sufficient and just, and do you feel that your DG has sufficient power and ability to control or manage resources to accomplish your goals?*

Do you consider your DG to be sufficiently staffed – or is it undermanned in relation to other DGs?

DG TREN has more than 1 000 people working in the DG, and only nine desk officers working on the TEN-T projects, with the help of five people working with the finances, but in terms of programming, selection and management of the projects, there are about ten people for more than 200 projects, which is a heavy burden on them. None of the respondents consider the allocation of resources to be sufficient, and there is a general feeling that the work being done is not as good as it could have been. One official says:

> You only have time to do the most urgent things, […] you are lacking the time for longer-term thinking and for preparing new policy ideas or something. We are not always well prepared when it comes to new initiatives and to presenting new policy ideas, and I think sometimes that what comes out of this house in general is not the best quality it could be, partly because of this lack of time and maybe there is not the right person on the right file but still this person has to do it (#6).

There has been a report from the Court of Auditors (2006), which is very critical in particular on this inadequate resource allocation which hampers more in-depth management of projects of the TEN-T, and the answer to this critical report is

setting up an executive agency under DG TREN, which will in principle have 99 staff. This agency will be active from the beginning of 2008.

DG ENV is a much smaller DG than DG TREN, with a staff amounting around 650. The number of people working with the TEN-T is the same as in DG TREN, but they are only dealing with TEN-T 5-10% of their time. All of the interviewees consider the DG to be seriously understaffed, and one official claims that there is a lack of A and B-grade staff, and that the Commission in general is undermanned in the sense that maybe it has enough staff but it hasn't the right sort of staff. There are a lot of people in the lower grades who swell the numbers, which means that overall there is no increase in staff. The same person also says that the deadlines for responding to the Parliament are very short, which makes it difficult to have a rational work plan; "We are always responding to emergencies and sometimes I feel we are like fire-men rather than doing long term policies and strategic work" (#9). The general feeling in DG ENV is that the majority of problems are big problems only because they are solved at the end of the process, due to lack of resources. One official apprises that some ideas can be developed for years, with someone putting a lot of time and effort into it, and when it is sent out for comments there is a big risk that the comments are negative which implies that something has to be changed:

> Then you have to deal not so much with the idea as such but with the ownership and with the process. […] The ideal world would be that we all start to develop these policies from scratch together, and for that you need capacity, because this is time consuming. […] At this moment we are simply pushed by the circumstances to comment at a later phase of development, and then you have the problem which is much harder to solve compared to the situation if you have one team working from the very beginning on the issue (#12).

The general apprehension in both DG ENV and DG TREN is that they are not undermanned in relation to other DGs or has less resources, but rather that the Commission in general is lacking resources. Only one respondent, from DG ENV, says that the allocation is unequal, and that there is a lack of influence of environmental policy in the TEN-T since DG TREN is a bigger and more well-resourced department. But there are no turf battles stemming from a feeling of getting less than their partner – the causes for disputes in this case has more to do with problems being solved to late because of the lack or resources.

5.2   A Balanced Cooperation?

The above-mentioned notion made by Hague and Siek, that competition between agencies often is caused by the circumstance that one party feels that the exchange in a proposed relationship will be unequal, also raises the question how the officials in the different DGs consider the collaboration is functioning in terms of compromises. The officials are asked to: *Describe in your own words how you*

consider the cooperation regarding TEN-T has functioned hitherto. Is it your understanding that the cooperation regarding TEN-T is balanced, or that your DG has been forced to compromise over important policy details?

The working majority of the interviewed officials in DG TREN report that the situation has changed to a certain degree during the five past years; that DG TREN has improved its scope of taking environmental considerations into account. Several of them confess that the environmental issue was quite disregarded in transport policy decisions before. Only one respondent says that they have been forced to compromise, but adds that it was not a question of forcing, but rather an attempt to finding the right balance, which the respondent considered as positive. Most of the respondents view the cooperation on the TEN-T as balanced.

From DG ENV's point of view there is a more critical stance concerning how the cooperation has functioned, and the general perception is that there has been quite a lot of compromising, as mentioned by five out of eight officials. This also emphasizes what the officials in DG TREN themselves apprise – that it is not until the last few years that DG TREN has considered the environmental issues more seriously. The fact that DG ENV is a smaller DG also affects the cooperation:

> Now it seems that DG TREN is listening much more to us, and is in the mood to cooperate better, which is a combination of the culture, leadership and management. Each DG has its priorities and you don't always treat other topics as thorough as you should because you have limited resources and external pressures, and DG ENV is rather weak with little resources compared to the topics and the legislation that we handle (#3).

The previous leadership in DG TREN with its centralistic and almost despotic features can also be an important aspect concerning the neglecting approach towards environmental concerns. Personal-related issues can be problematic, as mentioned earlier concerning the affective dimension of group conflicts (see above 1.2.1). Hague and Siek claim (1992:4) that turf battles can stem from the case where one or more representatives of one organization are personally disliked by staff of another organization, or constitute an organizational or political threat. This case is underlined by an official in DG ENV: "When it comes to the TEN-T applications, the cooperation has been worthless, it has not functioned at all. But I think that DG TREN has shown willingness though, they have wanted to have meetings, but it is not always easy to get through between the DGs, and that issue is person-related. It does not have to do with each and every person in DG TREN, it is one specific person that it has not functioned with" (#10). Another person thinks that the lack of influence of environmental policy in the TEN-T has primarily to do with the fact that DG TREN is a bigger and more well-resourced department, than that DG TREN is chef du file. Another difficulty that is mentioned is that there is a high turnover of desk officers or policy officers, and within DG TREN the desk officers have changed. Those officers would have had

trainings on the EIA and SEA Directives to have all the details explained to them, and then those persons leave, which was happening now.[4]

5.3   Policy Disputes and Issue Conflicts

All the previous chapters have scrutinized the elements that can bring about turf battles and bureaucratic competition, and found that many of them were present in the case of the cooperation on the TEN-T. The officials are asked three more questions: *Can you think of any disputes between DG ENV and DG TREN regarding the TEN-T? If yes: how did these disputes start and how have they been addressed and solved?*
Describe in your own words what you would consider to be the ideal way to work with the TEN-T.

5.3.1   The Conflicts

Most of the officials are not unaware of turf battles, although most of them at first are reluctant to give any examples. One official emphasizes that the Commission is supposed to act as one entity, and spilling the beans about conflicts can be considered as very disloyal. However, a number of conflicts were eventually discussed in the interviews, and there were different opinions on the sources of the conflicts. It seems that some areas of the TEN-T project are more prone to disputes than others. Inland navigation is a problematic policy area with lots of conflicts, where the River Danube is a case of continuous discussion, and where the rigorous Water Framework Directive is a constant obstacle. Also the Natura 2000 Directive causes disputes: "When a project is slightly into a Natura 2000 site, I think in most of the cases we do have a conflict in the sense that from here and from the Member States and their transport ministries, people tend to say 'Yeah, but if it is just affecting a little bit, it doesn't matter', whereas DG ENV is very, very strict on that, saying that even if it is a little bit, it does matter. All people assess importance in different ways" (#6).
Disputes concerning different policy objectives are not uncommon either:

> The Commission is unfortunately very compartmentalized, and it is not unusual to have turf wars. I think that we do have situations where policy initiatives are driven by for example DG ENV in the aviation domain and where policy proposals come from the Commission perspective from DG ENV, which is not necessarily fully in line with the policy objectives of DG TREN from a transport perspective.

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[4] The Environment Impact Assessment and Strategic Environment Assessment Directives regulate procedures ensuring that environmental consequences of projects are identified and assessed before authorization is given.

Sometimes you do have different interpretations on the importance of a particular initiative, and whether an initiative is posing an unreasonable burden on the industry (#11).

One official emphasizes that problems often stem from the allocation of resources to the exercise. The ongoing selection process has been an enormous work load for DG TREN, with more than 350 proposals and each of them needs to be thoroughly scanned. This creates a big workload also for DG ENV since they need to review the environmental compatibility of those projects that are proposed for funding, with a very short time frame of three weeks. This time frame is imposed on them by the Commission, which has certain constraints by budgetary process, and expectations from Member States. DG ENV only started evaluating when the documents were sent out a month before deadline, and that created a lot of tension which turned into a conflict. They were able to reply within the time frame of the inter-service consultation, but they replied at 5.30 on Friday evening, when the results were going to be distributed on the following Monday morning. Ten out of the TEN-T projects had received a negative opinion, which, according to the official, came out of the blue and caused severe constraints on the process, since five days after the inter-service consultation the Director-General of DG TREN was going to the Parliament to present it, meaning that the document had to be finalized and a proposal had to be prepared before that. The official says:

There we had a massive clash, on the process, not on the substance, which went very high. […] It turned into one of the biggest political conflicts I have seen in my Commission career for simple management reasons, not on substance. It was simply a matter of them, not sending their opinion at 5.30, but instead two o' clock, we would then have had a meeting and in that meeting we would have devised a formula after they mentioned their ongoing work and selection of their concern. […] I don't think they entirely realized how political this was, because in the past the TEN-T has been a fairly low-key, less funded program, but this time round because the procedure has changed and we go to the Parliament publicly at a very early stage before we go to Member States, it has politicized the thing immensely. It probably also comes down to the core of the work, you still have in DG ENV people who are hardcore environmentalists and some of the desk officers are, no doubt about it, and other are less so and have a broader and much more balanced view. But you have people in DG ENV who simply think that whatever the mode of transport is, it should be curbed if possible, so that also at least sheds a certain light on the way things were done (#8).

One official adds that there are always conflicts stemming from, in DG TREN's opinion, DG ENV's tendency to listen more to local opposition groups than to DG TREN. Yet a third person agrees with the notion that lack of resources and deadlines in combination with communication problems are causing tensions:

There are these turf things; "This project is mine, it is not yours", but these are petty little things, very small. […] In practical terms, sometimes disputes are

exaggerated because we speak different kinds of languages. This is where our problems are coming from – we never discuss the substantive parts of the systems, which is a pity. This is because we are all understaffed, we don't have the time for those discussions, and deadlines are tough (#4).

Although some of the officials claim that the conflicts between the two DGs merely concerns management issues and not substantive aspects, there are examples of issue conflicts, basically stemming from different views of the importance of things, one official touches on the implication of the differing policy core beliefs:

When we prepare an initiation of the TEN policy, of course for us what is interesting is different infrastructure options and their comparison, and there is typically a conflict with DG ENV who wants us to look at all other policy measures as well. So instead of looking at infrastructure, they want us to look at pricing – for instance how to reduce transport demand overall and then reduce the need for infrastructure that way. There we always have to discuss and try to clarify why we as DG TREN, or in this unit of the TEN-T, focus on infrastructure, and don't every time reopen the whole discussion on transport policy overall (#6).

Also in DG ENV, some of the interviewees consider that the problems in the cooperation with DG TREN have to do with internal organization and with inter-service consultations which are done in unreasonably short time periods, rather than policy beliefs. But one official emphasizes that there are cases where issue conflicts are evident:

An example is that despite the fact that climate change is a very hot topic politically at the moment, DG TREN has not given any thought at all to the climate change aspects of the Trans-European Networks. Such as what does adaptation to climate change mean for transport infrastructure, and they haven't got any answers: Is there any greenhouse gas assessment of these massive projects? No. Any obligations to use local building materials? No. So I think it is not on their agenda (#5).

One official has another point of view than the DG TREN official on the cause of the dispute with the TEN-T applications mentioned above, claiming that DG TREN had a too optimistic view on how quickly they would be able to carry out their part of the work, and that the work was not prepared correctly in administrative terms. This meant that the desk officers in DG ENV had to spend unreasonably much time on administration of DG TREN's files and requesting missing documents. DG ENV supposedly only had five days to review the documents from the point that all the missing documents were received. The official also thinks that conflicts arise since the problems can be politically sensitive: "I think that at some point the whole thing is politicized, and then the real problems are not the issue anymore; it becomes some sort of politics problems and that is not the same thing" (#10).

Speaking of the political, there are also other aspects where the political has impacts on the cooperation between the DGs, which is basically out of their hands; one official underlines that the political cycles with five years election cycles affects things, because most of the persons entering the policy arena wants to show some results within that given time, which means that project deadlines can be shorter than what is feasible, because that politician wants to see the project done, finalized and shown within his/her policy cycle. This implies sometimes accepting politically imposed compromises which are not always the best ones.

There have also been cases of measuring of power between the DGs, which according to Hague and Siek is a typical element in turf battles. There can be conflicts over identity or public perception if one of the organizations fears that the cooperation can change how it is being appreciated by the public, for instance as being less powerful than its joint partner (Hague – Siek 1992:4). Stevens adds (2001:201) that the fight for status is another element in the conflict for resources, that belongs in the category of *intangible* resources, as opposed to the *physical* recoures – staff and money. In the case of the TEN-T there was a meeting with the Member States in the summer of 2007 concerning the TEN-T projects, which was held by DG TREN. DG ENV was present, and asked DG TREN to pass the environmental questions to them, but DG TREN supposedly ignored DG ENV completely during the meeting: "They answered all questions concerning environmental aspects themselves, which is not always correct. But then again, I am not sure if this depends on DG TREN or if it depends on this person that we are having problems working with" (#10). Another official agrees with this aspect of status and power, pointing out that: "I think because transport and energy are so important to the economy and such big industries, their needs take precedence over other needs so there can be areas where environment is out" (#5). An interesting remark is that almost all of the respondents are quite dissatisfied with the cooperation and with the TEN-T overall.

5.3.2   Solving and Avoiding Conflicts

There are thus plenty examples of different types of conflicts, the question here is – how are they solved, or most preferably, avoided? Solving the conflicts is mainly accomplished by having as many meetings as it takes to overcome the issues at hand, and there is common thinking in both camps that it would be far better to have more meetings in order to avoid that conflicts accrue and spiral into huge clashes. There are suggestions on more consultations at a high political level, between Commissioners and Directors-General, which should be accompanied by low level discussions at working level. It has to be ensured that the policy level and the working level understand the need of cooperation, or that the objectives of a certain proposal are consistent. "Upstream we need to define what the key issues are, so that we can inform both of us of our policies, to get compromised solutions. […] In order to avoid conflicts downstream we have to develop a more common thinking upstream" (#4). The official from DG TREN talking about the

clash regarding the reviewing of the TEN-T projects elaborates with the idea that perhaps DG ENV should not have the responsibility to check the proposals:

> It is legislation which is not so difficult and it is information which is provided from the Member States. What DG ENV does is to ensure that the formal steps have been taken by the Member States and they check it with a number of certain forms, so it is work which is very bureaucratic, which I think can be done here in the house as well, and we would do it much more efficiently because we are much more interested in the timetable and in the outcome. […] Here we really get into the culture thing – either they trust us or they don't (#8).

Another official thinks that it would have been useful with a desk looking at certain proposals where there are doubts. There would be contact persons at each side and these contact persons should channel things. One respondent suggests that an idea would be to bring the responsible officer from DG ENV along on missions, to visit and inspect the projects. Regarding the question on the ideal way to work with the TEN-T it was not surprisingly considered to be a great need for more resources. DG TREN put hopes into the new TEN-T Agency that will be an executive agency autonomous from but not independent from DG TREN, which will imply that there will be a better ability to manage projects much more closely and in more detail, ensuring that all elements of the project cycle and of the project components – project cycle from selection, decision, implementation, payment, monitoring to evaluation – is much better set up by beneficiaries. DG TREN will perform guidance for this and provide better forms to be used for project proposals with help from DG ENV.

One official requests more research, to provide DG TREN with longer-term data, ideas and tools. There would also be teams, "because now the situation is that people are working on their own file in isolation and not benefiting from the knowledge from other colleagues on the files". And the whole TEN-T policy would have to be rethought: "The problem is that the methodology that has been used is very political, in the sense that you have Member States officially represented and them proposing priorities, and then you take the priorities and maybe try to get rid of some, and I think what is missing is a real analysis of what the TENs could or should be – what the needs are in terms of traffic and internal market, and in terms of accessibility and cohesion" (#6).

In DG ENV, there are also request for making the work on the TEN-T more team-based within the DG, with a task force and a head of the task force, working full-time and not people working in different units with the people working 5-10% on the TEN policy. There are also thoughts, as in DG TREN, on bringing the cooperation closer together: "The personal relations must be developed further with DG TREN, because when there are problems it is a lot easier if you have confidence and you trust the person, if you see them as colleagues" (#7). This could also avoid the problems of having different priorities, talking different languages and thinking at different scales. The only problem is that this would require more time and more resources.

6   Concluding Remarks

The sociological strand of new institutionalism with its focus on institutions' less formal aspects, such as administrative culture, beliefs, informal communication, decisional processes, identities and leadership proved to be a very fruitful foundation when analyzing the cooperation between DG ENV and DG TREN concerning the Trans-European Transport Network. Applying the theories of bureaucratic competition on the interview respondents' confessions reflects that those are all more or less valid in the case of the cooperation on the TEN-T. Issue conflicts – disputes regarding whether a problem exists, what the best solution is, and what the best means of implementation are – have also been present. Several officials mention the DG's different standpoints, and there have been cases with disagreements over Natura 2000 projects, and over different interpretations on the importance of a particular initiative.

Analyzing the cooperation from the point of view of *allocational* and *functional* rivalries, we can see that both elements are present. However, the allocational dimension – where the resources in the implementation process are in focus – is mostly creating problems in an indirect way; the officials are not *per se* competing over the resources, it is rather the lack of resources that are causing the disputes. This can be exemplified in DG ENV, where the general feeling is that the majority of problems are big problems only because they are solved at the end of the process, due to lack of resources. The lack of staff also creates stress, and ignited the huge clash between the two DGs concerning the review of the projects, where tight deadlines and lack of information annoyed DG ENV and forced them to disregard some of the projects that DG TREN had proposed for financing. The functional dimension – implying that agencies advocate very different policy solutions for problems – has much more bearing in the TEN-T case. The policy core beliefs are relevant here, since they constitute the basis for the solutions and methods being used. Even though almost all of the interviewed officials from DG TREN think that the policy core beliefs are in accord, my conception is rather that of the officials in DG ENV; the beliefs are quite divergent since the concept of sustainable mobility in the case of DG TREN is more concerned with economical and liberal aspects than with environmental aspects. The policy solutions and methods are even more divergent, and finding the right balance between transport and infrastructure demands and environmental concerns has proved to be a very difficult task. Thus Nicholson-Crotty's two hypotheses mentioned earlier (4.1) – that bureaucratic agencies will compete with each other over public policy when they hold different policy core beliefs and those functional rivals will be highly reluctant to compromise with each other over key aspects of policy – can be verified here.

Stevens' starting points for a theory on bureaucratic competition are also represented in the TEN-T cooperation case. The first notion – that conflict over the approaches which policy should be adopted is as significant as the struggle for leadership and position within policy areas – is perhaps not so valid in this case, since DG TREN is assigned as chef du file for the TEN-T collaboration, which all of the interviewed officials in DG ENV consider fair and correct. But the second notion – ideological conflict over the policy approaches and solutions – is more relevant, as mentioned above, with the policy core beliefs being divergent and also with the DG ENV officials being more idealistic and personally involved in their cause. Stevens' last notion on conflict over intangible resources – salience, status and reputation – was also relevant. Some respondents in DG ENV felt that DG TREN had the ability to, and actually in some cases even did, override environmental concerns due to the weight of the DG and due to the status that energy and transport has as being heavily backed up by the industry.

Hague and Siek's theory includes the element of personalities – where one or more representatives of one organization are personally disliked by staff of another organization, or constitute an organizational or political threat, due to beliefs and preferences. This is applicable both on the case of the previous Director-General of DG TREN, who was disliked by the officials in DG TREN as well as in DG ENV, and also on the case of one specific person dealing with the TEN-T in DG TREN, with whom the officials in DG ENV found it difficult to cooperate. Christiansen's claim that disputes between DGs can occur on the basis that one DG might is more bureaucratic-oriented in its mode of operation, whereas the other is more politically oriented can also be verified. DG TREN's culture is more politically oriented with close contacts with the industry and stakeholders, and also French-oriented in its style and approach, whereas DG ENV's culture is more idealistic or ideological oriented, more informal but yet bureaucratic, and Anglo-Saxon in its approach. These aspects certainly affect their attitudes and their cooperation.

It is clear that most of the respondents are dissatisfied with one or several aspects of the TEN-T cooperation. There is broad agreement that environmental concerns were severely neglected some years ago, but according to most of the respondents in DG ENV the balance is still in some cases tipping in favor of infrastructure and economical concerns, which is also underlined in the EEA reports, whereas the DG TREN officials consider the cooperation as balanced. Most of the respondents call for closer cooperation in order to avoid future conflicts, and there are suggestions on teams working together and having regular meetings since avoiding conflicts downstream requires a more common thinking upstream.

An intriguing remark is that none of the theories on bureaucratic competition mention the importance of cultural aspects when it comes to the origin of disputes between agencies. Nicholson-Crotty's policy core beliefs, Steven's ideological notion and Hague and Siek's attention to beliefs, preferences and values in the affective dimension, are the elements closest to the cultural aspect, and Beetham briefly mentions the significance of cultural aspects when it comes to political outcomes. I consider that this cultural element deserves to be more explicitly

elaborated in those theories, since it has proven to be of great significance regarding how different agencies act and how they cooperate with each other. Another aspect that also is neglected by the theories on bureaucratic competition is that of communication, which also proved to have vital importance for spurring conflicts. The closest call is Hague and Siek's affective dimension, focusing on interpersonal or socio-emotional relations, but which does not investigate the communication element. In future research these models and theories thus would profit from integrating administrative culture and communication, and they do gain from being intermarried with the thorough approach of the sociological version of new institutionalism. Two interesting cases for further research are the debates around biofuels and the emissions trading scheme, since several of the respondents claim that there has been serious clashes between the DGs in those areas. It could also be exciting to build on Cini's research on the relation between DG ENV and DG TRADE to investigate how environmental concerns measure up to those considering economical competitiveness in that area.

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Appendix 1 The Interviewed Officials

DG TREN Position, Date of Interview

Anselmo, Jose. Head of Unit Directorate B4: Optimisation of Networks, Interoperability and Intermodality. 2007-11- 22

Calleja-Crespo, Daniel. Director Directorate F: Air Transport. 2007-11-22

Gheivelis, Ioannis. Policy Officer Directorate B1: Ten Policy and Technological Development. 2007-11-28

Kazatsay, Zoltan. Deputy Director-General, Coordination of Directorates B, E, F and G. 2007-11-27

Lyuckx, Olav. Policy Officer Directorate B1: Ten Policy and Technological Development. 2007-11-29

North, Christopher. Administrator Directorate F: Air Transport, Head of TEN-T Agency. 2007-11-22

Paquet, Jean-Éric. Head of Unit Directorate B2: TEN Transport project management. 2007-11-23

Ruyters, Herald. Coordinator for Trans-European Transport Network. 2007-11-23

Sikow, Catharina. Principal Administrator Directorate B1: Ten Policy and Technological Development. 2007-11-28

Van Vreckem, Dirk. Advisor to Zoltan Kazatsay. 2007-11-27

DG ENV Position. Date of interview

Blöch, Helmut. Deputy Head of Unit D2: Protection of Water and Marine Environment. 2007-11-23

Delcampe, David. Policy Officer Unit C3: Clean Air and Transport. 2007-11-23

Lindström, Kajsa. Administrator Unit D3: Cohesion Policy and Environmental Impact Assessments. 2007-11-26

Major, Mark. Policy Officer Unit C3: Clean Air & Transport 2007-11-27

Parker, Jonathan. Principal Administrator Unit D3: Cohesion Policy and Environmental Impact Assessments. 2007-11-21

Miko, Ladislav. Director for Directorate B: Protecting the Natural Environment. 2007-11-26

Ramallo, Ignacio. Administrator Unit D3: Cohesion Policy and Environ-mental Impact Assessments. 2007-11-27

Van de Velde, Joost. Administrator Unit B1: Agriculture, Forests & Soil 2007-11-26

Appendix 2 Interview Questions

1) Tell me about yourself and your background – your education and work experience. How long have you been working at DG ENV/DG TREN?

2) Tell me about your work tasks at DG ENV/ DG TREN, and how long your work has been involved with issues regarding TEN-T.

3) It has often been pointed out that every DG has its own work climate and its own culture; can you describe your DG's culture and climate? Do you think it is affected by the leadership within the DG?

4) Do you believe that this culture and climate differ from the culture and climate at DG ENV/ DG TREN?

5) When it comes to policies, how is your DG working to gain approval for its opinions?

6) How is your DG working with forces outside the institution, such as lobby groups and NGOs?

7) What is your assertion of your DG's core policy belief?

8) Do you believe that your DG's core policy belief conflicts with what you consider to be DG ENV/ DG TREN's core policy belief? If so, in what way?

9) Do you feel that DG ENV and DG TREN advocate different policy solutions for environmental problems, or do you consider the policy solutions to be unanimous/in accord?

10) Do you consider that DG ENV's and DG TREN's methods to achieve their respective goals are divergent in any way? If so, can you explain in what way you consider them to differ?

11) Do you consider that the allocation of resources to your DG is sufficient and just, and do you feel that your DG has sufficient power and ability to control or manage resources to accomplish your goals (concerning the TEN-T)?

12) Do you consider your DG to be sufficiently staffed – or is it undermanned in relation to other DGs?

13) Is it your understanding that the cooperation regarding TEN-T is balanced, or that your DG has been forced to compromise over important policy details?

14) Describe in your own words what you consider to be the ideal way to work with the TEN-T.

15) Describe in your own words how you consider the cooperation regarding TEN-T has functioned hitherto. What would you like to change or improve? What are, in your opinion, the greatest successes with the cooperation?

16) When agencies with differing cultures and/or policy solutions have to cooperate, sometimes policy disputes can evolve – can You think of any disputes between DG ENV and DG TREN regarding the TEN-T? If yes, how did these disputes start and how have they been addressed and solved?

Appendix 3 Tables

Table 1a) Do you think that your DG's culture and climate is affected by the leadership?

	Yes	No	Don't know	Total sum
DG ENV	7	1		8
DG TREN	10			10

Table 1 b) Do you believe that this culture and climate differ from the culture and climate at DG ENV/ DG TREN?

	Yes	No	Don't know	Total sum
DG ENV	8			8
DG TREN	10			10

Table 2) Do you believe that your DG's core policy belief conflicts with what you consider to be DG ENV/ DG TREN's core policy belief?

	Yes/ Sometimes	No	Don't know	Total sum
DG ENV	6	1	1	8
DG TREN	5	5		10

Table 3) Do you feel that DG ENV and DG TREN advocate different policy solutions for environmental problems?

	Yes/ Sometimes	No	Don't know	Total sum
DG ENV	6	2		8
DG TREN	9	1		10

Table 4) Do you consider that DG ENV's and DG TREN's methods to achieve their respective goals are divergent in any way?

	Yes	No	Don't know	Total sum
DG ENV	6	2		8
DG TREN	3	6	1	10

Table 5) Do you consider that the allocation of resources to your DG is sufficient and just, and do you feel that your DG has sufficient power and ability to control or manage resources to accomplish your goals (concerning the TEN-T)?

	Yes	No	No answer	Total sum
DG ENV	1	7		8
DG TREN		9	1	10

Table 6) Is it your understanding that the cooperation regarding TEN-T is balanced (B), or that your DG has been forced to compromise (C) over important policy details?

	B	C	Don't know	Total sum
DG ENV	3	5		8
DG TREN	8	1	1	10