

Lund University
Centre for East and South-East Asian Studies
Masters Programme in Asian Studies
East and Southeast Asia Track
Spring semester, 2008

CHINESE MIGRATION TO ROMANIA:
THE PAST COUNTS

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ABSTRACT

One of the defining features of the post-Cold War era is the growth of international migration in all areas of the world, especially in Europe, where the lift of the Iron Curtain created needs and opportunities as far as immigrants are concerned.

Although a beneficial process in itself, the growth of migration to Europe was frequently a cause of various forms of conflict, which in the social science was explained by the theory of immigrant phobia. The purpose of my thesis was to reveal more of the ingredients that can make migration successful. I studied the case of the Chinese migration to Romania as an apparently paradoxical one: with all the factors that normally trigger immigrant phobia in place, the coexistence of the dominant and migrant group is seemingly peaceful.

The study was conducted as a quantitative research meant to test the hypothesis that the positive attitude of Romanians towards Chinese migrants is influenced by their early and exclusive contact with the Chinese imported goods, during the communist dictatorship of Ceausescu. In turn, the hypothesis was derived by using theories, secondary data and pre-knowledge of the author. Data on both independent and dependent variables were collected by a poll and analyzed with SPSS to test the degree of correlation and signification. The results proved relevant and they were further discussed in a socio-psychological analytical frame, leading to the conclusion that previous contacts with vectors of a culture soften the interaction with migrants representing that culture.

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1. INTRODUCTION

In the post-Cold War era, breakouts of the growing tension between host societies and immigrant groups occurred across Europe. Some of the most well known manifestations of this increased tension are relevant: March 2000 – Jorg Haider’s Freedom Party, with extreme-right orientation, accedes to power by vote in Austria, stirring wide criticism from the other EU countries; October 2005 – violence spreads in the outskirts of Paris as two teenagers of Maghrebian origin die after being chased by the police¹; May 2006 – violence against immigrants, especially against those who are not white², reaches a peak in Russia, with people, including children, being stabbed, shot or beaten to death in many incidents across the country.

These events and hundreds alike are only the top of the iceberg; even more worrisome is what lies beneath, as shown by the various polls conducted in Europe on the host societies’ feelings towards immigrants. When asked about their feelings with regard to the number of people of another culture who live in their countries, 46% of all Europeans questioned in 2003 said that they felt that they were too numerous, whereas in 1997 only 41%, and in 1989 only 37% were of this opinion, as shown by the 2004 and 1998 Eurobarometer of EUMC³. The trend is obvious.

On the other hand, Europe needs migrants to counterbalance its demographic stagnation. Table 1 (in Annex 1) show that Europe's 2005 population increase of more than 2.0 million people was driven by immigration. Already, 12% of the population of Europe consists of immigrants⁴, the majority of them being Muslim, but with many new comers from Asian countries as well, especially from China. Whereas the Muslims have lived in Europe for centuries, being already accepted and somehow integrated, the increased number of Chinese raises new challenges for the governments and the host societies in general. It is a widespread belief among societies and researchers that Chinese are inassimilable; voicing that belief, Marsot states that “however long they remain in a

¹ New York Times, 28th of Oct. 2005

² AFP, 6th of June 2006.

³ The European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC) is a NGO based in Vienna

⁴ OECD Immigration Statistics Report for 2004, released in June 2006

foreign country, and even if they settle for good... they mingle with the host peoples without ever becoming indistinguishable from these.... The inassimilable character of these Chinese colonies inevitably posed problems for local authorities” (1993, p 103). Given this claimed inassimilable character, the Chinese migration to Europe deserves particular attention, thus the research subject of the present study is the interaction between the dominant group and the growing Chinese community in Romania – a country shown in Table 1 to have one of the most dramatic decreases of population in 2005, thus expected to allow more Chinese immigrants in the years to come⁵.

1.1. Context and research problem

A huge amount of literature has been written on socio-cultural interaction between host societies and immigrant groups, and within this framework, many studies aimed to explain the immigrant phobia. As far as the latter is concerned, the existent literature focuses on the causes of hostility towards immigrants, especially in Europe and USA. Drawing upon the reasons of hostility and conflict, Alexseev⁶ develops a “security dilemma” model to describe anti-immigrant feelings of host societies all around the world. Other authors discuss the realistic conflict theory⁷, which emphasizes considerations of economic well-being, and social identity theory⁸, claiming that societies react to the danger of their cultural identities being altered by large influxes of immigrants. To sum up, all the authors give main prevalence to the racial, the cultural or the economic aspects, in different proportions.

There are however cases of low immigrant phobia even when the above listed perceptions are high. Such is the case of Romania, where as emphasized in the next chapters, all the factors that theoretically might trigger a high immigrant phobia are in

⁵ As recently as 14 November 2007, one of the most influential daily newspapers in Romania, “The Event of the Day”, was predicting in its main article that some tens of thousands of Chinese workers will flood the labor market due to recent changes in the Romanian legislation

⁶ Alexseev, M, “Immigration Phobia and the Security Dilemma”, Cambridge University Press 2005

⁷ O’Connell, M [Economic forces and anti-immigrant attitudes in Western Europe: a paradox in search of an explanation] *Patterns of Prejudice* 39, No.1, 2005, pp 60-74

⁸ Paxton, P [What’s to Fear from Immigrants: Creating an Assimilationist Threat Scale] *Political Psychology* 27, No.4 2006, pp 549-569

place; in spite of this, quantitative data and the lack of any violent incident point to a normal cohabitation between the Chinese migrants and the dominant group. When the causal factors identified by the theory of immigrant phobia are absent in a particular country, the peaceful cohabitation with the migrant group appears as logical and generally valid; on the contrary, if the causes for hostility are there but the migration is still successful, explanations should be looked for in the specificities of each *dominant group – migrant group binomial*. Therefore this study will scrutinize the Romanians – Chinese relation, focusing on the post 1968 period, when bilateral contacts, either direct or indirect, took off as explained in the next chapter.

1.2. Purpose of Study and Research Questions

This study aims to bring up new contributions in understanding the factors that could facilitate the interactions between immigrants and the host communities. It looks for complementary answers to a question that has been preoccupying policy makers and governments: what are the circumstantial conditions for a successful immigration?

Starting, on one hand, from theories in the sociology and social psychology concerning group interactions, and on the other hand, from the Romanian experience, this study attempts to emphasize the major role played by the host society's previous contact with vectors of the immigrant group's culture. In doing so, the study will focus on the contact of the Romanian people with the Chinese imported merchandise prior to 1989; the peculiar conditions of the Romanian market, as shown in the next chapter, make these goods very strong vectors of the Chinese culture in the country led iron hand by Ceausescu and his Communist Party. Given all these, the research questions are as follows:

1. What are the peculiar conditions under which a host society do not show immigrant phobia? How did they work in the Romanian case?
2. How does the early contact with markers of a culture influence the late contact with migrants from that country? What are the socio-psychological mechanisms of this process?

1.3. Methods and selection

1.3.1. Design of the study

This is a non experimental quantitative study with the aim of testing a hypothesis – the one that early contact with Chinese merchandise positively shaped the attitude of the Romanians towards the Chinese migrants. The data is collected by a poll and analyzed using an applied statistics method (SPSS), in order to check the correlation between the independent and the dependent variable. The two variables are as follows:

1. Independent variable: the perception of the quality of Chinese goods imported before 1989. The questionnaires will test the degree of knowledge on these products, the comparison with similar products available on the market at that time, the nature of the experience with those goods (satisfaction/dissatisfaction), characteristics attributed to the goods (e.g. innovative, durable, complicated, attractive etc.).
2. Dependent variable: the degree of tolerance towards the Chinese migrants today, detailed as degree of direct interaction, degree of polarization of attitude (deeply positive/deeply negative), and characteristics attributed to the Chinese migrants (hard working, meticulous, cheat, etc.)

The deductive part is followed by an analytical work with the aim of and theoretically explaining its findings. The two parts are complementary in this study, reinforcing each other and giving more credibility to the final findings.

In selecting the hypothesis among the various possible ones, my pre-knowledge played an important role. That explains to a large extent the design of the study: the analytical part was used to counterbalance the inherent subjectivity and to test my findings from the first part, and the quantitative method was chosen for its rigor, as opposed to the flexibility of the interviews.

1.3.2. Selection and data collection

The study used primary data collected through a poll conducted in Romania in July 2007. The sample was nationally relevant for Romania, as 1230 persons answered the questionnaire in 226 check points across the country. The selection of the respondents was done randomly in order allow further comparisons between different groups (young/elder, rural/urban etc).

The questionnaires were designed by me but the poll was conducted on the basis of a contract by IMAS, a Romanian company specialized in this kind of quantitative research, with over 10 years experience in conducting surveys. Annex 2 at the end of the study presents the questionnaires and the results of the survey, as delivered by IMAS. The main target of the questionnaires was to provide data on the two above mentioned variables.

As regards the analytical part of the study, secondary data was used – mainly academic articles on theories circumscribed to the concepts of social memory, attitude and behavior. Examining the scientific literature on attitude structure, I found that a commonly discussed structural aspect of attitudes is their cognitive–affective foundation (Chaiken, Pomerantz, & Giner-Sorolla, 1995; Eagly & Chaiken, 1998; Zanna & Rempel, 1988) – a categorization that proved highly useful for my study. What surprised me though was that none of the studies on attitude structure focused on interethnic relations - a notable gap in the literature given that behavior, from interpersonal to international level, is conditioned by attitude.

Secondary and primary data was also used in the form of newspaper articles, and statistics on the Chinese migration or the bilateral trade between Romania and China.

1.3.3. Analytical methods and other considerations

There are two analytical steps in this study. Firstly, the quantitative testing of the hypothesis includes an analytical work on the findings of the above mentioned poll, in order to emphasize the relevance of the correlation between the two variables. Secondly, the relevant theoretical concepts and arguments on attitude and social interaction are put

together in order to check their consistency with the findings of the study. The analytical framework looks at the socio-psychological causalities of attitude and social behaviour; it is at the same time an over-testing of the hypothesis in the light of the accepted relevant theories, and an explanation of the mechanisms.

A positive result to hypothesis testing shall not mean this study exhausted the possible answers to the research problem; many other causes may have contributed to the success of the Chinese migration to Romania, the door for further research remaining largely open.

1.4. Overview of the thesis

In the following, chapter 2 is a discussion on the immigrant phobia, including a brief discussion on its relevant theories. Various explanations provided by the relevant literature are reviewed. The chapter then looks at how these theories work – or better said, do not work, in spite of the conditions being met – in the case of Romania, which makes the Chinese migration to this country a paradoxical success. An explanation to this paradox is looked for in the historical conditions of the host country. Again, various possible explanations provided by the Romanian context are reviewed, and the one that seems the most plausible is selected to be tested, thus becoming the hypothesis of the study.

Chapter 3 is entirely dedicated for the statistical analyze of the results of a poll designed and conducted to test the above mentioned hypothesis, while Chapter 4 checks the consistency of the poll's findings with the analytical frame of the thesis. Both can be read as a confirmation of the hypothesis – a quantitative one in the 3rd chapter, and a theoretical one in the 4th, the latter having also explanatory character. Chapter 5 summarizes the key findings of the thesis, underlines its limitations and provides some suggestions for further research.

2. CHINESE IN ROMANIA

2.1. Background

The communist regimes of China and Romania established diplomatic relations in 1949. From the 1950s to the 1980s, the Party and state leaders of the two countries exchanged frequent visits, with the contacts reaching a peak in late 1960s – early 1970's, for reasons to be found in the international political situation. As openly opposing the 1968 Soviet Union's military intervention in Czechoslovakia, Romania feared a military aggression from its huge Eastern neighbour; since the Sino - Soviet relations were on their turn at a very low level, strengthening ties with China appeared as a logical step. The good political relation was mutually beneficial, as Ceausescu – at that time, the spoiled child of the Western democracies – played an important role in negotiating the normalization of the Sino – American relations⁹.

Economically, the 60 million US dollars credit granted by China to Romania in 1972 was welcome for a country that was already experiencing economic problems due to excessive centralization. To be noted that half of the loan was in goods – mainly cheap consumer goods – that flooded a market dominated by the low quality indigenous products. The economic relations kept developing and by 1980, Romania was China's most important trade member in the CMEA¹⁰, with the 1980 volume of trade reaching 1,200 million US dollars, 50 per cent more than the Sino – Soviet trade¹¹. Romania was delivering to China oil equipment, other machinery and plants, metallurgical and chemical products, products of the timber industry, while China was delivering oil and again consumer goods – which in early 1980's had become a scarcity as Romania was deeply affected by isolation and the Ceausescu's forced savings policy¹².

⁹ President Nixon saw Ceausescu as “the most useful of all the intermediaries” in the process of Sino-US rapprochement - Times, 1971, July 26

¹⁰ Also known as COMECON, the Council for Economic Assistance was created in 1949 by Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary and Romania

¹¹ Tanjug, 1983, March 16

¹² U.S. Library of Congress, at <http://countrystudies.us/romania/51.htm>

As far as cultural relations are concerned, it is relevant that from 1980 to 1983, about 4,000 Chinese specialists in political affairs, economics, technology, science, culture, and tourism have visited Romania¹³. At the same time, Romania was actively promoted in the official media in Beijing as a “sister nation”, which can explain why it became a preferred destination for migration in Eastern Europe after the fall of the Iron Curtain in 1989. By 1999, according to unofficial estimates, around 20,000 Chinese migrants had come to Bucharest – one percent of the population of the Romanian capital¹⁴.

Today, official data record the presence in Romania of around 5,000 Chinese migrants¹⁵, but only the ones who were granted residence permit are counted; as the proceedings for the residence permit are not easy, it is to be supposed that the real figure is a lot larger. According to data from Chamber of Commerce, there are 8,000 firms in Romania partially or integrally owned by Chinese, which is another strong indicator that the real figure of Chinese residing in Romania is larger than the official one. Even so, the official data are still useful by emphasizing the occupational distribution of the Chinese migrants: around 80 per cent are involved in small trade. It is also to be noted the geographical distribution: almost 90 per cent live in Bucharest. Even more, they live in the same neighborhood, near to the famous – at the national level – commercial complex “Europa”, dominated by Chinese and their merchandise.

Although not as impressive as in other European capitals, the number of Chinese migrants is expected to grow, in spite of the more restrictive immigration norms adopted by Romania after the accession to the European Union. This is why for instance a real estate developer recently launched a project for building a residential park similar to a China Town, designed to accommodate around 3,000 Chinese immigrants in 12 flat buildings¹⁶. Romania will most likely follow the European trend, which shows a significant increase in Chinese immigration for the last decade¹⁷; under these circumstances, with the phenomenon expected to take proportions, it is important to

¹³ Radio Beijing, 183, May 3

¹⁴ Duta, M *Chinese in Romania – The East European Pole of the Asian Civilization*, Adevarul, 1 Aug 2005

¹⁵ Data from the Department for Foreigners, February 2007 – see Table 2 in Annex 2

¹⁶ Vintilescu, R *Dobroiesti Chinatown*, Cotidianul, 2 Feb 2006

¹⁷ “Recent Demographic Development in Europe”, Council of Europe, Strasbourg 2001

evaluate the response of the host society; the following chapter attempts to do it in the light of the existent theories.

2.2. A paradoxical success

2.2.1. Theories on prejudice against immigrants

A diverse set of theories on animosity towards immigrants has been generated by scholars, completing and sometimes competing with each other. Quilian for example (1995:587) sees the individual-group dichotomy as comprehensive in explaining prejudice against immigrants, which he defines as “antipathy accompanied by a faulty generalization”. He identifies three main streams of *individual prejudice theories*. The first one seeks the causes of prejudice as the psychological displacement of fear or anxiety onto others. A second stream of research focuses on individual features, as attitude surveys show that people from the working class, from older cohorts, and who have less education express more prejudice. Finally, the self-interest theory postulates that individuals develop negative affects and rigid stereotypes toward individuals with whom they are in competition and conflict.

As far as the *group level theories* are concerned, it is to be mentioned Blumer’s paper “Racial Prejudice as a Function of Group Position”, in which he sees prejudice as a defensive reaction against challenges to the dominant group's exclusive claim to privileges. Moving the analysis one step forward, Bobo creates the model of realistic conflict theory, which posits that the subordinate group is "a threat to real resources" of the dominant group (Bobo 1983:1197). Focusing on competing economic interests as source of tension, the realistic group conflict provides explanation for immigrant phobia in periods of scarcity in a country’s history. Consistent with this theory is for instance the documentation by Dollard (1938) of the growth of anti-immigrants feelings in an American town, proportionally to the deepening of the economic crisis. More dramatically, Dollard’s research was confirmed in his times by the rise to power of the Nazi, in the context of the deep crises of the 1930’s.

70 years after, the vote patterns in Europe still confirm the theory of realistic group conflict: in constituencies experiencing high unemployment and economic problems, the far-right gets high scores with a strong anti-immigrant discourse. This was the case in Romania, where in 2000 the candidate of the far right, Vadim Tudor, was the second in the presidential elections, barely defeated by the very charismatic leader of the 1989 anti-Ceausescu coup – Ion Iliescu. At that time, Romanian economic performance was one of the lowest in Europe.

However, as O’Connell (2005:62) observes, the conclusions of sophisticated research in the last decade have become increasingly skeptical about economic forces having a direct, unproblematic and uni-directional effect on attitudes towards immigrants and related behaviours, including voting patterns. Thomas Pettigrew for instance makes the distinction between the old-fashioned form of prejudice, centered on competition for resources, and the new type, based predominantly on perceived threat to the culture norms and values.

Blatant prejudice is the traditional form; it is hot, close, and direct; (...) Subtle prejudice is the modern form; it is cool, distant, and indirect. It taps the perceived threat of the minority to traditional values, the exaggeration of cultural differences with the minority, and the absence of positive feelings toward them. (Pettigrew 1998:83)

Furthermore, elaborating on quantitative analysis undertaken in six Western European countries, O’Connell (2005:63) gets to the conclusion that the right-wing extremism was facilitated by rising levels of immigration but *not* by a declining national economy, which was actually found, on the contrary, to correlate with a dampening down of the extremism.

To sum up, while the classical theory points to the new comers as a threat to the jobs and more generally to the economic well being of the dominant group, the newer theory sees the threat to the national identity as the ultimate explanation for the immigrant phobia. Romania, as I will show in the following, is an interesting case at the borderline between the two theories, offering grounds for the validity of both. Prior to that, it is worth

overviewing the newest of the theories explaining immigrant phobia, which blends the previous ones with a very fashionable concept nowadays: security.

In his recent book (2005), “Immigration Phobia and the Security Dilemma”, Mikhail Alexseev develops a security-based model to describe anti-immigrant hostility in host societies. This model takes into account the following perceptions in the host society: *anarchy*, which relates to the host population’s perception of their government’s ability to secure their borders and protect the host population from excessive immigration intent of the migrant population; “*groupness*”, which relates to the immigrant population’s resistance to assimilation and also to their visual and perceptual distinctiveness of the migrant population; *intent* of the migrant population, referring to the host’s society perception of whether the immigrants are integrating into society, and whether they maintain loyalties to their sending state; *socio-economic impact*, including impact on income and jobs, education, the environment, and crime. Alekseev (2005) posits that the level of these perceptions and their interaction will determine the level of threat experienced by the host population, and consequently the level of prejudice.

Although Alekseev cover a variety of regions and situations, from the Russian Far East to the US-Mexican border, in his effort to build a credible model, the new trend in dealing with migration after the 9/11 attacks is obvious in his work. Like in most of the articles and books issued after 9/11, migration is framed as a security issue. Two key features of his book made it however highly useful for my thesis: first, security proves a very appropriate ingredient to put together realistic and symbolic theories on immigrant phobia. Second, he deals with perceived threat, rather than any actual threat, when it comes to immigrant phobia acquisition. The latter is especially important in my case, as the Chinese for now cannot pose any real threat to Romanians given their number.

2.2.2. Romania and the failure of the theories

In the light of the above listed theories, Romanians should be expected to show a high immigrant phobia. In the economic realm for instance, although competition for jobs was

not common till recently, an intensively debated case seems to set up a new trend. The fact that a textile factory preferred to bring 800 workers from China, rather than hire Romanians in a town severely affected by unemployment, stirred a fierce debate in mass media. Critics said the plant would have found Romanian workers, had it offered better wages, but the owner of the factory countered that higher wages would make his products uncompetitive internationally¹⁸. Till recently, foreign investors were attracted to Romania by its low wages¹⁹, but with the accession to EU from 1st of January 2007, Romanian workers demand salaries adapted to the country's new status. Therefore the influx of Chinese workers might have been upsetting for the locals and given the intense public debate, for the Romanians in general.

In a broader perspective, Romania gives enough ground for the realistic conflict theory. With 13 percent of the population under the 2\$ poverty line²⁰, the highest in the European Union, with large inequalities and deep social frustration against corrupted and inefficient governments, with a large share of the GDP growth (4 to 6 percent for 2005-2007, World Bank data) covered by privatizations and foreign currency sent home by the Romanian emigrant workers²¹ - it is easy to see the immigrants as the scape goat. The nationalistic parties, constantly credited with around 20% intention of vote, are doing a "good" job in catalyzing animosities against minorities on grounds of affecting the economic well being of the indigenous people.

Even more corrosive is the activity of these parties in light of the "modern" theory on immigrant phobia – the one that touches upon national culture and identity. Although the Chinese are not under target yet, frequent verbal attacks on Jewish and Gypsies show the potential of the nationalistic current, rooted in Ceausescu's era, when the personality cult was blended with theories on the Latin purity of the Romanian blood.

¹⁸ International Herald Tribune, 10 April 2007.

¹⁹ 250 Euros average salary in 2005, data from the National Commission for Statistics (CNS)

²⁰ World Bank statistics, 2005


²¹ 4.3 billion Euro in 2005 according to the 2006 Annual Report of the National Bank of Romania

As for Alekseev's "security dilemma", the four triggers of immigrant phobia perfectly apply to Romania, for the following reasons:

- *Anarchy* - relates to the host population's perception of their government's ability to protect it from excessive immigration – which in Romania is very low, because of the corrupted administration and inefficient bureaucracy
- *The intent of the migrant population* refers to the host's society perception of whether the immigrants are integrating into society; Chinese are seen as inassimilable and maintaining strong ties with the mainland
- *Groupness* relates to the immigrant population's visual and perceptual distinctiveness, evident in the case of Chinese. In support of this aspect, one may also refer to the distance theory which posits that the more unknown is a culture, the more difficult it proves bridging with another
- *Perceptions on socio-economic impact* were discussed above; on the social side, to be added that in early 90's, homicide within the Chinese community was one of the favorite subject of mass media, due to its frequency and bloody character

In spite of all these, neither blatant nor subtle prejudice against Chinese developed in the Romanian society. A case of violence against a Chinese was never reported, let alone group conflicts. The welcoming character of the Romanians can be ruled out as an explanation; at times, violent conflicts occurred when it comes to Hungarian or Gipsy minorities, or to Arab immigrants. As for the subtle prejudice, the graph²² below, showing the positive answers to the question: "*Would you agree to have as neighbour a person/family belonging to the following nationality...*" clearly emphasizes the lack of hard feelings towards the Chinese immigrants, if not in an absolute manner, at least as compared to other ethnic groups.

²² From the survey research that is the basis of the Chapter 3. The whole survey in Annex 2



Explanations of such an evident misfit between what theories suggest and what practice shows is to be found in the peculiarities of the Romanian socio-cultural and historical context. In the following, I will try to list the possible explanations, with a brief analysis on their pros and cons.

2.2.3. Possible explanations

There is a variety of contextual explanations consistent with the Romanian socio-historical circumstances. First of all, given the above mentioned frequent conflicts with Hungarians and Gypsies living in Romania, one could say that Romanians “invest” all their resources of group conflict and racism in the relation with these scape-goats. The scape-goat theory can provide an explanation also when seen in an international context: after the attacks on 9/11, Europe is so focused on Muslims that it might “neglect” the non-Muslim immigrants. This second aspect seem to be confirmed to some extent by the graph above, which shows that Romanians are more reluctant to people coming from the Middle East than to other immigrants.

Another line of reasoning could lead us to the migration of Romanians to Western Europe as explanation for our case; indeed, countries which are both sending and receiving

migrants rarely experience conflicts among the dominant and subordinate groups. However, the phenomenon of Romanian labor force migration is relatively new, having taken amplitude only after Europe opened its borders to Eastern-European workers, which makes it an unlikely reason for low prejudice against immigrants.

A tempting explanation lies in the size of the Chinese immigrant group, which one may say has not reach a critical mass yet. Blalock (1967) outlines two reasons for a connection between intergroup relative size and prejudice. First, competition for resources increases with the size of the minority group; second, large immigrant group size can increase the potential for political mobilization and result in a greater threat to the dominant group.

However, a two-fold argument stands against the size of the Chinese migrant group size as explanation for low prejudice among Romanians. Firstly, after reviewing the literature on the topic, Quilian (1995:189) argues that these studies do not conclusively support the relation between increased size of the subordinate group and increased discrimination. This relation may be a valid explanation for prejudice against Blacks in USA, but as far as Europe is concerned, as Quilian's study emphasize, size of migrant group is of little relevance. Secondly, putting our case in a different analytical frame, we will find that far from being a reason for low prejudice, small size of the migrant group could on the contrary have a negative influence. Indeed, small size of the migrant group means low contact with the dominant group – and contact is beneficial for reducing prejudice. As McLaren (2003:929) posits in the conclusion of his multivariate analysis study, “all of the investigations of the contact hypothesis in the European context, including this one, have indicated that contact does matter for reducing hostility toward immigrants to Europe”. Not having the opportunity of direct, physical contact with the Chinese, the Romanians' perceptions on the new comers were shaped through the filter of mass media, which as shown in the previous chapters focused mainly on the negative aspects.

Some of the above discussed factors undoubtedly play a positive role in shaping the attitude of Romanians towards Chinese migrants, but none of them seems to be the ultimate cause. Given that, this study adds a new one, provided by the recent past of Romania. It is

possible, I argue, that Romanians do not show prejudice against Chinese migrants because their image of China and the Chinese was built in the 1970's, through the Chinese consumer goods that flooded the country at that time²³. What made them strongly imprinted in the collective memory, as I will try to argue, is the fact that they had monopoly on the Romanian market as far as imported goods were concerned. With the Western “imperialist” products practically forbidden, with a very low trade with other Eastern European communist countries (except for USSR which is a special case), with most of the indigenous production being poor quality – the high quality going to export in order to pay the country's debt – Chinese toys, school supplies, tools or clothes were a delight for a deprived population. For over a decade, it was the only contact of the ordinary consumer with the outside world; as for the quality, it was incomparably higher than the local products' one.

In the following chapters I will try to test whether these circumstances indeed played a role in shaping the Romanians' attitude towards Chinese. Quantitative and qualitative methods will be equally utilized: the former in order to test correlation, and the latter to explain the socio-psychological mechanisms beneath this process.

3. CORELATIONS. A QUANTITATIVE STUDY

3.1. Operationalization of the variables

The hypothesis I test is, in the light of the discussion in the end of the previous chapter, that immigrant phobia against Chinese is inversely proportional to the favorability of the evaluations of vectors of the Chinese culture – in my case, the consumer goods made in China. To operationalize the research, the two variables were “translated” as follows:

²³ Tables on the evolution of trade of Romania between 1966-1970, available at http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=va2.document&identifier=5034CA05-96B6-175C-9D1E985BB79D8B4B&sort=Collection&item=Romania%20in%20the%20Cold%20War, show that at time, USSR and China were the main trade partners of Ceausescu's regime; however, while in the imports from USSR, food accounted for 1 percent and consumer goods for 3 percent, in the imports from China, food accounted for 17 percent and consumer goods for 34 percent.

- Immigration phobia, *the dependent variable*, was defined by two basic concepts, derived from the discussion in Chapter 2.2.1: perceived threat and hostility towards migrants. Accordingly, the respondents were asked whether they see the Chinese migrants as having good or bad intentions, on one hand, and whether they would agree to have as neighbour a Chinese person/ family, on the other hand. In order to grasp more information and to allow useful comparisons, the second question on the dependent variable referred not only to Chinese, but also to other migrant groups. Each of these groups was chosen for a reason, be it for the group size and dynamic (Turks), Asian origin and connection to Gypsies (Indians), negative connotations in the new international context of the war on terror (Arabs).
- Favorability of the evaluation of the Chinese culture's vectors, *the independent variable*, was on its turn operationalised on three axes: satisfaction with using the consumer goods made in China, the qualities attributed to these goods, and the qualities attributed to Chinese in general.

The study aims to find a possible correlation between the two variables; therefore it will use SPSS (applied statistics for data analysis, downloadable from Internet) and correlation coefficients ("rho", in the tables hereafter). These can vary between -1 and +1, thus indicating the strength and direction of the relationship. Correlation is considered relevant over +/- 0.1, and a "plus" sign will indicate that an increase in one of the variables is followed by an increase of the other one. The SPSS tables also provide information on the significance of the results: the lower the significance level, the higher the statistical significance of the findings, that is to say, the lower the chance that findings are the result of mere chance.

3.2. Key findings of the survey

3.2.1. Strong correlation between perceived threat and qualities attributed to Chinese

Data revealed a strong correlation between the perceived characteristics of Chinese people and the nature of the Chinese migrants' intentions, in the Romanians' view. The

correlation coefficient is similar for the qualities listed in the questionnaires; however a higher correlation is found for inventiveness and devotion.

			Chinese migrants – good or bad intentions?
Spearman's rho	Chinese migrants – good or bad intentions?	Correlation Coefficient	1,000
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.
		N	1230
Diligence		Correlation Coefficient	,611(**)
		Sig. (2-tailed)	,000
		N	1230
Inventiveness		Correlation Coefficient	,623(**)
		Sig. (2-tailed)	,000
		N	1230
Discipline		Correlation Coefficient	,650(**)
		Sig. (2-tailed)	,000
		N	1230
Devotion		Correlation Coefficient	,684(**)
		Sig. (2-tailed)	,000
		N	1230

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

3.2.2. Significant correlation between perceived threat and the qualities seen as specific to Chinese made goods

A weaker but still relevant correlation was found in this regard. Again, the correlation coefficient is similar for each item listed in the questionnaires.

			Chinese migrants – good or bad intentions?
Spearman's rho	Chinese migrants – good or bad intentions?	Correlation Coefficient	1,000
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.
		N	1230
High quality		Correlation Coefficient	,189(**)
		Sig. (2-tailed)	,000
		N	1230
Durable		Correlation Coefficient	,194(**)
		Sig. (2-tailed)	,000
		N	1230
Ingenious		Correlation Coefficient	,198(**)

	Sig. (2-tailed)	,000
	N	1230
Minutely worked	Correlation Coefficient	,194(**)
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,000
	N	1230
Complicated	Correlation Coefficient	,196(**)
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,000
	N	1230
Efficient	Correlation Coefficient	,213(**)
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,000
	N	1230
Nice	Correlation Coefficient	,198(**)
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,000
	N	1230

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

3.2.3. Relevant correlation between hostility and qualities attached to Chinese migrants (only for urban segment, more than 200,000 inhabitants)

The correlation between hostility and the indicators of the independent variable was found relevant only for the urban sample (cities of more than 200,000 inhabitants), a result that should have been expected given that people from big cities had much more access to vectors of Chinese culture before 1989.

		Would you agree to have a Chinese neighbor?	
Spearman's rho	Would you agree to have a Chinese neighbor	Correlation Coefficient	1,000
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.
		N	279
Chinese people – lazy/ hardworking	Chinese people – lazy/ hardworking	Correlation Coefficient	,266(**)
		Sig. (2-tailed)	,000
		N	279
Chinese - inventive?	Chinese - inventive?	Correlation Coefficient	,261(**)
		Sig. (2-tailed)	,000
		N	279
Chinese - disciplined?	Chinese - disciplined?	Correlation Coefficient	,379(**)
		Sig. (2-tailed)	,000
		N	279
Chinese - devoted?	Chinese - devoted?	Correlation Coefficient	,275(**)

Sig. (2-tailed)	,000
N	279

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

3.2.4. Relevant correlation between hostility and the qualities seen as attached to Chinese made goods ((only for urban segment, more than 200,000 inhabitants)

The research found good correlation between the qualities seen as specific to Chinese made goods and the hostility against Chinese. Again, this is valid only for the case of cities of more than 200,000 inhabitants, for the same reason: the vectors of Chinese culture, be them movies or consumer goods, did not penetrate the rural market.

			Would you agree to have a Chinese as neighbor?
Spearman's rho	Would you agree to have a Chinese as neighbor?	Correlation Coefficient	1,000
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.
		N	279
Good quality		Correlation Coefficient	,203(**)
		Sig. (2-tailed)	,001
		N	279
Durable		Correlation Coefficient	,224(**)
		Sig. (2-tailed)	,000
		N	279
Ingenious		Correlation Coefficient	,216(**)
		Sig. (2-tailed)	,000
		N	279
Minutely worked		Correlation Coefficient	,182(**)
		Sig. (2-tailed)	,002
		N	279
Complicated		Correlation Coefficient	,179(**)
		Sig. (2-tailed)	,003
		N	279
Efficient		Correlation Coefficient	,181(**)
		Sig. (2-tailed)	,002
		N	279
Attractive		Correlation Coefficient	,210(**)
		Sig. (2-tailed)	,000
		N	279
Nice		Correlation Coefficient	,213(**)
		Sig. (2-tailed)	,000
		N	279

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

3.2.5. Weaker correlation between hostility and the satisfaction with the various categories of Chinese made goods (still relevant on the urban sample)

			Would you agree to have a Chinese as neighbor?
Spearman's rho	Would you agree to have a Chinese as neighbor?	Correlation Coefficient	,1000
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.
		N	279
Toys		Correlation Coefficient	,158(**)
		Sig. (2-tailed)	,008
		N	279
School supplies		Correlation Coefficient	,178(**)
		Sig. (2-tailed)	,003
		N	279
Food		Correlation Coefficient	,170(**)
		Sig. (2-tailed)	,004
		N	279
Home tools		Correlation Coefficient	,191(**)
		Sig. (2-tailed)	,001
		N	279
Clothes		Correlation Coefficient	,176(**)
		Sig. (2-tailed)	,003
		N	279
Personal hygiene tools		Correlation Coefficient	,221(**)
		Sig. (2-tailed)	,000
		N	279
Other tools		Correlation Coefficient	,128(*)
		Sig. (2-tailed)	,033
		N	279
Movies		Correlation Coefficient	,114
		Sig. (2-tailed)	,056
		N	279

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

3.3. Conclusions of the survey

Both of the basic concepts used to define immigrant phobia showed relevant correlations with the independent variable, and high statistical significance. However, only the first

one, namely the perceived threat, proved relevant at the national level, whereas the hostility only showed a relevant correlation at the urban level. The explanation is two fold. On one hand, hostility was operationalized as the degree of acceptance of a Chinese neighbor, which is hardly conceivable in the rural area, while perceived threat was operationalized as the intentions of Chinese, a more abstract concept that allowed more freedom for respondents. On the other hand, the contact itself with the Chinese culture's vectors was very limited in the rural areas prior to 1989. Items like Chinese made toys, clothes or food were only available in the urban supermarkets before 1989 – not to speak about movies, as the villages didn't have movie theatres. The results of the poll show a sum of the „Don't know” and „Don't answer” answers roughly equal to the rural population of Romania, around 50%, allowing us to assume that it was the urban population who actually experienced the contact with the Chinese goods.

The splitted results on national/ urban, far from affecting the relevance of the survey all together, on the contrary confirm the correlation between the independent and dependent variable. As far as the cities' inhabitants are concerned, the survey results confirm beyond doubt the correlation between the good memories on this contact and the good attitude towards Chinese migrants today. The next chapter tries to further explain this correlation by using concepts and theories from social psychology.

4. SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS

4.1. Affective attitude and the resilience to attitude change

Along the previous chapters the term „attitude” was often used in its common meaning as the relation between Romanians, as dominant group, and Chinese was under scrutiny . Chapter 3 quantitatively emphasized the positive attitude towards the Chinese goods prior to 1989, the positive attitude towards Chinese immigrants today, and the link between the two. In order to explain these findings, we need to swing to the realm of social psychology, where attitude is defined as „a psychological tendency that is expressed by evaluating a particular entity with some degree of favor or disfavor” (Eagly 1992:693).

The entity in this case – or „the object of attitude”, as referred to in the literature – are the Chinese in general and the Chinese immigrants in particular. As for the process of „evaluation”, Fazio (1986:230) notes, it is seen in a very broad sense, ranging in nature from a very hot affect (the attitude object being associated with a strong emotional response) to a colder, more cognitively based judgement toward the object. Depending on the role played by emotions in knowledge acquisition, the attitudes are affective or cognitive – a classification with important consequences as far as the present study is concerned.

For affect-based attitudes, affective reactions exert a primary and powerful influence on the individual, and the attitude is initially acquired with minimal cognitive appraisal. Relevant information that is acquired subsequent to these affective reactions may serve to confirm or bolster the initial attitude. The cognitive structuring that takes place is likely to be in service of the affect and does not constitute the basis of the attitude. For cognition-based attitudes, domain-relevant information is acquired first, and affective factors come into play only after, and as a result of, considerable cognitive appraisal. Although affective processes often occur in cognition-based attitudes, their role in shaping attitude development is minimal. (Edwards 1990: 204)

The research question of this thesis was constructed as a paradox: why the Romanians' attitude on Chinese remained positive in spite of the many factors that usually trigger immigrant phobia? Factors occurred after 1990, discussed in Chapter 2, were supposed to alter the good positive attitude on Chinese; however, that didn't happen, as shown in Chapter 3. The explanation for the low effectiveness of these counter-attitudinal factors may lay in the nature of the attitude's origin; I argue that the primacy of the affective factors in shaping the Romanians' attitude in the late 60's – early 70's made it resilient to change.


The explanation is again two-fold. On one hand, the tensions at the Russian border, after Ceausescu's opposition to invading Czechoslovakia in 1968, gave Romanians a tremendous feeling of insecurity, increased by the mobilization of the Army decided by Ceausescu. The country was fearing a war with the huge Eastern neighbor, with zero chances of winning; in these circumstances, the perceived support from China was seemed as vital, even though China has never shown any intention to get involved. It was mere propaganda and the propagandistic effect of the many visits of Ceausescu to China

that made this country „the protector from the shadow” and persuade the Romanians to credit it for the happy end of the story. On the other hand, the access to the Chinese imported goods, at a time when no other imports were allowed, as shown in Chapter 2, contributed to the positive attitude toward China and the Chinese. In the dark decade that followed the relative opening up of the early 70’s, owning Chinese products was almost a prize for a deeply deprived population. These are two strong arguments that the origin of the Romanians’ attitude was mainly affective. One may identify cognitive elements as well, especially in the first factor – feeling of support and protection against Russia. Actually, as Edwards (1990:204) emphasizes, the distinction between affect and cognition based attitudes is not dichotomical; that is to say, it is unlikely that we ever form pure affect based and cognition based attitudes. In reality, the author explains, attitudes are positioned along a continuum, according to the primacy and the relative contribution of affect and cognition in their acquisition and further development. In our case, deeper reasoning would have told Romanians that is unrealistic to expect open support from China in a military conflict with Russia. Similarly, a comparison of the Chinese goods with Western ones would have revealed the actually poor quality of the former. Instead, affective factors were at work – mainly gratification and perceived support against threats, which are pointed by the above quoted author as main contributors to affect based attitudes.

Correctly identifying the type of attitude is important as it casts an influence on its ability to withstand counterattitudinal information. As affect based, the Romanians’ attitude towards Chinese was, in the light of Zajonc’s work (1980), expressed with more conviction and more resilient in time. Affect based attitudes are difficult to change, Zajonc claims, because the counterattitudinal information tends to be discounted or at least assimilated. Zajonc’s work was consistent with Festinger’s dissonance theory: people experiencing cognitive dissonance are likely to avoid exposure to information they have reasons to believe may increase dissonance (Festinger 1957:163). In the light of these theories, it is to be mentioned that, when it came to identifying the origins of Ceausescu’s change of leadership style after 1970, Romanians avoided to put the blame on Chinese. Although in 1971 Ceausescu visited China and North Korea, anybody in

Romania would tell you that he turned to the „far-East style of communism”, with the personality cult, after having visited North Korea²⁴; nobody would mention China.

The mechanism was furtherly explained by Edwards (1990), who’s empirical studies led him to draw conclusions on the influence of different factors of persuasion to different types of attitudes. The graph below²⁵ shows that affect based attitudes are difficult to change by cognition, whereas affective pressures may be conducive to attitude change.



In the Romanians’ case, the counterattitudinal factors that came into place after 1990 – the ones identified in the immigrant phobia theory as triggering hostility against migrants – were cognitive factors. Be it fear of losing jobs, of altering the cultural identity of the nation, or of rising criminality, these were reason based factors with little impact on an affect based attitude, according to the above graph.

²⁴ Most of the authors agree that Romania in the 1980s was more akin to North Korea than, say, Hungary, and that Ceausescu’s Eastern Trip (China and North Korea, 1971) opened his eyes to the use of ideological mobilization of the masses and the cult of personality. See Mark Almond, “Decline without Fall: Romania under Ceausescu”, London, Alliance Publishers, 1988, and Dennis Deletant, “Romania under Communist Rule”, Iasi, Center for Romanian Studies, 1999.

²⁵ From Edwards, K, “The Interplay of Affect and Cognition in Attitude Formation and Change”, *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 1990, Vol. 59, No.2, 202-216


4.2. Other factors limiting the impact of counterattitudinal information

There is in the socio-psychological literature a substantial body of empirical work on attitude change, with many different possible factors of change being put under the researchers' microscope. Aside from the affective, as opposed to cognitive, character of the knowledge acquisition, already discussed, the researchers focussed on the implicit/explicit type of attitude (Rydel et al, 2006), on the source credibility (Wu and Shaffer, 2006) the prior contact with the attitude object (Fazio, 1986), the attitude importance (Holbrook et al, 2005), or the amount of persuasive information (Davidson et al, 1985). A brief overview of the mechanisms by which some of these factors work shows they perfectly fit as explanations for our case.

Personal importance, for example, has been recognized as related to the strength of one's attitude. Holbrook et al (2005:750) explore the two mechanisms of this effect: personal importance lead people to selectively expose themselves to attitude-relevant information, and on the other hand, once exposed to such information, personal importance instigate people to process it more deeply and richly, thereby facilitating later retrieval. According to Holbrook's findings, people are better able to remember information relevant to important attitudes. Since he defines as important the attitudes that bring at stake people's material interests, security interests or simply their values, we can conclude that Romanians' attitude towards China were important in early 70's. During Ceausescu's honey-years with China, information about this country was abundant in the Romanian media, allowing elaboration and encoding in the long-term memory of the Romanians, thereby equipping them to resist persuasion²⁶.

Information from mass media, abovely referred to, was an indirect and, in the light of the previous paragraph, a selectively cognitive way to aquire attitude. At this point we can describe the acquisition and development of the Romanian's attitude towards China and Chinese from the late 60's until the 80's by the following model:

²⁶ The process seemed to have worked both ways: during my frequent visits to China, when people found out that I am a Romanian, the invariable response was "Romania, sister nation!"



Prior contact with the attitude’s object – in our case, the direct contact with the Chinese goods pointed in the triangular model – also plays an essential role, as emphasized in the literature. Wu and Shaffer (1987), building upon Fazio et al (1982), find that direct-experience attitudes are on one hand more affectively charged than indirect-experience attitudes, and on the other hand, they bear a higher influence on an attitude relevant persuasive appeal. Specifically, direct-experience attitudes are found to trigger negative reactions to counter-attitudinal factors, and more positive to pro-attitudinal ones. Again, theory and empirical findings of scientific research support the assumption that immigrant phobia factors activated after 1989 failed to alter the good perception on Chinese due to the circumstances in which the initial attitude was acquired.

Last but not least, strength of the attitude is a concept that has to be evoked, as especially important when it comes to the automatic activation of attitudes. Attitudes, as Fazio et al (1986:229) explain, can be either spontaneously activated, without any conscious effort from the subject, or on the contrary, activated through a more reflective process, by weighting arguments. The three experiments presented and discussed in the above quoted study point to the idea that automatic activation of attitude is far more likely when the association between object and evaluation is strong, that is to say, when it comes as the result of a previously well learned set of associations, and equally important, Fazio et al stress (1986:236), when it is an affective attitude. Both of these conditions are fulfilled in our case, which can explain the automatic activation of Romanians’ attitude towards

Chinese after 1990, and consequently why they construed the available information on the object in a selective way. Upon the mere exposure to the subject, the key word „Chinese” activated the affective linkages and blocked the further reasoning that normally should have led to immigrant phobia.

5. CONCLUSIONS

The starting point of the thesis was the aparent misfit between the trend in Europe and the situation in Romania, as far as immigrant phobia is concerned. Using historical and statistical data, my pre-knowledge as somebody having grown up in Romania in the 1970s and the results of a poll I designed, I argued that Romanians have a positive attitude towards Chinese immigrants, in spite of all the conditions for immigrant phobia being fulfilled. I then tried to identify and explain the motives beyond this aparent paradox. After having ruled out some other possible causes, I focused on the previous contact with vectors of Chinese culture that have occurred in the communist recent history of Romania.

The poll conducted nationwide confirmed the corelation between the contact with Chinese made goods between the late 1960s – late 1980s and the positive attitude today. Using an analytical frame derived from social psychology, I then designed the model explaining the link; it came out that it was a combination of factors in the initial acquisition of attitude towards China and the Chinese that made it resilient in time and resistant to counter-attitudinal information available after 1990. The affective character of all the components of attitude’s aquisition was the key ingredient that made it difficult to change in spite of its exposure to factors that otherwise would have triggered the immigrant phobia.

Although the findings of this thesis were heavily influenced by the very specific conditions of the host society – immigrant group interaction, there is still enough room for generalization to make it relevant for policy makers anywhere. Basically, I found that in the *direct* (although mediated through products) – *indirect* („told” by others, through

mass media) communicational binome, the bias is on the former when it comes to attitude acquisition. This suggests that rather than focusing on mass media in their strategies to fight immigrant phobia, governments should turn to mediate contact between groups through technological and cultural interaction. By instinct, communities found ways to communicate this way, take for instance the Thai restaurants or the Gypsy music. Nevertheless, there is enough space for improvement and for identifying new ways to uncover the hidden message carried by technological and cultural products coming from the immigrants' culture, on one hand, and by the past affective contacts, on the other hand.

There are however many limitations of the present research that need to be evoked in order to temper the enthusiasm of its findings. First of all, the two initial causes of attitude acquisition – feeling of support in 1968 and contact with the imported goods afterwards – were put together in the analytical frame, although the poll that preceded the theoretical analysis only studied the contact with the goods. The explanation is simple: initially the poll was designed to explore the role of both of these factors, but as it was conducted on my own fees, it proved unaffordable so I had to choose either of them; I decided to focus on the goods. The 1968 moment was supposed to be explored in focus groups but then again it would have exceeded the allowed space, therefore questions on how the two factors influenced each other, and whether the contact with the goods would still have been relevant in the absence of the 1968 moment, will unfortunately remain unanswered for now. Other limitations may have been subjective in nature, the assumptions for example I made using my pre-knowledge as Romanian – even though I tried to back them up with theories and data when available. In light of these, and given the sample, questions and methods I used, the reasonable final conclusion of my thesis is that in the Romanian context, the contact with the Chinese-made goods during the communist dictatorship largely accounts for the acquisition and resilience of the positive attitude towards Chinese, in spite of many counter-attitudinal factors in place after 1989. This is one of the motives for Romanians not showing immigrant phobia, thus contradicting the relevant theories on the topic.

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ANNEX 1: TABLES

Table 1. Demographic Indicators in Europe, 2005

	Pop. January 2005 (in thousands)	Births per 1,000 population	Deaths per 1,000 population	Nat. pop. decrease/increase per 1,000 population	Net migration per 1,000 population	Total pop. change per 1,000 population	Pop. January 2006 (in thousands)
EU-27	459,488	10.5	9.7	0.7	3.7	4.4	461,507
Germany	82,501	8.4	10.1	-1.7	1.2	-0.5	82,456
France	60,561	12.6	8.8	3.7	1.7	5.4	60,892
UK	60,035	11.9	9.9	2.0	3.3	5.3	60,354
Italy	58,462	9.9	10.4	-0.5	5.8	5.3	58,772
Spain	43,038	10.9	8.8	2.1	15.0	17.1	43,781
Poland	38,174	9.4	9.7	-0.3	-0.3	-0.7	38,148
Netherlands	16,306	11.6	8.4	3.1	-1.2	2.0	16,338
Greece	11,076	9.4	9.2	0.2	3.1	3.3	11,112
Portugal	10,529	10.5	9.7	0.8	3.9	4.7	10,579
Belgium	10,446	11.4	10.0	1.4	3.2	4.6	10,494
Czech Rep.	10,221	10.0	10.5	-0.5	3.5	2.9	10,251
Hungary	10,098	9.6	13.5	-3.9	1.8	-2.1	10,076
Sweden	9,011	10.4	9.9	0.5	2.7	3.2	9,040
Austria	8,207	9.4	9.0	0.4	7.4	7.8	8,270
Denmark	5,411	11.8	10.3	1.6	1.4	3.0	5,428
Slovakia	5,385	10.0	9.8	0.2	0.8	0.9	5,390
Finland	5,237	11.0	9.2	1.8	1.7	3.5	5,255
Ireland	4,109	15.3	6.5	8.8	11.4	20.2	4,193
Lithuania	3,425	8.9	12.9	-4.0	-3.0	-7.0	3,401
Latvia	2,306	9.3	14.2	-4.9	-0.5	-5.4	2,294
Slovenia	1,998	8.8	9.2	-0.5	3.6	3.1	2,004
Estonia	1,347	10.6	13.1	-2.5	-0.3	-2.8	1,343
Cyprus*	749	10.9	6.7	4.1	27.2	31.3	773
Luxembourg	455	11.5	7.6	3.9	3.4	7.3	458
Malta	403	9.9	7.2	2.7	5.0	7.8	406
Croatia	4,444	9.4	11.1	-1.7	2.6	0.9	4,448
Bulgaria	7,761	9.0	14.6	-5.6	-1.8	-7.4	7,704
Romania	21,659	10.2	12.3	-2.1	-0.5	-2.5	21,604

Notes: *Greek part of Cyprus only



Source: **EUROSTAT, Chronos Database.**

Table 2: Chinese in Romania
 Department for Foreigners' data, February 2007



COUNTY	Permanent residence	Economical activities	Professional activities	Commercial activities	Workers	School children	Preparatory year	Students	Professional training	Doctoral students	Family reintegration	Married to Romanian	Individual Family Member	Specialists	TOTAL
Alba	1	0	0	10	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	14
Arad	9	0	0	6	6	0	0	1	0	0	7	1	0	0	31
Arges	1	0	0	1	0	0	6	0	0	0	1	4	0	0	13
Bacau	3	0	0	5	282	0	1	0	0	0	2	1	0	0	294
Bihor	2	0	0	8	3	0	0	0	0	0	3	1	0	0	17
Bistrita-Nasaud	7	0	0	0	2	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	11
Brasov	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	6
Bucuresti	615	0	0	1812	854	8	19	24	2	1	362	81	6	0	3855
Buzau	9	0	0	7	20	0	0	0	0	0	6	0	0	15	57
Calarasi	7	0	0	20	0	0	0	0	0	0	10	2	0	0	39
Cluj	9	0	0	3	6	0	0	3	0	0	2	5	0	0	30
Constanta	8	0	0	4	1	0	0	0	0	0	11	5	0	1	30
Galati	2	0	0	12	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	19
Giurgiu	0	0	0	7	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	9
Hunedoara	19	0	0	25	10	0	0	3	0	1	6	1	0	0	65
Ialomita	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	6
Iasi	3	0	0	0	6	0	0	5	0	0	0	4	0	0	19
Ilfov	45	0	0	233	68	3	3	8	0	0	63	9	0	5	438
Maramures	2	0	0	2	3	0	0	0	0	0	4	1	0	0	12
Mehedinti	7	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	1	0	0	14
Mures	4	0	0	7	1	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	14
Prahova	9	0	0	8	1	0	1	1	0	0	4	0	0	0	24
Salaj	4	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	10
Satu Mare	0	0	0	13	2	0	0	0	0	0	7	0	0	0	22
Sibiu	2	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6
Suceava	4	0	0	5	1	1	0	0	0	0	6	3	0	0	20
Teleorman	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	4
Timis	11	0	0	14	12	0	2	1	0	0	9	6	0	0	55
Vaslui	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	4
Vilcea	7	0	0	17	1	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	0	0	29
Vrancea	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	5
* TOTAL *	803	0	0	2234	1290	13	32	46	2	2	518	144	6	21	5189

ANNEX 2
ROMNIBUS SURVEY RESEARCH, July 2007

Q1. How pleased you were with the Chinese made goods you used before 1989?





Q2. To which extent would you agree with each of the following statements: The Chinese made goods you used or owned before 1989 were...?





Positive answers: Totally agree (4) + Agree (3)

Q3. On a scale from 1 to 4, what qualities would you attach to Chinese people?





Q4. To which extent would you agree to have as neighbour a...



Methodology

Multistadial sample – 226 checking points in 108 towns
 Sample size =1230 respondents; error within $\pm 2.8\%$

Sample structure:

<i>% on column</i>	Frequencies	Percentage
SEX		
Masculin	595	48.4
Feminin	635	51.6
AGE		
18-29 years old	289	23.5
30-44 years old	302	24.5
45-59 years old	307	24.9
60 and over	332	27.0
TOWN TYPE		
Rural	536	43.5
Small city (10-49,000)	221	17.9
Middle size (50-199,000)	193	15.7
Big city (more than 200,000)	281	22.9
REGION		
Transilvania	402	32.7
Muntenia	437	35.5
Moldova	273	22.2
Bucharest	118	9.6
MONTHLY INCOME		
< 50 euro	257	20.9
50 >= – < 100 euro	258	20.9
100 >= – < 200 euro	250	20.3
>= 200 euro	266	21.6
Undeclared	200	16.3
EDUCATION		
Primary school	350	28.5
Middle high school	365	29.7
High school	363	29.5
University	152	12.4
SOCIAL STATUS		
AB (high)	185	15.1
C (average)	381	30.9
DE (low)	664	54.0
TOTAL	1230	100.0