



LUND
UNIVERSITY

STV004

Tutors: Bo Petersson
and Yan Sayegh

Department of Political Science

France for the (Naturalized) French?

Multiculturalism and French National Identity

Jessica Reed

Abstract

Following the inauguration of the ministry for Immigration, Integration, Co-development and National identity (MIICNI) in May 2007, French national identity has been the focus of close scrutiny. In a pioneering governmental project France is seeking to promote national identity, but is the promotion of national identity compatible with multicultural diversity? The paper is a discussion of the governmental discourse of French national identity analysed using Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). It seeks to bring to the fore a critical account of the newly rising discourse on French national identity. A national identity discourse is not totally at odds with multicultural society, but the exclusion of foreign cultures in the paradigm is to a certain extent detrimental in a multicultural society. This paper discusses multiculturalism on a local, national and global level and seeks to critically analyse the applicability of cultural racism theory in the case of French national identity.

Key words: national identity, CDA, cultural racism, multiculturalism, France.

Contents Page

1 Introduction	1
1.1 Research Question and Aims	1
1.2 Disposition	3
2 Background	4
2.1 Vive la République	4
2.2 Multiculturalism and the Republic	5
3 Critical Discourse Analysis – An Analytical Framework	7
3.1 CDA Theory	7
3.1.1 Theorizing National Identity Using CDA	8
3.2 Methodology	8
3.2.1 Objectivity and Discourse Analysis	9
3.2.2 CDA Methods	9
3.2.3 Defining National Identity	10
3.2.4 Analytical Categories	10
3.3 Material	11
4 Framing the Discourse	12
5 Cultural Racism Theory	13
5.1 Balibar’s Cultural Racism Theory	14
5.2 Discussing Cultural Racism Theory	14
6 Analysis	15
6.1 Text Analysis	15
6.2 Framing National Identity	15
6.3 Analytical Categories	16
6.3.1 Representations of Immigrants	17
6.3.2 Representation of the French	18
6.3.3 Local and National (French) Cultural Identity	19
6.3.4 Representations - A Summary	20
6.3.5 Threats to National Identity	20
6.3.6 Republican Values	21
7 Conclusions and Reflections	23
8 References	27

1 Introduction

In May 2007, under the auspices of the newly elected president of the French Republic, Nicolas Sarkozy, a new ministry bearing the title “Ministry for Immigration, Integration, Co-development and National Identity” (MIICNI) was inaugurated. According to Francois Fillon, the Prime Minister of France, the MIICNI was created in order to take over from the minister of the interior the issues concerning immigration and integration, whilst also commanding the pioneering projects of accounting for and encouraging co-operation between France and its former colonies and overseeing the promotion of national identity in France.

Support for the creation of the new ministry was weak both in the political and public spheres. Not for the first time, newspapers condemned the President of being racistⁱ, and the only political party to openly approve of the creation of the MIICNI was Jean Le Pen’s notorious far right-wing Front National Party. Much of the media coverage deplored the political institutionalization of the promotion of national identity, demanding an explanation of how France as a multicultural country could legitimately defend a singular and uniform vision of national identity. The support of Le Pen and the issue of multiculturalism are details in the debate where multiculturalism plays an intrinsic part in understanding the base upon which the ministry was created, as we will see further on. Although support for the MIICNI may be weak at present, the careful crafting of its discourse follows an historical blueprint that plays on the sensibilities of French identity where a strong particularistic identity may be ill at odds with the realities of multicultural modern French society. France is a country whose past lingers in its present and shapes its future more than most other western countries, and as such this paper links the present discourse to its historical underpinnings.

1.1 Research Question and Aims

I use critical discourse theory (CDA) as my theoretical and methodological base and as such it permeates the formation and positioning of my research question and my three central aims. As a critical theory, the aim of CDA research is both to “unmask ideologically permeated...structures of power” whilst highlighting “inclusion and exclusion in language use” (Wodak et al, p.8, 1999).

ⁱ Following the riots in the *banlieues* in 2005/2006 according to the media, Sarkozy coined the rioters in racist terms which he later apologized publicly for.

The main ideological base in the governmental national identity discourse is French republicanism. Both Nicolas Sarkozy and the minister for the MIICNI, Brice Hortefeux, frequently refer to republican values in their speeches and communiqués and therefore one main aim of the paper is to give an understanding of what French republicanism entails.

The use of inclusion and exclusion in the discourse may be evident in the (re)production, representation and exclusion of a discursive “other” as part and parcel of the discourse. Without an “other” we cannot form a coherent image of our in-group. The “other” in the national identity paradigm is the immigrant population and in France the dominant discursive image of immigrants in the media and public eye as a whole is by and large a negative one. They riot, they are unemployed, they don’t integrate, they are more likely to be incarcerated than their French counter-parts and so on. Being aware of this current mood about immigrants, I started the research expecting to find an altogether negative image of immigrants mirrored in the national identity discourse, but this was not entirely the case. As a second aim of the paper then, I analyze the construction of the immigrant “other” in the discourse and inclusive and exclusive mechanisms in the discursive language.

Another tenet of critical theory is that research should endower us with the means to engage in social justice or at least to highlight prevalent injustices (Crawshaw & Tusting, 2000:5). This takes for granted that there exists a “prevalent injustice” that needs remedying and CDA has the tendency of being closed to alternative results as the only feasible and righteous conclusions rest on the supposition that the research object has an oppressive core. In my opinion the governmental discourse on national identity may be detrimental *to a certain extent* with regards national multicultural diversity, but that its’ cost to multiculturalism on a national level *may* benefit social cohesion and promote diversity on other levels. As such, my third general aim is to highlight the relative social injustice of promoting one national identity with regards exclusion of immigrants and minorities whilst also maintaining an open mind by highlighting the positive elements of the discourse.

As language is our primary means of communication, language bridges the gap between a reality that is obscured and the reality that it imposes. Adhering to a critical realist approach my research is based on the premise that an objective reality exists, but is often obscured by an imposed reality created and upheld by powerful institutional structures (Fairclough, 2005). My preconceived understanding is that firstly, the institutionalization of the promotion of one French national identity creates an *artificial reality* that there is only one French national identity and one French community. This is artificial as it makes the essentialist claims that a French people exists and have always existed and, most importantly, should continue to exist on certain terms that are not necessarily appropriate in a multicultural society. Hence the toned-down *objective reality* is that France is de facto a multicultural state with a culturally diverse population.

To summarize, my three main aims of the paper are to 1) coherently illustrate the link between republicanism past and present in the discourse 2) to analyze inclusion and exclusion mechanisms and 3) to give an account of the positive

dimensions of the discourse as well as the negative in order to analysis the object from a more balanced approach than merely proclaiming it to be entirely oppressive. From this starting point I have formulated the following research question:

To what extent is the governmental promotion of national identity detrimental to multicultural diversity?

1.2 Disposition

The paper is divided into six sections. Section one details a background to the research object. Section two discusses CDA as an analytical framework. For some discourse theorists, theory and method are two clear entities whereas I perceive CDA to be a fusion of the two thus creating an analytical framework. Section three discusses the theory of cultural racism that is applied to the discourse and section four designates the boundaries of the discourse as research object. Section five forms the core of analysis and finally section six closes the paper with some conclusions, reflections and ideas about the analysis and my findings with some suggestions to future research.

2 Background

Although the establishment of a ministry that married the ostensibly diverse issues of immigration, integration, co-development and national identity shocked the media and political parties alike, President Nicolas Sarkozy argues that these issues are inextricably linked and should therefore be dealt with under the umbrella of the MIICNI. The following chapter serves as a background to understanding the historical and present day political influences that account for the creation of the MIICNI where national identity is concerned. This is crucial as to understand the present discourse we must understand its historical foundations and political legacy. The themes underscored here are historical and modern day multiculturalism and republicanism

2.1 Vive la République!

A comprehensive analysis of modern French society begins with an understanding of its historical legacy, particularly of its republican political system that remains chained to the past (Howarth & Varouxalis, 2003:4).

Since the French Revolution and the establishment of the Republic, republicanism *per se* has often been defined along the political division lines according right and left perspectives (Howarth & Varouxalis, 2003:11). In modern France everyone claims the name republican so a fruitful conceptualization of the French republic as it stands today is that of the French republic as both the all encompassing nation-state with a culture and history on the one hand, and as the longstanding French political system (Révanger, chap.7, Cole & Raymond, 2006:117). This definition is illuminating as it illustrates the republican notion as being cultural and historical as well as political. The most commonly quoted declaration of the essence of the republic, which has been quoted by the minister for the MIICNI Brice Hortefeux and by Nicolas Sarkozy, is in article two of the constitution and reads: “France is a republic, indivisible, secular, democratic and social”.

The chequered history of the French Republic has demonstrated that the republican values of uniformity (or indivisibility) have often been imposed from the political elites onto the masses (Cole & Hanley, chap.2, Cole & Raymond, 2006:25). The Jacobin Reign of Terror was by far the most extreme form of republicanism where those deemed traitorous to the republican values of indivisibility and unity were swiftly done away with (Howarth & Varouxalis, 2003:7). The republican values of unity and indivisibility that were central during the Jacobin era remain today etched in French political culture. French political

culture is imbedded in the Republican tradition (Raymond, chap.1, Cole and Raymond, 2006:7), which in turn stands for nonnegotiable unity (Howarth & Varouxalis, 2003:116). It can be construed that a coherency between past and present exists: the republic of France remains true to the tradition of indivisibility, a nation united under the commonality of republicanism which is manifest as universal equality in the constitution: “*liberté, égalité, fraternité*” (Freedom, Equality and Fraternity/Brotherhood). How this republican universal unity is culturally practiced may be evident in France’s relative reluctance to multiculturalism.

2.2 Multiculturalism and the Republic

Following the pivotal French Revolution of 1789, France changed tact from being a particularist nation-state that differentiated between humans to one of a generalist, universal nation-state that accorded equal rights to all people (Howarth & Varouxalis, 2003:117). This universalism dictated that the population be accorded equality based on the republican ideals of unity and indivisibility and as such this uniform unity that still exists today means that cultural diversity is to an extent frowned upon in the republican tradition because it is not compatible with the “universal” model (Howarth & Varouxalis, 2003:117).

The lack of reference to national multiculturalism in the national identity discourse, and indeed by the government at large, demonstrates that multiculturalism is a thorny issue. Multiculturalism is often demonstrated as France defending her identity against cultural uniformity on a global levelⁱⁱ, but rarely - if at all - is it used with regards the plethora of different cultures inhabiting France on a national level. Many argue that France chooses to ignore its’ multicultural plurality and if we define multiculturalism as “the organized representation of cultural difference” (Baumann, 1999:122), there is much evidence to support the argument that France chooses not to embrace multiculturalism (Wihtol de Wenden, 2003:77) as positive discrimination, minority-specific identity politics and *communautisme*, or community-building, are seen as being “opposed to the republican ethos” (Howarth & Varouxalis, 2003:37) and not part of the Jacobin tradition (Wihtol de Wenden, 2003:77).

Although theorists criticize the universality of the French republic, the ambiguous use of the term universalism is in my mind no longer appropriate. French universalism is in fact national particularism as it is one form of cultural and historical identification that is promoted above and beyond a plethora of potential models in multicultural France. This is a central point that I will return to, but it is important at this early stage to understand that national multiculturalism is fundamentally argued to be displacing the smooth running of

ⁱⁱ Nicolas Sarkozy, speech at the Franco-Saudi Economic Conference, 14th January 2008, www.elysee.fr

republican national cohesion, whereas international multiculturalism as the defense of French language and culture, is positive.

3 Critical Discourse Analysis – an Analytical Framework

The theory and methods of CDA are here fused in one section as the one overlaps the other. I have however drawn some crude boundaries between theory and method in order to illustrate the theoretical underpinnings of CDA, for example explaining what a discourse is and discussing how we can understand national identity from a CDA perspective, as well as some CDA methodologies. As such the net sum of this chapter is to explain my personal analytical framework as, thanks to the diversity of CDA theory and methods, the CDA researcher is free to oscillate between a variety of disciplines, but must of course finally carefully select a certain theory and method for the research to be a success (Fairclough, 2005).

3.1 CDA Theory

CDA is a complex theory to understand and implement as there is an abundance of theoretical positions within the field – a British variety headed by Norman Fairclough, a school of Venetian thought as proposed by Ruth Wodak, and a Dutch school with Teun van Dijk at the forefront to name but a few. It would be impossible to carry out a research project by implementing all the facets of CDA theory, but there does exist a set of fundamental basics in CDA, which I intend to highlight in the following. This section is relatively short as references to discourse theory permeate the paper and therefore this serves to regroup the main tenets of the theory.

Common for all CDA analysis then is the analysis of a discourse from a critical perspective. The research object, or discourse, in this context is the production of representations that becomes naturalized by society in general and thereafter reproduced as part of the social norm. They often have underscoring values, ideologies and, from a critical perspective, are often oppressive in nature (Fairclough, 2005). Representations refer to a set meaning of “how things are and have been, as well as imaginaries – how things should be” (ibid.).

Applying this definition of discourse to the present research object will give us the following: the national identity discourse is *institutionalized* by the government; it produces coherent *representations* of French people and immigrant people and it is *oppressive* by forcing a multicultural society to conform to a particularistic culture and identity. The ideological underpinnings are often masked by the use of language, as a discourse is based on a specific use of

language that maintains power structures. As such, the analysis of the texts of a discourse, which are both written and spoken, (Wodak et al, 1999: 8) often reveal hidden ideologies (Crawshaw & Tusting, 2000:5).

Central to maintaining a discourse is the reproduction of discursive representations through a strategic use of language. As a CDA researcher, we begin with the premise that language is not neutral but rather used as a tool to shift and change the limitations for what is socially acceptable (Esaiasson et al, 2003:235).

3.1.1 Theorizing About National Identity Using CDA

Having identified the parameters of the discursive shell above, we can further introduce some premises for analyzing national identity in the CDA paradigm.

National identity is the bond between place, people and power (Lechner, 2004:2). Lechner further argues that the political elites reproduce manufactured traditions in order to sustain this connection. Although the whole process is invented from an imagined reality, it nevertheless becomes a reality and the consequences of deconstructing it are not to be taken lightly (Lechner, 2004:3). In contrast Wodak and company state point blank that there is no such thing as one national identity and the very construction of one should be questioned as it creates in and out-groups (Wodak et al, 1999:3-5). Four more theoretical positions are posited which form the basis of their understanding of national identity: 1) nations are mental constructions; 2) national identity is discursively produced and reproduced; 3) national identity is the attainment of commonality through a common culture, a common collective memory, and a common language etc.; 4) institutional and social practices form these discourses; 5) national identity proclaims national uniqueness (Wodak et al, 1999:.3-5).

Here we see the dichotomous relationship between essentialist notions of nationhood and national identity as demonstrated by the Fillon government and constructivist theories as depicted in CDA theory emerging as an important element in the research. Although Lechner may argue that the imposed reality is nevertheless a reality all the same, he agrees that nationhood and the idea of national identity is nothing more than fictitious (Lechner, 2004:2).

3.2 Methodology

Critical Discourse Analysis is conducted in a multitude of different ways, and often varyingly interpreted according to the reader (Crawshaw & Tusting, 2000:33). Here I would like to banish the common thought that discourse analysis is more or less subjective (Wodak et al, 1999: 8), whilst also relating my choice of methodological framework to other critical discursive choices.

3.2.1 On Objectivity and Discourse Analysis

More than often, positivist research is pitted against hermeneutic and critical research in methodological debates, contrasting objectivity and subjectivity respectively. Here, I choose not to enter this fruitless discussion by dichotomizing subjectivity and objectivity, but would instead like to illustrate the objective qualities of my research.

My first point of reference is the cultural context of the researcher. As discourses are not only present in language but also discursive practices and semiotics which include social practices and actions, the researcher is often literally surrounded by the discursive research object which is normally argued as being a positive methodological tool in discourse analysis. I however believe that it serves best to maintain a certain distance from the research object, a belief which undoubtedly strives against mainstream discourse analytical thinking. As Steven Ungar argues “who is better qualified than an informed and presumably sympathetic outsider to chart differences that daily exposure might fail to reveal?” (Ungar, 1996:4). It is in my opinion easier to critically evaluate something as subjective as national identity when the national identity in question is not your own.

Secondly, although deciphering the often hidden meaning of discourses is an interpreting act and therefore highly subjective (Crawshaw & Tusting, 2000:33), lending the research a strong sense of inter-subjectivity increases the objectivity of the research (Esaïsson et al, 2003:23). I have therefore made a conscious effort to include as much of the original material that I have translated as possible in the parameters of my analysis. This together with detailed descriptions of my analytical models lends well to inter-subjective accuracy.

I do not attempt to aim for the same lofty heights of verifying a theory’s worth, or claiming that my subjective values as a researcher will not at some point intermingle with my research object, but worth noting is that where methodology is concerned, the choice of method is rarely objective in the first place (Lundquist, 1993:97) so where we can draw the line of pure objectivism is in my mind a shady area of grey.

3.2.2 CDA Methods

Critical Discourse Analysts have a wide range of analytical methods to choose from and often deciding on one specific methodological framework is a daunting task. Ruth Wodak and company form their analysis of Austrian national identity based on a reference guide used to decipher patterns of strategy, argumentation and content within the given discourse (Wodak et al, 2003:3). They define strategy as being “a more or less accurate plan adopted to achieve a certain...objective” (Wodak et al, 2003:31). Attempting to uncover the behind-the-scenes strategy of a discursive action is ambitious to say the least and further poses many problems such as the availability of such hard to come by

information. Crawshaw and Tusting explain that a critical discursive textual reading of national identity should be more aligned with linguistic readings of texts, where sentence structure, grammar and the lexical terms of the text should be accounted for (Crawshaw & Tusting, 2000:36-60). This, however, markedly diverges the focus from other crucial elements in the text, such as its ideological positioning, as we cannot analyze every word in the text and therefore must focus on the core features of the discourse. Being skeptical of both the vagueness of the first “strategic” variant of analysis and of the meticulousness of the second, I created a set of analytical categories specific to my research, which are clearly defined, easy to decipher yet at the same get to the heart of the discourse by unraveling ideological and historical legacies.

3.2.3 Defining National Identity

The first part of the analysis is concerned with extracting a definition of national identity in the discourse. Sarkozy and Brice Hortefeux mention national identity in different contexts when talking to different publics, both domestic and international and therefore material relating to national identity was widespread. By collecting different references to what national identity consists of, I could then analyze who it includes and how it relates to multiculturalism by using analytical categories and applying cultural racism theory.

3.2.4 Analytical Categories

Once I have a working definition of discursive national identity I continue the analysis by applying four analytical categories to extract the essential core of the discourse. These are: 1) representations of the immigrants and the French people 2) perspectives on cultural identity – local, national and global 3) perceived threats to national identity and 4) the incorporation of republican ideology.

The first category, *representations*, seeks to reconstruct the representations inherent in the discourse concerning immigrants and French people. I ask if these are two clearly distinguishable representations with a set core of statements made about them. I ask if the representation of immigrants is unnecessarily negative or if it has positive elements, and if the representation of the French people is gratified, essentialized, exclusive only to “real” French people born and bred or if it refers to all French nationals.

The second category, *cultural identity*, refers to the discursive rift in cultural identity on a local and national level. Cultural identity is contextual in the discourse and by analysing the layers of cultural diversity we gain an insight into the multi-faceted way multiculturalism is dealt with in the discourse. Here I map out the various cultural identities that Sarkozy and Hortefeux detail and demonstrate how their contextual difference demonstrates the ways in which multiculturalism is seen from different angles in the discourse.

The third category is *perceived threats to national identity*, which helps explain the governmental need for a ministry for the promotion of national identity. Sarkozy and Hortefeux time and again speak of a need to “defend” national identity so in order to defend it there must be an initial threat worth defending against.

The fourth and final category, *republican ideology*, links the present discourse to its political and historical roots. Republican values underpin the discourse – it is the respect of republican values that is at the heart of the discourse - and therefore important in the analysis.

3.3 Material

Discourses permeate the fibre of society and are borne in language used in official documentation, the media, intellectual studies and so on (Wodak et al, 1999:vii). Common for discourse analysts is therefore to carefully select a collection of material that, as primary sources, demonstrate the representations inherent in the discourse and as secondary material, reproduce those representations.

The production of the current discourse is unique in the fact that even though it is an extension of former ideological, philosophical and historical discourses, it is the first time such a discourse has been structurally institutionalized in a governmental ministry. As this modern institutionalized discourse is relatively new, it has one discernible centre of production for the present time, which is the Fillon government. I disregarded the media as a source of discourse to be analyzed (except one article that was written by the minister for the MIICNI) as the information relayed to the reader was often presented in debate form, which would therefore be more suitable to argument analysis or other critical forms of qualitative text analysis such as *idékritik* (Esaïsson et al, 2003:234-235).

What was interesting was that I could evaluate and analyze the discourse from its origin and potentially gain some further insight into how a discourse is successfully naturalized. I therefore chose to focus my material on primary sources in the form of governmental official documents, which are valid textual material in CDA (Fairclough, 2005). I focused my analytical material on primary sources – speeches, written texts, communiqués and short campaign films – that were accounted for by President Sarkozy and the minister for the MIICNI, Brice Hortefeux.

4 Framing the Discourse

In order to frame my research object, I had to carefully choose the discourses' parameters and this proved to be a difficult part of the research process.

My primary aim was to extricate the governmental discourse of national identity from the plethora of discourses surrounding national identity and also those that the MIICNI produces concerning the various poles of the ministry – discourses concerning immigration, integration, co-development and national identity. My primary concern was framing the institutional, governmental discourse of national identity and the major thorn in the deliberation process was identifying where the boundaries of national identity begin and end in the discourse.

The immigrant in the national identity discourse is not divorced from other discourses on immigration and integration that the ministry produces, which was a problem. I could not research both national identity and the different facets of the immigration discourses due to the constraints of the paper, but the representation of the immigrant seemed to me intrinsic to the production of a French “us” and therefore essential. As such, I excluded clandestine immigrants and refugees, who appeared in the overlapping discourses but had different profiles and focused primarily on legal immigrants who I believed at the outset would form a somewhat homogenous discursive “other”.

As the research was to focus on the *structural institutionalization* of national identity this meant *focusing on the discourse of the institution in question*, in other words the MIICNI. Since it is a new ministry that was inaugurated at the end of May 2007, I focus on a time period starting with Nicolas Sarkozy's presidential campaign, from March 2007, when the issue of national identity became pertinent in the public eye, through to January of 2008. Discourses have the potential to alter in content and context so for me it was interesting to study a discourse from its inception.

5 Cultural Racism Theory

When dealing with collective groups, such as a nation, it is often the case that self recognition as a part of one group is a direct result of recognition of a discursive “other” (Billig, 1995: 66). More often than not this “other” is presented using negative terminology (Vincent, chap.4, Cameron, 1999:54) and thereafter results in the formation of a negative opinion of the “other” (Putnam, 2007:7).

Without a positive collective image national identity would not be able to prosper. So how is it possible, as for example in the case of Germany post world-war two, to maintain a positive national identity? Nation-centric positive discourses coupled with negative depictions of others is one tried and trusted method (Wodak et al, 1999:1) which ultimately involves imagining a nation and the community that live in it (Anderson, 2006:6) and juxtaposing a discursive ‘other’ onto the model (Wodak et al, 1999:20).

In light of accentuated anxiety concerning the influx of immigrants into France, immigrants and foreigners form the discursive ‘other’ (Howarth & Varouhalis, 2003:29). As Putnam states, the rising challenge for western democracies is to expand traditional “we” or in-group definitions to incorporate new immigrant populations (Putnam, 2007:3), but France seems reluctant to do this as it has one culture that it does not seem ready to dilute in order to accommodate other cultures. Does this mean that France is culturally racist? The following is a discussion of Etienne Balibar’s theory of cultural racism and Robert Putnam’s theory of social cohesion.

5.1 Balibar’s Cultural Racism Theory

Etienne Balibar is one of France’s leading elite intellectuals and an expert in the field of cultural racism in France. His theory maintains that racism has shifted from being essentially biological to essentially cultural (Balibar, 1999:21) and that France propagates this.

Balibar defines standard racism as the superiority of one race, race denoting biological differences, with regards another (Balibar, 1996:1). The main crux of Balibar’s theory is that culture has replaced race as the motivation for hatred and fear of the other and therefore racism is now a sociological problem rather than a biological one (Balibar, 1999:21). The sociological element does not mean that determinism has vanished from the debate, on the contrary culture is perceived to be as absolute as nature (Balibar, 1999:22) especially in France where “pure culturalism” is widespread (Balibar, 1991:26). Cultural racism is therefore the alleged superiority of one culture over that of another, which is often envisaged as

the national culture's superiority over the immigrant culture as the category of immigrant culture has in Balibar's mind replaced the category of the colonized race (Balibar, 1999:20).

Balibar continues that this new racism is problematic as there is no such thing as cultural homogeneity (Balibar, 1991:49), but what is being projected as one definite, essential culture in France serves merely to ostracize immigrant populations.

Balibar's theory at times lacks depth and complexity when dealing with the issue of multiculturalism and fails to theorize past a one-dimensional attack on French society. In reality, would it be possible to have a multicultural society fully engaged in catering to all cultures? Certain cultural practices, such as genital mutilation, are central in some African cultures but outlawed in France. I do not mean to say that Balibar implies that all cultural differences should be acceded in France, but a failure to discuss an alternative to the status quo consequently simplifies a complex issue.

5.2 Discussing Cultural Racism Theory

Robert Putnam does not adhere to the essentialist view of cultural absolutism and argues that far from ostracizing immigrant populations promoting a strong national identity results in social cohesion and increased social security (Putnam, 2007: 23; see also Withol de Wenden, 2003:84). It is therefore, in his opinion, not a case of cultural racism, but of cultural necessity that nation-states are promoting national identity.

His argument unfortunately enhances existent divisions between nationals and immigrants by pointing to immigrants as the root of social insecurity and not to other potential causes of the demise of social unity, such as far right extreme movements, other racist factions or other possible causes. The question at heart in the debate between the two theoretical ideas is cultural heterogeneity. Putnam sees cultural heterogeneity as a necessary prerequisite for social cohesion whereas Balibar sees it as stifling multiculturalism. We must here ask if it possible to have one national identity in a multicultural society where a French national may have their cultural roots in Morocco or Gabon, or if, as Putnam argues, this will lead to greater social cohesion.

6 Analysis

The analysis of the discourse opens with an overview of my process of analyzing the discourse. I then define discursive national identity and continue with an analysis using my analytical categories and apply the theory of cultural racism at each possible stage in the analysis. It is in this section that I put into practice the bulk of my research aims – to critically analyze the discourse whilst being aware of essentialized meanings and exclusionary and inclusionary language in the discourse – as well as being able to begin to answer my research question:

To what extent is the governmental promotion of national identity detrimental to multicultural diversity?

6.1 Text Analysis

Analyzing discursive texts requires a systematic process of analysis based on several criteria which Crawshaw and Tusting exemplify. These criteria include situating the text spatially, contextually and according to the subject matter; positioning the author or speaker and the reader or listener and situating the text in a time frame (Crawshaw & Tusting, 2000:33-50). It was important to begin by defining the contextual properties of the discursive elements in order to frame them and understand their meaning on a concrete level. As such, each reading began by contextually situating the text.

6.2 Framing National Identity

The lack of consensus in defining national identity may be a strategy to avoid bad publicity, accusations of "ethno-racism" as Hortefeux has voiced concerns of (1), but also a strategy to allow the nation to imagine this identity just as the nation-state is imagined.

As Hortefeux and Sarkozy cited different things in different speeches in different contexts it was difficult to make a solid claim on what the governmental depiction of national identity is. Hortefeux argued in a newspaper article entitled "My Vision of National Identity" that a sense of national identity was more natural when young people did military service and when the media was solely

nationally-ownedⁱⁱⁱ. On the welcome page of the MIICNI ministerial website, Hortefeux states:

”French identity is both the heritage of our history and the future of our national community”^{iv}.

Here, French identity is linked to one people – French people with a collective French past and a collective future. When Sarkozy talks of French national identity, he refers directly to the people as the country and states:

“I believe in a national identity. France does not have a race, France does not have an ethnicity. France is a republic with a certain number of values”^v.

”France is a community of values”^{vi}.

National identity is alluded to by Sarkozy as being the sum of France’s provinces that, although diverse in culture, psychology, personality etc., each province is bound by a common history and a common destiny which forms a coherent national identity (2). Sarkozy avoids calling France a race or an ethnic group, but does however use the word “civilization” when talking about French national identity on many occasions^{vii}. I will return to this in my analysis of the alleged threats to national identity, but here we can see that although national identity is never outrightly defined as such, identity is linked to one given culture and heritage of France. This gives us a good basic understanding of the governmental definition of national identity: one united people of the nation-state of France that, although diverse in local identity, have a united national identity.

6.3 Analytical Categories

Moving on to the main part of the analysis is the use of analytical categories. Here I have attempted to separate the different categories, but of course overlapping between categories occurs. What I attempt is to deconstruct the discourse using the categories to understand the various components of the discourse and critically evaluate the use of the theory of cultural racism throughout the analysis.

ⁱⁱⁱ Brice Hortefeux, ”My Vision of National Identity” in La Libération newspaper, 27th July 2007.

^{iv} Brice Hortefeux, ”Missions and Roles”, 19th december 2007.

^v Nicolas Sarkozy, ”Identity, Immigration, Security, Respect” NS TV, 2nd May 2007.

^{vi} Nicolas Sarkozy, official video clip ”National Identity”, NS TV, 18th April 2007.

^{vii} Nicolas Sarkozy, Press Conference, 8th January 2008.

6.3.1 Representations of Immigrants

There are two representations of immigrant populations in the discourse – one which depicts the population that is prepared to integrate and be a part of French society whole-heartedly, and the other which prefers peripheral minority community living and remains outside French society, which is depicted in negative terms. It is a binary all-or-nothing representation. On a video clip entitled “National Identity” which was broadcast during the presidential campaign, Sarkozy talks of national identity being the sum of “a community of values” that are the sum of different homelands which create one large homeland (3). He pauses in his speech and the image of a black girl and a coloured man dancing and laughing at a festival flashes across the screen,^{viii} which one imagines is to be understood as the different “homelands”. This gives the impression that Sarkozy’s France would be an all-embracing culturally diverse country, but on closer inspection, this is the only evidence in the discourse that I have come across where Sarkozy has talked of diversity in this context, as the sum of different foreign cultures on French soil. As we will see, the diversity Sarkozy prefers to refer to is that of local French cultural diversity or French diversity on the global scale.

In other video clips and speeches Sarkozy alludes to a “bad” male immigrant that is not welcome on French soil (4). The sex of the immigrant goes unsaid but is understood between the lines. This is the immigrant that does not respect liberty or equality, that forces his daughter to wear a headscarf, or controls the life choices of his wife.

It is a stereotypical representation that is rife in France and using Balibar’s theory, we could understand this as a grove generalization of immigrant culture that depicts it as homogenous and backward, thus inferior to French. It is a dangerous stereotype that Sarkozy uses, but the message is that immigrants that do not respect women’s rights or the right to freedom are not welcome in France as this is a part of French identity (5). We come back to the discussion about what is acceptable cultural practice and here Sarkozy is rightly stating that the oppression of women is not acceptable in France, as most people would agree. What is in line with Balibar’s theory is the superiority complex that I personally read in the text when Sarkozy states that by coming to France immigrants must realize that the French nation is long-standing, maybe more long-standing than the immigrants own, and therefore not open to change (6).

The most tangible expression of controversial differentiating between the immigrant “other” and the discursive “we” is in the distinction between the “good” national community and the “bad” minority community. As we have seen Sarkozy and Hortefeux both refer to the national French community as something good. Hortefeux states that the “bad” community-building of minorities has a negative impact on personal development:

^{viii} Nicolas Sarkozy, official video clip “National Identity”, NS TV, 18th April 2007.

“Lacking knowledge of the [French] language, minority community life substitutes integration and causes a breakdown”^{ix}

In his published newspaper article about national identity, Hortefeux deprecates minority community associations evoking the memory of the war in Algeria which remains a sensitive issue even today. Until a few decades ago, the French were alone in commemorating the dead following the bloody independence war of Algeria, but with Algerians constituting the largest immigrant population in France, a movement of NGOs demanded the right for the Algerians to be able to commemorate the end of the war with independence celebrations. What is discreetly left out is which dead the French are commemorating, especially as the Algerian war is a taboo subject that is not even taught in schools. The sympathies are being relayed to a certain public with a certain background and knowledge and specifically seeks to disparage minority communities:

”These communities are developing their demands to a point where, for example, the remembrance of those who died ”for” France takes place after remembrance of those presented as the deceased ”because of” her [France]”^x

The ”good”community, the only community that has the right to exist is the often cited ”national community”^{xi} and that the ”promotion of our identity is a response to minority community building”^{xii}. By creating a homogenous negative minority community the discourse fails to account for differences in immigrant cultures and community lifestyles and therefore fails to account for its multicultural communities that are not necessarily all negative. In other multicultural countries, minority community building can have positive effects, such as the Native Indian communities in the USA or the Aborigine communities in Australia.

6.3.2 Representations of the French

There is a strong representation of the immigrant ‘other’ as being either willing to integrate by learning French and integrating into French society, or as detrimentally wishing to remain on the margins of French society involved in minority community life. The French, on the other hand, are represented as a homogenous group that share a number of traits which form their national identity and that community-building is encouraged.

^{ix} Brice Hortefeux, speech at the close of the European Year of Equal Opportunity, 17th December 2007.

^x Brice Hortefeux, ”My vision of National Identity”, La Libération newspaper, 27th July 2007.

^{xi} For one example, see Brice Hortefeux, closing speech at the European Year of Equal Opportunity, 17th December 2007.

^{xii} Brice Hortefeux, ”Missions and Roles” of the ministry, taken from the website, 19th December 2007.

In a speech about the agricultural sector in an agricultural conference, Sarkozy braces national identity. It was not uncommon for the President to contextually change subject in speeches and communiqués to talk of national identity in a few sentences then return to the subject matter at hand. This gives us an indication that national identity is something of great importance for the President. In this instance, he referred to the link between the earth and French people as part of national identity, that *every* French family has a grandparent that has worked in the fields (7). Here Sarkozy's language is exclusionary as it refers to a French heritage that immigrants and foreign born nationals do not have. The French population is therefore here coined as being a people of long descent in France.

Another evidence of the heritage of an exclusive French people is a poignant scene in one of Sarkozy's presidential campaign videos. It begins with Sarkozy talking to school children stating that:

“That which you [referring to the school children] are today is the product of generations that have preceded you”^{xiii}.

He continues his speech about the legacy the children have in upholding “our ways of life” with the image changing to that of Sarkozy walking slowly through a large graveyard with uniform gravestones and the French flag flying near a statue. One is to assume it is a graveyard of second world war soldiers. France, as previously mentioned in the opening chapters, is historically bound, especially to the second world war, and this piece of imagery could therefore be construed as linking the French national people to a common past, leaving little room for the French multicultural people of today in the representation. Imagining a nation and its people is not negative per se, but the extent to which the historically and earth-bound French population is essentialized supports Balibar's insistence that discourses of an exclusionary nature lean heavily on an historical legacy (Balibar, 1991:17). It could therefore be perceived as negative with regards the de facto multicultural population of France that do not have an historical connection with France during the second world war period.

The diversity of the multiple “homelands” symbolism we saw in the representation of immigrants refers to the immigrant populations as his speech was about the integration of diversity into the French model. The French population, on the other hand, is a unique people with a common history. Indeed, Hortefeux perceives that the 2 million or so foreign born French nationals remain part of the immigrant population (8), which demonstrates a certain unwillingness to allow foreigners to ever really fully integrate as they are always to be classed as immigrants.

^{xiii} Nicolas Sarkozy, “Identity, Immigration, Security, Respect”, NS TV, 2nd May 2007.

6.3.3 Local and National (French) Cultural Identity

A second dimension of the representation of French people is French culture on a local and national level. Sarkozy changed the meaning of national identity and local identity and community forming depending on his audience. Whilst talking at a congress in Corsica, a French island that is plagued by separatist terrorist attacks, Sarkozy lucidly spoke of the needs of the Corsican people to maintain their French identity and that Corsican local identity is, and should remain, merely part of an overall French national identity (9) & (10). In front of a public in Marseilles, a city that is renowned both for having a strong sense of local identity and a high concentration of immigrants, Sarkozy celebrated local identity by stating that Marseilles did not suffer immigrant suburb riots like Lyon or Paris (11) and further that a distinct local identity is indeed necessary here.

This is illuminating because it underscores the “good” immigrant representation and incorporates it into the representation of the people of Marseilles without discriminating between French and immigrant. The “good” immigrant is the reference to the fact that the suburbs of Marseilles did not “participate” in what Sarkozy coined the immigrant riots in 2005. I will return to cultural identity on a global and national level in the third category of analysis, *perceived threats to national identity*, but here a summary of the discursive representations of immigrant and French is needed to proceed to the next category.

6.3.4 Representations – A summary

To conclude then, the representations of the immigrant and the French population – despite some evidence of occasional overlapping – coexist as two distinct representations. Conclusively from the material, the French population has an identity to “defend”, “to promote” and to “be proud of”^{xiv}; a heritage that is unique and a national community that is to be cherished. This is embellished in the following category, where the French national identity is not only something to be proud of but promoted globally. In contrast, the immigrant has by and large an identity that should not be expressed through participation in minority communities, and must be re-evaluated in order to adopt the values and culture of France. The diversity of culture that Sarkozy speaks of is not a diversity of national cultures of the immigrants, but a diversity of local cultures. As Balibar argues, this is not multiculturalism but a form of “pure culturalism” that promotes only French culture and French interests and portrays minority communities unjustly as one negative phenomenon.

^{xiv} See Brice Hortefeux “Missions and Roles” on the ministry website, and also Nicolas Sarkozy, official clip “National Identity”, 18th April 2007.

6.3.5 Threats to French National Identity

As French national identity is something to “defend”, the question needs asking *from what?* Sarkozy argues that it is not from immigrants per se (12). However, both Sarkozy and Hortefeux state on numerous accounts that French national identity is a direct counter balance to minority community building, and that by linking the “defence” of national identity in the same discursive space as controlling immigration and reducing minority community-building it is hard not to draw the conclusion that these are inherently linked. But if we are to follow the discourse and agree that it is not immigrants that we must defend national identity from then it may be the imposing harmonizing control of the European Union. This is not the case as Sarkozy states that European identity is part of an international “community of destiny” (13).

The underscored threat in the discourse is global cultural particularism, which is destroying cultural global diversity (14). Sarkozy states here, before a public in Riyadh concerning an economic conference, that each “civilization” must develop an identity (14).

It is an interesting slant on the issue of multicultural diversity. Global culture – which is never clearly defined so we are to assume it is Anglo-Saxon cultural hegemony – is the enemy of the cultural state, and Sarkozy not only seeks to “defend” the French national identity as a means of claiming diversity on a global scale, but further seeks to gain cultural influence by putting France higher on the cultural global ladder by proclaiming a French civilization. Sarkozy stated in a press conference in early January of 2008 that he was to initiate a French “civilization policy” which would rejuvenate a world in need of renaissance (15).

If before there was little evidence to support Balibar’s claim that France deems itself culturally superior, this was the start of a new set of ideas that were to come in the discourse that demonstrated that the encouragement of having pride in the national identity was becoming a belief that France should be a global cultural leader. In a speech in Saudi Arabia, Sarkozy claimed that France had the prime responsibility in upholding *francophone* culture (15). Drawing the link to Balibar’s theory where cultural racism is an extension of colonialism, we see here that it is the powerful, culturally strong developed country that assumes responsibility for a culture that covers a large part of the African continent as well as part of Canada. Unfortunately, I did not have the time or scope to further develop these discussions on the issue of “civilization” as it only started to appear in some speeches from January onwards. I have, however, included some ideas about this issue in the section entitled “Future Research”.

6.3.6 Republican Values

In this final category of analysis the republican values that Sarkozy and Hortefeux state as the foundations of national identity are explored and questioned. Although some values are legitimately placed in the discourse, such as gender equality and liberty as we have seen in the representation of the

immigrant “other”, the use of the republican values of temporality and indivisibility are questionable.

Laïcité, or temporality in the secular state, is one of the founding French republican values. As Sarkozy states, he has been heavily criticized for showing too much interest in the religious issues in today’s France^{xv}, but his standpoint is both progressive yet stifling. In his speeches at the Grand Mosque in Paris, he states a desire for “an Islam of France [a French Islam] and not an Islam in France”^{xvi}. In the wake of Islamic militantism (albeit a small, but forceful, proportion of Western populations), and the increasing influx of Muslim populations, Sarkozy is one of the few western heads of states to demand that Islam adjust to the standards of France. It is a hotly debated issue, but one that is progressive. If we are to very crudely look at the state of affairs of human rights, especially of women, in Islamic countries we cannot help but draw the conclusion that some ways of practicing Islam are oppressive, but nonetheless tolerated and far from classifiable as extremism. These forms are unacceptable in a country like France, and therefore a practicable and progressive Islam must be initiated in order to cater both to the needs of the Muslims but also to maintain democratic liberties in France. Baumann argues that all cultural indicators, including the seemingly static category of religion, are socially constructed and can therefore be adapted and reshaped (Baumann, 1999:23), which could be useful in envisaging a new French Islam.

The second issue concerning temporality is the lack of it in Sarkozy’s speech concerning the restructuring and rejuvenating of the French civilization. He states, before a council meeting in Riyadh in January 2008, that although he must ensure the wellbeing of every religious sect in France, he must also protect the heritage, the culture, the civilization of France that is, as every other civilization, founded on religion (16). The adaptable element that we saw in the discourse on Islam is reduced to an essentialist view that religion is still central to the French “civilization”, the historical religion of France being catholicism. The link to history and religion as absolutist culture in Sarkozys’ discourse will only serve to exclude people practicing France’s second largest religion, Islam, as well as Judaism and Protestant religions as here Sarkozy is referring to France’s catholic roots. The republican value of temporality gives way to the larger picture of focussing on one nation that is united by heritage, culture and a religious base, which should not be the case in modern, multicultural, *secular*, France.

Moving from temporality to indivisibility we see one of the main problems concerning republican values in a multicultural society. The republican value of indivisibility is present in the discourse as it is one of the founding values in the republican system,^{xvii} but it is to a certain extent incompatible with modern day multicultural France. Indivisibility suggests the indivisible nature of the French nation and the French people. As Sarkozy stated before, each personal identity that is prevalent in the provinces and forms local identity has its own makeup, but forms a unified national entity that constitutes French national identity. If a persons’ local identity is not of the French location where they live but from “far

^{xv} Nicolas Sarkozy, New Year’s Wishes Speech to the National Defence, Elysée, 17th December 2007, www.sarkozy.fr.

^{xvi} Nicolas Sarkozy, Speech at the end of Ramadan, Grand Mosque in Paris, 1st October 2007, www.sarkozy.fr

^{xvii} See for example Brice Hortefeux in “Missions and Roles”, 2007.

away”, this excludes them from the scenario. The exclusiveness of the republican values may have been relevant in a time when France was not a multicultural nation to the extent that it is now.

7 Conclusions and Reflections

From the outset, I had a set of preconceived ideas about what my findings would furnish me with. I believed that:

- French national identity would rest on a base of a common collective memory of an historical legacy, a common culture and a united people.
- Immigrants would by and large be excluded from the paradigm, or that they would be portrayed as the negative discursive “other”.
- The threat to national identity would be revealed as being the immigrant “other” and that national identity should be defended against immigrant influxes at all costs.
- That the national identity discourse would be more or less incompatible with French multicultural society.

French national identity is a multifaceted phenomenon that affects not only “organic” French people, but also immigrants and foreigners abroad in different ways. It is a phenomenon that affects identity on a local level, a national level and a global level and has far reaching consequences for each of these micro and macro sociological identities. The discourse highlights the complexity of promoting national identity in a multicultural era and the following serves as a summary of my findings, some reflections on my choice of theory and method and some suggestions to future research.

7.1.1 National Identity for the French and Immigrants

One of the expected findings was the positive and exclusive representation of a French nation, a people or “civilization” with a core culture, heritage, collectively remembered past and common future. This was not entirely based on essentialist claims, as I believed it would be, but the heavy reliance on references to a collective memory was tangible.

The representation of the immigrant “other” took on two main forms. The negative representation of the immigrant denoted those immigrants unwilling to adhere to republican values, such as gender equality and freedom of liberty. In parts it deteriorated into the usual stereotypical portrayal of the immigrant that doesn’t work, who fails to integrate into society etc. Lacking in this stereotype is the question of if society is partly to blame, especially as those responsible for representing immigrants in this manner ironically only serve in isolating them more from society. The “good” representation of immigrants was limited, but nevertheless present in the discourse, which was an unforeseen result. However, with regards community-building, the French were encouraged to form local

communities based around French local cultures, whereas the immigrant minority communities were portrayed in a very negative light. It demonstrated the discrepancies between the value of culture for the French and immigrants, and in sum produced a negative picture of immigrant culture as opposed to French culture.

7.1.2 Multiculturalism, National Identity and the Republic

One of the most interesting dimensions of the discourse was the twist on multiculturalism. The government's complete lack of focusing on multiculturalism as the representation of different cultures from abroad within France illustrates that the government chooses not to embrace its multicultural status. In none of the speeches, communiqués or articles that I read for background research and during the analysis was there any reference to this. The closest was a vague reference to minority communities, but this does not give a full account of multiculturalism in France – it is only one segment, one multicultural life choice.

Interestingly, the discourse focused on either multiculturalism as the plethora of French cultures on a local level that form one national identity, or as France's need to defend national identity and the *francophone* culture against an all engulfing global culture. In turn, it was the global culture that was deemed as the primary threat to national identity in the discourse, even though I was of the opinion that some of the discourse pointed subtly to internal multiculturalism as the threat. This rests as my personal opinion as I believe there may not have been enough evidence in the discourse to support my presupposition.

Certain republican values that France ratified following the revolution of 1789 now seem outdated and others ignored in the government's relationship with multicultural France. As a secular state, the government should maintain a secular position and continue to tailor a French Islam but not indulge in reminiscing about the religious roots of the country. The value of indivisibility should be somewhat revised to incorporate the multicultural dimension of French society that was no doubt lacking when it was first drafted.

In conclusion, I believe that my presupposition that the multicultural objective reality of France is largely ignored or carefully side-tracked in the discourse seemed plausible given the lack of attention to internal multiculturalism in France regarding cultures from abroad, but was surprisingly utilized on a global level which brought a new dimension of national identity thinking to the forum.

7.1.3 France, Cultural Racism and CDA

Having used CDA and cultural racism theory in my thesis was both constraining and illuminating. It was constraining because both were nuanced to the extent that the research object was deemed inherently injustice and therefore

the result would be predictable but by keeping an open mind to positive elements in the discourse I could curb the extent to which this would affect my research. The theories were illuminating as I could adapt CDA theory and method to suit my research object, and the theory of cultural racism was applicable in certain instances that it maybe wasn't intended (such as it would be possible to use it to claim cultural racism for the French state against global culture).

What cultural racism brought to the forefront was an understanding of how racism has changed context from biological to cultural. Racism is of course contextually relative and I do not claim that the French state is strategically culturally racist. Rather my own thought is that it is a possible "side effect" of cohesive measures that proclaim one uniform national identity. Immigrants should integrate into their host country to have the best chances of a successful life there, but the French cultural hegemony in France is stifling. In a generations' time the number of dual nationals will have markedly increased thanks to the Schengen agreement and globalization so can this generation be expected to adhere to one national identity?

In conclusion, to reply my initial research question of *to what extent is the governmental discourse of national identity detrimental to multiculturalism*, we must evaluate it on all levels. On a global level, it seeks to defend nation-state multiculturalism, and even bipolar multiculturalism through the expansion of cultural *francophonie*. On a national and local level, it encourages manifestations of diversity within French culture as long as they are in keeping with the overall aims of national identity, but what it fails to do is to adequately represent and involve foreign cultural elements into the national paradigm, which is an important element. As such it is exclusionary of a large part of the French population, which is detrimental to not only the populations in question, but to social cohesion at large as to oppressive or curb one's freedom to choose identity may lead to internal societal tensions.

7.1.4 French Civilization – Future Research

On a final note, a completely unexpected finding that is extremely interesting and deserves further research is Sarkozy's new conception of the term "civilization" and what he calls "civilization policy". It is in my mind rather curious that he uses a word which during the past decade or so has been used frequently to distinguish between the civilizations of Islam and Christianity, or between civilizations of race and skin colour, but he uses it to refer to an individual country: France. The grandeur of the word illustrates a possible desire to have the people of France and the country of France recognized as something powerful and important. Indeed, Sarkozy stated in a press release early in January 2008 that he was to initiate a French "civilization policy" that would rejuvenate a world in need of renaissance (17). This civilization policy that he talks of entails focusing on all aspects of French society – economic and social – and reforming them using the starting point of identity and the civilization needs of the French people to do so. Having briefly looked into this issue in the final part of writing

this thesis it would be interesting to analyze such a policy – what impact it has on society and how it could be implemented – as a suggestion to future research.

8 References

- Anderson, Benedict, 2006. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London: Verso.
- Balibar, Etienne & Wallerstein, Immanuel, 2002. *Race, Nation and Class: Ambiguous Identities*. London: Verso.
- Baumann, Gerd, 1999. *The Multicultural Riddle: Rethinking National, Ethnic and Religious Identities*. E-book, www.elin.lub.ludwig.lu.se.
- Billig, Michael, 1995. *Banal Nationalism*. London: Sage Publications.
- Cameron, Keith, 1999. *National Identity*. Exeter: Intellect Books.
- Cole, Alistair & Raymond, Gino, 2006. *Redefining the French Republic*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Crawshaw, Robert & Tusting, Karen, 2000. *Exploring French Text Analysis: Interpretations of National Identity*. London: Routledge.
- Davies, Peter Jonathan, 1999. *The National Front in France: Ideology, Discourse and Power*. E-book, www.elin.lub.ludwig.lu.se.
- Esaïsson, Peter, Gilljam, Mikael, Oscarsson, Henrik, Wängnerud, Lena, 2003. *Metodpraktian: Konsten att studera samhälle, individ och marknad*. Stockholm: Elanders Gotab.
- Fairclough, Norman, 2005. *Critical Discourse Analysis*. *Marges Linguistiques*, 9: 76-94.
- Feldblum, Miriam, 1999. *Reconstructing Citizenship: The Politics of Nationality Reform and Immigration in Contemporary France*. New York: State University of New York.
- Howarth, David & Varouxalis, Georgios, 2003. *Contemporary France: An Introduction to French Politics and Society*. London: Hodder Headline Group.
- Lechner, Frank. *Redefining National Identity: Dutch Evidence on Global Patterns*. 2007. *International Journal of Comparative Sociology*, vol. 48(4): p. 355-268.
- Lalumière, Catherine. *The Battle of Cultural Identity* <http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/>, January 4, 2008.
- Lundquist, Lennart, 1993. *Det vetenskapliga studiet av politik*. Lund: Studentlitteratur.
- Perry, Sheila & Cross, Máire, 1997. *Voices of France: Social, Political and Cultural Identity*. Guildford: Biddles Ltd.
- Putnam, Robert, 2007. *E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and Community in the Twenty first Century*. *Scandinavian Political Studies*, Vol. 30, No.2: 137-174. www.synergy-blackwell.com.ludwig.lub.lu.se, January 2, 2008.
- Wihtol de Wenden, Catherine, 2003. *Multiculturalism and Political Integration in Modern Nation-States*. UNESCO, VOL.5, 1. www.unesco.org, dec2, 2007.

Wodak, Ruth, de Cillia, Rudolf, Reisigl, Martin & Liebhart, Karin, 1999. *The Discursive Construction of National Identity*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press Ltd.

Primary Material

Taken from the website www.premier-ministre.gouv.fr

TEXTE DE BRICE HORTEFEUX – “Missions et roles”, downloaded 28th November, 2007.

DISCOURS DE BRICE HORTEFEUX pour la clôture de l’Année européenne 2007 de l’Egalité des chances, 17 decembre 2007, downloaded 19th December, 2007.

DISCOURS DE BRICE HORTEFEUX LORS DES ASSISES NATIONALES DE L’INTÉGRATION, 3 décembre 2007, downloaded 10th December, 2007

DISCOURS DE BRICE HORTEFEUX à la presse 8 novembre 2007, downloaded 18th December 2007.

DISCOURS DE BRICE HORTEFEUX devant le sénat, 2 octobre 2007, downloaded 19th December 2007.

DISCOURS DE BRICE HORTEFEUX devant l’assemblée nationale 10 septembre 2007, downloaded 19th December 2007.

TEXTE DE BRICE HORTEFEUX - Immigration, développement et integration: trois missions etroitement liées, 1 juin 2007, downloaded 20th December, 2007.

TEXTE DE BRICE HORTEFEUX – “Ma vision de l’identité nationale”, taken from the newspaper La Libération, July 27th 2007.

Taken from the website www.elysee.fr:

DISCOURS DE M. LE PRÉSIDENT DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE, Inauguration du Tramway Marseille, 3 juillet 2007, downloaded 24 January 2008

ALLOCUTION DU PRESIDENT DE LA REPUBLIQUE Rencontre Economique Franco-Saoudienne Riyad, 14 janvier 2008, downloaded 24 January 2008

DISCOURS DE M. LE PRÉSIDENT DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE Salon SPACE Rennes – le 11 septembre 2007, downloaded 24th January 2008

ALLOCUTION DU PRESIDENT DE LA REPUBLIQUE Devant la conseil consultatif de Riyad, Riayd, 14 janvier, 2008, downloaded 24th January 2008.

ALLOCUTION DU PRÉSIDENT DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE Rupture du Jeûne Grande Mosquée de Paris, 1 octobre 2007, downloaded 23rd January 2008.

INTERVENTION DU PRESIDENT DE LA REPUBLIQUE Voeux aux Forces de la Nation, Palais de l'Elysée, 17 janvier 2008, downloaded 23rd January 2008.

ALLOCUTION DU PRESIDENT DE LA REPUBLIQUE Pour l'inauguration du lancement de Via Stella, Palais des congrés, Ajaccio, 30 octobre 2007, downloaded 23rd January 2008.

ALLOCUTION DE M. LE PRÉSIDENT DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE Devant la Collectivité Territoriale de Corse, Ajaccio, 30 octobre 2007, downloaded 23rd January 2008.

DISCOURS DU PRESIDENT DE LA REPUBLIQUE devant le Parlement hongrois Hongrie, 14 septembre 2007, downloaded 25nd January 2008.

CONFERENCE DE PRESSE DU PRESIDENT DE LA REPUBLIQUE, Palais de L'Elysée, 8 janvier 2008, downloaded 23rd January 2008.

Taken from the website www.sarkozy.fr:

CLIP OFFICIEL NS TV: L'identité nationale, 18 avril 2007, downloaded 25th January 2008.

CLIP OFFICIEL NS TV: Identité, immigration, sécurité, respect, 2 mai 2007, downloaded 25th January 2008.

A. Analytical Annex

Translated from the French by Jessica Reed

1. "We are to be reminded that it is far from the intentions of the Government to practice any form of "ethno-racial" categorizations, contrary to what I have heard or read" (Brice Hortefeux, Press Meeting, 8th November 2007).
2. "France is all its provinces which, throughout the centuries, have come together, have loved one another, and have united to form one single and same people, one single and same nation. France is a country where each province has maintained the memory of its history, has maintained its identity, its personality, its culture, its psychology, but where each has felt attached to something larger, where each approves of the feeling of sharing a common destiny with all the others" (Nicolas Sarkozy, Speech before the territorial collectivity of Corsica, Ajaccio, 30 October 2007)
3. "France is a community of values, it is an ideal, it is an idea. France is a multitude of small homelands which, when added together, make one big one" (Nicolas Sarkozy, official video clip "National Identity", NS TV, www.sarkozy.fr, 18th April 2007).
4. "Those who want to force their daughter to wear the headscarf, those who want to control the future of their wife by disrespecting their [right to] liberty are not welcome on the soil of the French republic" (Sarkozy, "identité, immigration, sécurité, respect", NS TV, www.sarkozy.fr, 2nd May 2007).
5. "Women in France are free, just like men, free to move around, free to marry, free to divorce. The right to abortion, this is also a part of our identity" (Nicolas Sarkozy, "Identity, Immigration, Security, Respect" NS TV, www.sarkozy.fr, 2nd May 2007).
6. "And so I said: "it is necessary to have identity and immigration". Why? Because France must welcome new French people, French people that come from far away. We welcome them with their own identity, but they, those that join us, must accept the idea that France comes from much further away, that she has begun before them, and that France is the bearer of values that they must respect" (Nicolas Sarkozy, official video clip, "National Identity", NS TV, www.sarkozy.fr, 18th April 2007).
7. "The word "earth" has a French significance, and I was elected to defend French national identity. And in this French national identity, there is a relationship between the French and the earth, with their ancestors, with their grand-parents. All the families of France have grand parents who, at one moment or the other, have worked the earth" (Nicolas Sarkozy, Speech at the Space conference, Rennes, www.elysee.fr, 11th September 2007).
8. "Integration politics addresses the 5 million legal immigrants present in France. Amongst them, 3 million have a foreign nationality and 2 million, born abroad, have

made the choice to become French” (Brice Hortefeux, Speech at the assembly seating for Integration, 3rd December 2007).

9. ”Corsica has a strong soul, a strong identity, a strong character and at the same time is profoundly French” (Nicolas Sarkozy, Speech before the territorial collectivity of Corsica, Ajaccio, 30th October 2007).
10. ”...Corsican identity being nothing other than a composite of national identity” (Nicolas Sarkozy, Speech at the Inauguration of Via Stella TV channel in Corsica, Ajaccio, 30th October 2007).
11. ”I say this in Marseilles because each ward of Marseilles has managed to maintain life, an identity, a village-like cohesion.....I have seen the tangible consequence during the terrible nights of November in 1995 and 2005: around Paris or Lyon cars were burning, but not in Marseilles” (Nicolas Sarkozy, Speech at the Inauguration of the Tramway in Marseilles, 3rd July, 2007).
12. ”Our country possesses a strong national identity, the word identity is not a big word, it is an original identity of which I want to say elsewhere that she [national identity] is not threatened by the welcoming of foreign populations. On the contrary” (Nicolas Sarkozy, Speech at the Grand Mosque, Paris, 1st October 2007, www.elysee.fr).
13. ”People of Hungary, you are a European people. People of France, we are a people of Europe. We belong to the same Union, to the same destined community, to the same European identity” (Nicolas Sarkozy, Speech before the parliament in Hungary, 14th September 2007, www.elysee.fr).
14. If we want to stop the flattening of the world, a globalization which pulverises everything, where there would only be one single language, one single culture, that’s to say no more culture at all, it is necessary for each of us to have the courage to develop an identity for our civilizations” (Nicolas Sarkozy, Speech at the Franco-Saudi Economic Meeting, Riyadh, 14th January 2008, www.elysee.fr).
15. ”You know, if we have had the feeling that the *francophone* culture and that *francophonie* is on the decline, it is necessary to have the honesty to accept the own responsibility of France” (Nicolas Sarkozy, Speech at the Franco-Saudi Economic Meeting, Riyadh, 14th January 2008, www.elysee.fr).
16. I have the duty to ensure that everyone, whether he is Jewish, Catholic, Protestant, Muslim, atheist, mason or rationalist, feels happy to live in France, feels free, feels respected in his convictions, in his values, in his origins. But I also have the duty to preserve the heritage of a long history, of a culture, and, I dare say the word, of a civilization. And I don’t know any country whose heritage, whose culture, whose civilization, does not have religious roots” (Nicolas Sarkozy, Speech in front of the Council of Consultants, Riyadh, 14th January 2008, www.elysee.fr).

17. "Ladies and Gentleman, the evening of the 31st of December, whilst presenting my new year wishes to the French, I told them of my intention to implement a civilization policy so that France will be the soul of the new renaissance of which the world is in need." (Nicolas Sarkozy, Press Conference, the Elysées, 8th January 2008, www.elysee.fr).