

Policy coherence and managing implementation in the aid arena

- The case Afghanistan

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Acknowledgement

I am grateful for all participants in this master thesis and for all help some of them have provided me with such as further contacts and policy documents. I want to aim a special thank to Johan von Schreeb who helped me to get in contact with persons essential for the results of this thesis.

There are a large amount of actors in both the Swedish and in the international arena. Those included and referred to in this thesis are:

Amnesty Internationals (AI) main objective is to promote and actively work for human rights. The organisation is distinctly based on voluntary membership and is thus dependent on active participation of these members for the activities.¹ Elisabeth Löfgren whom I had the honour to interview works as a press secretary for Amnesty International Sweden.

Diakonia is a Christian organisation engaged in democratisation processes and the protection of human rights. They also work, globally and in Sweden, with means to inflict changes in the battle against poverty and oppression in the world. Aid work is carried out in co-operation with 450 local organisations, churches and NGOs in 50 countries.² Bo Forsberg is Secretary General.

European Union (EU) is by politicians and policymakers emphasised as the world's biggest aid player.³ 60 percent of all aid comes from the union.⁴ EU can in term of diplomacy offer potential opportunities to organise conduct of diplomatic relations with a third state.⁵

International Red Cross Committee (ICRC) within the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. ICRC is an impartial, neutral and independent organisation with exclusively humanitarian mission to protect lives and dignity of victims of war, internal violence and to provide them with assistance. ICRC has been present in Afghanistan since 1986. They work together with the Afghan Crescent Society with all sorts of activities from medical support and health facilities to mine awareness and relief distributions.⁶ I had the privilege to meet Deputy Head at the Security and Stress Unit Melker Mabeck (has served in Afghanistan as Team Leader in the relief operations), Head of Sector for Cooperation programmes in Asia Sandra Moretti Carr (25 years with the ICRC) and diplomatic attaché Lila del Del Colle at the Humanitarian Diplomacy Unit.

International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) is through UN-mandate assisting the Afghan Government creating conditions for stabilisation and reconstruction.⁷ I met Tomas Karlsson, as responsible on a strategically level for Swedish Armed Forces military effort in ISAF.

¹ www.amnesty.se 080722 16:30

² www.diakonia.se 080807 10:31

³ Hettne et al 2008:59

⁴ Carlsson, Minister of Development Cooperation 080612

⁵ Aggesam et al 2008:64

⁶ Cooperation with National Societies ICRC 2007:11

⁷ www2.mil.se/sv/ 080729 20:44

Médecines Sans Frontières (MSF) is an international humanitarian aid organisation that provides medical assistance to populations in danger in more than 70 countries. MSF withdrew from Afghanistan in August 2004 after five of their staff members were killed.⁸ Dan Sermand whom I had the privilege to interview works as a General Director for MSF Sweden.

Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) are military units with the purpose of providing security and reconstruction assistance in unstable nations. PRTs originate from a United States Armed Forces (USAF) project used in the Vietnam War⁹ and began in Afghanistan in late 2001.¹⁰ Experience in PRTs referred to in this thesis is Jan Dunmurray who worked as Chief of Military Operations in Northern Afghanistan (Regional Command North, ISAF) during 2007.

Save the Children Alliance is a loose interlaced umbrella organisation. Their fundamental aim is to assist vulnerable children and promote implementation of the Child Convention.

Swedish International Development Agency (Sida) works on behalf of Sweden's Parliament and Government with the objective to help create conditions that will enable the poor to improve their lives.¹¹ I was obliged to meet Afghanistan handler Tomas Bergenholz at this agency.

Sweden's Ministry for Foreign Affairs Sweden is a humanitarian superpower who gives second most aid per capita in the world.¹² Mikael Lindvall, deputy Director Humanitarian policy and conflict issues and Johan Schaar, Commission on Climate Change and Development (former head of Sida's division for humanitarian assistance and conflict management) represents Sweden's Ministry of foreign affairs in this paper.

Swedish Afghanistan Committee (SCA) is a politically, religiously and ideologically neutral member based organisation. Their purpose is to support the Afghan national independence, manage development cooperation in Afghanistan in effort to support democratic, economical and social development.¹³ Bengt Kristiansson was at the time for interview Secretary General.

Swedish Armed Force mission is to deal with military threats and armed conflicts.¹⁴ One of the Swedish Armed Force main undertakings today is international operations.¹⁵ I met Carl-Gustav Schultz whom works with civil-military cooperation, Anders Oltorp, head of the development section working with concept of Effect Based Approach to Operations, Controller Petra Pfeiff, Charlotte Isaksson, Senior Gender advisor and Legal Adviser Marica Ericson Benedict at Swedish Armed Forces Headquarter.

A list of abbreviations is available in the back of this paper.

⁸ The Lancet Vol 370 August 4, 2007:377f

⁹ Rana 2004:571

¹⁰ Afghanistan Nytt #4, 2007:13

¹¹ www.sida.se 080729 20:13

¹² www.regeringen.se 080514 16:29

¹³ www.sak.se 080729 20:03

¹⁴ www2.mil.se/sv/ 080729 20:44

¹⁵ Ericson-Benedict at Ministry of Defence, 080318

Abstract

During the past decade the debate on aid has been an area of criticism because of its supposed ineffectiveness. The mixture of development-, security- and conflict solution questions becomes more evident as civil servants, military and NGOs interact in the same territory. This poses the challenge of policies to be coherent. Since it has been argued that policy coherence has attracted small attention by academics it is time to put the issue on the agenda also hoping to contribute with ‘how-to’ issues. The primary research supporting this paper is semi-structured interviews with a range of senior and mid-level officials from main stakeholders in international humanitarian response.

This thesis analyses the political implications of core traditional humanitarian principles of impartiality, independence and neutrality in a context where borders between humanitarian and political-military action has become blurry. Based on a case study this thesis shows aid in change and explores policy coherence of aid in conflict/crisis situations. Coordination of response could theoretically improve effectiveness. The downside of it is that coordination itself has become an end where new clusters structures multiplied existing platforms of dialogue instead of simplifying. Afghanistan substantiates the diligence and validity of these apprehensions and issues.

Key words: policy coherence, aid, humanitarian assistance, NGOs, military Afghanistan, cooperation

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1 Introduction

Billions of dollars are spent on aid. Are these spent effectively? The answer for would probably be no and I am interested in finding out why.

Aid is in change, becoming more supra-national and co-ordinated.¹⁶ Since the beginning of this century the complexity of multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations has increased and a trend towards integration of humanitarian, military and political actors has grown. Afghanistan seen as a contemporary context substantiates the diligence and the validity of these apprehensions and issues.¹⁷

World politics concerning aid involves not only states but many non state actors.¹⁸ Organisations mission in a conflict area incorporates various tasks and objectives. In Afghanistan these differ widely, ranging from purely humanitarian relief and peace promotion efforts, to more long term construction of economical and political infrastructure. Numerous activities in the sector of aid involve relationships and activities for which collaboration are essential. This collaboration should though not be taken as granted as history has shown difficulties in terms of counteractions and duplications.

1.1 Purpose

With the concept of policy coherence I seek to understand problems of cooperative action using theory of implementation. It is for me important that research is not only about having intra-scientific ambitions. Analysis and results should also be useful by the practician in the field. My ambition is to contribute with guidance in possible ways (according to participants in this study) of dealing with ‘how-to’ issues in a conflict situation. When cultural ideas clashes and expectations difference frustration mounts within international groups.¹⁹ It is in the study of policy coherence therefore natural with contradictions between interviewees. One reason of why I find this study even more interesting to conduct.

Even though it is rare to see an entirely new appearing issue on the agenda,²⁰ it is little written about how armed forces understand their role in civilian tasks,²¹

¹⁶ Hettne 080612

¹⁷ Rana 2004:567

¹⁸ Keck & Sikkink 1998:1

¹⁹ Samverkan i kris och konflikt: ett utbildningsinstrument för dig i utlandstjänst 2004:40

²⁰ Hill 2005:145

²¹ Rana 2004:570

coherence and integrated missions. Grabel sees a need to rethink what policy coherence means as a concept²² while I see a need to increase the knowledge concerning the use of it. I do not wish to contribute to another definition or distinguishing the definition of policy coherence but see it as a versatile concept and a forward vision of what might be possible.

1.2 Research questions

When dealing with conflict and crisis situations.

- Do peace building organisations, military; NGOs and states understand each other?
 - Do they have a common apparatus of concept?
 - Performance aside, how do fast responders such as MSF and ICRC fit into arrangements given that they may fall outside formal coordination systems?
 - Is there a need for a common platform to achieve better policy coherency?
- are here questions at issue:

In order to find out there are questions that need to be sorted out, such as how many and which organisations cooperate? What are their aims? If problems appear, where do these problems appear – at individual, organisational or network/relationship level? Numerous organisations often assume that there is a desired end or status and these tend to shift quite a lot. The edge of the problem is that if NGOs, institutions and military are working towards the same goal and if not why can they not then work together?

With base in interviews a contribution to this study is opinions expressed by participants. By pointing out that also said that no definitive conclusions will be drawn on how cooperation as ideology impact on humanitarian assistance in conflict situations.

1.3 Method and material

The issue of policy coherence is best explored through an example. Researching case study as method can give a great outreach and opens the possibility to in a deeper way view the single case Afghanistan.²³ The challenge will be in an empirical way to highlight the problem of policy coherence. The motive for my choice of research object bottoms in that *Afghan Compact* was one of the first

²² Grabel :335ff

²³ Lundquist 1993:105

substantive efforts by donors and host nations to coordinate their agendas. For guidance on how to interact on field level a field-based study would be optimal, this has unfortunately not been possible despite various efforts.²⁴ I reason that the material found whilst situated in Sweden and Geneva is good enough though in order to carry out the study in mind.

The methodology for this piece of work was based on three data collection methods.

1. Key policy documents and academic texts/books.
2. A series of approximately 1 hour interviews. Most interviews were conducted in person, solitary by phone.²⁵
3. Information imbibed at seminars and similar.

The primary research supporting this paper was conducted between January and June in 2008. This outlook did not aim to provide a comprehensive overview of policy coherence based on exhaustive research but to underline trends highlighted by those I heard, met and talked with.

The method used in this study is semi-structured interviews with a range of senior and mid-level officials from main stakeholders in international humanitarian response in Afghanistan and other countries. A total of about twenty were interviewed. Data was manually analysed. The framework of analysis is not based on questionnaires or survey data that can be compiled and evaluated quantitatively. By saying so no statistical material is being presented.²⁶ I have unfortunately, despite numerous efforts²⁷ not been able to come in contact with someone working for the United Nations (UN). They have therefore been put aside in this study, not desirable since they play an important role.

Hard data is difficult to come by. It is therefore important to highlight that interviews are relatively subjective in concern that interviewees represent an organisation. Also worth knowing is that whom or what are defined as central actors can derive to which perspective the writer is emanating from.²⁸ It is not certain those chosen by me as “important actors” are important according to others. This study therefore serves interaction between empirical and normative political science. Still I judge that the reasoning I keep is not of a character that they are totally dependent on solitary sources, which foster inter-subjectivity and reability.

²⁴ I have applied for numerous scholarships but not been able to receive any because of the time limit, lack of ensuring security in Afghanistan etcetera.

²⁵ Lindvall by phone. All interviews have been recorded if reference is needed, all in writing, some on tape.

²⁶ Lundquist 1993:103

²⁷ Written letter and email 080124 to UNAMA offices both in Pakistan and New York, email to UN inquires 080201 & 080609, email to the general director of the Swedish UNA (080225) whom forwarded me to a deputy, email to siddiquea@un.org 080306, costy@un.org and wahlstromm@un.org 080312, and a final try to UN inquires .

²⁸ Bengtsson et. al 2001:10ff

1.4 Delimitation

There is a wide range of conflicts and a conflict is more than an acute violent stage.²⁹ Whatever reason conflicts are very complex in its structure.³⁰ This thesis aims for a closer examination of the various international and local actors implicated in setting the policy agenda in post-Taliban and war-torn Afghanistan. Delimitations are made in consideration to permitted size of this thesis. I study concepts of coordination and cooperation seen from humanitarian organisations, state institutions and others working in direction for development, peace and security. With that said that I neither study resistance movements such as the Taliban's, or their capacity to coordinate efforts nor collaboration within organisations. Those are question at issue of their own.

It is not my aim to find out whether NGOs and civil organisations take part in countries foreign policy or to find methods or instruments for evaluation. I do not either consider if some actors would be authorial to another.

1.5 Disposition

At first clarifications and distinctions about the concept of policy coherence are needed before I start to examine the problem raised by the development-humanitarian aid-security nexus. The following chapter outlines my theoretical framework, comprising four parts; policy formulation, managing implementation, top down versus bottom up and organisational process. My intention is to present the case starting with a background including humanitarian aid and efforts towards policy coherence. Here are two chapters of analysis, the first concentrating on collaboration and impartiality, independence & neutrality (with empery embedded) and the second analysing different types of integration and policy coherence. Chapter six comprises concluding remarks and a brief review of future aims.

1.6 Definitions

1.6.1 Humanitarian assistance & aid

29 Hettne et al. 2008:61

30 Samverkan i kris och konflikt: ett utbildningsinstrument för dig i utlandstjänst, 2004:26

Humanitarian assistance is defined by Oxfam as: delivered impartially to those in need, irrespective of who they are.³¹ If military belongs to the occupation power the military are ordered to provide humanitarian efforts when nobody else can assist. Since it is not carried out by an impartial organisation it is then not delivered impartial.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) defines Official Development Assistance (ODA) (aid) as: “[...] resources transferred on concessional financial terms with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries [...].”³²

1.6.2 Coordination – Policy coherence – Cooperation

Tim Jones distinguishes *policy coordination* as getting several institutions and organisations to work together. The concept of *policy coherence* goes further reinforcing policy action across institutions and organisations in an effort to create synergies.³³ May et al defines policy coherence as when various policies go together because they share a set of ideas or objectives.³⁴ Policy coherency is for me a matter of degree and about that efforts within a policy area should not counteract but support each other. *Cooperation* is a complicated concept concluding elements such as parallel efforts (not necessarily duplications) and numerous actors. In description of non-combat functions of armed forces dealing with civilian functions the Swedish Military and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) use *civil-military cooperation* (CIMIC).³⁵

³¹ Oxfam International 2008:2

³² Burnell 1997:4

³³ Jones 2002:391f

³⁴ May et al. 2006:383

³⁵ Rana 2004:568ffs

2 Policy coherence, implementation and the policy process. A theoretical point of departure.

The concept of policy coherence is under-theorized and have according to May et al received diminutive empirical examination. This even though policy scholars generally agree that greater coherence of policies is enviable.³⁶ Grabel agrees by saying that a new battle of concept, to date 2007, has attracted small attention by academics but raised attention from the UN, NGOs and other parts of the non-academic development community. It is therefore now time to put the issue on the academic agenda. This study explores linkages between policy coherence and managing implementation in systems of aid in conflict and crisis situations.

I am interested in studying how security, development and humanitarian assistance can make a coherent contribution. My aim is to find out if efforts pull in the same direction and harmonizing workloads efficiently instead of duplicating – or worse counteracting – each others efforts. I use theories of managing implementation, policy process, top down vs. bottom up and organisational process trying to find these answers.

I have in consideration three hypothesis concerning why communication and cooperation between participants in this study does not always take place where I borrow the third from May et al's (2006) three hypothesis concerning policy coherence.

1. There is no tradition of communication and collaboration.
2. There is a lack of resources – it is hard and time-consuming to obtain the information necessary.
3. Policy coherence is increased for policy domains for which there is dominant executive agency.³⁷

2.1 Policy process/formation/formulation

Policy process is according to Hill essentially complex and multilayered, a political process, but in its widest sense.³⁸ Kingdon depicts policy process as

³⁶ May et al. 2006:381

³⁷ ibid.:385ff

haphazard or muddled.³⁹ To use Miles definition this will be a cross-organisation approach to policy formulation.⁴⁰ Hill shows that aspects of policy formation such as agenda setting need to be seen as closely related.⁴¹ According to Hager interdependency and organised cooperation is essential for efficient policymaking in a network society⁴² therefore coherence matters in setting policies. The constructive element is here what possibilities there are in the institutional order you are in.

2.2 Managing implementation

Managing implementation is about finding controlling features that function. Issues, interests and targets here functions as policy variables with an understanding that policies in a given policy area cohere because of consistent issue framing, policy clients and integrative policy area. Implementation problems often arise because there is a tension between the normative issue of government (what ought to be done, by whom and how) and the conflict between interests.⁴³

There are by no means possible to reflect how an organisation or government agency better can contribute with humanitarian assistance, towards a lasting peace, etc. without evaluating the principal values that pervade the specific institution or organisation activities and guidelines. It is first when the institution or organisation relates to what it considers to be important in specific situations that its underlying values become tangible. It is then easier to differentiate elements that actually contribute and counteract to effective operations. After that we may be able to change what counteracts operations in the aid arena.

One way of analysing implementation problems introduced by Hood in 1976 is to begin thinking about what he calls “perfect administration” comparable to what economist calls perfect competition. Perfect management can in this case be where “the management” (for example an international body such as UN) is defined as a condition in which external elements of resource accessibility (for example NGOs) and political tolerability (from example states) is included in the management to produce perfect policy implementation.⁴⁴

Examinations of implementation according to Hill need to give attention to that:

- implementation involves complex intra-organisational interactions.

³⁸ ibid.:4

³⁹ ibid.:160

⁴⁰ Miles in Baehr & Wittrock 1981:153

⁴¹ Hill 2005:172

⁴² Hager 110

⁴³ Hill 2005:194

⁴⁴ Hood 1076:6

- the analysis of those interactions are negotiations between actors who are at least quasi-autonomous, most of them autonomous
- this autonomy may be linked with the claims of legitimacy.
- these complexities need to be seen as contained within different national or transnational political systems which influence the games played and legitimacies claimed.⁴⁵

2.3 Top-down vs. Bottom-up

The top-down perspective can be seen as rooted in stage models and makes a clear distinction between policy formulation and policy implementation. These can be separated because implementation is defined as actions by public or private individuals/groups as achievements set forth in prior decisions. Policy formulation is from a top down perspective set by officials.

The Bottom-up perspective gives us another way of looking at the policy process called “backward reasoning” where individual action is the starting point. Their actions can be response to problems. To understand this connection we need to focus on the interaction between actors and agencies and what seems to be influencing what, how and why.⁴⁶ I touch why this trend occurs (political directives), what influences it (actors in the international body) and how (international forums).

2.4 Organisational process

A distinction needs to be drawn between what is referred to the policy process occurring within a single organisation and the one concerning relationships between organisation.⁴⁷ My main focus is on the latter. The social analyse would include which ways boundaries between organisations may vary and be disputed but this political science analysis more focuses on the pure forms of dialogue.

Implementation as well as all aspects of policy process often involves inter-organisational systems. I am looking at a situation with many organisations, overlapping jurisdictions, differences of function and cross-cutting authority relationships. The importance of inter-organisational relationship can not only be seen as arising pragmatic concerns but also the recognition of importance of networks or the way in which organisational configurations influence actions.⁴⁸

⁴⁵ Hill 2005:193

⁴⁶ ibid.: 176, 183f

⁴⁷ ibid.:193

⁴⁸ ibid.:237

3 Background

At the same time as the degree of interaction within the world economy has increased, the same thing has happened within the system of world politics.⁴⁹ It is determined that it is the states responsibility to protect Human Rights (HR)⁵⁰, but they are also the primary violators.⁵¹ As a result other actors get involved.⁵² National and international organisations have come to play a far more important role than anyone could forecast.⁵³ States collapsing or external interventions constitute a growing threat and causes not only local but regional and global consequences.⁵⁴ During the last years we have seen numerous examples of how democratisation- and peace-keeping efforts, from a western variant has failed. Afghanistan is one example. Below is a short background of Afghanistan's history and how aid has been carried out in the specific country and a description of efforts towards policy coherence that are in relevance for the specific case.

3.1 Afghanistan

Numerous years of severe drought and more than two decades of war have ravaged Afghanistan and brought pervasive suffering to its inhabitants. In the era of Cold War the US, by proxy, provoked a Soviet invasion in Afghanistan in 1979 by financing the Islamic *mujahidin* uprising. The Soviet troops withdrew in 1989. President Burhanuddin Rabbanis forces took Kabul in 1992 and the Taliban's came to power with support from Pakistan. Restoring law and order through imposition of a strict variant of Islamic law was the Taliban's claim. The harshness of Taliban rule became apparent, and by late 1990s it became a concern for the international community.⁵⁵ The US coalition, in the name of war on terror, launched the first air strike against Taliban targets in Afghanistan in October 2001.⁵⁶ Ground operations have followed ever since.

⁴⁹ Dicken: Peter, *The Global Shift*

⁵⁰ Muchlinkski 2001:37

⁵¹ Keck & Sikkink 1998:12

⁵² Gunner & Namlı 2005:296

⁵³ Muchlinkski 2001:37

⁵⁴ Björkdahl i Det 21 Århundredets trusler:71ff

⁵⁵ Kandiyoti 2005:21

⁵⁶ UN in Afghanistan 2001-2002 Report of Secretary General Document A/56/875-S/2002/278
2002:2

When war broke out in Afghanistan 1979 it was already one of the world's poorest countries⁵⁷, the same situation faced the afghan people in 2001.⁵⁸ In early 2002 Afghanistan had big similarities with the concept of "failed state".⁵⁹

3.1.1 Aid in Afghanistan

Most obvious in the Afghanistan is a mix of several insecure situations, economically as well as security-wise, a country prone to conflict situations but also natural disaster.⁶⁰ The country management is struggling to improve living conditions for its population. Facilities such as clean water, electricity and medical care are in short supply. Humanitarian aid is in this fragile context therefore a matter of life or death.⁶¹ Between 4-6 billion US dollars a year is being distributed as aid in Afghanistan. 350 million Swedish crowns are earmarked annually which makes Afghanistan the biggest receiver of Swedish aid in Asia.⁶² Economic and humanitarian assistance in Afghanistan has over the past two decades been dominated by emergency orientation. Mostly short-term orientated project implemented by NGOs has in recent years been loosely coordinated within systems established by donors, NGOs and UN agencies.⁶³

3.2 Efforts towards policy coherence

3.2.1 Co-financing

Several NGOs and UN agencies develop partnerships with several donors and finance different projects. Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) is example of such, set up by the UN General Assembly in 2005 and launched in 2006. The three objectives are 1) Promote early action and response to reduce loss of life 2) Enhance response to time-critical humanitarian requirements and 3) Strengthen core elements of humanitarian response in low funded crises.⁶⁴ CERF is a financial instrument created to ensure efficient and work as rapid response in under funded emergencies. The work is led by the UN Emergency Relief Coordinator and Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) at

⁵⁷ Barakat 2002:807

⁵⁸ Rubin:50

⁵⁹ Shurke et. al. 2002:878

⁶⁰ Moretti , ICRC 080410

⁶¹ Cooperation with National Societies ICRC 2007:11

⁶² www.regeringen.se 080514 16:29

⁶³ Shurke et al. 2002:885

⁶⁴ Resolution 60/124 2005, United Nations General Assembly, New York.

a global level but by the UN Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) in the specific country.⁶⁵ The HC serves as the core for decision making for coordination through clusters.⁶⁶

3.2.2 UN

Starting with the Brahimi Report⁶⁷ in 2000 UN consistently maintains that humanitarian actions should remain subsidiary to political objectives.⁶⁸ The UN is increasingly bringing together its different functions in Integrated Missions (IM) as an instrument in those countries that are in transitions from war to peace. UNIM can be seen as a policy with the intention to promote coherence between development, humanitarian, military and political elements in a UN operation. This has been used in Afghanistan. UNIM are headed by a political appointee, generally the UN Special Representative of Secretary General (SRSG) for that specific country. Humanitarian organisations are set to report directly to UN.⁶⁹

In 2002 UNAMA was established through UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1401. The original mandate was to support rebuilding and national reconciliation outlined in the Bonn Agreement. Today Afghanistan has gradually moved from the Bonn Process and UNAMA's work has adopted alongside. UNAMA's mandate is renewed annually but do since March 2006 contain six main elements: providing political and strategic advice for the peace process; providing good offices; assisting Afghanistan's government towards implementation of the Afghanistan Compact; promoting HR; providing technical assistance; and continuing to manage all UN humanitarian relief, recovery, reconstruction and development activities in coordination with the government.⁷⁰

3.2.3 European Union (EU)

The European Security Strategy (ESS) from 2003 works as a reference for greater coherence between development and security issues in EU. The document expresses an ambition to integrate the whole panoply of instruments. This expanded with Civilian Headline Goal in 2008. A programme which added new goals and operational capabilities from integrated crisis management, monitoring missions, supporting measures and contributions to Security Sector Reform (SSR)

⁶⁵ <http://cerf.un.org>

⁶⁶ Stobbeart et al. FMR 29:19

⁶⁷ <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N00/594/70/PDF/N0059470.pdf?OpenElement>

⁶⁸ 080814 10:45

⁶⁹ Stobaerts et al FMR 29:18

⁷⁰ United Nations 2000. Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, UN Document Ref. A/55/305-S/2000/809, New York: United Nations, August 2000.

and Disarmament, Demobilisation and Rehabilitation (DDR).⁷¹ EU development cooperation (another word for aid) is according to Maastricht calibrated to the principles of ‘3 Cs’, coherence, complementarity and coordination.⁷²

The EU-Afghanistan Joint Declaration was sought to build on what the writers of the agreement calls “the success of the Bonn Agreement”. It includes working areas such as political and economic governance; SSR and Justice Sector Reform; Counter Narcotics; Development; HR, Civil Society and Refugee Return and Education and Culture. In effort to strengthen bilateral cooperation and examine progress Afghanistan and the EU are obliged to meet annual at ministerial level.⁷³

3.2.4 The Bonn Agreement

UN sponsored talks about Afghanistan’s future in late 2001 resulted in an establishment of a 30-member interim authority and a judicial commission called the Bonn Agreement.⁷⁴ The central intention and principle with the agreement that includes long-term development: democratisation, economic development and social justice were to reinstate a national government. In this should all ethnical groups would be represented.⁷⁵ The partnership from Bonn erect on a mutual engagement and responsibility to succeed from both donor and receiver side. The North Americans was supposed to contribute with battling forces while Europeans would take responsibility for economical development and peacekeeping safety.⁷⁶

3.2.5 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness

The Paris Declaration identifies goals and targets for the reduction of inequality and poverty, capacity development and achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).⁷⁷ The purpose with this declaration was among other things better coordination, increased efficiency and responsible-taking. It is an attempt to reform the ways that donor countries deliver and manage aid in an effort to significantly improve development performance.⁷⁸ §3 iv and v stands out in terms of policy coherence with the explicit message of eliminating duplication of efforts and rationalising donor activities to make them as cost-effective as possible. Further reforming and simplifying donor policies and procedures to encourage collaborative behaviour. §14 expresses encourage for coordination between the civil society and the private sector. Donors are committed to

⁷¹ Aggestam et al 2008:120f

⁷² The Treaty of Maastricht Article 130u-x

⁷³ Korski 2008:1

⁷⁴ Barakat 2002:802f

⁷⁵ Shurke et al. 2002:888, 876

⁷⁶ Rashid in Kristiansson 2004:31ff

⁷⁷ Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness

⁷⁸ Paris Declaration on Aid Effectivness. §1

harmonise aid for capacity and development and not only in work reduce duplicative, separate efforts but also promote joint strategies.⁷⁹

3.2.6 Swedish policy goals

Sweden's Policy for Global Development (PGD) strive for consistent, cooperative politics that reflects a global trend descendent from the Paris Agenda.⁸⁰

3.2.7 Afghan Compact

The Afghan Compact grew from the spirit of the conferences concerning Afghanistan's future in Bonn, Tokyo and Berlin.⁸¹ Three pillars stands critical and independent of activity in the Afghan compact: security; governance, rule of law and human rights; economic and social development. The principles for cooperation do not only concern the cooperative work load but the promotion of cooperation.

Coordination and Monitoring is a segment in the compact that highlights establishing a *Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board* concerning implementing the compact. This board is co-chaired by the Afghan Government and the UN whereas the intention with the board is to ensure greater coherence.⁸² Annex II, Improving the effectiveness of aid, is the part that expresses the trend towards cooperation in accordance with the Paris Declaration.⁸³

⁷⁹ ibid. §24, 32

⁸⁰ Forsberg, Diakonia 080423

⁸¹ The Afghan Compact, part security,

⁸² The Afghan Compact, Coordination and Monitoring, Annex III

⁸³ The Afghan Compact, Annex II

4 Collaboration

Collaboration can be seen in many examples such as the return of refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Afghanistan where Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation (MORR) is responsible but supported by UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), with assistance from the International Organization of Migration (IOM), United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the World Food Programme (WFP), World Health Organisation and others.⁸⁴

With benchmark in Top-down vs. Bottom up perspective and organisational process I am trying to understand presumptions for and obstacles with collaboration.

4.1.1 Civil-military cooperation (CIMIC)

Improving synergy between civil and military efforts in multinational intervention is nowadays a key priority for armed forces and states.⁸⁵ CIMIC is not a new phenomenon, but it seems more complex today. A more recent development in the civil-military area is that civilian experts now are embedded into structures within the military to provide their expertise in civil administration, policing and political reforms.⁸⁶ According to Rana military and political actors are at present more definite in how they want to intervene. The military is today able to jump from peacekeeping, waging war and providing humanitarian assistance in the same day.

4.1.2 Organisation

Generally are civil organisations less hierarchical, have younger executives and shorter ways of decision than the military. Military units are usually top-down. They emanate from a contract with central power while civil organisations work from a more bottom-up oriented perspective that starts with agreements and projects on a local level. Time perspective also differentiates them two.⁸⁷ Civil efforts, especially the ones of development characteristics, are prepared to stay at one place for long while the military units have a time restrained mandate. Most countries rotate the whole contingent every six months, something many civil

⁸⁴ UN in Afghanistan 2001-2002 Report of SG Document A/56/875-S/2002/278 2002:8

⁸⁵ Rana 2004:586

⁸⁶ ibid:568ff

⁸⁷ Eriksson 1999

organisations points out as a lead subject for difficulties in coherence. Knowledge and experience concerning the more long-term civilian work will never be built up properly.⁸⁸ This means that the different efforts can come out of time with each other, for example concerning which advancements that is reasonable in a certain time period. Even if civil and military organisations agree about the clasping purpose about a mission their short-time purpose can sometimes land up in conflict with each other.⁸⁹

4.1.3 Comprehensive approach

PRTs are often described as taking comprehensive approach but are according to Rana a military action with civilian components drawn up to get support for military action.⁹⁰ The danger in CIMIC is how to know who is who since you are more or less part of a team says Bergenholz.

The relationship between ICRC and multinational military missions are limited by maintaining independence of decision making and action.⁹¹ According to Mabeck the concept of an acceptance-based approach is a corner stone in their way of operating. However, the value of their way of working is not based of the fact that they have been doing it for 'a long time', but because *over time* it has proved to be an effective way of protecting and assisting victims of armed conflict. For coordination system to be admittedly one of the primary issues, according to Bengtsson et al, is that organisations and their efforts will be able to maintain their identities.⁹²

4.1.4 'Hearts and minds'

'Hearts and minds' operation are in the spotlight for critique regarding its contribution to confuse respective roles and remitting humanitarian organisations and militaries in the minds of the beneficiaries.⁹³

A problem MSF put on the agenda is that UN peacekeepers that provide relief may not be trained in providing humanitarian assistance.⁹⁴ It can have negative effects on security for humanitarian organisations and their ability to provide aid if populations (and 'others') come to see "humanitarian" action as nothing but a disguise for other political/military agendas. You then risk a rejection by the population in general, possibly endangering humanitarian workers and thus denying victims in need the protection and assistance which they have a (legal!)

⁸⁸ Karlsson Swedish Armed Forces 080122

⁸⁹ Eriksson, in FOA-tidningen nr 5-1999

⁹⁰ Rana 2004:569f

⁹¹ ibid:582

⁹² Bengtsson et. al. 2001:25

⁹³ Mabeck ICRC 080407, Sermand MSF 080314, Kristiansson SCA 080310

⁹⁴ Oxfam International, 2008:3

right to benefit from.⁹⁵ To achieve long-term effects Karlsson expresses that the military sometimes need to use quick impact resources. Cooperation is here more eminently because when you have allocated a short term need to communicate along this to provide something more long-term without risking failure.

Making aid organisations associated with western politico-military efforts have resulted in making humanitarian aid workers former targets for violent opposition and killing. MSF withdrew from Afghanistan in August 2004 after five of their staff members were killed. A Taliban spokesperson claimed responsibility for the murders with the motive that organisations like MSF work for American interests.⁹⁶ A leaflet was distributed by the US military in southern Afghanistan saying “Pass on any information related to Taliban, Al Qaeda and Gulbaddin to the coalition forces in order to have a continuation of the provision of humanitarian aid”⁹⁷, clearly endangering the people in need.

Rana highlights the need to keep a clear distinction between humanitarian action and political-military action. Not because ICRC does not shy away from the military, sometimes a military unit is the last resort, but because of the often highlighted argument, to avoid blurring of boarders.⁹⁸ As Schultz says, CIMIC is boarder-crossing and blurry boarder. It is all about a subjective judgement and in the eye of the contemplator.

4.2 Humanitarian Goals

Sometimes humanitarian action is political in itself as humanitarian action takes place in a political context. MSF is of the position that the humanitarian imperative (meeting immediate needs and saving lives) is the main goal, independent from and incompatible with political solutions to crises.⁹⁹ De Torrenté says that western governments already in 1990s begun to put humanitarian goals centre stage in military efforts. It was though not until after Sept 11 that the ability for humanitarian organisations to remain neutral was destroyed along with Bush’s with-us-or-against-us doctrine as well as Colin Powell’s expression of NGOs as “force multipliers”.¹⁰⁰

4.3 Independence, Impartiality & Neutrality

⁹⁵ Mabeck ICRC 080407

⁹⁶ The Lancet Vol 370 August 4, 2007:377f

⁹⁷ available at www.msf.org/countries/page.cfm?articleid=409F102D-A77A-4C94-89E0A47D7213B4D5

⁹⁸ Rana 2004:565ff

⁹⁹ Sermand, MSF 080314

¹⁰⁰ The Lancet Vol 370 August 4, 2007:377

Attacks against aid workers and civilians have escalated in Afghanistan.¹⁰¹ An article by Vanessa van Schoor in the Lancet highlights that as western government wage “humanitarian wars” maintaining neutrality for NGOs while providing aid seems increasingly difficult. Not only coalition forces but also aid agencies have been accused for doing little to disassociate themselves from each other. Their response has been that it does not matter how political their action is as long as they provide help.¹⁰²

In hot war situations like Afghanistan Donini find it logical to maintain maximum insulation and independence, partly because UN is on the ground of a Secretary Council resolution. It is then important for humanitarian actors to be seen as humanitarian and nothing else. Donini further thinks that in lower level crises humanitarian players are allowed to operate more in a way which they have operated in the past in contrary to in a crisis that is part of the global war on terror, such as Afghanistan. It is therefore more important to be independent.¹⁰³ A military organisation can never be impartial, somebody has asked them to come there. Civil organisations can try to be impartial but yet again it is not what is expressed but who the receiver is and how that person perceives words that matter.¹⁰⁴

Donini expresses that it is not as if humanitarian action is something that is separate, impartial, independent and neutral. It is something that is imbedded in the way which global governance functions.¹⁰⁵ Mabeck says that neutrality is not a goal in itself, but nor is it just supposed to "protect" them. It is a mean through which ICRC can gain acceptance for their presence and activities. Additionally consequently provide ICRC with safe access to people and areas where their work is needed. Torrenté believes the same.¹⁰⁶ Paul O'Brien, ex-advocacy coordinator in Afghanistan for CARE¹⁰⁷ disagrees and says that for several remaining non-political in the current highly charged political climate is unrealistic by saying: “politics are too important to be left to politicians”.¹⁰⁸

According to Torrenté aid in conflict zones nor promotes peace or fuels war¹⁰⁹ which is contra dictionary to Ericson-Benedict's hypothesis that supply of basic needs contributes to stability in a conflict situation. There is so far no evidence that providing aid independently will in fact hinder improvement towards development and/or peace but in recent years there have been voices concerning that “aid fuels war. On the opposite Francis Sejersted and others have expressed that delivery of fraternity and humanity to all parties in a conflict play a role in constructing a meaningful peace.¹¹⁰

¹⁰¹ Svenska Dagbladet 080908

¹⁰² The Lancet Vol 370 August 4, 2007:377

¹⁰³ Donini 2007:3ff

¹⁰⁴ Schultz Swedish Armed Forces 080122

¹⁰⁵ Donini 2007:2

¹⁰⁶ The Lancet Vol 370 August 4, 2007:378

¹⁰⁷ www.care.org/ 080716 00:54

¹⁰⁸ The Lancet Vol 370 August 4, 2007:378

¹⁰⁹ Torrenté 2004:3

¹¹⁰ ibid.:7

It is clear that collaboration problems are very much similar to problems of managing implementation. They arise because of there is a tension between the normative issue of what ought to be done by whom and how.

5 Coherence

Earlier outlined hypotheses about policy coherence is:

1. There is no tradition of communication and collaboration.
2. There is a lack of resources – it is hard and time-consuming to obtain the information necessary.
3. Policy coherence is increased for policy domains for which there is dominant executive agency.¹¹¹

Using answers from interviewees I will with these above and usual problems in managing implementation try to understand the issue of coherence. Starting with communication I ask myself what are the potentials of communication in terms of policy coherence?

5.1 Communication

5.1.1 Dialogue

In many crisis and conflict situations dialogue is informal and unplanned but sometimes partners make a deliberate and planned effort to use dialogue strategically. ICRC exchange relevant information¹¹² and MSF inform about their activities irregularly in UN meetings, with ministries etcetera.¹¹³ Bergenholz, along with others, stresses that there are fine meeting structures and assembly points but he says that it is not the same things as that actors really listen. The real issue is that every country has their national agenda. It seems hard to keep the balance between different national aims in the region you operate. Löfgren thinks dialogue is very much dependent on the people who acts as information channels. People with engagement are easy to have a dialogue with. There are good structures, but if it is not “right” persons on these positions those structures do not work. Forsberg accentuates this by saying that aid is to a great deal built on trust and therefore are informal contacts the most important of all.

¹¹¹ ibid.:385ff

¹¹² Rana 2004:589

¹¹³ Sermard, MSF 080314

Lack of communication can result in inefficiencies for both donors and organisations. The potential positive effect of communication and collaboration is the potential to learn from each other. A platform for communication and coordination is therefore of value both for donors and organisations operating in the field. The main obstacle concerning donor communication and coordination seems to be time. Unfortunately it is time-consuming, both to set up and to maintain networks. Especially humanitarian organisation tends to little have time to allocate to networks.¹¹⁴

5.2 Word of apparatus

5.2.1 Mix of security-, development- and conflict solution questions and its meaning for cooperation

According to Lindvall the mixture of security-, development- and conflict solution questions evolves from that it is not possible to detach development from security. There is a need to fight uprising before outlining motive of development. On one hand, says Schaar, it must be a mix if you want to lower transaction costs. On the other hand people must work with that principals must be maintained.

5.2.2 Understanding *policy coherence* as concept

I asked participants if they believe that military, NGOs, peace building organisations and states do understand each other and if they have a common apparatus of concept? With the aim to understand the importance of policy coherence as theoretical concept and to what extend the use of words is important.

Moretti says that actors in general understand each other but that they might not use same words. Sermand feels that the apparatus is different because of mandate and principal's organisations rely on. Vocabulary is according to him important. Not because of the words but because of the semantic understanding. Bergenholz holds that all parts speak very different language. He further believes that instances do not have a common word of apparatus and that there is a great distance between NGOs as well. Schaar believes that we can not emanate from that we do understand each other or have a common apparatus of concept. Further Löfgren believes that every organisation has its own language.

In some parts words of apparatus do matter says Forsberg, but he believes that it is rather interests than the word of apparatus that is a problem. Interviews at the

¹¹⁴ Sermand MSF 080314, Del Colle ICRC 080407

Ministry of defence expressed a similar approach, that it is rather what is within concepts that are interesting than explicit words. The one who sits on power has interpretative prerogative.¹¹⁵ The officials believed that it is not a problem with apparatus of concepts on a grass-root level. Politically the concepts are vague and therefore it is not a problem there either. It is when it comes to the level between operational and official level problems arise because it is the implementation level.¹¹⁶

5.3 Integration

Because polices may be supportive to each other Jones believes that policy integration is the key to coherence.¹¹⁷ Rana on the other side believes that integration can create a risk of humanitarian workers getting associated as part of conflict. Another risk expressed concerning UNIM is that it will split the UN from the NGO community pointing that UN is a political organisation influencing the humanitarian discourse with what happens in the Security Council. A Security Council that works on the basis of political compromises whereas humanitarian action functions on the basis of absolutes.¹¹⁸ In an order to avoid duplications and counteractions, is integration and still keeping identities possible?

5.3.1 Counteractions

Much of the military strategic dominance in Afghanistan has been contra productive. 2007 put the main trend when 7000 died in the country as a result of security related violence.¹¹⁹ I questioned all interviewees if organisations counteract each other. Unfortunately the easiest examples to find are according to Lindvall only in one direction (and that is not a fair picture), when military efforts counteract humanitarian. The MDGs contra initiatives from the World Bank are one example of counteraction says Forsberg. Water is one issue in the MDGs where the World Bank has demanded that water should be released in a free market despite the fact that large parts of the earths population can not afford water which they now have to pay for.¹²⁰

The following question, in an effort to answer if integration and still keeping identities is possible, was how organisations can ensure that their presence do not

¹¹⁵ Dunmurray, Isaksson, Pfeiff, Schultz Swedish Armed Forces 080122

¹¹⁶ Dunmurray Swedish Armed Forces 080122

¹¹⁷ Jones 2002:400

¹¹⁸ Donini 2007:4

¹¹⁹ Kristiansson, SCA 080310

¹²⁰ Forsberg, Diakonia, 080423

counteract others efforts. For Moretti this could be achieved basically through dialogue but also with transparency and coordination mechanism in place. The Red Cross Movements efforts to ensure that their presence do not interfere with others are through what they call *Memorandum of understanding*, within the Movement but also with others. Schaar believes it should be a repeating instruction that international workers responsibility is not only to work from their belonging organisations' purpose but to seek coordination and complementarity. A solution pointed out by Bergenholtz is that aid/civilian councillors and military councillors are within a system that demands both parts to sign before means are paid out so that no tomfoolery happens.

5.3.2 Coordination

The UN approach about coordination grew ten years ago. UN wanted to clean their own house since collaboration between agencies did not work. In 1998 the UN introduced a SF approach for Afghanistan, a test case for the UN Administrative Committee for Coordination (UNACC) with the aim to avoid disconnects between development, HR and humanitarian aspects and to develop strategies in complex emergencies.¹²¹ Sermand is critical about the approach and says that if the UN can not make it work within the house, how are they suppose to make it work with all thousands NGOs that exist in the world?

Besides four NGO coordinating bodies there was Before 2002 little joint strategy structure to encourage development between humanitarian agencies in Afghanistan. A review undertaken in 2001 found SF not to be successful but most profoundly originated serious disconnections that was initially meant to be secured.¹²² Each sector of the Afghan National Development Framework (ANDF) Programme Groups was formed in 2001-2002 in an effort to encourage coordination. These groups are single led by a lead ministry and technical supported by a programme.¹²³ A lot concerning UNAMA is referred to as coordination processes,¹²⁴ but how much and in what way this is really coordinated is not definite. In fact very few of the interviewees spoke of UNAMA or knew of UNACC.

In an answer of where coordination problems occur Aggestam et al expresses that coordination of development, humanitarian assistance and security instruments is limited by a long-term/short-term dichotomy.¹²⁵ The Paris Declaration was a change of trend.¹²⁶ Bergenholtz holds that the Paris declaration has contributed with increased cooperation and effects but highlights that it is a

¹²¹ Aggestam et al. 2008:885f

¹²² ibid. :885ff

¹²³ UN in Afghanistan 2001-2002 Report of Secretary General Document A/56/875-S/2002/278
2002: 6ff

¹²⁴ www.unama.org

¹²⁵ Aggestam et al. 2008:116

¹²⁶ Robberts 080612

small part of the total sum of aid. According to Korski Americans and Europeans have failed to coordinate their activities because of a lack of common strategy as well as by tension between different partners and they have therefore failed with implementing a united strategy. Korski is harsh in his critique to the EU Afghan Agreement and says that Afghans have yet to see reimbursements in terms of access to delivery of basic needs, justice and security regardless of all billions of euros spent, exasperated by American and European policy disagreements.¹²⁷ The deficient seems to depend on unwillingness to increase economic and military contributions since almost all European countries share a common analysis of problems in Afghanistan but also because Europe and US disagree on the nature of the problem. For US the Afghan mission has always been tied directly to the Bush administrations war on terror. EU and its member countries did not have a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Korski also criticises individual European donor countries not acting coherent as a group.¹²⁸ EC activities have so far been regarded as “just another EU member state”, despite the Commission’s growing ambition to represent member states.¹²⁹ Del Colle says coordination is a tricky debate. The NGOs she is in contact with are generally not in favour of coordination. Some coordination aims are very nice on paper but in many cases NGOs do not have enough resources to attend.¹³⁰

5.3.3 Cooperation

Insufficient cooperation has been one of the primary obstacles to successful implementation of missions in conflict areas.¹³¹ There is logic in cooperation that you amass power but much experience from the field speaks of how little coherence there is.¹³² One barrier concerning cooperation may be that participating partners have insufficient understanding of each other.¹³³ For development work to be successful it is necessary to learn from each others experience and try to organise work in a way that makes it possible to concentrate on field work and administrative routines.¹³⁴

NGOs have difficulties approaching power positions. It is then their way to work with a member base where members contribute with resources in mind that that states have failed in certain regards.¹³⁵ The autonomy is therefore in some way linked with legitimacy.¹³⁶ It creates a conflict of interest if NGOs would

¹²⁷ Korski 2008:1

¹²⁸ Korski 2008:7ff

¹²⁹ Hettne et al. 2008: 8f, 37

¹³⁰ Serman, MSF 080314

¹³¹ Samverkan i kris och konflikt: ett utbildningsinstrument för dig i utlandstjänst, 2004:5

¹³² Forsberg, Diakonia 080423

¹³³ Donini, Antonio 2007:3

¹³⁴ Serman MSF 080314, Del Colle ICRC 080407

¹³⁵ Oltorp. Swedish Armed Forces 080122

¹³⁶ Hill 2005:183

cooperate with states.¹³⁷ The military though have much to learn from NGOs concerning contexts to be able to operate better says Bergenholtz.

Eventual pitfalls concerning cooperation is suppressing multiplicity rather than maximising value of differences. Another risk is stalling innovation and operational capacities created by intensity to the lowest common denominator in multilateral platforms.¹³⁸

5.3.4 Motives for cooperation

In an open war situation, such as Afghanistan, Donini find it sensible to separate humanitarian coordination functions as much as possible from political functions because of clearly temptation for one to use the other one. With background in this I asked actors in the humanitarian aid arena what motives there are for co-operation? Harmonization as a motive to make own efforts easier?

Intentions in cooperation for making own workload easier were confirmed by all participants. The interviewees did also find other motives for cooperation such as to avoid duplication and gaps, transparency and make planning easier. Löfgren thinks motives for cooperation are very different from case to case. Some do certainly reason that it would be easier for them if we do things in a certain way. The military for sure do reason that they need civilian organisations since the military is seen at with scepticism. Eriksson discuss CIMIC in *Framsyn* (Nr 5 1999) where he finds that the closer you see organisations in the field their objectives tend to be more self-centred in a motive to ease their own efforts.¹³⁹

5.4 Policy Coherence

Policy coherence is often presented as promoting a win-win situation of lifesaving aid and peace¹⁴⁰ but the aim needs to be clearly defined in order to be able to work effectively. Policy goals can be noted and framed broadly or narrowly. Not said that one is more successful or better than the other.¹⁴¹ Essential is that involved actors are familiar with each other and with each other's defined objectives and working methods.¹⁴² Although each operation faces unique challenges, there are also common challenges that must be addressed. Important to notice is that it is not evident that policy coherence necessarily imply better policies since policy coherence as term do not tell us about the given set.

¹³⁷ Oltorp, Swedish Armed Forces 080122

¹³⁸ MSF: What relation to the "aid" system 2007:3

¹³⁹ Eriksson, Pär i FOA-tidningen nr 5-1999

¹⁴⁰ Torrenté 2004:7

¹⁴¹ May et al. 2006:383

¹⁴² Samverkan i kris och konflikt: ett utbildningsinstrument för dig i utlandstjänst, 2004:18

May et al. argues that policy coherence is a concept easy to understand but difficult to measure.¹⁴³ I would after my interviews say that it is not very easy understand either. All participants had different conceptions, probably because of their cultural, organisational and social context. Some of them thought synergism effects would be hard to measure while a few did not. Numerous of the ones I interviewed heard the word policy coherence first when I told them about it but knew about the concept.¹⁴⁴ For Sermard the concept means not policy as mainstream, but in a sense that concerning aid they work bilateral with whomever and that everybody is a potential partner. Bergenholts perception of the word is that everybody interprets policies the same. Kristiansson associates the concept with lobbying in Brussels and a concept that has grown in EU. Oltorp associates the concept with numerous international cooperation project as well as capability towards EU and NATO. Clearly policy coherence is a relative term. A combination of interests and targeting policies contributes to policy coherence. May et al sees the limited policy coherence as a result of lack of strong underlying institutions¹⁴⁵ but strong underlying institutions do not necessarily evolve because of a lack for coherent policy.¹⁴⁶

5.4.1 Clusters

Clusters are a by UN attempt to implement improved coordination in an effort to fill out gaps in humanitarian assistance. The clusters have though according to MSF intersectional project study so far resulted in a proliferation of coordination platforms, clusters and sub-clusters. Writers of the study found that at closer examination of cluster lead agencies repeatedly demonstrate inadequate leadership but more focusing on administrative support, information-sharing or training. In 2006 the cluster had shown little added value to either systematically or effectively mobilise resources.¹⁴⁷

NGOs do need to coordinate themselves so that it is clear what the common standpoint of the NGOs is in the debate about cluster coordination. There are plenty of reasons why the ICRC has chosen to not be a part of the UN cluster system. One reason being is that it is incompatible with ICRCs "all-victims-approach" and could jeopardise the neutrality and independence of their action.¹⁴⁸ Another reason for this opt-out is because, according to ICRCs principles (independence, neutrality, etc) it cannot be coordinated by anyone. The fact that the UN is often seen as a political organ only aggravates this. Therefore, the ICRC decided to follow the discussion about cluster coordination (in reality and the field they will be confronted with this coordination, even if it only affects

¹⁴³ May et al. 2006:383

¹⁴⁴ Moretti, ICRC 080410, Schultz, Oltorp, Swedish Armed Forces 080122

¹⁴⁵ May et al. 2006:398ff

¹⁴⁶ Grabel 2007:336

¹⁴⁷ MSF Intersectional project 2006:4

¹⁴⁸ Mabeck ICRC 071121

them indirectly). The ICRC does not believe in isolating themselves, like MSF which decided not to follow the cluster coordination debate up close (only through other NGOs who do attend the meetings). For ICRC these principles do not mean isolation so they must maintain key bilateral contacts with UN coordination structures.¹⁴⁹¹⁵⁰

5.4.2 Donors

Some conflate "policy coherence" with "donor harmonization" therefore the issue of donors needs to be considered. Donor coordination is now improving rapidly at a country level, processes that have usually been centred upon a variety of multilateral or ad hoc country-based mechanisms.¹⁵¹

5.4.3 Common and pooled funding

Common or pooled Humanitarian Funds (CHF) is a pooled funding concept established by a group of likeminded donors which provides un-earmarked contributions to a common pool. It is a reaction on the before concentrated donor earmarking. A study carried out by CARE requested UN to improve on information sharing concerning pooled funding.¹⁵² CARE also found that in principle funding will improve timeliness through better coordination avoiding separate project proposals from NGOs being submitted to donors in the ground.¹⁵³ Important for this study is the statement that good working relationships that exists is shaped by personal factors. Further that it would be more helpful if NGOs could develop a common voice when they work together¹⁵⁴ since it is hard to fully represent without a coherent stand or common frame of meaning.¹⁵⁵

The purpose of CERF may not have been as the outcome which shows.¹⁵⁶ Save the Children's express their experience with CERF as mixed but highlights that there have been some positive developments. What is described as the biggest problem is communication. Some Country Directors (CD) have also expressed frustration over that they were excluded from decision-making processes.¹⁵⁷ MSF's intersectional project found that so far CERF has been implemented in a highly politicised manner but that it seems promising to attract increased funding

¹⁴⁹ Del Colle, ICRC 080407

¹⁵⁰ Besides UN clusters there are forums for NGOs such as SCHR for the 8 biggest NGOs and ICVA for more. At these forums policies are discussed and how these relate to each other.

¹⁵¹ Hettne et al. 2008:55

¹⁵² CARE 2007: 10ff

¹⁵³ ibid.: 18

¹⁵⁴ Del Colle ICRC 080407

¹⁵⁵ Keck & Sikkink 1998:7

¹⁵⁶ CARE 2007: 8

¹⁵⁷ Save the Children's experience with CERF in 2007:1, 4

for emergencies. This despite its aim to respond to under-funded emergencies in life-saving actions.¹⁵⁸

5.4.4 Competition and influence

Competition for resources comprise huge tensions inside and between agencies as well as between agencies and their donors since scramble for resources is one way of survival. Ron and Cooley writes that NGOs nowadays have to act more like a government and/or a business since they both replace many governmental functions such as social services but also have to act more like a business in terms of institutionalism, professionalism etcetera. This in effort to have access to resources.¹⁵⁹ Can problems with coordination be a result of competition of finances as well as influence on both national and the international arena?

Del Colle says it is hearsay, but that there is competition for finance and influence between NGOs and that the issue of competition also exists between UN agencies. Del Colle refers to that therefore clusters are a good idea since they concentrate on one issue, otherwise there may be overlaps. Sermand expressed that it is true that they do compete, but what they also do is that when they do not have enough resources they give indications to others of necessities to be done. Diakonia compete with companies as much new aid comes from the commercial market.¹⁶⁰

Competition of finances do not increase cooperation between states, NGOs etcetera but increases cooperation in the sense that you build consortiums.¹⁶¹ Complementary can exist and be progressive even without collaboration.¹⁶² Through adopting policies you can in a sense ensure that sensible interests will not be exploited.

¹⁵⁸ MSF Intersectoral project 2006:6

¹⁵⁹ Ron & Cooley, The NGO scramble

¹⁶⁰ Forsberg Diakonia 080423

¹⁶¹ Kristiansson SCA 080310

¹⁶² Sermand, MSF 080314

6 Conclusions

Coordination of response could definitely be positive and would theoretically improve effectiveness. What Stobbeart et al puts as the backside of coordination is that coordination itself has become an end where new clusters structures have multiplied existing platforms of dialogue instead of simplifying.¹⁶³ MSF are distinct with their view that they think it is impossible and unrealistic to seek to bring all actors under one single banner. MSF find that the “aid system” today has not shown to actually perform as a “system”.¹⁶⁴ This does not mean that MSF are not in the belief that positive correlation between humanitarian assistance and international military and political actions cannot exist but if international efforts under UN mandate are seen as pure humanitarian aid it confuses definitions.¹⁶⁵ I am not certain that those two are possible to distinguish though since the former is an effect of the latter. Independence must not lead to isolation says Del Colle who thinks ICRC have found an appropriate way of communicating. I have found that ICRC do fit into this arrangement and that they do not fall outside formal coordination systems and that MSF have chosen not to participate in all existing forums for dialogue and cooperation.

According to May et al there are great potential in crafting policy consistency which in turn leads to policy coherence with fewer interest.¹⁶⁶ I agree because even though the ones I have interviewed did not see a problem with the mix up of development, humanitarian assistance and security they see a great problem with in that every actor hold on tight to their agenda. This takes us to the fact that analysis of managing implementation is an issue about negotiations between actors who are at least quasi-autonomous and that problems concerning managing implementation arise because a conflict of interests.¹⁶⁷ As long as there are as many agendas as there are, policy coherence will be difficult. Therefore policy coherence depends on how issues and their interest relate. Diverse issues and agendas can cohere if policies contain integrative properties that link issues and interests.

Mabeck highlights the fact that they do not work for the same goal (some participants thought they did though). Lack of consensus ruins efficiency, notably vital is consensus in the work of development and security in a conflict deviated situation.¹⁶⁸ Coherence and consensus is according Carlsson about to cooperate

¹⁶³ Stobbeart et. al. FMR 29 :18

¹⁶⁴ MSF: What relation to the “aid system”:6

¹⁶⁵ Torrenté 2004:12

¹⁶⁶ May et al. 2006:384

¹⁶⁷ Hill 2005:193

¹⁶⁸ Carlsson, Minister of Development Cooperation 080612

with competences. Hettne is by the belief that a better world order in a more qualitative sense can only be created by consensus and consistency between different policy areas. Even though there are positive examples of coordination and cooperation policy coherence is difficult to achieve since the belief of working towards the same goal shows that institutions, military and organisations do not understand each other or at least not each others aims. Understood also from chapter 5.2.2 that institutions, military and organisations participating in this study does in some what way have the same understanding of policy coherence as concept. Not said that they have the same word of apparatus.

The hypothesis about that there is a lack of resources which aggravate achieving policy coherence was verified by Del Colle and Sermand¹⁶⁹ who says it is hard and time-consuming to obtain information necessary.

The main difference between civilian and military is that civilians are civilians while the military can be seen as legitimate targets of violence. Still both humanitarian actors and military units are obliged to understand the evolving doctrine as they are obliged to share working environment. The dilemma is expressed by Torrenté as “there is no right resolution or ideal *modus operandi* for heavy issues” but what is vital is that internal interest groups together with political actors share a process of dialogue to exclude that efforts harm each others. All actors must understand that their actions affect all those whom they share geographic and humanitarian environment with. This study findings is that all parts can do more to improve, particularly on coordinating the willingness of people and putting somebody responsible of doing so.

6.1.1 The constructive element

I asked the persons I interviewed of their perception about how ambitious the aim of coordination is and heard that it is very ambitious in the agenda of UN and there can be see other initiatives as well.¹⁷⁰ The level of ambition concerning cooperation is probably higher than ever before says Schaar. The rich world has been hit by the principal. The international body, generally UN, has called attention to increased cooperation, NATO as well.¹⁷¹

I found that programmatic choices within the UN system and others have been questioned in terms of impartiality and those additional layers of administration and coordination has institutional factors that contribute to degrees of coherence. This was confirmed by Schultz who says that EU documents are a nice idea but that it is further up to the member states to implement and follow those rules. The ongoing processes in aid issues in conflict situation has shown to be both political and haphazard. Even though there have been numerous political initiatives and decisions concerning policy coherence, these have not been implemented in all

¹⁶⁹ Sermand MSF 080314, Del Colle ICRC 080407

¹⁷⁰ Sermand, MSF 080314

¹⁷¹ Karlsson Swedish Armed Forces 080122

layers, says Karlsson. Results from chapter 5.4.1-5.4.3 also shows that UN as an executive agency not either increases or certain policy coherence. There are though examples of increased policy coherence as a result of agencies working together such as the Paris Declaration on aid effectiveness. The key word here seems to be communication. The aim seems not to be harmonisation and joint decisions in all matters, but rather that organisations and donors should be aware of other donors and organisations. Not only does this provide a better overview of the sources of financing, it will also result in a better understanding of differences in ideologies and standpoints that characterises various actors.¹⁷²

Concerning what must happen so that positive coordination will become reality Karlsson believes cooperation should start at top level to later be implemented on official level and then be transferred to the operative level¹⁷³ while Forsberg believes in decentralisation. Schulz emphasised the Brahimi report and what that might mean in the future. A coordination board is according to former UN SG necessary to provide oversight.¹⁷⁴ This opinion is though not shared with participants in this thesis where Schultz and Sermand says that international platforms already exists and that there is no need for a new platform. Lindvall does not either see a solution in another instance taking over. Dunmurray on the other hand feels that the existing forums are toothless and felt that we further need to elucidate the forums that exist. Lindvall thinks an open sense and continuing dialogue is what it takes.

Concerning whether there is a tradition of communication and collaboration as the thesis forecasted the situation not to be, some Swedish participants speak about a Swedish tradition in cooperation. Therefore this hypothesis can not explain why positive collaboration and cooperation does not occur in a Swedish context, lack of communication and miscommunication is rather what has been highlighted in this concern.

Numerous of the participants I interviewed felt that improving coordination and in some cases cooperation on operational and contextual level in general may be the key for success. Intermittently is that NGOs are not interested in taking orders, whether they express it as, not wanting to being co-ordinated or simply just being an observer.

Eventual outcome of increased coherence could mean that: reporting requirements can be harmonised; donors/organisations gain a more holistic perspective of other organisations; joint financing of administrative capacity building can be enabled as well as knowledge may be shared and discussions on strategies and visions for the future may be conducted.

6.2 Future and further research

¹⁷² Isaksson, Schultz National Defence 080122

¹⁷³ Karlsson 080122

¹⁷⁴ United Nations General Assembly A/61/583

The future of Afghanistan and its people is in the hands of the international society and their ability to ensure human rights and security. We can think around and we can improve, we can function better, but a change of the system will maybe not be in a foreseeable future. Even optimistic scenarios foresee an international presence in Afghanistan for many many years to come.¹⁷⁵ The upcoming NATO summit in Bucharest and the appointment of a new UN special envoy opens a chance for coalition partners to adopt new strategies to advert disaster in a near future.¹⁷⁶ There is also an ACCRA meeting in September concerning the Paris declaration and how it is observed.¹⁷⁷ Korski sees that a new common approach would be best based on strategy for political inclusion with a strong international leadership.¹⁷⁸ For a long-term political strategy international coalition needs to agree on strategy led but by far more political than military goals. There is a need that EUs national governments treat their mission in Afghanistan as a common enterprise since they are working through EU institutions.

There is a need for further research on the effects of coordination and cooperation in the aid arena as well as the how policy coherence between development aid, humanitarian assistance and security efforts can contribute in conflict and crisis situations. I have shown that diverse issues and agendas can cohere if policies contain integrative properties that link issues and interests. Here may be an opening for continuing mix-up of issues and a closer exchange between for example policy implementation and conflict research.

¹⁷⁵ Karlsson, Schultz 080122

¹⁷⁶ Korski 2008:32

¹⁷⁷ Carlsson, Minister of Development Cooperation 080612

¹⁷⁸ Korski 2008:1f

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List of Abbreviations and acronyms

AI: Amnesty International

ANDF: Afghan National Development Framework

ASG: Afghan Support Group

CD: Country Director

CERF: Central Emergency Response Fund

CFSP: Common Foreign and Security Policy

CHF: Common or pooled Humanitarian Funds

CIMIC: Civil-military cooperation

CMR: Civil-Military Relations

DAC: Development Assistance Committee (within the OECD)

DDR: Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration

EBAO: Effect Based Approaches to Operations

ESDP: European Security and Defence Policy

EU: European Union

GA: General Assembly

HC: Humanitarian Coordinator

HR: Human Rights

HQ: Head Quarters

ICRC: International Committee of the Red Cross

IDP: Internally Displaced Person

IM: Integrated Mission

INGO: International Non-governmental Organisation

ISAF: International Security Assistance Force

JCB: Joint Coordination Board

MDGs: Millennium Development Goals

MORR: Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation

MSF: Médecins Sans Frontières

NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

NGO: Non-governmental Organisation

OCHA: Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

OECD: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

ODA: Official Development Assistance

OEF: Operation Enduring Freedom

PGD: Policy for Global Development

PRT: Provincial Reconstruction Team

SCA: Swedish Committe for Afghanistan (In Swedish SAK: Svenska Afghanistankommittén)

SF: Strategic Framework

SG: Secretary General

Sida: Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency

SRSG: Special Representative of the Secretary General

SSR: Security Sector Reform

UN: United Nations

UNACC: United Nations Committee for Coordination^{*}

UNAMA: United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan

UNHCR: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNICEF: United Nations Children's Fund

UNSC: United Nations' Security Council

US: United States

USAF: United States Armed Forces

US AID: United States Agency for International Development