



LUND
UNIVERSITY

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STVP11
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Fall: 2007

Turkey Full Member of the EU,

Fact or Fiction?

A study of possible mechanisms that prevent Turkey from becoming a member of the EU.

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Abstract

This essay is about Turkey's accession to the EU and what the main obstacles are for a membership. In order to become a member in the EU there are certain political conditions that needs to be fulfilled. Within the EU there is a disagreement about whether or not Turkey should join because of its failure in implementing these conditions. With the help of a conceptual framework dealing with three concepts of implementation, I have created a set of hypotheses based on information in scientific articles which highlights Turkey's problems in becoming a member in the EU. By testing these against Swedish and Turkish newsarticles I have tried to come to some conclusion about why it is that Turkey has problems with the implementation. My analysis shows that the main obstacles in Turkey are powers within the country that are against reforms required for an EU membership. Equally important are powers in the EU, such as political leaders and the public that are against a Muslim country joining.

Key words: Turkey, European Union, conceptual framework, implementation, political reforms

Table of contents

1	Introduction	1
1.1	Research Purpose and Question.....	2
1.2	Methodology.....	2
1.3	Material.....	3
1.3.1	Delimitations.....	4
1.4	Disposition of Essay.....	4
2	The Study of Implementation	6
2.1	Implementation.....	6
2.1.1	Implementation Top-down and Bottom-up.....	7
2.2	How to Make Implementation Succeed.....	7
2.2.1	A Question of Ability.....	7
2.2.2	To Understand the Decision.....	8
2.2.3	To Want or Not Want? That Is the Question.....	9
3	Hypotheses	10
3.1	The Leading Opposition in the EU.....	10
3.2	The Public Doubt in the EU.....	11
3.3	Opposition in Turkey.....	12
4	Analysis of Hypotheses	14
4.1	Turkish Newsarticles.....	14
4.1.1	The Leading Opposition in the EU.....	14
4.1.2	The Public Doubt in the EU.....	16
4.1.3	Opposition in Turkey.....	17
4.2	Swedish Newsarticles.....	19
4.2.1	The Leading Opposition in the EU.....	19
4.2.2	The Public Doubt in the EU.....	20
4.2.3	Opposition in Turkey.....	22
5	Conclusion	24
6	References	27

1 Introduction

For many years Turkey has tried to become an integral part of Europe. Despite many ups and downs in the relationship between the two, Turkey has continued its pursuit to become a member of the European Union (EU). Most of the time Turkey has been related to as “the other” in Europe, because of its non-western culture and identity. It is however a country influenced by western values and norms. It now would seem that a Turkish membership in the EU is no longer impossible. But accession to the Union has been difficult and a Turkish membership is met with great ambiguity both within Europe and within Turkey.

Two years after the establishment of the European Economic Community (EEC), Turkey applied for membership. In 1963 the Ankara Agreement was signed which made it associate member and also a possible candidate for full membership in 1995. This agreement awoke expectations in Turkey and started preparatory work in order to meet the demands for membership.

In 1987 Turkey applied for membership in the EEC. However, the Commission was of the opinion that the negotiations should not be started. One of the obstacles was that it would lead to great economic and social obstacles for the country. Also, a political problem was the lack of respect for human rights in Turkey. However, in 1999 the Helsinki European Council granted Turkey the status of candidate country.

At the Helsinki summit it was decided that the EU should assist Turkey in making internal political reforms. A part of this strategy was to make it able to fulfil the Copenhagen Criteria by creating a political dialogue with the EU. Since 1999 and after the election of the Justice and Development party (AKP) in 2002 Turkey has undergone political reforms, aimed at promoting democratization and human rights. Important in this progress have been the EU goals, which have framed the work and united disparate groups around the reforms. Amongst other things, Turkey has made amendments in its constitution, such as the allowance for education and radio broadcasting in Kurdish. Capital punishment has also been abolished in times of peace.

However, these reforms have not been complete and there are problems when it comes to implementation of reforms. In Turkey there has been different opinions regarding the impact of the reforms and the opening of negotiations. Some political groups and actors mean that in order to pursue the reforms, an opening of negotiations is important. Others are afraid of what the reforms will lead to if the EU does not start the negotiations. Also, resentment among Turks has come to grow because the EU applies a different set of membership criteria to Turkey which has not been the case with previous candidate countries.

In October 2004 the Commission recommended that the EU would start negotiations about membership with Turkey. However, the Commission

established the fact that despite the political reforms Turkey had made in order to fulfil the Copenhagen Criteria, there were still further measures that needed to be taken. The Commission recommended that the negotiations could at any time be put to a hold if Turkey did not meet the fundamentals of democracy and human rights. In October 2005 accession negotiations were opened.

1.1 Research Purpose and Question

Considering the wide debate today about Turkey's accession to the EU, I find it of great interest to study why it is that Turkey has become such a problematic candidate to the EU. Not only has Turkey already undergone major reforms but also faces further demands from the EU, demands that has not been set for previous candidate countries. Since the EU focus on Turkey's political reforms, the purpose with this essay is to analyse the problems Turkey have with the implementation of these reforms in order to meet the EUs criteria for membership.

In order to do this I will make an analysis of implementation concepts. In addition I will use hypotheses based on scientific articles dealing with the Turkish accession to the EU. The hypotheses will be tested against my empirical material consisting of Turkish and Swedish news articles. The aim is to increase our understanding of Turkey's problems with implementation. I hope, on the basis of my findings, to be able to answer the following question:

Why does Turkey have problems with the implementation of the political reforms?

1.2 Methodology

In this essay I will start by doing an analysis of the concepts of implementation which will constitute the conceptual framework for this essay. As a researcher I am dependent on concepts and terms which are used within my area of research. I will do a study based upon previous research on the subject of implementation, where it is necessary to make an analysis of the concepts being used (Nuopponen 2002: 4 - 5). It is important to define, be specific and put limits to the concept that is to be analyzed. It is about creating a concept that in the best way possible shows what is to be studied, and to explain why this concept is being used (Johannessen, Tufte 2003: 34).

I will continue with constructing a set of hypotheses. Hypotheses are assumptions that are limited to time and space and which gain support or are rejected grounded on the results from the empirical research (Esaiasson *et al.* 2005: 38; Johannessen, Tufte 2003: 34). I intend to form hypotheses concerning the problems of implementation in Turkey, based on different scientific articles. I

will link the hypotheses to the concepts of implementation. I will then test these hypotheses against news articles from Swedish and Turkish media written about Turkey's problems. The aim is to see if the concepts of implementation can be of use when testing the hypotheses.

The essay will also have a comparative feature as I will compare the arguments put forward in the Swedish and Turkish articles concerning Turkey's problems with joining the EU.

This is a qualitative study, as opposed to a quantitative. A common critique towards this kind of study is that it is too subjective and lack transparency (Bryman 2004: 269-271; Johannessen, Tufte 2003: 28). In order to prevent this I will present how I will go about in my research of the material being used and how I come to my conclusions. It can also be difficult to generalize this study and thereby apply it to another one. My intentions are however to make the reader aware of this particular case, that is, Turkey's difficulties with becoming a member of the EU. However, the information presented might give an insight to what difficulties other candidate countries might be presented with when applying for membership.

1.3 Material

This essay is based on a variation of texts. My choice of material has been guided by my research problem (Wallén 1996: 45; Winter 1983: 31). My primary sources consist of articles from Swedish and Turkish newspapers online. I have chosen articles from three of the largest newspapers in Sweden; Dagens Nyheter, Sydsvenskan and Svenska Dagbladet. From Turkey I have chosen articles from three newspapers written in English. These are Today's Zaman, Journal of Turkish Weekly and Turkish Daily News. I have been in contact with a Turkish student at Lund University who has confirmed the reliability of the Turkish news sources. From all of the newspapers I have chosen a variety of articles written by different reporters and thereby hope to get a broad overview of information which will help me make an unbiased analysis.

I have also included scientific articles chosen from different scientific magazines and written by various authors from which I will construct my hypotheses. By choosing different magazines, as well as authors with both Turkish as well as other nationalities I hope to get a broad picture of what the perceptions are of Turkey's accession to the EU.

When conducting my research on implementation in order to create my conceptual framework, my focus has been on implementation concepts found in the research by Anders Sannerstedt¹ and Jeremy Richardson². I find that their

¹ See Anders Sannerstedts chapter "Implementering – hur politiska beslut genomförs i praktiken" in Bo Rothsteins book "Politik som organisation – Förvaltningspolitikens grundproblem" (1997). Sannerstedt is lecturer at Lund University.

² See Jeremy Richardsons chapter "Eroding EU policies – Implementation gaps, cheating and re-steering" in "European Union: power and policy-making" (1996). Richardson is a professor at Nuffield College in Oxford.

research well suits the aim of this essay. They in turn refer to several prominent researchers in the field of implementation; I therefore believe it is well argued in favour of using these as my main sources when I do my concept analysis.

1.3.1 Delimitations

One of the adjustments I have made in my research is to stay focused on the picture that the media and scientific articles present about Turkey's accession to the EU. I have also focused on previous implementation research. Here I have found enough with material to ground my research on. It would have been interesting to go into more detail about the official picture of the EU and Turkey, but I found the access to such first hand material to be limited.

Since Turkish is not my mother tongue I have been limited to use Turkish articles written in English. I am aware of that these articles; limited in language and number, can not represent the overall view of media. I do believe however that they to some extent can give an insight of how the problem is elucidated in Turkish media, and to whether or not I find support for my hypotheses. My choice of using Turkish newsarticles speaks for itself. The essay is about Turkey's accession to the EU and Turkish media should therefore be covered. My choice of also looking at Swedish newsarticles has to do with the fact that Sweden is one of the few countries that accept a Turkish membership in the EU. It would have been interesting to look at French or German newspaper considering the fact that these countries are the strong opponents, but I have found myself limited by the number of pages in this essay.

The time span of the Swedish and Turkish articles is 2004 – 2007 due to the fact that the Commission recommended the EU in 2004 to start membership negotiations with Turkey. I therefore consider this an interesting period to study concerning Turkey's accession to the EU. When it comes to the scientific articles I found it necessary to widen the time span to 2001 in order to find suitable material for my hypothesis.

There are many explanations to why Turkey has problems with becoming a member of the EU. I have chosen to focus on the implementation of political reforms since this is, according to the EU, where Turkey has the most problems when it comes to meeting the demands for membership.

1.4 Disposition of Essay

In chapter two I will give an introduction to implementation, where I will analyse three central concepts of implementation. This will represent the conceptual framework for this essay.

With the help of my concepts, I will in chapter three provide an account of a set of hypotheses. These are based on information presented in several scientific articles. The hypotheses together with the concepts will give the reader an

apprehension of what possible problems Turkey face with the implementation of the EUs membership conditions.

In chapter four I will test the hypotheses by analysing Turkish and Swedish newsarticles. This chapter is structured according to my hypotheses in chapter three where I will first present the Turkish articles and provide an analysis. I will then do the same with the Swedish articles.

In my final chapter I will present the conclusions of this essay. I will discuss my findings and also provide an answer to the question guiding this essay: Why does Turkey have problems with the implementation of the political reforms?

2 The Study of Implementation

“People now appear to think that implementation should be easy; they are, therefore, upset when expected events do not occur or turn out badly. We would consider our effort a success if people began with the understanding that implementation, under the best of circumstances, is exceedingly difficult. They would, therefore, be pleasantly surprised when a few good things really happen”

(Pressman and Wildavsky 1973: xii – xiii)

In this chapter I will start by giving a short introduction to implementation and implementation failure as well as the top-down and the bottom-up tradition. I will then present Anders Sannerstedts conditions for implementation together with Jeremy Richardsons view. Both Sannerstedt and Richardson present certain preconditions needed in order for implementation to succeed, which is also a way to understand possible problems with implementation. Sannerstedt has set up three conditions that the implementer needs to fulfil in order for the implementation to be successful. The implementer has to understand the decision, has to be able to implement it and also has to want to implement it. Understanding, ability and will are going to be three implementation concepts that I will define and analyse. Together with my own reflections this will constitute the conceptual framework for this essay.

2.1 Implementation

Implementation means “to carry out, accomplish, fulfil, produce, complete”. What is then being implemented is a policy, which contains both goals and means in order to achieve it. Implementation is related to policies responding to different problems in society (Hill, Hupe 2006: 3 - 5). Put simply, implementation is to carry out a political decision (Sannerstedt 1997: 16). It deals with questions like “what governments do, why they do it, and what difference it makes” (Lundquist 1991: 29).

However, it is often the case that political decisions are not implemented in a way the decision makers intended (Sannerstedts 1997: 26) and we can therefore talk about an implementation gap or even an implementation failure (Hill, Hupe 2006: 10). To be able to explain this problem has long been the focus of the literature of implementation (Sannerstedt 1997: 26).

2.1.1 Implementation Top-down and Bottom-up

Within implementation there are two different views on policy analysis, the top-down and the bottom-up tradition. Within the top-down tradition the aim is to analyse intentions and goals and evaluate whether or not these were reached. If the goals were not fulfilled, what prevented the decision to be implemented? (Björkemarken 1995: 72) The starting perspective for this analysis is the political decision taken at the highest level (Sannerstedt 1997: 22). The bottom-up approach aims at analysing how people try to solve problems, what their intentions are. Since politicians and officials have different roles and interest, problems with implementation are something that can be expected (Björkemarken 1995: 93).

With time it has been acknowledged that there is a need to synthesize the two traditions to be able to explain public control and its consequences. Unlike earlier, actors from different levels get a more central role. Policy is created and implemented due to these different actors and levels. It can be different political and administrative levels, officials enjoying some freedom of action in their work (so called “street-level-bureaucrats”), interest groups, organisations and/or the response from different target groups (Björkemarken 1995: 75).

2.2 How to Make Implementation Succeed

2.2.1 A Question of Ability

It is difficult to make implementation succeed in practice due to all conditions that needs to be fulfilled. Seen from a bottom-up perspective, one problem may be that there are too many actors involved (Richardson 1996: 279). There is a great risk that actors do not accept the policy or the political decision (Richardson 1996: 280; Sannerstedt 1997: 39). Also, if the chain of actors is too long the policy can somewhere along the line be changed either intentionally or unintentionally (Richardson 1997: 281). It is important that the political decision is presented in a way acceptable to the different actors (Sannerstedt 1997: 39). When it comes to the implementation of directives given to a state; such as the EUs directives to Turkey, it is important to have in mind what the state is composed of. The legal system, the political administrative system, the army, political groups and individuals are just a fraction of those that have to take a part in the implementation process and are therefore crucial if it is going to succeed or not. As the bottom-up approach shows, different roles and interest among actors will most likely lead to difficulties with the implementation. A strong political opposition in Turkey to political reforms will hinder or at least delay the implementation process.

The structure of the implementation also needs to state who is responsible of what (Sannerstedt 1997: 27). States implementation agencies often have their own traditions and objectives. They are influenced by their organisational ideologies

and/or who they govern. Governments therefore may have problems with controlling agencies in the public administration (Richardson 281-282). Introducing political reforms in a country is something that will take time, especially where institutional traditions are deeply rooted. It is important to remember that institutions and organisations are run by individuals, whose personal opinions and experiences will influence how they implement a decision taken at a higher level. The implementation will also be effected by individuals outside the organisation; since they are in daily contact with the organisation and will therefore indirect have influence. A government's ability to control these individuals will be the main difficulty and problem, not controlling the organisation per se.

An important factor in the implementation process is the need for necessary resources. This counts as personnel, foremost personnel with adequate competence. Further there need to be enough with money and time in order to carry out a decision (Sannerstedt 1997: 34). A problem with EU policies are that they expect too much too soon or because there is a lack of recourses such as money. Often the EU relies on regulation rather than helping states with resources. Even if the EU sponsors there might also be the need of funding from the national government in order for the implementation to be successful (Richardson 1997: 280 - 281). Conditions set for a membership can imply larger changes and adjustments for some countries than others. It is important to keep in mind what prerequisites states have when it comes to the implementation of EU policies. For some states the EU has reasoned that a membership will help the country in its pursuit of higher standards, such as a stronger economy and welfare reforms. But with Turkey this already has to exist in order to become a member. National governmental funding might also be necessary. However, equally important is that the funding is evenly and correctly distributed among those agencies that are to go through with the implementation. In order to do an implementation analysis here it requires having a top-down perspective since it is the EU polices that guides the implementation process. However, a bottom-up approach is also necessary since the access to resources will in the end determine whether or not agencies will be able to go through with the reforms.

2.2.2 To Understand the Decision

From a rational perspective it can be expected that the objectives of a policy are precisely formulated and that they will not be in conflict with each other. However, in reality the goals of political reforms are often vague and can also contradict each other (Sannerstedt 1997: 28). This is often the case in the EU where policies are seen as "peace-treaties", due to disagreement about what the EU should be. This means that policies; or goals, are relatively vague which will lead to difficulties in the implementation process (Richardson 1996: 278). It should also be brought to attention that there can be disagreement between member- and non-member states. This can concern different aspects but will none the less also lead to a failure in the implementation. It can also be the case that

there will not even be an implementation process due to the fact that the EU can not force a non member state to agree to different policies or reforms. From a top-down perspective it therefore becomes important to analyse how the intentions and goals of the decision-maker (the EU) were perceived by the implementer (Turkey) and how they were actually implemented.

In order for implementation to be successful the parties should fully understand and agree on the objectives that need to be reached. This should also persist throughout the implementation process (Richardson 1996: 282). It is important that the implementer do not misinterpret the intentions of the decision-maker (Sannerstedt 1997: 26).

2.2.3 To Want or Not Want? That Is the Question

In the end however, it all comes down to if the implementer is actually willing to go through with a decision or not. It is important that the implementer likes the decision and feels motivated to realize it according to the intentions (Sannerstedt 1997: 27). A common problem is simply that the implementer does not like the political decision (Sannerstedt 1997: 36). It can be the form or the content of the policy that is not favoured. Sometimes it is not the implementation as such that is not working but rather the policy being ineffective. This has to do with if the problem is inadequately understood or what the underlying cause is and how the problem is best solved (Richardson 1996: 281).

Important in constructing a policy is to take into consideration the parties that are to implement it. Even if there is genuine attempt to implement EU law, Turkish national administration might have trouble adapting to the new Euro-regulation (Richardson 1996: 286). Local conditions, needs and wishes as well as values may underlie non-compliance with political decisions (Sannerstedt 1997: 36).

This brings the analysis to a bottom-up perspective, where focus is put on the officials' intentions. The will to implement is influenced by the parties' values and opinions about how important the implementation actually is, what limits there are for the implementation, who is responsible for it and so on. To what extent there is a will to go through with the implementation depends on how the value of the implementation is considered as well as the value of other goals. When it comes to EU policies there are different political and administrative levels to take into consideration both within the EU as well as in Turkey that is to implement the decision. It might not be enough with the Turkish government's approval of the membership conditions as well as willingness to go through with necessary reforms. Different institutions, groups as well as people need to accept the reforms in order for the implementation to succeed.

Finally, there needs to be a relationship between the decision-maker and the implementer based on negotiation. The relationship should not be hierarchic; instead the parties should be seen as equals with both conflicting and also overlapping interest and goals (Sannerstedt 1997: 38; Richardson 1996: 290).

3 Hypotheses

After having read several scientific articles I will here shortly try to conclude what the main problems are for a Turkish membership in the EU, according to these articles. Together with the concepts of implementation this will constitute the hypotheses. Most of the articles deal with the same issues, where the minority question (mainly the Kurds), a strong opposition both in Europe and in Turkey towards Turkey joining the EU, are the main obstacles to the implementation of political reforms. My hypotheses will therefore focus on these issues. Looking at the opposition in Turkey, my focus will be on the army. Despite the time span between the articles printing dates, the arguments put forward are surprisingly similar to each other. This chapter can also provide an insight to previous research about Turkey's accession to the EU, and what the different views are on this issue.

3.1 The Leading Opposition in the EU

Turkey has undergone many reforms in order to tackle the problems which the EU sees as an obstacle to a membership. Even though the EU is aware of the achievements of the Turkish government, the real challenge will be to ensure a systematic and effective implementation of these reforms (Fittipaldi 2004: 46).

The critique towards Turkey is based on four categories, these being economy, politics, culture and security. Often the arguments against a Turkish membership have to do with Turkey's economic weakness and difficulties in aligning its culture and religion with Europe's (Redmond 2007: 308) Seeing Turkey as a predominantly Muslim country it should not be accepted as a member of the Union, which is essentially a Christian club (Yilmaz 2003: 11). However, most problematic has been the political conditions relating to democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respects for minorities (Redmond 2007: 310). For the EU it has been important to keep Turkey close due to security reasons, but shortcomings in the above categories, have made the EU find Turkey unacceptable as a full member (Redmond 2007: 308). Instead, countries opposing the membership such as France, Germany and Austria have offered Turkey a privileged partnership or a special status instead of full membership. This would provide Turkey with free trade and closer integration in security and military affairs. But for Turkey this would not bring anything it does not already have due to its participation in the EU Customs Union and NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) and accepts therefore nothing else than a full membership (Phillips 2004: 86). EU policy has at times been unclear, ambiguous and misleading which has led to high

expectations in Turkey, but also confusion due to the dismissal of the membership (Redmond 2007: 307-308).

This brings me to my first hypothesis:

The best Turkey can hope for is to be offered a kind of special status or privileged membership of the EU due to its unfulfilment of the political conditions.

The concept of interest in relation to this hypothesis is *understanding*. According to both Sannerstedt and Richardson, disagreement among member states about what the EU should be often leads to policies being vague and contradictive. Offering Turkey a special kind of membership can be seen as a peace treaty between memberstates that can not agree on what part Turkey should be allowed to take in the EU. As Richardson points out, difficulties for Turkey to understand what needs to be done in order to become a member and the disappointment about being rejected despite reforms that have been made, will lead to difficulties in the continued implementation process.

EUs own indecisiveness can instead make Turkey turn away from the EU, as the few benefits from a special kind of membership are not worth the uncertainty about ever becoming a member. As Sannerstedt says, it is important that there is no misinterpretation between the implementer and the decision-maker, which EUs vacillation can finally result in. Also, there might be disagreement between Turkey and the EU about what reforms Turkey has implemented and what more needs to be done. These are factors that can come to influence the implementation process.

3.2 The Public Doubt in the EU

It is not only the political leaders that are in opposition of Turkey joining the prestigious club. The EU citizens are also seen as an obstacle to the admission (McLaren 2007: 252). The large scale immigration of Turks in Europe has led to resentment towards the Turks among EU citizens. Instead of empathy towards the country of origin of the migrants, many EU citizens see the immigration as a threat to in-group recourses and culture. This in turn manifests itself as opposition to Turkey's candidacy for EU membership (McLaren 2007: 254). This is clearly the case for Austria and Germany, which have both received numerous Turkish immigrants. These are two of the strongest opposing countries to Turkey's membership.

This resentment goes back in European history when the "guest worker" program led to a large migration of Turks into Europe. In the 1960 Turks were able for the first time to get a passport and travel abroad. At the same time, Europe; especially Germany, was in need of labour. The deal was that when the economic boom declined and unemployment rose, these guest workers would have to return home. However, in reality it turned out differently with workers staying and also bringing over their families. A problem is that these groups have

had difficulties integrating into the European societies, which has led to concerns about Turkey's accession to the EU. EU citizens fears that a Turkish membership will lead to additional migration which will produce hard-to-integrate minorities that will threaten social peace and stability (Teitelbaum, Martin 2003: 97).

Once again I would like to point to the concept of *understanding*. According to Richardson, the parties should fully understand and agree on the objectives in order for implementation to be successful. In this case, in order to successfully enlarge the EU with Turkey, the government leaders need to allay the fears that have arisen due to migration by adopting measures. It is however most likely that the Turkish leaders will oppose such measures and have trouble accepting the fact that the EU may need some time to adjust to a full Turkish membership (McLaren 2007: 274). This can also turn into a question of *will*. The EU citizens (as well as political leaders) resentment towards Turkey joining the EU can instead become a reason for Turkey to not join. It seems, however, unlikely that the accession talks will proceed either smoothly or quickly, and will therefore affect the Turkish implementation process.

My second hypothesis will therefore be:

The large scale migration of Turks in Europe and the problems it has created so far, e.g. difficulties with integrating into European societies, will be an obstacle for Turkey's possible membership and thereby also for a successful implementation of political reforms.

3.3 Opposition in Turkey

When it comes to the implementation of reforms, there are two opposing camps in Turkey. The "integralists" are in favour of a rapid implementation of all of the EU's required reforms. The "gradualists" also support accession to the EU, but favour a process of adaptation over a longer period of time. They also oppose some of the conditions attached to EU membership (Aydinli, Waxman 2001: 384). One influential group in Turkey is the army, which is also divided between these two camps. Being so influential has led to a problematic situation, since the EU demands that the army obey under civilian control and thereby get less influence on Turkish politics (Phillips 2004: 86).

The two opposing camps; but foremost the army, have become an obstacle for another condition set by the EU. This concerns increased minority rights for the Kurds. Since it is a highly sensitive issue in Turkey, this condition for membership has become controversial. While the integralists see it as a necessary step for membership, the gradualists refuse to back down from their negative stance on the issue (Aydinli, Waxman 2001: 384 -385). Due to this conflict between the parties, the Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has been hindered in his pursuit of EU membership (Clarke 2006: 13). He has however, gone through with reforms such as economic liberalization and human rights protection. In addition he has made amendments in the constitution leading to

decreased power of the military. This has led to strong reactions among “army hard-liners” and other ultranationalists who do not want to give up prestige, privilege and power (Phillips 2004: 86). However, reducing the military’s power through Brussels will be much easier for Erdogans government, as well as other sensitive issues, which will be an incentive to keep striving for a EU membership (Yilmaz 2003: 10).

One of the problems is that the army sees it self as a protector and promoter of the legacy of modern Turkey’s founding father, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. Atatürk created the Republic of Turkey, based on a vision of a modern state similar to its European neighbours. Westernization and secularism became the cornerstones of the Turkish state. The army deems it necessary to defend the state from threats such as separatism, terrorism and religious fundamentalism. Resistance among army members about granting the Kurds increased rights has to do with fears about “Kurdish separatism” (Phillips 2004: 86; Aydinli, Waxman 2001: 388).

My third hypothesis will therefore be:

Internal security concerns evoked by the Kurdish question will ultimately prevent Turkey from undertaking the reforms necessary for an EU membership, due to the many involved parties such as the army, PKK³ and nationalists.

As long as there is opposition among different actors in Turkey to the demands of increased rights for the Kurds, there will be great difficulties for Erdogans government in implementing the political conditions. It will be especially hard to overlook the army’s point of view since they have such powerful influence. Here two concepts of implementation become interesting, *ability* and *will*. First, according to Richardson and Sannerstedt, the ability to implement a policy (or policies) can be prevented due to too many actors being involved in the process and that many of them do not accept the policy. Further, the division within different groups; such as the army, concerning this issue means that the government needs to control their agencies better in order to be able to go through with reforms. It needs to structure who is responsible of what.

Second, it is a question of will. Like Sannerstedt ascertains, actors involved in the implementation process are guided by their own will to actually go through with a reform. As long as actors think there is a limit to what reforms Turkey should go through with, such as granting the Kurds increased rights, the Turkish government will have difficulties to go through with a full and successful implementation process. It is clear that the will to implement is affected by the parties’ values and opinions about how important the implementation actually is. For members of the army it is more important to prevent separatism and conflicts than granting Kurds more rights and thereby jeopardizing the stability and peace of the country. Also, according to both Sannerstedt and Richardson, in order for implementation to succeed the parties should have corresponding goals and interest. What I have written here shows that this might not be the case, especially not when it comes to the Kurdish question.

³ The Kurdistan Workers Party

4 Analysis of Hypotheses

In this chapter I will make an analysis of what is said in Turkish and Swedish newsarticles about Turkey's accession to the EU. This way I will be able to test my hypotheses and also see if my concepts of implementation are of any use when trying to explain what possible problems Turkey has. I will start by describing what is said in Turkish articles and thereby see if I get support or not for my hypotheses. After that I will do the same with the Swedish articles. I will also compare what is said in the Turkish and Swedish articles with each other. In my final chapter I will discuss my findings and present my conclusions.

4.1 Turkish Newsarticles

4.1.1 The Leading Opposition in the EU

Lively discussions have been held in the EU concerning Turkey's accession. In order to start negotiations about accession, a set of conditions and reservations was set, which had not been the case with previous candidate countries. These conditions have to do with the member states not being able to agree on whether or not Turkey should be able to join at all. But since the EU has already said yes, these conditions are a way of halting the process. Opposing states such as France, Germany and Austria have instead called for something else rather than a full membership. The French President Nicolas Sarkozy is strongly against Turkish accession. According to him Turkey does not belong to Europe ("The EU and Turkey 3 years on" December 12, 2007 *Today's Zaman*; "Turkish reservations about EU relations" November 22, 2007 *Turkish Daily News*). Despite the support by other EU members; such as Great Britain and Sweden, these were not able to make the union renew its promise to let Turkey join. This is seen by Turkey as a betrayal, and France resistance will block future relations between the two countries ("Tüsiad: French objection to Turkey pathological" December 12, 2007 *Today's Zaman*; "Annoyed Turkey to keep diplomatic pressure on EU" December 12, 2007 *Turkish Daily News*).

Religion is one of the obstacles to Turkey's accession. Many Turks feel that Christian values have become a criteria for EU membership and that Turkey can not become a member due to cultural and spiritual differences ("Christian Values: New EU Membership Criteria for Turkey?" September 23, 2006 *Journal of Turkish Weekly*; "Merkel insists on 'privileged partnership' for Turkey" September 25, 2004 *Turkish Daily News*).

An interesting point that needs to be made is Turkey's own religious discrimination towards non-Muslims. Although Islam might not be a restriction towards Turkey's membership, Turkey's own restriction on religious freedom might be ("Religion at heart of debate over Turkey's EU bid" September 26, 2004 *Turkish Daily News*). Even though Turkey has made improvements such as making amendments in the constitution concerning religious minorities, there are still reports that indicate crimes against human rights, such as religion.

Between the political parties; even within the parties, in the EU there are also different opinions on the matter. In 2004 just before the EU commission was to release a progress report dealing with Turkey's accession, the EU parliament was divided ("Erdogan meeting heats up Turkey debate in European Parliament" September 25, 2004 *Turkish Daily News*).

When reading the Turkish articles I find partial support for my first hypothesis. Many of the articles deal with the debate between EU member states about whether or not Turkey should be able to join the Union. It is this disagreement, rather than Turkey's unfulfilment of the political conditions, together with France strong opposition that has led to discussions about a special kind of membership. This gives evidence to Sannerstedts and Richardson's theory that agreements within the EU often are 'peace treaties'. This might lead to confusion in Turkey about what reforms they need to go through with. While this shows that the concept of understanding is useful I believe that the newsarticles shows that the concept of will is more useful. Turkey's history with the EU shows that this is not the first time Turkey has been let down by promises made by the EU. It also shows that Turkey has turned its back towards the EU in an attempt to show that the EU is not indispensable for Turkey. While Turkey have made reforms and comprehends what the EU asks of it, it is equally important for Turkey to be able to show the EU that they in turn also can set some demands. The only thing actually supporting Turkey's problems with the political conditions is the discrimination of non-Muslim religion.

How the EU handles Turkey's application for membership will come to set the course for future candidate countries. If religion comes to be a determinant, it will jeopardize EU's relationship with potentially important new members. It will also endanger relations with non-members bordering the EU as well as with Muslim countries in the east; countries the EU needs to stay on good terms with for economic and security reasons. Religious discrimination does not go hand in hand with the fundamentals upon which the EU is built.

However, it is important not to forget the problems Turkey have with the acceptance of non-Muslim religions. While it is easy to criticize the EU of being a strict 'Christian club', Turkey needs to deal with national religious issues as well. One critique towards Turkey is the lack of respect for human rights, which includes respect for religious minorities.

4.1.2 The Public Doubt in the EU

Except for political leaders there is a widespread opinion among EU citizens that Turkey should not be able to join. One reason for Turkey's bad image is the large Muslim communities living in Europe, which have failed to integrate into the new society. The fear of these communities trying to "Islamify" Europe has led to the EU citizens doubting the suitability of letting a predominantly Muslim Turkey join. In order to tackle this, the Turkish government needs to realize and handle its image problem ("Winning the heart of EU citizens will be an uphill battle" September 26, 2007 *Today's Zaman*).

Actions committed by radical Islamists in Europe, like the bombings in Madrid and London, have also made people doubt Islam's compatibility with European values ("Turkey And Europe's Problem With Radical Islam" November 6, 2005 *Journal of Turkish Weekly*).

Actions outside of Europe such as the cartoon controversy and the subsequent reactions in the Muslim world gave further weight to Europeans fears and the growing polarization between Europeans and Muslims. This will most likely lead to further hostility between host societies and Muslim immigrants, which also will strengthen the opposition to a Turkish membership in the EU ("Turkey's impending disorientation" February 7, 2006 *Turkish Daily News*).

The question of letting a Muslim and culturally different country join the EU also became an electoral question in the EU referendum, where a no vote from the European citizens also would be considered a no to Turkish accession ("As French EU vote draws near, Turkey grows restless" May 22, 2005 *Turkish Daily News*).

Overall, the common opinion in Europe is that Turkey is too big to be digested, too poor and too different from the rest of Europe. A membership would mean the EU problems would increase as well as the member's economic and political burden ("If Turkey Says No?" August 22, 2005 *Journal of Turkish Weekly*).

There is however mutual influence between the public and its leaders on the opinions about a Turkish membership. The politicians inform the citizens about factors that can create a negative image of the Turks ("Fall may bring tension in Turkish-EU relations, says consultant" July 21, 2006 *Turkish Daily News*). Politicians and state leaders on the other hand cannot disregard the public opinion. Either way, it will be difficult for Turkey to counteract this negativity ("Hot autumn descends fast on Turkey-EU relations" September 10, 2006 *Turkish Daily News*).

My second hypothesis is to some extent confirmed. Turkish immigrants failing to integrate have led to the European citizens doubting Turkey's place in the EU and therefore opposing a membership. Both the EU and the Turkish government need to adopt measures in order to alleviate Europeans fears of letting Turkey join. Such measures might be difficult for groups in Turkey to agree to which can affect the implementation process.

However, the main fear seems to be that a membership of a Muslim country would lead to *further* immigration of Muslims and there are concerns of what this

would imply. I think that here it becomes most useful with the concept of will. As Richardson points out, sometimes it is not the implementation that is not working but rather the policy being ineffective. A problem can be inadequately understood and also how it is best solved. In this case, the Europeans fears of Muslim communities have also led to believing that since Turkey is predominantly Muslim it does not fit in the EU. A membership would only bring more trouble to Europe. What is forgotten in all of this is that actions threatening culture, peace and stability have to do with certain groups and not Islam (“Turkey And Europe’s Problem With Radical Islam” November 6, 2005 *Journal of Turkish Weekly*). The reason for the present situation is not Turkey’s EU membership.

Even though many Muslims in Europe face social barriers to integration, a problem can also be how the receiving state handles immigrants. Germany is an example that due to laws, immigrants face significant difficulties in assimilating to the new society.

The solution in Turkey’s case would therefore not be exclusion but rather inclusion in the EU. By encouraging Turkey’s EU membership religious tendencies can be prevented. Instead Europe could learn from its cooperation with a Muslim Turkey (“If Turkey Says No?” August 22, 2005 *Journal of Turkish Weekly*). The encouragement will most likely also lead to a more successful implementation process in Turkey, since there is a better understanding between the two parties about what the underlying problems are for a membership. It will be easier for Turkey to come to an insight of what needs to be done in order to join the EU. If the EU can accept the differences between Islamic Turkey and the rest of Europe it will be easier for Turkey to go through with the reforms.

4.1.3 Opposition in Turkey

One of the critical issues in Turkey’s EU membership bid is the political influence of the Army. This can be linked to two major challenges for Turkey: Political Islam and Kurdish nationalism (“Turkey’s Political Conflicts and the EU’s Involvement – 2007” May 5, 2006 *Journal of Turkish Weekly*). Nationalists have strongly criticized Prime Minister Erdogans acceptance of Kurds defining themselves as a distinct ethnic group in Turkey. They think that Erdogan is questioning the “one Turkish nation” policy and that a separate Kurdish identity can lead to a divide of the state along ethnic lines (“Erdogan’s remarks on Kurdish identity stir debate over Turkey’s national identity” November 30, 2005 *Turkish Daily News*).

The Turkish army is concerned about the political reforms needed in order to become a member of the EU. It fears that the reforms will increase Kurds cultural and political rights which will lead to separatism (“Lynching psychology thrives on Kurdish question and bad governance” September 18, 2006 *Turkish Daily News*).

Despite attempts to improve the situation not all parties involved seem to want to resolve the question, which has led to continued violence. This means that the goal of full cultural and political rights for the Kurds is unobtainable. It also

means weakened support by the EU (“Trouble in the South-East: Will the Reformers Please Stand up?” April 4, 2006 *Today’s Zaman*).

In order to reach a solution The Turkish government needs to start by guaranteeing the rule of law (“Trouble in the South-East: Will the Reformers Please Stand up?” April 4, 2006 *Today’s Zaman*). A first step would be to make the army obey under strict civilian control, which is also a necessary condition for a membership in the EU. This has become a test for the EU in order to see if the army can respect the democratic arrangement of civil military relations (“Turkey: We want no military coup!” April 29, 2007 *Journal of Turkish Weekly*).

In 1984 members of PKK took up arms for autonomy (“Erdogan’s remarks on Kurdish identity stir debate over Turkey’s national identity” November 30, 2005 *Turkish Daily News*). But as the Turkish state is becoming more democratic, the PKK needs to do the same. They should give up their armed struggle and turn to peaceful dialogue instead (“Trouble in the South-East: Will the Reformers Please Stand up?” April 4, 2006 *Today’s Zaman*). However, none of this has become reality. The PKK has been able to pursue its separatist movement due to the Turkish government non-comprehensive approach on the Kurdish question (“PACE Criticizes Turkey’s Methods of Combating Terrorism” September 5, 2006 *Today’s Zaman*). Even though there have been amendments in the law, the military remains strong and keep pursuing attacks against the PKK. A hope was that the Turkish Europeanization would bring a solution to the Kurdish question. When the PKK declared the end of the cease fire in 2004 it became evident that Turkey’s approach to the EU was of no help (“Turkey’s Political Conflicts and the EU’s Involvement – 2007” May 5, 2006 *Journal of Turkish Weekly*).

The information presented in the articles clearly support my third hypotheses. It also becomes clear that my concepts *ability* and *will* have been useful. There are different opinions in Turkey about granting the Kurds increased rights. While the government tries to push for reforms in this question, nationalist, foremost the army resists such attempts. These groups fear that Turkey will be divided along ethnical lines and that there are great risks of Kurdish separatism. Their fears have been confirmed by their neighbouring country Iraq where Kurds now control a region in the North. As long as the army believe that it is the political reforms imposed due to the EU accession process, it will be difficult for the government to keep pursuing them. The Kurdish question is so deeply rooted that it will be difficult to come to a solution any time soon. For some it is not worth jeopardizing peace and stability for. There are simply too many wills in order to enforce practical steps towards increased cultural and political rights for the Kurds. Important to notice in the articles are if it is really just the army’s will that is preventing a solution to the Kurdish question. It is clear that the army has been able to take advantage of the government’s passivity and difficulty to come up with a stable solution as well as the PKK’s provocative attempts to ignore the few attempts by Erdogan to reach a solution. The fact the government has not yet reached a stable solution might indicate that they also fear separatism or that they simply do not have the capacity to go against the army or the PKK.

In order to reach a solution, all parties involved needs to have the same goals and interests. Maybe opposition groups should reconsider. Instead of excluding

the Kurds and thereby encourage separatist feelings, the Kurds should be granted more cultural and political rights. By giving the Kurds a voice and a stake in Turkish political life, maybe the outcome will be the opposite. Instead of seeking independence the Kurds want to belong to Turkey and be loyal citizens (“Trouble in the South-East: Will the Reformers Please Stand up?” April 4, 2006 *Today’s Zaman*). An important step in this is to move closer to the EU which provides a chance for further reforms in this question.

4.2 Swedish Newsarticles

4.2.1 The Leading Opposition in the EU

Swedish articles put emphasis on who oppose Turkish accession and who does not. Already in 2004 there was mentioning of a ‘privileged partnership’ instead of full membership for Turkey. (“Islamofobi problem för Turkiet i EU” December 14, 2004 *Sydsvenskan*).

The strongest opponent is the French President Nicolas Sarkozy who has made it clear that Turkey does not belong in Europe. Since each EU state has the right to veto against a new member, the French opposition can be the main obstacle for Turkey’s membership bid (“Nu blir det strid om Turkiet” May 9, 2007 *Sydsvenskan*).

There are great tensions in the EU between countries that wish to enlarge the EU and their opponents. Sarkozy has taken the initiative to start a “group of wise men” whose assignment will be to come up with ideas about the future of the EU. Sarkozy’s actual goal for this group was to draw the borders of Europe future expansion. Germany and Austria support this line of thought (“Turkiet huvudvärk för EU” December 14, 2007 *Dagens Nyheter*). Countries like Sweden, Italy and Great Britain however refused this suggestion since it would mean an exclusion of Turkey from the Union (“Sarkozy: Turkiet i Asien, inte i EU” November 13, 2007 *Sydsvenskan*). Instead they want the EU to respect its previous commitments to Turkey. The controversy over the Turkish issue has led to a fundamental conflict between the two views on the future of the EU (“Hårdhänta prov väntar EU-länderna” December 12, 2007 *Svenska Dagbladet*).

The main arguments of those who believe that Turkey does not belong in Europe are the EU’s limited ability to absorb such a large country as well as the protection of Europe’s identity. This has resulted in decreased enthusiasm among Turks about joining the EU. There is a great risk that the reform process will slow down or even stop if it becomes evident that the promises about a membership were false. As a result, radical forces of Islam can take advantage of the situation. It will also send out signals to the Muslim world that Islam can not be combined with democracy (“Grattis, Europa!” March 25, 2007 *Sydsvenskan*; “EU kräver att Turkiet förändrar åsiktslag” November 6, 2007 *Svenska Dagbladet*; “Befogad kritik mot Turkiet” October 31, 2006 *Sydsvenskan*). Turkey feels that France is

trying to bloc future membership talks with the EU. Instead they urge the importance of both parties keeping confidence in each other (“Frankrike krockar med Turkiet i EU” June 26, 2007 *Dagens Nyheter*).

Just like the Turkish newsarticles, the Swedish give support to my first hypothesis that the best Turkey can hope for is a privileged membership. The reason put forward is not so much Turkey’s unfulfilment of the political conditions. It is rather the disagreement about the EUs enlargement which has not led to discussions about a privileged membership, as the Turkish articles show, but to conflicts between the member states.

The disagreement between the states has made Turkey doubt EUs honesty about a membership. This has led to less enthusiasm among the Turks and also a chance for more radical religious groups to take advantage of the situation. This corresponds well with my findings and analysis from the Turkish articles. The concept of will becomes useful since Turks feel that the aim of becoming a member of a club that it is not welcomed into has its limits. This will, I believe, hinder a continued implementation process and even less a successful one.

Like the Turkish articles show, it is also a question of understanding since it has become difficult for Turkey to believe in a membership since not even the EU can agree on its future enlargement strategy. This will lead to difficulties in Turkey’s implementation of political reforms. It is most likely that the disagreement has led to the new membership conditions set for Turkey. But to empirically prove this will be difficult. It is important to remember that the demands also increase for other states applying, not only Turkey. As the EU becomes more and more established and a stronger actor internationally it can also afford to raise its demands. Despite states like Sweden and Britain that are in favour of future enlargements, the EUs protectionism will make it hard for new states to live up to the growing demands.

4.2.2 The Public Doubt in the EU

The Swedish articles show that a large part of the French, German and the Austrian population are sceptic about Turkey joining. The main reasons are that the religious and cultural differences are too big (“Islamofobi problem för Turkiet i EU” December 14, 2004 *Sydsvenskan*). According to many, Turkey does not fit into a Christian Europe. In addition, an obstacle for Turkey will be to get accepted by the EU countries which suffer from low growth and instable welfare system. Europeans fear increased competition from Turks on the already competitive labour market. Turkey does not have the political will to take part of the European integration project. Seeing that it is too large it will get the institutional system of the EU out of balance (“Signerat” September 29, 2005 *Dagens Nyheter*; “Ingen rädder för turken här” March 28, 2007 *Sydsvenskan*). Although one of these articles was printed in 2005, I believe this to still be a problem. New member countries still face tough conditions on the labour market as well as instable welfare systems. Considering the fact that many Turks already reside in Europe there is a general fear that a Turkish membership will increase the migration and

thereby also the competition. In 2007 it is reconfirmed since there is still popular opposition to letting a relatively poor Muslim country join (“Grattis, Europa!” March 25, 2007 *Sydsvenskan*).

France and Austria have declared that they will take a popular vote the day Turkey fulfils all the membership conditions. However, this could destroy the dream of a politically unified Europe, since the French strongly oppose the Turkish membership. To them it would be a slap in the face to even have to vote about it (“Lång väg till EU för Turkiet” October 4, 2005 *Dagens Nyheter*). The French have already declared their resistance to a Turkish membership by voting no to the new EU constitution (“Nu blir det strid om Turkiet” May 9, 2007 *Sydsvenskan*).

In Sweden, one of the few countries in support of the Turkish membership, most of the political parties agree on this subject. However, the public opinion is another. In 2007, a survey showed that only 10 percent were in favour of a Turkish membership. However, the question is whether this applies to the notion that Turkey would become a member today or in the future. It is however interesting to see how there has come to be a gap between the public and the politicians regarding Turkey and the EU (“Massiv opinion mot turkiskt medlemskap” May 8, 2007 *Svenska Dagbladet*).

As opposed to the Turkish articles, the Swedish does not mention the Turks that already reside in Europe. However, considering the fact that most of the Turkish immigrants in Europe reside in France, Germany and Austria it is most likely that this has affected the public opinion about a Turkish membership. Neither do the Swedish articles mention anything about the possible impact on the public opinion of the terrorist actions taken by radical Muslims. The main focus is simply that Turkey does not fit in Europe due to religious and economic reasons, which also can be read in the Turkish articles.

As the scientific articles show the European citizens are afraid that immigration will threaten in-group recourses and culture, which both the Swedish and Turkish articles confirm. Like I reasoned with the Turkish articles, the question is whether this is because of the Turks already living in Europe or the possibility of this happening due to an *increase* of Turkish immigrants if (when) they become members.

What use then do I have of my concepts of implementation? My line of argument when I analysed the Turkish newsarticles with the help of my second hypothesis, also applies to the Swedish articles. It is a question of will, since Europeans fears of Islam have made them reject a Turkish membership. But it is simply not just religion. I would like to add the economic aspect, that Turkey is too big and too poor, which also makes it a question of ability. The EU asks too much too soon which has become unfair in Turkey’s case. Previous candidate countries, such as Poland, were able to join in order to be able to improve democracy and its economy. For Turkey, these conditions have to be fulfilled in order to become a member. It can therefore become a resource problem. As I mentioned earlier, it becomes more and more difficult for new applicants to join the EU. Ever since it became clear that a membership in the EU was possible, Turkey has strongly pursued political reforms in order to live up to the political

conditions. The development has been quite rapid. However, during recent years Turkey has dealt with the critique saying the implementation process has slowed down. Maybe the EU needs to realize that pushing so hard for reforms also needs encouragement as well as practical support. Turkey has gotten neither, and maybe this is a reason why they face difficulties with the continued implementation process? What is forgotten are the reforms Turkey has actually gone through with. Should they not get any credit for that? In order to get a little you have got to give a little. For Turkey to be able to continue its implementation of political reforms, the EU should live up to the expectations of its promise of one day letting Turkey become a member.

4.2.3 Opposition in Turkey

Just like the Turkish articles showed, the main obstacle in trying to solve the Kurdish question in Turkey is the strong influence of the military. Already in 2004 the army warned about a Kurdish region in Iraq, which would inspire the Kurds in Turkey to demand their own cultural and political rights (“Turkiet varnar för kurdstyrd region i Irak” January 17, 2004 *Sydsvenskan*).

The Kurdish question has become highly disputed within Turkey. Except for the army, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs has said it would be unacceptable with a Kurdish federal state (“Turkiet är inte redo ännu” October 4, 2005 *Svenska Dagbladet*).

Erdogan’s government is torn between the military and the EU. As part of the Europeanization process Erdogan has promised to solve the Kurdish question through democratic reforms. A first step has been to allow the Kurds limited language and cultural rights. This has become highly problematic since he has to stay on good terms with the army, who oppose such reforms. The army also doubts Erdogans real intentions because of his Islamic background. To add to the tension is the EUs demand to limit the power of the Turkish army (“Kurdfrågan på väg att lösas” August 12, 2005 *Dagens Nyheter*).

Before the election in 2007 the Kurdish question was a very sensitive issue. The army wanted the government to give its support to a military attack towards the PKK in northern Iraq. For many Kurds this was just a way for the military to stir up nationalistic feelings in Turkey. But for Erdogan it was a difficult decision since he could risk the votes of many Kurds and also the possible membership in the EU (“Ett viktigt val för alla kurder” July 13, 2007 *Sydsvenskan*). An invasion of Iraq, which is occupied by the USA, can also lead to further problems such as a conflict with Turkey’s closest ally: the USA (“Turkisk opposition för Irak-invasion” January 14, 2007 *Sydsvenskan*).

Many believe that the Turkish military attacks against PKK in Iraq are only an excuse for preventing the Kurds from gaining more independence. It is also a way for the army to keep control of the situation considering that the AKP has improved the situation for the Kurds and moving Turkey closer to the EU. It is however important to remember that even if the PKK gets eliminated, the problem

of Kurdish oppression still remains (“Kurderna skräms av krigshetsen” October 10, 2007 *Dagens Nyheter*).

The Swedish newsarticles give strong support to my third hypothesis. Just like the Turkish articles showed, the main obstacle is the fear of the Turkish army that the Kurds will gain more rights. The main focus is Erdogans difficulties with both pleasing the army and at the same time increasing the Kurdish rights as to please the Kurds and the EU. There is a slightly different tone in the Swedish articles however. The Turkish articles imply that the army remains strong and can keep pursue its attacks towards the PKK because the Turkish government has not been able to come up with a stable solution. The Swedish articles indicate that the army keep pursuing its attacks because it is starting to fear the reforms the Erdogan government has made when it comes to Kurdish rights and thereby increasing Turkey’s chances of getting into the EU.

Despite this, there still remain difficulties in the implementation process due to different actors opposing reforms. Just like with the Turkish articles, the concepts of *ability* and *will* help explain Turkey’s problems with implementation. I would like to add a little to my reasoning. As long as there are actors who oppose reforms it will be difficult for Erdogan to keep pursuing them. Part of the implementation problem is state institutions which oppose granting Kurds cultural and political rights. When it comes to the army it is highly difficult to see how Erdogan can best solve the problem. The army believes that an EU membership will reduce its role and power and one of the EUs demands for membership is to reduce the role of the army in Turkish politics. Except for the army, the Swedish articles also show

When it comes to the army I find their stance a little contradictive. On one hand they see themselves as the protector of the legacy from Atatürk. On the other they counteract attempts made by Turkey in trying to westernize and come closer to its European neighbours, which were the goals of Atatürk.

5 Conclusion

Considering the difficulties Turkey is facing when trying to become a member in the EU, I found it of interest to elucidate what the main problem is. The EU has on several occasions made it clear that the main obstacle for a Turkish membership is Turkey's failure in implementing the necessary political reforms. The purpose with this essay has therefore been to analyse why it is Turkey has such problems when it comes to the implementation of these reforms.

By testing the hypotheses with the help of my concepts of implementation I have been able to come up with different explanations. To some extent I have been able to confirm my hypotheses but the Turkish and Swedish newsarticles also widens the perspective a little. At the same time it has become evident that there is little difference in how Turkey's case is presented in the Turkish and Swedish articles. The conclusions I draw when doing my analysis of the hypotheses are therefore much alike.

When it comes to hypothesis one, both the Swedish and Turkish articles show that due to Turkey's size and religion, EU member states can not agree on whether or not Turkey should be able to join. This does not necessarily mean that the best thing Turkey can hope for is something like a 'privileged membership' since states such as Sweden and Great Britain believe that Turkey should be promised nothing else than a full membership. The disagreement does automatically not lead to difficulties for Turkey when it comes to the implementation, it is however an indication that this might be the case. To answer my question, with the help of the concept of understanding it can be interpreted that it will be difficult for Turkey to comprehend what is necessary in order to please the EU and will thereby effect the implementation process. However, it can also be that Turkey chooses to stop the reform process deliberately because a membership seems impossible as long as powerful countries such as Germany and France oppose it. Thereby the Turkish and Swedish articles also showed that the concept of will became useful. Even though it does not answer my question it gives an apprehension of why Turkey has become such a problematic candidate to the EU.

The Turkish articles support hypothesis two, indicating that the Turkish migrants in Europe have led to the European public opposing the membership. I have therefore had use of the concept of understanding since both the EU states as well as Turkey needs to take measures in order to make Turkey more appealing. This however might be difficult in Turkey since not all actors are in favour of such measures. However, the Swedish and Turkish articles indicate that it is rather the fear of further immigration, than the already existing one, that is seen as a threat to many Europeans. It therefore becomes a question of will, since this fear is most likely based on a prejudice against Islam as a religion and not Turkey. This can give a possible answer to my question since the demands set by the EU

have to do with how the politicians are affected by the public opinion on the issue. Many, both within Turkey and in the EU, are of the opinion that these demands are higher than with previous candidates. Except for religion it is also an economic aspect which makes the concept of ability useful. The extra set of criteria applied to Turkey makes it more difficult for Turkey to go through with a successful implementation.

As the two first hypotheses deals with external forces that influence Turkey in its implementation process, the third hypothesis deals with internal obstacles such as the army. According to both the Turkish and Swedish articles, concerns among different groups in Turkey about increased rights for the Kurds has made it difficult for Erdogan to go through with reforms necessary for an EU membership. This confirms that the concepts of will and ability have been useful when analysing why Turkey has problems with the implementation of reforms because of the Kurdish question. Important has also been the fact about how Erdogans Islamic background has become an additional obstacle when trying to make the army cooperate; an army that governs the secular heritage of Turkey. As long as the army is suspicious about Erdogans real intentions with his leadership, it will probably be almost impossible to make the army agree to reforms that limits their power but increases the Kurds.

When it comes to the concepts of implementation I have found the concept of understanding difficult to apply to Turkey's situation. Even though I have found the concept useful, in order to see if disagreements have led to vague policies and in turn difficulties in Turkey's implementation process, my answers only become more of assumptions. In Turkey's case the concepts of will and ability has been most useful, because in the end it all comes down to what or/and how many actors take part in the implementation process, and if they are willing to go through with it.

In order to be able to fully use all three concepts – ability, understanding and will – the research needs to be done on an actor and administrative level. That is why I find hypothesis three to give the most satisfying answer to my question. However, I am of the opinion that all of my hypotheses together with the help of my concepts of implementation have increased our understanding of Turkey's problems with implementation and thereby why it faces difficulties in its strive towards an EU membership.

It is said that no one has pushed so hard for political reforms as Erdogan. Even so, he still faces strong opposition pulling in the other direction. The solution is not to please both the EU and the national opposition groups. If Turkey is to become a member, the EU needs to take into consideration what reforms that have already been made. Important is also for Erdogan to keep up the implementation process, but in order to do that the promise of full membership needs to be obtainable in the nearest future.

By the end of the day the EU needs to ask itself if it actually wants Turkey to join or not. The question is why the EU at one point in 2004 agreed to start membership negotiations and why today some countries oppose it and therefore find different ways to prolong the process? My conclusion is that the EU is not able to reach homogeneous agreements and has trouble sticking to promises. I

believe that this will remain a problem as long as member states are too influenced by questions relating to domestic policies. This is the case when it comes to Germany, France and Austria with large Turkish communities. While these state leaders deem it necessary to keep Turkey close for security reasons they also fear what the repercussions will be if they go against the common will of the public opinion.

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