



LUND
UNIVERSITY

Department of Political Science

STV 004
Tutor: Anders Sannerstedt

Failure versus Success

An Analysis of Angola's and Mozambique's Peace Outcomes

Karin Fransson

Abstract

Resolving an intrastate war can be a difficult task. Angola and Mozambique, both former Portuguese colonies which both gained independency in 1975, has suffered longstanding intrastate war. Within a year and a half they both signed their first peace agreements, with different outcomes to follow. This thesis has two purposes. The main one is to use Kumar Rupesinghe's model of conflict transformation in order to analyse why Angola's peace failed and why Mozambique's lasted. A comparative case study of the two countries is performed with the help of mainly secondary sources like books and articles written by academic scholars. The analysis shows that Mozambique employed initiatives, in accordance with Rupesinghe's model, in a much wider scope than Angola, and hence it can count as being one of the reasons why Mozambique's peace lasted whilst Angola's failed.

The other purpose is to test Rupesinghe's model's usefulness. Findings show that the model is interesting and useful and can be used as one way to explain why a peace last or fail, but also that it has its shortcomings. For example, there are elements within the model which are too similar and also the aspect of culture has not been taken into account in Rupesinghe's model.

Key words: Angola, Mozambique, peace, conflict transformation, Rupesinghe's model

Table of contents

List of Abbreviations	5
1 Introduction.....	1
1.1 Purpose and Research Question	2
1.2 Methodology	2
1.2.1 Sources – a Critical Discussion	3
1.2.2 Definitions	4
1.2.3 Delimitations	4
2 Theoretical Discussion.....	5
2.1 Why Conflict Transformation?.....	5
2.1.1 Conflict Management	5
2.1.2 Conflict Resolution	5
2.1.3 Conflict Transformation	6
2.2 Rupesinghe’s Conflict Transformation Model	6
3 From Pre-negotiation to Sustaining the Effort	8
3.1 Pre-negotiation Stage	8
3.1.1 Angola	8
3.1.2 Mozambique.....	9
3.2 Understanding Root Causes	9
3.2.1 Angola	10
3.2.2 Mozambique.....	10
3.3 Ownership of the Peace Process.....	11
3.3.1 Angola	11
3.3.2 Mozambique.....	11
3.4 Identifying All the Actors	12
3.4.1 Angola	12
3.4.2 Mozambique.....	12
3.5 Identifying Facilitators	13
3.5.1 Angola	13
3.5.2 Mozambique.....	13
3.6 Setting a Realistic Timetable.....	14
3.6.1 Angola	14
3.6.2 Mozambique.....	15
3.7 Sustaining the Effort.....	16
3.7.1 Angola	16
3.7.2 Mozambique.....	16
4 From Evaluating Success and Failure to Local Peacemakers	17

4.1	Evaluating Success and Failure.....	17
4.1.1	Angola	17
4.1.2	Mozambique.....	17
4.2	Strategic Constituencies	18
4.2.1	Angola	18
4.2.2	Mozambique.....	18
4.3	The Role of Outside Peacemakers	19
4.3.1	Angola	19
4.3.2	Mozambique.....	19
4.4	The Role of Local Peacemakers.....	21
4.4.1	Angola	21
4.4.2	Mozambique.....	21
5	Conclusion	23
	References.....	26

List of Abbreviations

CCM	The Mozambican Christian Council
FLEC	Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda
FRELIMO	Front for the Liberation of Mozambique
GPA	General Peace Agreement
MPLA	Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
OMM	Organisation of Mozambican Women
ONUMOZ	United Nations Operation in Mozambique
RENAMO	Mozambican National Resistance
UN	United Nations
UNAVEM	United Nations Angola Verification Mission
UNITA	National Union for the Total Independence of Angola

1 Introduction

Countries suffering from war will at some point face a peace process leading to a peace agreement. Violent interstate and intrastate wars have characterised and still characterise several African countries. Two African countries which have been plagued by longlasting war are Angola and Mozambique, where the war in Angola is one of the most destructive ones ever. They are both former Portuguese colonies which gained independence in 1975. After their respective independencies intrastate wars broke out between opposing groups with the support of superpowers. In Angola, Cuba and the Soviet Union supported the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), and the USA, Zaire and South Africa supported the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). During the years of war the supporting countries did little in order to stop the bloodshed in Angola. In Mozambique South Africa supported the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO), and China and the Soviet Union supported Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO).

After decades of war negotiations started between the warring parties, and in 1991 Angola signed their first peace agreement. Mozambique signed theirs in 1992. Angola soon again plunged back into war, whilst Mozambique has managed to sustain their peace. Although Angola and Mozambique share important similarities “their transition to peace and elected government produced different outcomes” (Malaquias 1998). Why did Angola’s peace fail whilst Mozambique’s lasted? Present research “provides surprisingly little guidance on why cease-fires fail or on what helps make peace last” (Fortna 2004:1). Surely there are many reasons as to why a peace fails or lasts, but are there things that can be done during the peace process in order to make the peace more likely to last? In this thesis it will, with the help of Rupesinghe’s model of conflict transformation, be analysed why the peace in Angola failed whilst the peace in Mozambique lasted.

This thesis commences with an introduction chapter where the purpose of the thesis and the research question will be presented and there will also be a method and material discussion. Chapter two will pose a discussion around the three theoretical schools conflict management, conflict resolution and conflict transformation. I will also motivate why Rupesinghe’s model of conflict transformation was chosen for this thesis. Chapter three and four will present the eleven elements of Rupesinghe’s model and it will become clear what Angola and Mozambique did or did not do during their peace processes with regard to each element. Finally, in chapter five the conclusions from the analyses will be presented and the usefulness of Rupesinghe’s model will be discussed.

1.1 Purpose and Research Question

Is there something that can be done to improve the chances of a durable peace? The primary aim of this thesis is to analyse why Angola's peace failed whilst Mozambique's lasted. Why did the two peace processes result in different outcomes? Rupesinghe's model of conflict transformation takes up eleven elements which can be helpful in order to prepare for a stable peace in a country. Therefore, this thesis will focus on Rupesinghe's elements and what initiatives were employed in the two countries during their peace processes. Hence, the research question reads as follows:

- How can it, with the help of Rupesinghe's model, be explained why the peace in Angola failed whilst the peace in Mozambique lasted?

The additional purpose is to test Rupesinghe's model's usefulness, since it does not seem like it has been used very often. Therefore, it is interesting to test if the model is useful in a theoretical context and as far I know there has not been a study carried out using Rupesinghe's model of conflict transformation on Angola and Mozambique. The aim with using Rupesinghe's model is to test if it can explain the different outcomes of Angola's and Mozambique's peace processes, and if not, what is lacking in the model? In the final chapter I aspire to give some critical thoughts around Rupesinghe's model.

A wishful purpose is also that this study can be used as a contribution towards our understanding of initiatives which can play an importance in a country's way toward peace.

1.2 Methodology

To be able to answer the research question a qualitative research method has been chosen, since a qualitative method is a way to capture the entirety (Esaiaasson et. al. 2004:233, Devine 2002:207). Qualitative methods sometimes get criticized for being a limited research method because of the researcher not being able to draw generalizations. All research methods have their disadvantages and "what is a valid method depends on the aims and objectives of a research project (Devine 2002:205). My main ambition is not to draw generalizations, but to analyse why Angola's peace failed and Mozambique's lasted. I do not aspire to tell people involved in peace processes *how* they should solve a war, I only seek to give *recommendations* on what elements should be considered to be included in a country's peace process.

This thesis is a case study of Angola's and Mozambique's initiatives employed during their respective peace processes. The two cases have been chosen on the basis of "most similar case design", since there are several reasons

which make these two countries fruitful to compare (Esaiasson et. al. 2004:111). Even though there are differences there are also numerous similarities, for example they are both former Portuguese colonies which got “freed from colonial rule in 1975 by Marxist liberation movements; and both spent their first two decades of independence mired in bitter internecine conflict” (Greenhill & Major 2007:23). Furthermore, both wars were of intrastate character and went on for more than 16 years. Moreover, in both countries the conflict revolved around strong leaders; Jonas Savimbi for UNITA in Angola and Afonso Dhlakama for RENAMO in Mozambique. Angola is looked upon as a failure since the first peace agreement, the Bicesse Accord, broke down and the country plunged back into war once again. Mozambique on the other hand is looked upon as a success because their first peace agreement, the General Peace Agreement (GPA), has lasted. An important difference between these two countries is that Angola, as a contrast to Mozambique, is a country with a lot of natural resources, especially oil and diamonds.

In order to carry out the research Rupesinghe’s model of conflict transformation has been used. Rupesinghe’s model can help to explain why Angola’s peace failed whilst Mozambique’s lasted. To be able to explain this I will need to identify what the two countries did with regards to the eleven elements presented in Rupesinghe’s model. The model has been chosen because it takes up several elements which Rupesinghe claims are necessary in order to achieve a durable peace. Furthermore, it is not a model which seems to have been used a lot and it is pleasant to find a theory which is not developed by western theorists, since most of them are. Another reason why Rupesinghe’s model has been chosen is because it focuses on intrastate wars, which is applicable for both Angola and Mozambique.

1.2.1 Sources – a Critical Discussion

It could have been useful to visit Angola and Mozambique in order to be able to interview people with knowledge about the peace process. I reason that the material found whilst situated in Sweden is good enough in order to carry out the study in mind.

Getting the history right can be seen as a difficult task since it can be complex to find the definite answers. “Only a handful of journalists followed the wars closely enough and long enough to have a historical perspective, and of those few, none was intimately acquainted with both sides of the wars. A high proportion of what was published, moreover, was written by journalists or scholars who knew neither Portuguese nor any local African language in Mozambique or Angola” (Minter 1994:77). In the aftermath of that, scholars have carried out research where they have examined smaller parts of previous material and also found new insights through interviews with for example participants in the wars. Therefore, I have used multiple sources in order to strengthen the validity of the material found (Esaiasson et. al. 2004:312). The sources used for this thesis are reliable secondary sources, such as books, reports and articles. By reliable sources I mean

professional scholars like for example Alex Vines and Thomas Ohlson, and also well-reputed organisations such as the United Nations (UN). Sources like these are sadly not assured to be completely reliable, but by using them it is a way to avoid as many pitfalls as possible.

1.2.2 Definitions

Central concepts in this study are intrastate war and peace. I consider Angola and Mozambique “to be in peace” from the second they signed their respective peace agreements.

When defining intrastate war I use Thomas Ohlson’s definition meaning “an incompatibility between the government of a state and at least one identifiable, organized actor within that state” (Ohlson 1998:32). In Angola it was a war between UNITA and MPLA; MPLA was at that time classed as being the government. In Mozambique the internal war was between RENAMO and FRELIMO, where FRELIMO was the government at that time.

1.2.3 Delimitations

The reasons why Angola’s peace failed and Mozambique’s lasted are several and all can not be covered in a thesis of this size. Therefore, the focus will be on the eleven elements in Rupesinghe’s model of conflict transformation and how they can explain the different outcomes of Angola’s and Mozambique’s peaces. Hence, the study can be more thorough than it would have been if other factors for the outcome of the peaces would have been involved.

This thesis will focus on the time leading up to the countries first peace agreements; the Bicesse Accord for Angola and the GPA for Mozambique. This is because they were the first peace agreements after independence for both countries.

It has been easier to find material concerning Angola and Mozambique on some of the elements in Rupesinghe’s model. Therefore, some of the elements, like *ownership of the peace process* and *evaluating success and failure*, have less facts about what actually happened in Angola and Mozambique during the peace process compared to for example elements like *the role of outside and local peacemakers*, where there was plenty of facts to be found about both countries. Still, I reason that the material found about both countries on each element is enough to be able to carry out a fruitful analysis.

2 Theoretical Discussion

In this chapter an overview of Rupesinghe's model of conflict transformation will be given. Two other theoretical schools will be presented shortly, namely conflict resolution and conflict management. Hence, this chapter will pose a short discussion around the three different theoretical schools, in order to show why conflict transformation has been chosen. Furthermore, Rupesinghe's model of conflict transformation will be presented.

2.1 Why Conflict Transformation?

A comparative analysis of the initiatives employed in Angola and Mozambique would be of little interest if the initiatives were not to be put in a theoretical context. With the help of the analyses, conclusions about the importance of the different elements of Rupesinghe's model of conflict transformation can be drawn. All three theoretical schools presented below have differences, but "all three schools rely on a shared tradition of thinking about conflict and intervention" (Miall 2004:17).

2.1.1 Conflict Management

Conflict management focuses, as they name reveals, on how to manage a conflict. It does not give ideas on how to solve a conflict. Conflict management theorists reason that violent conflicts arise as a result of differences in values and interests within and between communities. Furthermore, they see conflicts like these as impossible to solve, but it is possible "to reach a historic compromise in which violence may be laid aside and normal politics resumed" (ibid 2004:3). Conflict management is also about how to intervene in a conflict and how to design appropriate institutions. One way to calm a conflict could be to send peacekeeping troops, but the troops would not be there to stop the conflict; instead they get sent to cut down on killings.

2.1.2 Conflict Resolution

Conflict resolution theorists, on the other hand, argue that people cannot compromise on their fundamental needs in communal and identity conflicts. Conflict resolution "therefore emphasises intervention by skilled but powerless

third-parties working unofficially with the parties to foster new thinking and new relationships” (Miall 2004:3). Conflict resolutionists try to develop a “processes of conflict resolution that appear to be acceptable to parties in dispute and effective in resolving conflict” (ibid 2004:4). The theory has an analytical and problem-solving approach. Furthermore, the theory focuses on finding reasons to the conflict and thereafter how to deal with them.

2.1.3 Conflict Transformation

“Conflict transformation theorists argue that contemporary conflicts require more than the reframing of positions and the identification of win-win outcomes” (ibid 2004:4). The theory points out the importance of involving the whole society in the process of peace building and it emphasises that outside mediation is not preferable. “It also recognizes that conflicts are transformed gradually, through a series of smaller or larger changes as well as specific steps by means of which a variety of actors may play important roles” (ibid 2004:4). Furthermore, unlike conflict resolution which favours skilled third-parties, conflict transformation emphasises the importance of using people and their knowledge within the setting. According to conflict transformation theorists, peace-building necessitates far more than just elite agreements.

Kumar Rupesinghe is a theorist within the field of conflict transformation who “argues for a comprehensive, eclectic approach to conflict transformation that embraces multitrack interventions. He proposes building peace constituencies at the grassroots level and across the parties at the civil society level (where it exists), and also creating peace alliances with any groups able to bring about change, such as business groups, the media and the military. He sees conflict transformation as a broad approach incorporating conflict resolution training and Track I interventions including diplomatic interventions and peacekeeping” (ibid 2004:5). Differences between conflict transformation and conflict resolution and management are that conflict transformation focuses on involving as broad spectrum of the society as possible in the peace process. Whereas conflict management circles around how to stabilize a war so that killings get cut, conflict transformation involves that aspect but also go all the way to a solution of a conflict.

2.2 Rupesinghe’s Conflict Transformation Model

Kumar Rupesinghe grew up in Sri Lanka but has studied and worked all over the world. He has written over 40 books and more than 200 articles about for example building peace in divided societies. Rupesinghe’s model of conflict transformation contains the following elements which he reason should be taken into account during a country’s peace process:

- (i) Pre-negotiation stage
- (ii) Understanding root causes
- (iii) Ownership of the peace process
- (iv) Identifying all the actors
- (v) Identifying facilitators
- (vi) Setting a realistic timetable
- (vii) Sustaining the effort
- (viii) Evaluating success and failure
- (ix) Strategic constituencies
- (x) The role of outside peacemakers
- (xi) The role of local peacemakers

The following two chapters will give a comparative analysis of the initiatives employed in Angola and Mozambique during their peace processes using Rupesinghe's model of conflict transformation. In order to carry out an as thorough analysis as possible each element of the model will be considered and they will be presented in the same order as shown above, and what was done in Angola and Mozambique, with regard to the specific element, will be presented and analysed.

3 From Pre-negotiation to Sustaining the Effort

3.1 Pre-negotiation Stage

The purpose of this stage is to bring the warring parties into the negotiation process and realistic goals for the negotiation process should be set up. It is important that the parties have a will to commit to peace. “The ‘strategic intent’ of the pre-negotiation phase is to reduce intractability, to formulate and design a process which can bring parties to the negotiation table and to begin the trust- and confidence-building necessary for a successful negotiating exercise” (Rupesinghe 1995:80). It should be questioned *why* the warring parties are coming to the negotiation table and it is important to understand their motivations for deciding to come to the negotiation table. Are they ready to negotiate for peace or are they just trying to buy time whilst they get resupplied?

3.1.1 Angola

The warring parties came to the negotiation table in Angola was out of two reasons. Firstly, access to weapons was lower than ever. MPLA had lost their main supplier for weapons, which was the Soviet Union. Furthermore, Cuba withdrew their troops which affected UNITA’s warfare. As a consequence of this, the USA also proved less enthusiastic to military aid UNITA. Still, MPLA and UNITA respectively were equipped with heavy weapons and controlled significant sectors of the country. Taking up arms would be an option for both MPLA and UNITA if they did not feel satisfied with the negotiations. Once the peace agreement had been settled the “MPLA shifted approximately 20 000 of its elite troops into a paramilitary police force; whilst UNITA kept its heaviest weapons and more than 25 000 battled-hardened fighters hidden in the bush” (Gounden & Solomon 2001:185).

Secondly, the USA, the Soviet Union and Portugal, were intensely pressuring the parties to negotiate. The warring parties in Angola did not go into the negotiations because they were ready, but because the negotiations were imposed on them.

Furthermore, it was not possible for the warring parties to start negotiating since the trust between them was non-existent. “It was a negotiation to be dictated

by Washington, Moscow and Lisbon but had no relevance to the situation on the ground in Angola” (Gounden & Solomon 2001:185). Still, the talks came under way. “Both parties accepted a Portuguese mediation offer in early 1990, but the negotiations did not lead anywhere until the USA and the USSR joined Portugal as observers” (Ohlson 1998:74). The talks carried on and once at the negotiation table UNITA figured that since the peace agreement would lead up to an election they were certain they would win. Hence, UNITA reasoned that it was a reason good enough to stay in the negotiations. MPLA was also certain that UNITA would win the election. “In fact, for the US (with the consent of the two others), peace was not the first and only aim. The peace process was perceived more as a route for UNITA to come to power” (Messiant 2004). UNITA had put down their weapons to one degree, but they had only done that because they were certain that they would win the election. Had they known that MPLA would win the election, surely they would not have gone into the negotiations. The peace was doomed already from the start since the way the peace eventually came about had effect on the duration of the peace.

3.1.2 Mozambique

The warring parties in Mozambique reached a stalemate in the early 1990s when they both realized that neither side would win. It came across since none of the parties were getting any more supplies from their supporters, as a consequence of the end of the Cold War. (Ohlson 1994) The Soviet Union stopped giving financial support to FRELIMO. South Africa stopped supplying RENAMO because the country itself was due to go through a democratic transition. Another reason for the beginning of the negotiations was the devastating drought plaguing Mozambique. “The famine which followed brought both FRELIMO and RENAMO to the point of exhaustion, so that neither side was able to continue the armed struggle” (Newitt 2002:221). The most difficult problem facing Mozambique was “how to bring Dhlakama and Renamo into the peace process” (Ohlson 1998:136). Still with the help of for example the Mozambican Christian Council (CCM), Tiny Rowland (a multi-millionaire businessman), and several countries (which we will see about later in the analyses), negotiations came underway. Both FRELIMO and RENAMO felt good about the negotiations commencing since they both figured they could not pursue the war any longer.

3.2 Understanding Root Causes

Rupesinghe proclaims that “it is abundantly clear from the experiences in Somalia, the former Yugoslavia, Sri Lanka and elsewhere that there is a need for a clear conceptual and theoretical understanding of the root causes and the sources of intractability of a given conflict” (Rupesinghe 1996:166). Settlements which ignore the root causes can face further confrontation. How and why a war started

needs to be addressed in order to know when to intervene and also to be able to facilitate the proper resolution to a war.

3.2.1 Angola

In the case of Angola “it is difficult not to escape the stark fact that the root causes of the conflict had less to do with ideological (capitalism vs communism) and ethnic (Ovimbundu vs Mbundus) considerations and more to do with the desire for complete control on the part of leaders who utilised such considerations as vehicles for their own naked political ambitions” (Gounden & Solomon 2001:186). The leaders of UNITA and MPLA, and perhaps also the mediators, must have been fairly aware of what the underlying issues were, but still these were not brought up. If they would have been then the Bicesse Accord could have been altered in alliance with these and a breakout of the war once again could have been avoided. There was a deep mistrust between MPLA and UNITA and this fact was not given consideration during the negotiations or in the Bicesse Accord. The civil war in Angola involved not only high political stakes but even greater economic interests given its immense natural resources, particularly oil and diamonds. “Lack of a consensus on how Angola's wealth should be divided in a post-conflict era ultimately booby-trapped the entire peace operation” (Malaquias 1998). During the negotiations a resolution to the main underlying internal problems never got discussed.

3.2.2 Mozambique

Mozambique on the other hand did not experience the same problem as Angola concerning natural resources, since they hardly have any natural resources. Already early in the peace process the warring parties agreed that they would try to end the war together. “The Mozambican case underlines the crucial need for peacemaking initiatives to come to terms with the underlying, often hidden, factors driving armed conflicts” (Armon et. al. 1998). There were several issues to the war in Mozambique and most of them got solved. “The settlement eventually met all of Renamo’s demands for a multiparty state, the end of the Marxist-Leninist political and economic system, and the inclusion of more traditional political and religious authorities” (Lloyd 2001:318). One example of an issue which did not get solved was land distribution. Furthermore, Lloyd writes that regional and ethnic rivalry, political freedom and rights did not get fully solved.

“If one sees the preemptive moves by Frelimo to address popular grievances as the prologue to the political settlement, then almost all the immediate grievances were resolved. The political settlement itself resolved the major outstanding grievance of access to the political system. Thus, the settlement’s resolution of the immediate causes of the conflict was sufficient to establish normal politics” (ibid 2001:319). Even though not all root causes got solved the resolution of the war had the support of the people in Mozambique.

“Mozambicans were satisfied with the resolution of the grievances and its outcome: peace” (Lloyd 2001:320). The support of the people is a requisite for peace to last.

3.3 Ownership of the Peace Process

Rupesinghe states that it is vital to involve “local actors so that they become the primary architects, owners and long-term stakeholders in the peace process” (Rupesinghe 1995:81). If the international community has too much of a say and stress the warring parties it might do more harm than good. “International pressure is not applicable in many intra-states conflicts plaguing the world today” (Solomon & Mngqibisa 2000). If local actors are involved they will support the peace work because they will feel it is “their” peace.

3.3.1 Angola

In the case of Angola “the Bicesse Accord was, in large measure, imposed upon the parties” (Gounden & Solomon 2001:187). Foreign leaders were the actual architects of the peace agreement, not local actors and Angola’s leaders, which would have been the main objective. Hence, it does not appear surprising that fighting continued throughout the peace process. Since Angolans were not particularly involved in the peace process; they did not feel they had to obey its conditions. The Bicesse Accord was “orchestrated by Portugal with help from the superpowers” (Birmingham 2002:170). The USA and the Soviet Union were at that time counted as being the superpowers, with the USA pulling most of the weight. Furthermore, the peace process did not include all different ethnic groups in Angola, and with Angola’s troublesome history concerning ethnicity in the country it should have been a requisite that they all should be offered to get involved in the peace process.

3.3.2 Mozambique

Before the negotiations started Chissano, president of FRELIMO, prepared “the Mozambican people for the prospect of negotiations” (Ohlson 1998:138). “In contrast to Angola, where superpower rivalry both escalated the level of conflict and aided at key points in promoting conflict resolution, the dynamics of conflict and conflict resolution in Mozambique were dominated by regional rather than global geopolitics” (Minter 1994:165). As will be shown under chapter 3.4.2 a broad selection of local actors, like CCM, women groups, were involved in the peace process in one way or another, and therefore it can be counted as if Mozambicans owned their peace process.

3.4 Identifying All the Actors

It is important for the peace process that all actors like for example elites, leaders, women, non-military actors and opinion-shapers get identified and brought into the peace process. “Accurate identification must be made of all significant actors – the visible and articulate elites as well as the less visible, less articulate, but still influential opinion shapers and leaders” (Rupesinghe 1996:167). Failure in bringing all the different actors into the peace process can result in a breakdown of the process. It is out of importance that non-military actors are “fully involved in the peace process because exclusive reliance on highly visible political or military elites has proved disastrous in the former Yugoslavia, Somalia and even Sri Lanka” (ibid).

3.4.1 Angola

Little effort was spent on bringing the Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (FLEC) to the negotiating table. It came as no surprise “that they issued a statement on 31 July 1992 saying they would boycott the elections and carry on an armed struggle until independence for Cabinda was won” (Gounden & Solomon 2001:188). To not involve FLEC in the negotiations was a mistake since Cabinda is the region which is very rich of oil and the rest of the country are dependent upon the profits there from. Since the USA, the Soviet Union and Portugal, and also UNITA and MPLA to some extent, dominated the peace process in Angola. Hence, for example potential elites or opinion-shapers were excluded from Angola’s peace process.

3.4.2 Mozambique

In Mozambique CCM worked hard in getting all the warring actors into the peace process. Furthermore, all major political actors, together with the superpowers, participated in consultative processes. In Mozambique the Organisation of Mozambican Women (OMM) got formed in order to spread their broad political agenda for Mozambique and also to raise awareness about women. The members grew steadily and one of the organisations missions was to lobby for peace. Furthermore, the members went around the country to tell other women what they could expect if Mozambique would reach peace. (Moran & Pitcher 2004) Mozambique got a lot of actors into the peace process, since for example women and CCM were involved.

3.5 Identifying Facilitators

Who could be a good person to design the peace process? People who can contribute with their expertise and knowledge about different issues are favourable. For example people “who have the background knowledge, analytic and mediation skills to make a positive contribution to the design process” (Rupesinghe 1995:81).

3.5.1 Angola

In the case of Angola the facilitators were people from the USA, the Soviet Union and Portugal, since these countries were the ones who imposed the peace negotiations on the Angolans. “There were no internal facilitators whom the parties could agree upon” (Gounden & Solomon 2001:188). For the “other international actors the involvement of the US was a sufficient guarantee that events would run smoothly” (Messiant 2004). Perhaps the USA, the Soviet Union and Portugal had high-quality mediation skills, but since they had not been living in the country nor had a lot of personal experience of Angola’s background they were not the optimal facilitators. People living locally in Angola would have been more suitable.

3.5.2 Mozambique

President Mugabe of Zimbabwe was crucial for the peace process in Mozambique since he managed to bring Chissano to recognize Dhlakama and RENAMO and also reassured Dhlakama that it would be safe for him and RENAMO to enter the peace process. Mugabe can also be thanked for bringing the two parties together in Rome for the significant talks which lead to the peace agreement being signed. (Ohlson 1998) Furthermore, FRELIMO contacted the Vatican which in turn suggested the services of Sant’ Egidio, a Catholic community which was founded in Rome 1968, to help with the peace process (see also chapter 4.3.2). Sant’ Egidio representatives “had the credentials to mediate due to their long-standing familiarity with Mozambican issues and because they were well known to one or both belligerents” (Armon et. al. 1998). The strength of Sant’ Egidio was that they were taking it slowly in order to keep a valuable dialogue with the parties.

Tiny Rowland’s involvement was also of great importance, since he “became personally engaged in the peace process and was instrumental in building up Renamo’s confidence to step out of the bush and negotiate” (Vines 1998). He had experience of negotiating with rebels since 1982. Rowland also flew the different parties to places where negotiations were due to be held. When the peace negotiations started only the two warring parties, Rowland and President Mugabe were present. There were some issues RENAMO and FRELIMO could not agree upon and they became more and more impatient, starting to give up. Rowland

then “intervened, pleading that having got so close to an agreement, it was surely worth waiting a short while longer to conclude it” (Vines 1998). Soon after the parties agreed and signed the agreement. After the peace agreement had been reached Chissano publicly thanked Rowland saying Rowland “facilitated contacts, gave advice, and helped find ways to ensure the meeting would be held” (ibid). Hence, Rowland’s involvement in the peace process was of uttermost importance. Rowland was the only person whose advice Dhlakama trusted and Dhlakama expressed his gratitude towards Rowland since he had worked so hard to make the peace possible.

“The United States, Great Britain, France, Portugal and the United Nations had also provided political and technical support, ensuring that implementation of the GPA would have broad international backing. This was crucial because the agreement was in many ways flawed. Not only had many practical elements been insufficiently discussed, but both sides lacked the capacity to set up and operate the complex structures required for implementation” (Rupiya 1998). Hence, Mozambique had, compared to Angola, several facilitators involved in the peace process.

3.6 Setting a Realistic Timetable

It is significant to set a timetable which includes different stages. The timetable should not be too long or too short. If it is too short there is a risk that the trustworthiness of the peace gets damaged. If it is too long and the negotiations go on for a long time then there is a risk that the drive for peace gets lost. “Those involved in designing the peace process must also devote an adequate amount of their time to the process” (Rupesinghe 1996:167). If a timetable attempts to do too much over a short period of time it may result in most not being done or done exceedingly bad. “Rupesinghe emphasizes the importance of setting a realistic timetable, from the identification of root causes and significant actors, through such phases as cease-fires, to the elaboration of mechanisms of political and social accommodation, for the success of the peace process” (Gounden & Solomon 2001:189).

3.6.1 Angola

During the negotiations leading up to the Bicesse Accord the superpowers were staking out the peace agreement. According to the negotiations which led up to the Bicesse Accord, the Angolan government and UNITA were supposed to establish a new army consisting of 50,000 soldiers from their total of an estimated 250,000 soldiers. The soldiers were also supposed to be demobilized to be used in the new army before elections were to be held. “However, from the start, the process of assembling government and rebel troops was very slow, resulting in huge delays in the establishment of the new army” (Malaquias 1998). This was

because Angola was suffering from an immense number of logistical problems in the assembly areas, like lack of food, shelter and transportation. Not surprisingly it got “pointed out that, two and a half months after the assembly of troops was supposed to have been completed, barely 60 percent of the troops declared by both sides had been encamped in assembly areas” (Malaquias 1998). Furthermore, the report declared that such problems undermined confidence and also jeopardized the implementation of a range of other features of the Bicesse Accord.

“UNITA argued for a maximum of twelve months between ceasefire and elections” (Minter 1994:53). MPLA on the other hand opted for 36 months since it would take a fairly long time to set up several conditions for holding elections. The final agreement they agreed upon “set the election for fifteen to eighteen months” (Minter 1994:53). Since the three countries supporting UNITA were certain that UNITA would win the election (and that was also UNITA’s and the supporting countries aim) “is why an early date for the elections was set, despite being a totally unrealistic time frame for the completion of all the necessary tasks” (Messiant 2004). All the tasks agreed upon in the negotiations leading up to the Bicesse Accord was supposed to be achieved within this time span, which can be looked upon as being unattainable owing to the amount of different missions it included. Owing to Angola’s history of several disputes over different issues, the amount of soldiers within the country and the distrust between UNITA and MPLA there were several issues which would take time to solve. 15 months might sound like a long time but with regard to the things taken up in this section it can be understood why the short time span was one of the reasons the peace in Angola did not last. If the superpowers would have understood the conditions on the ground in Angola they would have been able to draw up a more realistic timetable which would have helped towards a lasting peace (Gounden & Solomon 2001:192). Furthermore, there was a deep mistrust between the factions which takes time to heave. That fact did not get taken into account during the negotiations. Angola’s peace process leading up to the Bicesse Accord had what Rupesinghe would say – a timetable which tried to do too much over a short period.

3.6.2 Mozambique

In Mozambique the parties set up an agenda which stated that “the parties would discuss the main topics of the negotiations sequentially” (Cohen 1992). To finish one topic before proceeding on to the next one is a sought after procedure when negotiating since the different tasks get given substantial time to be fully solved. The parties involved in Mozambique’s peace process realized the process towards peace had to be slow in order to give RENAMO time to learn to become political instead of military. Just like in Angola there was distrust between the warring parties, but in Mozambique this got taken into account and FRELIMO postponed the election for a year from when it had been scheduled in the first place until the distrust had been solved. The peace talks in Mozambique “dragged on from July

1990 to the final signing of a General Peace Agreement in Rome in October 1992” (Newitt 2002:221).

3.7 Sustaining the Effort

In order for a peace process to be successful it is important to invest “financial resources, patience and a sustained commitment from sponsors” (Rupesinghe 1995:82).

3.7.1 Angola

The UN only sent enough peacekeeping soldiers to cover for “one observer for every 333 soldiers which is a very low figure compared to, for example, Namibia where there was one observer for every six soldier (Gounden & Solomon 2001:190). This shows that the sponsors did not invest considerable money or commitment to the peace process. Also for the warring parties to see that the sponsors did not seem to put a lot of interest in the war, might have made the parties feel indifferent towards whether there would be war or peace. When trying to find solutions for Angola, like in all wars, it was necessary to invest money, patience and commitment. This was not done to a great extent. “In Angola, the incapacity and unwillingness of the international community to commit enough resources weakened the prospects for success of peace-building attempts in the 1990s” (Jeong 2005:192). If it would have been, the outcome of the peace process could have been a different one.

3.7.2 Mozambique

Just like in Angola there were sponsors involved in the peace process, but they were not dictating as much as the sponsors did in Angola. Instead they put more money, patience and commitment into Mozambique’s peace process than was the case of Angola. During the negotiations in Mozambique the parties could not agree upon several issues at the start, but they kept negotiating and put essential patience in the process. (Vines 1996) “The depth and intensity of external assistance during the Mozambican peace process and the deployment of peacekeeping troops following the accords” are seen as some of the main reasons for Mozambique’s successful transition from war to peace (Moran & Pitcher 2004:503). For example, the UN “decided to pour resources of men, money and material into Mozambique to prevent the peace process coming unstuck – in marked contrast to the minimalist role it had assumed in Angola” (Newitt 2002:222). The UN had experienced the recent failure in Angola and learnt a lesson. Furthermore, Rowland also invested a lot of money, patience and commitment.

4 From Evaluating Success and Failure to Local Peacemakers

4.1 Evaluating Success and Failure

Success and failure throughout the peace process needs to be addressed. This is of importance since people involved in peace process can learn from experiences of previous peace processes. It is important to evaluate whether “the main interests of the parties are being addressed, the precedents and principles used in searching for a solution and their usefulness, the obstacles encountered, factors that led to progress, alternatives and missed opportunities coordination with other peacemaking activities, and lessons to be learned from the process” (Rupesinghe 1996:167).

4.1.1 Angola

Angola did not have a system within its peace process which evaluated success and failure. If they would have had such a system then maybe “the parties and international sponsors would have asked why throughout the negotiations leading up to the Bicesse Accords, fighting on the ground continued” (Gounden & Solomon 2001:191). Furthermore, if the parties involved in the peace process would have looked upon what was failing in the process they could have done something about it, and they could have learnt from any possible successes encountered during the process.

4.1.2 Mozambique

Since Angola’s peace process started earlier than in Mozambique the people involved in the peace process in Mozambique were following the development of Angola’s peace process closely. Mozambican leaders were inspired by Angola’s model towards peace but when Angola’s peace failed they decided to alter their strategies. Hence, they were not only focusing on the success and failure in their own country – they were also watching the progress in Angola for inspiration on how to handle their own peace process.

4.2 Strategic Constituencies

Different networks like the media, independent scholars, religious institutions, peace institutions, government officials, intergovernmental and government officials and donors, relevant non-governmental organisations (NGOs), former members of the military, members of the business community are what are seen as strategic constituencies. (Rupesinghe 1995) It is important to involve the civil society in the peace process cause they work as a guarantor of any negotiated peace. Strategic constituencies are also important in order to uphold the peace process over time. Another “principal aim of these strategic groups should be to help build the political will to promote and maintain peace building” (ibid 1995:82). It is important for the peace process that “all constituencies of society have a stake in peace” (Solomon & Mngqibisa 2000).

4.2.1 Angola

The civil society in Angola was relatively underdeveloped before the Bicesse Accord, so the civil society had no role in the peace process since they were not allowed to exist in the country. “The only truly non-governmental groups allowed to operate before the end of the 1980s were run by church organisations Caritas Angola and the Council of Evangelical Organisations of Angola” (Vines et. al 2005:7). Furthermore, “the state controlled the media and mass organizations for youth, for women, for workers and for some of the professions” (Meijer & Birmingham 2004). MPLA took exclusive control of organizations and hindered any development of the civil society with the exception of various churches and faith-based groups, which still did not get involved in the peace process. “Without ‘buy in’ from the general population, implementation of a peace agreement is extremely difficult” (Gounden & Solomon 2001:192).

4.2.2 Mozambique

In Mozambique people at “all levels of Mozambican society” were interested in ending the war within the country (Greenhill & Major 2007:25). CCM, the umbrella body uniting 17 of the country’s Protestant Churches, worked hard in order to get RENAMO to be willing to participate in negotiations. CCM did fairly early take on an active role in the peace work – working for reconciliation and getting the two warring parties into negotiations. They were the first to openly call for peace.

A newspaper called Noticias openly gave credit to CCM on their work towards peace, which made people in Mozambique aware of the peace work and that CCM were working towards peace. It is, according to Rupesinghe, central to promote peace in order to maintain a peace process’s legitimacy with the inhabitants of a country. Several of the “‘grassroots’ initiatives have been praised

by observers for their contribution to securing and building peace in Mozambique” (Moran & Pitcher 2004:511).

4.3 The Role of Outside Peacemakers

Outside peacemakers play an important part in intrastate wars since “the state cannot play the role of non-partisan broker because the state is often a party to the conflict” (Solomon & Mngqibisa 2000). “Diplomacy and outside non-governmental peacemakers have important roles to play in mediating the mitigation or resolution of violent internal conflict” (Rupesinghe 1995:84).

4.3.1 Angola

Outside peacemakers did not, as seen above, put in a lot of resources into the Angolan peace process. One example is the UN which played basically no roll during the negotiations which lead up to the Bicesse Accord. They were only called into the negotiations at the end. Eventually the UN initialized a mission called United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM). The UN gave Angola \$118 million towards peace keeping efforts. “The United Nations mission charged with monitoring the ceasefire and the planned elections was woefully short-staffed and poorly funded – less than one-fourth the amount allocated to Namibia in 1989, for a country with ten times the population and a war-ravaged infrastructure” (Minter 1994:54). The UN’s Special Representative Margaret Anstee pointed out that the UN should never have carried out a peace process during the circumstances which occurred in Angola. Furthermore, she pointed out that there was a serious lack of resources like “people, money, mandate” (Messiant 2004). If the UN would have supported Angola as much as they did support Mozambique, which we will see below, than the peace in Angola would have been more likely to last since the UN could have helped with several tasks during the peace process. “The narrow nature and the low-budget character of UNAVEM’s mandate was completely inadequate in relation to what was needed” (Ohlson 1998:146). This can be contrasted to Mozambique “which drew great attention from the UN leadership and donor countries” (Jeong 2005:192).

4.3.2 Mozambique

In Mozambique several outside peacemakers were involved in the peace process; the UN, other countries, Rowland and President Mugabe. “The United States played a prominent facilitative role in getting these negotiations under way and then continued to consult closely with the mediators and both Mozambican parties throughout the subsequent 2 years of talks” (Cohen 1992). UN invested \$327 million in 1993 and \$295 million in 1994 towards peace keeping efforts in

Mozambique, which can be compared to the amount invested in Angola, as seen above. The UN initialized an operation called the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) in order to implement the peace agreement and to monitor the cease fire and the withdrawal of foreign troops. “These efforts, along with the presence of thousands of UN troops and observers, increased faith among the exhausted Mozambican population that ONUMOZ would guarantee the peace and protect them against possible predations by defectors from the agreement” (Greenhill & Major 2007:25). In line with ONUMOZ, elections would not be held until the military situation was under control and the agreement could not be “implemented unless the Mozambican parties made a determined effort in good faith to honour their commitments” (UN 2001). Furthermore, the UN became aware of the fact that financial carrots were of importance for a successful peace process in Mozambique. Hence, “a donor fund to facilitate Renamo’s transformation to a political party was set up by the UN” (Ohlson 1998:137). Therefore the UN was one of the peace makers who supported RENAMO on its way from guerrilla to a political party.

It is worth noting that “during the period of demobilization and lead-up to elections, nearly 8000 international troops and civilian police observers were on the ground in Mozambique – an area less than two-thirds the size of Angola – whereas only 556 observers were on the ground in Angola during the analogous period, 100 of whom were only election observers” (Greenhill & Major 2007:25-26). This shows that the UN was more devoted to Mozambique than Angola since they sent more resources there. “Given the fragility of the state in these two former Portuguese colonies, the UN was expected to facilitate both transition processes through peace operations” (Malaquias 1998). They did, but with a much greater extent to Mozambique than Angola.

The Community of Sant’ Egidio had a broad knowledge about the war and therefore they could play a helpful part in the peace process. “Sant’ Egidio hosted 12 rounds of peace talks in Rome” (Vines 1996:129). “Sant’ Egidio provided an acceptable “neutral forum” in which the major players could directly negotiate on how to end the war and divide the remaining political spoils” (Vines 1996:147). The Community also put pressure on the Italian Government to get involved in trying to achieve peace in Mozambique.

The Italian Government understood “that aid packages and other financial incentives would be needed to cajole the parties into reaching a final settlement” (Armon et. al. 1998). The Italian Government gave RENAMO a significant amount of money in order to make them stay in the peace process. “By the time of the signing of the Rome accord, the Italian government had spent some US \$20 million on the peace process” (Vines 1998). Unlike in Angola, the UN was in charge of the peace process in Mozambique, which could be one of the reasons why Mozambique came out as a success whilst Angola’s peace quite promptly failed.

Diplomatic officials from several countries were involved in the Mozambican peace process. For example other African countries like Kenya, Malawi and South Africa.

4.4 The Role of Local Peacemakers

It is important that the local community is involved in the peace process. “Influential members of the local communities with a first-hand knowledge of the conflict, actors, the political and economic situation and the cultural background will have a distinct ‘comparative advantage’ over other potential peacemakers wishing to act as third-party mediators. What is more, they will ‘own the peace’ once it is made, and will maintain a stake in ensuring its sustainability” (Rupesinghe 1995:85). The local community will have a deeper understanding of the war taking place in their country than outside actors.

4.4.1 Angola

There were no local peacemakers in Angola. Therefore the “parties were increasingly dependent on the attention of outside sponsors” (Gounden & Solomon 2001:193). Most likely the outcome of the peace process in Angola would have been a different one if local peacemakers, with their familiarity and deeper understanding of the war, would have been involved in the process and the contents of the Bicesse Accord.

4.4.2 Mozambique

CCM took the first initiatives to peace in Mozambique. CCM had connections to both warring parties which was an invaluable resource in the peace process, since CCM could play the part of an “informal leader”. “The Catholic Church, whom the government media had consistently vilified for calling for dialogue with Renamo, became the mediating party” (Cabrita 2001:269).

1984 CCM “became actively involved in the peace process” (Vines 1996:120). They made it clear that they thought that dialogue was the only way to solve the war. CCM wrote open letters calling for a dialogue between the Government and RENAMO. Hence, it became known to the public that CCM were working for dialogue and peace. In 1987 CCM made clear to Mozambique’s president Chissano that they would get in touch with RENAMO. As a consequence of that, Chissano encouraged CCM to talk to RENAMO. CCM held several talks with RENAMO on the way towards peace. FRELIMO and RENAMO considered CCM to be a neutral party which made it possible for CCM to hold meetings and negotiations between the two warring factions.

In the beginning the warring parties did not want to talk directly with each other. That gave CCM an important role since they were the ones who had to uphold the dialogue between the parties since both parties trusted CCM (Sengulane & Gonçalves 1998). “The churches pursued various strategies to help speed up the talks. The launching of petition campaigns, with signatures gathered in Mozambique, Italy and Portugal, as well as public prayers for peace, were a

great help in drawing attention to Mozambique's plight and reminding the delegations that the people's suffering continued." (Sengulane & Gonçalves 1998) CCM set up networks working together with different parties. CCM adopted principles in their quest for peace, which for example included:

- Look for what unites rather than what divides.
- Discuss problems step by step.
- Keep in mind the suffering that so many people endure as war continues.
- Work with the friends and supporters of both sides; this is fundamental.
- Remember the deeper dimensions of peace such as forgiveness, justice, human rights, reconciliation and trust.
- Work with other groups; the power of the churches was much increased by their inter-denominational cooperation. (ibid)

Furthermore, "organisations, communities and individuals who locally negotiated peace zones during the war through special rituals or purification ceremonies, through the use of magic by local chiefs and spirit mediums, through the performances of dances and plays that condemned war and encouraged peace, and through the use of soccer games to end the conflict and to provide mechanisms for dispute mediation" (Moran & Pitcher 2004:503). Hence, several local peacemakers were involved in the peace process.

5 Conclusion

The main objective of this thesis was to perform a comparative analysis of why Angola's peace failed and Mozambique's lasted, by answering the following question: *How can it, with the help of Rupesinghe's model, be explained why the peace in Angola failed whilst the peace in Mozambique lasted?*

Angola and Mozambique have similar backgrounds. They are both former Portuguese colonies which suffered long-lasting intrastate wars, but after their first respective peace agreements they experienced different outcomes. Angola soon again plunged back into war, whilst Mozambique's peace has lasted ever since. With the help of the eleven elements of Rupesinghe's model of conflict transformation it became clear to what extent the countries employed initiatives during their peace processes.

Rupesinghe emphasizes the importance of bringing the warring parties into negotiations, and also to be aware of whether the parties are ready to negotiate for peace or not. As for Angola negotiations were imposed on the parties and MPLA and UNITA came to the negotiations out of the wrong reasons. No actors from the civil society were involved in the peace process in Angola, which is a requisite in order for it to be successful. In Mozambique, on the other hand, both parties came to realise that now was the time for negotiations and in Mozambique the "whole" country was involved in the peace process. In Angola it was only the superpowers that were engaging in the peace process. In Mozambique local actors (like women groups), facilitators (like Tiny Rowland), strategic constituencies (the newspaper Noticias) and local peace makers (like CCM) were all involved in one way or another.

Angola had many root causes to its internal war. The main problem was that both leaders of the warring parties wanted to rule the country. Furthermore, Angola's rich natural resources, like oil and diamonds, and also ideological and ethnic issues were reasons to the war. Despite there being several causes to the war they did not get addressed during the negotiations. In Mozambique most of the root causes got solved, and even though not all of them got solved the Mozambican people were happy with the outcome and it is a requisite for a durable peace that the peace has the support of the country's people.

Furthermore, the UN put enormously more effort into Mozambique than Angola in order to sustain the peace process. With regards to Mozambique being less than two-thirds the size of Angola it is remarkable that only about 400 UN peacekeepers got sent to Angola compared to around 8000 to Mozambique. Therefore, the prospects for peace in Angola severely weakened, since peacekeeping troops are important in order to keep the order in a country during demobilisation leading up to elections. In Angola it was only the superpowers that could be classed as being outside peacemakers, whilst in Mozambique there were

several outside peacemakers who were involved. Apart from the countries that had been supporting FRELIMO and RENAMO during the war, also the Italian Government, the Community of Sant' Egidio, individual persons and several African countries were involved in Mozambique's peace process.

In Angola a realistic timetable for all the tasks that the country had to go through during the peace process was not set up. Since UNITA was only interested to get the election over and done with, since they were convinced they would win, they opted for a maximum of twelve months between the ceasefire and the election. MPLA on the other hand opted for 36 months. Eventually, they settled for fifteen to eighteen months which was too short a time considering Angola's history of several difficult disputes. Furthermore, since Angola did not have a system evaluating success and failure during the peace process, they did not look upon what was succeeding or failing during the peace process. If they had done so they would have realised that the timetable was not realistic and they could have altered it in accordance with what was occurring. In Mozambique the parties agreed that they would take one issue at the time and not move on to the next issue until the former one was solved. Furthermore, the parties postponed the election with one year from when it was originally scheduled since they realised that it was not realistic to go through with an election until the distrust between RENAMO and FRELIMO was solved. Mozambique was also watching Angola's process carefully since Angola was one year ahead with their peace process. The parties involved in Mozambique's peace process could therefore see what was succeeding and failing in Angola, and from that learn lessons on how to cope with their own peace process.

The second purpose of the thesis was to test the usefulness of Rupesinghe's model of conflict transformation in order to understand why a country's peace lasts or fails. To be able to do this I tested the model on Angola (the failure) and Mozambique (the success). Rupesinghe's model of conflict transformation is good in that aspect that it is a broad approach which takes up several different elements as being important in order to achieve a durable peace. It involves elements like setting a realistic timetable, the importance of identifying facilitators and all the actors, and the role of outside and local peacemakers, etcetera. The model's flaws are that Rupesinghe does not describe some of the elements very clearly. The elements of identifying all the actors and strategic constituencies are quite similar and it is a bit difficult to actually understand the complete differences between them. Identifying all the actors entails that for example elites, leaders and opinion-shapers should get identified and brought into the peace process. It also states that non-violent actors should get involved. This does not differ a lot from the element strategic constituencies which for example involve the media (which also could be classed as opinion-shapers), government officials (which also could be classed as elites or leaders) and the churches and NGOs (which also could be classed as non-violent actors). Hence, Rupesinghe should have developed what these elements involve more thoroughly so that it would have been clearer. Now they appear to be too similar.

Something else about Rupesinghe's model is that it lacks an, which I consider, important element; namely culture. There are different groups of people living

both in Angola and Mozambique and most likely they have different cultural backgrounds, which need to be taken into account during the peace process. This element should be considered and I reason that Rupesinghe's model should be developed in order to include an element of culture. This could be done in a future study of Rupesinghe's model of conflict transformation.

To summarize; it became clear during the analysis that Mozambique in general employed more initiatives during their peace process, compared to Angola. If Angola would have employed initiatives on every element in Rupesinghe's model, than perhaps the outcome of Angola's peace process would have been as successful as Mozambique's. As mentioned in the introductory chapter, there are surely several ways to study why Angola's peace failed and Mozambique's lasted, but Rupesinghe's model serves as one way of explaining why Angola was a failure and Mozambique a success. The analyses showed that all elements in Rupesinghe's model are out of importance in order to achieve a durable peace.

References

- Armon, Jeremy - Hendrickson, Dylan –Vines, Alex, 1998. Preface. <http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/mozambique/preface.php> Available: 2008-02-04
- Cabrita, Jodao M, 2001. *Mozambique: The Tortuous Road to Democracy*. Palgrave MacMillan
- Cohen, Herman J, 1992. Mozambique and Angola: Prospects for peace and democracy, *U.S. Department of State Dispatch* Vol.3 No.41, 770-774.
- Devine, Fiona. *Qualitative Methods*. Pages: 197-215. in Marsh, David – Stoker, Gerry (ed), 2002. *Theory and Methods in Political Science*. New York: Palgrave MacMillan.
- Esaiasson, Peter – Gilljam, Mikael – Oscarsson, Henrik – Wängnerud, Lena, 2004. *Metodpraktikan – Konsten att studera samhälle, individ och marknad*. Stockholm: Nordstedts Juridik.
- Fortna, Virginia Page, 2004. *Peace Time: Cease-Fire Agreements and the Durability of Peace*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
- Greenhill, Kelly M. & Major, Solomon, 2007. The Perils of Profiling. Civil War Spoilers and the Collapse of Intrastate Peace Accords, *International Security* Vol.31 No.3, 7-40.
- Gounden, Vasu – Solomon, Hussein. *Conflict Resolution in Africa: A Comparative Analysis of Angola and South Africa* in Alker, Hayward R. – Gurr, Ted Robert – Rupesinghe, Kumar, 2001. *Journeys Through Conflict*. Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
- Jeong, Ho-Won, 2005. *Peacebuilding in Postconflict Societies – Strategy & Process*. London: Lynne Rienner.
- Lloyd, Robert B, 2001. Conflict Resolution or Transformation? An Analysis of the South African and Mozambican Political Settlements. *International Negotiation*, Vol.6 No.3, 303-329.

- Malaquias, Assis V., 1998. UN Peace Operations in Lusophone Africa: Contrasting Strategies And Outcomes, *The Journal of Conflict Studies* Vol.18 No.2
http://www.lib.unb.ca/Texts/JCS/bin/get.cgi?directory=FALL98/articles/&file_name=Malaqu.htm Available: 2008-01-15
- Meijer, Guus – Birmingham, David, 2004. Angola from past to present.
<http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/angola/past-present.php> Available: 2008-02-12
- Messiant, Christine, 2004. Why did Bicesse and Lusaka fail? A critical analysis.
<http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/angola/bicesse-lusaka.php> Available: 2008-02-12
- Miall, Hugh, 2004. Conflict Transformation: A Multi-Dimensional Task.
http://www.berghof-handbook.net/uploads/download/miall_handbook.pdf
 Available: 2008-02-27
- Minter, William, 1994. *Apartheid's Contras – An Inquiry Into the Roots of War in Angola and Mozambique*. London: Zed Books
- Moran, Mary H – Pitcher, M Anne, 2004. The 'basket case' and the 'poster child': explaining the end of civil conflicts in Liberia and Mozambique. *Third World Quarterly*, Vol.25 No.3, 501-519.
- Newitt, Malyn. *Mozambique*. Pages: 185-235 in Chabal, Patrick, 2002. *A History of Postcolonial Lusophone Africa*. London: Hurst & Company.
- Ohlson, Thomas 1998. *Power politics and peace policies : intra-state conflict resolution in southern Africa*. Uppsala: Institutionen för freds- och konfliktforskning.
- Rupesinghe, Kumar (ed.), 1995. *Conflict Transformation*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Rupesinghe, Kumar. *Mediation in Internal Conflicts: Lessons from Sri Lanka* in Bercovitch, Jacob (ed.), 1996. *Resolving International Conflicts – The Theory and Practice of Mediation*. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Rupiya, Martin 1998. Historical context: war and peace in Mozambique.
<http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/mozambique/historical-context.php>
 Available: 2008-02-07

- Sengulane, Dínis S. – Gonçalves, Jaime Pedro, 1998. A calling for peace: Christian leaders and the quest for reconciliation in Mozambique. <http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/mozambique/calling-for-peace.php>
Available: 2008-02-07
- Solomon, Hussein & Mngqibisa, Kwezi, 2000. Towards conflict transformation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo with specific reference to the model of Kumar Rupesinghe. http://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary_0286-28765749_ITM Available: 2008-01-15
- UN, 2001. http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/onumoz.htm
Available: 2008-02-23
- Vines, Alex, 1996. *RENAMO – From Terrorism to Democracy in Mozambique?*
London: James Currey.
- Vines, Alex, 1998. The business of peace: ‘Tiny’ Rowland, financial incentives and the Mozambican settlement. <http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/mozambique/business-peace.php> Available: 2008-02-07
- Vines, Alex – Shaxson, Nicholas – Rimli, Lisa – Heymans, Chris, 2005. Angola: Drivers of change. Position Paper 3: Civil Society. <http://www.gsdr.org/go/topic-guides/drivers-of-change> Available: 2008-01-24