



**LUND**  
UNIVERSITY

Department of Political Science

Master of European Affairs  
Spring 2007  
Supervisor: Jakob Gustavsson

# The Concept of Freedom in the Context of the War on Terror:

A Comparative Study of the European Union and the United States  
Rhetoric

Laura Dib

# Abstract

Language is a powerful tool in the creation of social identities. This work analyses the security policy discourses of two major actors in world politics: the European Union and the United States. The material is composed of security documents of both actors ranging from the time before the 9/11 terrorist attacks to present day. Discourse analysis, especially its Foucauldian strand emphasising the structural power of language, is used to analyse the material. The work places its main focus on the analysis of the term *freedom*; its occurrence, significance and evolution in the security policy discourse. The contemporary security discourse of the U.S. emerges from the politico-ideological frames of liberalism and neo-liberalism. In the EU, freedom has traditionally been understood as the freedom of movement. Since the beginning of the War on Terror in 2001, the EU and the U.S. have used an increasingly offensive language in their security rhetoric. The discourses of both actors converge over the period of study and rely increasingly on the self / other opposition whereby freedom is conceptually opposed to terrorism.

*Keywords:* European Union, United States, Security Policy, Freedom, Discourse Analysis

*Characters:* 84810

# Table of Contents

<b>1</b>	<b>Introduction .....</b>	<b>1</b>
1.1	Subject of the Study .....	1
1.2	Methodological Aspects .....	1
1.3	Structure .....	2
1.4	Material .....	3
<b>2</b>	<b>The Discursive Method in a Comparative Security Policy Analysis .....</b>	<b>4</b>
2.1	Definitions of Discourse Analysis.....	4
2.2	Speech Acts, Enunciation and the Contested Concept of <i>Freedom</i> .....	5
<b>3</b>	<b>The History of Freedom in the American and European Politico-Ideological Constructions .....</b>	<b>7</b>
3.1	The Liberalist Tradition in the USA .....	8
3.2	Instrumental Vision of <i>Freedom</i> in the European Union Treaties .....	12
<b>4</b>	<b>Freedom in the Security Policy Discourse.....</b>	<b>16</b>
4.1	<i>Freedom</i> before the War on Terror .....	17
4.2	The Security Strategies after 9/11 .....	20
4.3	The Security Discourses Today.....	24
<b>5</b>	<b>Conclusion.....</b>	<b>27</b>
	<b>Bibliography .....</b>	<b>29</b>

# 1 Introduction

The world has never had a good definition of the word liberty [...]. We all declare for liberty; but in using the same *word* we do not all mean the same *thing* [...].  
Abraham Lincoln

## 1.1 Subject of the Study

*Freedom* is a widely used concept in the rhetoric of today's world politics. It has acquired particular significance in the context of the United States' War on Terror that was launched in 2001. President Bush's administration has adopted a proactive conception of freedom that can and should be brought and implemented in all parts of the world. Freedom is also a fundamental concept in European integration and one of the core values of the European Union. However, its political, ideological and strategic understandings differ significantly from those adopted in the U.S.

In my thesis, I intend to analyse and contrast the rhetoric of the European Union and the United States in the context of the War on Terror. I am particularly interested in the freedom-discourses of these actors. I shall approach the question through the framework of discourse analysis. As a part of the social constructivist school, discourse analysis is a method that concentrates on the language as a social phenomenon. The question of the discursive method will be dealt in more detail in the next chapter. In this work, I will use the terms "freedom" and "liberty" interchangeably. Other methodological issues will be discussed briefly in the next sub-chapter.

## 1.2 Methodological Aspects

I have chosen to compare two significant international political actors, the European Union and the United States. For this reason, I shall apply some ideas regarding the comparative method that have been described by Arend Lijphart (1971). According to Lijphart, the comparative method is a technique for discovering empirical relationships among variables. The efficacy of this method can be undermined by a setting that presents many variables and a small number of cases. One of the solutions to overcome this problem is to focus the comparative analysis on "key" variables (Lijphart 1971: 683-690). I agree on this interpretation of the problems of the comparative method, but I do think that in the particular research setting of my study, the limited number of cases does not

pose a serious problem. Moreover, I have selected one key variable – the security discourse – as the subject of my study. In this way, I believe to be able to discover some comparable features between the two actors, even though they differ on the number of other variables. It must be said, though, that Lijphart embraces a positivist epistemology according to which science is a generalizing activity with an ambition to discover an existing reality. This view does not suit very well the social constructivist epistemology adopted in this work (see Chapter 2).

The question of power is central to any political science study. The question of how to analyse it receives multiple answers. According to Nikolas Rose (1999), for much of the twentieth century, answers to this question were dominated by the massive spectre of the state. The modern state was analysed in terms of apparently hegemonic power. Today, the argument by many sociologists and political scientists goes in the opposite direction. New ways of analysing political power that recognise the complex set of relations between state and non-state authorities, the significance of infrastructural powers, networks of power and the like, have gained ground. Studies about governance are one image of this tendency. Governance “directs attention to the nature, problems, means, actions, manners, techniques and objects by which actors place themselves under the control, guidance, sway and mastery of others, or seek to place other actors, organizations, entities or events under their own sway” (Rose 1999: 16). The argument of my work consists to say that discourse is one of these means by which power as a tool of governance can be studied.

In addition to the discursive dimension, I shall employ a historical approach to the idea of freedom, in order to determine the evolution of the concept. As will be highlighted during the study, taking a historical perspective to the use of the term freedom is essential in order to understand its current meanings and implications. Political ideologies of classical liberalism and neoliberalism will be explored in the work, both in the U.S. and the EU contexts. The present-day uses of the term freedom will be constantly contrasted with its previous understandings.

### 1.3 Structure

After the introduction in Chapter 2, I shall define the method of discourse analysis and explain its use in the study of international relations. I will emphasise the power-related aspect of discourse analysis. I will then move on, in Chapter 3, to observe the historical evolution of the meaning of freedom both in the United States and in the European Union. In that section, my objective is to present the changes in the conception of the term. The emphasis will lie in the current understanding of freedom in the neoliberal politico-ideological environment. The empirical study of this work will be conducted in Chapter 4, where I shall employ the method of discourse analysis in order to study selected foreign policy documents of the EU and the USA. The objective of the empirical study is to discover the meanings attached to the use of the term freedom in these documents and to analyse how they portray and construct the politico-ideological structure of the actors in question.

Thus, my research question is the following: What use(s) of the term *freedom* do the EU and U.S. security documents apply? It is supplemented by the following sub-questions: What is the relation of the contemporary security documents to the previous uses of the concept? Do they contribute to the securitization of the general discourse and how?

## 1.4 Material

The issues of security and terrorism are situated between domestic and foreign policy fields. On the one hand, security measures mainly concentrate on the preservation of domestic or “Homeland” security. On the other hand, terrorism as a phenomenon has spread worldwide and battles to conquer it are fought outside national borders. This is reflected in both U.S. and EU documents. The empirical material of my thesis comprises written documents published by the two actors. My intention is to study documents of similar political importance in order to make them comparable. For this reason, speeches held by both the U.S. President George W. Bush and the EU High Representative Javier Solana are not, as such, considered in this study. The U.S. documents present, however, introductory speeches and fragments of speeches by the President and these texts will be analysed.

In the European Union, the anti-terror measures are mainly dealt with in the Justice and Home Affairs Council. They are also closely linked to the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice; a project established in the 1999 Treaty of Amsterdam and launched the same year through a work programme adopted in the Tampere European Council. One of the European documents, the European Security Strategy, is an exception. It was drafted at the request of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and under the responsibilities EU High Representative Javier Solana (Strömviik 2005: 220-221). It is thus a foreign policy document unlike the other EU documents used in this study. In the United States, issues related to terrorism belong to the domain of the Department of National Security and the President is the head of these policies.

In order to answer some of the questions above, documents at different periods of time have been selected for this study. I have gathered three texts from both actors: one before the terrorist attack in 2001, one (relatively) soon after it and one in the present situation. For the study of the EU rhetoric, I will use the Presidency Conclusions establishing the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (1999), the European Security Strategy (2003) and the European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy (2005). For the study of the U.S. rhetoric, I will use National Security Strategies published in 1998, 2002 and the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism of 2006. The documents published by the U.S. Department of National Security are more homogeneous than the ones issued by the EU in the sense that they follow the same format. The documents will not be studied in their entirety, but I will concentrate on the sections concerning the freedom-discourses.

## 2 The Discursive Method in a Comparative Security Policy Analysis

In this work on the security policies of the U.S. and the EU, I have chosen *discourse analysis* as my method. There is no common definition for discourse analysis and it has gained ground in the field of International Relations relatively recently. It covers a large and heterogeneous field of research topics. Discourse analysis is often classified as part of the social constructivist framework of social sciences. The social constructivist approaches in general reject the positivist conception of observable truth. Social constructivism as such is not a theory but rather a philosophical position. Its basic assumption lies in the hypothesis of mutually constitutive social action as a significant factor of the construction of identity (Christiansen et al. 2001: 8). According to the social constructivist ontology, institutions affect social identities and fundamental interests of actors (Risse in Wiener and Diez 2004: 160). One of the interest points in the empirical study will focus on the question of constructed identities.

### 2.1 Definitions of Discourse Analysis

In general, discourse analysis can be defined as an analytical approach that focuses on texts in the broad sense. The different approaches to discourse analysis share the object of study, linguistic entities larger than one sentence, and the presence of social and historical context in the analysis. Two main points of view as to the nature of discourse are, however, under debate. According to the first one:

Discourse is to be seen as text or textuality, i.e. as a manifestation of the constitutive principles of the use of language (in speech or writing), or as these principles themselves.

The second viewpoint emphasises discourse:

as a social, psychological and cultural practice, covering both linguistic and non-linguistic elements. (Visgø 1992: 2).

In my study, I will adopt the second viewpoint although I do not have an emancipatory agenda, as do some works of critical discourse analysis. I will place the current discourses in a broader perspective by presenting their historical backgrounds (see Chapter 3).

Despite its focus on texts, discourse analysis is not solely a linguistic discipline. Orla Visgø (1992) argues that discourse analysis has to be seen as an interdisciplinary field where the object of study governs the use of methodology

and not the other way around. This is exactly the starting point of my analysis. The study of discourse of the European and American security documents will be guided by the phenomena found in the material, which will subsequently be analysed and discussed. I will try to avoid preconceived ideas and assumptions about the texts that would stigmatise the analysis before even reaching the conclusions.

## 2.2 Speech Acts, Enunciation and the Contested Concept of *Freedom*

Thomas Diez (1999) explains how language is commonly understood as a tool that describes or takes note of reality outside language. He also notes that the research concerning the EU, Europe and European integration is largely of this constative nature. Yet on many occasions, language seems to go beyond its constative function. J. L. Austin thus introduced the notion of “performative” sentences (Austin in Diez 1999: 600). The notion of performativeness of language illustrates the capacity of the language to perform through the act of speaking itself. Actions taken through speech do not only translate into the speaker’s actions but can also force others to act. These kinds of actions are called *speech acts*.

In the context of politics, it is probably uncontested that most articulations (negotiation statements, laws, treaties etc.) do or at least intend to do something. The signing of the treaty on the European Coal and Steel Community founded the first European institution. The system of governance established since then can be presented as a remarkable collection of speech acts and their effects. The evolution of the EU has taken place through declarations, treaties, decisions by the European Court of Justice and Community legal acts. Such speech acts have important social and political consequences (Diez 1999: 601-602). Moreover, according to Kenneth Glarbo, a realist understanding of the Common Foreign and Security Policy is not entirely satisfactory for the study of foreign policy coordination. European political cooperation should thus be viewed as a case of social construction (Glarbo in Christiansen et al. 2001: 141). In my work, I will take into consideration the nature of the EU and U.S. security documents as speech acts. Also, the writers of these documents definitely have the purpose of performing several actions e.g. identifying threats, establishing allies and enemies and so on. These questions will be analysed more in detail in Chapter 4.

Michel Foucault took the idea of the performativity of the language one step further as he concentrated on the power structures vehicled and maintained by discourse. He centres his attention on the discourse as *enunciative construction*. Enunciation is the act of producing certain discourse in a certain setting. The identification of the enunciator implies uncovering the power structures, since the actor who is in the position to enunciate also holds power over the subjects of enunciation. The position of enunciation presupposes institutions in which discourses are produced and propagated. These institutions are broadly taken as



structures that set the limits for the enunciation. They pose both the enunciator and the addressee and set standards for the possible and acceptable contents of what can be said. This strand of discourse analysis tries to find out the conditions to be able to enunciate a certain discourse. Power is thus seen as a structural phenomenon. (Foucault in Visgø 1992: 6-7). In the context of the European and American security strategies, it can be stated that they are an illustration of an institution that grants the power of enunciating to the few and leaves the role of addressee to the many. The idea of the performativeness of the language is similarly addressed by Jennifer Milliken (1999). She explains that beyond giving a language for speaking about phenomena, “discourses make intelligible some ways of being in, and acting towards, the world, and of operationalizing a particular ‘regime of truth’ while excluding other possible modes of identity and action.” (Milliken 1999: 229). Discourses define *subjects* that are authorised to speak and to act and the relations between the actors. They also define the *knowledgeable practices* performed by these subjects towards the *objects* which the discourse defines. In the process, people may be destroyed as well as disciplined, and social space becomes organized and controlled. In other words, discourse subjects produce places and groups as their objects. (Milliken 1999:229).

As discussed above, words and concepts do not portray a neutral reality “out there”. If anything, they contribute to the creation of the reality that cannot be dissociated from language. In this work, I have chosen to concentrate on the study of the concept of *freedom* in the context of European and American security documents. *Freedom* can be called a “contested concept” that does not have one commonly accepted meaning (Diez 1999: 602). The study of the security documents will show that freedom represents different things, ideas and values in different contexts. What follows from the discussion about enunciation, is that the actor who is capable of defining this contested concept also gains power by using it. More importantly, he imposes his vision of the contested concept on the addressee of the discourse. This power is obviously used to attain political ends. This Foucauldian formulation of discourse is more radical than the speech act tradition from which it draws upon. It puts more emphasis on the context in its relation to the individual actor. Accordingly, discourse has a constitutive role in the production of subject identities. (Diez 1999: 603). In order to create a comprehensive idea of the term *freedom* and its use in present-day security policy discourse, it is necessary to trace the evolution of the concept and the ideologies linked to it. This is the task that I shall deal with in the next chapter.

### 3 The History of Freedom in the American and European Politico-Ideological Constructions

In this chapter, I shall observe the evolution of the concept of *freedom* in both American and the EU contexts. Even in a democracy, history always involves power and exclusion, for any history always portrays the views of someone. History and historical evidence are crucial to people's sense of identity and for this reason the evidence itself becomes the focus of struggle. (Appleby et al. 1994: 4-11). The specific feature of this work is that it links historical and discursive analysis in the field of security policy. The objective is to unearth the history of words and incorporate that research into the analysis of cognitive structures of present-day texts. More concretely, my aim is to trace the ideological evolution of the contested concept of freedom and reflect on its current meanings in the security policy discourses of the actors in question.

As explained in Chapter 2, the Foucauldian tradition of discourse analysis emphasizes the constitutive role of discourse in the production of subject identities. The process of producing identities through discourse can be conceptualised as a political struggle. Discourse is not only a means of politics – instead, politics are an essential part of discourse. The struggle to impose a meaning on such terms as *freedom* is not only a struggle between politicians but also between the different discourses that enable actors to articulate their positions (Diez 1999: 603). This kind of battle over the concepts, and over the dominating discourse in general, is constantly ongoing in the field of politics, including foreign policy. Actually, the issue of discourse is absolutely essential for foreign policy because this policy area consists mainly of discourse and speech acts and only to a lesser extent of concrete policy actions. For this reason, it is in my view extremely important not to look only at the current stage of a certain debate but to trace the evolution of the crucial concepts that are used in the debate.

Nikolas Rose (1999) argues that the ideas and practices of freedom have a long history. It is generally accepted that the liberalist tradition is inherited in the Western thought from the philosophy of Enlightenment that promoted an egalitarian conception of society. According to this view, there ought to be no moral or political hierarchy based on birth or nature. (Saastamoinen 1998: 24). Rose explains that freedom became an ideal for all in the course of a profound transformation in European and American societies in which modern individualism was formed. In part, it is argued, individual freedom arose from the particular character of economic relations under capitalism. This economic individuation was linked to a more general fragmentation and pluralisation of social values and forms of life. Yet, the modes of organising reality in terms of

freedom were not an unintended consequence of changes in social and economic relations, rather they were invented. (Rose 1999: 66-68). The same argument holds true also today. Constitutive discourses continue to play a central role in the creation of new social realities. They contribute to the conceptualising of world views by labelling acts and actors e.g. through the rhetoric of terror vs. freedom.

*Classical liberalism* of the eighteenth century was based on the principle of “freedom to order our own conduct in the sphere where material circumstances force a choice upon us, and responsibility for the arrangement of our own life according to our own conscience” (Hayek 1944 in Rose 1999: 137). Thus, liberalism draws its significance from the fact that it linked systematically, for the first time, the art of governing to the practice of freedom. From this point on, individuals “must come to recognize and act upon themselves as both free and responsible, both beings of liberty and members of society, if liberal government is to be possible” (Rose 1999: 68). This kind of liberty, as it is understood under the political doctrine of liberalism and which is compatible with liberal arts of rule, has a history. It is possible to historicize the ideas that are taken for granted today, and in the name of which people are governed today. Historical parallels exist between the ethic of freedom and the history of government. Through this type of analysis, freedom becomes to be understood not simply as an abstract ideal but as material, technical, practical and governmental. (Rose 1999: 63).

I will now move on to trace the history of the concept and the idea of freedom in the American and the European contexts. I shall first explore the American meanings of freedom, in sub-chapter 3.1. I will trace the idea of freedom from the onset of the United States in the eighteenth century through the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution. I shall then compare those ideas with the present vision of freedom in the USA of the twenty-first century. In the sub-chapter 3.2, I shall study the evolution of the concept at issue in the EU context. I shall mainly study the meanings of freedom in the treaty constituting the European Economic Community (EEC). I have deliberately chosen to study this document as it is a fundamental step on the path of European integration. Tracing the evolution of the idea of freedom all the way from the beginning of European civilisations would have been a task deserving a study of its own.

### 3.1 The Liberalist Tradition in the USA

In the introduction to the book *Freedom in America* (1977) Norman A. Graebner states that the concept of personal liberty was fundamental to eighteenth century American freedom. This implied “freedom from the impediments of class, tradition, or governmental favoritism which enforced servility and thereby privileged minority” (Graebner 1977: 3). Americans, living in free environment, quickly removed all vestiges of the European class system. In an environment free from the European guild system and promoting the movement from one community to another, mobility early became a central ingredient of the American dream. (Graebner 1977:3). This is to be contrasted to the situation in the post-war

Europe, in which the lack of labour mobility has been one of the stumbling stones on the road of European economic integration.

For Americans, who lived in a free environment with ample opportunity for movement and wealth accumulation, the major restraints lay not in the nature but in the government. Political liberty was described a condition where the individual enjoyed constitutional safeguards against compulsion or the threat of compulsion. Gordon S. Wood (1977) argues that it was not the controversy with Great Britain or the Declaration of Independence in 1776 that contributed the most to the formulation of the conception of individual liberty. The liberty invoked in the struggle for independence did not yet have the precise meaning it had later. In the early days of the American democracy, “the people” was seen as a unitary homogeneous body having a single interest when set against the power of the king or the executive. Consequently, “it was the experience of Americans in the decade after the Declaration of Independence, leading up to the formation of the Constitution in 1787, that actually made meaningful the Revolutionaries’ concern with personal freedom” (Wood in Graebner (ed.) 1977: 44-45). Indeed, the state legislatures in the 1780’s enacted laws favouring certain groups over others and constantly interfered in the judicial process. The idea that public and private liberties do not necessarily coincide emerged only at this stage in the American history. The fact that the executive was not the only source of oppression but that the legislature could also perform tyranny of the majority was addressed in the Constitution and the following Bill of Rights. (Wood in Graebner (ed.) 1977: 44-49).

The formation of the Constitution in 1787 laid the basis of the modern American conception of personal freedom. It brought out the dual character essential to the American constitutional system. Unlike in the British tradition, in America a clear distinction was made between legality and constitutionality. This implied that all legal acts were not necessarily constitutional. In the eighteenth century the abuses by majorities of the interests and rights of minorities were seen in a wider context influenced by the philosophy of the Enlightenment. The legislative abuses of individual rights were not seen as violations of democracy but as products of it. The crucial issue that led to the formation of the federal Constitution revolved around the question of how to maintain democracy and at the same time avoid its vices. The new federal constitution offered new opportunities for diffusing and partitioning power to protect liberty. The division of power between different levels of government was the first step of what has come to be called the principle of federalism. As a consequence, the ideas of personal liberty achieved their first and fullest expression in America. (Wood in Graebner (ed.) 1977: 48-53).

The USA is still today governed by the same document and operates under the same system with which it began over two hundred years ago. The right to “Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness” (United States Declaration of Independence) are still the guiding principles of the American government. The Constitution created a complicated political system sustained by a balance of power between the majority will and the minority rights. The power is divided between two distinct governments (state and federal) and between distinct and separate

departments (legislative, executive and judicial). It can be argued that it is precisely this balance of forces and separation of functions that has been able to adequately preserve freedom and protect the whole scheme from collapsing. (Murray in Graebner (ed.) 1977: 103-110).

In the course of history, the executive became the most effective branch of the American system. The presidency has developed as the focal point of this system. Since the birth of the state, the power of the president has grown and he has carved an increasingly important role for himself. In the words of Robert K. Murray: “the president increasingly assumed the responsibility of speaking for all the people” (Murray in Graebner (ed.) 1977: 112). The emergence of the United States as a world power, the threat of nuclear war, the requirements of national security, and the growing complexity of domestic issues have added to presidential opportunities as well as responsibilities. In major crisis situations, the representatives of the people have consistently granted to the executive all the power he has requested. Nevertheless, Murray argues, there are always remedies in the constitutional system to rectify the abuses of power of one or the other branches of the governing system. (Murray in Graebner (ed.) 1977: 111-113). In my view, this point is to be debated in the current context of the war on terror and the exceptional rights acquired by President George W. Bush. Since the U.S. National Security Strategies are created by the President and his bureau, I shall take notice of his role in relation to the question of freedom in the American political discourse.

Before entering the debate concerning the interpretation of freedom in the present-day United States’ foreign policy, I shall briefly assess the conventional difference between political and economic liberalism. According to Wendy Brown:

In *economic* thought, liberalism contrasts with mercantilism on one side and Keynesianism or socialism on the other; its classical version refers to a maximization of free trade and competition achieved by minimum interference from political institutions. In the history of *political* thought [...], liberalism signifies an order in which the state exists to secure the freedom of individuals on a formally egalitarian basis. (Emphasis in original) (Brown 2005: 39).

The present regime in the United States is usually conceived as neoconservative and embracing a neoliberal political rationality. As Francis Fukuyama states: “Neoconservatism has become now irreversibly identified with the policies of the administration of George W. Bush in its first term, and any effort to reclaim the label at this point is likely to be futile” (Fukuyama 2006: xi). In order to grasp the neoconservative-neoliberal position concerning the contested concept of freedom, it is necessary to consider the way in which this rationality emerges as governmentality, that is to say, a mode of governance encompassing but not limited to the state, and one that produces subjects, forms of citizenship and behaviour, and a new organization of the social. (Brown 2005: 37).

Wendy Brown (2005: 39) argues that neoliberalism refers to liberalism’s economic variant. This does not mean that neoliberalism would simply be a set of economic policies. Rather, neoliberalism carries a social analysis that reaches every domain of the “citizen-subject” from education policy to practices of empire.

Neoliberal rationality, grounded in the market, is not only or even primarily focused on the economy. It involves extending and disseminating market values to all institutions and social action. It contrasts with liberal democracy, which, over the past two centuries, provided at least a modest ethical gap between economy and polity. Neoliberalism, for its part, extends economic rationality to formerly non-economic domains and institutions. This prescribes the action of the citizen-subject. Individuals are supposed to be rational, calculating creatures whose moral autonomy is measured by their capacity to provide for their own needs and service their own ambitions. The moral and political judgment of individuals is reduced to a cost-benefit calculus. This mode of governmentality convenes a “free” subject who rationally deliberates about alternative courses of action, makes choices, and bears responsibility for the consequences of these choices. As individual “entrepreneurs” in every aspect of life, subjects become wholly responsible for their well-being and citizenship is reduced to success in this entrepreneurship. (Brown 2005: 40-46).

Wendy Brown argues that neoliberalism entails the erosion of oppositional political, moral or subjective claims located outside capitalist rationality yet inside liberal democratic society, that is, the erosion of institutions, venues, and values organized by non-market rationalities in democracies. She claims that liberal democracy cannot be submitted to neoliberal political governmentality and survive. In her view, neoliberal rationality has facilitated the dismantling of democracy during the national security crisis caused by the 9/11 terrorist attacks. “Democratic values and institutions are trumped by a cost-benefit and efficiency rationale for practices ranging from government secrecy [...] to the curtailment of civil liberties” (Brown 2005: 47). Moreover, she argues that neoliberal policies and actions disguise under the legitimating cloth of a liberal democratic discourse that is increasingly void of substance. (Brown 2005: 46-47).

The current situation concerning the understanding of freedom in the USA can indeed be debated. The terrorist attacks in September 2001 can be viewed for several reasons as a turning point in the issue of civil liberties in America. New interpretations of freedom seem to emerge, and they are often linked to the enforcement of security. I shall not investigate thoroughly the situation of political freedom in the USA today. I will, however, as an example, look at a very controversial legal act, which has given reason to a lot of debate. The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of October 2001 known as the USA PATRIOT Act dramatically expanded the authority of U.S. law enforcement agencies for the stated purpose of fighting terrorism in the United States and abroad. Among its many provisions, the act increased the ability of law enforcement agencies to search telephone and email communications and medical, financial, and other records; eased restrictions on foreign intelligence gathering within the United States; expanded the Secretary of the Treasury’s authority to regulate financial transactions, particularly those involving foreign individuals and entities; and enhanced the discretion of law enforcement and immigration authorities in detaining and deporting immigrants suspected of terrorism.

The act, and other concurrent reactions to the terrorism, reflect a decision by the federal government to view security in terms of “the preservation of the security of the homeland.” A more expansive approach to security than the United States has previously taken has led to the alteration of many laws and judicial traditions, and to a virtual abandonment of the “Cold War era barriers between foreign intelligence and domestic law enforcement.” (Relyea 2002 in Jaeger et al. 2003: 296). Despite the public support (according to ABC- *Washington Post* poll taken 12.9.2001, two out of three Americans were willing to surrender civil liberties in order to stop terrorism), concerns have emerged regarding the extent to which the new provisions would infringe upon civil liberties. (Rackow 2002: 1651-1652). Historically, in times of war, patriotism and national security have both been used to justify the widespread repression of civil liberties. Paradoxically, in the American discourse of the war against terrorism, freedoms are restricted in order to protect “freedom”. The PATRIOT Act diminishes the role of judicial oversight in criminal investigations as well as citizens’ privacy. While individuals’ freedoms are decreasing, agents of repression enjoy increased freedom from oversight. (Collins and Glover 2002: 80-82).

The political implications of the neoliberal rationality for liberal democracy, such as those explained in this chapter, are significant. As the example of the USA PATRIOT Act has shown, the relation between individual and collective rights today is far from being unequivocal. It is thus interesting to investigate the effect of these changes on the idea of freedom in the empirical part of my study (Chapter 4). In the next sub-chapter I shall concentrate on the conception of freedom in the context of European integration.

### 3.2 Instrumental Vision of *Freedom* in the European Union Treaties

European integration can be seen as a space for competing ideas, ideologies, programmes and discourses. It can thus be understood as a field of competing politico-ideological projects. Along the lines adopted by William Walters and Jens Henrik Haahr (2005), I shall study the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (1957), in order to determine the meaning of freedom in the European integration. The focus shall be on governmentality. The aim is to determine to what extent the Treaty proposes a liberal form of rule for Europe, a mode that would govern through freedom. This type of rule supposes populations that are constructed as free individuals and collectivities. One way to approach the conception of freedom in the Treaty is to see in what context it appears. In order to assess its meanings, the use of the term freedom should also be contrasted to the use of the same concept that has been made in the establishing documents of the United States (see sub-chapter 3.1). (Walters and Haahr 2005: 42-44).

Freedom in the Treaty of Rome is far from the ideas expressed by the founders of the United States. The opening sentence of the Declaration of Independence proclaims that all men are created equal and endowed with an undeniable right to

liberty. Liberty is an individual possession that cannot be surrendered or transferred. In contrast, in the EEC Treaty, freedom is not derived from a transcendental source and it has lost its relationship with individuality. It appears as a certain kind of good that can be provided by a pooling of resources, rather than a right held by individuals. Freedom in the EEC Treaty serves an end. It does not constitute an end in itself. When the Treaty states in Article 3 that the Community shall include the “abolition, as between member states, of obstacles to freedom of movement for persons, services and capital” it makes an explicit reference to a series of different ends. In this discourse, freedom has become a tool, a technology for the achievement of specific governmental objectives, such as stability, development and rising standards of living. The status of freedom as a tool of government is confirmed throughout the Treaty. It is contextualized and tied to various specific activities and practices. Freedom is “freedom of movement” for persons, services and capital (Article 3), and for “workers” (Articles 48, 135). It is “freedom of establishment for member state nationals” (Articles 52, 54) and the freedom to “provide services” (Articles 59, 61, 62, 65). (Walters and Haahr 2005: 44-45).

This type of conceptualization also implies a definition of subject categories that are concerned with the EEC type of freedom. The Treaty of Rome does not mention the word “citizen”, but there are frequent mentions of other subject categories such as producers, farmers, workers, etc. Subjects are thus defined in relation to categories of economic and social activity and their rights are intimately related to their participation in the economic process. At the same time, the freedom of these “citizen-subjects” (to employ the word used by Wendy Brown, see Chapter 3.1) is restricted, and subject to regulation. The freedom of movement, for instance, is a conditional freedom which allows its subjects to move in a purposeful direction only i.e. to seek employment. (Walters and Haahr 2005: 47). The concept of European citizenship has naturally evolved since the establishment of the EEC Treaty. The concept of EU citizen was created in the Maastricht Treaty (1992) and redefined in the Amsterdam Treaty (1998) (European Commission web-page). But even with the creation of the citizenship, the idea of freedom in the EU stays instrumental and is subordinate to the needs of the Common Market. In the empirical part of the study, I shall try to identify the type of subjects that the use of the term freedom implies in the European security documents.

Individuals of the Treaty are the object of governmental action and are rarely the political authors of such action. They are not defined as the ultimate source of legitimacy and authority as in the case of the US Constitution, but are more like the possession of states. This type of discourse that promotes a particular reading of freedom can be seen as an instance of liberal governmentality. However, Walters and Haahr also argue that the promotion of particular kinds of freedom is not the sole concern of the Treaty and the Common Market. It is articulated with, and in some places confronted by a problematization of security. The question of security does not appear as a singular objective in the Treaty but it is problematized in multiple ways. (Walters and Haahr 2005: 48-54).



The question of security and *securitization* can be approached through the theory of speech acts (see Chapter 2.2). According to Ole Wæver (2000: 251), “security is the speech act where a securitizing actor designates a threat to a specified referent object and declares an existential threat implying a right to use extraordinary means to fence it off.” This means that an issue becomes a security issue if the relevant audience accepts the claim made by the discursive actor and thus grants the actor the power to modify and possibly even violate rules that otherwise would bind. This process of constructing security issues is often termed as securitization. Moving an issue to the security realm often carries great political implications, which is exactly the reason for doing the security move. In the speech act perspective, it is not possible to talk about security that would exist independently “out there”. In contrast, this perspective claims that an issue becomes a security issue by the securitizing act. (Wæver in Kelstrup and Williams 2000: 251). The EU and U.S. security documents are illustrations of the current security concerns of the actors in question. They are examples of elaborated speech acts that construct the threat and security imaginary of the actors. However, they should not be misinterpreted as portraying some independent truth about the current security situation.

To return to the analysis of the EEC Treaty, it is possible to read it from the perspective of “liberal security”. The Treaty is concerned with securing the proper working of the European market economy. In the neoliberal conception of well-being, security is tied to competitiveness and economic performance. Walters and Haahr explain their idea as follows:

The crucial point to note is that market processes are, from the perspective of the Treaty, never something which can be taken for granted. [...] Their existence and reproduction at a European level is *problematic*, and cannot be assumed. As such they need to be secured. (Emphasis in original) (Walters and Haahr 2005: 55).

At the Treaty level, the securitization of the market economy is addressed through the creation of an institutional structure. As has been explained in Chapter 2, in the Foucauldian perspective discourse is a productive machinery capable of constructing institutional practices. Indeed, it can be said that “structural factors – such as institutions, bureaucracies, international regimes, the state of the economy, geopolitical emplacement, and so on – are *cognitively* mediated by the actors in question rather than affecting policy actions directly” (emphasis in original) (Carlsnaes 1994 in Aggestam and Hyde-Price 2000: 23-24). The security discourse that will be analysed in Chapter 4 can thus be understood as more or less conscious cognitive mediation produced by discursive actors and creating structural factors that we often tend to call “realities”. It will be interesting to analyse to what extent the idea of liberal security is portrayed in the EU security documents and how they construct new elements of securitising institutions.

As in the United States, in Europe too, the concept of freedom today receives variable interpretation. However, there is a significant difference between the understandings of freedom in Europe and in the U.S. due to their different approach towards terrorism. Europe has had its share of terrorist attacks (in 2004 in Madrid and 2005 in London). Nevertheless, no action compared to the USA

PATRIOT Act has been taken in the EU or at the member state level. I shall thus briefly examine the Berlin Declaration issued in March 2007. This declaration, marking the 50th anniversary of European integration, highlights the historic achievements of the European Union, the equality of all member states, fundamental values upon which the EU is based, and challenges for the future (Berlin Declaration 2007). In the declaration, the concepts of peace and freedom are associated and freedom is related to the liberation of East-European nations. Surprisingly enough, it is not mentioned as one of the core values alongside with mutual solidarity, respect for diversity and tolerance. Consequently, it can be concluded that freedom is still not a focal point in the EU discourse. Moreover, commentators repeatedly underline the economic dimension of the Union (e.g. The Times 3.3.2007). The drafting of the declaration has shown that the public EU discourse is a forum for tensions over defining the cognitive structures that guide the integration. Viewpoints ranging from Europe's Christian heritage to the cherished social protections that, for their part, clash with the pro-market policies cause discord on the ground. In the next chapter, I shall observe how the competing discourses appear in the security policy context.

## 4 Freedom in the Security Policy Discourse

The authors of the book *Collateral Language* state, somewhat provocatively, that “language is a terrorist organization...” (Collins and Glover 2002: 1). Even if this statement is overblown, it catches some crucial aspects of the security discourse. The discourses produced by the European Union and the United States are tools of creating enemies and identifying threats just as much as consolidating alliances. In this chapter, I shall explore the language of six security documents, three by each actor (for the description of the material see Chapter 1.4). It will not be possible to conduct a thorough discourse analysis on all the documents. For this reason, I shall concentrate on some specific aspects that relate, on the one hand, to the historical discussion of the previous chapter and, on the other hand, to the cognitive construction operated through these discourses. Hence, the main interest will be to discover to what extent the idea of liberal security is portrayed in the security documents of both actors. Moreover, the construction of the self, the other and their relation will be examined. All these issues will be observed through the analysis of the conceptual field of freedom. For this purpose, I shall concentrate on some, in my view the most interesting parts of the texts.

As discussed in Chapter 2, language can be a means for creating and maintaining structures of power. Political power, for its part, can be used in the process of identity formation. A common language, together with common modes of thought on which it is based, can provide to the formation of a collective identity and to its material existence (Tonra 2003: 743-744). The power of representation is embedded in the *self / other* distinctions that are created by the discursive actors. The predominant view in both academic and political discourses is that the modern self is western, male and rational. The diversity of the other is rarely addressed. On the contrary, the other is often portrayed as an empirical object defined only with respect to what it is not rather than with respect to what it is. (Murphy and Rojas de Ferro 1995: 64). These tendencies become increasingly noticeable in the empirical material when approaching the present moment. The terrorist acts in September 2001 and the subsequent declaration of war on terror have influenced especially the U.S. discourse to portray terrorism as the essential other as opposed to the self. In the EU, these perceptions are more temperate, but significant changes can be observed in the recent documents.

According to George Lakoff, understanding political positions requires understanding how they fit in certain moralities. As explained in Chapter 2, the use of language is not neutral and employing it in a defined moral or political conceptual system uses and reinforces that conceptual system. (Lakoff 1996: 384). In a later article Lakoff (2001) argues that the 9/11 terrorist attacks launched a

frantic search for metaphors in the U.S. administration. The fact that the proclaimed “War on Terror” was anything but a traditional type of war with a nationally defined enemy army increased the need for new metaphors. Moreover, the war discourse also seems to determine the U.S. domestic policy agenda. As a consequence it will allow the neo-conservative leadership to “do whatever they want in the name of national security” (Lakoff, 2001). The question of conceptual metaphors is of crucial importance for this work. Both the U.S. and the EU present a set of underlying morality assumptions that also translate in their security discourse. On the other hand, these moralities shift according to the political convictions of the actors. In this way, the change in leadership also affects the discourses of the actor. I presume that these changes of moral focus are more perceivable in the president-led American politics than in the consensus-driven EU of 27 member states.

In my analysis, I shall follow the ideas of Jennifer Milliken about the predicate analysis as well as the thesis of Norman Fairclough about the practice of discourse analysis. Predicate analysis focuses on the language practices of predication – the verbs, adverbs and adjectives that attach to nouns. Predications of a noun construct the thing that is named as a particular sort of thing, with particular features and capacities. (Milliken 1999: 232). I shall apply this approach to the noun *freedom*.

## 4.1 *Freedom* before the War on Terror

The first two documents that I shall analyse are from the time before 2001. For the EU, I shall study the Tampere Presidency Conclusions of 15-16.10.1999 and for the U.S., the National Security Strategy for a New Century of October 1998<sup>1</sup>.

The European Council's Presidency Conclusions start with a general introduction that states the creation of an area of freedom, security and justice (AFSJ) and the appointment of a new Council Secretary-General who will also take the responsibility of the High Representative of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. What is interesting in the introductory part is the use of the expression “to be determined” in relation to the creation of the AFSJ. This verb is a clear statement of the decisiveness and firmness necessary to confirm the actorness of the European Council. The introductory part is followed first by the Tampere milestones, and then by subsequent chapters explaining the different policy initiatives taken by the European Council.

The main objects of analysis of the Presidency Conclusions, for this study, are the nine *Tampere Milestones towards a Union of Freedom, Security and Justice*. The very name “milestones” is noteworthy since it implies the idea of a road or a path that the Union should follow. In the first point of the milestones, a statement is made concerning the common values of the European integration. It is said to be “[...] firmly rooted in a shared commitment to freedom [...]” (PC 1999: 2). The

---

<sup>1</sup> In the text I shall refer to the Tampere European Commission Presidency Conclusions as PC 1999 and to the United States National Security Strategy for a New Century as NSS 1998.

evocation of roots in relation to values underlines the perception of common history. The expression “shared commitment” strengthens the idea of community especially since the subject of this sharing is not explicit. All participants to the European integration are supposed to share the commitment to freedom. The document intends to speak in one voice on behalf of all Europeans even though the EU does not have a political representative comparable to the U.S. president. This statement is clearly a constitutive cognitive act that can be interpreted as a part of the construction of the European community at the level of ideas and perceptions.

The second point of the milestones presents a totally different image of freedom. In this paragraph, freedom is not anymore a vaguely defined core value, but a more concrete concept. An environment has to be created where freedom “can be enjoyed” (PC 1999: 2), in the same way as other consumer goods. These statements can be interpreted as illustrations of the liberal economic ideology already established by the EEC Treaty (see Chapter 3.2). The only concrete example of freedom given in this part concerns the freedom of movement of the EU citizens. Under the third point, freedom continues to be treated as a quantifiable good. In this part, it is however presented in negative sentences from the viewpoint of those “world-wide who cannot enjoy the freedom Union citizens take for granted” (PC 1999: 2). Interestingly enough, the negative sentences are used to present a positive outcome. Freedom is “not + exclusive” i.e. it is inclusive and it would be “in contradiction with Europe's traditions to deny such freedom” (PC 1999: 2) i.e. it is granted. The conclusion of this presentation is that the EU needs to develop common asylum and immigration policies.

In the fifth point, freedom is represented as something that requires securitizing measures in order to be enjoyable. It is linked with the creation of the AFSJ and especially the area of justice. Freedom thus needs to be promoted through legality and law. Criminality is seen as the main opposite to freedom. In the same logic, the sixth point emphasises the threat posed to freedom by “serious crime” (PC 1999: 2). In order to secure freedom, crime and criminal organisations must be fought. It is noteworthy that the document does not mention the word “terrorist” or “terrorism” at all. Finally, the seventh point underlines that the AFSJ should be based “on the principles of transparency and democratic control” (PC 1999: 2). This is the classical mantra of the European integration that still has not reached the proper level of either transparency or democratic control, at least in the eyes of the citizens. All in all, it can be said that the Tampere Presidency Conclusions, even though they are concerned with freedom, only present a very instrumental view of it. Terrorism is not seen as a valid threat and accordingly, freedom is not its counterpart. Even though the term appears relatively often in the milestones part of the text, it still seems to be secondary in its importance and subordinate to other economic and legal concerns.

The National Security Strategy for a New Century is a much longer document than the European Council Presidency Conclusions. Of its nearly sixty pages, I shall mainly concentrate on the preface and the introduction that express the U.S. values more in general. The rest of the chapters are devoted to a more detailed description of security policies. In the United States, the president is at the centre

of the national security policy process. The closed nature of the process, the limited number of political actors involved outside of the executive structure, the limited knowledge of the general public on such matters, and the tradition of deference to the president on national security reinforces the president's dominant role (Sarkesian in Cimbala (ed.) 1984: 318). This also applies to the NSS 1998 where the text makes direct reference to the enunciator of the strategy, President Clinton, e.g. through the use of the personal pronoun "I": "I have instructed", "I am confident", etc. This can be contrasted with the situation in the EU, where no single political actor is capable or allowed to formulate the security views of the Union.

The preface starts with a high-flown statement that portrays the United States as the "world's most powerful force for peace, prosperity and the universal values of democracy and freedom" (NSS 1998: iii). The tone of the text is more informal and direct than of the PC 1999, possibly due to the extensive use of personal pronouns. The reader is included in the realm of the reality presented by the NSS 1998 from the very first sentence that uses the first person of plural: "As *we* approach the beginning of 21st century" (emphasis added) (NSS 1998: iii). Similarly, the first paragraph also uses the possessive pronoun "our" to refer to the American nation and people. This kind of use of pronouns continues throughout the document. According to Norman Fairclough (1989: 127), the choice between pronouns is tied with relationships of power and solidarity. The actor that uses pronouns inclusively ("we" that refers to the reader as well as the writer) makes an implicit authority claim that he has the right to speak for others. This kind of use serves the type of ideology that stresses the unity of a people at the expense of recognition of divisions of interest. (Fairclough 1989: 128). In the case of the NSS 1998, these types of objectives are most likely. When it comes to the first point, the whole document is attributed to President Clinton, who in this way speaks for the American people. Secondly, constructing a unity of a nation is essential to security discourses. In this sense, the individual liberty cherished in the classical liberalist tradition gives way to collective security. This tendency is noticeably reinforced in the later U.S. security documents.

After the introductory paragraphs of the preface, the image of freedom changes. The three core American objectives are stated to be: "to enhance our security, to bolster America's economic prosperity, to promote democracy abroad" (NSS 1998: iii). In relation to these objectives, freedom is subordinate to economic prosperity and appears under the concepts of free markets and free trade. The NSS 1998 proposes to promote free trade through the World Trade Organization and free trade areas. It asserts that the forces necessary for a healthy economy also deepen democratic liberties. Democracy and free markets are associated on several occasions as nominal phrases. This use of language is a perfect example of constructing the economic liberalist ideology as it has been described in Chapter 3.1. In the very last sentence of the preface, the NSS 1998 refers to the historical role of the United States and the call for global leadership: "At this moment in history, the United States is called upon to lead – to organize the forces of freedom and progress [...]" (NSS 1998: iv). This sentence leaves unclear the agency of the call. The obfuscation of agency may be ideologically motivated

(Fairclough 1989: 124), which I think is the case in the NSS 1998. It is unclear if the call for leadership comes from the global community (and who would act as its voice?) or from the U.S. national interests. I believe that the vagueness of the language concerning the agent is deliberate.

The introductory chapter that follows the preface starts with a reference to the preamble of the U.S. Constitution. In this reference, liberty is once again brought up as a core value guiding also the American security principles. Later in the chapter, the more vague principle of liberty is concretized as the safeguard of political liberties. (NSS 1998: 1). This is the only clear and explicit reference to political liberties in the document, although their meaning is not further explained. In the fourth paragraph of the introduction, freedom appears once again under the label of free market economics. Moreover, in this paragraph it is presented as an inherently American value: “Many nations around the world have embraced America's core values of representative governance, free market economics and respect for fundamental human rights and the rule of law [...]” (NSS 1998: 1).

As a conclusion to the analysis of the U.S. National Security Strategy for a New Century, it can be said that it presents a vision of freedom that well corresponds to the neoliberalist ideology in its current form. Freedom is mainly an economic concern. When reference is made to freedom as a core value, the meaning of this is never explained. Even though terrorism is already presented as a threat to U.S. security, it is not linked as intensively to the freedom rhetoric as it will be in later documents. In my view, the NSS 1998 and the PC 1999 use a very similar discourse in relation to freedom and in neither of them promoting freedom is a high priority. The PC 1999 presents a subject that is more receded from the discourse (no use of personal pronouns) and is in general more technical and less appealing to the wider public. The milestones part of the text was, however, rhetorically more varied than the technocratic documents in general. The next sub-chapter will analyse documents that have been written after the terrorist attacks in 2001. My hypothesis is that the freedom discourse of the more recent documents will present noticeable changes in relation to the older ones, especially when it comes to the conceptualising of the “free world” against the “un-free / terrorist world”.

## 4.2 The Security Strategies after 9/11

The National Security Strategy of the USA of September 2002 and the European Security Strategy of December 2003 are probably the most studied documents in this field<sup>2</sup>. Because of their relatively uniform format, they present a more fruitful topic for comparison than the older documents. The reason for this is quite obvious. The ESS 2003 was informed to a certain extent by the existence of the American model (Duke 2004: 459). Also, the ESS is partly a response to feelings that a common expression of the Union's ambitions in the field of security and

---

<sup>2</sup> The National Security Strategy of the United States of America will be referred to as NSS 2002 and the European Security Strategy as ESS 2003.

defence policy was needed. Nonetheless, there are significant formal differences between both texts in terms of length, depth and language. The NSS 2002 is more than twice as long as the ESS 2003, it is more elaborative on key points and presented with an air of authority and decisiveness (Berenskoetter 2005: 73). As asserted all along this study, policy documents including security documents are themselves political tools that carry specific messages for both domestic and international audiences. According to Felix Sebastian Berenskoetter:

The NSS shows an assertive US government making a case for its ‘war on terror’, with the aim of *closing* the debate on the purpose and role of the US power in the post-Cold War world. In turn, the ESS, part of a long-term process of building up a common European Foreign and Security Policy, shows an EU attempting to increase its stand as a credible global player and thus *open* the debate among member-states to clarify the EU’s security identity. (Emphasis in original). (Berenskoetter 2005: 73).

These positions of the two actors are to be kept in mind when analysing the freedom discourses in the two security documents.

The NSS 2002 begins with an introductory letter from President George W. Bush. It is the most interesting part of the document for the study of freedom discourse. The letter opens with a statement that the twentieth century has witnessed great struggles between liberty and totalitarianism that have ended “with a decisive victory for the forces of freedom [...]” (NSS 2002<sup>3</sup>). Starting from this very first sentence, freedom is constantly represented as a counterforce to some kind of negative force. These negative forces incorporate (or can incorporate) different concepts that are presented as non-American e.g. “totalitarianism”, “the enemies”, “terror”, “war”, “evil design of tyrants”, “poverty and disease” and “foes”.

In the letter, the idea of freedom is defined somewhat more precisely than in the NSS 1998. Freedom is characterised as embracing both “political and economic freedom” and it includes the right for people: “to be able to speak freely; choose who will govern them; worship as they please; educate their children [...]; own property; and enjoy benefits of their labor” (NSS 2002). The values of freedom are thus defined quite explicitly. The letter also presents the U.S. as an actor who promotes freedom in the world. Paradoxically, the text states that the U.S. aims at promoting human freedom in the way that all nations and societies could choose the political and economic liberty promoted by the U.S.: “We seek instead to create a balance of power that favors human freedom: conditions in which all nations and all societies can choose for themselves the rewards and challenges of political and economic liberty” (NSS 2002). The use of colon that links the two parts of the sentence gives the latter part an explicative meaning in relation to the first part. What is meant by “human freedom” is thus explained in the last part of the sentence, which for its part clarifies what “choosing” means in the American security rhetoric. What is paradoxical about this statement is that the conduct of freedom, in principle, presupposes the possibility to choose between all the available options. In this case, however, the U.S. explicitly

---

<sup>3</sup> The introductory letter does not contain page numbering.



restricts the freedom of other nations in the name of freedom. This mindset reflects for its part the curious view of the current American leadership, that “freedom” can be promoted by restricting freedom (cf. Collins and Glover 2002: 80-82 in Chapter 3.1).

Later in the introductory letter, freedom is associated with the cooperation of the world’s other great powers. These feature Russia and China, but the EU or Europe in general does not explicitly appear as a partner in the group of “freedom-loving nations” who would share the same values of freedom with the USA. The reason for this is probably not in the security values of the EU but rather in its relative insignificance for the American security scheme. Besides, the USA expresses its willingness to “extend the benefits of freedom across the globe” (NSS 2002). What is meant by the “benefits of freedom” in this context is “the hope for democracy, development, free markets, and free trade” (NSS 2002). Hence, the letter continues the neoliberal political discourse already present in NSS 1998 that links democracy and free trade in the same cognitive sphere.

The primary body of the NSS 2002 is divided in 9 chapters. The first one is titled: *Overview of America's International Strategy*. This first chapter begins with a citation from a speech by President Bush. In this fragment of a speech, the President proclaims the American nation as the safeguard of “a peace that favors liberty” (NSS 2002: 1). In the same logic as in the introductory letter, the positive values carried by “our nation” are contrasted directly to threats “from terrorist and tyrants”. Moreover, President Bush promises to encourage “free and open societies on every continent” in order to “extend the peace” (NSS 2002: 1).

The text of the strategy then goes on in the same tone as in the introductory letter. The United States is presented as a strong nation with a mission (the reader is included in the nation by the use of personal pronouns) and which has no equal. An interesting statement is made at the end of the first paragraph of the first chapter: “The great strength of this nation must be used to promote a balance of power that favors freedom”. This sentence presents several keys for interpretation. First of all, it clearly illustrates the realist world-view of the writers of the document. The situation of “balance of power” is presented as a necessity, and its possibility or appropriateness in the present political situation is not impugned. On the other hand, the whole concept of balance is destabilised by the assertion that it should “favor freedom”. During the Cold War, when the idea of the balance of power was the most salient, it literally implied balance between the military and political power of the two ideologically opposed camps. In the new American security conception, balance can seemingly be extended in the advantage of one camp. In my view, this perception ruins the whole idea of balance. Since the U.S. does not currently have an equally powerful counterpart in the present world, it is anachronistic to speak about a balance of power.

This overview of the NSS 2002 has shown how the freedom-discourse has evolved after the 9/11 terrorist attack. First of all, freedom and terrorism are contrasted in a totally new way. However, these new allegations repeatedly stumble on paradoxical argumentation that has been explained in the chapter. This type of discourse aims at the securitisation of the general vision of freedom. In

addition, the liberalist rhetoric that presents freedom as free markets is omnipresent in the document.

The introduction to the European Security Strategy highlights the fact that “Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure nor so free” (ESS 2003: 1). What is meant by freedom in this opening statement is left for the reader to interpret. The next paragraph explains that the “creation of the European Union has been central to this development”. The use of the indefinite pronoun “this” links the two statements together. The term freedom does not appear as frequently in the ESS 2003 discourse as in the NSS 2002. Still, in the first chapter of the document, “the spread of democracy” has allegedly “brought freedom and prosperity to many people.” What is noteworthy in this statement is that neither the EU nor Europe proclaim themselves as carriers of these positive values, at least not directly. The positive development is, in the ESS 2003 interpretation, the result of the: “Flow of trade and investment, the development of technology and the spread of democracy” (ESS 2003: 2). This formulation gives the impression that some unidentified market forces, technological advancement and democracy in general are the bearers of freedom. The role of human (and European) agency is purposefully left unspecified.

In contrast to the PC 1999, terrorism is now presented as a key threat to Europe. Moreover, in relation to the terrorist threats, the European societies are referred to by a personal pronoun: “[Terrorism] seeks to undermine the openness and tolerance of our societies” (ESS 2003: 3). This example (not unique in the text) shows a noticeable change in comparison to the dissociated and technocratic jargon of the Presidency Conclusions. Yet, Biscop criticizes the ESS 2003 of being overly threat-based. This characteristic is illustrated by the overestimation of the terrorism threat and by overemphasizing the need to address it. Such threat-based approach carries a risk of focusing too much on defence to the detriment of prevention (Biscop 2004: 16-17).

Not surprisingly, given the EU’s evolution, the strategy strongly emphasizes multilateral co-operation with and within international organizations. It recognises that international cooperation is a necessity. Interestingly, the transatlantic relationship is identified as a core element of the international system. As can be recalled from the previous overview of the NSS 2002, the U.S. document did not even mention the EU as a partner. The rhetoric in relation to the cooperation in the ESS 2003 is quite remarkable: “Acting together, the European Union and the United States can be a formidable force for good in the world” (ESS 2003: 13). This statement is very far from the traditional, neutral EU-language. The issue of morality is explicitly brought forward and can be related to the moral discourses of the American neo-conservatives (see Lakoff previously in this chapter).

Andrea Ellner (2005: 228) explains how the ESS conceptualizes future security challenges as negative effects of globalization. The strategy is deeply wedded to the concepts of “human security” and “global common goods”, which must be protected or enhanced through a mix of political, economic and, if necessary, military means. The latter are seen as important, but as a last resort rather than a primary tool in protecting security now or in future. It is quite clear, that the ESS 2003 presents a whole new kind of approach to the tackling of security issues in

the EU context. It is in the midway between a simple exchange of information and a fully operative community of action. At the same time, it is not based on a mere “least common denominator” discourse, but aspires for a genuine common understanding. The ambition is to include the “peoples of Europe” in the cognitive sphere of “our societies”.

The two strategies share a number of things in common. The main one being the belief that security challenges of the future are likely to be varied, often with deep social, economic or religious underpinnings (Duke 2004: 463). However, the fact that the European Security Strategy does not adopt a far-reaching discourse of freedom is in my opinion a clear difference in relation to its American counterpart. Moreover, the ESS 2003 does not present freedom as the opposing force against terrorism or other threats. Rather, it presents a more classical view of freedom that is a central, yet undefined value. It lacks the moral tone of the NSS 2002. Freedom in the security context has also moved on from the very instrumental view that was made of it in the PC 1999. Freedom no longer appears as the freedom of movement nor is it associated as strongly to economic activity as previously. This, however, could be explained by the different nature of the PC 1999 and ESS 2003 documents. While the former was primarily aimed at the development of the internal policies of the Union, the latter presents the first resumed attempt to formulate a foreign policy strategy. Moreover, the ESS is not intended to be subject to frequent change (Duke 2004: 460). I think that this aspect of the ESS is crucial, since it defines the future path and depth of integration in security matters.

### 4.3 The Security Discourses Today

The last two documents that I shall study are the most recent available security documents of the two actors. They are both intimately related to the issue of terrorism which is also translated in their discourse. For the EU, I will study the European Counter-Terrorism Strategy that was adopted by the Justice and Home Affairs Council in December 2005. For the United States, the object of study will be the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism of September 2006<sup>4</sup>. The American version is an update of an earlier counter-terrorism strategy from 2003.

The EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy presents four pillars for “combating terrorism”. They are: *prevent*, *protect*, *pursue* and *respond*. The main text of the document is arranged under these headings. The term freedom appears for the first time in the first paragraph of the introduction: “[Terrorism] poses a serious threat to our security, to the values of our democratic societies and to the rights and freedoms of our citizens [...]” (ECTS 2005: 6). For the first time, in the EU discourse studied for this work, terrorism is directly presented as the antipode of positive values that include freedom. Moreover, the general tone of the introduction is more offensive than in the older documents. It is created through the vocabulary in general (“combating terrorism”, “international terrorist threat”)

---

<sup>4</sup> Respectively referred to as ECTS 2005 and NSCT 2006.

and reinforced by the assertiveness of the discourse that is combined with generalising statements: “Terrorism is a threat to all States and to all peoples” (ECTS 2005: 6). The use of possessive personal pronouns (“our security”, “our democratic societies”, “freedoms of our citizens”) gives the impression that the positive concepts somehow belong to “us” and can not be associated with “them”.

In the second paragraph of the introduction, the term freedom is used to characterise the EU: “The European Union is an area of increasing openness, [...] allowing for free movement of people” (ECTS 2005: 6). This is the more typical use of the concept in the EU context and concerns the core principle of the EU – the free movement of people. It has been commented upon in previous sub-chapters. The general tone of the discourse gets milder and more technical later in the text and freedom is no longer mentioned. The four main chapters that are organised under the four pillars mainly present practical issues and describe different security measures necessary to tackle the issue. The viewpoint is very EU centred and does not try to define very precisely the characteristics of the “enemy”. The latter part of the text resembles in its discourse more closely the traditional EU documents with its elaborated technical descriptions of security tools and measures. The American version of the Strategy for Combating Terrorism differs significantly from the European one in this respect.

The first chapter of the NSCT 2006 is titled: *Overview of America’s National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*. It opens with a statement declaring that: “America is at war with a transnational terrorist movement [...]” (NSCT 2006: 1). In the next paragraph, freedom is once again presented as the alternative to terrorism: “[...] we promote freedom and human dignity as alternatives to the terrorists’ perverse vision of oppression and totalitarian rule” (NSCT 2006: 1). It is interesting to note how the term freedom is flexibly used in different conceptualisations. In the same chapter the text then reveals that the U.S. has a “freedom agenda” which is conceptually opposed to “al-Qaida’s agenda”. Differing from the previous value-laden discourse, this rhetoric resembles more of the classical political struggle between parties promoting different agendas.

The next chapter contains a list of successes and challenges in the present situation in the war on terror. They present some very salient cues of analysis. In the list of successes the USA PATRIOT Act is praised: “The Administration has worked with Congress to adopt, implement, and renew key reforms like the USA PATRIOT Act that promote our security while also protecting our fundamental liberties” (NSCT 2006: 4). This interpretation gives an overtly positive view of the act and seems almost like a direct answer to its critics (see Chapter 3.1). In the challenges part, the Iraq war is presented through the discourse of freedom: “The ongoing fight for freedom in Iraq has been twisted by terrorist propaganda as a rallying cry” (NSCT 2006: 4). It is to be rested that the situation in Iraq is not referred to as a war but as a “fight for freedom” which carries more positive connotations than “war”. The fact that this concept is used also legitimises the U.S. presence in Iraq, since, in the logic of this discourse, freedom is a shared positive value and it is legitimate and even justifiable to protect it. At the same time, the opposite discourse is discredited and described as “propaganda”.

The American strategy focuses much effort on conceptualising the enemy as the very image of evil. In the chapter headed “Today’s Terrorist Enemy”, the terrorist ideology is described as: “the ideology of oppression, violence and hate” (NSCT 2006: 5). The whole chapter concentrates on setting terrorism and conceptualising it as far as possible from “us”. Terrorist are the “others” par excellence. They are demonized when they are compared to: “a form of totalitarianism following the path of fascism and Nazism” (NSCT 2006: 11). The historical facts and roots behind these different extremist movements do not seem to matter much in the official American counter-terrorism discourse. In contrast, the American ideology, incarnated by the inclusive pronouns “we”, “us”, “our”, is depicted as a perfect antipode of the villain terrorists. Thus, it can be said, that the discourse of this document uses a reflexive construction of identity. Describing the enemy with very strong images and linking it intimately to what “we” are not is an essential building-block of what “we” are. In this sense, “we” cannot exist without “them” – the diametrically opposed image of self.

## 5 Conclusion

In this work I have studied the freedom discourses of the European Union and the United States through a selection of security documents. My ambition has been to link the analysis of the current discourses of freedom with the politico-ideological background of this term. Hence, the analysis proceeded in a chronological manner starting with a historical account of the meanings attached to the term *freedom* both in the U.S. and the EU. In the empirical part I moved on to study the contemporary discourses in the security documents of both actors.

In the United States, the idea of freedom is closely tied to the liberalist tradition whereby freedom implies, first and foremost, individual liberty from the domination of the state or any kind of authority. The neoliberalist ideology has, however, brought new meanings to the term by relating it intimately with market rationality. The discourse analysis carried on the U.S. security documents in Chapter 4, showed a significant shift from the traditional understanding of freedom. In the texts analysed in this work, the term freedom was mainly used to construct the image of self against the other – the free Americans against the subjugating terrorists. The idea of individual freedom was blurred in the vague references of freedom as a common value. The content of this value was not explained but the discourse assumed that everyone would subscribe to it. The tone of the documents grew more intense when approaching the present moment. The juxtaposition of the two world-views was the most accentuated in the latest document. It can be said that all the documents intended to construct a certain simplified vision of “us” versus the “enemy”, but the discourse reached its most Manichean point in the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism of 2006.

In the European Union, the concept of freedom has traditionally been linked to the free movement of people. In the 1957 EEC Treaty this was the dominant conception of freedom and it did not relate in any way to the individual liberties of the citizens. Moreover, at that time, the subjects of the integration were not treated as citizens with political and social rights and obligations. They were perceived by the Community only in their quality of work-force. Also, a lot has changed in the EU’s discourse in fifty years. Although the freedom of movement and the primacy of the Single Market are still visible in the discourses of the Union, new types of ideas are emerging. While the 1999 Tampere Presidency Conclusions can be characterised as a quite typical technocratic discourse, the European Security Strategy of 2003 marks a notable shift. For the first time, terrorism is presented as an explicit threat to the security of the EU. Yet, the ESS 2003 does not present freedom as the opposing force against terrorism. In contrast, freedom is presented as a central but an undefined value. Approaching the present moment, the EU discourses also acquire a more offensive tone. In the European Strategy for Combating Terrorism 2005, terrorism and freedom-related positive

European values are for the first time directly presented as each other's counterpoints. In my view, this evolution is partly an illustration of the American influence to the European rhetoric.

The conclusions of this analysis can be paralleled with those made by Sven Biscop in relation to the U.S. and EU Security Strategies (2002-2003). According to him, the American strategic thinking has come to be dominated by a security rationale. The concepts of national sovereignty, national interest and the balance of power have become the cornerstones of the U.S. security policy after 9/11. The study of the security documents also showed the tendency of securitising the freedom discourses and brought up examples concerning the idea of the balance of power. In the EU, the terrorist attacks have also brought about a certain renewed emphasis on defence as it is reflected in the formulation of the European Security Strategy. Nonetheless, defence issues have not pushed the comprehensive approach to security off the agenda. (Biscop 2004: 14).

This study has clearly justified the significance of a discursive approach to International Relations and foreign / security policy studies. This method has revealed linguistic practices that could have gone unnoticed if another type of method had been applied. Furthermore, discourse analysis does not simply reveal these linguistic practices but also makes their interpretation possible. The finding that the security discourses increasingly rely on the self / other opposition and depict terrorism as the constituent other like never before, is a remarkable fact. Moreover, this work has asserted the relevance of discourse analysis for the study of power. In the introduction I wrote a hypothesis that discourse is one of the means used to control and generate power in governance. Although the empirical study was conducted on a limited theme only, it clearly showed that the enunciating actor has great powers in constructing the public's identities. These findings also place the work in a larger social constructivist political science context where the analysis of identity construction is of focal interest. Future research on the U.S. and EU political ideologies should take this dimension into consideration.

# Bibliography

## *Books*

- Aggestam, Lisbeth – Hyde-Price, Adrian, 2000. *Security and Identity in Europe: exploring the new agenda*. Basingstoke: Macmillan Press Ltd.
- Appleby, Joyce – Hunt, Lynn – Jacob, Margaret, 1994. *Telling the Truth about History*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.
- Brown, Wendy, 2005. *Edgework: critical essays on knowledge and politics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Christiansen, Thomas – Jørgensen Knud Erik – Wiener Antje (eds.), 2001. *The Social Construction of Europe*. London: SAGE Publications.
- Cimbala, Stephen J. (ed.), 1984. *National Security Strategy: Choices and Limits*. New York: Praeger Publishers.
- Collins, John – Glover, Ross (eds.), 2002. *Collateral Language: a user's guide to America's new war*. New York: New York University Press.
- Fairclough, Norman, 1989. *Language and Power*. London: Longman Group UK Limited.
- Fukuyama, Francis, 2006. *America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power and the Neoconservative legacy*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Graebner, Norman A. (ed.), 1977. *Freedom in America: A 200-Year Perspective*. Pennsylvania State University Press.
- Kelstrup, Morten – Williams, Michael C. (eds.), 2000. *International Relations Theory and the Politics of European Integration*. London: Routledge.
- Lakoff, George, 1996. *Moral Politics: What Conservatives Know That Liberals Don't*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Rose, Nikolas, 1999. *Powers of Freedom: reframing political thought*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Saastamoinen, Kari 1998. *Eurooppalainen liberalism: etiikka, talous, politiikka*. Jyväskylä: Atena Kustannus Oy.
- Strömvik, Maria 2005. *To Act as a Union*. Lund: Lund University, Political Studies 142.
- Walters, William – Haahr, Jens Henrik, 2005. *Governing Europe: Discourse, governmentality and European integration*. Oxon: Routledge.
- Wiener, Antje – Diez, Thomas (eds.), 2004. *European Integration Theory*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Visgø, Orla, 1992. *The Analysis of Political Discourse*. TeFa nr 5 (FUMS Rapport nr 167) Uppsala: Uppsala Universitet.



### *Articles*

- Berenskoetter, Felix Sebastian, 2005. "Mapping the Mind Gap: A Comparison of US and European Security Strategies", *Security Dialogue* Vol. 36, No. 1, pp. 71-92.
- Biscop, Sven 2004. "The European Security Strategy – Implementing a Distinctive Approach to Security" *Sécurité & Stratégie* No. 82, pp. 1-43.
- Diez, Thomas, 1999. "Speaking 'Europe': the politics of integration discourse", *Journal of European Public Policy* 6:4 Special Issue, pp. 598-613.
- Duke, Simon, 2004. "The European Security Strategy in a Comparative Framework: Does it Make for Secure Alliances in a Better World?" *European Foreign Affairs Review* 9, pp. 459-481.
- Ellner, Andrea 2005. "The European Security Strategy: Multilateral Security with Teeth?" *Defense & Security Analysis* Vol. 21, No. 3, pp. 223–242.
- Jaeger, Paul T. – Bertot, John Carlo – McClure, Charles R., 2003. "The impact of the USA Patriot Act on collection and analysis of personal information under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act", *Government Information Quarterly* 20, pp. 295–314.
- Lijphart, Arend 1971. "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method", *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 65, No. 3, pp. 682-693.
- Milliken, Jennifer, 1999. "The Study of Discourse in International Relations: A Critique of Research and Methods", *European Journal of International Relations* Vol. 5(2), pp. 225-254.
- Murphy, Craig N. – Rojas de Ferro, Cristina, 1995. "Introduction to the Theme Section: The Power of Representation in International Political Economy", *Review of International Political Economy* Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 63-69.
- Rackow, Sharon H., 2002. "How the USA PATRIOT Act will permit governmental infringement upon the privacy of Americans in the name of 'intelligence' investigations", *University of Pennsylvania Law Review*, Vol. 150, pp. 1651-1696.
- Tonra, Ben 2003. "Constructing the Common Foreign and Security Policy: The Utility of a Cognitive Approach", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 41 No. 4, pp. 731-756.

### *Policy documents*

- Declaration on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the signature of the Treaties of Rome*, Berlin March 2007.  
[http://www.eu2007.de/de/News/download\\_docs/Maerz/0324-RAA/English.pdf](http://www.eu2007.de/de/News/download_docs/Maerz/0324-RAA/English.pdf) (last consulted 2.5.2007)
- National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, September 2006.  
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nsct/2006/nsct2006.pdf>  
(last consulted 9.5.2007)
- The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, September 2002.  
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2002/nss.pdf>  
(last consulted 9.5.2007)
- A National Security Strategy for a New Century*. The White House, October 1998.

- <http://clinton2.nara.gov/WH/EOP/NSC/html/documents/nssr.pdf>  
(last consulted 9.5.2007)
- Council of the European Union 2005. *The European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy*. Council doc. 14469/4/05, 30.11.2005.  
<http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/05/st14/st14469-re04.en05.pdf>  
(last consulted 9.5.2007)
- European Council, 2003. *A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy*. Brussels: European Council.  
<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf>  
(last consulted 9.5.2007)
- European Council, Tampere 15-16 October 1999. *Presidency Conclusions*.  
[http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms\\_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/00200-r1.en9.htm](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/00200-r1.en9.htm)  
(last consulted 9.5.2007)

#### *Internet sources*

- “Declaration of What? Blair and Britain must avoid being ambushed in Berlin next week”, *The Times* 3.3.2007, online version.  
[http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/leading\\_article/article1464430.ece](http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/leading_article/article1464430.ece) (last consulted 20.4.2007)
- European Commission, Justice and Home Affairs, European citizenship.  
[http://ec.europa.eu/justice\\_home/fsj/citizenship/fsj\\_citizenship\\_intro\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/citizenship/fsj_citizenship_intro_en.htm)  
(last consulted 18.4.2007)
- Lakoff, George 2001. “Metaphors of Terror”. *The Days After*, University of Chicago Press.  
<http://www.press.uchicago.edu/News/911lakoff.html>  
(last consulted 3.5.2007)