

# When Speaking about Turkey...!

- *A comparative analyses of the arguments put forward in the debate on Turkey's bid for EU membership*

## **Abstract**

The arguments put forward in the debate on Turkey's bid for EU membership are many and diverse. The aim of this thesis is, by using the methodological framework of constructivist comparative politics and Political reasoning, to systematically structure the arguments. Officially the question of whether or not Turkey will become a member of the EU depends upon the developments internally in the country. In reality there has been no doubt that Turkey is a special case, where the results of the negotiations in the end also will depend upon the general public opinion in Europe. By looking closer at the general debate and the most important arguments put forward in the debate on Turkish EU membership, it will be possible to gain a greater understanding of what in the end might be the deciding factor. The fact that Turkey is a Muslim country makes the debate about the negotiations different from previous enlargement rounds.

**Keywords:** *Turkey, arguments, Britain, Franc, Germany, Denmark, Constructivist Comparative Politics and political reasoning.*

**Characters:** 76.095

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## **1.0 When speaking about Turkey**

According to a survey conducted by the European Commission in 2005, 52 percent of EU citizens opposed Turkish membership whereas only 35 percent supported it. The survey reported 80 percent of Austrians opposed membership, as did 74 percent of Germans. Against this background of popular resistance to Turkish membership in several European countries, numerous politicians have increasingly voiced their opposition to full membership, and some have distanced themselves from earlier support for Ankara. Together with the former German chancellor Gerhard Schröder and British Prime Minister Tony Blair, French president Jacques Chirac has backed Turkey's accession. However, in the period leading up to the French referendum on the EU constitution in June 2005, Chirac felt obliged to bow to public sentiment against Turkish membership and promised to put Turkish accession to a referendum. Two of Europe's leading politicians, the German chancellor Angela Merkel leader of the Christian Democrats in Germany and the newly elected French president, Nicholas Sarkozy, leader of the governing Union for a Popular Movement (UPM) in France, declared their opposition to Turkish membership. Instead they have promoted the idea of a special partnership between Turkey and the EU. (McGill International Review fall 2005)

Turkey's opponents say it has not sufficiently improved its human rights record. It has not yet recognised Greek Cyprus, an EU member, and it disputes the general view that its campaign against the Armenians in 1915 was genocide. Turkey's supporters say the lure of EU membership has already brought great improvements, notably the abolition of the death penalty, in its human rights record. They talk of Turkish entry as both a bridge to the Islamic world and a block against Turkey drifting away from the West. Among Europeans this is not merely an argument about Turkey. It is an argument about the identity of Europe. Many Europeans who oppose Turkey's EU bid feel that they will be sacrificing their collective identity if the modern state that emerged from the ashes of the Ottoman Empire is allowed to join the group. Their anxiety was best summed up in Denmark, where a Muslim headscarf was placed on the 'Little Mermaid' statue in Copenhagen with the words: 'Turkey in the EU?' written on an accompanying sign. (www.SFgate.com 04.10.05)

The rhetoric used to describe the EU's enlargement process has been very different over time. The rhetoric used to describe the Eastern enlargement which was completed in 2004 was especially very different from that used to describe Turkey. Whereas the Central and Eastern

European Countries have been called the kidnapped west and described as 'belonging to the European family of nations', Turkey is always linked to utility defined in terms of security. Turkey is described as an important partner to Europe and is often discussed in relations with Israel and Morocco. With regard to Turkey the references to duty or kinship is virtually absent. The main reason for enlarging to Turkey is neither that Turkey must be returned to Europe nor that the EU has a particular duty toward Turkey, but that Turkey is strategically important. (Sjursen 2002: 504) Britain is one of Turkey's biggest supporters when it comes to EU membership. The extent of concern in the British Government about Turkish accession is made clear in a pamphlet 'Turks in Europe' published by the Foreign Policy Centre. Stephen Twigg, the former Labour minister who remains influential in the Prime Minister's circle, warns that anything other than full membership would be:

*"A shabby offer to make to the millions of Turks that already live in Europe. What will future generations say about us if we turn our backs now... on the best Muslim friend we have?" (Twigg 2005: 10)*

The Vice-president of the Commission Verheugen is also concerned about the negative way Turkey is portrayed by some member-states. "Europe is sending Turkey almost exclusively negative signals:

*"We are focusing on the weaknesses of the country, and not encouraging them to change. This is feeding a reluctance to make the reforms we are asking for, which in turn leads Europe to the view that the Turks simply can't manage it." (.www.english.people.com)*

The discussions are interesting because of their frequently implicit content, and some of the arguments open up for torrents of intertwining, different discourses. The difference in argumentation is surprising: some arguments are indeed based on politics or economy, but others are religious, racial, ethnic, cultural, or based on defence opportunities, morality or human rights. There are many parties with opposing views and much at stake in this situation. With a population of over 70 million, Turkey will undoubtedly have a substantial impact on the EU, becoming its second-largest member. In the European Parliament it would have a number of seats in proportion with the size of its population, giving Turkey considerable influence over common European issues. Such developments have caused many, both politicians and voters, to fear the inclusion of Turkey in the EU. Throughout Europe, the argument that surrounds Turkey's projected accession revolves around a series of issues, ranging from demographic through geographic to political. Perhaps the most sensitive of all arguments centre on the cultural

and religious differences. Since the EU identifies itself as a cultural and religious mosaic that recognises and respects diversity, the supporters of Turkey's EU bid believes that, as long as both Turkey and the EU member-states maintain this common vision, cultural and religious differences should be irrelevant. (EurActiv.com 23<sup>rd</sup> of September 2005)

After the French and Dutch no to the Constitutional Treaty, the issue of Turkish membership was once again on top of the agenda. Post-referendum surveys indicated that resistance against enlargement and particularly against Turkish membership, had played some but not a very large role in the voting results. But politicians throughout Europe had interpreted the result as an indication of voters' dissatisfaction with the rapid pace of enlargement and as a warning to slow or freeze the process. (Casanova 2006: 234) The French interior Minister and at that time presidential candidate, Nicholas Sarkozy, had already stated the need to suspend enlargement at least until Europe's political crisis was resolved. Similar calls to stop, or at least to postpone, the negotiations have come from the governments of Holland, Austria, and Denmark. The British, Italian and Spanish governments have spoken in favour of Turkish membership. The German chancellor, Angela Merkel opposes Turkey's entry into the Union offering Turkey instead a 'privileged association' short of full membership. (Casanova 2006: p 235)

## **2.0 Research puzzle**

The arguments used in the debate about Turkey's bid for EU membership are many and diverse. Some member-states have changed their minds over time, regarding whether or not it is a good idea to accept Turkey as a member of the Union. The change of hearts is often related to changing governments and changing public opinion. The purpose this essay is to try and systematically structure the debate and thereby clarifying and trying to understand the arguments used. My research puzzle will therefore be the following:

***How are the arguments regarding Turkey's bid for EU membership structured in the member-states and is the rhetoric used different in each country?***

I will answer my research puzzle using the theory of political reasoning put forward by Vedung by trying to understand the arguments in the context they are put forward. This combined with the methodological reasoning of constructivism and comparative politics will help me to set up a framework for comparing and structuring the arguments. The constructivist part will be very limited but will help me in explaining why speeches and written material can be an expression of true political meanings and understandings and therefore worth analysing.

## **2.1 Thesis structure**

In this section I will briefly explain how my thesis is structured so the future reading will be easy to follow. As stated before the purpose of this thesis is to examine and structure the argumentation regarding Turkey's bid for EU membership. I will begin my thesis by giving a short historical introduction of Turkey's relationship with the EU. The purpose of this is to give the reader an understanding of the very long and complicated negotiations that Turkey has taken part of. Since I am conducting a comparative text analysis my methodological review will introduce the analytical framework I have chosen, being Constructive Comparative Politics (CCP). This framework allows me to use the easily operational framework of comparison mixed with constructivist thoughts.

I connection with the methodological considerations I will also discuss the general level of analysis, the validity of the thesis and other things connected to the comparative framework. The constructivist part of the methodological framework will, as I have said earlier, be very limited and are more or less only included to make the reader understand why written words or speech acts can be the expression of real political meanings and understandings. The method of comparative politics is often criticised and therefore I will take a closer look at some of the main points of critique and discuss the general validity of the thesis. I have chosen to take a closer look at Vedung's thoughts on political reasoning, therefore I will introduce the main thoughts behind it which I will use when analysing the empirical material I have chosen. To gain a greater understanding of the political text analysis research field I will take a closer look at some of the options at hand and shortly explain why I have made the theoretical and methodological choices I have. After having discussed my methodological choices I will present the comparative research design I will use in my analysis and shortly discuss the choices I have made.

The empirical material I have chosen for this thesis is speeches and interview made by or with the heads of state of four EU member-states; Britain, France, Germany and Denmark. In the presentation of the empirical material I will discuss why I have chosen the member-states I have and thereafter the selection of the material and the implications these choices could have for the validity of the thesis. The analysis is the most important part of the thesis since I in this part will try to systematically structure the arguments regarding Turkey's bid for EU membership. In this section I will also try to put the arguments into the context they are to be understood in. This allows me to gain a deeper understanding of the arguments. The purpose is though still to systematically structure the debates about Turkey to gain a greater understanding of the arguments used and not to explain the arguments in its self. I will use four different categories for my analysis; security arguments, normative, cultural and religious arguments, human rights and democracy arguments and economic and public opinion arguments. The comparative research design allows be to better structure the analysis and thereby offer a valuable contribution to the research on the debate about Turkey. To end my thesis I will conclude on the research puzzle I put forward in the beginning of the thesis and discuss my findings. I have chosen to include the speeches I will use in the thesis in the appendix as I believe that this enhances the validity of the thesis since it allows the reader to look through the speeches themselves.



### **3.0 Turkey and the EU – the long and winding road**

The question of Turkish membership of the European Union is one of the most discussed and debate subjects regarding the EU in the last couple of years, but Turkey's path to EU membership began long before that. Turkey signed the Ankara Association agreement on the 12<sup>th</sup> of September 1963 and applied for full membership of the EC in 1987. During the first half of the 1980s, relations between Turkey and the Community came to a virtual freeze following the military coup detach on the 12th of September 1980. The Association Council decided to decrease customs duties on almost all agricultural products to "zero" by 1987. The Turkey-EEC Association Council meeting revives the association process in 1986 and in 1987 Turkey applies for full EEC membership. The European Commission responded with its opinion in December 1989, stating that Turkey's accession was unlikely in the near future. Instead the Commission proposed establishing a Customs Union for industrial products and in 1995 Turkey became the first country to establish a custom union with the EU in anticipation of subsequent membership.

But the hopes and dreams of EU membership were quickly and unexpectedly dashed at the Luxembourg European Council in 1997. The meeting launched the EU's enlargement process with the Central and Eastern European Countries. They were all invited to start accession talks or were invited to do so starting in 2000, but Turkey was excluded from the process. Two years later, at its Helsinki summit, the council finally accepted Turkey's candidacy and on the 8<sup>th</sup> of November 2000 the Commission adopted an Accession Partnership Document for Turkey. In 2001 the Turkish government adopted the national program for Turkey for the adoption of EU laws and the Turkish parliament adopted over 30 amendments to the constitution in order to meet the Copenhagen political criteria for EU membership and by 2002 the Turkish Parliament had passed sweeping reforms to meet the EU's human rights criteria.

The Copenhagen European Council in December 2002 resolved that if the European Council in December 2004, on the basis of a report and a recommendation from the Commission, decides that Turkey fulfils the Copenhagen political criteria, the EU would open accession negotiations with Turkey. In the meantime, EU leaders had agreed to extend and deepen co-operation on the EC-Turkey Customs Union and to provide Turkey with increased pre-accession financial assistance. By 2004 Turkey had signed a protocol banning death penalty in all circumstances and the Commission issued a progress report on Turkey. On the basis of this recommendation the European Council gave the green light in December 2004 by deciding to start negotiations in

October 2005 and on the 29<sup>th</sup> of June the framework for the negotiations were presented. The negotiations will be open-ended meaning that their outcome cannot be guaranteed before hand. The negotiations will be conducted in the framework of an Intergovernmental Conference with the participation of Turkey and all EU member states. The policy issues will be broken down into 35 policy areas, more than ever before, and the decision will in the end require unanimity. The EU may consider the inclusion of a long transition period or permanent safeguard clauses in its proposal for each framework. The membership can only become a reality after 2014, which is the scheduled date for the establishment of the EU's new financial budget. The accession negotiations can be suspended in case of a serious and persistent breach of the principles of democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law on which the union is founded. Turkey will have to sign a protocol that will adapt the 1963 Ankara Treaty to the ten new member states of the EU, including the Greek Cypriot government. For practical purposes this would amount to an implicit recognition of the government for the first time since the island's division in 1974.

On the 3<sup>rd</sup> of October 2005 the accession talks were symbolically opened with Turkey and on the 12<sup>th</sup> of June 2006 the EU began concrete accession negotiations with Turkey but already in November of the same year the Commission published a critical report on Turkey's accession progress. The Commission recommended continuing accession negotiations with Turkey but also recommended the suspension of eight chapters related to Turkey's restrictions as regards to Cyprus. In December 2006 Turkey offered to open their harbours and one airport to Cypriot ships and planes in an attempt to avert the suspension of the eight chapters. On the 11<sup>th</sup> of December the GAERC council agreed on a partial freeze of accession negotiations with Turkey and on the 15<sup>th</sup> the European Council endorsed the agreement as adopted by the council. A euro barometer survey indicates that a majority of Turks support membership in the EU. The support of Turkey's aspirations by EU citizen, however only reached 28 %. (EurActive.com 23<sup>rd</sup> of September 2004)

## **4.0 Research method**

In this section of the thesis I will explain and discuss the theoretical and methodological choices I have made and present my research framework. I will begin by introducing the field of comparative politics with a special focus on the field of constructivist comparative politics. I will in connection with the presentation discuss some different aspects of the framework and some of the things that are important to keep in mind when conducting a comparative analysis. I will also introduce some of Vedung's thoughts on political reasoning and how he believes that arguments should be understood in the context they exist in.

### **4.1 Comparative Politics**

The task of comparative politics is to provide a research method that allows us to express meaningful theoretical and analytical statements about government and politics within complex and largely unplanned settings. The virtue of comparative analyses, especially when the analysis is limited to a single case or a few cases, is that it forces greater specificity on the researcher. (Peters 1998: 4) On the other hand the more you focus on the context and complexity the harder it will be to produce generalizations about the topic. There are many different kinds of studies that are classified as comparative. The classic debate in comparative politics is between the more quantitative statistically approach and the qualitative approach using fewer cases. In this thesis I will use the methodological approach of comparative politics to develop taxonomies and classifications schemes for the arguments put forward in the four countries that I have chosen. Taxonomies are not as elaborate as typologies but rather they may be simple listings of the major types in a class. Taxonomies assume a scheme that uses variables to classify the cases, although unlike typologies these do not involve the interaction of the variables. (Peters 1998: 16) The limited number of cases in this thesis makes it more valid to do qualitative analyses rather than a quantitative. Since the purpose is to classify arguments and to understand them in the context they are in, it is more preferable to have fewer cases. The normal assumption is that many cases make it easier to generalize whereas fewer cases make it harder. Since the purpose of the thesis is not to do generalizations it will not be a problem to only include four cases.

#### ***4.1.1 Levels of analysis***

One fundamental question for the design of comparative analysis is how to link the individual with the collectively. Countries are often assumed to be homogeneous which often not the truth is. Analysing a country from this assumption can have implications for the validity of the study if the implications are not taken into consideration. Another mistake that is often made is to assume that statements made by an individual represent the opinions of a whole nation or country. (Peters 1998: 44) Again this can be debated. If the person represents the government of the parliament then the statements can be said to officially represent the nation. On the other hand, there will always be parts of the public, which does not feel represented by their government. Comparative political analysis is heavily dependent upon the cases selected for analysis. A researcher should be able to justify the choices of cases on theoretical grounds. Without attention to the projected outcome of analysis, the choices of designs and of cases are unlikely to be the best ones. My research in this thesis is not so much to find the cause of a particular phenomenon, but rather more explanatory and trying to categorize different opinions and statements about Turkish EU membership seen in the context the statements are made. The fact that one of the categories in my comparative framework is public deals with the fact that public opinion is not always mirrored in the opinion of the politicians that represents them.

#### ***4.1.2 Constructivist Comparative Politics***

Comparative politics are often associated with a positivist position. For the purpose of my thesis this is not fully useable. I have chosen to take a closer look at different speeches made by the Heads of States in four different European countries on the same subject. It is therefore my assumption that a speech act can be an expression of real political opinions and one way to examinant the norms and political standpoints of the actor delivering the speech. Therefore the approach of Constructivist Comparative Politics is a valid and interesting way of combining the rather positivist position of comparative politics with some constructivist elements.

Constructivist Comparative Politics (CCP) makes the most basic ontological claim required for a constructivist perspective, that the world is socially constructed. Actors create the world by creating shared intersubjektive meanings through interaction in a community, but also in turn derive their identities and roles from these constructions. The real world does exist out there, but it is not entirely determined by the physical and material, rather it is socially constructed by shared meanings and understandings. CCP can be distinguished from much of comparative work

by its differing methodological and analytic positions. CCP is convinced of the value of intersubjectivism for understanding actors and action and fully incorporate interpretivist elements such as identity, culture, norms, principals and new understandings of casual relationships in the world. Given constructivism's emphasis on the social, it seems advisable to adopt a view of the world of countries as a global system of overlapping webs of social interaction and politics. (Green 2002: 47) As with most other motivations of political action there is often only indirect evidence of the existence of a true political meaning. Evidence for the existence of norms can be found in the discourse addressing a particular behaviour, i.e. rhetoric. (Björkdahl 2002: 13) It is important to stress that CCP still relay on the fundamental purpose of Comparative Politics being comparison. Normally the constructivist approach is used when conducting a case study but the CCP approach believes that it is better to look at more cases because it allows us to know more about reality. The purpose of using CCP as a tool for explaining how it is possible to examine and compare speech-acts is very relevant in this thesis but it is as I explained earlier mostly used to clarify the connection between speech-acts the logic of comparison.

## **4.2 Critique of the comparative method**

Critiques of the comparative approach often point to the many flaws and insurmountable intellectual objections. Scholar such as Peters believes that on one hand the apparent hopelessness is very real, but yet it is no reason not to carry on doing comparative politics. No matter what approach you chose for conducting your research, it will have some real and important problems. However the weaknesses do not mean that we should not choose it. On the other hand it means that we need to be aware of the strengths and weaknesses of each candidate method and then be wary of the results the analysis may give us. This allows us to compensate for the problems in the interpretation and in the analysis. (Peters 1998: 22)

### ***4.2.1 Discussion of the general validity and reliability of the Thesis***

Reliability means dependability or consistency and often relate to the empirical material in a qualitative research study. There are many ways of making sure that the reliability of the empirical material is okay. One way is to gather information from different sources and then comparing the results to se if they match. (Neuman 2000: 170) In this thesis I could have complimented my empirical material with interviews to further strengthen the reliability. Since I

am looking at the opinions of the heads of states in four EU member-states this could pose some problems. It would have been extremely difficult to be able to get an interview with neither Merkel, Blair, Chirac nor Fogh. Therefore I have relied on official documents take from the official homepages of the four heads of state which I define as being reliable.

Validity is the simple question of whether we are measuring what we think we are measuring, or whether the observations we make are a function of other factors not included in the analysis. In natural science the experimental design is supposed to solve those problems but the social scientists rarely have the luxury of conducting true experimental research. There is a range of things to do to make sure the overall validity of this thesis is okay but it is important to distinguish between internal validity, meaning that there is no errors internal to the research design, and external validity, meaning that results of the research is applicable to other settings and situations. (Neuman 2000: 172)

There are several sources of invalidity in comparative politics. One is history. While researchers are observing a case, there may be a number of other changes going on around them that are impacting the observations being made. (Peters 1998: 49) History is a very real validity problem to my thesis. Over time the arguments put forward regarding Turkey's bid for EU membership have changed in some of the EU member-sates. One way of avoiding the history pit fall is to put the comparative research in to a timeframe – meaning limiting it to a certain time period. In this thesis the time aspect is interesting in regards to the fact that some heads of state have changed their minds about Turkey over time, or governments have changed and thereby opinions. Therefore the interesting aspect is to look at specific actor's arguments in a specific time period put into the context they are to be understood. The purpose is therefore to systematically structure the arguments about Turkey as they are put forward and not to understand why they are put forward as they are. This purpose allows us not to end up in the 'history pitfall' as would have been the case if the purpose had been to understand the arguments. Another source of invalidity is selection bias, which I will discuss in the text chapter regarding the empirical material.

### **4.3 Political Reasoning - Vedung**

To gain a deeper understanding of political arguments and reasoning I will in this section take a closer look at Vedung thoughts on the subject. The method of rational assessment is presented by

Vedung (1982). The analysis, which Vedung calls a content-oriented analysis of political messages, offers a systematic examination of political messages, since rational assessment of political messages take ‘a close look at claims put forward in political discussions and reasons offered to sustain or weaken these claims.

Vedung offers a profound discussion of different kinds of interpretations. One of these is systematic interpretation, which offers some remarks that are useful for the analyses in my thesis. He distinguishes the systematic interpretation from the literal one, the latter only focuses on the actual formulations of a message. The literal interpretation tries to work out the surface meaning, without taking the context into account. It is obvious that this kind of interpretation is not enough for the purpose of this thesis. The literal interpretation is of course necessary in all kinds of interpretations, but it has to be complemented, for instance with ‘a systematic interpretation’. The basic idea of systematic interpretation is, that ‘the meaning of a message can be disentangled if it is placed into a larger context or system to which it belongs.’ In order to reveal the correct meaning we have to take the theoretical context into account: words and expressions can have different meanings in different contexts, and accordingly, we have to examine the context of the message. Vedung stresses, that this context may also be cultural. The meaning of the same word or expression may differ between two different cultures. The systematic method allows us to get at latent meanings of much more comprehensive and complex kind than a purely linguistic analysis. (Vedung 1982: 103) Pure systematic interpretation is very useful in describing political messages and can be used to arrive at a more and deeper possible and reasonable interpretation and in order to indicate the most reasonable interpretation.

#### **4.4 Comparative research design**

When conducting a comparative analysis of different arguments it is important that the categories, which you decide to divide the argument into, are well chosen. After having read through all the speeches and a whole range of scientific and newspaper articles I have chosen the following categories for my analysis: Security arguments, normative, cultural and religious arguments, human rights arguments and economic and integration arguments. The categories have been chosen from the notion that these arguments are the most used, but I also do believe that they more or less cover the debate about Turkey’s bid for EU membership. The arguments from the different countries will be divided into the categories and described in the context they are to be understood in. This means that I will very shortly try to explain why the head of state

argue in such a way not for the sake of the explanation, but to gain a deeper understanding of the arguments themselves. The whole purpose of systematically categorizing the arguments is to structure the debate about Turkey's bid for EU membership and thereby gaining a wider understanding of how the debate is structured in different countries. The idea is to create clarity and understanding.

#### **4.5 Discussion of the methodological choices**

Since I have chosen to combine constructivist comparative politics with Vedung's thoughts on political reasoning I will briefly discuss these choices to explain how they methodologically work together. Comparative politics often have a rational starting point, meaning that it is possible to study the real world, and through comparison make rational generalizations about it. The constructivist comparative politics have more or less the same foundation but on top of this they put a believe that norms are real and worth studying. In today's social science this is not a propostius claim to put forward, on the contrary many scholars, including some neo-positivists do also believe that norms are a very real part of the social world and in one way or the other constrain actors. Vedung's book 'Political Reasoning' could also be said to have a rational neo-positivistic foundation. He's book is written in 1982 before the constructivist wave but many of his thoughts are along the lines of some constructivist. In discourse analysis and hermeneutic text analysis the main thoughts are that our understanding of the world goes through the language, through discourses. In this thesis the constructivist element, as I have explained earlier, is very limited. The main reason for incorporating it is to explain how a written text or a spoken word can be an expression of true political meaning. Therefore I do not use a constructivist approach, I have just incorporated some of the constructivist elements into my theoretical framework and therefore I find it legitimate to use the different theoretical elements in my comparative framework.

##### ***4.5.1 Theoretical and methodological choices and rejections***

When doing scientific research it is important to clarify the choices you make throughout you work. I have chosen to use the methodological framework of constructivist comparative politics combined with Vedung's thoughts on political reasoning. Other methods of conducting an analytical text analyses does exist and perhaps the most well known would be the Discourse-analyses as developed by Fairclough and Laclau & Mouffe. A discourse analysis has its roots in



the structuralistic and post-structuralistick understanding of the language. The Meta theoretical starting point is that our understanding of the world only exists through the language. One of the main assumptions is that there exists one dominating discourse in each policy area. I do not believe that discourse-analyses would have been the best choice to answer my research-puzzle. First of all I do not believe that there exists only one prevailing discourse about Turkey's bid for EU membership but many. Therefore the discourse-analyses approach would be insufficient in categorizing the arguments put forward by the heads of states in the countries I have chosen for analyses.

Another way of looking at interpretation is to use the social scientific hermeneutics approach. Its distinguishing feature, as compared to conventional qualitative analysis, is its attempt to look beyond/beneath the superficial content of texts and thus to discover their 'deep structure', that is their 'hidden meaning' (Hitzler/Honer 1997: 23). At its core is the distinction between the manifest content of a text, that is its literal meaning, and a deeper level of the production of meaning 'between the lines', the latent content of a text, is made. In contrast to classical hermeneutics, 'social scientific hermeneutics' does not try to find out the intended meaning of a text, namely what the author really meant. To 'social scientific hermeneutics' meaning is produced independently from subjective intentions. The speaker is not necessarily aware or in control of the meaning he/she produces. Like the discourse analysis approach the hermeneutic approach assumes that the actor is not rational and therefore not aware of the meanings they create. Since I have more of a rational choice perception of actors then the more constructivist perception the hermeneutic approach would not be suitable for my analysis.

#### **4.6 Summary**

In this chapter I have presented my research method and methodological thoughts and discussions. The purpose has been to avoid some of the pit-falls of using a comparative research design and to make sure that my methodological choices do not clash. I have also presented Vedung's thoughts on political reasoning and in the following chapters I will especially use his concept of systematic interpretation. The chapter on research method may seem long compared to the rest of the thesis, but it is my believe that well discussed methodological choices are the very base of any piece of scientific work. In the next chapter I will present my empirical material and discuss the selection process and the invalidity it may cause.

## **5.0 Empirical material**

In this section I will present my empirical material and briefly explain how I have worked with the material and which implications this could have for the validity of my thesis. As mentioned before the purpose of the thesis is to systematically organizing the arguments put forward by heads of state of the member-states since it is my assumption that these arguments represents the official opinions of the country. Selection bias is a very real source of invalidity that may occur in a thesis like this. There is a natural bias in comparative research arising from the tendency to select the case the researcher knows best. The preference for familiar cases can present severe problems. The cases, which are most familiar, are not always the best for the purpose of the research you are conducting. The critique is often related to small qualitative studies where the selection of cases are often more vital to the outcome. To avoid this problem it is important to argue for the choices of empirical material that you make. (Peters 1998: 51ff)

I have decided to look at the speeches and interviews of the heads of state of four EU member-states; Britain, France, Germany and Denmark. This choice is made on the basis of these four countries involvement in former enlargements as described by Müftüler-Bac & McLaren. Therefore it is my assumption that these countries will have strong opinions regarding Turkey's bid for EU membership. I will shortly describe the four countries involvement in the past enlargement so as to gain a great understanding of their positions. Müftüler-Bac & McLaren use the term Patron-client relationship to describe how an old member-state can help a non-member state in their pursuit for membership and the division they use in their analyses is more or less the same, as I will use.

### **5.1 Presentation of speeches**

Three out of the four countries that I have chosen as my empirical material has not changed their Head of State in the last 6 years. Only Germany has a new chancellor, Merkel, since 2006. Therefore I will briefly explain the change in the German view on Turkey's bid for EU membership. The social democratic wave affecting all major countries in Europe, and in Germany in particular, at the end of the 1990s favoured a concept of Europe that was closer to the idea of multicultural citizenship and one that where more sensitive to the European aspiration of Turkey. (Font 2006: 206) Former German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer supported Turkish membership of the EU. He believed that Turkey would give Europe the weight, the means and the relevance to become a global actor. (Le Gloannec 2006: 271) Helmut Kohl from

the CDU (Christlich Demokratische Union) was not pro Turkish EU membership as the party he represented was not. By the Helsinki summit in 1999 the German government had changed and the SPD (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands) and Gerhard Schroeder were now in power. During their election campaign the SPD stressed the need of resolving Germany's Turkish problem and the recognition of dual citizenship. (Müftüler-Bac & McLaren 2003: 23) Indeed, Gerhard Schroeder, in a sense, began functioning like a patron for Turkey almost immediately after coming to power in Germany. Under the Kohl administration, the German vision of an ideal Europe was one that excluded Turkey, whereas Schroeder's ideal Europe was one that included Turkey. (Müftüler-Bac & McLaren 2003: 25) This change in political standpoint is a clear sign that it is national preferences of the member-state that determine EU policy, especially those of the Big Three (Britain, France and Germany) (Müftüler-Bac & McLaren 2003: 24) The German change probably occurred as a result of a change in the definition of what constituted a collective identity. (Müftüler-Bac & McLaren 2003: 26) With Merkel and CDU back in power the German attitude towards Turkey has changed once more.

Germany supported Poland in its efforts to obtain EU membership, perhaps to pay Poland back for past atrocities committed there but also for strategic reasons. Germany also pushed hard for the inclusion of Hungary and the Czech Republic, again for the purpose of increasing Germany's sense of security. The strong support for these countries can be explained with what Sjørusen refers to as a 'sense of kinship-based duty', which she argues, is lacking in the Turkish case. (Müftüler-Bac & McLaren 2003: 22) It has been very difficult to find a speech by the German chancellor where she mentions Turkey. Since the chancellor is reluctant in her attitude towards Turkey the speeches I have found mirror this.

The patron-client relationship between France and Romania was strongly motivated by need for a relatively large ally to counter the growing weight of the central European contingent within the European Union and maintain control over Germany's ever increasing political power. (Müftüler-Bac & McLaren 2002: 22) As with the German chancellor, it has not been easy to find a speech made by the president Chirac in English where he mentions Turkey. The one that I could find was in French but since my French abilities do not allow me to fully understand the text I decided to use an interview with the president instead. It could be debated if a speech and an interview is too different to compare. It is my assumption that as long as they portray political meanings they are compatible. I am well aware of the presidential elections that just took place I

Franc and therefore I will use both statements from Jacques Chirac and the newly elected president Sarkozy.

The Nordic countries were the first to press for the inclusion of the Baltic States as EU candidates. Denmark was in fact, the only Nordic state that was an EU member when the Baltic countries applied for membership and Denmark alone began convincing the other EU members that the Baltic States should indeed be included in the candidate list. When Sweden and Finland joined the EU, they strongly supported Denmark's position, and it is primarily because the Baltic States had so many advocates from within the EU that they were given candidacy status. (Müftüler-Bac & McLaren 2002: 22) The Danish Prime Minister has been very active in the press writing debate articles. I have chosen to take a closer look at one such article and two speeches. I have chosen two speeches because the statements on Turkey in both speeches is very limited. The speeches and the article are both in Danish but I have chosen to translate the quotes which I use in the thesis into English.

Britain is often being accused of being a warm advocate for widening instead of deepening the European integration. The most likely explanation for this would properly be the reluctant attitude towards the European cooperation that the British people often express. Britain has not had a client candidate country in past enlargements as the other countries had. The speeches made by the British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, in both so called door-step press conferences made after the Copenhagen Summit in 2002 and during the Dutch presidency in 2004. This approach allows the journalist to ask the PM questions and therefore the opinions on Turkey, is more notable than in some of the other speeches.

## 6.0 Analyses

Officially the question of whether or not Turkey will become a member of the EU depends upon the developments internally in the country. In reality there has been no doubt that Turkey is a special case, where the results of the negotiations in the end also will depend upon the general public opinion in Europe. By looking closer at the general debate and the most important arguments put forward in the debate on Turkish EU membership, it will be possible to gain a greater understanding of what in the end might be the deciding factor. The fact that Turkey is a Muslim country makes the debate about the negotiations different from previous enlargement rounds. Some see the religious fact as a threat others as a possibility of creating stability in Europe. The religious dimension would let alone mean that the negotiations will be more than just bureaucratic. (Sørensen & Boel 2005: 264)

In this section of the thesis I will systematically structure the arguments put forward in the debate regarding Turkey's bid for EU membership. I will use the categories that I presented in the section on research design. Along the lines of Vedung, I will present the arguments and then try to understand them in the context they are to be understood, meaning I will briefly try to understand and explain why each Head of State argues the way they do. I do this to gain a deeper understanding of arguments, which in return will help me to structure and understand them.

### 6.1 Security arguments

*"And I think this will increase the security and prosperity of Europe, of Turkey, of the wider world and region and that is why I think it is important." (Blair 2004)*

*"It's obvious that when it comes to security, stability and peace, having this (Turkey) large entity on our doorstep is absolutely positive. Rejecting it would certainly present a risk of instability, a risk of insecurity on our borders that must certainly be avoided." (Chirac 2004)*

The European Commission feels that EU enlargement to include Turkey would improve the security of the EU borders, especially with regard to the fight against illegal immigration and organized crime. Moreover, there is broad agreement in the EU on the importance of Turkey as an energy bridge between Central Asia and Europe and that being a member of the EU would increase EU control over oil and gas in the region. (Font 2006: 204) The French President Jacques Chirac and the British Prime Minister Tony Blair both use the security argument when

speaking about Turkish accession to the EU but for two very different reasons. The fact that Turkey is a member of NATO, and the very interesting geo-strategically placing of the country, makes the security argument very apparent. Chirac's arguments is very straightforward and puts emphasis on the important strategic position of Turkey, both cultural and geographically.

*"I would say that it is in our interest for it (Turkey) to lean toward Europe, toward our values or concepts of human rights, peace and democracy, and not toward Asia where it would be liable to take another path that probably generates instability or insecurity in Europe."* (Chirac 2004)

The difference between Blair and Chirac is that in connection with the security arguments Blair uses more normative arguments to say that the alleged clash of civilizations, which scholars such as Huntington would like us to believe is inevitable, can be avoided with Turkish EU membership.

*"The fact that Europe can welcome in Turkey and begin the process of negotiations for them to become a full member of the European Union is a historic event, it shows that those who believe there is some fundamental clash of civilisations between Christian and Muslim are actually wrong, that we can work together, that we can cooperate together, and I think that is of fundamental importance for the future peace and prosperity of my country."* (Blair 2004)

This perception of a connection between security and Turkish EU membership is one of the most common used arguments in the debate. But connecting it to more normative arguments is only done by Blair and shows how he in many ways believe in a common European identity that does not exclude Turkey and thereby Islam as the German perception of European identity often does.

Another way of looking at the British pro-Turkey standpoint is from a more strategically perception. During the Copenhagen summit in 2002 the Atlantist coalition, led by the British government proposed starting accession negotiations in January 2004. One reason was a belief that an unconditional start to accession talks could be a pay-off to Ankara in exchange for permission to fly over Turkish air space during the military intervention in Iraq that was already planned for the immediate future. Another reason was that Turkey's accession to the EU could dilute aspiration for European integration. (Font 2006: 208) The stable policy choices of Britain with the US have imposed Britain to follow US goals in the region or global, including Turkey. This is one of the main reasons why Britain is expected to support Turkish membership, in case of security matters. (Sahiner 2005)

*“...The reason why I think it is so important is that in a world where increasingly the issue is to do with whether it is international terrorism, global security, the international economy, in a world where increasingly those issues can only be dealt with by nations moving together, then the very fact that we are extending the borders of the European Union is a demonstration that Europe has the capability of reaching out into parts of the world that, yes, form a different part of the world from notions of Europe that we have had up until now, and that is precisely why I say this is such a historic movement” (Blair 2002)*

Turkey is becoming one of the most important strategic partners in the region because of its strong military capability and its geopolitical launching. Until Britain has decided to stop its strategic partnership with the US or until the US has stopped to support Turkey’s membership bid, it appears that Britain will be supporting Turkey’s accession to the Union. (Sahiner 2005)

*“...I think it is of profound importance for Europe, for this region, for the wider global stability, that Turkey is welcomed into the European Union.” (Blair 2002)*

The German chancellor Merkel has not used any security related arguments in the debate on Turkey’s bid for EU membership. The reason for this could be the Chancellors somewhat reluctant attitude towards Turkey which is founded in the official policy of her party CDU. The former German chancellor Schroeder, on the other hand, used the security arguments over and over again. Joschka Fischer, the former German minister of foreign affairs, compared Turkey entry into the EU with a kind of D-day in connecting to terrorism and it was his believe that Turkish EU membership would be the most positive answer to changeless that terrorism pose. With the CDU in power the argumentation has completely changed. Just before the EC meeting in December 2004 the CDU in Germany presented a proposal to the European-parliament arguing that Turkish EU membership would enhance the risk of terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism in Europe. (Sørensen & Boel 2005: 260)

## **6.2 Normative, cultural and religious arguments**

*“Again I think a few years ago people would have thought that very difficult to do, indeed a few weeks ago people might well have doubted whether we would be able to give such a firm date to Turkey. But we can and it is a huge demonstration of our confidence in the new Turkey that is taking shape and will eventually take its place in the family of the European Union.” (Blair 2002)*

No other candidate country has been as unpopular as Turkey. The greatest scepticism seems to be found in the countries with large Turkish populations and seams to be rooted in a fear for cultural differences such as religion, values and way of life. (Sørensen & Boel 2005: 278) In

terms of self-definition, the Spanish and Portuguese emerged as the least racist whereas the Austrians, Belgians, Danes and Germans emerged as the most racist. (Müftüler-Bac 2002: 90) The Christian Democrats in Germany who won the national elections 1 September 2006, oppose Turkey's entry into the Union offering Turkey instead a 'privileged association' short of full membership. This is also the position of the European People's Party, the umbrella organization of Christian Democrats and centre-right parties from all member countries of the European Union, which holds the largest number of seats of any political bloc in the European Parliament. (Casanova 2006: 235)

At the time of the Luxembourg Summit the CDU with Helmut Kohl was in power in Germany. The preferences of the German government regarding the Turkish candidacy at the time were to a large extent shaped by the perception of vast differences between European and Turkish cultures. Germany's insistence on more supranational control over immigration also reflects its attitude towards Turkey, which traditionally provided the German economy with an influx of migrant workers. Since immigration is a priority issue for Germany, it is not too far fetched to claim that Germany has serious reservations about Turkish membership owing to migration issues. Despite arguing in favour of giving Turkey a concrete membership perspective, Schroeder and Joshua Fischer displayed doubts about the cultural match. They continually referred to Turkey as an Islamic country; they justified their policies of giving Turkey a prospect of membership as a means to fight Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism and thus – willingly or not connected Turkey not only to Islam, but also to fundamentalism and terrorism. (Hülse 2006: 312) In the German debate the religious arguments have been very apparent. The former German chancellor Kohl dismissed the thought of Turkish EU membership by referring to the EU as a Christian empire. (Sørensen & Boel 2005: 256)

After the Luxembourg summit the Turkish Prime Minister Yilmaz complained that the EU was erecting a 'new cultural Berlin wall'. He held Germany responsible for not granting the longed-for candidate status to Turkey, but only to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, he declared that Germany was pursuing once again a *Lebensraumpolitik*. German politicians in turn, were outraged and Turkey-EU relations fell to an all-time low. (Hülse 2006: 316) After the European Council meeting in 2004 a heated debate focusing once again on religious culture and on the benefits of accepting Turkey as a member of the EU dominated the agenda. The debate in relation to the Christian religion was closely connected to the negotiations on the Constitutional Treaty. Following intense debate the EU agreed not to include any explicit references to



Christian religion. However the resolution did not calm the controversy over Turkey's accession. The French president Chirac has used the religious argument, but here it seems to be connected to the important security arguments. The fact that the now former French president uses the religious aspect as a positive thing could be related to the large Muslim population in France but also shows the gap between the population, who is afraid for the cultural differences and the president.

*“Let's have respect for others. Turkey is a secular country. Secularism was decreed in Turkey in 1923. It's a secular country that respects other religions, just as we respect other religions. So let leave it at that, please. Let's not provoke clashes of this nature. We have everything to lose, beginning with our dignity.”* (Chirac 2004)

Tony Blair defines Europe as a collection of values of solidarity between nations and people, not a common market but a common political space in which the citizens of Europe live. Turkey will be the key element because it has already been proved that the deal with Turkey undermines the clash between civilizations which particularly refers to the West and Islam confrontation. (Sahiner 2005)

*“But the important thing is that we are stating as a fundamental principle that the fact that Turkey is a Muslim country does not mean it should be barred from the European Union; on the contrary, if it fulfils the same principles of democracy and human rights then Muslim and Christians can work together, and that is a very, very important signal right across the world at the moment, and particularly important I think in the light of events of recent years.”* (Blair 2004)

The main difference between Britain and the other member states are that Tony Blair wishes to create a pro-European ideology. Turkey has to be a part of Europe because Europe needs a revision in order to prevent it from falling into nationalism and xenophobia. (Sahiner 2005) For the British politicians, Europe is a political project rather than a Christian club and it has to act according to its future goals.

*“I believe that it is again of huge importance for Turkey, for Europe and indeed for Britain. Turkey is a country with a long and proud history and it is also a country that is a Muslim country too. And all those people who thought that the European Union couldn't reach out in this way, I think we have shown that we can.”* (Blair 2002)

Before the Copenhagen summit in 2002, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing the former French president warned the EU heads of State against accepting Turkey. He believed that Turkey was not a European country and that they had a different way of life all together. (Sørensen & Boel 2005:

258) In 2004 d'Estaing viewed his opinions once again when he stated that the institutional setup in the Constitutional Treaty could not contain Turkey (Sørensen & Boel 2005: 260)

### **6.3 Human rights and democracy arguments**

*“It’s also a way of ensuring that this (Turkey) on our doorstep will definitively consolidate the progress it has made and must continue to make in the areas of democracy, freedoms, human rights, sexual equality, religious freedom, the respect for minority rights, etc.” (Chirac 2004)*

Too many in the EU Turkey’s accession would imply the geographical extension of democracy and fundamental human rights. Moreover the democratic package would probably include a united Cyprus and an acceptable solution for the Kurdish minority. However some voices within the EU, coming from different member-states, party ranks and institutional representatives, strongly believe there is little room for democracy in Muslim societies. (Font 2006: 204) The human rights arguments are often used to illustrate the positive effect the perspective of EU membership can create. The late Swedish minister of foreign affairs Anna Lind was in the beginning opposed to the idea of Turkish membership but soon realized the positive effect the process had of the reform process in Turkey especially in regards to human rights. This is a notable difference from the Danish perspective. Not many if any Danish politicians have used the positive and stabilizing effect of the negotiations to talk about Turkey in positive terms.

In the empirical material I have collected the arguments regarding human rights are almost not apparent. The former French president Chirac refers to the positive effect the perspective of membership has on different policy areas among them human rights. The arguments are all related to security in one way or the other and it is clear that Chirac sees the positive development in human rights as a means of getting Turkey to lean towards Europe and not Asia thereby securing the stability of the region.

*“I would say that it is in our interest for it (Turkey) to lean toward Europe, toward our values or concepts of human rights, peace and democracy, and not toward Asia where it would be liable to take another path that probably generates instability or insecurity in Europe.” (Chirac 2004)*

Many of the member states such as the Benelux and Nordic countries has been mildly opposed due to concerns regarding deepening the EU and the problems in Turkish democratisation. (Müftüler-Bac & McLaren 2002: 25)

## 6.4 Economic, integration and public opinion arguments

*“It is a fact that many Europeans are uncertain of Turkish EU membership perspective and we as responsible politician has to respond to this and be prepared to discuss it honest and openly” (Fogh)*

In 2002 64 percent of the French public was against Turkish membership (Font 2006: 208) and to appease the ‘no’ voters in France and to gain their support for the Constitutional Treaty, the French President Jacques Chirac and his party promised French voters back in 2005 that the Turkish accession, if and when it came to pass, would be subject to a referendum among the French population. (Benhabib & Isiksel 2006: 218) The French attitude towards Turkey has changed over time so as to keep up with public opinion. At the 2002 Copenhagen summit, the French and German governments proposed a middle ground formula for Turkish membership and both maintained ambiguous and unenthusiastic positions regarding Turkey’s candidacy, perhaps because neither was blind to public opinion at home (Font 2006: 208) and the newly elected French president has kept up with that line.

The newly elected French president Nicholas Sarkozy made a comment about Turkey’s EU bid after his official nomination in the party congress. He stated that ‘I want to say that Europe must give itself borders, that not all countries have a vocation to become members of Europe, beginning with Turkey, which has no place inside the European Union’. In France where public opinion was overwhelmingly critical of Turkey becoming a member, controversy became especially intense after Nicholas Sarkozy was elected as the new president of the governing party. In the weeks before the summit Jacques Chirac, who was not enthusiastically supportive of the Turkish cause, suggested the possibility of adopting a ‘third’ way by granting Turkey special partnership status and holding a referendum on Turkish membership. (Font 2006: 210)

The Danish debate about Turkish EU membership is often connected to the debate on immigration. The Danish Peoples Party picked up on the public opinion regarding Turkey and has been extremely critical ever since. The Danish Prime-minister Anders Fogh is officially pro Turkish EU membership but has at several occasions questioned the capacity of the EU to engage in further enlargements.

*“I believe that we have to discuss the future enlargements of the EU. We have to acknowledge that there is a limited to how big the EU can get, and how fast the process can go, if the EU has to keep its coherence” (Fogh 2004)*

Anders Fogh is also very aware of the public opinion, not just in Denmark, but also in the hole of Europe. The debate about the Constitutional Treaty in Denmark was in many ways wrongly connected to the debate about Turkey and again to immigration and the Danish Prime-minister has never been blind to that fact. On the other hand it seems that Fogh would rather not discuss the subject as honestly and openly as he has promised. The reason for this could be that Fogh before he became Prime Minister was very critical if not opposed to Turkish EU membership.

*“I can not imagine Turkey as a member of the EU. Political, economical and cultural the country we be the odd one out in the cooperation and Turkish membership would make the Union very unstable. Turkish membership would expand EU boundaries to Iran and Iraq and by that we would be entering the unstable area of the Middle East. (Fogh 2000: 226)*

After becoming Prime Minister Fogh toned down the rhetoric and is no longer advocating not granting Turkey EU membership but he still questions the process but now in a more discreet way.

*“In December 2006 the European heads of states suspended the negotiations with Turkey on several issues, because Turkey is still to willing to acknowledge Cypress as an independent state. In a best case scenario Turkish membership has a very long perspective and therefore not something we need to discuss or agree upon any time soon.” (Fogh 2006)*

The immigration argument seems to be very apparent in the debate especially in countries such as Denmark and Germany. German Christian Democrats perceive massive influxes of Turkish workers into Germany as a threat in three ways: wages and employment could be negatively affected; new Turkish Germans could become SPD and Green Party voters, as 500.000 Turkish German citizens were in the 2002 elections; Turkish mass migration would accentuate the cultural and religious differences among Europeans. (Font 2006: 204) Taking theses considerations in to account it is interesting that many of the Turks that live in these countries was invited as guest workers in the 1970s and back then was looked upon as an asset to the countries they came to. Another interesting spin on the argument is that some scholars believe that Turkish EU membership will make it more realistic for the EU to live up to the goals put forward in the Lissabon-strategy thereby making the EU the most competitive and knowledge based economy in the world. (Sørensen & Boel 2205: 271) If the negotiations on membership with Turkey come to a stop there would be a serious risk of immigration from Turkey to the rest of Europe. Financial speaking a stop in the negotiations would lead to lower growth and higher unemployment in Turkey thereby making it more attractive for Turks to immigrate towards Europe. On the other hand if the negotiations were successfully ended then the economic

opportunities would arise in Turkey and make it more attractive to stay put. Enlargements with Spain, Portugal and Greece has shown that membership are more or less bound to lead to economic growth. (Sørensen & Boel 2005: 270)

Having Turkey, as a new member would provide European companies with new investment opportunities provide millions of new consumers as Turkish income levels would come closer to those of the other member states and ultimately improve European competitiveness in the world economy. The expected long-term economic pay-off of EU enlargement must not be forgotten. However economic benefits would be unequally distributed among member-states and would take time to come into effect. Moreover, an eventual partnership with Turkey instead of membership could provide much of the same expected economic benefits for the member-states. (Font 2006: 203) The economic arguments are very important in the British debate on Turkey's bid for EU membership. In the British EU vision a market-based community is very central. In many ways it would be easier to fit Turkey in to this vision compared to the federal one. The massive improvements in the Turkish economy in recent years support the British argument. The Mediterranean countries are often more positive towards Turkey do to there economic involvement then the Scandinavian countries who does very little trade with Turkey. (Sørensen & Boel 2005: 272)

The consequences for the integration process that Turkish EU membership would create are mostly said to be lack of further deep integration. The British Prime Ministers have a tradition of being positive towards Turkeys bid for EU membership. The former Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher was known as a strong supporter of Turgut Özals and Tony Blair has followed in her footsteps. The main reason for this is that especially Thatcher wanted to slow down the process of deep integration by widening the integration process instead. From a French perspective this argument would be used to oppose Turkish EU membership. Sarkozy has touched upon this by saying that "The more we are the less integrated we are. The less integrated the weaker we are". The argument behind is that Turkish membership would make it difficult to continue the deep integration because the cooperation will water out the union both geographical and institutional. If we look back on the history of past enlargements the deep integration has taken place after the process, because it was needed to make the cooperation work. (Sørensen & Boel 2005: 272)

## 7.0 Conclusion

The arguments put forward regarding Turkey's bid for EU membership are many and diverse. The purpose of this thesis has been to systematically structure the arguments so as to gain a deeper understanding of them. The results of the negotiations with Turkey will in the end also depend upon the general public opinion in Europe. When you understand the arguments and the context they exist in it will perhaps give us an opportunity to look in to the future and determine which arguments in the end might be the deciding factor. In the analysis part of the thesis I have structured the arguments into four categories. It is very interesting that the way the four Heads of State argue about Turkey's bid for EU membership is very different. In the analyses I divided the arguments into categories but to answer my research puzzle I will look at each country separately and describe how the Heads of State in each country argue.

The British arguments are often related to security. It is clear that the stability of the Middle East, from a British perspective, is very important. The interesting thing is that the arguments, related to security, is often also connected to more normative arguments. The clash of civilisations or trying to hinder the clash of civilisations is a goal in its self for the British Prime Minister. In the British perspective the purpose of further enlargements is to hinder instability and to create a greater European civilisation, which also consists of Turkey. Blair does not use the public opinion argument, which is very apparent in the other three countries. I find that fact very interesting since the British people are some of the most euro-sceptic and not very positive towards Turkish EU membership. As mentioned before the Prime Ministers very positive attitude towards Turkey could be explained by the close relationship Blair has with the American President George W. Bush. The US has traditionally been very positive towards the perspective of Turkish EU membership and the President has on several occasions called up the Council Presidency of the council to try and pressure the EU into beginning the negotiations talks.

The French arguments are a bit harder to summarize than the British. The French president Jacques Chirac was to begin with fairly positive towards the perspective of Turkish EU membership but he soon realized that the French people did not share his enthusiasm. In connection with the debate about the constitutional treaty the French president sensed that the French people were very sceptic especially towards further enlargements and therefore he promised the people a referendum on Turkish membership. The newly elected President Sarkozy continues along these lines and holds on to the promise of having a referendum. One reason for

the somewhat negative attitude of the French people is the fear of increased immigration. Chirac has also used the security arguments to justify expanding the cooperation to Turkey. The differences between him and Blair is though that he does not connect the security arguments to the more normative ones instead he focuses on the purely security element of accepting Turkey as a new member.

The Danish debate about Turkey has in many ways been connected to the national immigration debate. Anders Fogh Rasmussen has never been a strong believer in the benefits of accepting Turkey in to the European community. Before he became Prime Minister he published a book in which he airs his concerns regarding Turkey. After becoming Prime Minister Fogh has toned down these concerns and is now acting as the patron of the public opinion saying over and over again that we need to have an open and honest discussion about Turkey. The more utility based arguments such as economic and security is not used by Fogh. Neither are the more normative ones.

The German chancellor Merkel is probably best know for her wish of granting Turkey a privileged relationship to the EU instead of full membership. It is very interesting to look at the German arguments about Turkey's bid for EU membership and how they are closely connected to the policy of the party in power. The German CDU has always been against Turkey becoming a member and has worked intensively one incorporating Christian values into the Constitutional Treaty, a mission they did not succeed in fulfilling. Merkel has though promised to keep the promise that the former chancellor Schröder gave Turkey in December 2004. The interesting thing is that Schröder acted as kind of a patron for Turkey and together with the former minister of foreign affairs, Fischer, he was one of the warmest advocates for Turkish EU membership. For Merkel Turkey became one of the hot potatoes during the election campaign in 2006 and she voiced her concerns of the negative consequences that she believed Turkish membership would have for the European cooperation.

The purpose of the conclusion part of a thesis is to make sure that I have answered the research puzzle I put forward in the beginning being *“How are the arguments regarding Turkey's bid for EU membership structured in the member-states and is the rhetoric used different in each country “*. The first part of the research puzzle is related to the research scheme that I presented earlier. I divided the arguments in to four groups to better understand which policy areas or themes the Heads of States used in their argumentation. As I have shown it is possible to see

some connections in the way the arguments are structured. I believe that the research scheme has allowed me to gain a deeper understanding of the arguments and has allowed me to briefly explain the context they exist in.

The second part of the research puzzle relates to the differences between the arguments put forward by the Heads of States. As I have stated before the difference is very striking. One thing I have discovered is that the arguments all, in one way or the other, relates to the national policy climate of the member-states. The Danish arguments all relates to immigration, which for some years has been on top of the political agenda. In Britain the arguments relates to security which I believe should be seen in connection with the national British policy environment, which after the London bombings are very concerned with national security. Non of the German arguments are directly positive towards the notion of Turkish membership which makes sense since the German Chancellor and her party the CDU are oppose to the idea of Turkish membership. The French arguments are the most difficult to organize since they cover almost all of the categories. It is my opinion that the French debate is very driven by the national public opinion and the promise given by Chirac to hold a referendum on the issue only makes the argument even stronger.

In this thesis I have discussed some of the arguments put forward regarding Turkey's bid for EU membership. I believe that I have succeeded in categorizing the arguments and by explaining and discussing them in the context they exist, I have gained a deeper understanding of the arguments. When you understand the arguments and the context they exist in, it will perhaps give us an opportunity to look in to the future and determine which arguments in the end might be the deciding factor. It is interesting that the European politicians, only to a limited extend, have risked their prestige on defending the decision to begin negotiation talks with Turkey. Only few have actively tried to clarify which positive assets Turkey can bring to the European community, especially if the union in the future wishes to play a greater role internationally. There lays a great task in bringing the right information about the benefits of Turkish membership if the gap between the European public and their politicians should be closed. (Sørensen & Boel 2005: 278)



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## Appendix

### Speeches by Prime Minister Tony Blair

#### *Prime Minister's press conference following the EU Council in Copenhagen 16th December 2002*

Thank you all very much indeed for coming to this press conference as the summit draws to a conclusion. I am sorry I am not here with the Foreign Secretary, but there are still certain talks under way, but the main decisions are now very, very clear. And so if you will forgive me, I will do the press conference now, but I may have to go back into the meeting at a later stage.

First of all I would like to express my thanks, and indeed admiration, for the Danish Presidency. It has been a quite remarkable piece of negotiation and my heartfelt thanks and respect to the Prime Minister, Anders Poul Rasmussen (phon), who has conducted these negotiations with such skill.

I think it is fair and it is right to say that this is a summit that redefines Europe for the future. This is an extraordinary moment in Europe's history. There are decisions of enormous importance that we have taken which expand and extend the boundaries of Europe, make Europe into a different institution, make it into indeed a different union altogether for the future, and when we look back at the history of Europe over many hundreds of years, and in particular the history of the 20th century, and we reflect on all the war, and devastation, and disaster, and conflict, and then we realise that today we are reuniting Europe, I think it is truly a moment that we can be very proud of and offers us huge hope for the future.

And essentially there have been three very important decisions that we have taken. First of all, we have welcomed into the European Union the 10 countries with whom we have been conducting the accession negotiations, and those negotiations are now completed, and those 10 countries will come in on the timetable that has been set out. I think it was 2 years ago in a speech in Warsaw where I said that I hoped that we would manage to complete the accession negotiations by the end of 2002 with a view to Poland and other countries coming in in 2004.

I think it was considered somewhat forward and optimistic at the time, but I am delighted that that has indeed come about. And this issue of enlargement has long been one that we have championed within the European Union, and for that reason and for many others we are particularly pleased with it. And I congratulate too all those countries that are part of this enlargement process, for the sacrifices and changes that they have made. It is incredible to think how much they have been able to change and reform their countries, drawn by the magnet of European Union membership. And those countries that used to be under the domination of the old Soviet Union, and who are now members of NATO and people who are being welcomed into the European Union. So that is the first thing.

The second thing is again a truly historic moment in our relationship with Turkey. For 40 years Turkey has wanted to have a date set for the opening of true accession negotiations to the European Union. Today we have done that. The date is December 2004, if the criteria are met. Then, as the amended text says, those negotiations will be opened without delay. I believe that is again of huge importance for Turkey, for Europe and indeed for Britain. Turkey is a country with a long and proud history and it is also a country that is a Muslim country too. And to all those people who thought that the European Union couldn't reach out in this way, I think we have shown that we can. And I would also congratulate the new Turkish leadership in the changes that they have made to enable us to give this firm date for the opening of accession negotiations. Again I think a few years ago people would have thought that very difficult to do, indeed a few weeks ago people might well have doubted whether we would be able to give such a firm date to Turkey. But we can and it is a huge demonstration of our confidence in the new Turkey that is taking shape and will eventually take its place in the family of the European Union.

And then thirdly, after quite some delay, the European Defence Initiative has finally come about properly, because there has been the agreement between the European Union and NATO, concluded earlier today, and as a result of that we can now have the European Defence up and running, able to conduct operations in circumstances where NATO doesn't want to be engaged, and this is, so far from conflicting from NATO, now it is very, very clear and specific, that it is complementary to NATO, that it runs alongside our NATO obligations and opportunities, and it allows us in circumstances where for whatever reason NATO doesn't want to be engaged, to undertake crucial tasks on behalf of the European Union. And that again is something that we in Britain have long wanted to see. This was an initiative on European defence, started by myself and President Chirac at St Malo some years ago, it has been

very, very difficult for all the reasons that we know, but it is yet another indication incidentally of the changing Europe that is taking shape before our eyes, because many of the disagreements between Turkey and Greece over the issues here were resolved in the course of the negotiation. And I think that again gives us tremendous hope for the future.

And finally I should say a word of congratulation too to Bulgaria and Romania that have been given the date set out in our text, and they are obviously well on the way, as a result of the changes that they are making, to be members of the European Union. So these summits can be often, and need often to be, painstaking and detailed negotiations about financial matters in the European Union, and of course financial matters played a significant part in this, of course they did, but I think the fact that we have today closed the accession negotiations with 10 countries coming into the European Union, expanding the European Union to 25, the fact that we have given a date for the opening of accession negotiations to the European Union for Turkey - something we have waited 40 years to achieve - and the fact that we have a European Defence Initiative that is now able to be up and running and functioning in the way that we want, I think these three achievements are enormous and have well repaid all the effort.

**Question:**

Prime Minister, did you never reflect in the course of these negotiations that in expanding Europe quite so far, you may be collectively creating something that is simply ungovernable? And if I may secondly, to what extent do you regard Turkey really as a European country? It may have a long and proud history, but it is not European.

**Prime Minister:**

Well those are two interesting questions. The first thing is that Europe is expanding. Instead of being 15 countries, we are going to be 25. That will mean fundamental changes in the way that Europe works. This will be from now on in a fundamentally different Europe, it has to be, because of the 10 that are joining, because Bulgaria and Romania will join them, and because of course of Turkey joining the European Union. And in answer to the second point, I think that it is of profound importance for Europe, for this region, for the wider global stability, that Turkey is welcomed into the European Union. The reason why we in Britain have championed Turkey's membership, on exactly the same criteria as everyone else, Turkey is not seeking special privileges, it is not seeking special rules, it will come into the club on the same rules as everyone else, the reason why I think it is so important is that in a world where increasingly the issue is to do with whether it is international terrorism, global security, the international economy, in a world where increasingly those issues can only be dealt with by nations moving together, then the very fact that we are extending the borders of the European Union is a demonstration that Europe has the capability of reaching out into parts of the world that, yes, form a different part of the world from the notions of Europe that we have had up until now, and that is precisely why I say this is such an historic moment.

**Question**

You said twice at this summit, for reasons that we all understand, that you think it is time to move on. But as you know, people will read, and hear, and watch more stories about you and your family in the days to come. You have never actually said what lessons you and your government have learnt from this whole fortnight, your wife has, but I wonder if you could briefly dwell on what you think you have learnt from this?

**Prime Minister:**

I am afraid I can't really, briefly or otherwise, Nick, if you don't mind. As I say, I totally understand why some of you guys will want to concentrate on this, and that is for you, but it is for me to run the government and this is really what I am trying to do here. If you would like to ask me a question on the Europe business, I would be very happy to take you again.

**Question:**

We can try. I would say I think a lot of people would like to know what you have made of that, but I hear what you say. There is a concern that some will have about a Europe of 25 nations, that you are now embracing many poorer nations here, and there will be people at home who fear that that means more cost for them and also, as you will well know after your announcement on work permits for the new accession countries, that it also means competition for their jobs at home. What do you say to reassure people about that?

**Prime Minister:**

That again is a very good point. People worry, if you are bringing poorer countries into the European Union, doesn't that impose a huge burden? Now in fact what we know of the history of the European Union is that every time we expand and enlarge, because the membership of the European Union actually increases the prosperity of it, that very quickly those nations become nations that are bringing prosperity not just to their own people, but to every part of

the European Union. You take a country with which we are very familiar - the Republic of Ireland. Ten years ago it wasn't the economy that it is today. If you look at Spain and the amazing changes it has made as a result of its membership of the European Union, Spain is now a country that offers a chance for trade and prosperity for all European countries. So yes there is a short term cost, and we are prepared to meet that, but the long term benefits of enlargement of the European Union in terms of trade, and prosperity, and living standards, as well as security, I think are those that far outweigh any of the short term costs.

**Question:**

One of your now world famous spokesmen said in the course of this meeting that the Scottish fishermen were a unique and special case within the European Union. Now in the context of more and more people joining, how can you argue that, and specifically in next week's talks how should that be reflected?

**Prime Minister:**

Well in respect of fishing in the Common Fisheries Policy, I have raised this in discussion with Romano Prodi, the Commission President today. We will do everything we can to secure as good a deal as we can for Scottish fishermen and their families, and in fact for the whole of the UK. But it is a difficult situation, for reasons everybody knows. And in fact this is not a situation that is going to be made worse by enlargement, but it is a situation that arises as a result of the depletion of fish stocks. And as I keep saying to people, about the problem there is no dispute, the question is what is the solution? Now we have engaged in making representations to the European Union at the moment because we believe the present proposals make life very, very difficult for us indeed, but I think it is best that I conduct those negotiations at the moment behind the scenes as it were.

**Question:**

What kind of grade would you give the Danish Presidency at this summit?

**Prime Minister:**

As I said earlier, I think they have done remarkably well. It has been an extremely difficult Presidency to have because of the huge nature of the negotiations, but I think the Danish Presidency has really been superb and my special congratulations to the Prime Minister, who has conducted a meeting that could have gone on frankly for a very long time, with very good humour and a lot of intelligence.

**Question:**

You have talked about the Union being fundamentally changed, do you think that inevitably means it will be - to use Mrs Thatcher's words - wider but shallower? And on the specific question of the euro, can you really imagine these countries which have signed up today joining the euro, or do you think there will always be an outer rim which will keep their own currencies?

**Prime Minister:**

Well I am sure in time those countries want to join the single currency and obviously they have got to fulfil the criteria for membership there. But I think that the argument about wider versus deeper has gone in the European Union, it may be an argument for parts of the Eurosceptic right in Britain, but it is not an argument that is happening elsewhere in Europe. I don't think there is any doubt at all, two things are very, very important about the accession countries, and I have noticed this talking to all of them: one, they have fought long and hard to get into the European Union and they have done so understanding entirely that the European Union will cooperate more in the areas that it needs to cooperate, and they are perfectly happy with that; but secondly, and this I think is the real difference, they are also all of them countries that have had to fight hard for their nationhood, and they share very much I think the British perspective about Europe, which is that Europe should be a union of nations where we come together and cooperate as sovereign nation states in our common interest, and that cooperation will be deep, but it will also be wide. And I just think the argument about wider versus deeper really is not an argument that most of those new countries really recognise.

**Question:**

We are told that on 28 November, No 10 was informed about a blackmail plot, which is a very serious matter. What did you know about that?

**Prime Minister:**

I am sorry, John, and honestly I don't want to be difficult about it, but all those questions can be dealt with back home. I really want to concentrate on these issues which as you know are very, very important.

**Question:**

Has this been what you would call a dramatic day?

**Prime Minister:**

It has been dramatic, dramatic and historic, and those are over-used words, we could probably say that about lots of summits, but in this case they are definitely justified. This has been an extraordinary summit, for all the reasons that I give. Turkey, on its way to being a member of the European Union, 10 new countries in the European Union and European defence up and running. Those are three huge and important decisions.

**Question:**

I would like to ask you what is the right procedure to be followed for the problem regarding Cyprus, between Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots?

**Prime Minister:**

Well I hope very much that the work of the UN Secretary General's representative, and the parties, continues. I believe that it is still possible to reach an agreement. I think that the UN proposals are the basis for doing that, and obviously there are still difficulties that have to be dealt with, but I hope that they will be dealt with, because in the end that settlement that allows the two communities to live together side by side, and allows them both to engage in the benefits of the European Union, is extremely important, and I am sure that those talks will continue in that vein.

**Question:**

According to the last Europe ... survey, just one quarter of British people has ever heard of the Czech Republic. How do you want to sell the enlargement to your people?

**Prime Minister:**

Well I am not aware of that survey and thank you very much for pointing it out. It is very helpful in my press conference on enlargement. But I suspect actually, I suspect probably, if you don't mind me saying so, that if you had used the old historical terms before the Czech Republic and Slovakia separated, you might have found it rather different. You are about to tell me that you surveyed them on that as well. OK. Whatever. But actually I think most people do know the importance of the European Union in Britain and of the enlargement process. But I can assure you that in the months to come these things will be debated in Britain and I am sure that there will be a very good and healthy debate about it, which will involve our relations with Poland, the Czech Republic and many other countries. And so far as I am concerned, we want to be a very good partner of the Czech Republic in the new Europe. So maybe survey them again in a couple of years time.

Speech by Tony Blair 17 December 2004

***PM welcomes historic day for Turkey– 17th of December 2004*****Prime Minister:**

First of all can I just say a few words to you. I would like to congratulate the Dutch Presidency for the way that they have handled this negotiation, it has obviously been extremely difficult, but immensely important and I am pleased that it has come to a successful conclusion. The fact that Europe can welcome in Turkey and begin the process of negotiation for them to become a full member of the European Union is an historic event, it shows that those who believe there is some fundamental clash of civilizations between Christian and Muslim are actually wrong, that we can work together, that we can cooperate together, and I think that is of fundamental importance for the future peace and prosperity of my country, Britain, and of the wider world. Of course this is going to be a long negotiation. I think everyone accepts it will be at least a decade before this membership comes about. There are also, once that happens, transitional safeguards that are there on some of the difficult issues that arise in any accession, but it is an immensely significant day I think for Europe. And I would also congratulate the Turkish government as well in the leadership that they have shown in making changes in their country. Of course there are various issues that are going to be resolved prior to the negotiations actually opening, which we have set a date now of 3 October. There is the indication by the Turkish government of their readiness to sign the Ankara Agreement, that is important. Of course that doesn't amount to a formal legal recognition by Turkey of Cyprus, but nonetheless I think there is a real sense of people wanting to work together and come together and that is important too.

So we always said that Turkey would be treated the same as every other country, that it would be the Copenhagen criteria that applied to Turkey. On the basis of their fulfilling those criteria we can begin the process of accession and the negotiation that leads to it, and even though this is obviously over a significant time frame, I still think it is very important and I think it is a good day for Europe, for Turkey, for the wider world.

### **Question**

What do you say to the people across Europe who feel very concerned about Turkey joining the European Union?

### **Prime Minister:**

I think everyone is sensitive to those concerns and it is why when you open the way to Turkey becoming a member of the European Union, that is the start of the process, and then there is a lot of negotiation that has to happen and it stretches over many years, obviously. But the important thing is that we are stating as a fundamental principle that the fact that Turkey is a Muslim country does not mean it should be barred from the European Union; on the contrary, if it fulfils the same principles of democracy and human rights then Muslim and Christian can work together, and that is a very, very important signal right across the world at the moment, and particularly important I think in the light of events of recent years. And I think this will increase the security and prosperity of Europe, of Turkey, of the wider world and region and that is why I think it is important. I think what we have done is we have opened the way for that accession to happen for Turkey, that is very important. Of course the criteria have to be fulfilled, but now we have actually set a date for the opening of negotiation, that will happen under the British Presidency of the European Union, and that is important. And it is a very historic day I think for Turkey, for Europe, for the wider world, and it shows that those who argued that there was some clash of civilisations, that Muslim and Christian countries can't work together have been shown to be wrong.

## **Speeches by Angela Merkel**

### ***European Policy Statement by Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel in the German Bundestag***

***11th of May 2006***

Mr President, ladies and gentlemen,

The German Bundestag has a healthy tradition of regularly debating where we are and where we are going with European unification. The debate this week, Europe week, is not only important in light of this tradition, but is also necessary, in my opinion, in view of the current situation.

I am therefore very grateful to the parliamentary groups for asking us to debate European issues in this particular week, for given the large number of individual issues that we discuss in the course of our business, one can easily get the impression that we sometimes fail to see the wood for the trees.

It was only right that two days ago, on Europe Day, we commemorated the great European Robert Schuman, the former French Foreign Minister, and remembered his initiative that led to the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community. Schuman proposed the creation of a joint authority to administer these two raw materials so vital to the defence industry. This was not any old initiative, this was the initiative that gave rise to the special relationship between France and Germany. But this initiative was also designed to prevent the European states, above all Germany and France, from launching a war on each other ever again.

Europe as a community of pacific interests - in the aftermath of the Second World War, after so much suffering and loss of life, this was a trailblazing idea. Europe as a community of pacific interests - a Utopia that has indeed been realized over the course of the decades that followed. The vision became a reality: the reality we know today.

You are all familiar with the milestones on the way: the European Economic Community of 1957, the establishment of the Internal Market and a single currency for twelve member states in the conviction that countries with the same currency will never again pit themselves against each other, and the constant growth of the European Community to include 25 and soon 27 member states.

Looking back, we can see that Robert Schuman truly revolutionized relations between the European states. An entirely new order emerged on the continent. This new order is in my opinion the most significant since the Peace of Westphalia.



After the fall of the Wall, with enlargement to the east and the end of the Cold War, European values and pacific ideals spread across the whole continent. We Germans in particular, with our history, cannot remind ourselves often enough that living in peace and freedom is by no means something that can be taken for granted.

It is a blessing and a gift. Because peace and freedom cannot be taken for granted, they must be constantly rediscovered and defended. We should also remind ourselves that all turns for the better in post-war Germany have been inseparably linked to Europe. Be it our reintegration as part of the European Union or indeed German unity, we have European integration to thank for an unparalleled period of peace, liberty and prosperity.

This also shows that Europe was from the very beginning more than just a marriage of convenience or community of interests. Europe has always been based on common values and aware of its shared history, and is united by its will to shape the future for the benefit of all. And it is precisely this will that we shall have to discuss with regard to the future.

A unique collaboration between larger and smaller states has emerged. Next year, we will celebrate the 50th anniversary of the signing of the Treaties of Rome. That will provide another good opportunity to look back on what has been achieved.

But it is also an opportunity to look forward with confidence. It is too early today to go into detail about the German Presidency in the first half of 2007 or to talk about the fact that the Federal Republic of Germany will simultaneously also hold the G8 Presidency, but we should at least start to look at what is to come. For this is another feeling we share - that it is not enough to simply pay tribute to the values and launch of the European unification process; that alone will not achieve what we desire.

This is therefore not the time for reminiscing about what has been done. This is rather the time for a policy statement! The truth must be looked in the eye, for it is in part sobering indeed. Many citizens criticize Europe for its tendency to overregulate and doubt that Europe can tackle the problems of the future - unemployment and low economic growth. In brief, it must be said that Europe is not valued as highly by the Europeans as its history would perhaps give reason to believe. The failed referenda in France and the Netherlands are surely signs of a deeper underlying problem.

In other words, it is not enough for us to show that viable solutions have been found. Indeed, we have fortunately adopted a financial framework for the coming years. And I would like to add that we have also succeeded in introducing criteria to ensure that monies from the Structural Funds will no longer be awarded if jobs will be moved from one country to another. This is a very important issue that had caused concern to many people.

We have further managed to reach agreement on the chemical industry. A fundamental agreement has been reached on the Services Directive. The European Parliament has successfully refused to adopt a pointless directive on UV protection. These are all positive achievements.

But they are not enough to make clear to the citizens what Europe means for them and what responsibility Europe bears. We must, and I am deeply convinced of this, critically review the state of the European project. We must put the people at the centre and answer their questions. What does Europe mean for my job, for my prosperity, for my social security when I fall ill or grow old? Does Europe make things easier, better or does it put a brake on them, put obstacles in their way? I believe that we should not avoid these questions. We should answer them directly, giving specific, concrete replies.

In my opinion, our task now is no more and no less than to add a new rationale to the historical reasons for the foundation of the European Union. I don't want to dramatize things, but I do believe a new rationale is more necessary than ever. For the situation is as follows. During the Cold War it was a massive step for the Western European countries to work together in the European Union, to decide not to confront each other. But it was beyond question that the European Union was superior to the entire socialist and communist edifice. There was no need to justify why this Europe was the right answer. It was a better answer than everything that was happening behind the Iron Curtain.

Then came the great triumphal march of freedom. The superiority of the ideal of freedom prevailed. The Cold War came to an end. Today, the entire continent can live according to this European ideal. But the situation has changed with respect to other continents. Europe must now justify itself and show that it can, in a more competitive world, in a globally transparent world, mould world policy according to its own values. That is the major task we now must face.

The citizens simply doubt that the social market economy and our idea of the dignity of man are really so superior, so prevalent, that they enabled us to win the Cold War and will also enable us to continue to live as we do, in a world for whom all share responsibility, and to act as a role model to others. We therefore have to consider what Europe means and how politics can once again shape the world we live in. Many people have the impression that everything is now determined by flows of capital, that politics has run out of steam. We must show that we have power. I thus believe it is vital for us to realize that with a population of 450 million people, the European Union can of course influence world trade. No single member state could assert its interests as effectively as we can assert them together. To cite just one example from the field of environmental protection, the individual member states could never have negotiated the Kyoto Protocol as successfully as we did as a bloc. We also have a common development assistance policy.

We work on many fronts as the European Union, and as such can influence things far more. In other words, there are occasions when a single state acting alone would go under, but where together we can successfully assert our interests. This is one very tangible advantage of the EU.

But in order to reach our overall goal, we have to focus and specify the key areas in which our successes have to be brought to the attention of the people, to prove to them that we are better off with Europe than without. In my opinion, the first issues are economic growth, the social responsibility that we have for the citizens, and jobs.

Every member state - and this will also be true in the future - will first have to solve its own problems. This is particularly true for Germany, since Germany is the largest economy in Europe. We should not draw the wrong conclusions from this. We have to do our duty. It was us who introduced the Stability Pact as part of European Monetary Union to give the people security. It is therefore not acceptable for us to infringe it for the third, fourth or fifth time running; if we do so we fail to meet our own demands.

I know that recent Federal Government decisions ask a great deal of the populace. However, we must restore the credibility of the standards we expect of others in Europe. For this reason the Federal Government has decided to abide by the constitution and by the Stability Pact once again. It's as easy as that. And where there's a will there's a way.

We fully support the Lisbon Strategy, according to which the be all and end all in a world of growing contradictions is economic success, successful innovation, growth and jobs. We will only be able to bring our weight to bear in many areas in Europe if we first show that we have a successful economic recipe, which is both humane and guarantees social responsibility according to the dictates of a social market economy. It is our task to cooperate actively on the Lisbon Strategy. It is important to examine where Europe has bound its own hands, where its policies are inimical to growth.

It must always be our task to watch out for competition in general and above all to give small and medium-sized businesses in the European Union a fair chance. We know that if Europe is to be successful, it must be among the leaders in education, research and innovation. These are our strengths. This is why we are right to make a national pledge to invest three percent of our gross domestic product in research and development. It is equally right for us to ensure that the European research structures can deliver on promoting efficiency. They should not be based on regional quotas. Research should rather be supported where it brings innovative results that can make us world leaders.

The path we have pursued at national and European level has brought a lot of regulation. I expressly support the Commission, in particular the President of the Commission and Vice-President Günter Verheugen, who have both said that dismantling bureaucracy is the order of the day. We can cut 25 percent of all bureaucracy, not just here at home, but throughout Europe. This is by the way a revolutionary step - especially since the entire *acquis communautaire* in Brussels is now a six metre high mound of paper from the past 50 years - that we have decided, after almost 50 years of European unity, to see whether we can change or reduce anything to consolidate our place in this rapidly changing world. This too is part of Europe.

The question of whether we will have economic success, whether we can give people jobs and whether the people have the impression that the values of a social order can be better realized in the European Union than at national level, is for me the crucial question, the answer to which will determine the extent to which Europe meets with acceptance.

In addition to economic vitality, we must also respond to the people's need for security, internal security and legal certainty. According to surveys, this is the one of the main demands that the citizens place on Europe. This is something they want.

But we are finding it difficult to transfer national competence to Europe in this area in particular. I am sure you all recall the debates on the European arrest warrant.

Nowadays, we use the Schengen Agreement without giving it a second thought. In the field of justice and home affairs, in particular, there will time and again be areas in which individual countries should unite and forge ahead. To give an example, I spoke just yesterday to the Lithuanian Prime Minister. Lithuania is working hard to be integrated into the Schengen Agreement, because it is an incredible advantage to have internal borders and to jointly manage external borders. This is an idea that we would have dismissed out of hand 30 or 40 years ago.

If you compare the conditions today on the German-French border to those on the frontier between Germany and Poland, you can almost feel the impatience of those waiting there. People ask, "When will crossing the border finally get a little easier?" Such progress has a tremendous added value for people which they have almost come to take for granted.

We now have a European criminal record and a European information network, the keyword being Europol. Particularly in the field of justice and home affairs policy we will have to continue the communitarization process, even if this means many member states having to give up their reservations. I think the intensive debate in the German Bundestag will go on about how much sovereignty we want to transfer and how much we want to keep. This discussion must take place. Another central issue - here, too, it is a question of how Europe is seen and how we can defend our interests - is the field of external security, of the European Common Foreign and Security Policy.

Totally new threats have arisen since the end of the Cold War - terrorism and fundamentalism. We have learned that no one country can deal with these threats alone, neither the super-power USA nor Russia, nor the European Union, let alone one of its member states.

If we are honest we must admit that, since the Cold War ended, Europe has had to undergo a major learning process. We failed to act quickly enough in the Balkans. Fortunately, we learned from that failure, and we succeeded by our action in Macedonia - which was hotly debated within my parliamentary group - in preventing a civil war. We, the European Union, have meanwhile assumed responsibility for Bosnia and Herzegovina. This is a totally new milestone. I still recall the heated arguments we had at that time about whether we are allowed to act outside our national borders!

Nowadays the vast majority of people feel it is a matter of course for us to take over responsibility in such cases. We are monitoring the peace process in the Indonesian province of Aceh. Within the Quartet we, the EU, have taken on a highly important role in resolving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Our commitment to safeguarding the elections in the Congo is another of our new responsibilities.

What does this mean? It means that Europe has learned to intervene before it is too late, before conflicts escalate and famines break out as in the Great Lakes region of Africa. Europe can no longer merely assert its claim to have a system of values at home; on the contrary, if we take these values seriously, we must assist in places where others cannot complete the job alone. That is the consequence of our ambitions.

We will see time and again that we are sought after as partners. This makes some people worried and they ask, "Can we live up to all these expectations?". Let me say clearly that if we want our way of life and business to become accepted in the rest of the world, we cannot shirk our responsibilities and shy away from challenges there. This is why we also have to be economically strong. If we want to shape policy - and what people are worried about is that politics has lost its power to shape events - we must be decisive rather than hesitant, because when we are, it looks as if we are capitulating in the face of challenges, and that would be precisely the wrong course.

To master on all these tasks Europe must be capable of acting. In this regard there are two problems which need to be discussed and which have not yet been fully solved. We can only take action if our internal structures are adequate to take the necessary decisions, if we are aware of what kind of organization this European Union is. Enlargement and deepening - both are issues which must now be seen in a totally new light because Europe is attractive, because many countries want to join the EU, but also because we must also say who can and cannot join, and specify what we can offer them so as not to appear to be a closed fortress.

As far as ability to take action is concerned, the debate on the Constitutional Treaty is very important. The negative results of the referendums in France and the Netherlands were a set-back, but this has no bearing whatever on whether or not we need a constitution. I say yes, we need the Constitutional Treaty. We need it because it gives us answers to various questions, and because it tells us what our fundamental rights are and what our common understanding is.

For the very first time the Constitutional Convention - chaired by Roman Herzog - succeeded in persuading the EU member states to set down what are generally described as our values in a catalogue of fundamental rights. We had lively discussions, for example, which will continue, on whether and if so how we include a reference to our Christian roots. This meant taking another long look at the different histories of the individual European countries. In our interaction with other religions and cultures it will be important for us Europeans to be able to clearly define our cultural identity. This is what others expect from us. How can we defend our values if we cannot define them first?

The Constitutional Treaty attempted for the first time to clearly allocate powers, something which citizens rightly demand, and which by the way was contained in the German Basic Law since the first day of the Federal Republic's existence. One of the best things about the Basic Law is that it clearly distributes the powers among the various levels. Next week we will have the pleasure of discussing the redistribution of these powers - not an easy issue, but one which has to be addressed, as blurred jurisdictions are always a democracy deficit. People no longer know whom they can hold responsible for what. This clarity is what needs to be restored in Europe.

The Constitutional Treaty, for the first time, envisages a European foreign minister. We must decide exactly what powers he will be given. When I look at our foreign minister, I can say that the European foreign minister will not put him out of his job. But it will be necessary to know who is speaking for Europe, for example in Quartet negotiations. This Constitutional Treaty's subsidiarity clause for the first time gives powers to the national parliaments.

By the way, the Commission President told me just now that this will not be possible without differences with the European Parliament, as that body watches like a hawk to see that the national parliaments do not regain too many options.

But I want to state here that in recent years the European Parliament has gained in importance to an extent unimaginable twenty or thirty years ago. Recently there were demonstrations in Strasbourg against the Services Directive. One of our MEPs said that he felt honoured, as there had never been demonstrations against a European law before. This shows that decisions are being taken there.

Ladies and gentlemen, we will also have to further discuss an issue not yet clarified in the Treaty. I am firmly convinced that the decision that the party receiving the most votes in the European elections has the right to nominate the Commission President was the right one, but we will need to see how this develops. If we have a legislative process in Europe with such a strong parliament, then we will also have to have the principle of discontinuity - something which for us in Germany is quite obvious. It cannot be a good thing for directives elaborated in the Commission Directorates-General to have a shelf-life of decades, regardless of who has just been voted in and is working there. This too is part of Europe's further development.

This means we have an EU able to take decisions because of the Constitutional Treaty, since the institutional aspect - the questions regarding the Commission, the European foreign minister, the Council - must be clarified in such a way that Europe can work. Today the decision-making mechanisms in Europe are so complicated that you almost need a university degree to work out who had the majority or how a blocking minority is created. The Commission's present format cannot be retained. Therefore we absolutely need the Constitutional Treaty to ensure the EU is effective and capable of action. The German EU Presidency, at the latest, will deal with this subject.

However, because this issue is so difficult and because the interests vary so widely, I am against taking an over-hasty decision which will result in us coming to a standstill again. We should instead reflect carefully on how we can bring the constitution project to a successful conclusion. I want to see the Constitutional Treaty come into effect, as does the Federal Government, and I assume that most of this House want this too.

Ladies and gentlemen, the second problem is that of enlargement. Let me say unequivocally that what we have promised - and we are all moving along the same lines here - will be implemented. However, the criteria for accession are also clearly defined. Next week we will receive the progress report on Bulgaria and Romania, and these two countries will in my view clearly become EU members.

But I also expect the European Commission's report to be honest about the two countries' deficits. We will not help these countries if we merely sweep their shortcomings under the carpet and hope the EU and the European idea will prevent them resurfacing. I assume the Commission will suggest ways of addressing these deficits.

It is also important that accession talks are not a one-way street. The criteria must be met. This applies just as much to Croatia as to Turkey. No country can ride on the back of another. Just because two countries began accession talks on the same day does not mean that they must complete them on the same day. Every country has the right to be treated in the way in which it portrays itself.

It was right, ladies and gentlemen, for the EU to break off talks on a stability and association agreement with Serbia and Montenegro for the time being, since that country is not cooperating with the Hague war-crimes tribunal. These signals must also be sent out: There is no accession at any price, but rather the conditions applying to the EU must be met.

As we cannot take on board all countries seeking membership, we will develop the neighbourhood policy. There is no question about that. I am firmly convinced that we cannot do this with trade-association agreements alone. We will have to offer these countries enhanced political cooperation, one which, however, must not necessarily mean full membership. I have mentioned the reasons why Europe must be effective. An entity that does not have borders cannot act coherently and with adequate structures. We must be aware of this and must therefore set out these borders.

Ladies and gentlemen, I think that if we answer the questions facing us and if we, the Federal Republic of Germany, play our role in helping people all over Europe understand that this EU is a unique opportunity for us to make our interests, values and way of life liveable, then the people will come round to our way of thinking. Maybe some issues will return to national competence or be transferred to the European level, but this process must take account of one question - does it provide added value for the individual, his social security, his job and our external and internal security? Can we use it to help others solve their problems? If we answer these questions honestly, then we will reach Europeans, not only with words but also with deeds.

Our policy must be strong enough to separate the important from the trivial. We must believe in the power of peace and freedom, of democracy and of human rights which should be realized all over the world. We must shape the future with our policy based on this huge success story.

People like Schuman, de Gaulle, Adenauer and many others at that time, although facing a landscape of ruins, had a vision. We have a solid foundation on which to build. Today there are new threats, new challenges and more competition. But using our history and our confidence we can make the 21st century Europe a similar success story. I for my part, alongside the Federal Government and yourselves, am determined to do so. Thank you.

### ***Germany as a responsible partner in Europe and the world***

*The 24<sup>th</sup> of January 2006*

#### **1.3 Enlargement**

A circumspect enlargement policy, which does not overtax the European Union's capacity to absorb new members, constitutes an important contribution to peace and stability on our continent. In this context, the further development of an ambitious and differentiated EU Neighbourhood Policy is gaining in significance.

Past enlargement represented a major step towards overcoming the painful division of our continent. Germany, in particular, is one of the beneficiaries. We stand by the commitments which have been made. Accession negotiations with Romania and Bulgaria have been completed. The schedule for Romanian and Bulgarian accession is tied to the fulfilment of clearly defined requirements. We will take a decision on ratification of the accession treaty with Bulgaria and Romania based on the European Commission's progress reports and recommendations.

We welcome the fact that accession negotiations have begun with Croatia. We stand by the European perspective for the other states of the Western Balkans, too, as agreed at the European Council in Thessaloniki.

We will ensure compliance with fair conditions of competition within the enlarged Europe and see to it that social distortions, for example through wage dumping and illegal employment, do not arise. Transitional periods will ensure that the German labour market remains protected from an uncontrolled influx of workers for up to seven years. Moreover, checks on persons at borders to the new Member States will only be discontinued once the strict security standards of the Schengen Agreement have been met.

Germany has a particular interest in a deepening of mutual relations with Turkey and in binding the country to the European Union.

The negotiations launched on 3 October 2005 with the aim of accession are an openended process which does not imply any automaticity and whose outcome cannot be guaranteed at the outset.

This poses a particular economic, demographic and cultural challenge. Against this background, we welcome the reform efforts undertaken in Turkey. We want to make every effort to foster development in the areas of democracy, the rule of law and economic affairs in Turkey, with which we are also closely linked within NATO.

There must be strict compliance with the conditions contained in the negotiating mandate and the Declaration by the European Community and its Member States of 21 September 2005, also as regards the EU's absorption capacity. In accordance with the Copenhagen criteria, this also encompasses the exercise of basic liberties, including religious freedom.

Should the EU not have the capacity to absorb Turkey, or should Turkey not be able to comply completely and in full with all of the commitments which membership entails, Turkey must be linked to the European structures as closely as possible and in a way that further develops its privileged relationship with the EU.

## **Interview with Chirac**

*the 15th of December 2004*

**QUESTION:** Mr. President, welcome.

**THE PRESIDENT:** Thank you, Mr. Poivre d'Arvor.

**QUESTION:** Tomorrow, the final discussions are beginning in Brussels to see whether or not EU accession talks will begin with Turkey. Usually, when negotiations begin, the point is to succeed. Does this mean that in 10, 15 years from now, Turkey will be in the EU?

**THE PRESIDENT:** Indeed, tomorrow the European Council will take place, and we will be able to answer your question on the opening of negotiations for Turkey's possible entry into the EU. This subject has given rise to an important debate in France, and it's a legitimate one. That's why I want to tell the French, through you, about my state of mind as I prepare to attend this Council.

The question is: Is it in the interest of Europe, and notably of France, for Turkey to join? My answer is yes, if.

Yes, if Turkey fulfills all the conditions imposed on all EU candidates.

When you think about what the founders of the EU had in mind, it was first of all a project for peace and stability. After centuries of war, of horrors, we want to leave our children a peaceful, stable region without wars.

The EU we wanted to create is also one in which democracy, human rights, the freedoms that to us are crucial, have deep roots. And it also represents the resolve to have the best possible conditions for economic and social development. Considering these three criteria, I believe it is in our interest to have Turkey, if it fulfills all the conditions. It's obvious that when it comes to security, stability and peace, having this large entity on our doorstep is absolutely positive. Rejecting it would certainly present a risk of instability, a risk of insecurity on our borders that must certainly be avoided. It's also a way of ensuring that this entity on our doorstep will definitively consolidate the progress it has made and must continue to make in the areas of democracy, freedoms, human rights, sexual equality, religious freedom, the respect for minority rights, etc.

**QUESTION:** But in these circumstances, are there any other answers besides yes or no? Yes to full accession or no? Or is there a third hypothesis, a third way, as you and the Austrian chancellor seemed to hope?

**THE PRESIDENT:** I will tell you, but first I'd like to say that it's also a very important factor for economic development. It's a huge market, it's an economically powerful country. It's in our interest for Turkey to be with us and not against us. I'd also like to add that Europe is a bit small in comparison with the world's major entities such as China, India and North America, and it would no doubt be strengthened in the future by Turkey's presence. Of course, this naturally presumes that Turkey will go ahead with everything we'd like to see. In other words, that it will deeply change its values, its ways of life, its rules.

**QUESTION:** Is it doing so at the moment?

**THE PRESIDENT:** It has certainly made a considerable effort. This is true. It is far from completing that effort, and "negotiations," you must understand, is not synonymous with "accession." It means that Turkey must still make a considerable effort over 10, 15, 20 years—I don't know how long, but certainly no less than 10 or 15 years—to assume what we call the *acquis communautaire*, that is, all of our rules, values and ways of life, both with regard to human rights and a market economy. All the values and rules that are ours. And to do so, it must make a considerable effort. There are 30 chapters expounding on what must be done. There are 88,000 pages of legislation that it must adopt. It's a considerable effort. So when you say: Can we find another solution? Solutions can always be found, that's the job of diplomats. But I don't think we can, because asking a

**QUESTION:** A privileged partnership, for example, which is what the Austrian chancellor would like to see.

**THE PRESIDENT:** Mr. Poivre d'Arvor, asking a country like Turkey, a great country rich in history, to make such a considerable effort to reach an uncertain or partial result is obviously not reasonable. And we would be assuming a very weighty responsibility as far as history is concerned if, after being told by the people of a nation, "We will adopt all your values, all your rules, all your objectives," we responded, "Well, no. In the end, we're going to be negative."

**QUESTION:** Even if we said, "You'd still be a privileged partner"?

**THE PRESIDENT:** They would never agree to that. They are a proud people and they are aware of making a gigantic effort to move closer to us. In the event that they make these efforts to meet Europe on every point, we couldn't just say to them: "Well, no. You can't be a full-fledged member." It's a weighty responsibility we'd be assuming as far as history is concerned.

**QUESTION:** How do you explain the hostility of about two-thirds of the French population, larger than in any other European country? Is it perhaps because of France's particularly strong Armenian community?

**THE PRESIDENT:** You will have observed that the great majority of our partners are in favor of opening talks and want them to succeed.

**QUESTION:** And the French themselves?

**THE PRESIDENT:** Even if it takes a long time. That's a fact.

**QUESTION:** The French are for opening talks, but apparently against accession.

**THE PRESIDENT:** You will also have noted, Mr. Poivre d'Arvor, that since 1963, when we drew up the Association Treaty and declared that Turkey had a vocation to enter Europe, not a single head of state, not a single French prime minister has questioned Turkey's European vocation. Not a single one. Now I grant you there's a debate, we have to embrace that. I would like to participate in this debate and tell the French how things stand. But I also don't want to inflame passions.

**QUESTION:** Let's get back to the Armenians. Was there a tragedy or a genocide in 1915? Your foreign minister used both expressions.

**THE PRESIDENT:** Mr. Poivre d'Arvor, we in France respect the rule of law. A law passed nearly unanimously in both the Senate and in the National Assembly that spoke of genocide. Consequently, it's the law.

**QUESTION:** Should Turkey's recognition of the genocide be a condition?

**THE PRESIDENT:** The main thing is that our history is marked by efforts of reconciliation and peace. I said earlier that Europe has always from the very beginning represented an effort to achieve reconciliation, peace, respect

for the other and openness toward others, and this has translated everywhere into a significant effort of remembrance. Naturally, Turkey must make this effort and I'm sure it will do so. For us that's very important, because beyond talk, beyond words, it's important to recall that France opened its doors in 1915, it welcomed a very large number of Armenians. France's Armenian community is fully integrated. They are French like you and me, naturally, but like everyone, they also have a memory, a sensibility that must be respected. And their number, the tragedy experienced by their families that lives on in their memories, must be respected. And all this presumes an effort on the part of Turkey to remember what happened, that's clear. I have no doubt it will do so.

**QUESTION:** Another argument made by detractors of Turkey's membership in the EU is its geographical location. It's near Syria, Iran, Iraq. Does Turkey seem European to you?

**THE PRESIDENT:** You know, Turkey's entire history since the Roman Empire has been characterized by its attempt to choose between Asia and Europe. Sometimes it has leaned toward Asia, sometimes toward Europe. So the question today is not whether it's Asia or Europe. The question is what is in Europe's interest. That's what matters to us. Is it in our interest for Turkey, in future generations, to lean toward Europe or toward Asia? I would say that it's in our interest for it to lean toward Europe, toward our values or concept of human rights, peace and democracy, and not toward Asia where it would be liable to take another path that would probably generate instability or insecurity for Europe.

**QUESTION:** But is it culturally European? We're talking about a population in which 95 percent adhere to the values of Islam and 72 percent are strongly practicing, while in Western Europe the number of practicing Catholics and Protestants is falling. Won't there be an imbalance?

**THE PRESIDENT:** Let's get a way from a mindset that necessarily leads to a lack of respect for others, to a war of religions, a clash of civilizations, culture wars with all that implies, and whose consequences, alas, are appearing in today's world in their most odious form-that of terrorism. Let's embrace a more human concept; let's have respect for others. Turkey is a secular country. Secularism was decreed in Turkey in 1923. It's a secular country that respects other religions, just as we respect other religions. So let's leave it at that, please. Let's not provoke clashes of this nature. We have everything to lose, beginning with our dignity.

**QUESTION:** There are undeniable statistical data: Turkey has 70 million inhabitants, France has just 60 million, Great Britain and Italy have a bit more, Germany has 80 million. It therefore may be easier for the Turks to block votes than it will be for the French. That may be one of the reasons that justifiably concerns part of the French population. Are you yourself concerned?

**THE PRESIDENT:** I am not concerned because I don't conceive of European expansion in terms of confrontations but in terms of seeking overall visions, common interests. That's exactly what we're doing, that's the whole spirit of the community. Naturally, on questions of voting and so on, the Constitution-which I hope the French will adopt-will considerably improve France's position in comparison with what would happen if the Constitution weren't adopted or if it hadn't been elaborated. The modalities for Turkey's integration-which should take place in 10 or 15 years-should be taken into consideration, and once again, there will be an accession treaty. Because I'd like to remind you of something in the debate you mentioned at the beginning of our conversation, Mr. Poivre d'Arvor-let's not forget that we probably will open talks

**QUESTION:** Would that happen right after Brussels?

**THE PRESIDENT:** In the course of 2005.

**QUESTION:** Toward 2005?

**THE PRESIDENT:** The date will be set by the European Council. It's not a major problem but the necessary preparations take a little time. So let's say 2005. But let's not forget two things, independent of the fact that the process will take a very long time, 10 or 15 years. First, that the negotiations are state-to-state. That means that throughout the entire period, from the opening of negotiations to their conclusion, each State, each nation, each of the 25 EU members can decide that it's not working out and can block the entire negotiating process. There must be unanimity. So each nation retains its entire freedom-I'm saying this to the French because I'm not sure it has been explained to them. Each nation, and notably France, retains the right to stop everything, from the beginning of the talks to their end; that is for the 10, 15, 20 years it takes. Second, as you know, there will be a constitutional reform in a few weeks in order to recognize the new Constitutional Treaty, which we will submit to a referendum. And in this constitutional reform, with the exception of those countries already engaged in accession talks, all new



memberships will have to be sanctioned by an accession treaty, adopted not by Parliament but by a referendum. That means that all French citizens will retain the right to express themselves, and the French people themselves-like those of other countries, incidentally-will have the last word. I think we must take all this into account and say: Let's remain open-minded, let's not throw out the baby with the bath water.

**QUESTION:** So to separate these two problems, Turkish membership and the referendum you yourself announced on July 14, wouldn't it be preferable to move up the referendum date just a little? You were talking about the second half of the year. Wouldn't it be better to hold it in May or June, since it's technically possible?

**THE PRESIDENT:** First we have to have the constitutional reform.

**QUESTION:** Will Parliament enact it in the beginning of the year?

**THE PRESIDENT:** Let's not prejudge what Parliament will do. I hope it will. But let's not prejudge. As soon as the process is sufficiently under way, I will tell the French the date I believe best for holding the referendum on the Constitutional Treaty.

**QUESTION:** Because you surely will have noted that two-thirds of the French today support this ratification, but 12 years ago, the numbers were pretty much the same for the Maastricht Treaty and yet the final result was extremely close. Doesn't that make you feel like moving up the date a little bit?

**THE PRESIDENT:** History doesn't repeat itself and we don't let polls determine our political responsibilities, regardless of their interest or importance. What I would like to say, on the other hand, is that this referendum will be very important. Very important for Europe and for France within Europe. France has always been an engine of European construction, the objective of which is the entrenchment of peace, democracy and human rights. And I hope it will continue to assume its responsibility as an engine. For that, it must say yes to the referendum on the Constitutional Treaty. I hope it will. What I also hope is that for once people truly realize that this is an important response to an important question. It shouldn't be treated in a political context with concerns that have nothing to do with it.

**QUESTION:** It's not a question of domestic policy?

**THE PRESIDENT:** No. This referendum must not be diverted from its vocation by considerations that have nothing to do with it; that's how important it is.

**QUESTION:** That's what the Socialists, for example, asked you after the adoption of their yes vote. It warmed your heart, didn't it, that "yes"?

**THE PRESIDENT:** The Socialists were right to emphasize that the referendum shouldn't be diverted from its objective. It's an important enough issue that everyone must vote according to their conscience and not according to considerations that have nothing to do with the question asked.

**QUESTION:** One last question, Mr. President. You announced that the French would be consulted on Turkey via a referendum. That may be in 2014; you may no longer even be here, unless you tell me the opposite today. Does your commitment hold for your successor?

**THE PRESIDENT:** Mr. Poivre d'Arvor, I've already told you. In a few weeks, the amended Constitution presented by the Government to permit the ratification of the Constitutional Treaty will provide that approval of the Accession Treaty for new candidates for EU membership-and foremost among them Turkey-will be subject to a referendum and not to a Parliamentary vote. In other words, no matter what happens, the French will retain the last word. No matter what happens.

**QUESTION:** Thank you

## Speechs and article by Anders Fogh Rasmussen

### *Kommissionen fremlægger rapporter om Tyrkiet*

*6th of October 2004*

I 1999 besluttede EU's ledere at give Tyrkiet status som kandidatland. Det betyder, at når Tyrkiet opfylder politiske kriterier om frihed og demokrati, retsstatsforhold, respekt for menneskerettigheder og beskyttelse af mindretal, kan EU indlede optagelsesforhandlinger.

Kommissionen har nu offentliggjort den årlige rapport, som gennemgår de tyrkiske fremskridt.

Samlet er det Kommissionens vurdering, at Tyrkiet opfylder det politiske kriterium. Kommissionen anbefaler, at der indledes optagelsesforhandlinger med Tyrkiet. Kommissionen peger samtidig på nogle konkrete områder, hvor Tyrkiet mangler at gennemføre de nødvendige reformer. På disse områder peger Kommissionen på behovet for fremskridt.

Nu skal medlemslandene drøfte Kommissionens rapport. Stats- og regeringscheferne skal tage stilling til Kommissionens anbefaling til december.

Statsminister Anders Fogh Rasmussen udtaler i anledning af rapporterne fra Kommissionen:

”Jeg tager Kommissionens rapport til efterretning. Jeg har tillid til, at Kommissionens rapport og konklusion bygger på et grundigt og sobert arbejde.

Når Kommissionen vurderer, at Tyrkiet opfylder betingelserne, så må det være rigtigt at iværksætte optagelsesforhandlinger.

Spørgsmålet om tyrkisk EU medlemskab er af stor betydning for EU's fremtid. Alene landets befolkningsstørrelse og økonomiske niveau betyder, at tyrkisk medlemskab vil stille store krav til EU. Det må vi tage højde for i tilrettelæggelsen af forhandlingerne. Der vil blive tale om en meget lang forhandlingsproces. Der vil være behov for lange overgangsordninger på vigtige områder.

Ikke mindst i det vigtige spørgsmål om arbejdskraftens frie bevægelighed skal vi finde en forsvarlig løsning. Meget langvarige eller permanente særordninger kan komme på tale.

Jeg lægger samtidig vægt på, at der i forhandlingerne bliver indbygget nogle stopklodser, som betyder, at hvis udviklingen i Tyrkiet pludselig rykker baglæns, så kan vi afbryde optagelsesforhandlingerne.

Jeg ser nu frem til at drøfte Kommissionens rapport med både partierne i Folketinget og de andre medlemsstater.

Jeg vil gerne understrege, at indledning af optagelsesforhandlinger ikke automatisk er lig med medlemskab. For at kunne blive medlem af EU skal Tyrkiet have en markedsøkonomi, der fungerer. Landets lovgivning skal tilpasses de ca. 80.000 sider EU-lovgivning. Og det er ikke nok at vedtage ændringer af lovene og reglerne. De skal også føres ud i livet. Tyrkiet opfylder i dag langt fra de krav, der skal til for at blive medlem af EU. Under alle omstændigheder vil der gå mange år, før Tyrkiet er klar til medlemskab”.

## ***EU skal i arbejdstøjet!***

### ***Kronik i Politiken tirsdag den 27. september 2005***

EU-samarbejdet er i krise. Forfatningstraktaten er lagt på hylden, og det er tvivlsomt, om den nogensinde bliver taget ned derfra igen. Det har skabt tvivl om, hvor EU-samarbejdets udvikling nu går hen. Det må naturligvis give anledning til eftertanke. Derfor har alle EU-landene besluttet sig for at gennemføre en tænkepause og tage en debat om, hvad vi vil med EU.

I enhver krise ligger også nogle muligheder. En krise som denne tvinger os til at gøre op med vanetænkning og til at gøre os selv klart, hvad vi egentlig vil. Jeg ser derfor frem til debatten i de kommende måneder. Den kommer for en gangs skyld ikke blot til at handle om ja eller nej til en ny traktat. Der bliver derimod mulighed for en mere grundlæggende og mere nuanceret EU-debat.

Men midt i den megen snak om krise er det nok nyttigt at sætte tingene i perspektiv. For hvad er egentlig problemet? Føler befolkningerne ikke, at EU-medlemskabet giver fordele? Har EU ikke leveret resultater? Ville Danmark og Europa klare sig bedre uden EU-samarbejdet?

Når det kommer til stykket, er de fleste nok enige om, at EU gennem årene har leveret store resultater. EU har været med til at skabe fred, frihed, stabilitet og økonomisk fremgang i Europa i løbet af det sidste halve århundrede. Og på det helt konkrete plan: bedre miljø, lavere priser, større udbud af varer og en masse andre fordele, som vi ikke tænker nærmere over i dagligdagen. Men EU er da også langt fra upopulær. Ifølge statistikkerne mener halvfjerds procent af danskerne, at Danmark har haft fordel af EU-medlemskabet, mens kun tyve procent mener det modsatte. De fleste vil nok også være enige i, at ikke mindst et lille land som Danmark fortsat har store fordele af et tæt europæisk samarbejde.

Hvad er der da så galt, kan man så spørge? Min vurdering er, at folkeafstemningerne i Frankrig og Holland afspejlede en generel følelse af utryghed og skepsis, som man uden tvivl også finder i Danmark og mange andre EU-lande. Der er ikke så meget tale om en skepsis overfor EU-samarbejdet som sådan. Men om en utryghed overfor fremtiden og den fart EU-samarbejdet udvikler sig med. Borgere i hele Europa oplever store og hastige forandringer. Globaliseringen bringer begivenheder i resten af verden tættere på vores hverdag. Samfundsmønstre er i opbrud. Der er større konkurrence og et stadigt større udbud af varer, informationer, indtryk og muligheder. Mange nye spørgsmål og udfordringer trænger sig derfor på, og borgerne forlanger klare svar af både EU og af deres regeringer.

Men borgerne har ikke altid fået klare svar. Tværtimod har EU ofte været svært at forstå. Jeg tror, at EU i de seneste år, har været for optaget af sine institutioner, processer og paragraffer. Vi har i EU forhandlet hele fem traktater over de sidste 20 år fra EF-pakken over Maastricht-, Amsterdam- og Nice-traktaterne til den seneste forfatningstraktat. I den samme periode er EU blevet udvidet fra 10 til 25 medlemmer. EU har altså været i konstant udvikling i 20 år. Jeg mener, at udviklingen har været rigtig. Men det har været en stor mundfuld, og jeg tror, at folk oplever, at EU er for optaget af interne forhold frem for at koncentrere sig om de konkrete problemer og bekymringer, som borgerne oplever i hverdagen.

Jeg står ved de beslutninger, der er taget. Den seneste udvidelse med de nye 10 lande er en stor succes. Det glemmer vi ofte. Hvordan havde Europa set ud i dag, hvis vi for 15 år siden havde ladet de østeuropæiske lande sejle deres egen sø? De enkelte traktater har også hver især givet god mening. Vi har løbende haft brug for at tilpasse samarbejdets spilleregler for at få klubben til at fungere i takt med udviklingen i verden omkring os. Derfor står jeg også ved forfatningstraktaten. Det er en god traktat – også bedre end den traktat, vi har i dag.

Men mens vi i EU har forhandlet op og ned ad stolper om nye traktater og nye udvidelser, har vi ikke været gode nok til at fokusere på de konkrete opgaver. Der har været for mange fine ord, for mange lange erklæringer og for lidt handling. EU har været for optaget af sig selv.

Det er på tide, at vi i EU stopper op og ser på realiteterne. Skal EU forblive den succes, som samarbejdet historisk har været, kræver det grundlæggende, at samarbejdet leverer resultater. Det kræver, at EU i højere grad forholder sig til borgernes bekymringer. Det indebærer først og fremmest, at EU vender blikket mod sine kerneopgaver. EU må simpelthen se virkeligheden i øjnene og komme i arbejdstøjet.

Men hvad betyder det så konkret? Lad mig nævne tre opgaver som ligger lige for:

1) En stor konkret opgave er de økonomiske udfordringer, som globaliseringen stiller Europa overfor. Vi skal være bedre til at skabe nye jobs i Europa. EU-landene skal i fællesskab passe godt på og videreudvikle det indre marked. Det er en stor succes, som vi sjældent tænker videre over. Og det er en helt nødvendig forudsætning for fortsat vækst og velstand i Europa.

De europæiske økonomier skal også tilpasse sig nye krav til konkurrenceevne og social bæredygtighed. Det kræver store reformer i mange lande. I sidste ende er det kun de enkelte EU-lande, som kan gennemføre reformerne. Men i EU kan vi lære af hinanden og tilskynde hinanden til de nødvendige reformer. Mange EU-lande er f.eks. meget interesserede i den danske samfundsmodel, som kombinerer et fleksibelt arbejdsmarked med et stærkt socialt sikkerhedsnet.

De økonomiske udfordringer fra globaliseringen handler først og fremmest om konkurrencen fra verden omkring os – fra Kina, Indien, USA og en lang række andre lande. Her står EU overfor et valg. Skal vi bekæmpe forandringer eller skal vi gå foran? Skal vi forsøge at beskytte europæisk landbrug og industri imod import fra lande, der kan producere f.eks. landbrugsprodukter og tekstiler billigere, end vi kan i Europa? Eller skal vi koncentrere vores kræfter om det, som vi kan gøre bedre? Min konklusion er klar: vi skal satse på forskning, uddannelse og udvikling af højteknologi. Til gengæld bør vi gradvist afvikle subsidier og handelsbegrænsninger.

Uanset hvilke beslutninger vi træffer i EU, er konsekvenserne helt konkrete. Det handler om arbejdspladser i Europa på kort sigt og på længere sigt. Det handler om de priser, som borgerne betaler, når de køber ind i supermarkedet og i tøjbutikkerne. Det handler om vores og andre europæiske børns fremtid.

Min klare holdning er, at EU skal gå offensivt til globaliseringen. Det er svært, og vi skal gøre det bedre, end vi gør det i dag. Men det redder ikke en eneste arbejdsplads i længden at lukke af for handlen med omverdenen. Tværtimod burde EU være en drivende kraft for at få mere global frihandel.

2) En anden konkret opgave for EU er grænseoverskridende problemer som terrorisme, organiseret kriminalitet, ulovlig indvandring. De enkelte EU-lande kan ikke løse den slags opgaver på egen hånd. Det kræver tæt samarbejde mellem nationale politimyndigheder at optrevle international kriminalitet og forebygge og nedkæmpe terror. Det har alle europæiske borgere en klar interesse i.

3) En tredje konkret opgave er EU's rolle overfor resten af verden. Hvordan skal EU forholde sig til konflikter i verden omkring os - ikke mindst hvis de finder sted i vores baggård? Hvordan skal vi forholde os til spredning af atomvåben og andre masseødelæggelsesvåben? Hvordan skal vi forholde os til krænkelse af menneskerettigheder?

EU har både en forpligtelse til og en klar interesse i at spille en rolle og forholde sig til disse problemer. I fællesskab har EU-landene en mulighed for at gøre en reel forskel i situationer, hvor de hver i sær ikke ville kunne flytte et komma. Det gælder både sikkerhedspolitik, økonomisk og udviklingspolitisk. EU og EU's medlemslande udgør f.eks. verdens allerstørste donor af udviklingsbistand. Det betyder, at vi i fællesskab kan gøre en forskel. Derfor skal vi være bedre i EU til at formulere og følge en fælles linie i udenrigs- og sikkerhedspolitikken.

Det var blot tre områder, hvor EU kan levere helt konkrete resultater. Der er mange flere. Men der er også områder, hvor vi skal gøre op med vanetænkning.

Det gælder måske først og fremmest spørgsmålet om den videre udvidelse af EU. Vi er netop ved at fordøje EU's hidtil største udvidelse med hele ti nye lande. Selv om det er gået over al forventning, og skrækscenarierne er blevet gjort til skamme, er det selvfølgelig noget, som tager tid.

I EU haster vi imidlertid videre med forhandlinger om nye udvidelser - bl.a. med Tyrkiet. Det er der mange almindelige europæere, som stiller spørgsmål ved. Går det ikke vel hurtigt? Kan EU bevare sin sammenhængskraft, når udvidelsen går så langt og så hurtigt? Kan vi i det hele taget forestille os et EU, som grænser op til Syrien, Irak og Iran?

Jeg mener, at vi bliver nødt til at drøfte EU's fremtidige udvidelser. Vi må erkende, at der er grænser for, hvor stor EU kan blive, og hvor hurtigt det kan gå, hvis EU fortsat skal fungere og bevare sin sammenhængskraft.

Vi må også helt konkret drøfte Tyrkiet. Forhandlingerne om medlemskab indledes den 3. oktober i år. Men det betyder ikke, at Tyrkiet har garanti for medlemskab. Det kræver for det første, at Tyrkiet er i stand til at påtage sig alle de forpligtelser, der følger af medlemskab. Det vil kræve meget store forandringer af det tyrkiske samfund. Men det kræver også for det andet, at EU kan overkomme at optage Tyrkiet. Det er et faktum, at mange europæere er usikre overfor perspektivet om tyrkisk medlemskab. Det må vi som ansvarlige politikere forholde os til og være parate til at diskutere åbent og ærligt. Det vil vi få lejlighed til under de kommende måneders EU-debat.

Når alt det er sagt, vil jeg gerne vende tilbage til mit grundlæggende syn på EU. Jeg tror på et tæt og stærkt europæisk samarbejde. Både et tæt økonomisk samarbejde og et tæt politisk samarbejde. EU er en forudsætning for, at Europa forbliver stærk nok til at gøre en forskel i verden. Jeg er ikke et sekund i tvivl om, at vi mere end nogensinde har brug for EU. Verden bliver stadig tættere forbundet. De udfordringer, vi som samfund står overfor, kræver stadig flere fælles løsninger.

I den virkelige verden er EU den eneste realistiske ramme til at levere disse løsninger. Men vi skal have Europas befolkninger med. EU er til for Europas befolkninger og ikke omvendt. Den utryghed og skepsis, som kom til udtryk ved folkeafstemningerne i Frankrig og Holland, skal tages alvorligt. I det hele taget skal vi blive bedre til at inddrage borgerne i EU-sager. Jeg håber, at debatten i den kommende tid vil bidrage til det. Vi skal også drøfte, om vi kan finde metoder til en bedre løbende dialog med befolkningen om EU-spørgsmål.

Min samlede konklusion er, at vi må sætte tempoet ned og konsolidere det EU, vi har. Vi kan ikke blive ved med at bygge til og bygge ovenpå. EU må få arbejdstøjet på og fokusere på at levere de konkrete resultater, som Europas borgere og virksomheder forventer af EU.

## ***Resultaternes Europa***

### ***21st of April 2006***

Europa står overfor store udfordringer i disse år. Globaliseringen er over os. Men økonomisk halter Europa efter USA. Samtidig ser vi nye økonomier i Øst, ikke mindst Kina og Indien, vokse hastigt frem. EU's ambitiøse målsætning om at være den mest konkurrencesterke økonomiske enhed i 2010 stiller store krav til reformviljen i medlemslandene.

Også politisk har hverdagen meldt sig efter succesen med den seneste udvidelse i 2002. Forfatningstraktaten, der skulle have været kronen på værket efter udvidelsen, er blevet afvist i to af EU's oprindelige medlemslande. Beslutningen om tænkepausen blev af mange set som et udtryk for, at EU-samarbejdet er i krise.

Hvad er gået galt, kan man så spørge? Er samarbejdet kørt fast? Mit svar er, at EU har været og fortsat er en succes. Men om EU også fremover forbliver den succes afhænger af, hvordan vi tackler de udfordringer, Europa står overfor. Europa står overfor to udfordringer. Den ene er, hvordan Europa tackler globaliseringen i sin bredeste forstand. Den anden er, hvad jeg vil kalde den folkelige udfordring. Hvordan sikrer vi, at borgerne bakker op om udviklingen af det europæiske samarbejde og oplever, at EU også er til gavn for dem?

De to udfordringer hænger uløseligt sammen. Et EU, der leverer resultater i forhold til de udfordringer, som globaliseringen stiller os overfor, er en forudsætning for folkelig opbakning. Vi må erkende, at EU i de seneste årtier har været meget optaget af sin egen udvikling. 5 nye traktater på mindre end 20 år. Og fra 12 til 25 - snart 27 - medlemslande på samme tid. Mange borgere har en fornemmelse af, at EU har handlet mere om institutioner, procedurer og paragraffer end om konkrete fremskridt til gavn for netop borgerne.

Når det er sagt, må vi ikke glemme de mange store resultater, som EU har leveret. EU har siden Anden Verdenskrig været hovedansvarlig for at sikre frihed og fred, vækst og velstand i Europa. Og i de senere år har det indre marked, den fælles valuta og senest den store udvidelse med landene i Central- og Østeuropa samlet landene om nogle meget store, fælles projekter.

I dag er det svært at se samme store EU-projekter for sig. Det betyder ikke, at vi skal lægge visionen om et stærkt og forpligtende samarbejde på hylden. Jeg tror på et stærkt og integreret fællesskab i EU. Men arbejdet med at skabe konkrete resultater må ikke overskygges af luftige politiske projekter.

Jeg vil ikke undlade at sige et par ord om forfatningstraktaten, som jo er anledningen til den tænkepause, vi er midt i. Forfatningstraktatens skæbne er stadig uvis. Mit bud er, at der ikke kommer en afklaring foreløbig. Jeg forventer, at tænkepausen på topmødet til juni vil blive forlænget. Jeg er meget ærgerlig over den situation, vi står i. For forfatningstraktaten er god set med danske øjne. Den indeholder konkrete fremskridt i forhold til de udfordringer og opgaver, EU står overfor. Derfor havde jeg meget gerne set traktaten ratificeret. Det ville også have givet os lejlighed til derefter at tage forbeholdene op til overvejelse igen. Men vi må respektere resultatet af folkeafstemningerne i Frankrig og Holland. Så længe Frankrig og Holland ikke kan godkende traktaten, er den lagt på hylden.

Det er for tidligt at sige, hvad en afklaring kan føre til. Der er tre mulige optioner:

For det første, at der bliver fundet en løsning på Frankrigs og Hollands problem, og at ratifikationsprocessen fortsætter. Det er der i øjeblikket ikke meget, der tyder på.

For det andet, at der bliver enighed om helt at opgive forfatningstraktaten og fortsætte samarbejdet på baggrund af den gældende Nice-traktat. Men den udvej har jeg svært ved at se. Et flertal af medlemslandene har allerede ratificeret forfatningstraktaten. De vil næppe acceptere at fortsætte på det eksisterende traktatgrundlag, som om intet er hændt.

For det tredje, at der bliver enighed om at forhandle en ny traktat.

Bolden ligger nu først og fremmest hos Frankrig og Holland. Uanset, hvordan det ender, er de udfordringer, som EU står overfor, de samme. Det udvidede EU skal kunne fungere effektivt og varetage europæernes interesser. Derfor er mange af forfatningstraktatens forslag åbenlyst rigtige. Det gælder f.eks. forslag om

- mere effektive beslutningsmekanismer,
- øget demokratisering, herunder åbenhed i lovgivningsprocessen
- en fast formand for Det Europæiske Råd
- en EU-udenrigsminister
- og i det hele taget det at skabe klarhed om EU's opbygning og værdier.

Diskussionen om forfatningstraktatens skæbne forsvinder ikke af sig selv. Vi har brug for at få klarhed på et tidspunkt. Ellers frygter jeg, at EU bliver ved med at vende tilbage til den - frem for at koncentrere kræfterne om det, det hele handler om: Et tæt og forpligtende samarbejde, der leverer resultater til gavn for borgerne.

Vi går ind i en ny fase af EU's udvikling. Efter 20 år med de store og markante projekter bør vi nu satse målrettet på konkrete politiske opgaver. En hel serie af projekter som tilsammen udgør en massiv indsats for at skabe konkrete resultater til gavn for befolkningerne i Europa.

I forhold til de sidste 20 års udvikling er det en ny tilgang til det europæiske samarbejde. I stedet for nogle få mega-projekter bliver det fremover mængden og summen af de mange små og konkrete projekter, der skal sikre fremdriften i det europæiske samarbejde. Jeg vil kalde denne nye strategi for, "Resultaternes Europa". Og jeg vil i dag skitsere et arbejdsprogram for et sådant resultaternes Europa.

Jeg ser særligt tre store opgaver for EU i de kommende år.

For det første: Hvordan sikrer vi, at Europa bliver i stand til at skabe vækst og beskæftigelse i fremtiden? Og dermed social tryghed. For det andet: Hvordan sikrer vi borgerne tryghed og sikkerhed overfor grænseoverskridende problemer. Hvordan bekæmper vi effektivt terrorisme, organiseret kriminalitet og illegal indvandring? Hvordan sikrer vi fødevarerikkerhed og miljø- og klimabeskyttelse? For det tredje: Hvordan styrker vi EU's evne til at varetage europæernes interesser på den internationale scene?

Europa har brug for reformer, som skaber vækst, sikrer flere jobs og ruster os til globaliseringen. Det handler om arbejdsmarkedsreformer, uddannelsesreformer, velfærdsreformer og meget mere. Ansvar for at gennemføre disse reformer ligger først og fremmest i medlemsstaterne. Her er nogle nået længere end andre. Danmark ligger på de fleste områder i front. Men det er også en fælles udfordring. Derfor skal vi i EU udveksle nationale erfaringer og inspirere hinanden. Men først og fremmest skal vi i EU arbejde tæt sammen på områder, hvor der er merværdi at hente. Lad mig pege på fem områder:

For det første skal vi videreudvikle Det Indre Marked.

- Vi skal have et indre marked for service og tjenesteydelser.
- Vi skal fortsat styrke konkurrencen på EU-plan - f.eks. ved at gøre det billigere at foretage betalinger over grænserne og bruge mobiltelefon over grænserne.
- Vi skal lette de administrative byrder for virksomheder.
- Vi skal bekæmpe økonomisk nationalisme og protektionisme i EU.

- Vi skal blive bedre til at tiltrække højtuddannet arbejdskraft.

For det andet skal vi sætte os som mål at skabe et reelt indre marked for forskning, udvikling og uddannelse. Forskning, udvikling og uddannelse er helt afgørende for at sikre velfærden i Europa i årene fremover. En europæisk satsning på dette område skal derfor have højeste prioritet.

I januar 2004 lancerede jeg en ambitiøs plan for at styrke forskning, udvikling og uddannelse på europæisk niveau. Siden da har Danmark været frontkæmper i denne sag. Og vi har allerede nået gode resultater:

- Vi har opnået en stigning i udgifterne til forskning og udvikling på 75% over de næste 7 år.
- Vi har sikret oprettelsen af et Europæisk Forskningsråd til at understøtte forskning på højeste niveau i Europa.
- Vi har sikret, at antallet af udvekslingsstuderende frem imod 2013 gradvist vil kunne øges med ca. 10.000 om året.

Men vi skal gå videre. Ikke mindst når det gælder mobiliteten for forskere, studerende og undervisere. Det skal være et helt normalt element i uddannelses- og forskningskarrierer at være en periode i et andet EU land. Europa skal kunne tiltrække og fastholde de bedste hoveder.

- Vi skal etablere et fælles europæisk teknologiinstitut.
- Vi skal styrke konkurrencen mellem universiteterne i Europa gennem benchmarking.
- Vi skal styrke mobiliteten gennem en endnu stærkere satsning på udvekslingsprogrammer. Målet må være en fordobling i forhold til niveauet i dag.

For det tredje skal vi skabe et indre marked for energi. Vi skal sikre europæiske virksomheder og forbrugere tilstrækkelig og billig energi samtidig med, at vi fremmer bæredygtig energi.

- Vi skal forsætte liberaliseringen af el- og gasmarkederne i Europa.
- Vi skal sikre den nødvendige udbygning af ledningsnettet for el og gas på tværs af grænserne.
- Vi skal sikre mere åbenhed omkring gaslagre og overveje fælles krav til gaslagre i medlemsstaterne.
- Vi skal øge energieffektiviteten og anvendelsen af vedvarende energi i EU - blandt andet gennem fælles målsætninger og støtte til mere forskning på EU-plan.
- Og endelig vil det være en god idé at etablere et permanent forum for samarbejde mellem producenter og aftagere af energi – en slags ”energi OSCE”.

For det fjerde skal vi styrke beskyttelsen af forbrugerne på fællesskabsplan. Konkret foreslår jeg:

- at Kommissionen skal forpligte sig til at høre et forbrugerudvalg i alle sager vedrørende forbrugerspørgsmål inden fremsættelsen af forslag.
- at vi i EU udvikler et fælles europæisk mærkningssystem for fødevarer. Vi har brug for et system på europæisk plan, der klart identificerer sunde fødevarer og styrker folkesundheden.

Endelig for det femte skal vi ikke blot liberalisere handlen i Europa, men også på verdensplan. Til gavn for os selv, men ikke mindst for udviklingslandene. Vi skal derfor kæmpe hårdt for at få en WTO-aftale i hus. Desværre er udsigterne for et ambitiøst resultat ikke lyse for øjeblikket. EU bør derfor i fremtiden lægge flere kræfter i at indgå bilaterale handelsaftaler mellem EU og tredjelande. Bilaterale aftaler med landene i ikke mindst Asien, som kan sikre os bedre og mere stabil samhandel, er derfor også en vej frem.

**Borgernes sikkerhed og tryghed**

Den anden store udfordring for Europa er at gøre noget effektivt ved de grænseoverskridende problemer, som skaber utryghed og usikkerhed blandt borgerne i EU. Det gælder ikke mindst spørgsmål som miljøbeskyttelse og kampen mod menneskeskabte klimaforandringer. Det er åbenlyst problemer, som vi bedst kan løse i fællesskab på EU-plan. EU har allerede gjort store fremskridt på miljøområdet ikke blot til gavn for hele Europa – men også for Danmark.

EU er til enorm gavn for miljøet. Af 192 EU-retsakter på miljøområdet fra 1994 til 2006 har 83 haft en positiv påvirkning af miljøbeskyttelsen i Danmark. 107 har været neutrale i forhold til beskyttelsesniveauet i Danmark. Kun i 2 tilfælde har EU-reglerne udgjort en forringelse i forhold til de danske regler. Det nye kemikaliedirektiv er et godt eksempel. Vi får med direktivet registreret ca. 30.000 kemikalier og styr på de farligste. Det vil betyde store miljøforbedringer og bedre arbejdsmiljø i hele Europa.

Vi skal også fremover fastholde og styrke EU-samarbejdet om miljøbeskyttelse. Vi skal:

- fremme nye miljøteknologier blandt andet gennem prioritering af dette område inden for det 7. forskningsrammeprogram.
- styrke forskningen i alternative energikilder.
- arbejde for ambitiøse fælles regler om nedbringelse af luftforurening. Vi har i fællesskab allerede vedtaget fælles rammer for beskyttelse af vand og natur. Nu er tiden kommet til at tage fat på luftforureningen.

Fordelene ved tæt EU-samarbejde overfor grænseoverskridende problemer er også åbenlyse i kampen mod international terrorisme, organiseret kriminalitet og illegal indvandring. EU har allerede leveret mange resultater på disse områder. Men vi skal fortsætte og sætte os nye mål. Lad mig være konkret: Vi skal styrke det praktiske og operationelle samarbejde i EU. Vi skal bl.a. sikre en mere effektiv udveksling af oplysninger mellem politimyndigheder bl.a. gennem udvikling af Schengen-informationssystemet og samarbejdet i Europol. Menneskehandel og illegal indvandring er en stor udfordring for Europa. Hundrede-tusinder kommer illegalt ind i EU. Nogle er kvinder og børn, som sælges til prostitution af kyniske bagmænd. Andre er fattige mennesker, som flygter fra lande uden fremtid for at finde arbejde.

Vi har på det seneste set, hvordan mange prøver lykken over Middelhavet i små både. Til de italienske og spanske kyster, til Malta eller til Kanarieøerne. Mange hundrede drukner i forsøget. Det er dybt tragisk. Det løser ikke i sig selv problemerne at lukke grænserne og bygge en mur op om Europa. Vi har brug for en mere effektiv kontrol af EU's ydre grænser, som bl.a. sætter en stopper for menneskesmugling såvel som våben- og narkotikasmugling.

Vi skal styrke det operationelle samarbejde i EU's grænseagentur og etablere et visum-informationssystem med biometriske kendetegn. Vi skal styrke EU's samarbejde om at tilbagesende personer med ulovligt ophold i EU. Og vi skal sørge for en sikker tilbagevenden til deres oprindelseslande.

Men i sig selv er det ikke nok. Vi skal også styrke indsatsen i nærområderne overfor flygtninge og illegale indvandrere. Vi skal hjælpe dem og myndighederne i de områder, hvor de immigrerer fra, før de tager af sted mod Europa. Danmark er gået forrest i samarbejde med FN's flygtningehøjkommissariat, men vi skal gå videre. Gennem EU skal vi:

- Støtte opbygning af kapaciteter i nærområderne til at håndtere flygtningestrømme. Det gælder kontrol, administrativ kapacitet og samarbejde mellem europæiske og lokale myndigheder.
- Investere i strukturer, som kan give flygtninge en tilværelse i regionen. Det drejer sig om at skaffe arbejde, sikre uddannelse, sundhed osv.

Nærområdeindsatsen skal gå hånd i hånd med EU's øvrige udviklingsbistand, handelsaftaler og udenrigspolitik i forhold til de regioner, hvor de illegale flygtninge kommer fra - både i EU's nabolande og længere væk.

En stærk fælles udenrigs- og sikkerhedspolitik

Det bringer mig til EU's udenrigspolitiske udfordringer. Hvad gør vi ved den fattigdom, ufred, ufrihed og ustabilitet, som sender mennesker på flugt mod Europa? Hvad gør vi ved sikkerhedspolitiske trusler som international terrorisme og spredning af masseødelæggelsesvåben? Det er udfordringer, som EU allerede i dag er konfronteret med. Spørgsmålet er, hvordan vi bedst styrker EU's evne til at tage fat om de store udfordringer - og til at varetage europæiske interesser i resten af verden?

Jeg vil især pege på tre områder, hvor der er brug for fremskridt:

Vi skal styrke den fælles udenrigs- og sikkerhedspolitik gennem bedre koordination af EU's politikker på den internationale scene. Vi skal styrke EU's evne til at agere i kriser og yde EU-borgere assistance internationalt. Og måske allervigtigst: vi skal udvikle nye samarbejdsformer med EU's nabolande. De fleste ved, at EU i dag er én af verdens to største økonomier. Både hvad angår økonomiens og udenrigshandlens størrelse har EU samme vægt som USA. De færreste ved, at EU til sammen står for ca. 55% af al verdens udviklingshjælp. Denne økonomiske vægt skal bruges mere aktivt i EU's udenrigs- og sikkerhedspolitik. Samtidig skal vi blive bedre til at tage hele EU's værktøjskasse i brug. EU's styrke er netop, at Unionen har en meget bred palet af instrumenter til rådighed. Men vi skal blive bedre til at anvende disse instrumenter, så de udgør en hel og sammenhængende politik. Det handler også om, at EU taler med én stemme ude i verden og handler i fællesskab. Vi skal blive bedre til at formulere og forfølge en fælles politik.

Allerede i dag har vi gode eksempler på EU's udenrigspolitiske betydning. Det oplevede vi fra dansk side i sagen om Muhammed-tegningerne. EU udtrykte fuld solidaritet med Danmark. Solanas rundrejse til Mellemøsten var af stor betydning. Og handelskommissær Mandelson var stærkt medvirkende til, at boykotten af danske produkter blev holdt i ave. Muhammed-sagen har vist værdien af at være medlem af et stærkt og solidarisk fællesskab - ikke mindst for et lille land som Danmark. Vi kan styrke EU's udenrigspolitik inden for rammerne af den nuværende traktat. Konkret foreslår jeg:

- at vi i højere grad anvender flertalsbeslutninger inden for den fælles udenrigs- og sikkerhedspolitik.
- at vi styrker Solanas stab.
- at vi drager fuld nytte af Kommissionens mange redskaber i udenrigspolitikken, herunder især de handelspolitiske og udviklingspolitiske redskaber.



- at vi sikrer en mere effektiv koordination, herunder et bedre samarbejde mellem Solana og Kommissionen og en bedre anvendelse af Kommissionens delegationer ude i verden. Jeg ser gerne, at vi bevæger os imod en fælles udenrigstjeneste der kan give EU et fælles ansigt udadtil i 3. lande.

Det andet område, hvor EU bør styrke sin indsats, er i forhold til at varetage borgernes interesser i en stadig mere global verden. Vi har i de seneste år været vidne til en række katastrofer rundt om i verden. Det være sig naturkatastrofer, som Tsunamien, terroranslag som i Bali og Ægypten eller uroligheder, som under ambassadeafbrændingerne. Det er oplagt, at vi i EU arbejder tæt sammen, når EU-borgere er truet.

- Vi skal styrke det konsulære samarbejde mellem EU-landenes ambassader uden for Europa.
- Vi skal styrke fælles kriseberedskabs- og evakueringsprocedurer for EU-borgere uden for EU.
- Vi skal gå sammen om at etablere tilstrækkelig flyløftekapacitet til katastrofebistand og evakuering.
- Og vi skal styrke samarbejdet om civilberedskab.

Den tredje og måske allerstørste udfordring er forholdet til EU's nabolande og den videre udvidelsesproces. Gennem hele EU's historie har udvidelsen været det centrale instrument, når det gjaldt om at udbrede frihed, sikkerhed og velstand i Europa. Den politik har været en kæmpe succes. Tag blot udvidelsen med lande som Grækenland, Spanien og Portugal, der for få årtier siden var diktaturer. Og senest udvidelsen med de central- og østeuropæiske lande. Hvordan havde Europa set ud i dag, hvis vi for 15 år siden havde ladet de østeuropæiske lande sejle deres egen sø? Det samme gælder landene på det Vestlige Balkan. EU har over de seneste 15 år ydet en kæmpe indsats for at stabilisere regionen. Det er vigtigt, at vi fortsat tager vores ansvar overfor landene på Balkan alvorligt. De er en del af Europa. Det er vigtigt, at perspektivet om EU-medlemskab er troværdigt, selvom medlemskab først kan komme på tale om mange år. Derved kan vi tilskynde dem til at gennemføre de reformer, der kan gøre dem til en stabil og velfungerende del af Europa.

I det hele taget skal vi stå ved de løfter, vi har afgivet. Men når det er sagt, er det også klart, at udvidelsespolitikken også har sine begrænsninger som stabilitetskabende instrument. Der er grænser for, hvor hurtigt og hvor langt EU kan udvide, hvis EU-samarbejdet skal fastholde sin evne til at levere løsninger på Europas udfordringer. Spørgsmålet om EU's ydre grænser trænger sig naturligt mere på. Lad mig gøre det klart: Jeg tror ikke, at det er muligt én gang for alle at trække en grænse ned gennem Europa.

Men vi bliver nødt til at tage EU's evne til at optage nye medlemmer langt mere alvorligt. Det gælder i forhold til EU's beslutningsdygtighed, EU's fælles politikker og befolkningernes opbakning bag EU. Vi kan ikke alene forlade os på løftet om EU-medlemskab, som EU's væsentligste udenrigspolitiske instrument. Som alternativ bliver vi derfor nødt til at satse langt mere på at udvikle en attraktiv naboskabspolitik. En politik, som tilbyder reformredskaber til lande, som enten aldrig eller først langt ude i fremtiden kan komme i betragtning til EU-medlemskab.

Jeg ser for mig, at vi på sigt bevæger os mod et egentligt paneuropæisk økonomisk område. Et område med frihandel og økonomisk samarbejde mellem EU og EU's nabolande. Et paneuropæisk økonomisk område skal også indebære en styrkelse af EU's naboskabspolitik. Vi må sikre, at nabolandene:

- i større eller mindre grad kan få adgang til at deltage i EU's indre marked
- kan deltage i en række af EU's programmer, fx udveksling af studerende, forskningsprogrammer osv.
- kan modtage betragtelig økonomisk støtte til reformer – f.eks. til korruptionsbekæmpelse, grænsekontrol og reform af retsvæsen.

Efterhånden som vi bevæger os mod et paneuropæisk økonomisk område må vi også se på, om landene på visse afgrænsede områder skal have mulighed for at komme nærmere på EU's beslutningsproces. Det er i EU's interesse at sikre stabile naboer forankret i demokrati og markedsøkonomi.

#### Afslutning

EU står i dag med hovedansvaret for udviklingen på det europæiske kontinent. Det er op til os i fællesskab at løfte den opgave. Der er tale om en kolossal udfordring. Vi skal i fællesskab skabe vækst, sikre flere jobs og ruste os til udfordringerne fra globaliseringen. Vi skal i fællesskab løse en række grænseoverskridende problemer, bl.a. bedre miljøbeskyttelse og mere effektiv kamp mod terrorisme, organiseret kriminalitet og illegal indvandring. Og vi skal i fællesskab forstærke europæeres rolle på den internationale scene. Svarene skal findes i en målrettet satsning på konkrete projekter, der tilsammen udgør en ambitiøs strategi for et "resultaternes Europa". Et resultaternes Europa, som fokuserer på kontante løsninger og fremskridt frem for luftige målsætninger og illusioner. Et resultaternes Europa, som sætter ind på udvikling af politik frem for ændring af traktater. Et resultaternes Europa, som satser på udvidelse af konkret samarbejde frem for ekspansion af institutioner. Et resultaternes Europa, hvor hver enkelt borger i Europa klart kan se, at EU er det praktiske redskab til at løse de opgaver og udfordringer, som vi bedre løser

i fællesskab end hver for sig. Et resultaternes Europa, hvor Danmark spiller en aktiv rolle med at sætte dagsordenen. Hvor Danmark kommer med konkrete udspil til udvikling af samarbejdet. Hvor Danmark målbevidst er med i kernen af EU. Et resultaternes Europa i tæt samklang med de konkrete behov, ønsker og mål, som vi europæere har.