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Securitization of EU development policy

To what extent has the EU development policy become securitized in the post-9/11 environment?

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Abstract

The events of 9/11 and the subsequently launched ‘war on terror’ ushered in a new era of world politics. The new, global security agenda came to dominate international politics bringing about the securitization of a range of international policies. As a part of this process, international development cooperation has come to be increasingly articulated in the language of security as well, i.e. it has become securitized to a large degree. This has received a huge attention from both academics and the aid community, but the phenomenon of the securitization of EU development policy remained relatively under-researched. The Copenhagen School’s understanding of the language of security as the main indicator of securitization provides a good departure point for the analysis of the official documents that make the framework of EU development policy. However, the Copenhagen School does not deal with the impact of rhetoric on policy and the confirmation of securitization that these practical implications provide for. The EU development policy remains primarily guided by the objectives of poverty reduction and sustainable development; however, there are clear signs of securitization brought about the post-9/11 era.

Keywords: post-9/11 era, security, EU development policy, Copenhagen School, indicators of securitization

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1 Introduction

“The new security situation and the threat of international terrorism affects development policy just as so many other areas of our lives.”

(Louis Michel, European Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian Aid, Overseas Development Institute, London, 24 February 2005)

1.1 Research problem, purpose and the aim of thesis

With the events of 9/11 and the launch of ‘war on terror’ that followed, security concerns returned to the top of the world politics’ agenda influencing all aspects of international politics and international relations. This new global security agenda influenced the international development cooperation to a large degree as well.

The aim of this thesis is to offer a contribution to the discussion of the process of securitization of international development cooperation in the aftermath of 9/11 events. The specific focus of this research is to establish the extent to which the EU development policy became securitized in the post-9/11 era and moved its focus from the officially proclaimed poverty-reduction objectives to security priorities of the EU.

While the securitization of international development cooperation has been of interest to many development, security and international studies scholars, the appearance of the same phenomenon at the EU level has, to date, received comparatively little attention from the EU scholars.

My ambition regarding this thesis is both empirical and theoretical:

- At the empirical level, I will try to establish the extent to which the language used in official documents that make the framework of EU development policy has become securitized. The results of this qualitative, discourse analysis will be cross-checked with the quantitative, empirical analysis of changes in the institutional set up, actual practices and aid flows in the field of development policy to establish if they fit to the increased rhetoric of securitization pursued after 9/11.
- At the theoretical level, I will take the Copenhagen School’s theory of securitization as a departure point, and try to develop it by expanding the definition of securitization, i.e. I will try to broaden the extent of its applicability to the new cases (of securitization) by proposing the

understanding of securitization as a *political process* as opposed to Copenhagen School's understanding of securitization as a *crisis situation*.

Regarding methodology, I will propose new indicators of securitization - the Copenhagen School doesn't take into account the impact of rhetoric on policy. Practical implications of the rhetoric of securitization can serve as indirect, secondary indicators of securitization by giving reality feed-back to that rhetoric. By exploring these indicators, this thesis will also give contribution to the research of concrete policy measures that show the increasing subordination of development policy to wider EU security agenda.

To conclude, the aim of this paper is to answer the following *research question*: "To what extent has the EU development policy become securitized in post 9/11 environment?" The question comprehends both the empirical purpose of establishing the level of securitization of EU development policy and the implications of this process for the practice of development policy, as well as the theoretical purpose of developing the theory of securitization by expanding its definition and proposing new indicators (of securitization).

I hope that this research study will represent a small contribution to the wider debate on the securitization of international development cooperation by exploring this phenomenon at the level which is under-researched, but also to the theory of securitization.

1.2 Subject area of the research: setting the context

The aim of this section is to contextualize the research topic, i.e. to put it in an adequate historical/international politics' perspective (the post-9/11 world and the securitization of world politics), in the context of (historically-determined) different forms of utilization of development policy for other-than-development purposes by the donors, and within the wider trend of securitization of international development cooperation.

1.2.1 Securitization of world politics in the post 9/11 era

Contemporary developments in world politics appear to have created an unusually propitious environment for academic fads. "The particular orientation of the George W. Bush administration in the United States and the impact of the events of 11 September 2001 have generated a widespread anxiety to proclaim 'newness' – to understand what is seen to be a fundamentally 'new' world order with a 'new' form and deployment of US power within it" (Phillips 2007 p. 158). In this light, such new or reshaped concepts as pre-emption, unilateralism, terrorism, empire and imperialism and, most of all, security and securitization have spawned a literature that is already huge. The assertion of 'newness' has also imbued a set of emerging contentions about world/international politics, which can be

summarized in the argument that the increasing number of international policies is marked by a process of ‘securitization’, in which they are deemed to be hijacked and fundamentally reordered by overarching security-related priorities and interests.

In other words, events of 9/11 brought the issue of security back to the top of international politics’ agenda. This (new?) emphasis on security and the ‘war on terror’ launched by a coalition led by the United States have become key defining elements for international policy in a new millennium fraught with increasing social unrest, growing militarism and armed conflicts.

This global security agenda influences international development cooperation to a large degree as well and that is the wider historical and (international) political context within which my research topic should be seen.

1.2.2 Changing approaches to development cooperation

Another important perspective through which my research topic has to be perceived is historically conditioned use of development policy by the donors for other-than-development purposes. “Development policy and foreign aid have always been part of donor states’ soft approach to pursuing foreign policy, military and commercial objectives” (Howell 2006 p. 123) and that is a well-researched topic (Mason 1964, Cassen 1994, German and Randel 1995, Belgrad and Nachmias 1997, Reusse 2002).

In the Cold War era, aid policy was embedded in a global political framework of ideological and geo-political superpower rivalry. With the end of the Cold War the apparent supremacy of liberal democracy and free markets freed aid policy somewhat from the constraints of ideologically-informed global political rivalries. Donor agencies and Western governments began explicitly to place issues of governance onto the development agenda, making human rights, democracy, the rule of law and accountability conditions for aid. In the humanitarian field the emphasis shifted from humanitarian intervention in the new wars towards conflict resolution and post-war reconstruction, which involved the strengthening of the rule of law, building representative institutions and improving state capacity (Duffield 2002).

This approach reflected not only the consolidation of governance as a key goal of development policy, but also an emerging view of the South as a source of international crime, terrorism and conflict that contributed to global instability. At this point the practical implications of conceptualising the South as a source of instability were most visible in conflict and post-conflict countries.

That the turning of the tide in favour of the global South had been reversed has become rapidly apparent since 9/11 and the declaration of the ‘war on terror’. Multilateral organisations and leading bilateral donors alike have released

statements emphasising a shift in priorities for development, with the need to combat international terrorism taking centre stage. But, as we have seen, the seeds of this new phase in aid policy were already being sown in the 1990s.

Therefore, my argument is not that a nexus between development and security policy is an entirely new phenomenon at the international or EU level¹. This nexus has always existed and has always been made explicit by the donors in the articulation of their strategies and by scholars in wide-ranging theoretical and empirical investigations. However, my intention is to explore if there is something new about the ways in which that nexus has been articulated by the EU in a post 9/11 context. And that is, basically, if the EU increasingly perceives the EU development cooperation policy as subordinated to EU security interests and concerns.

1.2.3 Securitization of international development cooperation

There are clear signs that the process of international politics' securitization influenced the international development cooperation to a large degree. This subsection introduces the reader into the topic by examining the increasing interlinking of international development policy with security concerns, particularly in the global North and especially since the declaration of the United States-led 'war on terror'.

A re-emerging development-security nexus is increasingly evident. This is hardly surprising given the international context of the past few years, but it poses a serious danger:

"For all the discussion of a two-way relationship between security and prosperity and the notion that the merging of development and security agendas is mutually beneficial, the trend seems to be that security at home is becoming the overriding priority of both agendas" (Beall *et al.* 2006 p. 53).

The (re)appearance of Northern security or 'global security' as a primary objective of development is quite clearly a response to the insecurity felt by the developed North in the post 9/11 environment, and the effect of this shift is that development itself becomes increasingly instrumental to the security agenda. These tendencies in international development cooperation received criticism from the aid community (BOND 2003, CHS 2003, Oxfam 2003, Christian Aid 2004) and spurred a debate in academic circles. As *The Reality of Aid* (major north/south international non-governmental initiative focusing on analysis of poverty eradication policies and practices in the international aid regime) warns:

¹ I found the most comprehensive analysis on the connections between development and security in *Development and Security* (Stewart 2004) and *Three Issues in Security and Development* (Page 2004).

“The rights of the poor have been deeply affected by the events of September 11th, 2001 and their aftermath” (Reality of Aid (RoA) Report 2006, p. 9)².

The resulting ‘war on terror’ generated tremendous pressures to make national security the key foreign policy objective in most donor countries, subordinating development policy and peace operations to these national interests. In the post 9/11 security-centric era, poverty and violent conflict in the South are viewed increasingly as ‘threats’ to the security of the North. Development assistance is increasingly seen through the lens of northern foreign policy interests, as a tool for rich countries to defend themselves against these ‘threats’.

As already stated, multilateral organisations and leading bilateral donors alike have released statements emphasising a shift in priorities for development, with the need to combat international terrorism taking centre stage (for the detailed analysis of the discourse pursued in these statements see Beall *et al.*) and they were followed by the diversion of aid flows (see below).

Since 2001, several donors have taken unprecedented steps to change the basic mandate and guiding principles of their aid programs in response to foreign policy interests (RoA Report 2006, p. 10). These shifts have been most stark in the changes over the past few years in the United States and Australia.

The shift in development priorities of the United States and the tendency towards the militarisation of aid is the most significant. US development assistance is now viewed as a strategic resource for US security interests and the ‘war on terror’³. This should come as no surprise given the current administration and geopolitical agenda of the US (discussed by Putzel 2006). Ngaire Woods’ study on aid diversion states that almost all of the increase in U.S. assistance (military, economic and Official Development Assistance (ODA)) between 2002 and 2004 (some \$20 billion) went to strategically important countries in the Middle East, the Fertile Valley (Israel, Egypt, Iraq, and Turkey) and to Afghanistan and its

² Other NGOs have also not remained silent on the issue. In a 2004 report, *The Politics of Poverty: Aid in the New Cold War*, Christian Aid launched a vehement critique of linking aid to the ‘war on terror’, warning that despite the genuine threat from terrorism, governments’ attempts to protect their citizens “should not and cannot be done by annexing the language and budgets of aid” (Christian Aid, 2004, p. 2). The report argues that, in a manner not dissimilar to the strategic allocation of aid for allies in the Cold War, the “growing politicisation of aid [. . .] threatens to obscure the goal of poverty reduction”, and calls for a re-balancing of the international agenda (Christian Aid, 2004, p. 24).

³ In the words of Andrew Natsios, USAID Administrator: “The war on terror has led to a broadening of USAID’s mandate and has thrust the Agency into situations that go beyond its traditional role of humanitarian aid and development assistance....Aid is a powerful leveraging instrument that can keep countries allied with U.S. foreign policy. It also helps them in their own battles against terrorism” (Natsios, 2004).

immediate neighbours. These allocations were roughly equal to the total US aid flows to the rest of the world combined.

While donors did not reallocate *pre-existing* aid money to national security priorities after 2001, many donors made new supplementary budget allocations to meet commitments flowing from the broad-based ‘war on terror’⁴. Trends since 2001 demonstrate a significant diversion of these new aid resources towards the foreign policy priorities of the donor countries, particularly in Afghanistan and Iraq.

As already said, the phenomenon discussed in this sub-section received a huge attention from academics and aid community (which resulted in a production of a number of scientific articles and books, as well as the analyses and reports from NGOs and think-tanks) and was analyzed on two levels: researches have been done on the actual aid diversions towards more security-relevant countries and programmes (such as above presented); and, on the changes at the discursive level - analyses of newly-published security-imbued development statements (Beall *et al.* 2006, Robinson 2006, Faust and Messner 2004).

At the normative level, while most of the aid NGOs and the scholars “suggest that if security for the North becomes a central guiding principle for development in the South, this will be damaging for both the project of global poverty reduction and global security” (Beall *et al.* 2006 p. 51), some commentators have presented the emerging development-security nexus as benign or even positive. Frances Stewart argues that “conflict has heavy development costs, so that promoting security is instrumental for development” and that “inclusive patterns of development are an important element in avoiding conflict, so that development is instrumental to the achievement of security” (Stewart 2004 p. 278). Similarly, Robert Picciotto talks of a ‘two-way causality’ between the two, and argues that “the future of aid lies at the intersection of security and development” (Picciotto 2004 p. 543). These authors, in the spirit of pre-9/11 thinking on development cooperation and consistent with the Monterrey consensus, promote the idea of a win-win situation, where aid can serve the security interests of both donor and receiver.

What was the aim of this sub-section? First, I wanted to introduce the reader into the topic and to present the research field within which I situate my research question. It is obvious that the process of the securitization of development cooperation is taking place at the international level, but what is the case with the EU development policy? To what degree has the EU development policy become securitized? Secondly, I wanted to make a short overview of the existing research

⁴ The most comprehensive review of the question of aid diversion for global security interest of donors has been the studies by Ngaire Woods. See N. Woods, “Reconciling effective aid and global security? Implications for the emerging international development architecture”, Global Governance Program, University College, Oxford, 2004 and N. Woods, “The shifting politics of foreign aid”, *International Affairs*, March 2005.

and the literature on this topic – the issue of securitization of international development cooperation received a huge attention from academics and aid community, but what is the case with the research on this phenomenon at the EU level? I will try to find out that in the next section.

1.3 Securitization of EU development policy - review of the existing literature

In the previous section I have presented a short overview of the existing research and the literature on the securitization of international development cooperation. As I have already stated, this is widely and in-depth researched topic, and most of the attention is given to the securitization of biggest multilateral and bilateral donors' aid policies. However, the securitization of EU development policy received comparatively less attention; most of the authors only touch upon the developments at the EU level in general analyses and overviews of this phenomenon, i.e. the securitization of international development cooperation. In this section, I will try to summarize the existing body of literature on my research subject.

Over the past few years, European Union institutions have issued a number of policy documents and statements signalling a paradigm shift in the approach to the issue of security and development. Following the tendency described in the sub-section dealing with this shift at the international level, in most of the literature written on this topic authors raise concerns about the specific role that these documents assign to development policy within the broader context of EU external policies. There are signs that the long-term poverty reduction is losing ground as the primary objective, while security and stability are gaining importance.

Therefore, a number of authors, specially in papers commissioned by aid NGOs and think-tanks dealing with development policy, warn that the on-going integration of EU development policy into the wider framework of EU external policies might lead to the subordination of 'normal' development objectives (such as poverty eradication) to over-arching security and foreign policy priorities and interests of the EU; i.e. as Robinson argues in his article *Integration and integrity in EU policies for security and development*, this integration might affect the integrity and autonomy of EU development policy (Robinson 2006). He puts forward the argument (similar to Jo Beall *at al.*) that the integration of security and development policy is going on with the European security as a priority, and not of the developing world's one. Therefore, "the growing inclusion of 'first-world' security criteria in development policies and instruments" is one of the trends that mark the EU development policy after the end of the Cold War (Robinson 2006 p. 71).

The author also argues that the new insistence on 'security conditionality' in agreements with the developing world "has the potential to open the door to the

use of development funds for security purposes and increases the need to monitor closely how funds are spent” (*ibid.* p. 82).

The same worry is expressed by Ngaire Woods and her research team (Woods 2004) in a comprehensive research study conducted on relations between effective aid and the global security. Authors pose a straightforward question if the EU aid is becoming more subservient to security goals? Trying to answer this question, authors discuss the EU’s efforts to enhance coherence in external relations which could result in EU development assistance becoming subservient to security. Just as Robinson, they raise concerns that institutional changes to effect greater coherence among instruments aimed at security and development assistance goals could push development considerations down the agenda. Both on-going institutional changes and those envisaged by the Constitution proposal (though rejected at the moment, its clauses are indicative about the possible developments in this field) talk in favour of the integration of development policy with the EU’s foreign and security policy - for instance, possible putting of development cooperation in with all Common Foreign and Security funding (Mackie and Rossini 2004). The result of all these changes, on-going and proposed, is “that alongside foreign and security policy, development assistance may find itself with a weak institutional footing, squarely under foreign policy leadership” (Woods 2004 p. 21).

Part of the previously mentioned *Reality of Aid: 2006 Report* are reports on different donors’ aid policies, and one of them is dedicated to the EU (EC) aid (Gavas 2006). As the title itself says, the report is raising a question if EC aid is “at the forefront of poverty reduction or global security” (Gavas 2006 p. 2).

Gavas argues that one of the main advantages of having aid programmes at the EC level is that the EC has the unique ability to deploy a number of policies other than aid: trade, in particular, but also foreign and security policy. However, there is also the threat that money set aside for development cooperation will be diverted to policies that are not linked to poverty reduction and are more of a priority for developed countries than developing countries. On that track, Gavas argues that the “new security imperatives have created a potential diversion of development cooperation portfolio resources in favour of investments of particular relevance to security policy” (Gavas 2006 p. 4).

Proceeding with the developments in practice, the author says that the heightened focus from 2005 on financing for development and achieving the 0.7% target (percentage of Gross National Income (GNI) to be assigned for ODA) has been coupled with a priority given to security issues in EU discourse and shifts in both aid conditionality and resource allocation. He then continues by elaborating on what is this process of ‘giving priority to security issues’ characterized by (Gavas 2006 p. 5).

All these authors agree that the EU's attempts to enhance coherence in external relations have provoked concern that EU development assistance will become subservient to security. However, two researchers from German Development Institute (Faust and Messner 2004) published an article in which they analyzed the consequences of the new European Security Strategy for the EU development policy. On the contrary to most of the authors cited above, Faust and Messner greet the integration of development policy with the European foreign and security policy as envisaged by the European Security Strategy. "In view of the fact, that development cooperation (DC) has specific operational experiences, particularly in relation to weak states, development policy needs to assume a proactive stance towards the ESS" (Faust and Messner 2004 p. 6) and thus become an important player in European security policy.

What can we conclude from this overview? First of all, most of the authors cited notice clear signs of securitization of EU development policy. Furthermore, the phenomenon of integration of development policy within the wider framework of EU's external policies received considerable attention - and while some authors warn of the possible subordination of development agenda to over-arching security priorities and objectives, some greet this development and argue in favour of stronger involvement of development policy in European security policy.

Most of these researches on the EU development policy are contributions to more comprehensive overviews of the state of international development cooperation in the post 9/11 environment. However, there are almost no works that research only this phenomenon, comprehensively and from all perspectives. I will try to give a small contribution to filling this void.

2 Securitization theory and methodology

In order to establish the degree of securitization of EU development policy in the post 9/11 environment, I will first have to provide an explanation on what do I mean by ‘securitization’. I will take the Copenhagen School’s theory of securitization as a departure point and try to develop it by proposing a modified definition of securitization, i.e. by widening the scope of its applicability to the new cases (of securitization).

2.1 Securitization Theory and the Copenhagen School

Over the past decade or two, new approaches in security studies have developed with the aim of challenging traditional realist and neo-realist theories. This debate began in response to the claim that the security agenda must be ‘broadened’ to examine threats beyond state and military security, and ‘deepened’ to include individual, social and global concerns⁵. One of the most influential of the new approaches is articulated by Barry Buzan and Ole Waever among others (Weaver *et al.* 1993, Weaver 1995, Buzan, Weaver and Wilde 1998), whose collective body of work is known as the Copenhagen School.

The Copenhagen School develops a distinctive ‘constructivist/realist’ position within the larger academic debate on the meaning of security. It identifies five general categories or ‘sectors’ of security: military, environment, economic, societal, and political security. This allows for a focus on traditional as well as non-traditional issues. Within this framework, ‘securitization theory’ defines ‘security’ not as an objective condition but as the outcome of a specific social process. Securitization is understood as “the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics” (Buzan, Weaver and Wilde 1998 p. 23) In opposition, desecuritization involves shifting issues from an ‘emergency mode’ back to a normal political process – that is off the security agenda and into the normal realm of public political discourse.

According to the Copenhagen School’s theory of securitization, the means through which issues are said to become securitized are discursive ‘speech acts’.

⁵ Ken Booth, for example, questioned whose security existing approaches were designed to address. Depending on the referent, security analyses point to different threats and prescribe different solutions (Booth 1991).

In other words, ‘securitizing actors’ - which may be states, international organizations, NGOs, etc. – use the language of security to convince an audience of the existential nature of a threat. Thus, the focus of the theory is not on what security is in reality, but what is presented and successfully recognized as a threat.

Is this (kind of) definition of ‘securitization’ applicable to the phenomenon I explore in this thesis, i.e. the securitization of EU development policy? I will try to find out that that in the next section.

2.2 The definition of securitization and the EU development policy

The Copenhagen School’s approach is useful for the analysis of the securitization of EU development policy in many ways. First, it helps to identify ‘the securitizing actor(s)’, the ‘referent object’ (whose security interests and concerns are at stake) which is in this case, obviously, the European Union. Secondly, it shows how the process of ‘securitization’ is completed through the ‘speech act’, by using language. It is thus especially useful for identifying and describing existing cases of securitization, in this case of EU development policy. This is especially important for the discursive analysis I will conduct, where I am going to analyze the official documents to see if they have become imbued with the language of security.

Now, what does the Copenhagen School has to say about *how* the issue becomes securitized? “To *securitize* an issue means to take it out of the normal realm of political discourse and to signal a need for it to be addressed urgently and with exceptional means” (Hyde-Price, Adrian 2003) or, the case of securitization occurs when “a securitizing actor uses a rhetoric of existential threat, and thereby takes an issue out of what under those conditions is ‘normal politics’” (Buzan, Weaver, Wilde 1998).

This kind of definition (these kinds of definitions) is/are only partially applicable to the case I examine; in the case of my research subject, if I would strictly apply this definition it would appear as if the development policy is a threat which has to be addressed urgently. However, I want to explore if EU development policy is actually used as a means to address threats and is, in that sense, ‘taken out of the normal realm of political discourse’. We need a more flexible definition to allow for the various different types of securitization which can exist.

Therefore, *I propose the securitization framework to be considered as a contested political forum to put issues on or off the agenda*. That means that the securitization framework can be applied to EU development policy in order to explore if security issues are increasingly put on the development agenda, or, if security agenda increasingly includes development policy. In other words, I propose the securitization framework to be seen as a *politicized process* as

opposed to securitization understood as *crisis situation* by the Copenhagen School.

I will try to explore to what extent elements of EU development policy have become securitized, that is subsumed or subjugated within the wider context of EU security agenda. By subordinating development policy to wider security agenda, securitizing actors can seek *to treat it in a manner different to the normal rules and practices of development policy making and implementation*. The aim of securitization is thus to justify the imposition of (security-related) conditions and measures in the area of development policy that wouldn't otherwise be considered the norm in this policy domain. It is the exceptional circumstances of the post-9/11 war on terrorism—what the Copenhagen School describe as the 'existential threat'—that has allowed the securitizing actors (the European Community in this case) to adopt policies and procedures extra-ordinary to the norms of the development policy domain.

2.3 Methodology and plan of the work

The aim of this section is to inform the reader on the methodology that will be employed in conducting the research on the securitization of EU development policy and writing up this thesis.

The research question I will try to answer is: "To what extent has the EU development policy become securitized in the post-9/11 world"? In order to answer this question, I established the indicators of securitization and by checking their presence in EU development policy I will try to establish the degree of securitization.

In conducting my research on the securitization of EU development policy I will combine qualitative and quantitative research, that is I will employ *multi-strategy research* (Layder 1993). Multi-strategy research can be undertaken in many different ways. In my research, I will apply *the logic of triangulation* – that logic "implies that the results of an investigation employing a method associated with one research strategy are cross-checked against the results of using a method associated with the other research strategy" (Bryman 2001 p. 447).

In the first part of my research I will analyze the most important official documents that make the framework and the guidance of/for the EU development policy. I will compare documents published before and after 9/11 to see if there have been any changes in the rhetoric used in these documents. My aim is to establish if the language used in these documents indicate that development policy is 'treated in a manner different to the normal rules and practices of development policy making and implementation', i.e. to what extent has the EU development policy come to be articulated in the language of security in the post-9/11 world.

These documents are going to be interpreted through *qualitative content analysis*. That approach “comprises a searching-out of underlying themes in the materials being analysed” (Bryman 2001 p. 381).

One of the drawbacks of Copenhagen School’s theory of securitization is that it doesn’t take into account the impact of the rhetoric of securitization on policy. If ‘the aim of securitisation is to justify the imposition of (security-related) conditions and measures in the area of development policy that would not be considered the norm in this policy domain’, then it is necessary to explore if these security-related conditions and measures (justified by the securitization) are actually imposed in practice. If they are, then they confirm the securitization process and can be considered as (indirect) indicators of securitization in the same time.

Therefore, in the second part of my research, I will perform a reality check to the rhetoric pursued in these documents by analyzing institutional changes, changes in actual practices and aid flows, which confirm that the EU development policy is not only increasingly articulated in the language of security after 9/11; these developments confirm the securitization process in practice through the imposition of above-mentioned measures and policies.

Again, both institutional changes and diverted aid flows which would point to the increased subordination of development policy to the over-arching security priorities and interests of the EU also represent the indirect, material indicators of the securitization of EU development policy. That leads us into the next section dedicated to the indicators of securitization.

2.4 Indicators of securitization

In this section, I will try to explain how am I going to measure securitization of EU development policy, i.e. what am I going to use as the indicators of securitization, which tell us how an issue (or the policy) is securitized.

I propose two kinds of indicators of securitization for this research - the ‘primary’ indicators will be explored in the discursive analysis:

- The language and the increase of the rhetoric of security. As highlighted by the Copenhagen school, *language* is important because it is used by the key securitizing actors to put forward their agenda and to gain political capital. In this case I will analyze the language and the rhetoric pursued by the EU to see if it points to the subordination of development concerns to the over-arching security priorities of the EU, and
- The linkage of issues with another previously recognized threat into a ‘security continuum’ (an indicator not explored by the Copenhagen School).

As already stated, I argue that the influence of rhetoric on the development of policy must be taken into account in the securitization framework (which the Copenhagen School does not). The consequence of taking this into account is that additional (indirect, or ‘secondary’) indicators of securitization, which represent the practical implications of the rhetoric, have to be introduced into the analysis:

- Institutional and administrative changes (including integration - more or less institutional - of development policy with other external policies of the EU, specially with CFSP, which (can) lead to the subordination of development policy objectives to foreign and security policy priorities; introduction of security-related clauses into the development cooperation agreements with the developing world – security conditionality; introduction of new security-focused programmes funded from development resources and other similar measures).
- Resource allocation or new financial instruments, which include the diversion of existing aid from poverty reduction and ‘normal’ development policy activities to more security-relevant ones; as well as (in certain cases and to a lesser extent) the introduction of new financial instruments for the financing of security activities which would otherwise be spent on poverty reduction objectives.

Whatever definition of securitization we may choose, there are many difficulties with trying to list the key indicators of such a process. For example, there is the question of how much money needs to be allocated, or how substantial the administrative changes need to be, before some issue or policy is considered securitized. That’s why we can speak only about the signs and different degrees of securitization; and each case of the presence of some (of the) indicator(s) of securitization has/have to be carefully examined and explained.

2.5 Clarifications

Before I start with the research, it is necessary to clearly define the meaning of some of the terms that will be used in the thesis. This is of great importance, because different definitions of these terms would lead us to different results of the research. For instance, the inclusion of EU member states’ bilateral aid into the EU development assistance would give completely different picture than if only Community’s aid is concerned.

Development policy is at the heart of EU’s relations with the developing world - it is a shared competence between the European Community and the member states, where Community policy in the sphere of development cooperation is complementary to the policies pursued by the member states. When discussing the EU development policy, I will focus on the European Community’s development policy. Having in mind the focus of this programme (which is not the development policy as such), the primary purpose of this thesis will not be to address the (securitization of) development policy at the member states’ level, but at the European (Community) level.

Therefore, the primary focus of my research will not be the development policies pursued at the member states' level. However, as clearly stated in Art. 180 of the EC Treaty, "the Community and the Member States shall coordinate their policies on development cooperation and shall consult each other on their aid programmes, including in international organizations and during international conferences. They may undertake joint action." For instance, the Tripartite Statement 'European Consensus on Development' calls for the harmonization of actions between the member states' and the Community level. The first part of the Consensus addresses the objectives, principles, values, a shared thematic framework and agreed mechanisms of the EU development policy applying to the EU member states and the Community. In this respect, all these kinds of actions and statements at the EU level, which aim at harmonizing the member states' actions with the agreed policy at the EU level, can be included in the qualitative analysis of my research.

3 Analysis of the official documents

As I have already stated in the introduction, my research on the securitization of EU development policy will consist of two parts. In this, qualitative analysis-part of the research, I will analyze the language used in the most important official documents that make the framework and guide the development policy of the EU. I will perform this analysis in order to examine the possible presence (and the degree of that presence) of the indicators of securitization. I will try to establish if the language used in these documents indicate that development policy is increasingly ‘treated in a manner different to the normal rules and practices of development policy making and implementation’, i.e. if the EU development policy has come to be articulated in the language of security after 9/11.

Before I start with the analysis of these documents, I will make a short overview of the EU development policy, its proclaimed objectives and the legal framework within which it is functioning.

3.1 Overview of the EU development policy

The European Union holds a unique status on the international stage and among the donor community. It is the world’s largest donor, as it accounts for more than half of the world’s official development assistance. The Commission itself manages +/- 11% of the world total, having spent over € 7.5 billion in 2005 (European Commission and OECD 2006). That means that the European Commission manages one fifth of ODA delivered by the EU.

The origins of the EU development policy can be traced to the association of certain overseas countries and territories to the European Community when it was created in 1957. Many of these overseas countries and territories gained their independence over the following decade, and it was in the interest of both the European countries and the newly independent countries to continue working together within a new context created by the two successive Yaoundé Conventions in 1963 and 1969 (on Yaoundé Conventions in: Holland 2002 pp. 27-32).

The international climate in the early 1970s led to profound changes in the Community's development policy. The accession of the United Kingdom in 1973 created the need for a more effective cooperation framework with a much larger group of partners. These changes were reflected in the first Lomé Convention (1975). This was also the time when the cooperation links with the countries of

the Maghreb and the Mashreq were strengthened, and the EEC began to reach out to Asia and Latin America (ALA).

Today, the European Union is the world's leading development partner, in terms of aid, trade and direct investment. Together, the EU and its Member States provide 55% of all official international development aid.

Although the beginnings of the Community's development policy date from the signature of the Treaty of Rome, it is only since the Treaty of Maastricht came into force in 1993 that Community's development cooperation has enjoyed a specific legal basis (Articles 177 to 181 of the Treaty). As envisaged by the EC Treaty in Art. 177, (Official Journal of the European Communities, C 325/33, 2002) the goal of EC development policy is to encourage sustainable development that helps to eradicate poverty in developing countries and integrate these countries into the global economy. In addition to these economic and social objectives, there is a political plan: to help reinforce democracy and the rule of law, whilst promoting respect for human rights and basic freedoms.

These are the proclaimed goals of EU development policy. Therefore, it is expected that the EU development policy (all activities, projects and funds), led by just-mentioned concerns, is focused on developing countries "and more particularly the most disadvantaged among them" (*ibid.* p. 111).

As we can see, the EC Treaty, which is the legal basis for EC development cooperation policy, assigns the development policy with the objectives intrinsic to development cooperation - poverty reduction and sustainable development. But, what do other official documents say?

Over the past few years, European Union institutions have issued a number of policy documents and statements signalling a paradigm shift in the approach to the issue of security and development. These documents raise concerns about the specific role of development and humanitarian aid policies in the broader context of EU external policies. There are signs that long-term poverty reduction is losing ground as the primary objective, while security and stability are gaining importance. In the following sections I will analyze these documents and try to establish if these concerns are justified.

3.2 Guiding documents of the EU development policy

In this section I will analyze the most important documents issued for the field of development policy, documents that guide the development policy and form the 'General Development Framework'. These are the so called 'development policy statements' and I will analyze the last two issued – one in 2000 and the other in 2005. That way, I will be able to analyze the rhetoric used before and after 9/11 and see if there have been any changes.

3.2.1 Statement on the EC development policy 2000

This Statement was adopted by the Council and the Commission in 2000 and it sets out ‘a clear and coherent strategy for the European Community’s development cooperation policy with a view to maximising the Community value-added in this area, improving the quality and impact of its actions and responding to the new global challenges.’

The Statement confirms the commitment from the Treaty to poverty eradication as the main objective of Community’s development policy. It states that poverty reduction strategies must contribute to “the consolidation of peace and the prevention of conflict” in developing countries, as well as to the “strengthening of democracy, gradual integration into the world economy, to more awareness of the social and environmental aspects with a view to sustainable development, to equality between men and women and public and private capacity-building” (p. 11).

The Statement also envisages six areas on which Community’s activities should be refocused and none of these are security-related. However, ‘conflict prevention and conflict management’ were listed as one of the five ‘horizontal issues’, i.e. issues that must be incorporated in all aspects of development cooperation (p. 6). But, as already stated, nexus between security and development has always existed in some form, for a simple reason that these two are indivisible: there is no security without development, and there is no development without security.

Therefore, it is obvious that security concerns did not play a significant role in this statement, i.e. that its rhetoric was not imbued by security concerns and objectives and, thus, ‘securitized’.

Having in mind that this statement, together with the Treaty provisions, provided the main framework for the conduct of EU development policy, it is arguable that security issues were not priority at that time, and that development cooperation policy was guided by ‘normal’ development objectives such as poverty eradication and sustainable development.

3.2.2 European Consensus on Development

As we have seen in the previous sub-section, the framework for the Community’s development policy was provided by the Treaty and by the Statement adopted by the Council and the Commission in November 2000. The primary objective for Community’s development policy envisaged by the Statement was to combat world poverty. The question of whether that should still be the number-one goal began to arise during the course of the years. The answer ‘yes’ was not that obvious anymore, given the new priorities that have arisen for EU external action and the pressures on development cooperation policy. Therefore, the Commission launched an initiative for the review of this Statement, which was finalized by the adoption of the European Consensus on Development, in 2006. In one of the

reports issued during the debate, the Commission states: “A number of important points from the 2000 Statement need to be reiterated for reasons of credibility and relevance. A long-term policy should not be subjected to radical changes every five years”. Nevertheless “a repositioning is needed to ensure the very survival of development cooperation in a turbulent context where new priorities, particularly the issue of security, are attracting the attention of the public and the political decision-makers” (European Commission, DG Development 2005 p. 21). This statement clearly shows that the Commission acknowledges the danger of development policy being subordinated to over-arching security priorities and objectives.

After years of debate and dramatically changed international environment, the EU adopted new development policy statement - on 20 December 2005, the Presidents of the Commission, Parliament and the Council signed the ‘European Consensus’. For the first time in fifty years of cooperation, the Brussels consensus defines the framework of common principles within which the EU and its twenty-five member states will each implement their development policies in a spirit of complementarity. The main incentive behind the adoption of European Consensus was to improve aid effectiveness through enhanced coordination and harmonisation between the member states’ and the EC level.

The chief objective of the EU development policy remains the reduction of poverty and the achievement of Millennium Development Goals. As for security-related matters ‘Addressing the state fragility’ was introduced as one of the Common Principles of the Community’s aid policy (The European Consensus 2006 p. 8). State fragility indeed represents an obstacle for the development of poor countries; however, the phenomenon of state fragility received a world-wide attention of politicians, diplomats and scholars exactly after the attacks of 9/11, committed by the terrorists which were given the sponsorship and the safe-heaven by failed states such as Afghanistan. It became obvious that fragile and failed states represent a big threat to the security of North. Thus, the introduction of this principle can be interpreted as a response of Europe to the new (and) global security challenges and threats that the world faced after September the 11th and as Europe’s contribution to the ‘war on terror’ through development policy measures.

The second part of this document sets out the policy guiding the implementation of the common EU vision on development. One of the principles for the implementation of this vision is the ‘principle of concentration’ which “will guide the Community in all its country and regional programming” (p. 21), but actually represents the principle of labour division by which the Community will deal with the areas of activity in which it has the comparative advantage. One of these nine areas is ‘Conflict prevention and fragile states’ (p. 26). This is for the first time that ‘conflict prevention’ and activities aimed at fragile states are officially proclaimed for the areas in which the Community will conduct its development policy.

The introduction of these principles is not sufficient to call development cooperation policy securitized – “the primary and overarching objective of EU development cooperation”...remains...”the eradication of poverty in the context of sustainable development, including pursuit of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)” (The European Consensus 2006 p. 4). However, the inclusion of ‘addressing state fragility’ as a common principle, and the ‘conflict prevention and fragile states’ as one of the areas of Community’s activity can not be perceived out of the post-9/11 context. Certainly the development policy can contribute to the prevention of conflict and state failure in the developing world, and certainly the development is not possible without peace and stability – however, if development policy is employed to address state fragility (and to prevent conflicts) as a security problem for the North and for the donors (EU in this case), then the development policy doesn’t serve its proclaimed goal of helping the poor countries, but protecting the security interests of the EU. The point to be made here is that “donor interest in many of the so-called ‘failed and fragile states’ is seen through the prism of the potential threat of the latter to Northern security interests” (RoA Report 2006 p. 7) in the post-9/11 environment.

It is reasonable to conclude that these novelties, specially the introduction of ‘addressing state fragility’ as one of the common principles of the development policy, represent the signs of securitization of EU development policy.

Having in mind the context in which ‘addressing state fragility’ is envisaged as one of the principles and areas of activity for the EC development policy, I argue that this move has primarily been done with an aim to protect EU security interests – which point to the development policy being, at least to some extent, ‘treated in a manner different to the normal rules and practices of development policy making and implementation.’

However, if ‘the aim of securitization is to justify the imposition of (security-related) conditions and measures in the area of development policy that would not be considered the norm in this policy domain’, in the second part of my research I will analyze if this slightly changed rhetoric towards the securitization is followed by changes in actual practice of the development policy – these changes would then not only just ‘follow the rhetoric’ and confirm the securitization process, but would also represent an indirect indicators of securitization.

To conclude, I argue that the introduction of ‘addressing state fragility’ as one of the common principles and ‘conflict prevention and state fragility’ as one of the area of Community’s development policy activities are the indicators of securitization of EU development policy. Given the context I explained, they represent an increase in rhetoric and use of the language of security with an aim ‘to treat development policy in a manner different to the normal rules and practices of development policy making and implementation’; i.e. in order to use it for the achievement of EU security objectives and interests.

They also represent another indicator of securitization I proposed - the linkage of issues with another previously recognized threat (through the development of 'security continuum').

3.2 Partnership agreement with ACP countries

In this section, I will analyze the most important development cooperation agreement of the EU and the developing world. Since partnership with the ACP countries is at the heart of EU development policy, representing the most important aspect of that policy, I will analyze the agreement that regulate this relationship – the Cotonou Partnership Agreement.

3.2.1 Cotonou Partnership Agreement 2000

Cooperation between the countries of sub-Saharan Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific (the ACP states) and the European Community (EC) dates back to the creation of the EC and is a particularly important aspect of the European Union's development policy and its policy on external relations in general⁶.

The last, Lomé IV Convention (EU-ACP relations were based on the system of Lomé conventions for 25 years), expired in 2000 and a new partnership agreement was signed in Cotonou later that year (Cotonou Partnership Agreement 2000). This agreement establishes a new approach and represents a new stage in the partnership whilst retaining the main instruments of the partnership (institutions, financial instruments, etc.). It aims to strengthen the political dimension of the partnership, to provide new flexibility and to entrust the ACP states with additional responsibilities.

The Agreement's main objectives are the reduction and eventual eradication of poverty and the gradual integration of African, Caribbean and Pacific States into the global economy, whilst adhering to the aims of sustainable development (Cotonou Partnership Agreement 2000 Art. 1, p. 7) and in that sense it doesn't differ from previous (Lomé) conventions.

⁶ The 1957 Treaty of Rome establishing the European Economic Community (EEC) initially formed the legal basis for cooperation with this group of countries which at the time were, for the most part, colonies of certain Member States. The Yaoundé I and II Conventions between the AAMS (Association of African and Malagasy States) and the EEC, signed in 1963 and 1969 respectively, constituted the first step in the creation of the partnership. Since 1975 relations between the ACP states and the EC have been governed by the Lomé Conventions, which have established a close, far-reaching and complex partnership. Cooperation focused on two key elements: economic and commercial cooperation, and development cooperation. Lomé IV, the last Lomé Convention, was signed in 1989 for a duration of 10 years and introduced many important new ideas. The promotion of human rights and respect for democracy became key elements of the partnership whilst new objectives such as enhancing the position of women and protecting the environment were incorporated in the framework of cooperation.

The partnership is based on five interdependent pillars: a comprehensive political dimension, promotion of participatory approaches, development strategies and priority for the objective of poverty reduction, the establishment of a new framework for economic and trade cooperation and reform of financial cooperation. One of the key elements of political dimension (Title II, p. 13), as envisaged by the convention, is ‘Peace-building policies, conflict prevention and resolution’ (Art. 11, p. 18) - partnership in this field is to concentrate on regional initiatives and on building local capacities. However, provisions to ensure that financial resources are not diverted from development objectives are also included – therefore, introduction of these policies should be seen as the introduction of policies which serve as a precondition to development, and in that sense are ‘normal’ to development policy making and implementation.

3.2.2 Cotonou Partnership Agreement Review 2005

The Cotonou Partnership Agreement was reviewed in 2005 (Cotonou Agreement Review 2005). Amendments to the agreement that stirred most of the controversy are amendments to the article 11 on the fight against terrorism (Art. 11a) and on the cooperation in countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (Art. 11b).

The Madrid Declaration adopted at the EU – Latin America & Caribbean Summit was the first to link aid and trade agreements with ACP countries to their willingness to cooperate on security. The Declaration also stated that “the commitment of countries to combat terrorism on an ongoing basis” would be an “influencing factor in EU relations with them” (European Council 2004).

This policy was put to the test in February 2005 during the five-year review of the Cotonou Agreement with the 78 ACP countries. The fight against proliferation of WMD became an essential element of the Agreement; the EU undertook to provide ACP states with additional resources apart from the European Development Fund to carry this out (Robinson 2006 p. 82). For the fight against terrorism a new article on cooperation has been added. Robinson warns that “this new insistence on ‘security conditionality’ has the potential to open the door to the use of development funds for security purposes and increases the need to monitor closely how funds are spent” (*ibid.*)

The introduction of these new clauses represent clear signs of the securitization of EU development policy and they were harshly criticized by the aid community (RoA Report 2006 p. 10, DFID 2005⁷).

These amendments represent a good example of an increase in the use of the language of security with an intention to employ development policy to serve

⁷ “Aid programmes should be linked to performance against poverty reduction and not to performance against global security goals” (DFID 2005).

other-than-development purposes; i.e. with an intention to use the development policy to tackle problems which the EU perceives primarily as the threat to its own security. Thus, these novelties were not introduced with the primary aim to increase security and development of the developing world, but to protect the security and the security interests of the EU. Furthermore, ‘fight against terrorism’ and ‘cooperation in countering the proliferation of WMD’ are distinctively ‘post-9/11 topics’ and the introduction of these clauses can not be perceived out of this context – their inclusion clearly follow the wider, global efforts to combat the terrorism and other ‘post-9/11 threats’.

3.3 European Security Strategy

In this section, I will analyze the document that provides the guidance for European security policy – European Security Strategy (European Council 2003). This document is of great importance for our analysis because, while discussing the EU security policy and its place in the overall framework of EU’s external policies, it touches upon the role of development cooperation policy in the changed security environment that brought about new global challenges and threats. The aim of this section is to explore if the role of EU development policy (in this new post-9/11 security environment) is framed in the language of security, i.e. if the role of development cooperation policy is (for)seen by the ESS as subordinated to European security priorities.

The ESS, agreed in December 2003, was welcomed by many as a “holistic and comprehensive understanding of security and as a response to what is seen as the unilateralism of the US security strategy” (Robinson 2006 p. 77). “No single country is able to tackle today’s complex problems on its own,” the ESS states. “None of these threats are purely military nor can any be tackled by purely military means. Each requires a mixture of instruments” (European Council 2003). Thus, sustainable security policy is not only a matter of military capacities but is based on the ability to use, at the earliest possible point, a combination of civil and military instruments to defuse both political and socioeconomic crises before they turn violent. This combination thus implies the use of a broad range of development-, foreign-, economic-, and environmental-policy instruments and the classic security-policy set consisting of police cooperation, intelligence cooperation, and, in the extreme case, military intervention. Consequently, the ESS calls for a closer dovetailing of various EU external policies’ instruments, as well as for efforts to gear them to the goals of security policy.

“But” the Strategy warns, “if we are to make a contribution that matches our potential, we need to be more active, more coherent and more capable” (p. 11). Further elaborating on the coherence, the Strategy is calling for bringing-together “the different instruments and capabilities: European assistance programmes and the European Development Fund, military and civilian capabilities from Member States and other instruments”, stating that “all of these can have an impact on our security and on that of third countries. Security is the first condition for

development. Diplomatic efforts, development, trade and environmental policies, should follow the same agenda” (p. 13).

As we can see, the new European Security Strategy recommends that foreign and security policy should more closely dovetail with development policy. And here we encounter the question that raised concerns among most of the authors cited in the review of the literature on my research subject – if the EU efforts to enhance the coherence of its external affairs will lead to development policy becoming subordinated to EU’s security priorities and interests (Mackie and Rossini 2004, Woods 2004, Beall *et al.* 2006, Gavas 2006, Robinson 2006).

I find the rhetoric used in ESS to define (the new) role(s) for EU development policy to represent an indicator of securitization of development policy. In the third part of the document (‘Policy implications for Europe’, p. 11), the Strategy calls the full spectrum of instruments for crisis management and conflict prevention to be employed, “including political, diplomatic, military and civilian, trade and *development activities*”. Thus, development activities are seen as one of “the instruments for crisis management and conflict prevention”.

This is an obvious use of ‘the language of security’ which takes the development policy out of the normal realm of development policy discourse; so, the securitizing actors, in this case the sponsors of the Strategy, employ the rhetoric that ‘treat development policy in a manner different to the normal rules and practices of development policy making and implementation’. However, if ‘the aim of securitization is to justify the imposition of (security-related) conditions and measures in the area of development policy that would not be considered the norm in this policy domain’, this ‘rhetoric of securitization’ will have to receive confirmation in the actual changes of the practice of development policy.

3.4 DAC official documents

The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) is the principal body through which the OECD deals with issues related to co-operation with developing countries. It is a key forum of major bilateral donors. They work together to increase the effectiveness of their common efforts to support sustainable development. DAC consists of 23 members, of which 22 are the biggest bilateral donors and the 23rd is the Commission of the EU, in charge of the development policy at the EU level. Members of DAC are expected to have certain common objectives concerning the conduct of their aid programmes. To this end, the so called ‘guidelines’ have been prepared for development practitioners in capitals and in the field.

The analysis of these guidelines is of great analytical value for my research, because members of DAC are obliged to follow them; thus, they belong to the group of documents that frame and guide the EU development policy. Furthermore, DAC guidelines are important because they confirm the argument

brought up at the beginning that the phenomenon of the securitization of EU development policy reflects the wider trend at the international level.

I will analyze two documents: *Helping Prevent Violent Conflict* (The DAC Guidelines 2001), a reference point for development co-operation actors in this field, and *A Development Co-operation Lens on Terrorism Prevention* (DAC Guidelines and Reference Series 2003), document which was endorsed by the DAC High Level Meeting in 2003 and complements *Helping Prevent Violent Conflict*.

3.4.1 Helping Prevent Violent Conflict

Just as in the case of development policy statements from 2000 and 2005, these two documents were adopted before and after 9/11 and, thus, differ significantly in defining the role of development cooperation in the resolution of security problems in the developing world.

The main difference is that conflict prevention (and, thus, security) is seen as a precondition and as “central to poverty reduction and sustainable development” (DAC Guidelines 2001 p. 17) before the 9/11. Thus, even when development policy is engaged in crisis and conflict management activities - the so called “conflict-related development assistance” (*ibid.* p. 3) – its aim is to achieve peace and security in the developing world, i.e. its long-term objective remains sustainable development, and ‘conflict-related assistance’ serves exactly that purpose.

Guidelines 2001 envisage some new, security-related responsibilities for the development cooperation: “Development agencies now accept the need to work *in* and *on* conflicts rather than *around* them, and make peace-building the main focus when dealing with conflict situations. This is a significant step toward long-term engagement and away from an earlier short-term concentration on post-conflict recovery and reconstruction efforts” (*ibid.* p. 17). However, these can not be seen as signs of securitization, cause it is security of the developing world which is addressed as an objective and as a precondition for sustainable development by the donors.

3.4.2 A Development Cooperation Lens on Terrorism Prevention

September the 11th brought the issue of terrorism into the centre of international attention - the international community, aid organisations, governments, the European Union, the United Nations system and the OECD have all embarked on a series of reflections on how to best support global efforts to combat terrorism.

After 9/11 the OECD Development Assistance Committee has held few senior level discussions on terrorism and *A Development Cooperation Lens on Terrorism Prevention* was a product of these discussions. This document covers

possible roles and policy options for the donor community and builds on the policies, principles and strategies agreed in the DAC Guidelines *Helping Prevent Violent Conflict*.

As explained in the previous sub-section, conflict-related development assistance envisaged by *Helping Prevent Violent Conflict* is seen through the prism of pre-9/11 thinking and in consistence with the Monterrey consensus, promoting the idea of a win-win situation where aid can serve the security interests of both donor and receiver. However, in *A Development Cooperation Lens on Terrorism Prevention*, development policy was assigned with a distinctively different role. Although the prevention of terrorism (as a form of a conflict) can be seen as a part of wider conflict-prevention efforts, the rhetoric in which the role of development policy - in tackling the threat of terrorism and the roots of terrorism - is framed in this document, points to the change of priorities.

While the security-development nexus is construed positively in *Helping Prevent Violent Conflict*, the linkage has taken on different form in *Lens on Terrorism Prevention*. Development cooperation is viewed as a means of addressing the looming threats of terrorism emanating from the global South towards the North. It is the security for the North that is a central guiding principle for development in the South:

“Development cooperation does have an important role to play in helping to deprive terrorists of popular support...and donors can reduce support for terrorism by working towards preventing the conditions that give rise to conflict in general and that convince disaffected groups to embrace terrorism in particular...this may have implications for priorities including budget allocations and levels and definitions of ODA eligibility criteria” (DAC Guidelines 2003 p. 11).

The primary incentive for the employment of development cooperation policy in tackling the threat of terrorism deriving from the developing world is not the security and subsequent development of the global South, but the protection of donor countries from terrorism. This represents the employment of development policy for the achievement of donors’ security interests and concerns – the securitization of development policy in this case is done by linking ‘issues’ (poverty and (under)development) with another previously recognized threat (terrorism) in a ‘security continuum’. DAC uses language, by rhetorically packaging terrorism with conditions that fall within the realm and primary concerns of development co-operation (“conditions that allow terrorists to be politically successful, build and expand constituencies, find recruits, establish and finance terrorist organisations, and secure safe-havens”, *ibid.*) to securitize development cooperation policy.

Lens on Preventing Terrorism not only uses rhetoric to securitize development policy, but announces concrete measures that confirm this change in rhetoric: “Applying a development co-operation lens to terrorism prevention has

implications for key policy and programme areas that may require donor agencies and their governments to calibrate approaches to efforts already underway. This may have implications for priorities including budget allocations and levels and definitions of ODA eligibility criteria” (*ibid.*). However, these potential changes will be discussed in the next chapter.

4 Institutional changes and resource allocations

One of the drawbacks of the Copenhagen School is that it doesn't take into account the impact of securitization on policy. Once an issue is rhetorically adopted and put on the political agenda, it must affect the development of policy for it to be effective in practice. Otherwise, the activities have only been rhetorically securitized with no practical result.

The aim of this chapter is to explore if there have been any practical results of the securitization process researched in the previous chapter (i.e. if there have been any institutional, or changes in actual practices (*modus operandi*) and aid flows; if any new (financial) instruments and/or co-operation programmes have been introduced) that point to the development policy being increasingly used for the fulfilment of EU security interests and priorities (on the account of the proclaimed objectives of poverty reduction and sustainable development).

These practical implications (of the securitization process) are of great relevance for my thesis, because they would confirm that the process of securitization is actually taking place.

Exploring the impact, practical implications of the securitization on policy, the process of securitization is actually receiving confirmation from the developments in practice. In that way, these institutional changes, and changes in actual practices and aid flows, represent indirect indicators of securitization. If security-related amendments on the Cotonou Agreement result in the introduction of security conditionality in the EU-ACP relations, this institutional novelty confirm the rhetoric used in an official agreement, and thus represent an indirect indicator of the securitization process. Now, what are the practical changes in the field of development policy (or that affect development policy) that confirm the securitization process explored above and that point to the development policy being increasingly subordinated to the wider EU security agenda?

4.1 Institutional changes

4.1.1 Security conditionality

The introduction of 'security conditionality' into the relations with the developing world represents a clear practical implication and an indicator of the securitization of EU development policy. The use of fight against terrorism as a systematic feature of the political dialogue with developing countries represent a clear

indicator of rhetorical securitization of development co-operation; this rhetorical securitization is followed by the the revision of EU political conditionality to include counter-terror priorities - “systematic integration of a clause on cooperation in the fight against terrorism and weapons of mass destruction in all agreements signed with developing countries” (Gavas 2006 p. 5) implies automatic application of this clause in the relations with the developing world⁸ and, thus, change in institutional set up of the co-operation programmes.

Furthermore, *Cooperation in countering the proliferation of WMD* (Cotonou Partnership Agreement Review 2005 Art. 11b) now represents an ‘Essential element’ of the agreement, meaning that it represents an obligatory condition for aid and for the cooperation with the respective country.

Aid community warned against this new insistence on ‘security conditionality’ arguing that it has the potential to open the door to the use of development funds for security purposes and increases the need to monitor closely how funds are spent (APRODEV 2005 p. 20). “Aid programmes should be linked to performance against poverty reduction and not to performance against global security goals” (DFID 2005).

4.1.2 Change of the ODA eligibility mandate

This sub-section is building on the analysis of DAC Guidelines from the previous chapter and is particularly important for two reasons: first, it shows how developments at the international level affect the EU development policy; and, second, how the rhetoric and the process of securitization is followed by the developments in practice.

As already stated in the discussion of DAC Guidelines, *A Development Cooperation Lens on Terrorism Prevention* not only uses rhetoric to securitize development policy, but announces concrete measures that confirm this change in rhetoric, such as “possible implications for the definitions of ODA eligibility criteria” (DAC Guidelines 2003 p. 11).

Since September 2001, Official Development Assistance (ODA) mandates have been amended and the allocation of development aid distorted to reflect the foreign policy priorities of some major donors to prevent and fight terrorism and

⁸ In 2001 the Commission began drawing up Country Strategy Papers, which intended to provide a more coherent approach to external relations with third states. Subsequently, ministers have discussed integrating new issues of ‘migration, terrorism and sustainable development’ into these papers. The problem is that in the name of stability, security and conflict prevention, aid can rapidly end up driven more by the security interests of the donor than by the development needs of the recipient.

to support northern global security interests (RoA Report 2006, Box 1: Changing mandates for ODA: giving priority to security, p. 10).

Changing mandates for ODA in donor countries have been accompanied by a vigorous debate within the OECD Development Assistance Committee to expand the criteria for what constitutes an aid activity. Since 1969, donors have agreed within the DAC on the common and detailed criteria for donor expenditures that can be reported as ODA in relation to the ODA target of 0.7% of their GNI. The current DAC criteria for ODA are already quite broad (see in RoA Report 2006, p. 11).

Explicitly *excluded* from these criteria are military aid and the enforcement aspects of peacekeeping (DAC 2001). But donors are allowed to include a number of related areas such as rehabilitation assistance to demobilize soldiers, training in customs and border control procedures, counter-narcotics activities, disposal of weapons and landmines, and the training of police forces in civil police functions (but not in counter-subversive methods or suppression of political dissent)⁹.

In March 2005 the DAC reported the outcome of the latest round of discussions about whether new areas of aid could be classed as ODA (OECD/DAC 2005). There was agreement to extend eligibility to the six items¹⁰. The DAC already excludes from ODA the supply or financing of military equipment or services and use of military personnel to control civil disobedience. The DAC discussed two other items (in March 2005) – training the military in non-military matters, such as human rights, and extending the coverage of peacekeeping activities. These were not considered appropriate for ODA (unlike the six new items, they currently involve large sums, mostly from defence budgets) but the debate is far from over. DAC members will return to the question of non-military training for the military and support to peace-building capacities with ODA resources at the DAC High Level Meeting in 2007. Meanwhile, some European donors continue to work in the EU, the G8 and with the African Union to build consensus for these adjustments.

⁹ See detailed discussion of reportable ODA and security issues in Mollett, H. “Official Development Assistance (ODA): Conflict and Security Issues”, Draft Discussion Paper for CONCORD, 2004, pp. 1-3.

¹⁰ 1) Management of security expenditure through improved civilian oversight and democratic control of budgeting, management, accountability and auditing of security expenditure. 2) Enhancing civil society’s role in the security system to help ensure that it is managed in accordance with democratic norms and principles of accountability, transparency and good governance. 3) Security system reform to improve democratic governance and civilian control. 4) Supporting legislation for preventing the recruitment of child soldiers. 5) Controlling, preventing and reducing the proliferation of small arms and light weapons. 6) Civilian activities for peace-building, conflict prevention and conflict resolution (OECD/DAC 2005).

Can the inclusions agreed in March 2005 be considered as practical implications of the securitization process described in the section on DAC Guidelines? Reactions vary: number 6 is uncontroversial; 4 and 5, as examples of DDR (disarmament, demobilisation and re-integration), could be seen as classic cases of ‘turning swords into ploughshares’. With the first three, it could be argued that the security services should be democratically controlled in the first place, without the need for ODA support: why is management more acceptable as ODA than security force activity on the ground?

Unsurprisingly, aid community warned that “*No further erosion* should be a guiding principle, but there may also be a case to explore the ‘roll-back’ of eligibility for quasi-military expenditures already allowed” (APRODEV 2005 p. 25). However, it is not suggested that the international community should not provide the resources required to address urgent conflict and security concerns, but that “including the disbursements for a broader range of activities for military aspects of peace operations or for the prevention of terrorism will only dilute the public understanding of the purpose of aid. It would effectively divert scarce ODA resources from poverty eradication” (RoA Report 2006 p. 14).

What was the purpose of this sub-section? ODA eligibility criteria are important for our research – they are set up by the Development Assistance Committee, and one of its members is the European Commission representing the EC development cooperation policy. The discussion about what counts as ODA is about ‘where to draw the line’ - these criteria are important because they oblige the EU in its aid disbursements (i.e. in the selection of activities which can be funded from development resources).

As we can see, the new, securitized rhetoric present in DAC documents reflected into these (above-described) strong pressures to change aid mandates and to allow the inclusion of security-focused programmes (i.e. military, defence and security sector reform programmes) as eligible for financing from development funds. It is debatable if these new ODA eligible programmes were introduced with a primary aim to protect donors’ or aid recipients’ security. However, given the rhetoric pursued in DAC Guidelines, the post-9/11 context, the world-wide present tendency of amending ODA mandates to reflect the foreign policy priorities of donors and constant and new pressures on DAC to further expand eligibility criteria to encompass new military-related co-operation programmes, these developments can be seen as practical implications and reflections of the securitization process described in the previous chapter – that certainly affect the EU development policy as well, specially having in mind that there was also “strong pressure from certain EU Member States to review the DAC criteria in order to integrate security concerns” (Gavas 2006 p. 5).

4.1.3 Efforts to enhance the coherence of external policies

Most of the existing research on my topic, reviewed in the first chapter, deals with the efforts made by the EU to integrate all external policies into the coherent framework of EU external relations. Thus, most of the authors (except for Faust and Messner 2004) raise concerns that this integration will lead to the subordination of development policy to over-arching security and foreign policy interests of the EU. European Security Strategy, analyzed in the previous chapter, called for the dovetailing of development policy with the European security and foreign policy - I found the language used to frame the role of development policy in the Strategy as the sign of securitization of EU development policy. But, was this rhetoric followed by any concrete moves that would give a reality feed-back to these indicators of securitization. In answering this question, one has to bear in mind that the process of external policies' integration is an on-going one and that, thus, we can talk only about tendencies, and can not give clear-cut answers.

The EU's attempts to enhance coherence in external relations have provoked concern among development agencies (both governmental and non-governmental) that EU development assistance will become subservient to security. The EU Commission has sought to allay these fears (European Commission 2004). However, several factors weigh into how this may work out.

As already stated, institutional changes to effect greater coherence among instruments aimed at security and development assistance goals could push development considerations down the agenda. At present the EU has streamlined the governance of its External Relations aid budget, channelling it through EuropeAid rather than through four different Directorates General. But, wider constitutional changes are likely to further affect these arrangements. At the political level, it has been proposed that a European Foreign Minister, sitting in both the Council and the Commission, would take charge of external policies. At the institutional level, the EU budget would group all external actions items under the heading 'The EU as a Global Partner' (*ibid.*). Subsequent instruments would include 'economic cooperation and development' and 'security'¹¹. These two items could even be fused so as to put development cooperation in with all Common Foreign and Security Policy funding (Mackie and Rossini 2004). The result is that alongside foreign and security policy, development assistance may find itself with a weak institutional footing, squarely under foreign policy leadership.

¹¹ The others are: humanitarian aid; pre-accession; a neighbourhood instrument for cross-border cooperation; and macro-financial assistance.

4.2 New financial instruments and aid flows

The aim of the last section was to show that the increased rhetoric of securitization explained in the previous chapter was followed by and had practical implications in certain institutional and changes in actual practices of the EU development cooperation policy. Thus, these changes also represent indirect (or secondary) indicators of securitization by confirming the rhetoric pursued in the official documents. In this section, I will perform an additional ‘reality check’ to this rhetoric by analyzing changes in resource allocations that took place after 9/11, and that point to the increased use of EU development aid for the achievement of EU security objectives and interests.

4.2.1 The new framework for the funding of external assistance

The European Commission replaced the existing range of financial instruments for the delivery of external assistance with a simpler, more efficient framework. Instead of the current wide range of geographical and thematic instruments that have grown up in an ad-hoc manner over time, the new framework will comprise of only six instruments, four of them new. The four new instruments are: an Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA), a European Neighbourhood and Partnership instrument, a Development Cooperation and Economic Cooperation instrument (DCEC), and an Instrument for Stability. Two existing instruments, for Humanitarian Aid and for Macro Financial Assistance, are not in need of modification, and will be maintained.

What stirred controversy was the fact that the largest instrument (DCEC), meant to deliver the Union’s contribution to the Millennium Development Goals, is set to take a lower share of spending, relative to more security-focused instruments, in the years up to 2013. “Although all figures are projected to increase from year to year, the increases for pre-accession and neighbourhood (largely middle-income) countries and for stability are greater and are at the expense of the share of aid allocated to Development Cooperation and Economic Cooperation instrument, the budget which includes aid to most low-income countries” (Robinson p. 82). DCEC would suffer a drop in share from 56 % to 49 % over the seven years.

Furthermore, the parameters of the instruments are not designed to follow the criteria¹² set by the Development Assistance Committee of OECD for ODA, making it impossible to track what share of external relations’ spending is allocated to poverty reduction.

¹² The so called ‘ODA eligibility criteria’ represent criteria agreed by the DAC members on what constitutes an aid activity. Since 1969, donors have agreed within the DAC on the common and detailed criteria for donor expenditures that can be reported as ODA in relation to the ODA target of 0.7% of their GNI.

Aid community expressed concerns over such developments stating that “if the EU is serious in its commitment to long-term development and the attainment of the MDGs, the share allocated to DCEC should increase at least *proportionately* with the overall increase in the external relations envelope instead of the decreasing share envisaged by the Commission and the Parliament” (APRODEV 2005 p. 22). Furthermore, since there is no clear dividing line between activities eligible for funding from the DCEC and the Stability Instrument “in budgetary terms, there is no protected space for the fight against poverty” (*ibid.*).

The new set up of the framework for the funding of external assistance seems to confirm concerns expressed earlier on that institutional changes to effect greater coherence among instruments aimed at security and development assistance goals could push development considerations down the agenda. Just as in the case of other on-going or envisaged institutional changes aimed at the enhancement of external policies’ coherence (analyzed in the previous section) this new financial framework represent a tendency that confirm the rhetoric pursued in the European Security Strategy and the proposed constitutional treaty.

4.2.2 African Peace Facility and the Stability Instrument

In this sub-section, I will analyze two newly-introduced financial instruments of which the African Peace Facility (ACP-EC Council of Ministers 2003) represents a clear case of the reallocation of aid resources for security purposes, and the Stability Instrument (The European Parliament and the Council 2006) may represent the replication of this case on the long-term basis.

African Peace Facility (APF) is a programme launched within the EU-ACP partnership as a part of EU efforts from 2004 to establish cooperation focused on facilitating African-led solutions to the continent’s problems – thus, the Commission launched this €250 million African Peace Facility programme, through which the EC financed peace-keeping undertaken by the African Union (AU).

The approval of this grant stirred controversy because Member States funded it by shaving 1.5% off the development allocation of each African country in the European Development Fund despite the fact that this does not qualify as ODA (Gavas 2006 p. 6). This was meant to be a one-off decision but the framing of the new Stability Instrument now provides the opportunity to replicate this type of support from the EC budget. Its aims are to respond to crises in order to re-establish the condition for regular aid and to cooperate in confronting global and regional trans-border challenges, technological threats and weapons proliferation. However, with the exception of some elements of peace support operations, most assistance delivered will qualify as ODA eligible, meaning that a portion of EU development aid will be diverted to this new instrument which makes no mention of poverty eradication.

4.2.3 Breach of ALA Regulation

Another case of the development resources' allocation for security purposes is the breach of ALA Regulation. In 2005, the EU's Asia & Latin America (ALA) Member State Management Committee voted through a project in the Philippines that includes intelligence capacity-building, border control and counter-terrorism initiatives, financed by development funds governed under the ALA Regulation. The case was looked at by the European Parliament, which has recently initiated legal proceedings against the European Commission at the European Court of Justice. The main aim of the contested decision is to combat terrorism by implementing United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001) on the fight against terrorism. However, the proclaimed aim of the ALA Regulation is to "aid development by means of financial, technical and economic cooperation". According to the European Parliament, a measure intended to help the government of the Philippines make its borders more secure, with the aim of combating terrorism, does not comply with the ALA Regulation and is therefore illegal. The decision of the Court is still pending¹³.

4.2.4 Allocations for Afghanistan and Iraq

When talking about the diversion of aid to national security priorities as a worldwide phenomenon triggered by the events of 9/11, trends since 2001 demonstrate a significant diversion of *new* aid resources towards the foreign policy priorities of the donor countries, particularly in Afghanistan and Iraq. While donors did not reallocate *pre-existing* aid money to national security priorities after 2001, many donors made new supplementary budget allocations to meet commitments flowing from the broad-based 'war on terror' (Woods 2004 and 2005). These large supplementary increases in assistance (not all of it ODA eligible) have been spent in security strategic countries, rather than the poorest and most vulnerable.

The EU has devoted significant resources to the reconstruction of Afghanistan and Iraq. The proposed commitments for activities in Iraq in 2005 were 190 million EUR, up from 160 million in 2004 and 29 million in 2003 (source: Preliminary Draft Budget 2005¹⁴). Meanwhile, the EU pledged a multi-annual contribution of 1 billion EUR to Afghanistan from the EU Budget at the January 2002 conference: hence, the budget line for Afghanistan reconstruction in 2005 was 183 million EUR, as it had been in 2004. Taking account of increases in the External Relations budget of 389 million EUR from 2003 to the preliminary proposals for

¹³ See in: Official Journal of the European Union C 10/15, 14 January 2006: http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2006/c_010/c_01020060114en00140015.pdf.

¹⁴ Preliminary draft budget 2005. See http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/afghanistan/news/ip04_687.htm, for figures on Afghanistan

2005, these programmes may have been funded by additional appropriations rather than displacement of other programmes. However, the increase of only 0.3% year-on-year between 2003 and 2004 for the budget line for cooperation with southern Africa suggests there may have been reallocations (Woods 2005 p. 15).

5 Conclusions

What was the aim of this thesis and what conclusions can we draw from it? The aim was to establish the extent to which the EU development policy had been securitized in the post-9/11 environment. In order to that, I have analyzed the most important official documents, issued before and after 9/11, that make the framework within which the EU development policy functions - development policy statements, Cotonou Agreement, European Security Strategy and DAC Guidelines. My intention was to establish if the rhetoric pursued in these documents had changed, becoming imbued by security concerns and, thus, securitized.

Given that objective, I have proposed the definition of securitization which I used to establish if EU development policy became securitized. Building on Copenhagen School's definition and modifying it, I have proposed the securitization framework to be considered as a contested political forum to put issues on or off the agenda. The aim of such kind of securitization is to justify the imposition of security-related measures and policies in the field of development cooperation (that, otherwise, would not be considered the norm in this policy domain) which would address/deal with security threats emanating from developing world.

I consider the proposed definition and the understanding of securitization - as a *politicized process* and not only as a *crisis situation* - to be the main theoretical contribution of this thesis (specially having in mind that they haven't been explored by the Copenhagen School).

After defining the process of securitization, i.e. *when* the process of securitization occurs, I have established the key indicators which tell us *how* an issue is securitized. Two indicators are of special importance for the discourse analysis I have conducted: as highlighted by the Copenhagen school, 'language' is important because it is used by the key securitizing actors to put forward their agenda; however, I proposed another indicator not explored by the Copenhagen School - the linkage of issues with another previously recognized threat into a 'security continuum'.

Since we can talk about the securitization of EU development policy only as about the process and the tendency, my intention was to establish the presence of these indicators of securitization in the official documents dealing with development policy. In order to see if there have been some changes, I have analyzed documents issued both before and after 9/11.

What were the results of this analysis? What do official documents say? First of all, the difference between documents published before and after 9/11 is obvious – new emphasis on security in the post-9/11 world touched upon all aspects of international politics and the EU development policy could not have stayed immune.

The nexus between development and security has always been present in the EU development policy and that is also the case with the documents (analyzed here) which were issued before 9/11. Thus, the ‘the language of security’ has also been employed in these documents to assign the development policy with certain security-related tasks, i.e. with the tasks of conflict prevention and (the contribution to) the resolution of other security problems in the developing world. Could we then argue that the development policy was, to a certain extent, securitized even before the 9/11?

No, because security has been seen as “an aspect of development” (Stewart 2004 p. 2). When these documents would talk about the security threats and challenges emanating from the developing countries, and the need for the development policy to address them, that wouldn’t mean that they seek to ‘take the development policy out of the normal realm of development policy discourse’ and change its priorities; on the contrary, peace and security were seen as preconditions for development and in that sense proclaimed as objectives of development policy.

On the other side, the analysis of documents issued after 9/11 shows the signs of changed priorities. Poverty reduction and sustainable development are, of course, still seen as the main objectives of development policy. However, in the context of new security priorities brought about the post-9/11 era, these documents show clear signs of securitisation. In their analysis, I have come across both indicators of securitization mentioned above. The ‘language of security’ is increased and new threats are envisaged – however, what differs these documents from those issued before 9/11 is that these (new) security challenges and threats, which the development policy is called to address (and which are perceived as emanating from the developing world), are now primarily seen as threats to the security of the EU, and not of the developing world (state failure, terrorism, proliferation of WMD). Thus, the introduction of new, distinctively post-9/11 security priorities onto the agenda of EU development policy indicates that the role of development cooperation is increasingly seen as one of serving the EU security interests – the development policy should address these new security threats emanating from the South not, primarily, to establish the conditions for development, but to protect the security of the EU.

This changed rhetoric expresses itself through another indicator of securitization that I have proposed and called the ‘security continuum’ – the linking of issue or a policy with another previously recognized threat(s), in this case poverty and (under)development with the threats of terrorism, state failure, etc. Again, these

phenomena are seen primarily as a source of security problems for the EU and development policy is invited to address them.

By securitizing development policy in this way, securitizing actors make ground for taking development policy ‘beyond the established rules of the game’ and employing it for the achievement of other-than-development objectives (in this case EU security).

The Copenhagen School’s definition of securitization does not include its impact on policy. Yet surely, once an issue is rhetorically adopted and put on the political agenda, it must affect the development of policy for it to be effective in practice. Otherwise, the activities have only been rhetorically securitized with no practical result.

I have performed the analysis of practical implications of the rhetoric of securitization in the fourth chapter – I analyzed institutional changes, changes in actual practices and aid flows that in reality confirm this changed rhetoric in the field of development policy. This approach to the problem of securitization – taking practical implications of the rhetoric of securitization as reality-check and indirect indicators of securitization – allows not only for the process of securitization to be better explored, but also provides with an analysis of the actual developments in the field of development policy.

Both discursive analysis of the official documents and the ‘reality-check’ performed by the analysis of institutional changes and aid flows show that the overall objectives of EU development policy remain poverty eradication and sustainable development. However, the events of 9/11 brought in a whole (new?) range of global security challenges and threats which require different treatment than the old security threats of inter-state wars. Different treatment of new security threats includes the use of ‘whole-of-government’ approach where the whole spectrum of different external policies is employed to tackle these threats. EU development policy did not stay immune on pressures to employ its resources and capabilities to address the ‘post-9/11 threats’. Thus, the clear indicators of securitization are present in the EU rhetoric and practice – that does not mean that the EU development policy has become just another foreign and security policy tool at the disposal of the EU; but, it certainly shows that the employment of EU development policy in the developing world increasingly serves the purpose of addressing security problems that are source of threats primarily to the EU and the developed North, and not the other way around.

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