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‘Civilian Power’ or Something Else?

The European Union on its way beyond ‘Civilian Power’

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Abstract

The European Union's (EU) external appearance is often described as a 'civilian power' (CP). However, due to increasing military capabilities and coercive approaches in international politics, it apparently moves towards a 'harder' kind of power. Applying a role-theoretical approach, the study explores what kind of power the EU actually constitutes and thus studies whether the EU's characterization as a CP is still empirically valid. In order to do so, the work takes into account two parts of a role-conception: the self-perception of the EU and the view of how the non-EU 'others' perceive it. Hereby, the Union's self-perception is investigated by means of qualitative text-analysis of central EU-documents. The perception of 'others' is studied with the aid of a self-conducted expert-survey. The result of this approach is ambivalent. The EU still constructs itself as a CP, but is aware of the increasingly use of coercive and military means. The perception 'from outside' reflects the EU's harder approaches in the international arena, but clearly does not perceive it as a predominately military actor. Thus, the labelling of the EU as a CP is not suitable anymore; instead it constitutes an actor shifting away from the 'civilian ideal'.

Key words: Civilian Power, European Union, Role-theory, Perception, Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)

Abbreviations

CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CPE	Civilian Power Europe
DEI	Declaration on European Identity
EPC	European Political Cooperation
ESDP	European Defence and Security Policy
ESS	European Security Strategy
EU	European Union
TEU	Treaty on Europe

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1 Introduction

“We started off as a peace project, and in many ways that is still what we are today: from building peace in Europe to peacebuilder around the world”
(Solana 2007a)

In her speech regarding to the 50th anniversary of the European Union¹, respectively the Treaty of Rome, the President of the European Council 2007, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, emphasised that the Union will continue to peacefully contribute to conflict resolution (Merkel 2007). Moreover, the solemnly adopted ‘Berlin Declaration’, which displays a kind of guideline for the contemporary Union, implies Europe’s unique role to promote freedom and democracy to the world in a peaceful way (Berlin Declaration). These two examples display a distinctive characterization of Europe as a project that is committed to peace due to its warlike past. Such a perception is widely spread among the decision makers in Brussels, the media and the academia (Prodi 2000, Kaldor 2007). Moreover, the EU is often seen as an adequate answer to new challenges of the post cold-war order due to cooperation, common institutions, and its strive for multi-lateral approaches in international politics. The peaceful integration process and the intense interaction between the member-states may even serve as a model for other states to overcome their conflicts. According to this perspective, it is due to its historical heritage, the political willingness of the member-states, and the lack of capability, which made it necessary that “the EU has been committed to contributing to international peace and security by soft, non-military means” (Björkdahl 2007: 1). Externalizing the values that guide the Union’s internal relations like peaceful conflict resolution, negotiation, democracy, the rule of law and the diffusion human rights² thus means pursuing to exercise a new kind of irenic power. Finally concluding the abovementioned, the European Union is distinct “in the setup and character of goals and values [and] in the configuration of political instruments used” (Elgström and Smith 2006: 2). The EU thus feels obliged to the purpose of a civilisation of policy and acts accordingly. In this sense, it can be understood as a ‘Normative’ or a ‘Civilian Power’ (Manners 2002; Maul 2006:2).

However, the recently developments since the establishment of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and a subordinated European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) also show another picture of the Union. The EU

¹ European Union will often be abbreviated as EU, Union or simply Europe.

² Manners (2002: 242-43) recognizes seven distinctive values – he calls it the ‘normative basis’- that characterize the EU.

apparently gets prepared for armed conflicts after its grand failure on the Balkans: The military capabilities today encompass 60,000 troops, comprise the Battle Group concept and the Rapid Reaction Corps and hence demonstrates a new willingness to deal with hard power (Björkdahl 2007: 2). The fourteen military and civilian missions that the Union launched since 2003 from Concordia in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (2003) to the planned operation in Kosovo (to be conducted in summer 2007) could be perceived as examples for a new 'military Europe'. In fact, the emerging militarization poses questions about the EU's abovementioned unique and civilian external appearance. In terms of Kagan (2002), it seems that the weak 'Venus Europe' is disposed to become a 'marsian warrior'.

Parts of the actual literature on the Europeans power in the world summarize these points by stating that the EU constitutes an actor that is 'civilian' or 'normative' by virtue of its tradition and history (Matlary 2006, Manners 2002). Simultaneously, however, it is emphasised that the EU "has built up considerable capacity in the military field over recent years, and this has been deployed in various missions" (Matlary 2006: 107).

This academic discussion, whether the EU is rather to be characterized as a military power (in the making) or a civilian power, serves as a point of departure for the following research questions.

1.1 Research questions and the objective of the study

In 2005, political science scholars Hill and Smith concluded in their textbook *International Relations and the European Union* that the EU is currently facing a dilemma according to its external policy (2005: 403). In this sense, they posed the question whether the Union should "attempt to develop its capabilities according to conventional definitions of power, including the military element, when this might put at risk the very (irenic) values which Europe has come to stand for in international relations?". The study aims to explore if this is the case. The crucial and pervading question, however, will be 'what kind of power' the contemporary EU displays? Is the following excerpt a fact?

"It [i.e. the EU] clearly has a significant global presence and a »Mister Nice Guy« image in international relations on account of its devout multilateralism and its traditionally non-coercive approach to its external relations. This image is encouraged both by EU actions frequently reflecting its principles and by comparison with other leading powers, notably the US." (Marsh and Mackenstein 2005: 251).

Consequently, the present paper tries to shed light on whether the Union is developing towards a military power, or does it display a 'true' civilian power?

The subject that will be tried to resolve subsequently, is whether there exists a gap between the European self-identity and its current behaviour, but also what

difference between the EU and the perception of ‘receivers’ of EU power (and ‘others’ in general) can be observed?

The goal of this study will be to contribute to the academic discussion of ‘Civilian Power Europe’ (CPE) and come up with a new approach that empirically includes the perception of ‘others’. This is assumed to be crucial due to the applied conception of CPE which implies both how the EU constructs itself (*ego part*) and how it is externally perceived (*alter part*) (Burckhardt 2004: 17). To the author’s knowledge, no scholar has yet scrutinized the concept of CPE completely by taking into account the external perception of the international environment, although there is a demand “of probing what expectations and images actors outside the Union have of EU foreign policy” (Chaban et. al. 2006: 245). Thus, this thesis aims to contribute somewhat to this rather unexplored area with an empirical investigation of EU’s actual role conception.

Furthermore, the paper wants to illuminate the rather foggy conception of CPE and aims to propose a suitable characterization of the actual role of the European Unions external identity.

1.2 Theory: Civilian Power Europe you are surrounded

Every thorough analysis needs a reflexive theory and perspective that structures all observations. Besides, a statement or finding of a social phenomenon is impossible to make in a theoretical vacuum.

Hence, to gradually approach the research question and answer it, I will utilize a certain theoretical framework. I will subsume three theoretical ‘stages’ or ‘dimensions’ to explain the conceptual design of this work. These stages grasp a broad, meta-theoretical approach (social constructivism), over to the perspective of the EU as a power to finally conclude with substantial role-theory. This is regarded as an attempt to orbit the issue of this work and to hopefully come to a valid and reliable result.

This present study embraces the research problem of the EU’s (possible) being as a civilian power with help of “the burgeoning school of thought known as »constructivism«” (Andretta 2005: 31). This approach is to be seen as the meta-theoretical fundament of this paper. The expectation is that this theory will facilitate a fruitful examination of the values, role and perceptions of the European Union’s foreign and security policies. Hence, social constructivism shall prepare ground for the subsequent portrayed methods and role theory. In International Relations (IR) the core element of constructivism is the social construction of reality. Besides, social constructivism is “unified by a common concern with how ideas define the international structure that constructs the identities, interests, and foreign policy practices (...)” (Barnett 2005: 252).

In general, there is no universal valid reality but perception. Perception, however, is a human construction. As Barnett puts it “the social construction of

reality concerns not only how we see the world, but also how we see ourselves, define our interests, and determine what constitutes acceptable action” (Barnett 2005: 259). The self-perception of the European Union, thus its ideas and values are expressed in speeches and official documents about the European Union’s external manifestation. More precisely, the author’s hypothesis is that in speeches and in EU key documents on its external relations, a set of self-perception will be provided (cf. 1.4).

According to Hill and Smith (2005: 7-13), there are three distinct perspectives on International Relations and the EU. Firstly, the EU seen as a sub-system of IR, secondly, the Union as a part of the wider processes of international relations, and finally, the EU as a power, impacting upon contemporary international relations. The study will adopt the very latter perspective, since it can be usefully applied to “assess the extent to which the EU shapes its external environment, [and] is perceived by other actors as so doing” (ibid.: 7). Also, this perspective emphasizes the importance of a “European »presence«, or more a European »identity«” (Andreatta 2005: 35). Consequently, this perspective enables to scrutinize the topic with help of role-theory.

The concept of role theory finally picks up the idea of self-perception, but broadens it with the views of how outsiders³ (‘others’) see this specific identity⁴. The perspective encompasses the assumption that the EU’s role includes two parts. The first part is an internalization of a self-perception and the second part constitutes an internalization of ‘others’ expectations. The central assumption is that “others’ views on the EU help to shape identity and roles” (Chaban, Elgström, Holland 2006: 247). Hence, foreign policy roles are formed through “continuous interactions between own role conceptions and structurally based expectations” (ibid.; cf. Dembinsky 2002: I, 20-21). Role-theory is perceived as “the leading explanation of why Europe is a Civilian Power” (Burckhardt 2004: 16) and could therefore establish an appropriate basis to analyse the issue. The thesis mainly applies the ideas of political scientist Hanns Maull (2006).

Roles are essentially conceptualized as “patterns of expected behaviour” (Elgström & Smith 2006, cf. Kirste & Maull 1996). More tangibly, role-theory provides this study with the idea of role conception⁵ defined as “actors’ self images and the effects of others’ role expectations” (Elgström & Smith 2006: 6). This concept enables to scrutinize how an actor is constructing itself in the international arena (*ego-part*). Moreover, it allows taking systematically into consideration the expectations of other actors (*alter-part*) (Maull 2006: 3-4). Both *ego* and *alter-part* shape twofold role-conception which thus outlines a coherent approach to the study’s topic (ibid.; Burckhardt 2004: 17; Dembinski 2002: I). In general, role perceptions are assumed to be reflected in the behaviour of the

³ The ‘others’ or outsiders refer to non-EU (state-)actors in international relations.

⁴ Sometimes, self-perception is referred to identity in this study. This is done to gain some variety in the diction. The author is well aware that self-perception and identity constitute two different approaches.

⁵ The difference between roles and role conceptions is that the latter is long-lasting while roles can change more rapidly (Kirste & Maull 1996).

foreign policy EU decision-makers (and inverted) (Harnisch 2000: 3, Kirste & Maull 1996).

1.3 Method

The paper assumes that the EU is an “inward-looking and self-referential (...) community that constitutes itself not only by institutions and processes but by discourses within it” (Hill and Smith 2005: 12). Sources of role-conceptualisations are assumed to be anchored in these discourses and the perception of others (Mitzen 2006: 271).

Keeping that in mind, the study tries to ‘get a grip’ on the discourse about Europe as a civilian power⁶. According to Esaiasson et. al. (2003: 18) this can be achieved with the help of a suitable set of tools, consisting of a) empirical knowledge (which already exists); b) earlier applied set of methods; and, c) maybe, normative discussions about how the discourse *should* be.

For the most part, the study will alter and process suggestions of Hanns Maull’s analytical dimensions of Civilian Power (Maull 2006). This concept comprises the implementation of the perception of ‘others’ to come up with a complete role-conception. He proposes a four-fold examination of the CPE model:

Explicitly, he suggests an empirical evaluation of the foreign policy self-perception provided by a) decision-makers, b) elites and c) citizens. This examination will be performed by an exploration of aa) foreign-policy principle documents, bb) qualitative interviews and cc) survey data. Finally, the empirical findings shall be compared to a conceptualized ideal-type of Civilian Power.

The present paper, however, will modify some points of Maull’s suggestions by narrowing his concept. For the first, it will reverse Maull’s suggestion by initially developing an expanded ideal-type of CPE on basis of existing literature. The second modification the author conducted in Maull’s methodological framework only takes into account the two first actor-variables (a) and b)) and the matching analytical methods (aa) bb))⁷. This proceeding is due to the fact that, regarding to the issue, vast public opinion-polls are quite rare and inaccessible. As already mentioned (1.3), the work conceptualizes role-theory. To summarize, this rather elite-focussed and slender methodological approach is supposed to be well

⁶ However, as Esaiasson et. al. accurately note (2003: 18), it is impossible to draw up a whole discourse in an undergraduate thesis.

⁷ Actually, the methodological category of interviews has been transferred into an expert-survey. This further modification suits into the category of interview according to Lundahl and Skärvad (1992). The motivation behind this, however, was the assumption that an expert-survey would come to similar valid results as an interview.

equipped to give substantial and comprehensible answers to the research question(s).

To examine the abovementioned key-documents and speeches, the proceeding of this work is a qualitative text analysis. This contains thorough reading and interpretation of whole texts and specific parts along with scrutinizing the text-content. The reason for picking this method is that it enables to reveal a certain text-content and intention that is hidden at first sight. Furthermore, this method allows to consider secondary literature of scholars in the field of CPE, which thus provides a useful help to link on the current discourse (Esaiasson et. al. 2003: 233).

A self-designed expert-survey finally complements the methodological toolbox. The survey has been conducted with stakeholders at Missions to the EU and at the related embassies in Sweden⁸. It was sent out by both e-mail and fax in April/ May 2007. The reason for choosing these electronic methods is mainly due to the possibility of a quick response. Basis and background of the survey is the here proposed definition of CPE. This definition was split into different items and then tested empirically. The selection of third countries that were asked to answer the survey was based on those countries where the EU is or was conducting civilian or militarily supported operations. The intention behind this choice was the assumption that those countries are very suitable since they are/were directly influenced of EU power. Experts chosen to answer the questions were all diplomatic personnel (like ambassadors or political attachés) since they are considered to reflect their governments' (therewith the 'others') perceptions of the EU in world affairs (Chaban et. al. 2006: 248). According to Maull diplomats are a suitable clientele to interview since they can be considered as role bearers⁹ (Kirste and Maull 1996). The survey has been sent out to foreign policy representatives from ten countries¹⁰. Seven responses have been received. Since the survey was sent to diplomatic mission in Brussels and Sweden, the rate of return was 35 %. This is a common rate and thus builds a valid empirical basis (Ray 1999). The survey's design consisted of eleven multiple-choice questions and the recipients had been assured to remain anonymous. Moreover, the survey was sent to EU-delegations in those countries where the EU is/ was carrying out operations. Aside from this, the Office of the High Representative for the CFSP, Javier Solana, was asked to response. This was done to get an empirical indication of the self-image provided by the analysis of the key-documents and to test the hypothesis whether the European Union still considers itself as a Civilian Power. Insofar, the empirical survey also reflected the role-theoretical approach to

⁸ I explicitly want to thank Annika Björkdahl for helping me designing and conducting the survey. Thanks also to the thesis seminar, especially Arian Ratkoceri and Tina Kolhammar for discussing it. Last but not least, thanks to Kristina Gröndahl-Nilsson who provided and assisted me with the fax machine at the department.

⁹ The original citation is „Zum anderen üben Staaten durch eine Vielzahl staatlicher Repräsentanten als einzelne Rollenträger (z.B. Diplomaten in verschiedenen Beziehungsrahmen an verschiedenen Orten) selbstverständlich mehrere Rollen gleichzeitig und nebeneinander aus“. The author translated „Rollenträger“ to role bearers.

¹⁰ The survey was initially sent to Missions of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Indonesia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Macedonia, Palestine, Ukraine, Moldova, Iraq, Georgia and Sudan.

consider both *alter* and *ego-part*. Four responses (N= 4) of EU-delegations had been sent back forming a sufficient background of analysis. Moreover, the office of the Javier Solana sent back its response displaying the general view from Brussels.

In general, it is expected that the main features of a role-conception will be reflected in these surveys¹¹. To provide transparency of the approach, the survey and its results are attached to the appendix.

1.4 Material

The work scrutinizes both primary and secondary material. The primary sources consist of official EU material related to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which is regarded as of importance for the concept of CPE. The motivation to occupy myself with the CFSP is that it can be shown most clearly of whether the EU is developing towards something different from a Civilian Power or not. Furthermore, the source-material is in large part chronologically limited from 2003 until today (May 2007). The reason for this is that the CFSP is a quite new phenomenon and characterized by rapid changes, so that the *detailed* examination of older material could be of less actual importance. However, some documents before 2003 will be considered. This is due to the very essential importance of a few papers or speeches that still build a frame of reference for the EU's foreign and security policy. Concretely, the European Security Strategy (ESS), several speeches and articles of the High Representative for the CFSP, whitepapers, treaties and statements along with speeches of the actual EU-Commissioner for Integration will be scrutinized. The other part of primary material is the above described written expert-survey (cf. 1.3).

Concerning the secondary material, the work draws on books and articles of relevant authors. They have been consulted to contribute and to assess the discourse on CPE. Besides, they supplied the paper with a scientific background and enabled to develop a framework of analysis.

It is however worth mentioning that the availability and accessibility of the used material is very imbalanced. While the flow of primary sources concerning the self-perception of the EU is almost unstoppable and also easily to access on the web spaces of the EU, primary material that relates to the others' perception is like finding a needle in a haystack¹².

¹¹ Harnisch (2000: 3) underpins this argument: „Die ‚außenpolitische Rolle‘ wirkt mithin als Prisma für externe und interne, materielle und immaterielle Faktoren, die sich über die Rollenperzeption der außenpolitischen Elite in Verhalten niederschlägt“

¹² Thanks to Ole Elgström who provided me with some ‘rare material’

1.5 Criticism of Method and Material: A fly in the ointment?

Since the understanding and conceptualization of EU's "global role and international identity is a highly controversial research issue" (Télio 2007: 2), the author is well aware that the methodological proceeding of this study will not be shared by every reader. Of course, other ways to come to terms with the CPE issue can be found. However, this small chapter cannot shoulder to analyse all divergent theoretical and methodological views on CPE which exist (see e.g. Burckhardt 2004: 13-21; Harnisch 2000: 21-31, Harnisch 1997). Thus, it only takes into consideration some salient criticisms that could emerge.

One interesting approach e.g. is centred on the main constituents of the European Union, namely the member states. Lisbeth Aggestam (2006) argues in her study on the security and defence role of the EU to consider the EU-3 – Germany, France and Britain – when exploring the international behaviour of the EU. This is because the 'Three' are perceived as key actors and driving forces of the development of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), each with distinctive approaches to the ESDP. This approach underpins the claim that "as the CFSP remains intergovernmental, the perspective of the Member States is arguably more important than that of the European institutions" (Burckhardt 2004: 19). Her proceeding is to examine mostly primary material related to the EU-3, like political speeches and documents along with interviews of representatives. Her finding is that "the extent to which their views converge or diverge will have a decisive influence of the future effectiveness of the ESDP" (Aggestam 2006: 6). To summarize, this approach can add value to the discussion of CPE, but the exploration of EU-originated material is supposed to be more suitable for the here discussed concern. This is due to the assumption that this material reflects a collectively negotiated result, while the examination of member-states related material is rather of importance for the development of CPE related EU-policies. However, for a post-graduate thesis both approaches would build an excellent and comprehensive analytical framework¹³.

Finally, one could consider the proposed framework as too elite-centric, not taking into account the perceptions of the European citizens. Moreover, the method of conducting a survey instead of face-to-face in-depth interviews with stakeholders could be criticised. However, these approaches are methodologically difficult and financially unfeasible for the author. The bulk of available (Eurostat, 'Eurobarometer') public-opinion data is useless for the study since it hardly comprehends issues regarding to CPE. Face-to-face interviews could not be conducted since they would consume too much time. Several telephone interviews attempts were made but the potential respondents found that the issue was too

¹³ With respect to the limited time and space the author is aware that a comprehensive attempt in a size proposed above is impossible to conduct in a Bachelor's thesis.

complex to talk over telephone. In general, it is also not easy to access high state-representatives. Apart from these legitimate criticisms, the framework is considered to be solid enough to carry CPE due to its advantage to present a concise scientific finding through the elaborated theories and methods. Briefly, in the authors opinion, CPE is dominantly an academic topic, thus it is elitist by design¹⁴. Moreover, CPE can best be analysed through mutually negotiated official EU-papers and speeches that reflect a sort of common-sense in the Union. Last but not least the implementation of an expert-survey may differ from a face-to-face interview approach, but will also result in valid empirical data.

1.6 Outline of the Study

First, the paper will start of with an exploration of the literature that has been written on the topic of CPE. This will be done to tie up with the related discourse and to examine where the study can be of help for actual research. Second, on basis of the secondary literature, an ideal-type of definition of CPE will be developed. This definition will enable us to scrutinize and assess the EU's external policy. Third, EU-key documents will be analysed and further build a corset of the European self-perception. Fourth, we will examine how 'the others' perceive the EU in world politics. We will then conclude the self-perception and the other's perspective of Europe.

¹⁴Of course, this does not mean that it will stay a solely academic issue in the future. Particularly with regards to the frequently political polemic about CPE, it can already be seen as part of a limited public debate.

2 The debate of CPE – Thirty years and still no consensus

“For these reasons there must be a league of a particular kind, which can be called a league of peace (foedus pacificum), and which would be distinguished from a treaty of peace (pactum pacis) by the fact that the latter terminates only one war, while the former seeks to make an end of all wars forever” (Immanuel Kant 1795)

This chapter presents an initial point for the following sections. Since the discourse of CPE has lasted for over thirty years, it is essential for the proceeding of the study to tie on the most important developments in the debate to evaluate the research questions.

Recently, instead of the perception that the debate about CPE “definitely seems to be a thing of the past” (Gnesetto cited in Smith 2005: 1), a revival of CPE emerged¹⁵ (ibid., Orbie: 126). The reason for this is probably rooted in the developments of EU’s ESDP operations in Europe and the world, where the (partly) utilization of military means caused a fundamental re-thinking of the Civilian Power idea. Hence, a short, general overview of the academic CPE discourse will provide us with a critical background.

In the wake of the beginnings of European Political Cooperation (EPC) in the early 1970’s, the EU was considered as a unique external actor. Apart from the never ending discussion on what the EU really *is* – an actor *sui generis*, less than a state but more than an international organization¹⁶-, it is striking that the EU developed a (more or less coherent) external appearance. In large parts of the academic literature, the outcome of that role in the world is characterized as an answer of the new international reality consisting of interdependence and new global challenges (Dembinsky 2002, McCormick 2007, Louis 2007). In this perspective, instead of seeking its short-term advantage and using ‘old-fashioned’ military coercion, the EU stands for a concept of regulating relations with help of international law, rules, and norms. Moreover, the EU is described as a new Kantian *foedus pacificum* in international relations which constitutes peaceful relations between its member states and serves an example for non-violent coping of global issues. In other words, the Union is described as ‘civilian power’ (Dembinski: I).

¹⁵ This renaissance results e.g. in a special issue of the Journal of European Public Policy (13:2, March 2006) which dedicates some hundred pages to the idea of CPE and its recent developments.

¹⁶ Significantly, McCormick remarks that “we do not even yet have a noun to describe the EU” (2007: 15).

Since François Duchêne, ‘founding father’ of CPE, initially presented the notion in an article 1972, the debate of CPE has fascinated scholars and lasted for over thirty years. Duchêne’s work comprised both descriptive features (e.g. observation of raising importance of interdependence and transnationalism) and normative elements (domestication of interstate relations regionally and globally) (Maull 2005: 779). Both elements are still to be found in the current CPE concepts and cause an intermingling of descriptive and normative (Burckhardt: 21-33).

Concretely, by relating to the EPC, Duchêne stated that lack of military power is not the handicap in international relations that it once was, and that Western Europe might become the first civilian centre of power (McCormick 2007: 27-28). He predicted the early 70ies EC as an upcoming area where the “old-aged process of war and indirect violence could be translated” to a modern “twentieth-century citizen’s notion of civilized politics” (cited in McCormick: 28). Consequently, he outlined ‘civilian power’ as “long on economic power and relatively short on military force” (ibid.). Western Europe, he argued, should remain true to its very characteristics, that are civilian ends and means. It should ‘domesticate’ and spread its civilian and democratic standards as a becoming cohesive international actor. Simultaneously, he stated that Europe will not build up its military capacity in order to become an unbiased mediator between the superpowers (ibid.: 69-70). His perception was that modern security policies more and more consisted “in shaping the international *milieu* often in areas which at first sight have little to do with security” (cited in Hyde-Price 2004: 4). The European Community simply was a different kind of actor in relation to the two existing superpowers. However, the pioneering approach Duchêne’s was not developed as comprehensive scheme, instead it is striking for its unsystematic manner (Orbie: 123, Maull 2005: 779). This vagueness is also the reason why CPE allows different interpretations by academics and policy makers. “The enduring resonance of the CPE role” remains “*because of*, rather than in spite of, [Duchêne’s] rather imprecise description” (Orbie: 124).

These diverse readings of the CPE notion reflect furthermore a discursive struggle that is characterized by a two-fold ‘rift’. Burckhardt (2004) identifies the first rift within the concept of CPE as the unsolved question whether a Civilian Power may use force. The second rift relates to the contested origins of CPE. Nevertheless, the first rift is considered as the most important one, giving us insights in the CPE’s different conceptions and thus will be elaborated here, while the second rift will not be a case of examination. This is due to the assumption that the study of the second rift does not very much contribute to the research-question. The observation of the first rift, however, is perceived as a suitable explanation for the discursive dissensions. Therefore, this paper in large part follows Burckhardt’s argumentation, but also synthesizes his work with Orbie’s (2006) fine review on the CPE debate. Indeed, a lot of links between the both authors’ remarks can be found.

Orbie (2006: 124) classifies three important authors, “founding fathers” in his words, which he allocates to different schools of IR. He consequently suborders Duchêne to the ‘pluralist’ school, while Johan Galtung’s account of a European

capitalist superpower (*The European Community: A Superpower in the making*), elaborated 1973, is seen as 'structuralist'. Both are contesting the 'realist' or 'Gaulist' approach of *l'Europe puissance*. In this context, Hedley Bull's contemptuous, realist critique of Duchêne's idea must be mentioned, which he labelled as a 'contradiction terms'. His characterization was that EU military integration is desirable but infeasible (ibid.). Moreover, he argued that the capabilities of great powers have to be defined by their military resources. Only with military capabilities there could be a European actorness (Whitman 2006: 103). During the 1980's this perspective was uncritically shared, hence, fell on fertile ground and exemplified the "rising dominance of realist approaches" (ibid.). Bull's criticism "reassembles Kagan's (2002) famous account on Europe as a 'Kantian paradise'" (ibid.). Though, Galtung's analysis also has actual significance, since it is applied by the globalization critical movement, questioning the EU's trade policy.

However, within the 'pluralist' approaches the CPE concept is further elaborated but scattered. By whether emphasizing the foreign policy means or ends, the differences arise. In this context, a "fierce debate" (ibid.: 125) whether military means are compatible with the CPE concept arose. Burckhardt (2004: 9-13) notices two competing discourses. The dominant discourse claims that a "Civilian Power can use force, even though the exact conditions remain contested" (Burckhardt: 9). The competing discourse comprises that a CPE by definition cannot employ military means.

In favour for the first mentioned understanding is the plain remark that Civilian Power Europe implies the term 'Power' which obviously refers to "a punitive sense of power" (ibid.). The vision of a European pacifist utopia is apparently not covered by CPE. Otherwise, as Burckhardt stresses "one could have left out the word altogether: a Civilian Europe would have been more fitting" (ibid.). The dominant discourse thus sees a defence capacity transforming the EU from a civilian power 'by default' (making a virtue out of necessity) to a civilian power 'by design' (Orbie: 125, Stavridis 2001, Larsen 2002: 292). However, military means must always be subordinate to civilian approaches of conflict management and only employed as an *ultima ratio*. This view clearly is in line with an original sense of self-defence in international politics. Duchêne himself argues that military integration in conjunction with self-defence would be compatible with his idea of Europe as a Civilian Power (ibid., Burckhardt: 10). However, a clear definition to what extent and under which circumstances a CPE is allowed to use force is not tangible. Burckhardt comments that the pro military integration strand is focussing more on the ends than the means of EU's foreign policy (ibid.: 10). At the same time argues another fraction that the discussion of ends "was long overshadowed" (Orbie: 125) by the debate on means.

A competing discourse, which constitutes the 'counterpart' of the first 'rift' discussed above, perceives the CPE's use of force differently. The military integration collides with the role of a Civilian Power. 'Power', in this line of reasoning, is interpreted as ideological and remunerative types of power, instead of pure force (Burckhardt: 12). Hence, the advocates of this perspective emphasize non-military and peaceful foreign policy, since

[...] the stated intention of enhancing the EU's military resources carries a price: it sends a signal that military force is still useful and necessary, and that it should be used to further the EU's interests. It would close off the path of fully embracing civilian power. And this means giving up far too much for far too little. (Smith, K.E cited in Orbie: 125)

In other words, the extensive use of military means reverses the peaceful 'magnetic force' of a CPE. In the end, the attraction to other actors will get lost and Europe would be distracted "from its comparative advantage in the non-military sphere" (Orbie:125). Moreover, third parties would perceive "such a development as a step toward the creation of a superpower" that uses force to "pursue its own interests" (Burckhardt: 12). As consequence, a security dilemma is imaginable with neighbouring regions. Authors favouring a non-military CPE are concerned whether a militarily integrated Europe is compatible with one crucial idea of CPE, that is the reversal of the balance of power logic in the 'old Europe' (ibid.). Another anxiety is the engagement in peacemaking operations. This is because the credibility of CPE as a promoter of worldwide legitimate governance could be damaged since humanitarian military interventions are only conductible in countries that are by far weaker than the intervening state. This could then led to an "'intervention à la carte'" (ibid.). However, European states could cooperate in defence, albeit not in connection to the EU as a whole. One solution is a direct engagement of single member-states in UN missions (Orbie: 125).

When taking a look at the works emphasizing the ends of CPE, the notion of Europe as a 'normative power' arose. Ian Manners (2002) shaped this notion in an often-cited article by underlining the promotion of internalized values through the EU. He relates to Galtung, but foremost to Duchêne and his notion of an *idée force*: "[Europe] must be a force for the international diffusion of civilian and democratic standards" (cited in Orbie: 126). By promoting its inner characteristics or its "normative basis", Europe has the "ability to shape conceptions of »normal« in international relations" (Manners: 239-40). This basis is to be found in Europe's "historical context, hybrid polity and political-legal constitution" (Manners: 240), which further "accelerated a commitment to placing universal norms and principles at the centre of its [i.e. EU's] relation with its Member States and the world" (ibid.: 241). This logic is recently followed by many other scholars that emphasize EU's value-driven and normative external appearance. It is perceived as the main distinctness of the Union as an international actor (Orbie: 126). Noteworthy in this context is that recently published works including 'normative power' neglect the close linkage to Civilian Power. However, the present work considers 'normative power', as proposed in this chapter (and by Orbie), as part of CPE and thus subordinates it under this concept. Other notions like the ones of Europe as a 'civilizing' or 'ethical' power as well are considered to be absorbed by the category of CPE (Sjursen 2006).

3 The difficulty of developing an Ideal Type CPE definition

Without a basic background of the notion “the analytical use of a Civilian Power Europe is limited” (Burckhardt: 33). Now that we have been provided with this background, we can use that knowledge to find a suitable definition for CPE that would fit in the presented framework. However, due to the abovementioned vagueness and indistinctness of the Civilian Power Europe concept, a tangible definition does hardly exist. Many scholars complain about this fact and advocate for an actual, well-elaborated ideal type definition that is needed for future research on CPE (Orbie: 126; K.E. Smith 2005; Burckhardt: 32). We will therefore try to come up with such a definition with means of different authors’ conceptions. In order to do so, this paper mainly draws on the definition provided by K.E. Smith (2005: 1-6). She outlines her classification with help of circumscribing it to the opposed model of a military power. With both ‘poles’ on each side (military on the one, and civilian on the other), this model enables the researcher to place his empirical observations on this dynamic ‘measuring stick’. The present paper adopts this formidable invention but modifies it with some few elements of Maull’s work (2006: 2; 2005: 779-83; Kirste & Maull 1996). It hereby follows Burckhardt’s suggestion that adopting Maull’s “German Civilian Power school” along with the studies of scholars concerned with EU foreign Policy would be promising (Burckhardt: 33). However, the provided ideal type definition does surely not claim to be ‘state of the art’.

It is crucial to imply Duchêne’s idea of the Union’s strength and novelty as an international actor that is rooted in its capability to extend (or domesticate) its model of security and stability with economic and political rather than military means. This notion builds the background for new conceptualizations of Civilian Power.

By means of a Weberian Ideal Type of Civilian Power Maull attempted to turn Duchêne’s unstructured notion in an analytical tool for foreign policy analysis. In his early work on Civilian Power, he merely applied it to analyse (West) Germany’s and Japan’s external appearance in the 1990s. Later, he clearly stated that his model is not merely applicable to states, but also to the chimera EU (Maull 2006: 2). According to Maull, a Civilian Power concentrates mainly on non-military, economic means to achieve its objectives, emphasizes multilateral cooperation (rather than conflict), develops supranational structures to cope with international problems, and, importantly, leaves “the military as a residual safeguard” (McCormick: 70). Karin E. Smith picks up Maull’s idea of an ideal-type but further elaborates his model. Indeed, her definition is an advanced attempt as she not only accounts for the two crucial elements of CPE, namely

means and ends. She moreover adds the central features of how these means are used, and the process by which foreign policy is made (K.E. Smith 2005: 2). In sum, she merges four criteria to a CPE: 1.) *means*: using non-military instruments (like economic, diplomatic and political) to achieve goals; 2.) *ends*: preference for international cooperation, solidarity, responsibility for global environment, diffusion of equality, justice and tolerance along with international regimentation with help of law 3.) the use of persuasion; and 4.) “democratic civilian control over foreign and defence policymaking” (McCormick: 70). While all four elements matter, Smith admits that “the line between what constitutes civilian and what does not” in the latter three features “is much harder to determine than in the first one” (Smith: 2). The first one, however, seems to be simply outlined. Civilian means are non-military and therewith economic, diplomatic, and cultural means, whereas military means comprises the armed use of force. However, this is the point where the here proposed definition inclines to adopt Maull’s viewpoint on military force and civilian power (Maull 2005: 779-82). A civilian power can still be civilian no matter if it has armed forces at its disposal. In Maull’s words (2005: 780): “This is why they are called ‘civilian powers’ – not because military power is irrelevant to what they are trying to achieve”. Otherwise, we could simply state that the EU, of course, is not a Civilian Power anymore due to its achievements in the ESDP and conclude the study at this point¹⁷. Rather, the present study suggests that military forces can be considered as civilian means if they serve for purposes of collective self-defence, or collective security and effective peace-keeping. What is significant accordingly –and here we anticipate the third of Smith’s elements- is the way how these means are used (see below). Military force can only be used collectively and with international legitimacy, and solely to pursue to civilize international relations (Maull 2005: 781). However, we must admit that this distinction may make the definition fuzzier since it depends on the scholars perception what ‘civilizing international relations’ (pursuing civilian ends) and ‘legitimacy’ means¹⁸.

When coming to terms with civilian ends, Smith outlines that the characteristics mentioned above, like the preference for international cooperation, can be described in Wolfers’ categorization as ‘milieu goals’ rather than ‘possession goals’ (K.E. Smith: 3). Whereas possession goals pursue national interests (in terms of EU: self-interests), primarily in security matters, milieu goals “aim to shape the environment in which the actor operates” (Elgström and Smith: 2). Hence, a Civilian Power represents something different from other powers in the international system since it is not an actor that is primarily driven by its self-interests. The observation, however, was made that this statement is

¹⁷ K. Smith notes that states that have military forces, even neutral ones like Austria and Switzerland are no “pure civilian powers, because they have military forces” (K. Smith: 6). The author assesses this perspective as oversimplified and therefore dare the step to make our definition more complex.

¹⁸ The question immediately emerging is whether the operation in Yugoslavia in the 1990s was legitimate or not. Maull admits that concerning the intervention in Yugoslavia the criteria of full international legitimacy were not fulfilled since it had no UN mandate. He also refutes the exception of singleness, since such interventions cannot be ruled out in the future (Burckhardt: 11).

rather vague (*ibid.*). Nevertheless, it is a crucial characteristic that encompasses a CPE.

Regarding to the third category, the way an actor uses its means to achieve its objectives, Smith draws on Nye's concept of 'soft power' (K. Smith: 4). 'Soft power' means the power of attraction, which is the opposite of 'hard' or 'command power' (means of coercion and inducement in international politics). In this sense, a 'soft power' co-opts rather than coerces other actors to "obtain the outcomes it wants in world politics" (Nye cited in *ibid.*). Other states admire the 'soft power's' values and status of prosperity and openness, and therewith try to emulate its example. However, this does not mean that a Civilian Power which is solely in possession of soft instruments uses these instruments exclusively in a persuasive manner. The concern here is that civilian/soft foreign policy tools like economic instruments (e.g. the promise of aid, sanctions etc.) can be used as 'carrots', but also as 'sticks', since they might encompass coercive implementations for the recipient. The same with military means: On the one hand, forces can be used e.g. for invading another country, but on the other hand they can be used for training other troops or civil (peace-keeping) engagements. In this sense the label of a Civilian Power is not correct anymore when it uses coercion with civilian means. Furthermore, it is difficult to determine when coercion ends and persuasion begins. Smith especially stresses the case when the actor conducting the persuading or coercion is much more powerful than the target country. She clearly differentiates between the intention that might be persuasive and the actual action, than could be perceived as coercive by an outsider (Smith: 4, cf. 4.2). Consequently, in the here provided definition "civilian powers rely on soft power, on persuasion and attraction, not on coercion or carrots and sticks" (*ibid.*). Whereas "coercion involves threatening or inflicting 'punishment' as in the use of sanction" and "persuasion entails cooperating with third countries to try to induce desired internal or external policy changes" (Wein et. al. 2007: 147).

The last point of this general definition is the abovementioned democratic control of the foreign-policy decision making process. This means a more "open diplomacy to encourage a more sophisticated public discussion of foreign policy matter" (Hill cited in K. Smith: 5). It is however hard to define what 'democratic control' or democratic legitimacy implies. Indeed, one can argue with the democratic deficits of the EU that the Union does not really fit in that scheme (cf. Wagner 2006). Nevertheless, the utilized definition here simply implies the democratic monitoring by member states, their parliaments, the European Parliament and public opinion (K. Smith 2005: 5).

In conclusion, the here presented ideal type of Civilian Power synthesizes K. Smith's "most radical vision of the »ideal type« of civilian power" (Louis 2007: 9) with a feature of Maull's 'realist' definition, namely the possibility for a civilian power to possess military force and to exert this force under very restricted conditions. So, by combining the four elements suggested by K. Smith,

"we can construct an (albeit approximate) 'ideal type': a civilian power is an actor which uses civilian means ([which includes military force under very restricted and multilateral

conditions]) for persuasion, to pursue civilian ends, and whose foreign-policy making process is subject to democratic control or public scrutiny. *All four elements are important.*" (K. Smith: 5)

The opposite of the ideal-type Civilian Power is the ideal-type Military Power. According to K. Smith (2005: 5-6), Military Power comprises "an actor which uses military means (exclusively, though admittedly this is difficult to envisage)", exerts coercion to manipulate other actors, "unilaterally pursues 'military or militarised ends' (again, difficult to envisage this, but we might include here goals such as territorial conquest and acquisition of more military power)", and finally, whose "foreign policy-making process is not democratic".

Since Björkdahl (2007: 2) remarks that "the conventional distinction between normative power and military power is simplistic and the complex relationship between these kinds of powers are more complex than often presented", the paper tries to provide an admittedly still simplistic distinction, but attempted to take into account a certain intermingling of civilian and military means. Both ideal types, military and civilian power, build the background to assess whether the empirical findings presented in the following chapters can be assigned to a CPE. Furthermore, the ideal type of Civilian Power will help us to assess whether we can place the contemporary EU on one of these 'poles'. On which position on a 'yardstick' between Civilian Power and Military Power can we put the EU? This metaphorical tool may help us to assess what kind of power the EU constitutes.

4 Analysis

This part tries, by means of qualitative text analysis and survey data, to analyse whether the European Union constitutes as a certain kind of power, and if it does, what kind of power/role it ascribes itself (*ego-part*). The empirical expert-survey will serve as primary material to analyse the *alter-part* of the EU, that is how the Union's role is perceived by the 'Others'. Thus, this finally forms a complete role-conception of the European Union, which helps us to answer the question which type of role/actorness 'fits' the EU?

4.1 Ego-Part

Even though there is an on-going debate on the character of European actorness, a large part of the academic literature assesses the external appearance of the EU as (even though partly incomplete) independent, distinct, and significant in the international field (Keisala 2004: 80-86; Elgström and Smith: 2-3; Mackenstein and Marsh: 247-253). In actual research, scholars of European foreign policy often point out that "there is (...) a strong sense of the EU being different from other international actors" due to its "post-Westphalian construct based on the voluntary pooling of national sovereignty and of its shared values (...)" (Mackenstein and Marsh: 250). Additionally, it is claimed that "ideational issues go to the core of the EU as an international actor" hence they "affect its structures, instruments and cohesion" (ibid: 257). To find out about this distinct role of the European Union - the uniqueness as a Civilian Power - we take a closer look at the construction and manifestation of CPE.

The *ego-part* of the European Union's role is supposed to be constructed and reflected by utterances of EU's main representatives and constituted in official documents. In the self-description of the EU the model of CPE clearly shines through. Since the first steps in direction of a common foreign policy, the idea of a specific responsibility towards the outer world is manifested in EU-documents. European policy is always presented as to be affected by the idea of dialogue and balance with others (Dembinski: 4). Already at the beginning of the external policy approaches, the 'Declaration on European Identity' (DEI; Copenhagen, 14 December 1973) expresses the Civilian Power content of the EU/EC's external policy cooperation. Apart from the awareness that the European states "have overcome their past enmities and have decided that unity is a basic European necessity to ensure the survival of the civilization which they have in common" (DEI: Article I, 1), the document states that the "essential aim is to maintain

peace” (ibid.: Article I, 8). In the section on relations to the world, however, the early idea of a CPE arises undoubtedly:

The Nine [EU Member States] intend to play an active rôle in world affairs and thus to contribute, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, to ensuring that international relations have a more just basis; that the independence and equality of States are better preserved; that prosperity is more equitably shared; and that the security of each country is more effectively guaranteed. In pursuit of these objectives the Nine should progressively define common positions in the sphere of foreign policy. (ibid.: Article II, 9)

This motive is also to be found in later documents and official agreements like the Treaty on European Union. The preamble affirms the implementation of a common foreign and security policy in order “to promote peace, security and progress in Europe and in the world” (TEU, Preamble). Clearly this excerpt is in line with our proposed definition of Civilian Power. Additionally, article F obliges the Union to the respect of Human Rights, whereas article J.1 adds the objectives to preserve peace and “to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms”. The Maastricht Treaty furthermore underpins the promotion of civilian ends. Explicitly, the TEU mentions the promotion of international cooperation in this context.

However, one could claim that since the establishment of an ESDP, which could evidently change the international role of the EU, the significance of both abovementioned documents is futile. But in fact, the emergence of the ESDP has been perfectly incorporated in the Union’s self-description (Dembinski: 5). Javier Solana, High Representative for the CFSP, argues that with help of the ESDP the EU is able to advance the EU’s “core objectives: the alleviation of poverty, the promotion of democracy and the rule of law, and the protection of human rights” (Solana 2000a). He points out that the military capabilities will allow the Union to make greater contributions “to the development of international stability and the preservation of peace and security” (ibid.). Conform to the idea of a CPE, Solana (2000b) states that the use of military force “will of course always be a measure of last resort”. After all, the European Union is “not in the business of deploying troops for the sake of it” (ibid.).

The commitment to the vision of a CPE can be further observed in actual speeches of European Union’s stakeholders, and, significantly, in present documents. Even though we have seen that the idea of the self-perception of Europe as a Civilian Power at least dates back to the 1970s, the first and clearest articulation of Europe’s adoption of a unique civilian role in the international arena is a statement of former Commission President Romano Prodi. As he spoke to the European Parliament at the beginning of his presidency he made clear the status of the EU as a Civilian Power: “We must aim to become a global civil power at the service of sustainable global development” (Prodi 2000). The notion of CPE at different levels of the EU seems to have become almost something like a political myth. At least the abovementioned statements show clearly that the EU understands itself as a distinct actor compared to others. Indeed, European key-actors incorporate the idea of CPE, which accelerates a shaping of the *ego-part* of

an external European role-concept. One crucial indicator is the repeated appearance of the “civilian power” notion in speeches of the present Commissioner for European Enlargement Olli Rehn. For instance, he explicitly names the term and summarizes central elements of CPE in a statement on the political situation in Turkey: “The European Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, and the supremacy of democratic civilian power over the military” (Rehn 2007). The preference for no-coercive civilian means and ends, along with the deep trust of Europe being able to domesticate and spread its inner relations to the neighbourhood is depicted in a speech of Rehn on Europe’s next frontiers: “by extending the area of peace and stability, democracy and the rule of law, the EU has achieved far more through its gravitational pull than it could ever have done with a stick or a sword” (Rehn 2006). Solana (2005) argues the same way, but accentuates the persuasive manner of EU’s action and even its democratic character by utilizing the problematic recourse of a ‘will of the people of Europe’:

“Many Europeans crave a role for the EU on the world stage as a peace promoter in order to banish the demons of Europe’s own conflict-ridden experience; they seek to extend beyond Europe’s borders the zone of peace and stability which the integration project has helped to achieve; and they believe that the EU can use its transformative power to persuade others to move from war to peace and to universalize its own norms and ethics”

In the field of security policy that is considered to be a crucial factor assessing the model of CPE, the EU reveals its self-perception particularly in the European Security Strategy¹⁹ (2003; ESS). The title of the document already suggests its normative intention to shape “A Secure Europe in a Better World”. Even more revealing was the Commission’s communication that was preceded by the strategy with the explicit title ‘The European Union and the United Nations: the choice for multilateralism’ (Louis 2007: 15). However, the ESS presents how the EU interprets world politics and its own role in international affairs and can be considered as an agenda for future policy activities. As main challenges, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, organized crime, state failure and regional conflicts are described. The two strategic objectives can be identified as building security in Europe’s neighbourhood and promotion of an international order, which is based on effective multilateralism (ESS 2003). Significantly, the ESS addresses not only the immediate effect of those challenges instead it names also its complex causes and takes responsibility for them²⁰. In general, the strategy illustrates how the Union perceives (future) threats and identifies interests, strategies and a proceeding of how to deal with security challenges (Wein et. al. 2007: 146).

¹⁹ Since the paper is also known as the ‘Solana doctrine’, statements of the High Representative of the CFSP will be simultaneously considered in this part of the analysis.

²⁰ This has been observed as an important difference to the National Security Strategy (NSS) of the US, which “does not explore the causes of [...] threats, the causes, (...) are outside the US and the Western world” (Mitzen: 282)

In the introduction of the document, the reference to the past of the EU/EC clearly shows the goal of a domestication or civilisation of international relations with help of “the progressive spread of the rule of law and democracy [that] has seen authoritarian regimes change into secure, stable and dynamic democracies” (ESS). The introduction leaves no doubt about the strictly civilian way of handling international crises: “European countries are committed to dealing peacefully with disputes and to co-operating through common institutions” (ESS).

The CPE notion is also expressed in “Europe should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security and in building a better world” (ibid.). This statement implies that Europe is a power for the ‘good’ in the world, which altruistically aims to make the world to a better place. In fact, this goal seems to be overambitious and reveals inconsistencies (see below).

Many scholars, however, find that the ESS is a “succinct, well-written description of the EU’s ‘role concept’ as a civilian force” (Maull 2005: 792, cf. Mitzen 2006). According to this argumentation, the paper, which was deliberately produced, emphasizes cooperation and multilateralism, and thus is a backbone of the notion of CPE. The ESS does consequently “leave no room for an alternative’ to multilateral action” (Mitzen 2006: 283). As objective, the ESS names the building of “the development of a stronger international society,” along with “well functioning international institutions and a rule-based international order”.

Maull (2005: 793) “easily find[s] all the core elements of civilian power” in the strategy. He names amongst others the crucial element of “the commitment to a fundamental transformation of international relations and to the need to organize broad-based international cooperation”. Indeed, a passage in the ESS underpins his findings:

The best protection for our security is a world of well-governed democratic states. Spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights are the best means of strengthening the international order. (ESS 2003)

In accordance to this excerpt Maull (2005: 793) notices further features of a CPE such as a “belief in the ‘democratic peace’ theory; (...) support for broader international participation and sustainable development; and the promotion of the rule of law (...)”. These observed factors strengthen the assessment of the ESS and can be backed with primary material provided by speeches of The High Representative for the CFSP’s. The clearest statement in this context is provided in Solana’s speech with regard to the Charlemagne award ceremony 2007, where he declared: “There is a European way of doing things in the world, of tackling international problems through dialogue, cooperation and building bridges. By protecting the vulnerable, and speaking in the name of those who are forced into silence” (Solana 2007d). Once again, an explicit multilaterally negotiated use of force is apparently not intended. The use of civilian instruments is rather preferred.

When it comes to the central and controversial element of the use of military power commentators observe that the “text says almost nothing about the use of force” (Dempsey 2003). He admits that the strategy “does little to relate concrete means to specific ends in given problem areas” and explains that this is due to “nature of the beast”, as the EU has “specific characteristics an actor”. Jennifer Mitzen, however, notices that military capabilities are solely mentioned in the context of post-conflict situations, but most striking “not as instruments for taking offensive action” (2006: 283). She also observes that the document restrains the term of pre-emption and rather replaces it with the notion of a ‘culture of prevention’ to build post-conflict peace (ibid.). In this context, the possible use of military force in EU military operations is linked to the democratic constitution of the Union. Javier Solana argues that operations in other parts of the world are demanded by the citizens of Europe, making it to ‘democratically justified’ operations (Solana 2007b; Solana Karlspreis engl.). In addition, the implementation of the ‘Petersberg tasks’ and therewith the possibility to deploy armed forces, is assessed to be only one part of a broad set of instruments. Future challenges that might threaten the EU’s safety cannot “be tackled by purely military means. Each requires a mixture of Instruments“ (ESS). As Solana (2007c) puts it “More than other actors, the EU can bridge the worlds of diplomats, soldiers and development experts”. In short, the findings suggest that the European Union seems to take the role as a CPE (Whitman 2006: 103).

But is the European Union self-perception really not reflecting the obvious efforts to develop itself to a militarily more capable actor? What about the recent (military) engagements in peace operations in the Western Balkans and the Democratic Republic of Congo? Is EU’s apparently attempt to combine “the post-modern, civilian power for the 21st century with traditional 20th century, great power capabilities” (Björkdahl 2007: 1) addressed in the self-image? Now, that the European Union has “made a remarkable, even revolutionary” progress in the ESDP and is finally able to “play a role which matches its responsibilities” (Solana 2007c), the abovementioned questions become evident. Indeed, an often-cited work of the Danish political scientist Henrik Larsen (2002) who examined the role of the EU from a discourse analytical perspective reveals two important discourses: The dominate discourse conceptualizes the contemporary Union as a Civilian Power and reproduces this notion. In the late 1990s, the dominant framework of meaning regarding to concrete international conflicts has always been related to EU’s possible contribution with economic and political means, even though great steps were made concerning the developments in the CFSP and ESPD (Larsen: 290). More recently, military means are presented as one “part of the Union’s joint instruments of conflict resolution and crisis management” (ibid.). Thus, civilian means, which are continuously “articulated *together* with the military ones” (ibid.) dominate, and hence, do not give military means a central importance. The striking feature of the dominant discourse, however, is that the EU constructs itself as a power, which also able to use means of coercion. Although persuasion remains essential, this development to “draw on its economic and political means to further its political goals” in a rather coercive manner consequently negates the European Union’s aspiration being a true CPE.

However, Larsen notes that the actual dominant discourse is not a total break with the CPE notion, but constitutes a crack in “that the use of military means in relation to concrete crisis is now presented as an integral part of the EU foreign policy profile” (ibid.: 292). In this context, a result of the conducted survey is striking: the majority of EU-representatives perceive there to be a gap between the EU’s self-construction as a CPE and the actual reality (Appendix 2 (A2)). In other words, it could be possible that the observed inconsistencies in the CPE-perception have sensitized EU-diplomats. Representing the strongest advocate of current EU foreign policy, the Office of the High Representative for the CFSP answered matching to the dominant discourse. From this perspective, the Union still constitutes a Civilian Power, emphasizing the use of persuasion but also applying coercive means. (Un-)Surprisingly, no gap between the self-conception as a CPE and reality is perceived. However, the positive answers according to the use coercion and the finding that the EU will gain influence through increasing military capacity, clearly indicate the abovementioned incoherence of CPE and hence point in the direction of the competing discourse.

The competing discourse stresses how the Union’s use of military means is central to create a unique role-concept as a ‘more serious’ actor in international relations. Military means further EU’s prestige and enable the Union to acquire an international status that truly displays its character (Larsen: 290- 293). In this sense, it seems that the competing discourse furthers the idea of a *Europe puissance*, making Europe a challenge to the US-superpower. In fact, this discourse is displayed in actual speeches of Solana. He often speaks of the impressiveness of EU missions and stresses the growing willingness to deploy European forces to crises areas (Solana 2007c). Nobody should dismiss the Union’s European security and defence policy as “all talk and no action” (ibid.). The “‘real world’ experiences give us [i.e. the EU] opportunities to integrate the ‘lessons learned’ into our evolving defence and doctrine”. Note here that the expression ‘real world’ may reflect the criticism of American conservatives (namely Kagan’s *Of Paradise and Power*), stating that Europe is living in a ‘Kantian Paradise’.

The ESS can also be analysed from this perspective, challenging the general view that it displays a coherent picture of CPE (cf. Wein et. al. 2007). From this perspective, the European Union views itself as an imperfect power, on its way to become a coherent actor with a full scale of military capabilities. “A more capable Europe is within our grasp, though it will take time to realise our full potential” (ESS 2003). The question arises what this coherence in regard to military integration would mean. Wein et. al. (2007: 150) see a danger that the ESS could help “to fall back into the old game of balance of power”. In this context they mention the US that seems to disagree with the military development and a new willingness to weaken the NATO ties ‘by doing it alone’. Exemplary an ESS passage may be quoted which could encourage a *Europe puissance*: “Our aim should be effective and *balanced* [italics added, B.K.] partnership with the USA. This is an additional reason for the EU to further build up its capabilities and increase its coherence” (ESS 2003). Predominately is the notion of ‘action’ or ‘activeness’, which aims at the readiness for pre-emptive action: The earlier the

better (Solana 2007c). This implies the apprehension that the EU gets early engaged where it should rather not just to send a signal to the world that it is capable. “An active and capable EU would make an impact on a global scale” (ESS 2003). Most evidently the Union says ‘goodbye’ to the CPE idea emphasizing that self-defence has to be rethought, since “our traditional concept of self-defence (...) was based on the threat of invasion. With the new threats, the first line of defence will often be abroad” (ibid.). Clearly, this quotation also stresses the abovementioned ‘activeness’ and the importance to defend the EU’s common values with “early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention” (ibid.). In general, the strategy underpins an “increasingly aggressive approach to conduct foreign and security policy” (Wein et. al.: 151) and legitimizes the use of force. Another assumption can be made by claiming that the concept of CPE now is a notion that merely serves the purpose of political consolidation. However, Wein et. al. (ibid.) admit that civilian instruments are still dominant for crisis- and conflict solution.

In conclusion, we have seen that the European Union is constructing itself and perceives itself as a unique, civilian actor in international relations. However, a competing discourse exists, identified by Larsen (2002), and its influence seems to increasingly gleam through. This is evident when one examines the ESS, but also the answers of the High Representative for the CFSP. The observed development underpin the assumption that the competing and the dominant discourse intermingle occasionally. This discourse implies features of the civilian EU pursuing the way of ‘soft imperialism’: The term means “»soft power applied in a hard way, that is an asymmetric form of dialogue or even the imposition or strategic use of norms and conditionalities enforced for reasons of self-interest rather than for the creation of a genuine (interregional dialogue«” (Hettne & Söderbaum in Wein et. al. 2006: 155) Thus a new discourse could be emerging being constructed of elements of both current discourses. Nevertheless, the dominant discourse has not forfeited its influence and is still prevailing. Hence, the model of a CPE still determines the self-perception of EU but it sustained very serious damage.

4.2 Alter-part

Solana (2007d) seems to recognize that there is a “subtle link between identity and external policy” and he is “convinced that there is a direct connection between the way we define ourselves and our external behaviour”. The study will now take a look on how this behaviour is assessed by the ‘Other’. Is the abovementioned crooked picture of the EU as a Civilian Power reflected in their eyes? Do they deny that Europe displays a Civilian or Normative Power? By studying the *alter-part* of the EU’s role concept we will be able to gain knowledge of “how well those [i.e. CPE] intentions have been translated into observable action” (Chaban et. al. 2006:247).

There are a lot of commentaries in the academic literature claiming that the European Union is perceived by other actors as a civilian ‘Mister Nice Guy’ in the international arena (Mackenstein & Marsh 2006; McCormick 2007). However, empirical evidence is missing. Nevertheless, a few exceptions can be found. One is Ortega (2004) who is the editor of a work about global views on the European Union. He concludes by stating that the new, civilian role does not pose any threat to other actors (cf. Solana 2007d). Obviously, the contributors²¹ of his paper acknowledge Europe’s civilian role, which implies the illustration of civilian ends and means (Ortega 2006: 119). Moreover, they do not see the EU becoming a *Europe Puissance* (ibid: 126-27).

Another exception but with a broader empirical focus is a recent work of Chaban et. al.(2006: 252) who present results that the EU appears “less confrontational” in negotiations and thereby displays a “softer alternative” to the US. When the focus does not lie on negotiations but is power-related and country-specific – the authors analyse the Asia-pacific region –, the ‘others’ perceive the EU mostly as an ‘economic power’. The EU is furthermore seen as an multilateralist actor ‘not using hard power’ and not likely to become a superpower (ibid.: 254-256). Sometimes Europe is observed as a ‘force for the good’ and a normative leader spreading its values (ibid.). In terms of military capabilities disagreements among parts of ‘the others’ are observable: one part refers to Europe as being militarily well prepared (according to the Bosnian conflict) and as “‘gaining’ in military power” (ibid.: 255). The other part asserts that Europe will hardly become a military power.

Since the mentioned works do not focus on CPE, they can only provide us with initial but limited information on the paper’s issue. Therefore, the empirical material gained from a survey related to CPE provides some useful data.

First of all, there is an overlapping between the findings mentioned above and the survey’s results. In fact, the large part (N= 6) of recipients first-ranks the Union as an economic power, whereas solely diplomats from Ukraine perceive it dominantly as a normative power. This arguably reflects the economic weight and trading ties of the EU. Significantly, Civilian Power and normative power are ranked second (of five) when the respondents should label the EU’s kind of power. Military power and ‘military power in the making’ were far behind and ranked last, reflecting EU’s rather small capacity of military force. The majority further states that this lack of military restricts EU’s influence in world affairs – even though mainly to some extent. However, three of seven respondents perceive the inconsiderable military capacity as not constraining the Union’s influence. A vast majority (N= 5) further considers that an increased military capability will, at least to some extent, assist to increase the Union’s influence in the international arena. One could interpret this twofold: First, there is an understanding in the ‘wider world’ of Europe’s increasing of military capacity. Second, there is

²¹ The work grasps views of eight representative authors from countries outside the EU, comprising Latin America, Africa, Asia, Oceania and Central America.

apparently a predominant realist understanding of international relations, emphasizing the traditional, military factor of influence.

Since the provided definition emphasizes that a CPE is restricted to use civilian means to pursue other actors, the 'others' were asked to assess the manner in which the EU seem to act in the international arena. At first sight, the findings are that the European Union acts according to the CPE definition since six of seven actors named that it rather acts in a persuasive manner (A2). Also, five of seven respondents pointed out that the EU does not act in a coercive manner (A2). Hence, one could argue that the Civilian Power self-image of the EU is prevailingly shared with regards to the way the Unions applies its means. However, by taking a closer look at the answers, it becomes clear that the perception of using dominately persuasive means is not uncritically shared. Of the six answers acknowledging that the EU acts in a persuasive manner, only one (Moldova) definitely states a 'yes', while the other five state-representatives answered that the persuasion is only perceived to 'some extent'. Ukraine even denies that the EU is persuasive in its international behaviour. Another indicator that the 'others' have doubts about Europe's civilian identity can be identified in two answers that view the EU as acting to 'some extent' coercive (A2). To study a convergence of the role-concept formed by others and the EU's CPE role, the questions above were narrowed down to a more tangible question. Is the conditionality of the EU perceived as an instrument of persuasion or coercion (A2)? The background for this question forms the observation that the EU increasingly uses this instrument in its foreign policy. Larsen (2002: 285) emphasizes that since the 1990s this foreign policy tool is applied mainly in relation to trade agreements and cooperation. Apparently, the focus is mainly on positive incentives, eschewing negative incentives. In this sense the EU uses "carrots rather than sticks" (ibid.). This also perceived by half of the outer-EU stakeholders. However, the other part perceives conditionality more differentiated as 'both persuasion and coercion', leaving room for interpretation where and to what extent the persuasion or coercion is sensed most.

Since a CPE is supposed to be shaping milieu goals rather than possession goals (cf. 3.), no indication should be measurable that the European Union is pursuing its very self-interest. The survey, however, provides us with information, which can be interpreted that the EU is actually pursuing possession goals. Hence, the majority (N=3, one abstain from deciding) of 'others' clearly answered 'yes' whether the Union is pursuing its self-interests through their operations. Two diplomats, differentiating more, answered the same question with 'to some extent'. Only the representative of Sudan negated the question. Nevertheless, these answers do not explicitly indicate that the EU aims to pursue possession goals. To be sure which of the two interest types are pursued by the Union, a further question tackling this would have been suitable. However, with the limited information available, the milieu goal implication of a CPE is questionable when it is compared to perception of 'outsiders'. Additionally, the results of the EU-delegations (A2) show that even the EU perceives itself to further self-interests with its military and civilian operations. Three of four EU-respondents (also the 'Solana office') answered that the Union is (at least to some extent) pursuing its

self-interest, while only one EU-diplomat (from the Delegation to the Democratic Republic of Congo) answered 'no'. To some extent an affirmation of question ten (A2) supports this assumption, since an aggressive pursuance of national (or self) interests probably provokes a dismissive stance towards this policy. However, only three respondents answered that the Union is to some extent engaged where it should rather not.

Finally, it became obvious that the current (self-constructed and reproduced) picture of the EU as a Civilian Power is not shared without doubts among most 'others' (ibid.). The majority of foreign actors clearly see a gap between the EU's self-description as a CPE and the reality. While two respondents find that the CPE-picture is only partly congruent with international relations reality, only the Georgian respondent does not see this. This result contains two important implications: First, it shows that there is apparently a development towards a 'less civilian power' appearance in the international arena. Especially when put together with the results of Question 7 and 6 (ibid.), the perception of 'others' point towards a more coercive international actor. The second implication is that the EU clearly walks a tightrope, since the own perception, displayed by the survey-result of the High Representative for the CFSP, confirm the self-perception as a CPE. The 'other', however, experiences this self-perception differently.

In sum, the *alter-part*, thus expectations of the 'other', constructs the European Union not as an ideal-type civilian power. The Union is rather perceived as a traditional actor which has persuasive and coercive instruments at its disposal and is keen on using both, but generally prefers to persuade other actors. The image of a 'power of good' described by the literature, however, is not reflected in the results. In this sense, the Union is not a hard military power, but is perceived as an economic power punching its weight to pursue its self-interests. The perception depicted in C4 could be summarized as a civilian power at crossroads, on its way towards a harder approach in international issues. Somehow there are also contradictions to be found when analysing the replies of the survey: on the one hand, some respondents highly rank the EU (first or second) being a normative/ civilian power, but on the other they perceive there to be a gap between its behaviour in reality and ascribe coercive behaviour to it. Furthermore, the question arises how this 'gap' between the labels of civilian power and something else are constituted? Only more empirical research will be able to resolve these questions. Yet, the *alter-part* of the role-conception constitutes a challenge to the self-perception of the EU and a (new) classification of EU's external appearance.

5 Conclusion

In this work the author introduced an own definition of CPE based on K.Smith's and Maull's knowledge. Combining this definition with the background of CPE notion the work's attempt was to show whether the current developments in the European foreign Policy, mainly the increasing willingness to use hard power, may have altered the conception of Europe as a Civilian Power.

Indeed, there are strong indications that the EU currently tries to couple its 'soft' power with 'hard' power. The consequences have been examined in both the conception of an *ego* and an *alter-part* of a role-conception. With help of a theoretical and methodological framework adopting role-theory, the study concludes with a two-fold finding in each role-conceptualization part.

The insight provided by the self-conception of the EU to large extent show that it is still constructed as a Civilian Power. Evidence for this has been shown in the analysis of the ESS, stakeholder speeches and other material. Despite the changes in the CFSP, the Union's self-understanding is to large parts still based on the values and norms anchored in the analysed material. The dominant discourse of the EU being a civilian power is uncritically reproduced in speeches of EU-policymakers, but also in the media. "The 'European way' of doing things in foreign policy" (Solana 2007d), according to this discourse, is displayed as the peaceful and unique way of civilizing international relations.

However, the study could also highlight support of the thesis that the EU external appearance is not any longer similar to the picture of a civilian power. The rhetoric of a more capable Europe along with the developments of the CFSP/ESDP and the "much greater use of political conditionality" (Mackenstein and Marsh 2005: 258) are serious indicators for an altered self-perception. Consequently, an existing competing discourse, emphasizing the military and coercive 'side' of Europe, seems to develop rapidly and mixes up with the dominant one at the same time. Thus, a new 'soft imperialistic' discourse is probably evolving, constructed with help of the abovementioned coupling of both hard and soft means. In other words, it could be argued that "the EU is beginning to change its character as an international actor" (ibid).

The investigation of the *alter-part* indicates that the 'others' perceive the general self-understanding of the EU as a CPE differently. The perception of non-EU international players forms a role-conception of the EU that rather matches with the developing 'soft imperialism' discourse, but is not congruent to that term. In their eyes, the Union is an important economic actor that is willingly to apply harder approaches in the international arena. The increasing coercive incentives of conditionality and the perceived self-interest build the basis for this observation. At the same time, the 'others' seem to understand the developments in the ESDP. The majority acknowledges the military evolvments since they restrict the

Union's influence. A stronger ESDP would, according to the results, lead to a greater influence of the EU in the world. In general, 'outsiders' realize that the EU is not a 'coercive force' or military power per se. They see the Union's external behaviour more persuasive than coercive.

However, the survey-results illustrate that within this perception an uncertainty can be identified: the assessment of the Union as an economic or civilian power is shared by all respondents. At the same time, they observe a rift between the European Union's self-conception as a civilian power and its real behaviour in the international arena. According to this, the *alter-part* is ambivalent and therefore a clear statement that indicates what kind of power the Union represents in the eyes of others is finally hard to make.

When comparing the findings of *alter-* and *ego-part*, it becomes clear that there is a gap between the EU's self-construction as a CPE and the role perceived by the 'others'. Thus, the role-conception's *ego-part* is not conform to its *alter-part*. However, since the ambiguity within both role-parts was empirically observed in both parts, an assessment of a complete role-conception of the contemporary EU is difficult to comprehend.

Thus to conclude, the from the findings in both *ego* and *alter-part*, it can be argued that the labelling of the EU as a CPE will not match anymore. The corset of CPE is not fitting anymore due to the growing 'military and coercive weight' of the EU and the assessment of the tailor ('other'), who tends not to recommend this piece of clothing. The study therefore argues for a new conceptualization of the EU, which encompasses these findings. One possibility doing so is utilizing the 'yardstick' metaphor, which implies the measurable space of the two ideal-types of civilian and military power. In this aspect, the civilian power of Europe is measurably moving towards the other pole, but is still far away from it. More insights on this can be achieved through further empirical research comprising interview methods.

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7 Appendix

A1: The original survey

All answers should be related to your experiences (as a representative of your country) how the European Union acts in relations to your country, respectively how you perceive the EU.

Please click on a box (☒) to mark your answer. Also note that you have only ONE answer-possibility for each question. If there are other possibilities it will be indicated.

1.) In sum, do you perceive the EU's engagement in your country to have been successful?

- yes
- to some extent
- no
- I don't know

2.) Would you say that the EU acts in a *persuasive* manner in the international arena?

- yes
- to some extent
- no
- I don't know

If you have answered yes, please state what kind of persuasion you have experienced:
You can type your answer here in the grey box.

3.) Would you say that the EU acts in a *coercive* manner in the international arena?

- yes
- to some extent
- no
- I don't know

If you have answered yes, please state what kind of coercion you have experienced:
You can type your answer here in the grey box.

4.) Do you perceive there to be a gap between the EU's perception of itself as a civil power in international relations and its actual behaviour?

- yes
- to some extent
- no
- I don't know

5.) What kind of power characterizes the EU best? Rank them from 1-5, where 1 is the term best describing the EU in world affairs. (Use the dropdown element by clicking on the figure)

- 1 Civilian Power
- 1 Normative Power
- 1 Military Power in the making
- 1 Military Power
- 1 Economic Power

6.) Would you characterize the conditionality of the EU (i.e. how the EU conditions its aid, trade and development assistance) as an instrument of persuasion or coercion?

- persuasion
- coercion
- both coercion and persuasion
- neither coercion nor persuasion
- I don't know

7.) Do you hold the opinion that the EU is pursuing its self-interests through its presence in your country?

- yes
- to a certain extent
- no

I have no opinion

8.) In your opinion, do you perceive the EU's limited military capacity to restrict the EU's influence in world affairs?

yes

to a certain extent

no

I don't know

9.) Do you think that the development of a European military capability will assist the EU in increasing its influence in the international arena?

yes

to a certain extent

no

I don't know

10.) Do you perceive the EU to intervene in matters where it should rather not?

yes

to a certain extent

no

I don't know

If you answered 'yes' or 'to a certain extent', can you please state one or more examples of such EU engagement?

You can type your answer here in the grey box.

11.) Which of the European states do you perceive to set the EU foreign policy agenda and dominate EU's external actions?

You can type your answer here in the grey box

Now, please be so kind to save this document and send it back.

Thank you very much for your time and cooperation!

A2: The aggregated replies to the survey

	High Representative Solana	EU' (N=4)	Others' (N=7)
Question 1: In sum, do you perceive the EU's engagement in your country to have been successful?			
yes		3	2
to some extent	1	1	5
no			
don't know			
Question 2: acts the EU persuasive in the international arena?			
yes		1	1
to some extent		3	5
no			1
don't know			
Question 3: acts the EU coercive in the international arena?			
yes	x		
to some extent			2
no	x	4	5
I don't know			
Q 4: Do you perceive there to be a gap between CPE and reality?			
yes		1	3
to some extent		2	2
no	1	1	1
I don't know			1
Q 5: What kind of Power characterizes the EU most ? (most high placed)			
Normative			1
Civilian		1	
Military Power in making			
Military Power			
Economic Power		3	6
Q 6: Is the instrument of conditionality rather persuasion or coercion?			
Persuaion	1	2	3
Coercion			
both coercion and persuasion		1	3
neither coercion nor persuasion		1	1
I don't know			
Q 7: Do you hold the opinion that the EU is pursuing its self-interests through its presence in your country?			
yes		1	3

to some extent	1	2	2
no		1	1
don't know			1
Q 8: Military capacity restricts EU influence?			
yes	1	1	1
to some extent		2	3
no			3
I don't know		1	
Q 9: Military capability increases EU influence in the World?			
yes	1	2	1
to some extent		1	4
no			2
I don't know		1	
Q 10: EU intervenes in matters where it should rather not?			
yes			
to some extent			3
no	1	4	4