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Department of Political Science

Multilateral Gaullism

Explaining French Policy Reorientation toward Multilateralism in Africa

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I met a lady, she was playing with her soldiers in the dark
oh one by one she had to tell them
that her name was Joan of Arc.
- Leonard Cohen

Abstract

The Franco-African liaison has in the 21th century evolved from a bilateral to a multilateral logic of affiliation. This policy transformation is to a significant extent due to the French rationalisation of resources, which can be understood as an attempt to extract external resources from multilateral institutions, such as the European Union. France increasingly uses these organisations' capabilities and resources to achieve its own policy goals in Africa. The strategy is put into operation as France is in economic decline and sees its privileged position in Africa challenged by other state actors. As visible consequences, French aid to development has gained a significantly multilateral profile and the EU is conducting French-initiated and controlled military operations in Africa. Traditional Gaullist policies are in this way given a new face.

Keywords: Franco-African relations, foreign policy change, aid-policy in Africa, Artémis, ESDP, Gaullism, Jacques Chirac.

Table of Contents

1 Introduction

The French foreign political approach to Africa has gone from, and still is going, from a bilateral to a multilateral logic. Why is this? In this paper I attempt to describe the change and link the policy shift to other areas, such as, most prominently, the French integration in the EU but also France's declining economy. The idea provided by the theoretical framework by *Theory of State Action*.

1.1 Background

French affiliation with its old colonies, as well as the rest of Africa, is taking on a new and multilateral profile. After 50 years of a strictly bilateral relation, forces seem to push France to reconfigure its relations with the continent. Thus a significant shift in French foreign policy in Africa is emerging. What was unthinkable only years ago, now is part of the procedural course of action. The French-African summit on the 15 and 16th of February 2007 illustrates the shift as it saw French high officials discussing African matters with their German counterparts – a scene unimaginable for an older generation of French decision makers. Indeed, European cooperation in the area of foreign- and security policy has intensified during previous years (see examples in Strömvik 2006; Major & Mölling 2007). Likewise, France has become increasingly active to promote multilateral policies also in other international institutions. In this thesis I attempt to portray this trend and link it to the French policy transformations in Africa.

1.2 Aim and query

The aim of my research is to explain the multilateralisation of French foreign policy in Africa. My query follows: *How do we best explain French foreign policy change from a bilateral to a multilateral logic of approach in Africa?* In order to systematically analyze this policy shift, I have consulted a realist model of international relations – Ikenberry's *Theory of State Action*. In drawing from core elements of this theory, I challenge the social constructivist perspective in general

and scholar Pernille Rieker's theories of French foreign political logic of action in particular.

1.3   Theories in the study

This paper is not primarily theoretical; it does not seek to develop or revise theories. Instead, I mean to contrast two ways of looking at international relations (IR): the social constructivist approach and the realist perspective. This endeavour though has second priority and will thus be found in a sublevel context. In the study, the constructivist viewpoint, with focus on issues of identity, is embodied in Pernille Rieker's writings and research on French foreign policy. The Realist perspective is incorporated in the employed *Theory of State Action*.

1.3.1   Rieker and social constructivism

In Rieker's article *Towards the Europeanization of French Foreign and Security Policy* the empirical focus is on changes in French foreign and security policy since the early 1990's. She analyzes to which extent the official discourse on foreign and security matters has been "Europeanized" and argues that a change has taken place over time that could be described as *socialization*. The first phase of socialization is often what is under way "when an actor starts instrumentally adjusting its discourse and actions to a community norm." (Rieker 2006:514) The second phase is when this "adaptation" is institutionalized and affects the identity of the norm-recipient ("learning") (ibid). In her article, France is an actor and norm-recipient, and the EU, and in particular EU's foreign and security policy, the community norm that actively seeks to shape the actor (Rieker 2006: 511-14).

Rieker argues that the socialization is a highly natural process in the international arena seeing that "national approaches tend to adapt to norms defined by an international community or institution to which they are closely linked" (Rieker 2006: 509). Given that Rieker regards identity and interest as closely linked and flexible, the norm-recipient is expected to change its preferences and behaviour. This is what arguably has happened with regard to French foreign policy: it has been Europeanized and has a new notion of its international role and charge. The driving force in the process has been accelerating European integration. Accordingly, the EU has been somewhat of a Trojan horse that has now unleashed new, arguably European, preferences in the French decision making system. In her article Rieker states:

"I would argue that the EU does not simply constrain, but rather shapes French security thinking in a way that can be referred to as Europeanization. At least it is clear that there is no longer a Gaullist consensus on defence and that in certain

areas of French military and civil-military activity, such as peace operations, Gaullism has little to say." (Rieker 2006: 510)

This verbal burial of the Gaullist foreign policy doctrine and idea that the Foreign policy changes, such as the one in Africa, are shaped by a new concept of identity (the European) is what I indirectly challenge in this study. The in Rieker's article all-present polarization between "Gaullism" and "Europeanization" is equally present in my study.

1.3.2 Ikenberry and realism

In my thesis, I challenge Rieker's newly published (Dec 2006) article with her viewing and explaining of multilateral state action by European states. This approach, as outlined, makes the EU-integration the independent variable while policy and/or discourse change is made dependent variable. Drawing from elements in Ikenberry with co-authors work, I have instead chosen to view the integration-process as merely a tool for state goals. Hence, I employ an *instrumental* way of looking at the European integration in particular as well as multilateral tendencies in general. In attempting this approach, I challenge the assumption that the integration is a driving force *in itself*. Likewise, I apply classical IR theory (Realism) in order to either complement on or better explain the French shift of policy in Africa[1].

1.4   Demarcations

I will concentrate my writings on two policy areas in order to have sufficient depth in my analysis: Public aid to development and military engagement. The reason for this is that many scholars and journalists that cover Franco-African relations regard the two as making up the core of the political relations (see for instance Chafer 2001: 168; www.adcis.uiuc.edu). Perhaps because they were once the ties that bound Africa to France: first by military incursion, then by economic and military dependency. The volatility in the two policy-areas the past decade has not gone unnoticed. On the contrary, they have been well covered policy alterations to those who have an interest in Franco-African relations.

1.5   Outline

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[1] Ikenberry's theory is revisited in chapter 3

After the second chapter, in which methodological issues are raised, follows the study. Firstly, I look at other theories of policy change that has led me to consult Ikenberry. I thereafter devote the remaining of the chapter to the applied theory. The fourth part contains a concise description of former Franco-African relations. In the fifth, I look at underlying state issues and the sixth chapter is dedicated at describing the movement towards multilateralism and contains an attempt to explain it with help from the applied theory. The seventh chapter is a closing part where I evaluate my findings and discuss Rieker's theory in relation to my own.

2   Methodology

There are different ways to go about if one wants to research the root causes of French foreign policy change in Africa. One can analyse primary sources with discourse analysis-tools in order to trace discrepancies over time. Also, one can vigilantly use secondary material to shape an image of the overall tendencies in French foreign politics. Last, one can also use foremost quantitative methods to get an image of, for example, how resources are used and controlled. I have chosen to employ a distinctly qualitative method using primarily secondary material. The main reason for not having any significant amount of official material is that it is not suitable for my theory. The applied theory, one can say, provides a framework for revealing strategies and hidden agendas of state action. Hence, with my framework, I search to reach beneath the rhetoric in the quest for root causes for policy change, and as the theory implies state strategies that are either confidential or simply not outspoken, I cannot expect to find extensively useful material in official sources.

Another thing deserves to be mentioned. The adopted perspective in the study is an essentially *Francocentric* one. This means that my focus is on France, its role and its policies. By this, I do not wish to state that the African countries are "passive recipients" – nothing could be more false. Rather, such a perspective reflects the fact that the relationship has been an unequal one. In addition to this, the scope of the thesis is limited and I therefore leave to future studies to include specific African variables (for further discussion see Chafer 2001:175-4).

2.1   Research design

The query concerns a subject that has previously drawn attention from political science (for recent work see Touati 2007, Quinn and Simon 2006, Agboluaje 2005). My study is original in the perspective from which I analyze French foreign policy in Africa.

My application of Ikenberry with co-authors theory to the French state and its involvement in Africa qualifies as a qualitative case-study which, naturally, has implications. Case-studies provide insights and depth to a phenomenon but can on the other hand not be generalized from (Essaisson et al. 2005: 178). This shortcoming will not pose meaningful problems to the study as my ambition is to illustrate an individual case of foreign policy change. Instead, I hope that my research can contribute on two fields – foreign policy change and French African policy – which would allow for a deeper understanding of both phenomena. The

criteria for this sort of profound study, while brief, allows others to pick up where I finish.

It could be argued that it is preferable with two or more theories to work with and compare when doing case-studies. To this critique I have two answers: first, the theory at hand is complex and in order for my description of it to be nuanced and accurate it requires a maximum of space. Therefore, there is no room for outlining other theories in a way which would do them justice. Second, as this paper to a certain extent is a response to the questions and theories outlined by Pernille Rieker on French foreign policy, I will inevitably (although briefly) touch upon her hypothesis and thus include alternative approaches.

As briefly mentioned, this thesis is also of a qualitative character. In difference to a quantitative study, the procedure might not be as easy to follow for an outsider which could lead to problems of *intersubjective verifiability* (Lundquist 1993: 52). In order to tackle this, the reader will be accurately guided and presented with every step of the study. With any luck, this will allow for the scientific value to be judged upon (Bergström & Boréus 2000: 221).

2.2   Definitions

In order to make the research possible to implement, the working terms have to be defined. I have defined *African policy* as "actions or discourses aimed at influencing the African countries". When I use the word *multilateralisation* I refer to a "tendency for increased multilateral engagement"[2]. I do this well aware that the term, in strict sense, is not a word (but neither is Europeanization if one is to be strict). As for *Gaullism,* I have drawn from historian Richard Vinen's idea of Gaullism, making a strict dichotomy between domestic and foreign Gaullist politics (Vinen 1996: 176-7). Gaullism has many connotations (especially in France) but what is relevant to my study is the meaning of a Gaullist *foreign policy*. This excerpt reflects very well what this doctrine is about:

"The main theme of de Gaulle's foreign policy was of national independence [...]. The basic tenets were that France should not have to rely on any foreign country for its survival [...] and that France should refuse subservience to any foreign power, be it the United States or the Soviet Union. One can also cite the policies of *grandeur* — that is, the insistence that France is a major power in the world scene and the establishment of military and economic forces to back this claim." (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gaullism)

When defining *International power,* I use Kenneth Waltz's definition of power as the "the ability to influence the behaviour of foreign state and non-state actors."

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[2] My stipulations

8

(Waltz, cited in Ikenberry et al. 1989: 467) As for the term *Africa*, it refers almost exclusively to *sub-Saharan Africa* in modern journals and literature. Even though this geographically excludes a major part of the continent, I have chosen to accept this association. This comes from the fact that there normally are two stories to tell about two Africa's in French literature. Historians and journalists culturally split Africa into the "Maghreb" (North-Africa) and "l'Afrique noir" (sub-Saharan Africa), paving way for Africa to implicitly become sub-Saharan Africa.

2.3   Source material

My main source of information is secondary material. This, naturally, has implications. It makes the evaluation of the sources essential. I have in every case considered authenticity, independence, contemporariness and bias. When necessary, I have verified facts with other sources and commented upon the source in the running text. Articles from high-quality newspapers (such as *Le Monde*) and international reviews of political science are dominant among the references. As these are the backbone of the thesis, and scientists and journalists theoretically are expected to behave neutrally (albeit not in the same way) they hopefully contribute to the credibility of the same. However because of this "shield of neutrality," at times it can be a problem to estimate how reliable the sources are (Essaison et al. 2005: 308). Furthermore, my ambition has been to use as newly published material as possible.

   To a more limited extent, but nonetheless, I use declarations and policy documents. This material remains unfiltered by others but is, on the other hand, naturally biased. My ambition is to place this material in context and uphold a critical approach. Strömvik (2005) suggests that official documents can be regarded as the tip of the iceberg of policy transformations saying that they are "not necessarily individual isolated measures, but 'rather one element in a sequence of actions...'". (Strömvik, citing Rummel 2005: 25-6) It is in this light I attempt to interpret my official material.

   Among the many sources I use, a few deserve to be mentioned because of their vital importance to my study. Touati 2007, Quinn & Simon 2006, Agboluaje 2005 and Major & Mölling 2007 are all current studies with extensive empirical information that is relevant to my study. The authors are all regarded scholars with a profiled focus on France, Europe and Africa.

3 Theory

3.1 Theoretical background – why states change foreign policy

At the core, the notion of change is a philosophical issue. Does change occur because all the elements that would allow for change suddenly coincide (the airplane crash-model)? Or does change occur at slow pace underneath the observable surface of events (the Marxist suggestion)? These ontological differences in how we generally view the notion of change are reflected among the scholars that focus on foreign relations, and maybe most notably among those who have dedicated parts of their scholarship to political change. In order to provide a brief overlook of the research field of foreign policy change I present below two theories by important scholars Jerel Rosati, Glenn Palmer and T. Clifton Morgan.

3.1.1 Rosati and the policy cycles

Rosati employs a cyclical model in order to describe and explain foreign policy transformation. Longer periods of stability and status quo are altered by shorter periods of change. According to Rosati, an influent scholar in IR, there is a constant tension in society between forces pulling towards change, and forces pulling towards status quo respectively. It is the power symmetry that determines if change may be allowed to occur and, in normal, the elements working for preservation have the upper hand. However, society finds itself in constant change and the balance may at times be turned into the change-protagonists advantage.

Foreign affairs are regarded as a fairly static and inflexible area of politics. It is when this peculiar field of politics is ultimately faced with substantial changes in the international system, in domestic politics or on the environmental field that change can (or must) occur because the foreign policy no longer can respond to the demands placed on it by society (Rosati 1994: 225-7). One therefore has to attempt to identify these elements of change as a scholar.

3.1.2 Palmer & Morgan and the trade-offs in foreign policy

Palmer & Morgan's theoretical model of foreign policy decision making contains a wide range of foreign policy behaviours. The authors argue that the overall objective for foreign policy is to produce one of two things: change or maintenance. In the pursuit of these goals states have to their disposal means such as "arms, alliances, conflict and foreign aid" (Rudloff 2006: 643). Some strategies aim at changing status quo, some aim at preserving it and the key for understanding state behaviour lies in the trade-offs between the two. States try to achieve the best blend possible for its purposes accordingly with its resources. Generally, resource-rich states invest more in foreign policy then do others (ibid).

A lot of theoretical literature suggests that the trade-off between strategies is, in short, a zero sum game – the one comes at the expense of the other. Palmer & Morgan show that this is not necessarily the case and outlines the conditions for such tradeoffs. This theory implies that states may change their foreign policy and start pushing for a change on the international level in one issue in order to preserve status quo on another.

Both Rosati and Palmer & Morgan have elements in their work that underscores the link between domestic and foreign policy. Moreover, their theories have economical features that I find interesting. The theories have served as useful guidance bringing me to work with a theory that especially cultivate and focus on such components (outlined in 3:3).

3.2   Hypothesis

"Security matters have lost their pre-eminence vis-à-vis economic considerations and the latter forces governments to unprecedented levels of collaboration." (Hill & Smith 2005: 30)

As I look into France's shift in foreign policy towards Africa, I rely heavily in the concepts presented in the theory below. However, I have chosen to emphasize some elements of the theory more than others. Particularly, I accentuate the strategy of external extraction as response to domestic instability and international challenges. Also, I interpret the notion of resources in an extensive way including not only purely financial means but also military resources. Extraction, I suggest, can be managed in an integrationist context. In the case of France, there are precedents of this. According to Ikenberry with co-authors, the French state has an "historical ability" to extract resources from the European Community. (Ikenberry et al. 1989: 467) A notable example is The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) which has been an important tool for accumulating external resources since it became an integral part of the EEC treaty in 1957. In this case, the resources are agricultural subsidies extracted in order to "buy off" farmers that compose an important political factor in France (Ikenberry et al. 1989: 467). Another example is the French ability to place costs for the Gaullist Africa policy on other EEC

members, markedly with the 131-134 paragraphs in the Treaty of Rome (Agboluaje 2005: 228).

Drawing from Ikenberry et al. my hypothesis is that there are elements of this old strategy in the new policy of multilateralism towards Africa. French Africa policy has since the end of the Second World War been a costly one: "The exercise of French grandeur was the answer to the complex and varied goals associated with France re-establishing herself in the world. This required that France exhibit a foreign policy that 'would exercise influence disproportionate to her material means'" (Quinn & Simon, citing Cerny 2006: 300).

The external extraction is generated primarily within the EU as France, being a dominant member of the Union, above all on foreign political issues, acts to share the burdens of its African policy with the other members. But the strategy is also likely to be present in other bodies that deals with Africa and where France exercise significant weight.

3.3   Ikenberry: A fusion of two realist schools

It is often said by contemporary diplomats and ministers of foreign affairs: domestic and foreign policy are closely entwined. Very often this is also said in context related to globalization as a growing trend in the 21th century but the close relations between the two spheres have been recognized and theorized ever since the Westphalian state emerged. The big challenge for analysts is the question of *how* the two levels interact. Ikenberry, Lake and Mastanduno have made a comprehensive attempt to "sort out the puzzling tangles" (Ikenberry et. al. 1989: 458). Their "theory of state action" draws from classical as well as structural Realism placing the state at the absolute centre of politics, domestically as well as internationally.

The theory at hand is first and foremost drawn from classical realism. This implies three major arguments. First, the international system is constituted of sovereign states that recognize no higher authority other than themselves. It can therefore be described as anarchic. Secondly, the nature of the relationship between states is primarily competitive although this does not exclude cooperation on some areas in order to reach unilateral goals. Third, states behave purposively as they navigate in the given system in search for power and material well-being. This model builds upon the assumption that the state is a rational actor which seeks to maximise its power and influence at the international arena (Ikenberry et al. 1989: 459).

The classical realist model also defines the role of the state in relation to the nation-state. In this model, statesmen are not simply expected to respond to changes within the nation-state but rather, they are expected to guide society. Hence, they always possess a minimum of autonomy in relation to non-governmental domestic actors. The statesman though, is dependent upon the domestic resources he can extract in order to gain an international position:

"… in the pursuit of foreign policy, the state must draw upon society and economy for material resources and political support. In effect, the state's external policies depend critically on what it can extract from its domestic system." (Ikenberry et al. 1989: 460)

As a consequence, statesmen will give a lot of attention to mobilize and extract the domestic sources of national power. May these be political, economic or military. Thus "the statesman must be an astute diplomat, but he must also be an able student of domestic politics." (Ikenberry et al. 1989: 460)

But how do international relations play in for policy outcome? This is where the theory integrates *structural realism*. Drawing from the works of primarily Kenneth Waltz, the authors compare the international system with the market which is, arguably, unintentionally created by self-regarding actors. It is assumed that the structure of the system in itself has considerable impact on the international outcomes, thus saying that looking at domestic politics is insufficient for the understanding of world politics (Ikenberry et al. 1989: 461).We are hence obliged to turn to both spheres of state action in order to explain state conduct. In summary, Ikenberry, Lake and Mastanduno's theory does not only provide a theory that integrates two diverging realist schools, but also bridges domestic and international politics.

3.4   The two spheres of action

3.4.1 Domestic means

Central to the model of state action is the assumption that states short-term international goal is the attainment of power and wealth. The two are, in realist theory, not important in themselves but they facilitate every states long-term goal: survival.

"Power, as Realists reminds us, is a currency with which to purchase security and other valued political goods. Wealth […] is a necessary means to power, and the two are in long-run harmony (Ikenberry et al. 1989: 462)

There are two strategies for optimizing the state strength through domestic means: *mobilizing* and *extracting* internal resources. By mobilization the state intervenes in the economy to "stimulate growth and enhance the wealth of society as a whole" (Ikenberry et al. 1989: 462). This can be managed in a direct or an indirect way by for example the allocation and nationalisation of resources (direct) or by the introduction of efficient property rights (indirect). Mobilization can be described as a state investment that pays off in terms of, for example, sustained or increased military expenditures and stimulated technological innovation. It is thus a measure that expands the economic and political bases of power (Ikenberry et al. 1989: 463).

Extracting internal resources is something substantially different from mobilization but they are nevertheless linked. A simple analogy would be that if the mobilization is sewing, the extraction is the harvesting. The extraction process is about the state's capacity to transform produced wealth into power, since they are in no way synonymous to a state's perception (ibid). A determinant of power on the international level is this transformational capacity. The state needs a well functioning apparatus for the taxing, requisitioning and expropriating of social resources that then can be converted to example wise foreign aid, military expenditures and propaganda. All of which are useful tools in the pursuit of international authority. Resources are, in *A Theory of State Action*, fundamental for governments' abilities to exercise international leverage.

3.4.2 International means

In order for the state as an organization, and for the officials that control it, to maintain support and overcome opposition they strive for two goals: 1.) the control over resources. This allows for them to hold back challengers and reward supporters, it is therefore an important tool. 2.) The preservation or establishment of legitimacy. Legitimacy is defined by the authors as:

"the acceptance on the part of domestic groups of the states claim to the exercise of decision-making authority" (Ikenberry et al. 1989: 464).

There is also a clearly defined relation between the two domestic goals. The more legitimacy the state officials enjoy, the less they are obliged to take coercive and more costly measures.

The mentioned domestic goals can be reached with help from international measures. Related to the two goals are the two strategies that the state can pursue at international level: *external extraction* and *external validation.* First, the external extraction is the mirror of internal extraction. It refers to state ability to accumulate resources from outside its borders. This may be done in a direct way (ex. imperialism and coercion) or in an indirect way (e.g. using leverage to get beneficial trade agreements). (Ikenberry et al. 1989: 464).

Getting access to international financial sources can relieve the state from internal burdens. The internal extraction can be decreased and the thereby ease pressure within the internal political system.

External *validation* refers to state representatives' use of their international status for the purpose of strengthening their positions "at home". This can mean everything from simple diplomatic recognition (in the case of smaller or newer states) to the long-term diplomatic reputation that the state officials and diplomats make for themselves (ibid). It could be theorized that the lack of recognition ("rogue-treatment") of some regimes, like Zimbabwe or North Korea, has weakened the leadership and forced it to more expensive, repressive measures. In some cases the leadership have been strengthened by its international isolation

but, theoretically, this has come at a very high price in terms of internal extraction. Counter-wise, the diplomatic, neutral and strong foreign-political traditions of Sweden may, example wise, have contributed to the popularity of the leadership at times (Fredriksson et al. 1996: 7-10).

The two external strategies have moreover a potential to enhance each other. As the authors put it:

"By participating in international organizations, elites in developing countries may enhance both their status at home and their ability to extract resources from advanced industrialized nation-states." (Ikenberry et al. 1989: 465)

Of course, one does not have to limit oneself to developing countries. Also industrialized countries can apply similar dealings. The state attributes will in all cases be determinant for which strategy the state will employ. Below follows suggestions as to how different states act in response to different situations. I have limited the scope to situations and attributes that could be applicable to France as the country is the subject of this paper.

3.5   Modells of Action

Hypothesis 3 ("H3" in Ikenberry's theory): *As domestic instability increases, the state will pursue external extraction and validation.*

This model contains the notion of "domestic instability" but goes beyond what we would normally associate with this language. Political instability can be everything on a continuum between substantially weak public supports for policy makers to the immediate risk of revolution and state overthrow. In order to deal with the disorders, bigger or smaller, the state can pursue international strategies since such strategies can:

"enhance the ability of the state to satisfy the proximate domestic goals jeopardized by instability" (Ikenberry et al. 466)

Drawing from what has been described, we can now roughly predict the responses in state action to domestic or international challenges. As stated previously, the size and character of the state will be determinants for its choice of action. For the analysis Ikenberry et al. makes the distinction between "soft" and "hard" states as well as between "powerful" and "weak" (see Fig 1 below). The degree of hardness of the state depends upon its capacity to "influence and shape society and economy" and the strength upon its ability to influence foreign states behaviour. The hard state also implies a centralized and autonomous state (in relation to society) (Ikenberry et al. 467).

It is apparent that the French state, with these criteria, qualifies as an internationally strong state with hard features. We will therefore focus on Ikenberry's suggested models of state action for this type of state.

H5: *Powerful states will emphasize international strategies more than will weak states.*

H7: *Internationally powerful states will engage in external extraction to a larger extent than will weak states* (Ikenberry et al. 1989: 469).

International Structure

	Weak	Powerful
Soft	Internal Extraction External Validation	External Extraction
Hard	Internal Mobilization	Internal Mobilization External Extraction

Domestic
Structure

Fig . 1 Strategies and constraints, from Ikenberry et al. 1989: 469

4   Historical Context

The French colonial empire has been a projection, in addition to a reflexion, of French power on the world stage. The empire was, at the end of the Second World War, one of the main reasons that France could claim a permanent seat at the UN Security Council (Touati 2007: 2). The end of the Second World War meant an altered relationship with the colonies. First, a new bipolar world had to be tackled in order for France to remain a "great power". In risk of decline and faced with the two most dominant states ever, the cornerstones of French foreign policy became *détente, entente et coopération* with *both* superpowers (Quinn & Simon 2006: 299). For France, as self-nominated leader of the non-aligned countries, the development of a nuclear capacity (*la force de frappe*) as well as the influence exercised on the African continent became key elements for manifesting independence and projecting power. Second, as the demands for independence in the colonies mounted, France found itself obliged to redefine the nature of its relations with Africa if it did not wish to see the same advancement (detachment) as in Indochina. A militarily humiliated France withdrew from Indochina in 1954 (Lindahl: 1995: 60). France's new policy became directed at walking the narrow path between remaining extremely influent though not a colonial power:

"Decolonisation did not mark an end, but rather a restructuring of the imperial relationship." (Chafer 2001: 167)

Once again, as newly elected president 1959, General de Gaulle played a significant part in this transformational period in French history. France developed in the 1960s what Sylvain Touati refers to as *neo-colonial* strategy under the supervision of de Gaulle (Touati 2007: 2). The policy towards the developing world was part of the grand ambition to "exert significant military, political, economic and diplomatic influence outside the orbits of the Soviet Union and the United States" (Quinn & Simon 2006: 299). This included giving the former colonies and other interested countries the means to develop and resist de facto subjugation by the two superpowers. De Gaulle saw the major political importance of Africa and "offered, and in some ways imposed, a package that tied France to the new states: newly established regimes were to remain under Paris's protection" (Touati 2007:2). The pact was, roughly, that France would provide technical, military and financial assistance and in return would get support for French international policies (ibid). This was the core-logic of the Gaullist African-policy.

The result was a close bilateral partnership with many countries at the time when most ex-colonisers disengaged from the continent. Consequently, a new

French Africa policy that formally aimed at supporting independence conversely tied many African countries ever closer to France.

De Gaulle's fifth republic, founded in 1959, gave the president a remarkably strong role to play in French politics. Alongside with the privilege to dissolve parliament, the president is head of state and army chief and conducts foreign policy (Lindahl: 1995: 65). The African policy is therefore, although institutionalized, linked to the president's personal interest for the continent.

4.1   A first phase of change

Two major reasons contributed to a first phase of change in Gaullist French policy towards Africa in the early 1990's: the end of the cold war and the rising of the phenomena of *cohabitation*.

The end of the cold war decreased the need for complicity with third world countries since these no longer had to be prevented from "choosing side". This meant that France, among other things, could reduce support, or increase support-conditionality, in view of the more unsavoury regimes in Africa. Some rulers had been reluctantly supported despite poor human-rights records in the context of the cold-war (Chafer 2001: 173).

The political system in France might have, secondly, contributed to a general weakening of the French African policy during the nineties. *Cohabitation* arises when the President is of a different political party than the majority of parliament and therefore is forced to appoint a Prime-minister from a rivalling party (Lindahl 1995: 64, 72). As consensus is required and important decisions have to be made by the lowest common denominator, it alters the way that foreign policy is introduced. The occurrence of cohabitation has allegedly influenced the managing of events such as the genocide in Rwanda, the devaluation of the CFA Franc and the Côte d'Ivoire crisis (Touati 2007: 3). It can be argued that the second period of cohabitation between Mitterrand and Balladur 1993-95 limited the damage that French policy inflicted in Rwanda as Balladur opposed Mitterrand's claimed pro-Habyarimana policy. Nonetheless, France suffered a severe loss of prestige and international confidence as a result of the Rwandan disaster. It is generally assumed that the cohabitation added to the ambiguous French actions, more than it did limit them (ibid). The third cohabitation, between Chirac and Jospin 1997-2002, meant strict constraints on the French foreign policy as the leftist parliamentary majority was reluctant to approve of Chirac's Gaullist oriented program. Hence, the traditional Gaullist policy could be weakened as all decisions were compromises. This was a setback for the historically close relations to Africa and the one who was supposed to carry on the Gaullist heritage – president Chirac. Chirac called the situation a state of "paralysis" (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cohabitation_(government)#France). As a visible result, the French army did not intervene as the Côte d'Ivoire crisis broke out in 1999. Since 2002, however, French president Chirac has been able to implement his vision of Franco-African relations and thereby, go on the offensive.

5   Underlying State Issues

5.1   African challenges

Sylvain Touati (2007) makes recent competition in Africa one of his key-issues to underpin in his analysis of French foreign policy in Africa. He states that "France's monopoly is under threat" (Touati 2007: 1). There are two main reasons for this evolution. To begin with, increased demand for oil in combination with widespread political instability among oil producers has lead to elevated oil prices. As a result, many countries, and companies look to Africa as they seek new terrains for oil import in order to diversify their resources. Secondly, the terms of trade between France and Africa have been somewhat normalized. As the continent has slowly been opened up to a liberal economic system by dealings in the World Trade Organization (WTO), the Franco-African business relations have had to follow (Touati 2007: 14). Previously, in accordance with the neo-colonial approach described above, French capitalism "could thrive quietly because it had been protected from external competition by its monopolistic positions and its close links with the political world." (ibid) The revived competition in Africa is primarily coming from China and the United States. The magnitude and the swiftness of this evolution are revealed by the vivid reactions that especially the Chinese offensive is sparking. The latest G8-meeting in Potsdam criticized China for allowing African countries to lend exceptional sums from China and thus remount a debt that the G8 have strived to eradicate (Le Monde 19/5 2007). This represents the tip of the iceberg of geo-political transformations in Africa where China is increasingly active to gain influence. A common judgement is that France cannot respond to these challenges by itself:

"[Les] nouveaux rapports planétaires accélèrent l'effritement de la zone d'influence française, conduisant le président Chirac à réorienter la politique africaine de la France dans le sens du multilatéralisme et d'une européanisation destinés à sortir du tête-à-tête franco-africain." (Le Monde 14/2007)

5.2   Domestic challenges

French economy has been stagnating for 25 years and during recent years it has changed place with Germany as the "child of sorrow" of European economy. Grand expectations were placed on Jacques Chirac when elected president on a

program of vast reforms in 1995 but since, the situation only seems to have worsened. French unemployment has averaged 10 percent during Chirac's years in the Elysée palace and public debt has during the same period of time grown faster than in any other European country. It now mounts to 66 percent of French GNP (Economist 2007: nr. 382). There even seems to be an element of stability in the stagnating tendency. In fact, the unemployment rate has not been below 8 percent in 25 years. In the 21th century, former black sheep in European economy Germany is rapidly taking market assets from France. The share of French exports outside the Euro zone fell by 18 percent between 1999 and 2006. Equally, in 2006 – a year of high juncture – French GNP growth was weak 2 percent compared to the average 2, 8 percent in the Euro zone (Economist 2007: nr. 382). This clearly represents a fierce challenge for French officials who are compelled to rationalise expenses – and find new sources. The stagnating, seemingly stabile, tendency is mirrored by a minor tendency of political instability in France. Not without logic, the state of French economy affected the French dismissal of the European constitutional treaty and the suburb riots of 2005. Also, the nation-wide protests against the first-time jobholder legislation and, in 2007, the subsequent protests after the election of Nicolas Sarkozy to presidency, showed a country in reform paralysis with mounting political tensions (http://www.spiegel.de/international/spiegel/0,1518,415188,00.html).

6 France and Africa in the 21th century – Toward Multilateralism

"la France affiche une réelle volonté d'inscrire ses relations dans un cadre multilateral, et ce developpement constitue aussi un nouveauté, sans que la logique traditionelle n'en pâtisse fondamentalement" (Adjovi 2006: 427).

6.1 Aid to development

Since the end of the third cohabitation in 2002, President Chirac has been able to implement his vision of Franco-African relations. In a speech at the 22nd France-Afrique summit he described the changes under way, as a shift from "assistance" to "a partnership system" (Touati 2007:3). According to Adjovi (2002) this means the continuance of a significant trend that has marked the Franco-African relations since mid-nineties: France is placing its relations with Africa in a bigger context where one continues to push for "action africaine" (Adjovi 2002: 431). This trend is highly noticeable in the policy area of aid to development.

France has been a significant aid donor to Africa for almost 40 years. During this time, Africa has developed very slowly and, in some cases, even stagnated. Aid has not always been efficient and one can argue that French leaders have used aid as a "marketing tool to drive forward and apply certain policies." (Touati 2007: 5)

The apparatus for administrating African development assistance was reformed in the late nineties. Before, foreign public aid to Africa passed through the French Ministry of Co-operation. This was formerly a separate governmental body agency for dealing exclusively with African matters and particularly matters that concerned the former colonies. Following the reform, the ministry was incorporated within The Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In parallel, functions formerly scattered on a number of bodies were centralized to the Quai d'Orsay and the Ministry of Economy and Finance. (www.acdis.uiuc.edu) Definition, management and monitoring of France's public aid to development are now conducted from these ministries. Hence, what was before a unique governmental unit, distinctly separated from other bureaucracies has been dismantled, and Africa now has the same position as the rest of the world in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

On aid matters, the development is apparent: France seeks to transform its relation with Africa in general, and its former colonies in particular, to a logic of

multilateralism. In Touati's words France "no longer wishes to deal with Africa by itself" (Touati 2007: 5). The government agency reform that built-in the Ministry of Cooperation in the Foreign Office in a larger context facilitated coordination for pursuing such an ambition.

A study published in 1997 by the *Review of African Political Economy* very accurately predicted the French Aid policy to become. Beginning with: "pressures are mounting for a re-assessment of aid policy, with cost-effectiveness as central concern." (Conte 1997: 139) The assessment was made with background to the growing costs that the Public Aid to Development[3] represented. While the average net sum given to such aid by the OECD countries decreased from 0.34 % of GNP in 1984 to 0.27 % in 1994, the French aid expenses grew from 0.59 % to 0.64% during the same period (Conte 1997:140). This had everything to do with an all more expensive Africa policy: an appreciated 76 % of French aid is oriented toward Africa (Le Monde 16/9 2006). In other words, the Gaullist-policy bill rose. However, since 1995, when the aid budgetary component fell to 0.55% of GNP, this trend has been reversed in an extraordinary way.

In 2004 France gave as little as 0.42 % of its GNP in aid to development. This represents about 8 billion Euros which in total sums puts France as a donor country in third place behind The United States and Japan (Le Monde 16/9 2006). However, estimates by the *Conseil d'analyse économique* (CAE) shows that 29 % percent of this sum amounts to multilateral aid that is administrated by the EU, the World Bank, IMF or the United Nations. Another 31% is devoted to debt annulations. Merely 8 percent net is comprised of loans or donations (Le Monde 16/9 2006). In other words, the direct bilateral aid is becoming an almost negligible part of the modern aid budget. These decreasing bilateral contributions comprise maybe the most significant aid-policy shift: as late as in 1994 the direct bilateral aid mounted to 78.7 % of the global aid budget (Conte 1997: 141).

As an example of the new multilateral commitment, the French pledge to the World Banks Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) program is strong. The country has agreed to cancel $7.6 billion debt (of a total of $54 billion by the G7 countries) and has created a structure for all creditors to provide debt relief to the world's poorest countries. The 7.6 billion in addition to the high profile may prove to be a good investment as France, with such gestures, seeks to play a key role within the World Bank. The Bank in fact channels the majority of aid flows to Africa (Touati 2007:5; Chafer 2001:173).

Is this new? One has to keep two things in mind when discussing French aid to Africa from the nineties onwards. First of all, the logic of relationship has historically been strictly bilateral (as described above). Secondly, French policymakers have historically regarded the Bretton Woods institutions as "bastions of Anglo-Saxon power" (Quinn & Simon 2006:301). The 1993 *Balladur-doctrine* signified a departure from this view as it stated that recipients of French aid must comply with economic agreements with the World Bank and the IMF (Quinn & Simon 2006: 301-2). This documented movement toward

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[3] Aide publique au devéloppement (APD) in France

multilateralism has since accelerated. French multilateral aid in the 21st century has formal priority over bilateral aid (Touati 2007: 5). The bilateral budgetary post is likely to diminish further in the coming years if the trend is upheld.

6.1.1 French aid and foreign policy goals

The multilateral context though, does not rule out the possibility that the aid is used in the pursuit of foreign policy goals. On the contrary, Bernard Conte argues that:

"France can use the multilateral channel as financial lever to make its aid seem more important to the receivers. More than half of French multilateral aid is channelled via the European Union, making France the leading European nation in 1996. It might then be supposed that France, as the leader, could influence to a certain degree, how European resources are allocated. Finally, this strategy allows France to adopt the advantageous position of advocate of Africa, and the third world in general, to international bodies." (Conte 1997:146)

Accordingly, the multilateral approach could be a more capable way to reach old policy goals on the African continent as well as internationally, and a more cost-efficient one as well. In retrospect, Conte's concept of multilaterally channelled French *grandeur* looks as if it was a policy agenda.

France has consistently pushed for the priority of the sub-Saharan region in aid-giving institutions proposing a Priority Solidarity Zone[4] (ZSP) for aid. Among the arguments flowing, French diplomats say that it is since this is the region where the UN Millennium goals will not be reached (Touati 2007: 6-7, BBC 23/12 1998). At the same time, no other country in the western hemisphere is likely to benefit as much from African development and shared African aid burden as France. Moreover, the country has meticulously cultivated an image as "leader" on African issues as well as "advocate of Africa" accordingly with Conte, and not only in the European Union.

At the 24th Franco-African summit in February 2007 in Paris, Jacques Chirac, addressing the African representatives, took great honour in having "modernised" the relations and having raised aid levels streaming to the continent, particularly through the G8 (Le Monde 15/2 2007). These efforts are widely acknowledged in Africa. In the words of the former prime-minister of the Central African Republic:

"Sans Paris, nous n'aurions jamais accès aux dirigeants de la Banque mondiale ou du Fonds monétaires internationles. On ne pourrait pas se faire entendre." (Le Monde 14/2 2007)

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[4] On the 54 worldwide countries chosen for the zone, 40 are located in sub-Saharan Africa

On a European level, several steps have been taken that comply very well with French foreign policy goals. The *Lomé* agreements have historically been a way for the EU to have close, and on aid and trade matters, generous ties with Africa with France as its fiercest proponent. In the late nineties,

"a number of [French] initiatives were undertaken with a view to burden-sharing. This was done at several levels. Within the European Union, France emerged as the most enthusiastic advocate of renewal of the Lomé Convention" (Chafer 2001:173)

Not long after French endorsement, negotiations could be initiated. The new Lomé agreement, signed in Benin's capital of Cotonou in 2000 (therefore called the Cotonou Convention), on economic cooperation between Europe and the African, Caribbean and Pacific counties (ACP) is arguably also an example of EU-policy *à la francaise*.

   The overshadowing goal of the new treaty is to normalize trade settings between Europe and Africa as well as to integrate Africa in the world economy placing transitional economic African costs at EU level. Following the designs of earlier Lomé conventions, the treaty is accompanied with a major fund that is not part of the EU-budget but nonetheless funded by EU-countries. The new fund (called EUF 9) has been attributed no less than 13 800 million Euros and an additional 1 700 million Euros from the European Investment Bank (EIB) only for the first seven years of the agreement (it runs on 20 years). (Agboluaje 2005: 242; www.eu-upplysningen.se) These expenses are to be added to an already all-time-high EU-aid budget[5] with significant African features (www.europe-cares.org). This economic partnership is debatably a project for countering "Americanisation" because the alliance EU-ACP would form a strong axis in the WTO. Adjovi comments:

"Ce nouvel accord permet aux Européens d'avoir des alliés dans le cadre de l'Organisation Mondiale de Commerce (OMC) notamment, afin de faire contrepoids à une américanisation trop poussé de la réglemenatation du commerce international." (Adjovi 2002: 432)

To counter "Americanisation" while simultaneously gaining prestige in Africa as "European leader" and "African advocate" harkens back to Gaullism. But is extraction the employed mean?

6.2   Aid summarized – *a logic of extraction?*

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[5] In 2004, EU aid to Africa was USD 14 billion. By 2010, it will exceed 24 billion USD (www.europe-cares.org)

The multilateral commitment is demonstrated primarily by France's increasing involvement in the European Union's aid system and also its commitment to international financial institutions such as The World Bank along with IMF. In short, the French aid funds are increasingly incorporated in a multilateral context. As a consequence, administrative costs are effectively transferred to other institutions and direct bilateral aid is radically reduced. Nonetheless, the Gaullist trade-off policy is effectively preserved because the aid-recipients are net not receiving less and they see firm French advocacy for their cause within the international bureaucracies. This multilateral answer to new circumstances qualifies as extraction as external resources effectively are being sought and used. A clear demonstration of an enduring Gaullist trade-off policy with Africa was the diplomatic events that surrounded the Iraqi war. France got a vast support from the African countries for its negative position on the war in the UN during the crisis (Le Monde 14/2 2007).

6.3   French military engagement

6.3.1 Tendency

In total, France has 37000 soldiers deployed outside French mainland. About half of these, 15000, are deployed in direct operations, called OPEX (Opérations Extérieures). The other half is composed of troops of "presence". An overwhelming majority of these are posted in Africa (Le Monde 29/8 2006: "Une presence sur tous les fronts"). France has extraordinarily close ties of "accord de défense" with six countries, equally ex-colonies: Cameroun, Côte d'Ivoire, Gabon, Togo, the Central African Republic and Senegal. To this adds agreements of "cooperation" with numerous other African countries (Le Monde 29/8 2006: "En Afrique, une approche politique"). All defence treaties with African countries contain secret clauses (Touati 2007: 10). Hence; French presence in Africa is still highly visible. However, the French military attendance is since the late nineties being "rendered more efficient" (*recentrer*) (ibid). Also on this policy area, the key-component of modernising Franco-African relations is a broadening of cooperation and, particularly the inclusion of the cooperation in a European context. In the words of France's biggest newspaper: *"la france cherche à mutualiser et à 'européaniser' sa précense sur le continent noir."* (Le Monde 29/8 2006: "En Afrique, une approche politique") Much is thus pointing in the European direction.

6.3.2 French-European policy

Africa is the first area outside of Europe where the EU-countries agreed to a common foreign policy (Touati 2007: 16). A common policy towards Africa has been important and French officials have been very specific about this, which

have drawn attention and raised suspicion that France uses the EU as a means to reach its own foreign policy objectives (Touati 2007: 16, Major & Mölling 2007: 12).

France has been a dominant actor in the creation of a common security and defence policy in Europe. Achievements that the country has lobbied for include major steps such as the Maastricht treaty (1992) and the Amsterdam treaty (1997) establishing institutions and guidelines for European co-operation. Yet, European interventionist capacity proved inadequate as war broke out in Kosovo in 1999. Subsequently, after Franco-British consent was reached, the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) could be established and further developed in the European summits in Cologne and Helsinki 1999 (Major & Mölling 2007: 5-6).

Major and Mölling (2007) suggest that France uses Europe as a device to reinstitute its lost *gloire et grandeur*. They cite Z. Brzesinksi's phrasing that "France seeks reincarnation through Europe" and add that "this [phrase] more or less resumes the French policy towards European cooperation in the realm of security and defence" (Major & Mölling 2007: 2). The authors look at French motives and influence in the creation and further development of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). They assess that the roots of increased French lobbying on EU security matters is the change in the international security landscape in the early nineties. (Major & Mölling 2007: 4) France had to adapt to a post- cold war situation. However, France also had to recognize that it had neither the position nor the resources to tackle new challenges on its own. The answer was therefore sought in inciting reforms (to regain position) and increasing European cooperation (to extract resources). Because Africa was an essential part of French foreign policy, Africa also had to be made an integrated and self-evident part of European Security and Defence Policy (Major & Mölling 2007: 3-5).

6.3.3 Franconization of EU foreign policy in Africa

One can distinguish three vital steps in making Africa a central part of EU security and defence policy in the 21th century. First was the creation of the Battlegroups concept in 2003. France wanted to improve interventionist capabilities and conceive a rapidly deployable European force, arguably, to "share the burden of high intensity operations more equally." (Major & Mölling: 2007:10) This aspiration was shared with the UK which also saw a potential for using the new force for Africa-related issues. However, Africa could not be explicitly mentioned in the final adoptive document as Germany with other members did not want to get involved in "post-colonial business" (ibid). Importantly, the Battlegroups concept offered a chance for France to involve the UK in European military cooperation.

Second was the adoption of the "EU strategy for Africa" document in 2005. The document draws on the European Security Strategy (ESS) but takes it a step further in stipulating a specific strategy for Africa. To begin with, the ESS was "considered a vehicle for projecting French positions to the EU level" as it

reflected traditional French positions on an autonomous European military force (Major & Mölling 2007:9). It was nonetheless adopted in 2003, to the background of the erupted war in Iraq. Because ESS was "more a political statement than a precise guide of action" France took it upon itself to further develop regional strategies. Naturally, Africa became the first strategy to be sketched and adopted (Major & Mölling 2007: 9-10). The *EU and Africa: Towards a strategic Partnership* document states EU effort to implement the ESDP Africa Action Plan and "will [...] to promote peace and stability through Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and European Security and Defence activities (ESDP) and military and civilian crisis management missions, including potential deployment of EU Battlegroups" (European Council 19/12 2005). As a result, Africa became an important focus in EU foreign policy and the EU took on new duties on the continent.

Third, was the Europeanization of the RECAMP (Renforcement des Capacités Africaines de Maintien de la Paix) concept. With beginning of 1997, France has pushed for the expansion of the EU contribution of military forces to the African Forces for peace-keeping within the framework of RECAMP. Initially RECAMP was a national project that involved cooperation with the UN and the OAU (now AU) but it is, at French initiative, becoming increasingly Europeanized (Le Monde 14/2 2007, Major & Mölling 2007: 11).

"[RECAMP] demonstrates how France was able to pursue national preferences through the co-operation in military frameworks." (Major & Mölling 2007: 11)

Without enthusiasm, the EU has approved of this evolution although the boosting of the African security forces has not been followed by any significant autonomy of action. Still, Paris plays a vital role in determining how the forces can be used (Le Monde 14/2 2007; Adjovi 2002: 428).

6.3.4 Artémis

"While it buttresses the EU's global capacity to act, ESDP also offered France the opportunity to follow its national policy goals." (Major & Mölling 2007:7)

France initiated, planned and led the second (after *Concordia* in Macedonia) autonomous EU-mission in the DR Congo in 2003. Equally, France contributed with the majority of the 1800 troops and commanded logistics. Additionally, Paris served as headquarters during the operation. In fact, the headquarters was built up to neighbour the French Defence Department itself (Hederstedt 2007: 22). France was a so-called *framework nation* and was as such able to "influence the set-up for future EU missions, [and] thus establish a French way of 'doing things'" (Major & Mölling 2007: 12) This "way" included *not* resorting to use NATO assets, as had been done in the first ESDP operation in Macedonia some months before. The so called "Berlin + agreement" otherwise provides the ESDP command with such possibilities (Hederstedt 2007: 22). Critics of operation

Artémis, as it was called, have argued that this operation ostensibly was carried out for the sake of French interests in Congo. For example, it is well known that Paris since many years "vote Kabila" (Le Monde 14/2, Major & Mölling 2007: 16). Maria Strömvik emphasizes Javier Solana's role in promoting an EU-mission to DRC and claims that the larger EU members, especially France, were initially sceptic (Strömvik 2002: 224). Peter Hederstedt, however, only sees the benefits that laid in the deal for France and accentuates a positive French attitude. If the operation was to fail, he analyses, France would not have been solely responsible (Hederstedt 2007: 22). As the operation was successful one might wonder who was given the credit in Africa – France or the European Union?

6.4 French military engagement – *a logic of extraction?*

On this policy area a logic of extraction has evidently been present. The French policies promoted within the EU have been consistent in the 21th century with "burden sharing" as a key objective. Significant achievements include the ESS adoption with the subsequent EU Strategy for Africa as well as the Artémis operation in Congo.

Of the different features one might discuss with regards to French dominance in ESDP in general, or in operation Artémis in particular, the symbolism of a military headquarters deserves attention. In the early sixties, president de Gaulle had expelled the NATO headquarters in Fontainebleau as French troop-command was not guaranteed. In 2003, France welcomed military multilateral cooperation with NATO-countries back to Paris. The French insist for control was now complied with and thus cooperation again made possible.

7 Conclusion – Explaining French Foreign Policy Multilateralisation in Africa

In this thesis I have shown how on two important areas, French African policies are being significantly altered in a multilateral direction. The driving forces behind this transformation are – in order to be humble – perhaps numerous. In the study I have exposed one aspect that evidently cannot be neglected: state interest in maximizing influence while minimizing expenses. The declining French economy and the, revived, fierce competition on the African continent have brought France to a dilemma: how maintain extensive influence without continuing to spend disproportionate means on keeping the close Franco-African ties? The response, I argue, has been sought in going multilateral. Following this strategy, other countries are increasingly drawn into "burden-sharing" with France when it comes to aid to development and military activity on the African continent. This, I argue, is the heart of the multilateralisation of French foreign policy in Africa.

As a consequence, French foreign policy towards Africa still qualifies as Gaullist because the underlying logic has not been altered despite the recent changes. The question is whether the transformations effectively have *reinforced* the Gaullist Africa trade-off policy. Much points in this direction and thus, two poles are unified that seemingly would be inconsistent: far-reaching policy independency, which is an inescapable pillar in foreign political Gaullism, and multilateralism. New policies would thus be built on old principles and continuity. I therefore cannot come to any other conclusion than Sylvain Touati:

"The reality is that the logic of neo-colonial Francafrique continues to function even when officials claim it has been abandoned" (2007:12).

7.1 Europeanized?

I would argue that Rieker commits two errors when trying to portray the transforming French foreign policy. To begin with, her analysis is too "eurocentred". She isolates the French integration in the EU as a process apart. Instead, it should be apprehended as an integral part of a larger movement of internationalisation where states, for different reasons, collaborate more. Internationalization could actually be classified as "hidden variable" in my study

as it affects both French economy and Chinese financial offensives in Africa. These puzzling tangles would have to be the subject of another study though.

Secondly, Rieker sees the EU-integration as the driving force that makes France take on new roles and perceptions. Roughly, she fails to see the bigger picture in the exchange between France as mighty EU-country and the EU as multilateral institution. As I have shown in this thesis, it is also justified to talk about a Franconization of European foreign politics, at least on the two areas covered in the scope of the study. So, is French foreign policy in Africa Europeanized? No, the new policies are a response to new challenges that the French state faces. Additionally, the tendency goes beyond close collaboration with the EU, France seeks authority and resources within several international bodies. These responses are ultimately aimed at maximizing the French states' international influence and guarantee its long-term survival. One could even think that de Gaulle had initiated them by himself. After all, he was "the man of the day before yesterday, for the day after tomorrow..."

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