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What Cosmopolitanism?

Exploring Cosmopolitanism in Political Philosophy

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Abstract

During the last decade or so, there has been an uprising for cosmopolitan perspectives in political science. Cosmopolitanism seems to be the new modern approach to global problems. But various conceptions of cosmopolitanism are being used in the debate. Therefore, I look into the different positions to try to distil out some coherence and find different usable sketches when adapting a cosmopolitan perspective on justice, the state and the relation between communities. I use a critical approach which I call "questioning the ontological givens", which means that concepts taken for granted (such as political community, the state and the proper relation between states) are being revised and scrutinized. I have found that cosmopolitanism as currently defined by scholars is in many ways a theory of justice. The thesis also gives a possible approach to the divide in philosophy between communitarians and cosmopolitans, just as it discusses different cosmopolitan positions with regards to the basis of political community. The state under globalization is also discussed, offering a scheme for thinking about the state in cosmopolitanism.

Key words: Cosmopolitanism, Political Philosophy, Justice, Political Community, the State.

Table of contents

1. Introduction 1

1.1 Statement of Purpose..2
1.2 Theory and Method 3
1.3 Methodological Issues and Outline of the Study 4

2 Finding a Cosmopolitan Point of Departure ...... Fel! Bokmärket är inte definierat.**5**

2.1 Why Cosmopolitanism is Back..5
2.2 In Search of Cosmopolitanism..6
2.3 Statists and Globalists 8
2.4 Practices - Between, Within and Beyond the State..9
2.5 From Humanitarian Assistance to Global Justice..10
2.6 Individuals versus States 11
2.7 Justice Through What? Moral and Law..12
2.8 Where is the Polis in Cosmopolis? Justice Through Politics 13

3. The Great Divide in Political Philosophy? 14

3.1 Cosmopolitans, Communitarians and Multiculturalists..14
3.2 What is wrong here..15
3.3 The New Cosmopolitanism and its Counterparts 16
3.4 Avoiding Falling into Cultural Imperialism 17

4. A Cosmopolitan World Order 18

4.1 The Common Feature of International and Domestic Politics....................................18
4.2 Eroding Sovereignty...19
4.3 A Clear Division of Inner and Outer Worlds 21

5. Conclusion 23

6. References 24

1. Introduction

This is an essay on cosmopolitanism. 'Cosmopolitan' can stand, and has stood, for a variety of things at different times and in different places. It many refer to an individual with many varied stamps in his or her passport, a woman's magazine, a person of uncertain patriotic reliability, someone who likes weird cuisine, an advocate of world government, or even on occasion an alcoholic drink (Hannerz 2005: 195). A word of such changeable definition may not seem to hold out much promise for scholarly use. Yet sometimes words become keywords not through their precision and consistency, but through their appealing character. In the face of this widening cosmopolitan perspective, social scientists and theorists find themselves embracing contrary views and starting points.

During the last decades, issues such as globalization, multiculturalism, or increased immigration, has opened the eyes to many people about differences and equalities. It has fuelled nationalist sentiments, not only within Western European states, but different expressions of nationalism, cultural relativism and the like can be witnessed the world over. At its best, is has prompted governments and citizens to reconsider the meaning of nationality and equality, or restating a more inclusive and multicultural conception of "the nation". At its worst, it has provoked xenophobic backlash.

At the same time, the north-south divide between wealthy industrial, post-industrial and poor countries has been an increasing object of political concern. Political philosophy has not been very prepared to think about these issues. A cosmopolitanism relevant to our global age must take this as a starting point, and *build a sound and politically robust conception of the proper basis of political community, and of the relations among communities*, claims David Held (2005: 10, emphasis added). Cosmopolitanism thus seems to be something like a theory of justice.

The default position in the debate is, naturally enough, whether national boundaries have significance and legitimacy. Cosmopolitans dispute this generally, by making specific arguments against particular kinds of defences of nationality. Precisely because the debate has had this character it has been less clear what the precise content of cosmopolitanism is about. It is somewhat clear what the position is *against* and ready to criticize, but what is it positive about, how and why?

These are indeed hard questions. But however difficult, it is important to try to find some answers. Part of the difficulty in understanding the precise nature of cosmopolitanism lies in the countless ways it has been used and understood. Critics target its various manifestations – as political visions, or perhaps ethical commitments – without being entirely clear about how these disparate expressions of cosmopolitanism cohere under a single paradigm. This essay will try to dig down into these various expressions and distil out some coherence on the subject, the what, how and why of cosmopolitanism.

1.1 Statement of Purpose

The aim of this essay is to critically examine the current debate on political philosophy and cosmopolitanism. The reasons for this are various. First, I believe it is time to start to clarify what it means to use the cosmopolitan approach in political philosophy. It is a position that is becoming more and more common when discussing such different themes as cosmopolitan democracy, duties beyond borders, nationalism etc. Second, it is a position that, I believe, can offer important insights and provide guidance for problems facing us today. Whether we choose to call them "problems" or not – international migration, nationalist uprisings, a global democratic deficit, or the eradication of poverty – these are themes that at least are posing new challenges to political philosophy.

Furthermore, the reasons for an emergent popularity of using cosmopolitan approaches are at least two. First, it is a position that has emerged as frequent in terms of a response to *new* challenges – as for example multiculturalism, globalisation, ecological threats, or immigration (Held 1995). For that reason, it is important to explore the different approaches and try to distil some clarity out of the abundance of arguments and positions.

The second reason is of a more timeless or abstract character, where discussions are grounded in an idea of a common humanity (c.f Pogge 2002, Beitz 2005) – i.e a fact that has *always* been the case. A third possible reason, which I believe is the most possible explanation, is a combination of the two positions just offered. In one sense, perhaps of a more moral character, humans have always been interconnected, but it is not until today that we have become aware of it through the vast possibilities in global interchange of information. Each day we are delivered pictures, articles and stories about the life of people we do not know, or have never met. This had led to an increased call for global justice, which I will discuss further along in the essay.

My aim is not to take a normative stance here and present a blueprint for further usage. Rather, the aim is to highlight and clarify contradictions and arguments within cosmopolitanism in political philosophy when applied to reality, and also to discuss how sustainable and reasonable the positions are. The aim is simply to present a usable sketch when grabbing the cosmopolitan position. Another delimitation is that this is an essay about *political* philosophy. There are other possible positions, such as sociological or anthropological viewpoints, and it is clear that political writings may have been influenced by these positions (and sociology/anthropology are in turn influenced by yet other positions). However, the demarcating lines have to be drawn somewhere and due to the aim of the essay I have chosen to focus on political philosophy.

As I wrote in the introduction, the debate on cosmopolitanism is full of conflicting ideas about the content – the how and the why. The guiding questions for the essay are therefore: *Which are the different positions on cosmopolitanism in political philosophy? How is the idea of cosmopolitanism perceived and what is it a response to?*

1.2 Theory and Method

In order to frame a sustainable definition, I believe that we first need to deeply look into the different positions to be able to distil out some comprehension of the concept. Therefore, I will discuss the different positions offered regarding ideas of the state, and the division between community and universalism. Since there is no common ground to stand on in this issue, it might seem as a meaningless task. But I would like to argue that this is not the case. It is through analyzing and critically examining the different ideas of cosmopolitanism that we might get one bit closer to a valid answer since it would hopefully mean that some positions within the debate can be left aside, others perhaps modified, and yet others incorporated.

That an academic debate is full of conflicting ideas is nothing new or strange. It is in part this very same fact that keeps us going, and gives us new inspirations to further studies. Cosmopolitanism is not an exclusion. Different authors appear to adapt different definitions or views of what it means to use a cosmopolitan approach when studying political issues. This has much to do with contradicting views of reality that the term cosmopolitanism is referring to. But it also has to do with the old view of "society turned upside down", where this condition in turn says something about reality (Liedman 1989: 14). Therefore, this essay will aim at *questioning the ontological givens* in the debate surrounding the debate on cosmopolitanism. On which premises is the debate resting? How does the different authors think about the state and the community/universalist concepts?

The theoretical approach used here will thus consist of describing and critically examining the ontological givens in the debate surrounding cosmopolitanism. It is sometimes argued that this sort of research is merely about description and as such, provides little use for further academic usage. But I would like to argue that this is not the case. Describing and critically examining means not to refer, but to interfere with the material used and to draw conclusions about it (Beckman 2005: 49). It means systematically sorting out the contradictory positions and to look for incoherence that perhaps does not seem obvious at first glance. It also means looking for what is sometimes called the manifest and latent dimensions (Liedman 1989: 8). The aim is not to take a normative standpoint, but rather to present an idea of how we should understand cosmopolitanism and what is important to highlight. The aim is simply to explain which positions are reasonable, valid and sustainable, and which are not (Beckman 2005: 56-57).

Critically reflecting upon the ontological givens may be a somewhat shaky method. The term critical theory has been associated with a strand of thinking originating in Frankfurt, Germany, in the early part of the twentieth century, where the theorists work were in large part directed by the perceived need to rethink the Marxist approach. I will not go in-depth and discuss Marxism or critical theory, but some issues are important to mention. What is at stake here is connecting the idea with reality. Corresponding with this analysis is also a dynamic theory of knowledge. In any era there will be a dominant understanding of the world, which answers objectively to reality. But when reality becomes contradictory, contending world-views arise (Buckler 2002: 181). Thus the ambition is to compare the idea with reality. Quite often there is a misunderstanding regarding critical theory and the revelation of contradictions or latent dimensions of power. But it does not have to refer to searching for hidden agendas or struggles for power. What it is about is systematically revising the idea or concept and test it with reality (Liedman 1989: 30).

1.3 Methodological Issues and Outline of the Study

Muddling through the cosmopolitan is certainly not an easy task. Trying to establish what is cosmopolitan, needs some idea of what cosmopolitanism signifies to be able to recognize what is cosmopolitan in the first place. In the words of Quentin Skinner – "We must classify in order to understand, and we can only classify the unfamiliar in terms of the familiar "(1988: 31). The perpetual danger in our attempts to enlarge our understanding is thus that our results, in some sense, are determined by how we have already defined and understood the phenomenon to begin with (ibid). Cosmopolitanism is not an unfamiliar concept, not at all. But the vast and sometimes disparate usage of the term calls for some clarification. And as long as the aim is not to create a conceptual revolution (which it is not), I see nothing wrong in using "old" concepts for the purpose of the essay. In addition, since I try to use a critical point of view when looking upon the different positions, it is my hope that I succeed in balancing this methodological problem.

Nowadays it is common to read about how various political and/or philosophical terms (to take an example) are essentially contested. What this approach wants to highlight is the fact that the words and ideas we make use of in our academic studies means different things to different persons, and as such may signify whatever we want them to. Indeed, when someone make claims for 'justice now', or 'freedom', it is hard to imagine that we would all see the same scenario in front of us. But at the same time, there is something paradoxical about this 'essentially contested'-argument. To say, and accept, that things are essentially contested, would then lead to the resulting contradiction that that very same argument is *essentially contested* (c.f Beckman 2005: 36).

The material used in this thesis is solely of a secondary nature, since I have not conducted any interviews or suchlike. I have tried to use a selection of authors that often are referred to in the academic debate. Not that not so famous authors would have presented the idea any worse, but since there are a few scholars that appear whenever cosmopolitanism is in focus, I found it more interesting to study and present them here. I may have left important authors aside, but I have at least tried to give a just picture of the authors used in the thesis. Furthermore, it is always the case that the material influences the researcher, and the researcher influences the material. I am aware of this methodological drawback and my aim has been to present the debate as honestly as possible.

In order to discuss cosmopolitanism, I will first start off with an analysis of what the cosmopolitan stand point in political philosophy means. Therefore, I will continue searching through the different perspectives and arguments made about the cosmopolitan position with regards to the proper basis of the political community. Then I will briefly look upon the relations between communities and the state.

2. Finding a Cosmopolitan Point of Departure

> "Cosmopolitanism is concerned to disclose the ethical, cultural, and legal basis of political order in a world where political communities and states matter, but not only and exclusively. In circumstances where the trajectories of each and every country are tightly entwined, the partiality, one-sidedness and limitedness of 'reasons-of-state' need to be recognized. While states are hugely important vehicles to aid the delivery of effective regulation, equal liberty, and social justice, *they should not be thought of as ontologically privileged*" (Held 2005: 10, emphasis added).

Cosmopolitanism is as a long-sidelined concept recently reactivated by a wide range of academics in social sciences. For various reasons, cosmopolitanism is back. In most cases, the re-emergence of cosmopolitanism arises by way of a proposed new politics of the left, embodying middle-path alternatives between ethnocentric nationalism and particularistic multiculturalism. For some contemporary writers on the topic, cosmopolitanism refers to a vision of global democracy (c.f Held 1995) and world citizenship (Heater 2002), for others it points to the possibilities for shaping new transnational frameworks for making links between social movements (c.f Delanty 2002). Yet others invoke cosmopolitanism to advocate a non-communitarian, post-identity politics of overlapping interests and heterogeneous publics in order to challenge conventional notions of belonging, identity and citizenship (c.f Nussbaum 1994). And still others use it to descriptively address certain socio-cultural processes or individual behaviours and values manifesting a capacity to engage cultural multiplicity (Parekh 2003).

2.1 Why Cosmopolitanism is Back

Whatever may be its uses and its limitations, there has been a strong tendency in discussions of cosmopolitanism as a phenomenon in history, adding the claim or implicitly assuming, that it is more or less an elite phenomenon. Clearly, there have been some reasons for such arguments, since cosmopolitan orientations have tended to go with more education, the opportunity to travel, and the prosperity, security and leisure which allow one to cultivate a wider range of interests and experiences.

While a growing awareness of common risks, such as climate change, is arguably fostering a sense of globally shared future, many emergent political issues, including human rights, are beyond the capacity of individual states to control. Further, the economic and political processes of globalization and regionalization, along with various perceived external challenges to national security, increasingly impact upon the accustomed sovereignties of the nation-state (Vertovec & Cohen 2002: 1-2). New alliances between countries – whether for regularizing free trade, harmonizing social policies or combating crime – can be described as modes of cosmopolitanism superseding the nation-state model. Over the past decade there has been a new, post-cold war tendency for multinational military interventions such as the Gulf War, The NATO actions in former Yugoslavia and the recent international 'coalition of the willing' following 9/11. These are sometimes described as cosmopolitan institutions and initiatives since they are multilateral and seem to supplant the nation-state model. Indeed, they represent examples of 'cosmopolitan war' (c.f. Zolo 1997). The criticisms of cosmopolitanism are of various kinds. Either they depend on a reaffirmation of realist claims about the continued significance of state power, or they stress a pessimistic reading of the post-Westphalian order as the dominance of global capital over both state and interstate politics. Or they depend on a communitarian view that sees the cosmopolitan idea as something that destroys the locally based webs of affection. Danilo Zolo (1997) stresses the hegemonic concentration of power in the hands of a few nations as a danger of cosmopolitanism, which is rightly seen as a possible threat. However, cosmopolitanism in this essay will not refer to hegemonism or imperialism, since it would make it exactly that and not a cosmopolitan perspective. A somewhat different argument is that the tendency of cosmopolitanism is to introduce a 'Wilsonian idealism', leading to actions far from the real world and running the risk of falling into dogmatism, where the ends justify the means in terms of coercion and manipulation (Dower 1998: 93, 96).

The 'pluralization' of political orientations is coexistent with the nation-state's struggle to maintain a singular identity in the face of globalization. Furthermore, multiculturalism has been a kind of broad vision of society where both specific ethnic and religious identities could be maintained along with a common national one. Having received much criticism for resting upon and reproducing rather rigid notions of culture and group belonging, cosmopolitanism in contrast to multiculturalism is now increasingly being invoked to avoid the errors of essentialism or some kind of all-or-nothing understanding of identity issues within the nation-state framework.

2.2 In Search of Cosmopolitanism

The term cosmopolitanism originates with the Stoics, whose idea of being a "citizen of the world" neatly captures the two main aspects of cosmopolitanism: that it entails a thesis about identity and that it entails a thesis about responsibility (Brock & Brighouse 2005: 2).

The most important contribution after the Stoics to cosmopolitan thinking can be found in Immanuel Kant's writings. Kant conceived of participation in a cosmopolitan society as an entitlement – an entitlement to enter the world of open, uncoerced dialogue – and he adapted this idea in his formulation of what he called cosmopolitan right under a "cosmopolitan constitution" (Kant 2005 [1795]). This meant the capacity to present oneself and be heard within and across political communities, with the final end to create a perpetual peace. Furthermore, what he refers to as a cosmopolitan right concern the duty of hospitality for foreigners:

> 'This right to present themselves to society belongs to all mankind in virtue of our common right of possession of the surface of the earth on which, as it is a globe, we cannot be infinitely scattered, and must in the end reconcile ourselves to existence side by side: at the same time, originally no one individual had more right than another to live in any one particular spot' (2005[1795]: 18).

It is a rather realistic, but quite simple, argument that is being made by Kant – we live on planet earth, no one had more right to live in any particular place than another to begin with, so just deal with it.

Contemporary conceptions of cosmopolitanism can be found in the work of Thomas Pogge (c.f 2002) and Charles Beitz (c.f 1999, 2005) who both express a vision of a cosmopolitan justice with a "moral imperative" connotation. "Philosophical attention to problems about global justice is flourishing in a way it has not in any time in memory. I do not need to say very much to explain why this is a good thing" (Beitz 2005: 11). In certain respects, this work seems to explicate and offer a compelling clarification of the classical conception of belonging to the human community first and foremost, and the Kantian conception of subjecting all beliefs, relations and practices to the test of whether or not they allow for uncoerced interaction and impartial reasoning (Held 2005: 11).

The dominant framework for thinking about distributive principles was formulated by John Rawls in *A Theory of Justice* (1999). The model developed here ignored the problem of thinking about questions of international distribution, by assuming that the principles of justice are developed for a closed scheme of social cooperation, which is entered by birth and exited by death.

Several writers of the justice-position have used Rawls ideal contract approach to argue that if we regard the whole world as one society, then the principles of justice should apply to the world as a whole. Beitz and Pogge both stress the idea of international justice and argue for a serious redistributive principle. Rawls had intended his theory to apply to societies essentially within nation-state boundaries where there are (usually) clearly schemes of cooperation and reciprocity, and governments capable of enforcing/implementing principles of redistributive justice. What principally motivates these authors is a wish to give a theoretical foundation to the intuition that rich nations ought to be doing a lot more to help poor nations with development. It is apparent that if this Rawlsian method is applied to the world as a whole there would be a global difference principle which will have immensely radical consequences for the redistribution of wealth in favour of the very poor.

To this it can be added a distinction made by Simon Caney between weak and strong cosmopolitanism (2001: 975). Weak cosmopolitanism just says that there are some obligations that cross national boundaries and that have moral weight. Strong cosmopolitanism, in contrast, claims that at the most fundamental level there are no society-wide principles of justice that are not also global principles of distributive justice. Strong cosmopolitanism seems to care about something that is not clear we have to care about. If everyone is entitled to a good life, why say that co-nationals cannot spend excess resources on each other, or on whomever they chose to? The implicit normative standpoint here is that there is a certain limit for when good life begins and what it looks like.

The fundamental problem is that we find ourselves confronted with an array of *reasons for action* – some originating in considerations about local attachments, some in considerations about the legal and economic structure of the global political economy and that structure's impact on human well-being, and some in facts about the well-being of individuals considered in abstraction from their spatial locations and group memberships (Beitz 2005: 19).

The world contains inequalities that are morally alarming, and the gap between richer and poorer countries is widening. The chance of being born in one nation rather than in another, pervasively determines the life chances of the citizen. Any theory of justice that proposes political principles defining basic human entitlements ought to be able to confront these inequalities and the challenge they pose (Nussbaum 2005: 196).

Cosmopolitans thus typically draw attention to vast disparities in the life prospects that people from the poorest and the richest nations face. Such massive inequalities are typically condemned, but often the concern when investigated is not with inequality per se, but rather with the radical insufficiency that some must bear, especially when they are unable to meet basic needs (Brock & Brighouse 2005: 5). What this passage tries to illustrate, is that *cosmopolitanism is about an idea of responsibility to create a more just world*, or advocating a certain level that has to be achieved in term of living conditions, development, etc.

2.3 Statists and Globalists

One of the first things that have to be addressed when one thinks about issues of justice that transcends the boundaries of states is whether one is looking for principles of *inter-national* or *global* justice, writes Rainer Frost (2001: 169). Whereas the former view takes political communities organized into states to be the main agents of justice (who is asked to be just, and who receives just treatment), the latter takes persons, regardless of their political membership, as the primary focus of justice – at least as far as the question is concerned with who receives just treatment. On the first view, principles of international justice are to regulate the relations between states in a fair way, and on the second view they are to regulate the relations between all human beings in the world, ensuring their well-being.

The first view can thus be called *statist*, and the second *globalist*. These labels of course are artificial and comprise a number of quite different perspectives. To clarify, we find within the statist camp liberals stressing the autonomy of peoples, communitarians emphasizing the integrity of cultural communities, nationalists arguing in favour of the priority of national ties of membership, and theorists of sovereignty defending the independence of states, as well as mixtures of these views.

On the one hand, it seems beyond doubt that a domestic political context of justice is marked by a degree of institutionalized, and of course non-institutionalized, social cooperation that has no global counterpart. On the other hand it seems equally clear that in the contemporary world, the degree of globalized interdependence has reached a point where it is impossible not to speak of this context as one of justice. There is a global context of trade, production and labour, ecology, institutions, legal treaties, migration, technological interdependence and the like. In order to come to a realistic global perspective then,

> "one sees a *context of force and domination* […] Therefore, if the discussion of principles of transnational justice is to start from an analysis of the present global context of *injustice*, it needs to see this context as one of a complex system of power and domination […] Shifting perspective to that of the dominated, then, reveals that theirs is a situation of *multiple domination*: most often they are dominated by their own (hardly legitimate) government, which in turn both cooperates with and is dominated by global actors" (Frost 2001: 174f, italics in original).

The main issue in this debate is to what extent the world as a whole is a context of justice. For such a context to exist, there have to be identifiable authors and addressees of legitimate claims of justice – be they rights claims or claims based on other grounds of justice. According to the globalists, the global context is the *primary* context of justice regardless of time and space. Statists do not deny that there are relevant justice claims in the international sphere, they merely argue for a restriction of their scope. The basic argument for this restriction is that with respect to political and distributive justice, the globe is not the primary context of justice. Compared to the "thick" context of domestic justice, it is merely a secondary "thin" one.

2.4 Practices – Between, Within and Beyond the State

Other theorists seek to transcend the national scale through other means, most commonly through the establishing of frameworks and institutions that bridge or overtake the conventional political structures of the nation-state system (see especially Held 1995). Foremost examples here are the United Nations and the European Union. In this sense cosmopolitan political institutions should address, as they already do on a large scale, problems of policies surrounding a host of problems that spill over national borders, such as crime or pollution. The core of this project aims at reconceiving political authority in a way that disconnects it from its traditional anchor in fixed borders and delimited territories, where the political issue in question is discussed without regard to the traditional spatial dimension. Another transnational site of cosmopolitan democracy is what is increasingly described as an emerging global civil society (Delanty 2002).

One other way of illustrating the variety of perspectives is to classify them according to the role that is attributed to the state. Here we see inter-state, intra-state and ultra-state practices.

Interstate practices are used by writers such as David Held (1995, 1998) and Andrew Linklater (1998), who have been preoccupied mainly with new transnational, supranational or global institutions that replace or parallel the nation-state. These authors are aware of the robustness of nationalism and communal sentiments, and thus cosmopolitanism in this interstate view becomes a means whereby national and global cultures can be mediated above the national sphere, but still through it.

The nation-states have been transformed in recent years by transnationalism, globalization and an increasing number of immigrants demanding entry. Of course, many important states such as the USA and Australia are nations of immigrants. However, the rationale of admitting more immigrants was historically predicated on the assumption that they would conform or slide into "the melting pot" and create a new national identity (Vertovec & Cohen 2002: 18). Therefore the *intrastate* positions aim at highlighting this fact – i.e the role of a transformed demos and dual citizenship (c.f Bauböck 1994, Hollinger 2002).

Ultrastate positions focus on how migrants, diasporas and other transnational communities have either revived or created global ties that have largely escaped their national locations and affiliations. Those active in global social movements also orient their politics toward agendas outside their resident nation-states (Vertocev & Cohen 2002: 19).

2.5 From Humanitarian Assistance to Global Justice

The cosmopolitan idea of justice holds that distributive principles are not to be constrained or limited by state or national boundaries. What sort of justice is it then that cosmopolitanism tries to advocate? We can see that there is a division between those who talk about *global justice*, as opposed to *humanitarian assistance*. The two concepts can be combined and does not have to be mutually excluding, (to think about humanitarian assistance would probably entail some sort of basic idea of global justice, which in turn surely entails some idea of humanitarian assistance in order to talk about global justice) but still there is a difference.

Moral philosophers, such as Peter Singer (c.f 2002), have long argued that the debilitating poverty and its resultant human miseries are pressing universal concerns, and that it is a moral obligation, and not just a matter of charity, that affluent countries should do much more than they are currently doing to assist the poorer ones. The scope of our moral concern, they argue, should not cease suddenly at the borders of our own country.

But the crucial question remains: what is the content of this obligation? Do we simply need an account for humanitarian assistance that can ensure that all individuals are able to meet their basic needs? Or do we need to go beyond humanitarianism and critically assess the distributive aspects of the global order against certain principles of justice? The battleline, so to say, in the philosophical discourse on ethics and international relations has shifted over the past decade. The central dispute, it seems to me, is no longer between those who think that the scope of our moral concern ought to be extended beyond our borders and those who do not – few theorists today would seriously argue that we have no humanitarian duties to foreigners absent some compelling national interest for helping. The new debate, as I see it, concerns the content of this moral concern and whether it is grounded on justice. That is, the interesting dispute is now between those who think that we only have humanitarian duties to foreigners, and those who think that we have, in addition to humanitarian duties, duties of distributive justice.

It is sometimes believed that a global ethic is sufficient to counter global poverty, that an appropriately defined and enforced duty of humanitarianism can adequately meet the subsistence and developmental needs of the worst off individuals of the world. But duties of assistance differ from duties of justice in two interrelated ways. First, duties of humanitarian assistance are limited-term commitments with a definable goal (as for example raising developing countries to a level necessary for sustaining functioning well-ordered social institutions) as opposed to duties justice that would aim to regulate inequalities between societies and hence be ongoing without a cut-off point. In other words, duties of assistance cease to be binding once all societies acquire a defined critical level of development, whereas duties of justice are ongoing and apply so long as inequality persists between societies. Second, duties of humanitarian assistance do not, consequently, directly address the global structural context within which countries *interact*, whereas duties of justice apply directly to the background *structure* (Tan 2004).

This distinction between duties of humanitarianism and duties of justice is schematic, and it is important to note that both approaches may be in agreement. Yet the difference between humanitarianism and justice is not merely a semantic one, but highlights for us the difference and real ways of approaching and conceptualizing questions of development, equality and poverty. It also allows us to recognize the subtle point that those who defend a global ethic need not necessarily be defending some account for global justice, and that those opposing global justice need not be opposed to global ethics. It is thus a distinction that merits more attention than it has traditionally received in the literature on global ethics and justice in which the terms "global ethics" and "global justice" tend to be used interchangeably, thereby obscuring important differences between those advocating for global justice and those for global ethics as such.

Humanitarian concern can of course call for the creation of certain global institutional mechanisms in order to facilitate and coordinate the distribution of humanitarian aid. But institutions are seen on this account as merely instrumental for discharging ethical duties, and are not themselves the direct subject of concern nor seen as themselves possibly being a basic source of injustice.

2.6 Individuals versus States

Why should we then call for a cosmopolitan theory of justice? The cosmopolitan view in its most basic form, to recall, holds that the individual is the ultimate unit of moral worth, and entitled to equal consideration regardless of contingencies like nationality and citizenship. But why should global justice be conceived from this egalitarian individualist perspective? Why not take international justice to cover literally inter*national* justice on a "morality of states"?

The "morality of states" doctrine has indeed dominated international relations theory for much of its modern history – the idea of state sovereignty and its corollary principle of non-intervention were historically premised on this ideal of the moral primacy of states. But a cosmopolitan approach which takes individuals to be morally ultimate in both domestic and global contexts seems more plausible and consistent with our modern sensibilities about the moral relationship between individuals and collectives. We are moved by global injustices in the first place because of the pain and suffering inflicted on *individuals* rather than by suffering of some abstract collective entity like the state. This does not mean that cosmopolitans have to deny the moral worth or standing of states, nor does it mean that they always must reject all state-based claims to equality. On the contrary, cosmopolitanism can accept that states can be useful channels for distributing certain goods and resources to individuals, and that membership in a state can itself be an important individual good. But unlike the state-centric approach, the cosmopolitan approach does not claim that looking at how states fare with respect to each other is all that is required for global justice. The cosmopolitan view is not that states are irrelevant, but that they should not be seen as the primary subject for the purpose of global justice.

2.7 Justice through What? Moral and Law

Three elements are shared by all cosmopolitan positions, argues Thomas Pogge (2002: 169). First, *individualism*: the ultimate units of concern are human beings or persons – rather than, say, family lines, tribes, ethnic, cultural, or religious communities, nations or states. The latter may be units of concern only indirectly, in virtue of their individual members or citizens. Second, *universality:* the status of ultimate unit of concern attaches to every living human being equally – not merely to some subset, such as men, aristocrats, Aryans, whites, or Muslims. Third, *generality:* this special status has global force. Persons are ultimate units of concern for everyone – not only for their compatriots, fellow religionists, or suchlike (ibid.).

This schematic overview is however very narrow and thin, and could thus embrace practically any topic. Thus, the mere reference to cosmopolitanism as something universal, general and individual is not enough, since it would be an empty cosmopolitan approach that said nothing about the how and why.

For now, another distinction that can be made here is that between legal and moral cosmopolitanism (ibid.). Legal cosmopolitanism is committed to a concrete political ideal of a global order under which all persons have equivalent legal rights and duties – are fellow citizens of a universal republic in the Kantian sense. Moral cosmopolitanism holds that all persons stand in a certain moral relation to each other. We are required to respect one another's status as ultimate units of moral concern – a requirement that imposes limits on our conduct and, in particular, on our efforts to construct institutional schemes. This view is more abstract, and in this sense, weaker than legal cosmopolitanism.

The crux of the idea surrounding moral cosmopolitanism is that each human being has equal moral worth and that equal moral worth generates certain moral responsibilities that have universal scope. Cosmopolitanism's force can well be appreciated by examining what the position excludes. As we have seen, cosmopolitanism rules out assigning ultimate value to collective entities, due to its emphasis on individualism. And it also rules out positions that attach no moral value to some people. However, there is something missing here.

A great part of the indeterminacy is due to there being so many ways to interpret what our equal moral worth entails. It is not the case that a mere 'equal moral worth-argument' would solve the problem. Because in its simplest form, it means just that, but nothing more. Having equal moral worth means also recognizing world-views differing from one's own, and in the worst case having to respect peoples that do not adhere to this principle. Because if not, then we would not be respecting the equal moral worth of that particular person. On the other hand, that other person would also have to respect our position. In the words of Thomas Pogge, the crux of moral cosmopolitanism is "that every human being has a global stature as the ultimate unit of moral concern" (2002: 169). This is a philosophical dilemma that is hard to solve.

Trouble appears when we ask what moral cosmopolitanism requires. For example, it does not say anything about the content of global political justice. And it does not commit itself in favour of a world government or a sovereign global authority.

2.8 Where is the Polis in a Cosmopolis? Justice through Politics

One might think that every perspective that starts from the basic premise of moral equality of all human beings is by implication cosmopolitan. But that is not the case. Rather, as it is presented in the current debate, it is about directing primary moral, and political, attention to those who are in need, and with whom we do not share an evident political community. But few political philosophers have been willing to take this step.

In general, the polity question is avoided. Or as Rainer Bauböck asks – "Where is the *Polis* in a Cosmopolis?" (2002: 110, italics in original). Democratic cosmopolitanism must ask itself the question of what kind of *demos* the global institutions will represent and be accountable to. One way is to adopt a purely formal conception of the demos simply as the group of persons that happens to be subject to a given political authority. In this case, a global demos exists by definition as soon as there are global political institutions that are exposed to democratic procedures of representation and accountability. The *polis* of cosmopolis could then be constructed from above but it would be a rather "empty" polis.

Another, more realistic strategy, is the view that the demos not only conceptually precede the institutions that represent it, but that it also corresponds to the social reality. It would accept the communitarian critique that attempts to expand democracy and justice across borders is not something that merely can be achieved through an appeal to morality or the creation of institutions.

3. The Great Divide in Political Philosophy?

Part of the question of where the polis in Cosmopolis is can be found in the debate on community and how this community is grounded. In the previous chapter I discussed the polis, here it is the *cosmos*. What I will try to highlight here is that there need not necessarily be a contradiction between the communitarian and universalistic perspectives.

3.1 Cosmopolitans, Communitarians and Multiculturalists

A number of authors suggest that contemporary political philosophy tend to make a division between *communitarians*, who believe that moral principles and obligations are grounded in specific groups and contexts (c.f Walzer 1994), and *cosmopolitans*, who urge that we live in a world governed by overarching principles of rights and justice (Pogge 2002). In this latter sense, following Kant, cosmopolitanism refers to a philosophy that urges us all to be citizens of the world – creating a worldwide community of humanity committed to common values (Vertovec & Cohen 2002: 10). But there is a divide here, not only between cosmopolitanism and communitarianism. Vertovec & Cohen argues, as just seen, that cosmopolitan thinkers want to *create* a worldwide community of humanity where common values are shared. This opens up for a division within cosmopolitanism with regard to whether this common humanity already exists, or should be created and it is not always clear how this creation should take place.

The communitarian position states that ethics and community are grounded in social practices and traditions. Conceptions of well-being and identity are not given in the abstract, but grounded in concrete cultural practices of time and place. The relations which people have with the community or society as a whole are of central significance in their life.

That there need to be a inconsistency between affirming the cosmopolitan ideal, and also recognizing the importance of particular commitments to family or fellow-citizens, has been questioned by Martha Nussbaum (see especially 1994), who tries to reconcile cosmopolitanism with patriotism and loyalty to one single state. There appears to be at least two ways to solve this puzzle. One is advocated by Kwame Anthony Appiah (2006), who raises the possibility of being a 'cosmopolitan patriot' through celebrating different human ways of being while sharing commitment to the political culture of a single nation-state – through a multicultural approach.

3.2 What is wrong here

In the eagerness of assuring moral equality across national boundaries, cosmopolitans, as well as advocates of multiculturalism, commits an important error. Because the moral universalist has to, in order to respect the very same moral equality he or she defends, at its worst respect practices or ideas that her or she does not like – in the name of moral equality.

Multiculturalists, defending the right of a community to express their culture, similarly have to cope with the fact that they might end up defending oppressing or cruel practices. And this is the point I am trying to make. A multiculturalist would probably not defend for example female circumcision, but without declaring what practices, or normative ideas that guide their philosophy, endless discussions on metaphysics will surely take place. Multiculturalism is also a form of moral universalism, since it states the right to be seen as a moral equal, but with perhaps differing cultural expressions.

Another element in the communitarian line of thought that to me appears as incomplete, is that of the context as the ground for morality, political community etc. If we accept context as the foundation of justice, and that justice thus is limited to that same context – what happens when for example large scale immigration occurs? Is it not then the case that the context becomes filled with "new" contextual perceptions of justice?

One interesting theme with communitarians that engage in debate with cosmopolitans is that since cosmopolitanism appears to be conceived as an inter-state phenomenon, they are arguing from the viewpoint of the state, whereas originally, communitarianism has been a theory of communities within states. Communities searching for protection or claiming rights against the state, but now when thinking about cosmopolitanism they draw the community lines along the national frontier. In its simplest form, there is something cosmopolitan about multiculturalism and communitarianism. And that is the moral equality-argument. Because since cosmopolitanism does not clarify what this moral equality consists of, this dimension is shared by the two positions. With the risk of oversimplifying, communitarianism and multiculturalism gives a community moral equality to define themselves – i.e the principle *per se*. They do not either say much about how or what the community should look like, but the principle is shared with cosmopolitanism.

The cosmopolitanism for justice takes its starting point to be the observation that if ethics is about enabling people to flourish and to flourish as far as possible, we need to be clear about what these basic conditions of flourishing are. There seems to be an argument for reliable access to elements of well-being, a healthy environment to live in, and a peaceful society. Concepts of well-being and identity are not given in the abstract but grounded in concrete particularities of time and space. The relations which people have with the community or the nation-state as a whole are of central significance in their lives (Dower 1998: 102). As such, there seems to be a conflict between communitarianism and cosmopolitan perspectives. But need there be one? Nigel Dower (1998: 105) presents a solution to the problem:

> '… that is taking one approach as fundamentally correct but interpreting various features of the other approach as derivative from the basic theory … Thus a cosmopolitan might say that the values internal to living in a particular community are to be derived from a fundamental theory as expressions of it, or a communitarian might argue that ideas of universal values and global responsibilities arise naturally out of the traditions of societies…'

What I am emphasizing here is the fact that there need not necessarily be a quarrel between moralities just because we can not agree upon its fundaments or sources. Values *per se* are held by all human beings, although they may differ. But seen from a minimalist point of departure, it means at the very least recognizing the survival needs that human beings share with another and with other species – the fact that we will expire if we do not receive enough oxygen, nourishment, water and shelter. It is in response to these survival needs that human beings have come together in communities, and in turn have had to work out a minimum form of basic human values (Bok 1995:80).

3.3 The New Cosmopolitanism and its Counterparts

There has been a development within cosmopolitan theory alongside changed features of reality, such as redefinitions of sovereignty, world order, globalization, and of course as a response to philosophical criticisms. The new cosmopolitans has started to face the needs of the ethnos and the needs of the species in order to abandon the term "universalist". We can distinguish between a universalist will to find common ground and a cosmopolitan will to engage human diversity. For cosmopolitans, the diversity of humankind is a fact – for universalists it is a problem. Cosmopolitanism shares with universalism a suspicion against enclosures, but the cosmopolitan understands the necessity and importance of enclosures in creating a community or bonds of affection.

Another term the newer cosmopolitans tend to avoid is pluralism. Cosmopolitanism and pluralism have often united together for the sake of defending and promoting tolerance and diversity. But cosmopolitanism is in this sense more liberal in style – it is oriented to the individual, and expects individuals to be simultaneously and importantly affiliated with a number of groups, including civic and political communities, as well as with communities of descent. Pluralism is more conservative in style – it is instead oriented to the *pre-existing* group, and is likely to ascribe to each individual a primary identity within a single community of descent.

Both the cosmopolitans and the pluralists are advocates of diversity. But pluralists are more concerned to protect and maintain the cultures of groups that are *already* well established at whatever time the ideal of pluralism is invoked, while cosmopolitans are more inclined to encourage the voluntary formation of new communities of wider scope that are made possible by changing the historical circumstances and demographic mixtures. Cosmopolitans are "specialists in the creating of the new, while cautious about destroying the old; pluralists are specialists in the conservation of the old while cautious about creating the new" (Hollinger 2002: 231f). It is only by separating out cosmopolitanism from what we might call its universalist left and its pluralist right that the new cosmopolitanism comes into view (the left-right spectrum is only schematic and not a political classification).

3.4 Avoiding falling into Cultural Imperialism

Quite often, when we discuss ideas or world orders, arguments are raised that this is a form of cultural imperialism. What right do we have to intervene, by means of politics or the armed forces, and impose Western ideas of organizing and managing a society, it is frequently asked. "Are we not repeating the errors of the Western missionaries who sailed out to Africa, or the South Sea Islands, and told the "primitive" people they found there to cover their nakedness, to practice monogamy, and to have sex only when prone, with the man on top?" (Singer 2002: 139). Have we not learned anything at all from this experience and that our morality is no better than theirs?

Discussions like these represent an ongoing debate, and as such create much confusion. Indeed, this debate presents itself as a possible obstacle to any notion of cosmopolitanism. Moral relativists are convinced that they are defending the rights of peoples in non-Western cultures and standing up for their right to preserve their own values. But taking moral relativism seriously leads to erring conclusions. For if morality is always bounded in context, then there are no meaningful premises for discussion. And more importantly, arguing, for instance, that the Western tradition is to suppress other cultures, then that simply is our way of life and there is nothing the relativist can do about it, since there can not be offered any reason for not continuing. In effect, moral matters become uninteresting.

How are we supposed to approach this theme then? Well, for example, one can condemn the ancient Chinese tradition of foot binding of women, while at the same time admiring Chinese calligraphy, pottery and dedication to the value of honest work. Likewise, we can condemn the controversial rite of sati (widow burning) while praising Indian pluralism, and the everyday sense of aesthetic (Benhabib 2002a: 41). In other words – we need not approach cultural traditions and worlds as *wholes*. It simply makes no sense to rank and order different spheres, for the category of 'these worlds' is itself a conceptual shorthand we use to distil some sort of coherence out of the multiplicity of conflicting narratives and practices that constitute the world.

"When children in the United States have Guatemala Day at school, we do not want them all to make a special ceremony of wearing Levi jeans and drinking Coca Cola, even if that is what Guatemalans in fact like to wear and drink" (Waldron 2000: 232). This 'distinctiveness-argument' that counts may be seriously mistaken if it is intended as a description of the consciousness of those who live in the communities in question or as a prescription about what respect for another culture ought essentially involve. It is just many fragments that happen to be available at a given place and time and that does not amount to the existence of a single culture in any socially or philosophically interesting sense if singularity. The pure culture, uncontaminated in its singularity is an anomaly.

4. A Cosmopolitan World Order

> 'it is an imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently and sovereign. It is *imagined* because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion' (Anderson 1991: 6).

Political identities need not be conceived in state-centric terms, since the boundaries of the civic community and the boundaries of the nation-state are not necessarily coterminous. It is quite often ascertained that the role of the state will co-exist with, or be a part of, a cosmopolitan world order. We have seen that there are quite different views on what this role will consist of and what it will look like. I would therefore like to discuss a few things on this topic. In the light of globalization – broadly understood as the different technological, economic, social and cultural processes that have made possible to imagine the world as a global space (Held et al 1999), many scholars have questioned the commitment to territoriality as the assumed framework of political community. But territoriality is not simply a descriptive claim that points to the existence of territorially sovereign states. More significantly, it is a normative principle that privileges the sovereign state as a site of political life and authority (Ruggie 1993). If globalizing processes call territoriality into doubt, then the fundamental question is how the political community should be understood and structured in a global era.

As more processes show less regard for state boundaries – exemplified by people shopping internationally, marrying internationally and researching internationally – the paradigm of societies organized within the framework of the nation-state is losing contact with reality (Beck 2002: 62). These changes have prompted a never-ending ongoing debate on the condition of the nation-state. Does it still exist or has it already gone? Is the scope of its activities even growing as its autonomy – state sovereignty – is shrinking? Or has the state and politics become zombies, dead long ago but still haunting in peoples minds?

4.1 The Common Feature of International and Domestic Politics

One central question regarding world order and state sovereignty is the relationship between the domestic and international sphere. Somehow, in spite of the recognized effects of globalization and the transformation of state sovereignty, the problem presumably is that different models of the fundamentals of politics are used by the domestic and the international arena. However, separating the two spheres is like drawing a line in water (Goldmann 1989). Thus, the question is not about whether domestic and international politics are separated from each other. That they are not is a truism. The issue is how this insight affects the study of world order and sovereignty, since the two systems are isomorphic and hence, findings at one level may be directly applicable to the other (Goldmann 1989: 104).

The international system is not altogether anarchic, sine international organizations and human rights regimes for example, are rendering international politics increasingly similar to domestic politics. Furthermore, domestic political systems are not altogether hierarchic and ordered. Not just Iraq in the year 2007, but also traditionally conceived western stable societies, contradicts the traditional view of international relations. Hence, the difference between anarchical and hierarchical politics do not necessarily coincide perfectly with the distinction between international and domestic politics (Goldmann 1989: 107).

A radical view of isomorphy would be that the difference between hierarchical and anarchical politics is unimportant. This, rather than the possibility that domestic politics may interfere with international political action, or that the international system perhaps is not completely anarchic, is a challenge to the realist tradition of international relations. It is not the case here to outright declare that the domestic sphere of the state is fully anarchic, nor that the international system is hierarchical. Nor is it the case that the difference between international and domestic politics is unimportant. There is no place like home and the domestic sphere surely fulfils very important aspects for our identity and feelings, and furthermore, domestic politics normally is well ordered and hierarchical, just as the international scene in many aspects seems fully anarchic.

However, actions occurring every day points in another direction – people commit crimes and go un-convicted both at the domestic and the international level, the state is increasingly passing verdicts that are influenced by international courts and the international human rights regime, regions such as Chechnya in Russia and urban districts such as South Central in Los Angeles or are characterized rather by anarchy than by order. Sometimes there seems to be entire states characterized by disorder such as Somalia, the Sudan or Iraq. At the same time, criminals are judged in court and sent to jail each day, and mostly, regional, urban and rural districts are stable and well-ordered. But the point I want to make here is that the difference between anarchical and hierarchical politics does not necessarily coincide perfectly with the distinction between international and domestic politics. *We just imagine that they do.*

4.2 Eroding sovereignty

Globalization makes it tempting to conclude that the state is in demise. The post Cold War era and the relationship between globalization/privatization 'is characterized by state power being eroded by making borders so porous that almost anything can enter' (Galtung 1998: 215). Yes. In some respect, globalization contributes to the de-nationalization of territorial space and so problematizes the modern institution of sovereignty based on the exclusive principle of territorial rule (McGrew 1998: 190). But instead, I would like to emphasize that globalization assumes that the state continues to play an integral role as an administrative unit for creating and organizing the conditions of globalization (c.f Evans 1998: 12).

Most observers and analysts of international relations have treated sovereign states as an analytic assumption. The bundle of properties associated with sovereignty – territory, recognition, autonomy, and control – has been understood, often implicitly, to characterize states in the international system. However, only a few states have possessed all of these attributes. Control over both transborder movements and internal developments have often been problematic (Krasner 1999) A political entity can be formally independent but de facto deeply penetrated. A state might claim to be only legitimate enforcer of rules within its territory, but the rules it is enforcing might not be of its own making. A state can be recognized, that is, have international legal sovereignty, but not have Westphalian sovereignty because its authority structures are subject to external authority or control., for example what may occur when ratifying a human rights convention. It can loose control of transborder flows and movements and still be autonomous, it can have domestic sovereignty, a well established and effective set of authoritative decision-making institutions and not be recognized.

Furthermore, it is quite frequently argued that supranational institutions, like the EU or the UN, are posing new dilemmas to state sovereignty. Indeed, they do, since it signifies handing over sovereignty to an outside actor. Also, ratifying human rights conventions means that what goes on within your borders is open to scrutiny, since you have handed over some of the right to supervision to an outside actor.

Support for an effective universal prohibition on genocide and crimes against humanity are other examples showing more clearly than any other issue how our conception of the sovereign rights of the state has changed over the last 50 years (Singer 2002: 106). In addition, every major peace treaty since 1648 has violated the sovereign state model in one way or the other (Krasner 2001: 18). On the other hand, if you are not a state, it is impossible to become a member of the EU or the UN. In fact, it could be argued that by entering international organizations or institutions you are confirming your role as a state. What happens is that you lose parts of your sovereignty, but that does not mean that the state per se disappears. The following quotation might clarify my position:

> 'if a ruler agrees that domestic ethnic minorities will be given specific rights and that behavior will be monitored by external actors, or that financial affairs will be managed by a committee appointed by foreign bondholders, he is not understood to have done something incomprehensible nor will he or others necessarily claim that his state is no longer sovereign (Krasner 2001: 41).

Some argue that states can no longer control their borders, since modern technology empowers non-state actors to evade state control of goods, people, money and information across territorial borders. Stephen Krasner represents the view that this scenario is nothing new. Historically, this has always been the case, and as such we can not say that sovereignty is disappearing because of an increasing interdependence (c.f Krasner 1999).

An alternative response is presented by Janice Thomson, setting the argument that if interdependence, interconnectedness and the like are increasing, it is a reflection of state power and interest. 'Any international economic system is predicated on the exercise of state power' (Thomson 1995:215). For example, the lack of interdependence between the US and Soviet during the Cold War suggests exactly that.

Normally, the state has not posed any restrictions on their citizens travelling abroad. Influences on the dinner table or in the music equipment are also accepted. At the same time, it is evident that other processes are not permitted. No single state in the world has opened its borders for full migration. It is always accepted with a quite vast list of premises that has to be fulfilled, such as assuring economic resources or perhaps the status as a refugee. Weapons, drugs and criminals are not allowed to move freely across national borders, but they do anyway. These flows are some of the primary issues that the sovereign state wants to regulate and control, and they do in many cases. Therefore, globalization has permitted the states to enhance and strengthen their political sphere and to define what is to be treated as politics in the first place, due to the handing over of issues to non-state actors. Calling them non-political issues does not mean that they are not political. The point is that they are not treated as such.

4.3 A Clear Division of Inner and Outer Worlds

There is widespread consensus that the modern nation-state system, characterized by an 'inner world' of territorially bounded politics and an 'outer world' of foreign, military and diplomatic relations is, when not at an end, undergoing changes which amount to its deep reconfiguration. To ascertain these new trends, one need not resort to exaggerated claims about the end of the nation-state system. In fact, the irony of current political developments is that while state sovereignty in economic, military and technological domains has been eroded, it is nonetheless vigorously asserted through cooperation in these very same domains (if not, it could not be cooperation in the first place), and national borders, while more porous, are still able to keep aliens and intruders on the outside (Benhabib 2002b: 441).

The emergence of international human rights, and the frequent conflicts in theory and practice between such norms and claims of national sovereignty, is the clearest indication of new forms of political order. In at least three related areas to justice and cosmopolitanism we are witnessing this development: humanitarian interventions, crimes against humanity and transnational migration.

We have lived with the idea of sovereign states for so long that they have come to be part of the background not only of politics and law, but also of ethics. Implicit in the term 'globalization' is the idea that we are moving beyond the era of growing ties between nations and instead are starting to contemplate something beyond the existing conception of the nation-state. A further assumption that has been greatly misleading in these debates is that of 'state-centeredness'. We are more authentically members of a family, of a neighbourhood, of a religious community or of a social movement than we are members of a state. 'While the modern nation-state remains a possible structural expression of democratic self-determination, the complexity of our social lives integrates us into associations that lie above and below the level of the nation state. These associations mediate the manner in which we relate to the state' (Benhabib 1999).

Life and thought is shaped *as much* by activities and institutions on non-national levels – whether subnational, transnational, or international – as by our inheritance from the centralized nation-state.

5. Conclusion

Cosmopolitanism, as currently used, is in many ways a theory about justice. It is a response to various different "problems" in the international arena, such as migration, poverty and inequalities. But what unifies the different perspectives is that it is a theory of justice. I have tried to demonstrate different perspectives used in the current debate on how justice should be achieved. I have also tried to sketch out different manners of how to understand the cosmopolitan tool in academic research. Further research could use the findings in the essay to clarify different positions – i.e should justice be conceived in terms of practices through institutions, politics, moral or law, or perhaps a newer form of cosmopolitanism that accepts difference but still sees equality.

The state does no longer have the ultimate ontological privilege when thinking about ethics, politics and justice. When thinking about boundaries and community, I have tried to offer a possible way of using the communitarian and cosmopolitan positions without necessarily resorting to endless quarrels about the exact nature of morals and ethics.

We live under the conviction that the line between the national and the international sphere is, or at the least has been, clearly drawn and upheld. But has the Westphalian state really been as sovereign in the past as much academic study take for granted? And has the states-system functioned as we perceive that it has done? This thesis has attempted to discuss these questions from a different perspective. We imagine that the state has always functioned like the theoretical tools adopted in academic research, but the fact is that it has not always functioned in that way.

I have tried to highlight the fact that there are other factors of identification in political communities that does not necessarily coincide with territorial borders. This is an important dimension of cosmopolitanism. One great hindrance to really getting the picture of cosmopolitanism has precisely been the fact that we have lived under the conviction that there are clearly drawn spheres between the international and the domestic. There are, but not necessarily as we have imagined them. It has been more of an imagined perfection than connected with reality.

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