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# “Give them toys?”

- The role of the military in the Turkish democratization  
process

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# Abstract

This thesis gives an account of the military interventions carried out by the Turkish military in 1960, 1971 and 1980. By applying Finer's calculus as a method of analyzing military interventions, I have tried to link the behavior of the military during these three coups with the Turkish democratization process.

Unfortunately, the results of the calculus responded poorly to my initial question at issue. Instead the framework of the calculus has provided in depth analysis of the *motives*, *means* and *opportunities* that explains why and how the military intervened.

*Key words:* Turkey, military, Finer's calculus, intervention

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CUP	Committee of Union and Progress
DP	Democratic Party
EC	European Community
EU	European Union
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IO	International Organization
IMF	International Monetary Fund
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NSC	National Security Council
NUC	National Unity Committee
RPP	Republican People's Party

# MAP OF TURKEY AND ITS NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES



# 1 Introduction

“A state is a human community that (successfully) claims the *monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force* within a given territory”. (Emphasis in original)

This definition of the modern state, as uttered by Max Weber<sup>1</sup>, recognizes the necessity for a state to control its military, since the monopoly of force is an integral part of what constitutes the state itself. Unfortunately, the relationship between state and military in established democracies has often proved rather complicated, and for young democracies, civil-military relations have, in many cases, been decisive in terms of democratic sustainability.

Interestingly enough, the role of the military in the process of liberalization and for the outcome of democratic transitions has been rather neglected as a main explanatory factor within democratization theories.<sup>2</sup> This is surprising since the military, together with what Paul Brooker has defined as ‘party dictatorships’, has emerged as the modern form of non-democratic regimes and institutions hindering states from extending and consolidating their democratic rule. (Brooker 2000:3)

Although judged by Samuel P. Huntington as a clear case of the third democratization wave<sup>3</sup>, Turkey with its influential military has proven to be a rather ambiguous case. In comparison with other ‘third wave’- democratic transitions from authoritarian governments, like the ones in Portugal, Spain and Greece in the 1970s, Turkey has not suffered from the ruling of a direct military regime. Instead, three military interventions, or coup d’états, have been carried out, in 1960, 1971 and 1980, since the Republic of Turkey was proclaimed in 1923. In each of these cases, the army has returned to the barracks within a year or two, maintaining their role as guardians of the state.

When assessing the democratization process in Turkey it is therefore necessary to analyze also the role of the Turkish armed forces. This essay is an attempt to do so.

## 1.1 Statement of purpose

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<sup>1</sup> Max Weber, “Politics as a Vocation”, p. 78. Quotation derived from the book “Rethinking Military Politics”, by Alfred Stepan, (1988), p. 1

<sup>2</sup> For further discussions of this issue, see Alfred Stepan, “Rethinking Military Politics”, esp. Chapter 1, and Paul Brooker, “Non-democratic Regimes: Theory, Government & Politics”, esp. Chapter 1-2

<sup>3</sup> Samuel P. Huntington defines a wave of democratization as “a group of transitions from non-democratic to democratic regimes that occur within a specified period of time and that significantly outnumber transitions in the opposite direction during that period of time”. (Huntington 1991:15)

The purpose of this essay could be described as twofold. It is an attempt to describe, analyze and compare the three military interventions that have occurred in modern Turkey in order to look for trends in the behavior of the military that could be used to assess the Turkish democratization process. In doing so it is also a bold attempt to put to test and operationalize the 'calculus of intervention' by professor Samuel Edward Finer.

The question at issue that I intend to answer is:

*By describing, analyzing and comparing the military interventions of 1960, 1971 and 1980, which conclusions can be made in assessing the role of the army in the Turkish democratization process?*

## 1.2 Theoretical Approach

The theoretical approach of this essay is based on Finer's calculus of military intervention. Since the question at issue partly aims at testing Finer's framework, Chapter 2 will deal exclusively with this theory.

## 1.3 Method and Material

Since I am interested in the military regime of Turkey, and since the theoretical framework that I will test is best suited for in depth case- analysis, qualitative methods seem preferable.

The calculus of intervention could be described as 'ideographic' or 'configurative', i.e. that it tries to identify all important factors in accounting for the outcome of the military interventions. (Landman 2003:19) Testing a configurative method is a difficult task, since it is not always clear which factors should be considered more important than others. When assessing which factors to include in my analysis, I have been guided by the appraisals of other scholars with extensive knowledge in the field. The calculus does allow for the inclusion of several different explanatory theories, but I have decided to use only the definitions as set by Finer himself in order to further limit the study.

As to the empirical material that my analysis is based upon, all my sources have been secondary. When trying to describe historical events one usually is faced with serious dilemmas concerning objectivity and biases. In the case of Turkey this seems to be even more evident considering the historical struggle between secularists and religious spokesmen, within as well as outside Turkey, whether the Ottoman legacy is one of modernization and Westernization or



traditional Islam. I have therefore been cautious to use books and articles published by well-known publishing houses, and by recognized scholars and researchers.

## 1.4 Disposition and Delimitation

The first part of this thesis aims at giving a brief introduction to the field of study and the question at issue, as well as mentioning the methodological concerns that have been made in order to implement the case study. Chapter 2 provides the theoretical framework and the analytical tools required in operationalizing Finer's calculus. In Chapter 3 an historical background to the democratization process of Turkey is presented, from the Ottoman reforms to the Atatürk legacy and beyond, which in addition to conceptualizing the military interventions, will be used also as the empirical base for the objective variable in the calculus, *the opportunity*. Chapter 4 consists of the actual testing of the calculus in terms of in depth analysis focusing on Finer's variables: *means*, *motives* and *opportunity* for each military intervention. In Chapter 5 the findings of the previous chapter are summarized and discussed, in addition to an evaluation of the calculus as a theoretical framework and analytical tool. The 6<sup>th</sup> and last chapter of this essay will try to answer the question at issue as well as suggesting future field of studies concerning the role of the military in the Turkish democratization processes.

As mentioned earlier the main problem facing configurative studies are concerns of delimitation. Due to space constraints and limitations in material and methods, the intention of this essay is not to yield a full account of the Turkish case. It is rather an attempt to provide important insights into the military and its interventions in Turkish politics as guardians of the state.

# 2 Theory

Since military regimes and military interventions by far have been the most common form of dictatorship in the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> Centuries, it is not surprising that many attempts have been made to explain the emergence of military dictatorships. Yet, as pointed out by Paul Brooker, the framework of analyzing military intervention in politics developed already in the 1960s by Professor Samuel Edward Finer (1915-1993), still seems to offer the most “comprehensive approach”. (Brooker 2000:59) This is the reason why I have chosen Finer’s calculus as my main theoretical framework.

## 2.1 Definitions

However, before presenting Finer’s theory in more depth, the following section will clarify some of the main concepts that will be used throughout the essay.

### 2.1.1 Democratization as Defined by Linz and Stepan

Initially, democratization meant simply the transformation of a political system from a non-democratic to a democratic rule. However, with the contributions of Linz and Stepan an important distinction was made between the initial phase of democratization, the *transition*, and the later phase, the *consolidation*, of a democracy.

“A democratic transition is complete when sufficient agreement has been reached about political procedures to produce an elected government, when a government come to power that is the direct result of a free and popular vote, when this government *de facto* has the authority to generate new policies, and when the executive, legislative and judicial power generated by the new democracy does not have to share power with other bodies *de jure*”.

(Linz/Stepan 1996:3)

Linz and Stepan both saw liberalization as an important ingredient in democratization, however Stepan made an important distinction between the two:

“In an authoritarian setting, ‘liberalization’ may entail a mix of policy and social changes, such as less censorship of the media ..., the toleration of political opposition. ‘Democratization’ entails liberalization but is a wider and more specifically political

concept...Liberalization refers fundamentally to civil society. Democratization involves civil society, but it refers fundamentally to political society". (Stepan 1988:6)

## 2.1.2 Military Intervention

Finer defined the concept of military intervention in rather broad terms as being "the constrained substitution of the military's policies and/or persons for those of the recognized civilian authorities". (Brooker 2000:62) By military policies, Finer referred to interventions of indirect rule from behind the scenes.

## 2.2 Theoretical framework

The following chapter will present and explain Finer's theoretical framework of military intervention.

### 2.2.1 'The Calculus of Intervention'

In explaining military interventions in politics Finer argued that both subjective and objective factors ought to be examined. Finer referred to the subjective factors as *the disposition*, which included motives and moods, whereas he described the objective factors as concrete *opportunities*. The relationship between the disposition and the opportunity, Finer described as a 'calculus of intervention'. (Brooker 2000:59) By combining the two variables, the subjective and the objective, four inferences could be derived from the calculus. These plausible outcomes were:

1. no intervention because there is neither disposition nor opportunity;
2. intervention because there is disposition and opportunity;
3. no intervention because there is no disposition although there is opportunity; and
4. unsuccessful intervention because there is disposition but no opportunity  
(*ibid.* 60)

As well as assessing the likelihood of future military coups, the calculus proved useful also in analyzing past military interventions since it tried to answer the questions of *how* and *why* the interventions were carried out by the military.

By contributions made by Nordlinger<sup>4</sup> and Janowitz the calculus of intervention was adjusted to incorporate also the notion of ‘*means*’, creating a motive/means/opportunity framework suitable for analyzing military interventions. By establishing this framework the calculus allowed for several theories or explanatory factors to be used supplementary.

In order to apply the Finer-based calculus of military intervention it is necessary to further define the different variables; motive, means and opportunity.

### 2.2.2 Defining Motives

Finer identified four main types of motives that in combination or separately could account for *why* the military would intervene. Reduced and restructured according to Paul Brooker’s interpretation, these four are:

1. National interest
2. Corporate self- interest
3. Social self- interest (class, ethnic or religious)
4. Individual self- interest

(Brooker 2000:63)

Finer argued that the military’s view on its own role as a guardian of national interests could either manifest itself in the military taking on a more passive ‘arbitrating/vetoing’ role or actively launching and implementing policies. (*ibid.* 63)

The distinction between the corporate self- interest and the individual self- interest is perhaps best described, by using Brooker’s explanation, as: “*the officers’ professional role as soldiers as distinct from their personal aspirations as individuals*”. (*ibid.* 64)

The corporate self-interest within the military has, due to the army’s hierarchical structure and discipline, tended to be very strong. Because of this, concerns of the autonomy within the armed forces such as for instance control over appointments seem to overshadow the social self- interests as the major reason for military interventions in politics. By social self- interest is here meant a soldier’s concern for the specific social group that he or she belongs to.

### 2.2.3 Defining Means

The variable *means* of intervention is somewhat twofold. It includes the actual method of intervention, as well as referring to the capacity available to use that

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<sup>4</sup> For further reading, see E.A. Nordlinger, “Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments”, esp. Chapter 1.

method. (*ibid.* 68) Finer argued that although the coup d'état in itself is the obvious method for a military to seize power, the threat of staging a coup could be an as effective tool. Finer also distinguished between different types of coup d'état; between the 'corporate' coup, in which the military act as a united force, led by the generals, and between the 'factional' coup, in which only segments of the military is involved, often lower and middle ranking officers. (Finer 1976:147)

## 2.2.4 Defining Opportunity

Finer defined the degree of political culture, or the development of a civil society, as essential in determining whether or not claims of legitimacy would serve as a positive or negative factor in assessing military interventions. In a society with a strong political culture, Finer argued, resistance and uprisings against military interventions in politics would serve as an obstacle for the prospects of coups, and therefore reducing the opportunity of intervention. (*ibid.* 79-82) At the same time, the legitimacy of a government can be eroded due to its lack of performance, which could therefore increase the opportunity for the military to intervene.

In addition to this theory of political culture, Finer contended that the opportunity for the military to intervene is maximized when: "(1) the civilian authorities are abnormally dependent upon the military, and (2) the military's popularity is enhanced while that of the civilian authorities is depressed." (Brooker 2000:73)

## 2.2.5 Summarizing the Finer-based Calculus of Intervention

Brooker has summarized the Finer-based calculus of intervention as follows:

<i>Motive</i>	<i>Means</i>	<i>Opportunity</i>
1. National interest 2. Corporate self-interest 3. Individual self-interest 4. Social self-interest	1. Coup method (seizure of power) 2. Coup-threat method (seizure of power)	1. Civilian government's lack of legitimacy 2. Civilian government dependent on military 3. Civilian government discredited.
<i>Inhibiting motives</i>	<i>Capacity-reducing factors</i>	<i>Negative factors (reducing opportunity)</i>

<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Belief in civil supremacy (national interest?)</li> <li>2. Fear of coup failure (corporate and individual self-interests)</li> <li>3. Fear of politicization of military (corporate self-interest)</li> <li>4. Fear of repeating past failures of military rule/interventions (corporate self-interest and national interest)</li> </ol>	<p>Various factors weaken internal cohesion; factional instead of corporate coups, less credible threats of staging a coup due to past failures etc.</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Civilian government has legitimacy.</li> <li>2. Strong political culture.</li> </ol>
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**Table 2.1. The Finer-based Calculus of Intervention. Based on Brooker (Brooker 2000:61).**


## 2.3 Democratization and the Calculus of Retention/Transferral of Power

Since the calculus of intervention is dated back to Finer’s work in the 1960s naturally new theories and explanatory factors have evolved contributing to the framework. The experiences of democratization and re-democratization in the early 1990s have also accentuated new aspects that could be incorporated into the theoretical framework of Finer’s calculus. Already in 1962 Finer discussed the tendency of the military to ‘return to the barracks’ after seizing power, but throughout the 1980s other scholars contributed with more specific explanatory factors adding to this observation. For instance, compared to parties or personal rule, military regimes showed a much greater tendency to relinquish power. Nordlinger calculated the average time span of military regimes to be only five years and perhaps even more astonishing he found that the most usual method of disengagement was voluntarily and initiated by the military regime itself. (Brooker 2000:194)

Taken these new findings into consideration, Brooker has suggested that the calculus of intervention should be divided into three different calculi in order to systematically analyze the cycle of military interventions. Assuming that what Rustow pointed out, namely that “factors that keep a democracy stable may not be the ones that brought it into existence” (Rustow 1970:341), applies also for dictatorships, Brooker suggested that three different calculi explaining the military intervention in politics should be combined as follows: 1) the calculus of intervention, 2) the calculus of retention/relinquishing of power, 3) the calculus of

transferral. Based on Brooker's framework this approach could be illustrated in the following way:

*The Systematic Analysis of the Cycle of Military Intervention*



**Figure 2.2. Calculus of military intervention, retention/relinquishing and transferral. (Brooker 2000:200).**

For the calculus of retention/relinquishing of power, Brooker argues that a 'balance sheet' should be used to weight the positive and the negative factors for each variable in order to estimate whether or not the military regime will retain or relinquish its powers.

As for the calculus of transferral, the focus of analysis is to *whom* the military is transferring its power; whether it be to the people by means of elections or to a specific political party, *how* the transferral is carried out and *when* the transferral tactically occurs.<sup>5</sup> With three rather open-ended questions; *whom*, *how* and *why*, the calculus of transferral is the most complex of the three calculi. Brooker pointed out that the calculi of retention and transferral are better suited for analyzing a particular case than to compare a larger number of countries, since there are too many conceivable combinations of motives, means and opportunities.

<sup>5</sup> The issue of timing of authoritarian transfers and democratic transitions have been discussed in depth by for instance Samuel P. Huntington. For further reading see Samuel P. Huntington, "The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Esp. p. 274-279

## 2.4 Operationalizing Finer's Calculus

Although Brooker suggests a trisected approach in analyzing military intervention in politics, for the scope of this essay it will suffice to use only one of the calculi. Since the focus of my study is mainly to look for trends in the behavior of the army, either of the three would provide possible frameworks for comparisons. However, since the calculi of transferral is concerned mainly with *whom* the power is transferred to, which is interesting when analyzing the relationship between the military and the Turkish party system and/or the civil society as a whole, and the calculus of retention seems less interesting since the Turkish army has throughout its coups returned to the barracks within a year or two, I have chosen a somewhat modified version of the Finer-based calculus of intervention as my theoretical framework. After all, this calculus poses the most relevant questions at stake, namely *why* and *how* did the army intervene? Another important advantage is that I can proceed from the definitions of motive/means/opportunities as stated by Finer, which will help the delimitations of this study.



# 3 Democratization in Turkey – From Ottoman Reforms to Atatürk Rule and Beyond

## 3.1 The Ottoman Reforms

In order to meet the new external threats such as the Russian invasion in the Caucasus, Muhammed Ali's rise to power in Egypt, and the Greek war of independence, the elites of the Ottoman Empire called for urgent military reforms in the early 19<sup>th</sup> Century. (Clogg 1979:59) Under Mahmud II (1807-39) an extensive reform program was launched, guided by strong Western influences aiming also at centralizing the Ottoman state under the Sultan. Any opposition by conservative religious agitators was crushed. The first phase of reform was followed by the Reorganization Period, or the Tanzimat, which lasted from 1839 to 1876. Ira M. Lapidus has pointed out that in many aspects, the Tanzimat reforms challenged the fundamentals of Muslim supremacy by replacing traditional educational, legal and religious systems with secular organizations. Ira M. Lapidus, Professor of History at University of California at Berkeley, has even concluded that "*the restoration of the empire was beginning to have revolutionary implications*". (Lapidus 2002:495) For the military sphere, the reforms produced a whole new army, placed directly under the centralized government and disciplined and constrained by the rules of the new military life, which separated the military from the civilian. (Mardin 1988:31)

With the reforms of Tanzimat a new bureaucratic and military elite was fostered. By creating the Young Ottoman society in the 1860s, this new intelligentsia found a platform for advocating a shift from the sultanate Empire towards an Ottoman constitutional regime. While taking advantage of the Ottoman defeat by Russia in 1876, these constitutionalists staged a coup d'état which brought Abd al-Hamid II (1876-1908) to power. By forcing the 'new' ruler to sign a constitution which directly limited the powers of the Sultan, the constitutionalists were able to establish a representative government, and decentralizing the government. However, Abd al-Hamid II did not approve of these constitutional changes, why he suspended the parliament and established an authoritarian and religiously conservative regime. (*ibid.* 497)

## 3.2 The Young Turk Movement and the War of Independence

In 1889 the Ottoman Society for Union and Progress was formed in Paris. The society was founded by journalists, publishers and officers who had been forced by the Sultan to go into exile. More commonly referred to as the ‘Young Turks’, its members maintained an allegiance to the Ottoman Empire, but advocated the return to a constitutional regime. (*ibid.* 497) In 1907 the Young Turk movement created the Committee for Union and Progress (CUP). A year later a cell within the CUP staged a coup and forced the Sultan to restore the constitution of 1876. Although officially declaring the new regime to be a parliamentary government, in reality it was run by the CUP and the military in a rather authoritarian manner.

The coup of 1908 established the precedents for military intervention in politics, on behalf of ‘the welfare of the people’. The involvement of the military in political parties, such as the CUP, where the responsibilities were shared between civilians and officers, established the notion of the military as mutually responsible for the faith of the nation. (Harris 1988:181)

From 1912 to 1918 the Committee of Union and Progress ruled by decree. (*ibid.* p.497) CUP launched comprehensive secularization reforms of the educational and legal systems and introduced programs aiming at the emancipation of women. As part of this Westernized transformation they also started to conceptualize a modern Turkish nationality.<sup>6</sup>

The independence of Albania in 1910, the Balkan Wars and the World War I destroyed the Ottoman Empire, and left a lacerated Armenian population in Eastern Anatolia. However, the consequences of this was ironically the emergence of a more homogenous Turkish state, stripped of the major part of its non-Muslim and non-Turkish populations, and therefore more susceptible to nationalism and concepts of the Turkish identity. (Ahmad 1993:41)

In the aftermath of the World War I, Mustafa Kemal, an officer trained at the secular military academies, decided to act upon the principles of the Young Turk movement and fight for an independent modern Turkish state. Under his rule, the Turkish military defeated the Armenian republic in the Caucasus, the French army in Cilicia and the Greeks in Anatolia, thereby forcing the European powers in 1923 to sign the Treaty of Lausanne, which recognized the independence of the Turkish state with its present boundaries. In 1923 Mustafa Kemal<sup>7</sup> proclaimed the

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<sup>6</sup> For further discussions about the concept of Turkish nationality see Nicole and Hugh Pope, “Turkey Unveiled: Atatürk and After”, esp. Chapter 3, and Feroz Ahmad, “The Making of Modern Turkey”, esp. p. 31-56

<sup>7</sup> Mustafa Kemal is often referred to as Atatürk, meaning the Father of the Turks.

secular *Republic of Turkey*, became head of the Republican People's Party (RPP) and was named president for life. (Lapidus 2002:499)

### 3.3 The Era and Legacy of Kemal Atatürk

Kemal Atatürk was devoted to the ideals of secularization and modernization and was *as* active in launching economical reforms as he was to convince the Turks to abandon the traditional Muslim life in order to truly embrace the secular (Western) style. As part of this crusade, in 1927 the traditional custom of wearing a fez was forbidden, in 1928 the Latin script officially replaced the Arabic one, and for the emancipation of women the reforms carried out by Atatürk transformed their status completely by allowing them to study, divorce and in 1935 be elected to the Turkish parliament. (*ibid.* 503) In the 1930s Atatürk tried to liberalize the regime, but was faced with public hostility and religious reactions towards his social revolution, which convinced him that the process of modernization had to be kept and controlled by bureaucratic and military elites until the society was ready for further liberalization. (Dodd 1996:132) George S. Harris has drawn the conclusions that: "Atatürk's main concern with the army was not to keep it out of politics, but to make sure it remained completely loyal to him and to the Republic". (Harris 1965:56)

Kemal Atatürk passed away in 1938, but the Kemalist legacy remained deeply rooted in the Turkish nationalism and in the ideology of the Turkish armed forces.

#### 3.3.1 The Role of the Army as Envisaged by Atatürk

The role that Kemal Atatürk had in mind for the military in the new Turkish state must be viewed as rather ambiguous, (which is important to stress since the generals have sought to legitimize their military interventions by referring to the principles of Kemalism). On the one hand, Atatürk constantly exhorted the importance and status of the military as the guardian of the state against foreign *and* domestic enemies, and made sure that the military academies indoctrinated its officers with the ideology of secularization. However, as soon as the struggle for Turkish independence was won, Atatürk made a clear distinction between the military and the civilian sphere, advocating for a professionalization of the armed forces. (Metin, Guney 1996:419) Through the new constitution in 1923 he deprived all officers of their right to vote<sup>8</sup>, and by doing so he established the

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<sup>8</sup> Article 23 of the 1924 Constitution: "no person may be a deputy and hold office under the Government at the same time". (Lewis:205)

grand principle that the military should *safeguard*, not *rule* the Turkish republic. (Harris 1965:57ff) This being said, the rebellions in the 1930s towards Atatürk's modernization reforms not only made Atatürk refrain from further democratization attempts, but also led him to actually enhance the role of the military as a political institution, making the political sphere even more dependent on the military involvement in political and economical matters.

### 3.4 The Transition to Multiparty System: Democratization, Turbulence and Military Interventions

The period from 1950 and forward Lapidus describes as: “the era of a dual military rule and multi-party political system, increasing social differentiation, rapid economic change, and resumed ideological conflict”. (*ibid.* 501) The move from a single-party regime to a multi-party system in the 1950s is by many scholars, amongst them Samuel P. Huntington, viewed as the beginning of the Turkish democratization process. (Huntington 1991:18) This transition into free parliamentary elections in the 1950s and the acceptance of a multi-party system which allowed for competition marked the emergence of a new political regime, although the military bureaucratic guardian state founded by Atatürk remained intact.

İsmet İnönü, a former general, became the successor of Atatürk, and continued the liberalization process that Atatürk had began. In 1946 the İnönü government allowed for the formation of the Democrat Party, and in 1950 free parliamentary elections were held. With the new political competitive atmosphere, the former one-party rule of İnönü's RPP lost its influence to the rising Democrat Party (DP) headed by Adnan Menderes.

The Menderes government favored economic modernization, but was more tolerant to religious expressions and allowed for Islam to be taught in schools. (Lapidus 2002:506) Increasing military collaborations with the United States (Turkey became a permanent member in NATO in 1952) helped to improve the infrastructure, the means of communication as well as modernizing and expanding the military arms. (Alford 1984:53) Rising political opposition from left- and right-wing groups, and an economy in the late 1950s that suffered from inflation, trade deficits and an ever growing foreign debt, ended in the military intervention in 27 of May 1960. The military junta seized power and arrested several party members, amongst them Menderes, who was put on trial for violating the constitution and later sentenced to death. Within a year after the coup, the military

had revised and established a new Constitution and set a date for parliamentary elections. Amongst the amendments in the Constitution of 1961 the military was handed back its right to vote in elections. Another paragraph provided for the creation of a National Security Council (NSC), to function as a separate but not parallel, body *within* the political establishment. The NSC, composed of the chief of general staff and the high commanders of the armed forces, was given a broad mandate to discuss all kinds of security concerns and then present its recommendations to the council of ministers, the department of defense as well as directly to the president. The establishment of the NSC created, what the scholar Cizre Sakallioğlu has described as: “*a double headed political system: the civilian council of ministers coexisted with the national security council on the executive level, and the military system of justice continued to operate independently alongside the civilian justice system*”. (Sakallioğlu 1997:157)

After the elections of 1961, new opposition parties emerged, decreasing even further the influence of İnönü and Atatürk’s old party, the RPP. Replacing the Democrat Party as the major competition of the RPP:s was now the Justice Party (JP), headed by Suleyman Demirel. Increased polarization and fragmentation amongst the political parties, among others, the issues of the uneven economic development, the increased social cleavages, together with rising oil prizes and a weakened European economy overall, led to inflation, foreign debts, high unemployment and eventually a new economic crisis. (Lapidus 2002:506 ff) In addition, the Kurdish minority, and left- and rightwing extremists, had begun to attack military and economic targets, which resulted in outbreaks of civil violence throughout the country. (Pevehouse 2005:138) In 1971 the army intervened again on March 12, by posing an ultimatum demanding that Demirel would step aside. During this new phase of military intervention the armed forces tried to squash the various terrorist cells that had emerged, but interfered as little as possible in the political institutions, only adding amendment to the 1961 Constitution. (*ibid.* 139)

In 1973, new parliamentary elections were held. Unfortunately, the same terrorist groups that had created civil unrest leading up to the 1971 crisis, resumed to terrorist activities after the elections in 1973. Fragmentation also within the military could be visible, as well as growing economical problems.

On September 12, 1980, the military seized power again, but this time in an extensive, full-scale coup d’état. The intervention of this new military regime reached beyond the earlier attempts to restructure the constitutional framework of the state. (Dagi 1996) Demirel was once again removed from office, and the military once again tried to squash the ‘rough elements’ in the society, but this time the armed forces came down with much more force than in 1971. Having already established the National Security Council through the 1961 Constitution, the NSC, headed by General Kenan Evren, was given the responsibility to oversee this military launched ‘law-and-order’- campaign. The first decree of the NSC dissolved the government, put four leaders of the major political parties under custody, banned all political activities, closed down trade unions, introduced censorship on the press and transferred all legislative powers to the NSC. 48 executions were carried out, and over 60, 000 people were arrested suspected of terrorism or other illegal political activities. (*ibid.*)

The coup of 1983 faced massive criticism and reactions from abroad. The EC-Turkey association agreements were frozen, Turkey was suspended from attending the Council of Europe and the OECD suspended its economic aid. (Pevehouse 2005:141)

In 1982, General Evren drafted a new constitution, which was approved by 90 percent in a referendum. In 1983 the formation of political parties were permitted, but politicians active before 1980 were banned from participating. With the election of 1983 which brought the Motherland Party of Turkey, a new center-right party headed by Turgut Özal, to power, Turkey re-emerged as a multiparty electoral system. (*ibid.* 140)

# 4 Testing the Calculus of Intervention

## 4.1 Dissecting the Military Coup of 1960

“Honourable fellow countrymen! Owing to the crisis into which our democracy has fallen, in view of the recent sad incidents and in order to avert fratricide, the Turkish armed forces have taken over the administration of the country. Our armed forces have taken the initiative for the purpose of extricating the parties from the irreconcilable situation into which they have fallen,... and will hold just and free elections as soon as possible under the supervision and arbitration of an above-party administration,... They will hand over the administration to whichever party wins the election.”<sup>9</sup>

(Ahmad 1993:126)

### 4.1.1 Defining Means

The junta that seized power in 1960 consisted of 38 members from the lower ranks of the military. Feroz Ahmad has described this seizure of power as “an intervention made from outside the hierarchical structure of Turkey’s armed forces”. (Ahmad 1993:121) Other scholars such as George S. Harris has analyzed the coup as being “in essence a colonels coup with merely a façade of senior officers recruited by their juniors to take advantage of the strong hierarchical sense of the Turkish military profession.” (Heper, Evin 1988:183) Thus, in applying Finer’s definition of means, we can conclude that the coup d’état initially was factional, not corporative of its nature. The intervention later turned into a more united military responsibility as the high commanders accepted the need to step in.

Since there had been no previous coup d’état Finer’s capacity reducing-motives will not be taken into consideration as an explanatory factor.

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<sup>9</sup> Excerpt derived from the 7 a.m. broadcast transmitted over the Ankara Radio of 27 May 1960 by the military junta referring to itself as the National Unity Committee (NUC).

## 4.1.2 Defining Motives

### 1. *Corporate Interests*

The connection between the Turkish military and the RPP that during the era of Atatürk had been rather unproblematic, was openly criticized already in 1946 by the Democratic Party. With the defeat of the RPP in the elections of 1950, also the military lost its political influence through its former military-civilian bureaucratic coalition. However, although the DP diminished the prestige of the military, it *did* try to respond to the basic demands of the military by modernizing its training and arms systems. (Heper/Evin 1988:139) These efforts were enhanced by the NATO membership in 1952. Thus, professionally derived complaints of the military against the DP would not seem to be a sufficient motive for the military to intervene.

### 2. *National Interests*

However, the political polarization and the power struggle between the DP and the RPP seem to have been of greater concern to the military. The RPP had become much more socialistic in its ideology since its defeat in 1950, and had began to oppose the politics of Menderes through numerous political agitations and by mobilizing mass demonstrations to express its discontentment with the DP government. (Heper/Evin 1988:139) The response by Menderes was immediate and harsh; besides arresting the instigators of rebellion, he also threatened to close down the RPP. It has been suggested by Kemal H. Karpat that it was actually Menderes' decision to use the military against the RPP that made a handful of officers decide to intervene. (*ibid.* 141) The old ties between the military and the former one-party, as such also the representative of the Kemalist legacy, should not be underestimated. That being said, the Atatürk legacy also strongly opposed military intervention in politics, which according to Karpat was the main reason why a corporate coup did not initially take place. (*ibid.* 141ff)

Despite the factional character of the coup initially, the larger officer crop did accept the need for the military as a whole to step in and seemed, according to the findings of George S. Harris, to motivate this larger intervention by referring to 'the vital interests of the nation'. (Heper/Evin 1988:183) Thus, for the scope of our analysis the military did eventually take upon itself the more active role, as described by Finer, of implementer of new policies, rather than safeguarding already existing ones.

### 3. *Individual Self-Interest*

Although there is a fine line between corporate interests and individual self-interests, since the coup of 1960 was factional initially there is much to gain on looking into the consequences of the coup-makers decision to act, i.e. how the rest of the military responded to these individuals.



The leadership of the army in 1960 was headed by General Cemal Gürsel, who later became elected president of the new democratic government. Due to the tradition of hierarchy in the Turkish army, Gürsel apparently had expected the young officers of the junta to return to the barracks immediately after their seizure of power. However, the National Unity Committee (NUC), which was what the junta called itself, had no intention of being excluded from power. (Heper/Evin 1988:163) Instead, Gürsel had to share the seats in the interim regime with the radical officers. Since Gürsel advocated a return to civil rule as soon as possible, a policy that was opposed by many members of the junta, Gürsel decided to deprive 14 NUC- members of their ranks, including its leader Colonel Alparslan Türkeş (Ahmad 1977:162) This purge within the military created anger amongst some of the younger officers who felt that they indirectly had lost the representation in the NUC. In reaction to this, two attempted counter-coups consisting of former NUC members to overthrow the government were made in 1963 and 1964. Both failed and the military put the instigators to trial and executed them. To prevent any further military coups from below, senior officers formed the Armed Forces Union (AFU) in 1961, consisting of officers of all ranks and whose aim was to monitor all dissident elements and activities within the army. Ahmad concludes that: “the days of military *coups* from below were over”. (*ibid.* 128) Similar conclusions are made by Harris who have pointed out that the purge of officer corps in 1960 was much more extensive compared to later attempts to get rid of partisans within the military establishment. In fact, as state by Harris: “the experience of 1960 left the commanders with an abiding concern to keep subordinates out of political roles and to confine dealings with politicians of the top-ranking generals.” (Heper/Evin 1988:184)

#### 4. *Social Interests*

There seems to be little evidence to assume that what made the officers initiate the coup of 1960 was mainly concerns of their social interests, such as class, ethnicity or religion. Especially, due to the Kemalist ideology propagating the importance of maintaining a secularized military, the social interests seem not as important as the rest of the indicators.

##### 4.1.3 Defining Opportunities

Due to the rising political power struggles that the Menderes government had to face, in combination with an unstable economy leaning towards a foreign currency crisis,(see chapter 3.4), it seems fair to conclude that the performance of the civilian government could be questioned by the civil society. The fact that the RPP mobilized mass demonstrations aimed at discrediting Menderes rule, could also be seen as signs of societal discontentment with the government in office. The historical bonds between the military and the RPP could as well be viewed as a factor that gave legitimacy to the military intervention, since what the RPP

originally stood far, was the same ideological ground that, at least officially, guided the military's actions in 1960. However, when balancing positive and negative factors according to Finer's calculus, out of the three variables, this is the most difficult to define.

## 4.2 Dissecting the Military Intervention of 1971

“By January 1971, Turkey seemed to be in a state of chaos. The universities had ceased to function. Students emulating Latin American urban guerillas robbed banks and kidnapped US servicemen, and attacked American targets. The homes of university professors critical of the government were bombed by neo-fascist militants. Factories were on strike and more workdays were lost between 1 January and 12 March 1971 than during any prior year. The Islamist movement had become more aggressive and its party, the National order Party, openly rejected Atatürk and Kemalism, infuriating the armed forces.”

(Ahmad 1993:147)

### 4.2.1 Defining Means

The military intervention in 1971 has been described by George S. Harris as a military ultimatum, rather than a full- scale military coup. (Heper/Evin 1988:186) In applying the framework of the calculus, the 1971 military intervention actually fits what Finer has defined as a ‘coup- threat method’. The high military commanders simply gave Demirel, head of state, an ultimatum, threatening to intervene more forcefully if he did not dissolve the government and declare a state of martial law. The intervention was carried out by a united army, why it can be labeled corporative.

### 4.2.2 Defining Motives

#### 1. *National Interests*

The military intervention in 1971 seems to be a rather clear case of the army declaring its duties as guardians of the national interests. Only if the civilians refused, as was the case of the Demirel government, to provide effective rule to stabilize the country in a time of social unrest, would the generals use the authority vested in them to actively intervene. As pointed out by Clement H. Dodd, the period following the coup of 1960 did actually see tendencies of

disengagement in terms of military involvement in politics. (Mastny/Nation 1996:133)

Also George S. Harris has drawn the conclusions that it was the safety of the state that was the military's main concern and reason for intervening in 1971. (Heper/Evin 1988:188)

It should be mentioned though that scholars such as Kemal H. Karpat have pointed out that the intervention of 1971 seemed only half-thought through from the account of the generals, which partly could explain why it did actually not produce any lasting results. (*ibid.* 147)

## 2. Corporate Interests

The fact that the generals remained rather passive after the initial phase of the intervention in 1971, seeming reluctant to dictate how the politicians should proceed after the government had been dissolved or who the new regime should elect as prime<sup>10</sup> minister, could be viewed as further proof that the intervention of 1971 was not first and foremost an expression of corporate interests. Although the interventions did result in the creation of amendments to the 1961 Constitution, which further increased the military autonomy; other amendments issued were aimed at specifically strengthening the powers of the civil government in responding to national threats. (Heper/Evin 1988:188) As pointed out by George S. Harris, "the commanders clearly did not see a need to throw out the existing system, but rather they agreed on a certain 'fine tuning' that would promote more efficient and decisive government." (*ibid.* 188)

The content of the amendments also shows that it was not mainly concerns of cuts in military budget, or civilian intrusions into the military autonomy, reasons defined by Finer as plausible military corporate interests at stake, that made the military intervene. It seems though that certain events like the student uprising in February of 1971 when students fired on the gendarmerie troops, and the kidnappings of American military staff serving in Turkey, which in itself was very disturbing to the generals, seemed to if not decisive so at least rapidly speed up the commanders' decision to act. (*ibid.* 186)

Since the interests that motivated the military to intervene in 1971 seems to be mainly revolve around the national and corporate self-interests, analyzing the impact of individual self-interests and social interests seem superfluous for our purpose.

### 4.2.3 Defining Opportunites

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<sup>10</sup> Naturally this fact could be seen also as evidence of what Finer has called 'inhibiting motives', i.e. that earlier coup experiences (fear of politicisation of military, fear of repeat of past failures of military rule) acted as constraining the military operation.

In comparison to the events leading up to the intervention in 1960, the domestic security situation in 1970 seems to have reached untenable levels. Demirel's reluctance to call for martial law, has of Feroz Ahmad, been identified as what finally, at least in the eyes of the military, caused the government to lose all credibility for restoring peace and control. (Ahmad 1993:147) The question of legitimacy seems therefore rather obvious. According to Finer's assumption that the opportunity to intervene is maximized when the civilian government is abnormally dependent on its military for internal security, and the popularity of the military is enhanced, at the government's expense, the situation in 1971 seemed very favorable in terms of opportunities favorable towards an intervention. There is, however, another aspect that is interesting to discuss, since it could be used as an explanatory factor of why the intervention of 1971 was so limited compared to 1960.

As a negative factor reducing the opportunity of intervention, external factors could be seen as playing a deterrent role. This has been suggested by both Laurence Whitehead<sup>11</sup> and perhaps even more convincingly by Jon. C. Pevehouse in his book *Democracy from Above* (2005), which deals with the important role played by international factors in the outcome of democratic transitions and democratic consolidation processes. In the case of the military intervention of 1971, there seems to be some evidence that the high command did take external factors into consideration when planning its move. For instance, when approached in 1970 by a group of officers asking him to lead a coup d'état with the aim of establishing a military regime, the commander of the Turkish Air Force, General Muhsin Batur gave the following reply:

“The western world cannot accept this sort of system and procedure. It's just not good enough to say 'if they don't accept it, then so be it'. If we give way (i.e., adopt the proposed plan) we'll get support from the Eastern Bloc and Red China, but that would be a disaster for Turkey.”

(Heper/Evin 1988:162)

That Turkey as a member of NATO, the Council of Europe and having signed Association Agreements with the European Community presumably leading up to a membership in the EU, would be forced to, if not to follow, at least to consider the principles of democracy and democratic rule, is a reasonable assessment to make. The relations to the West, and the security alliance with the United States in particular, were after all of great importance to the Turkish military. Although external factors did not hinder the generals from intervening, they might have played a part in limiting its scope.

The intervention of 1971 did result in the decision by several European states to suspend their economic aid to Turkey and demanding a return to democracy.

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<sup>11</sup> For the reasoning of Laurence Whitehead, see O'Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead, “Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives”. Esp. p. 6-23

However, the support from NATO continued to be strong due to Turkey's geo-strategic position facing the Soviet Union. (Pevehouse 2005:142)

The deepening collaboration between the Turkish military and NATO should not though be fully dismissed as a possible restraining factor. Monteagle Stearns has pointed out that NATO actually provided for an enhanced professionalism within the Turkish military by modernizing arms and by involving the Turkish military in operations abroad. (Stearns 1992:134)

### 4.3 Dissecting the Military Coup of 1980

“Dear citizens, it is because of all these reasons...that the Turkish armed forces were forced to take over the state administration with the aim of safeguarding the unity of the country and the nation and the rights and freedoms of the people, ensuring the security of life and property and the happiness and prosperity of the people, ensuring the prevalence of law and order- in other words, restoring the state authority in an impartial manner.”<sup>12</sup>

(Ahmad 1993:181)

#### 4.3.1 Defining Means

It has been said that the military intervention of 1980 that lasted until elections were held in 1983, dramatically changed the scene of domestic Turkish politics. (Dagi 1996:2) In the eyes of the public it was a corporate coup, led by a united army force, headed by the Chief of General Staff of the NSC, Kenan Evren.

#### 4.3.2 Defining Motives

##### 1. *National Interests*

William Hale has concluded that the army had four main tasks set for itself when intervening in 1980: “firstly, to suppress terrorism; secondly, to restore economic growth and stability; thirdly, to introduce a new Constitution and legal arrangements which, it was hoped, would prevent another lapse into anarchy; and, fourthly, to work out effective arrangements with the civilian politicians, both old and new”. (Heper/Evin 1988:166) It seemed obvious that the army was aspiring to

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<sup>12</sup> Quote by General Kenan Evren in a broadcast over the radio and television explaining the reasons,( namely the economic breakdown, the social anarchy with rising violence and social divisions), causing the military to intervene.

shoulder the burden of the civil government in order to deal with the state of crisis that the Turkish society was in.

When polarization and power struggles between the leading political parties in the late 1970s delayed the declaration of martial law needed to respond to escalating civil riots and violence, and the police seemed unable to stabilize the situation, the chief of the NSC, Kenan Evren, tried to convince the parties to collaborate in order to regain control of the society, although with little effect. (Güney 1996:623ff)

Thus, when the generals initiated the coup they were in a sense trying to safeguard the Turkish democracy from itself. Evren himself stated that the main reason behind the intervention was “to avert a civil war and to save the democracy that was going down the drain”. (*ibid.* 621) Seeing that the politicians seemed too entrenched in their personal power aspirations in order to provide an effective rule of the state, even when faced by a national crisis, the generals sought it necessary to permanently remove the old layer of political leaders from politics, and prevent, by means of a new constitution, a similar political situation to ever reoccur.

## 2. *Corporate Interests*

An interest of vital concern to the military that seemed to have been threatened in the turns of the 1970s, was the Kemalist legacy of secularization; directly intertwined with the founding principles of the military. The emergence of the Islamist National Salvation Party, which assumed a ‘swinging’ position and therefore managed to shape government policies supporting a Muslim educational system, concerned the generals greatly. By manifesting their religious cause, for example by remaining seated and silent during the playing of the national anthem, and by insulting the army by not paying respect to the generals on the Day of Victory on August 30, 1980, as is customary, the leaders of the National Salvation Party managed to provoke the military, who certainly viewed these symbolical demonstrations as both a blasphemy of the secular Kemalist legacy, as well as directly undermining the military confidence. (Mastny/Nation 1996:134)

## 3. *Individual Self-Interest*

The coup of 1980, and the events leading up to it, seems to be a very complicated case to analyze. Political dissensions as well as personal disputes and rivalries amongst the high commanders of the Turkish armed forces seemed to erode military prestige from within the army itself. (Heper/Evin 1988:189) Feroz Ahmad has claimed that the fragmentation within the army could best be described as a power struggle between the military ‘moderates’ and the ‘extremists’ in their approach to solving the state of crisis in the late 1970s. (Ahmad 1993:181) Both parties seemed inclined to intervene, but whereas the ‘moderates’ called for an intervention similar to the one in 1971, the ‘extremists’ demanded a thorough restructuring of the political party system, advocating the

takeover by a military regime. (*ibid.* 182) Despite these polarized opinions, the military was cautious not to flaunt any signs of factionalism to the public. All decisions leading up to the intervention were taken collectively, and General Kenan Evren became the military mediator and spokesman.

However, the opinions dividing the high commanders was known to, and seemingly taken advantage of, by the two leading political leaders, Demirel and Ecevit. Assessing the growing frustration amongst the armed forces in the late 1970s as directed against their personal rule, they both tried to find ways of downgrading the military's political role. (*ibid.* 189) Roger P. Nye has suggested that they saw a golden opportunity to do so when the presidency of former officer Cevdet Sunay terminated in 1973. (Nye 1977:218) The army, polarized in its opinions, did not have a clear candidate for Sunay's succession. On top of this Sunay added to the military disorder by aspiring to maintain in office and maneuvering in order to have the constitution changed so that he could extend his term. Since, historically the chief of the general staff had been the strongest candidate to run for presidency the first step for the military was to decide upon who should seize this position. In the end the Commander of the Ground Forces, Faruk Gürler was appointed chief, although, as pointed out by George S. Harris, his candidacy was not favored by the air force and the navy who wanted a representative from their own division. (Heper/Evin 1988:190) Given this obvious intrigue within the top rank of the army, Demirel argued that an election of a military as president "would be considered a sign that democracy is not working in Turkey". (*ibid.* 190) In the end a compromise was reached and the retired Admiral Fahri Korutürk was elected president.

These events seem to have marked an important change in the relationship between the civilians and the military, reducing the influence of the army. Harris have concluded that "henceforth, the commanders would find that they had the option of acting or being ignored, but nothing in between". (*ibid.* 191)

However, it seems to have been the failure of the politicians to focus rather on maintaining their parliamentary majority than providing an effective political rule that first and foremost forced the military to intervene.

#### 4. *Social Interests*

Although the events leading up to the military coup did seem to enhance clashes between ethnic groups, religious- secular antagonists, and left- and right wing extremists, there seems to be little evidence supporting the idea that it was mainly out of concerns for the social groups that the officers themselves belonged to, which made them act in 1980. (Finer actually acknowledged the fact that the social interests often play a minor role due to the corporate nature of the military, which is detached from the rest of the society by creating it's own hierarchical system. (Brooker 2000:66)) However, if also political groups could be thought of to be included as social self- interests, the political polarization within the military could perhaps be said to have shown such tendencies.

### 4.3.3 Defining Opportunites

There are many plausible factors of opportunity that can be said to favor the military coup in 1980. One of these is the Turkish debt crisis in 1977. In fact, according to Stephan Haggard and Robert Kaufmann, it was economic factors such as an initial exchange crisis, reduction in investments and growth, and half-hearted efforts by the politicians to implement fiscal adjustment programs, that weakened the Turkish democracy. (Haggard/Kaufman 1995:97) Further, they viewed the link between economic crisis and social violence to be indirectly correlated. (*ibid.* 99) Without a doubt, the poor economic performance in the 1970s had discredited the government and eroded its legitimacy, (although attempts had been made by the politicians to reform the economy according to guidelines of the IMF. )

Thus, that the civil society by 1980 was deeply frustrated of and disappointed with its politicians is not difficult to understand. In addition to economic stagnation and increased unemployment, it is estimated that approximately 1,500 people lost their lives in terrorist attacks during the Demirel government. (Ahmad 1993:179)



# 5 Findings

In order to facilitate comparisons of the military interventions, this section aims at making visible the findings of the analysis in Chapter 4.

## 5.1 Summarizing the Analysis

### 1. Defining Means

<i>Variables</i>	<i>1960</i>	<i>1971</i>	<i>1980</i>
<i>Method: coup or threat to use coup</i>	Coup	Threat to use coup	Coup
<i>Corporate/factional</i>	Initially factional, turned corporate	Corporate	Corporate but suffering from polarization within the military
<i>Capacity-reducing factors</i>	No previous coups	-*	-

\* No evident findings

### 2. Defining Motives

<i>Variables</i>	<i>1960</i>	<i>1971</i>	<i>1980</i>
<i>Grading interests</i>	1. Individual/Corporate self-interest of the junta. 2. National interest of preserving the legacy of Atatürk	1. National interests: stability, democracy, capitalism and secularism.	1. National interest: stability, capitalism and secularism. 2. Corporate/individual interests 3. Social interest in terms of political groups?
<i>Passive/Active role</i>	Active	Passive	Active

<i>Inhibiting motives</i>	Kemalism: separation of military/political sphere.	Fear of politicisation of military? (Corporate self-interest)	Polarization within the army
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## 2. Defining Opportunity

<i>Variables</i>	<i>1960</i>	<i>1971</i>	<i>1980</i>
<i>The legitimacy factor/ political culture</i>	? Weak findings.  (Civil society involved, mass protests arranged by RPP against Menders.)	Lack of legitimacy : 1.Civilian government dependent on military for internal security. 2. Civilian government discredited, poor economic performance, high unemployment. 3.Terrorism	Lack of legitimacy: 1. Civilian government dependent on military for internal security. 2. Civilian government discredited, poor economic performance, high unemployment. 3.Terrorism
<i>Negative factors (reducing opportunity)</i>	Obstacle: Absence of previous coup	Possibly: IO:s, NATO, Council of Europe, IMF, bilateral relations with Western countries.	Possibly: Aspirations for membership in EU?

## 5.2 Discussing the Findings

What then can be said when looking at the findings?

Although this study is rather limited in its scope, certain interesting aspects can be observed when comparing the analysis. For instance, when looking at the calculus for *means* one notices that the intervention in 1971 was the only one of the three that did not suffer from faction or polarization. In fact, the Generals intervened by *threatening a coup*, and was successful in removing Demirel from office, although the intervention in itself did not seem to yield that much result in the end. Nevertheless, it poses an interesting question: What is the correlation between the probability of a successful outcome of the coup-threatening method and the degree of unification within the army? Despite the fact that the

intervention in 1971 has been described as a ‘half-coup’ or an ‘ultimatum’, perhaps the generals’ more passive approach can be understood by the initial success of the intervention in gaining power without using force.

When comparing the intervention of 1971 and 1980, interestingly enough, the *motives* that supposedly led up to the decision to intervene are almost identical for both cases, with one difference; the corporate self-interest did not seem to play a decisive role in the 1971 intervention. Also for the *opportunity* calculus do the cases of 1971 and 1980 resemble each other. The fact that the intervention in 1971 did not hinder the outburst of a new wave of violence and anarchy a couple of years later, i.e. the experience of earlier preventative actions, should be looked upon as an important factor when assessing why the scope of the intervention in 1980 was much more extensive, and why the political opinions within the officer corps had started to polarize. Implications of the 1971 intervention could very well have affected the autonomy of and the structure within the military.

When comparing the coup of 1960 with the other two, there seems to be indications that the national interest for intervening might have changed, or at least been modified over time. It would be interesting to look deeper into how the army rhetorically has defined the legacy of Atatürk, which it is obliged to guard. By doing so, the legitimacy principle could also be better assessed, especially for the case of 1960.

### 5.3 Evaluating the Calculus

With the calculus of intervention, Finer tried to create a framework that could be used to analyze military interventions by answering the questions of *why* and *how* a military coup is carried out. By including the subjective variable of *motives* to answer *why*, and the objective variables of *opportunity* and *means* to answer *how*, the motive/means/opportunity- framework for analyzing military interventions has been said to provide a “comprehensive check-list that takes all factors into account”. (Brooker 2000:61) Theoretical frameworks that aspire to contain all factors involved in military interventions naturally need to be put to test.

After applying the framework, and using Finer’s definitions of the variables, one reoccurring problem has been that the distinction between subjective and objective factors has proven rather complicated. Finer’s calculus has placed the motive, means and opportunity variables on a parallel level, but often motives are shaped by the surrounding preconditions, the *opportunities*. To apply the calculus as an intended balance- sheet (see figure 2.2) requires each variable to first be assessed as a separate body before it can be combined with the others. By treating the motives, means and opportunities as static bodies the dynamics between them is lost. This has proven to be the case especially when analyzing interests as static elements. Adam Przeworski, for instance, has concluded that interests may be “quite stable throughout the process but that they will be poor predictor of behaviour when expectations of success shift rapidly”.

(O'Donnell/Schmitter/Whitehead 1986:55) (It should be stated though that by using three calculi; one for the seizure of power, one for the retention of power and one for the actual transferral, Brooker has tried to deal with this problem. The parallel positions of the variables will though remain as such. )

Another assessment of the calculus is that the same factors that Finer has described as inhibiting and capacity-reducing, are factors that likewise could be used as enhancing an intervention. Thus, it could be argued that it was a fear of coup failure of the junta in 1960 that convinced the rest of the military to intervene. Previous failures can also account for and even increase the opportunity of new attempts to be made; as in 1980 in the aftermath of the intervention in 1971.

In the calculus of transferral, two additional questions have been added; it seeks to answer the questions of *to whom* and *when*, i.e. aspects of military-political relations and timing. When looking at the findings of my analysis it seems that the calculus of transferral could perhaps have provided a better framework for the field of study that I was initially interested in, namely if, by analyzing the three military interventions, patterns of changing military behavior could provide some insights also into the state of the democratization process in Turkey.

However, since the calculus of transferral is much more complicated than the calculus of intervention, it would have been difficult to limit such a research to the scope of this essay. That being said, in order to use any of the calculi effectively, a much more specified method than the one used here would have to be worked out.

In assessing the calculi one clear advantage is that it allows for many different theories to be combined. By using it *only* as a framework and not as a theory, much is to be gained.

## 6 Conclusion

The aspirations of this essay were described as bold already in the introductory pages. It strived to connect the democratization process of Turkey with its military, by the use of a configurative method called the ‘calculus of intervention’.

Although the calculus proved rather difficult to use, the links between democratization as defined by Linz and Stepan, and the Turkish military did appear in the analysis, mainly in the section of *opportunity* and in the relationship between the military and the civilian leaders, but connecting the two thoroughly would require a whole new analysis. The findings and main contribution of this essay should therefore be seen as providing an extensive background to the Turkish history of democratization as well as an in depth analysis of *why* and *how* the Turkish military intervened in 1960, 1971 and 1980. In addition, the experiences derived from using the calculus should also be assessed in order to improve future attempts to analyze military interventions and linking them to democratization.

The Turkish military interventions have so far not developed into authoritarian regimes. The armed forces have intervened only when the civilian leaders have seemed incapable or unfit to deal with a state of crisis. The fact that the military intervenes, restores order and then returns to the barracks voluntarily, makes the role of the Turkish military rather difficult to assess. The armed forces are the guardians of the Kemalist legacy and the Turkish democracy, but the only way they can safeguard these values is by breaking them.

In 1997 the Turkish army once again intervened in the political sphere. It was done rather discretely, and much behind the scene. Although not a full fledged coup, it indicated that the autonomy of the Turkish military remains. In order to understand the role of the military in the Turkish democratization process, one must also begin to define the borders of this autonomy. It will not be enough to curb their powers by following Huntington’s advice to “give them toys”.<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> Excerpt from Huntington’s guiding principles for curbing military power and promoting military professionalism. (Huntington 1991:251)

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