



LUND
UNIVERSITY

STV004
HT 06

Tutor: Anders Sannerstedt

Department of Political Science

The Electoral System and Political Culture

A comparative inquiry in an African context

Henrik Bengtsson

Abstract

This thesis aims to examine how the electoral system affects the behaviour of the political elites in an African context. My hypothesis is that different electoral system presents different incentives to political elites and that these incentives affect their behaviour, contributing to the formation of a specific political culture, more or less beneficial for the consolidation of democracy. The study compares two matching cases; first out is Tanzania and Mozambique, followed by Mali and Benin. The essay aspires to analyse the electoral system effects on the political culture of respective country. In order to achieve this, a three front attack on the concept is applied, firstly a qualitative investigation of the political party's behaviour, secondly mass-surveys of the citizen's perception of democracy and political actors will be analysed, and finally, this thesis will take into account economical and welfare statistics. The result of this inquiry indicates that its primary the context that provides with incentives towards cooperation among the political elites in African countries, not the electoral system.

Keywords: The Electoral System, Political Culture, Elections in Africa, Elites, Africa

Characters: 70 533

Table of contents

1 Introduction.....	1
1.1 Research Question.....	1
2 Theory and Operationalization	2
2.1 The Dependent Variable	2
2.1.1 Political Culture	3
2.1.2 Indicators of the Dependent Variable	4
2.2 The Independent Variable.....	5
2.3 A Comparative Inquiry	6
2.3.1 Methodological Problems	6
2.4 The Analytic Framework	7
3 Analysis Case 1.....	8
3.1 Tanzania.....	8
3.1.1 The Political Life of Tanzania	8
3.1.2 Mass Attitudes in Tanzanian.....	10
3.1.3 Political Performance in Tanzania	11
3.2 Mozambique	12
3.2.1 The Political Life of Mozambique.....	13
3.2.2 Mass Attitudes in Mozambique	14
3.2.3 Political Performance in Mozambique	15
3.3 Tanzania – Mozambique.....	17
4 Analysis Case 2.....	20
4.1 Mali.....	20
4.1.1 The Political Life of Mali	21
4.1.2 Mass Attitudes in Mali.....	22
4.1.3 Political Performance in Mali	23
4.2 Benin.....	25
4.2.1 The Political Life of Benin	26
4.2.2 Mass Attitudes in Benin.....	28
4.2.3 Political Performance in Benin	28
4.3 Mali – Benin	30
5 Conclusions.....	32
References.....	33
Appendix 1 – Tanzania.....	41

Appendix 2 – Mozamabique	42
Appendix 3 – Mali.....	43
Appendix 4 - Benin	44

List of Figures and Tables

Figures

2.1 Variable View	2
2.2 The Analytical Framework.....	7

Tables

3.1 Economical Statistics, Tanzania.....	11
3.2 Human Development Index, Tanzania.....	12
3.3 Freedom House, Tanzania.....	12
3.4 Economical Statistics, Mozambique	16
3.5 Human Development Index, Mozambique	16
3.6 Freedom House Rating, Mozambique.....	17
4.1 Economical Statistics, Mali.....	24
4.2 Human Development Index, Mali.....	24
4.3 Freedom House Rating, Mali	25
4.4 Economical Statistics, Benin.....	28
4.5 Human Development Index, Benin.....	29
4.6 Freedom House Rating, Benin	29

1 Introduction

The electoral system have been pointed out as the most powerful constitutional weapon that exists in order to create accommodation between different groups in ethnic divided societies. (Horowitz 1991 p.163) The above argues that institutions matters and this thesis purpose is to scrutinize how the electoral rules affect the behaviour of the elites in new African democracies.

Africa is a continent of special interest because almost all African states have under the last decade been through significant political changes (Reynolds & Sisk 1998 p.1) and due to Africa is an ethnic divided continent, (Glickman 1998 p.37) implying a complex situation for democracy and a context different from the western sphere. It can be problematic to apply research on consolidated western democracies to African states and comparative studies examine this field are atypical. (Lindberg 2005 p.46; Linder & Bächtiger 2005 p.861; Barkan 1998)

In emerging democracies, it's widely regarded that the actions of the political elite is vital for a successful transition to democracy (Linder & Bächtiger 2005 p.863; Lindberg 2004 p.175-176; Pigenko 2002 p.88; Diamond 1999 p.173) and the commitment among the political elite is somewhat a precondition for democracy. (Diamond 1993 p.430) If then the electoral system affects the political elites, then this essay investigates a field of scientific importance. Lindberg concludes in his research that the mere fact that elections are held improves the democratic status, and says further that: *"It is also noteworthy that elites in so many diverse countries across Africa seem to adjust their behaviour and strategies as a result of repeated elections."* (Lindberg 2006 p.149) My response to Lindberg's result is the research question.

1.1 Research Question

This thesis aims to investigate how the electoral system contributes to the construction of the political culture in emerging African democracies.

2 Theory and Operationalization

The purpose of this chapter is to operationalize central theoretical concepts and present the methodology this study is based upon. Figure 2.1 below illustrates the basic construction of the thesis.




Figure 2.1 Variable View

The electoral system is the independent variable, which explains variations in the dependent variable, political culture. (Esaiasson et al 2004 p.52-53)

My inspiration to write about the effects of the electoral system derives primarily from two books, Arend Lijpharts (1977) *Democracies in Plural Societies* and Donald L. Horowitz's (1991) *A Democratic South Africa?* Lijphart introduced the importance of elite co-operation in ethnic divided societies and Horowitz the notion that an electoral system presents certain incentives; this is also noticed by other scholars. (Lindberg 2005 p.43; Norris 2004 p.7; Reilly 2001) In Ben Reilly's words; "*Certain electoral systems, under certain circumstances, will provide rational political actors with incentives towards cooperation, moderation and accommodation*". (Reilly 2001 p.6) Elite co-operation is obviously cooperation between elites, implicit in the parliament. In Lijphart words; "*Consociational democracy entails the cooperation by segmental leaders in spite of the deep cleavages separating the segments. This requires that the leaders feel at least some commitment to the maintenance of the unity of the country as well as a commitment to democratic practices*" (Lijphart 1977 p.53) Lijphart continuing by arguing that; "*the elite's operational code*" can tell us something about an unstable democracy prospects in transforming to a stable ditto. (Lijphart 1977 p.54) Elite co-operation according to Lijphart is connected to agreeing on basic democratic assumptions; it requires therefore a specific type of political culture to get there. Let's begin this odyssey with a closer exam of the dependent variable.

2.1 The Dependent Variable

In order to operationalize the dependent variable, a properly introduction and definition of political culture is required.

2.1.1 Political Culture

Political culture refers to; “*A people’s predominant beliefs, attitudes, values, ideals, sentiments, and evaluations about the political system of its country, and the role of the self in that system.*” (Diamond 1993 p.7-8) The concept assumes that the attitudes and cognitions of political behaviour aren’t random, instead they represent a consistent pattern, and a specific political culture can be beneficial for the consolidation of democracy. Such a culture is one of moderation and accommodation, implying tolerance for other political beliefs and a sense of trust in political actors. (Diamond 1993 p.11; Dahl 1997 p.34)

To a certain degree political culture is a historical legacy, but it doesn’t imply that the values the political culture consists of are frozen forever. Instead the political culture is shaped by different ages, institutional experiences, and political learning. (Diamond 1993 p.411-413) Different institutions present incentives, affecting the construction of political culture. (Diamond 1999 p.166) Attention should also be brought to the fact that political culture is a heterogeneous phenomenon, (Almond & Verba 1989 p.26) and a simplification of the complex nature of human behaviour.

Just like political culture, elite political culture can be define as the set of beliefs, attitudes and ideas about politics but with the exception that they are held by the ruling elite. (Hague & Harrop 2001 p.86) The elite culture has been considered essential for democratic consolidation (Darnolf 1997 p.12) due to if the elite’s don’t accept the basic rules of democracy, the legitimacy of the political system rapidly will fade. (Diamond 1999 p.173) Furthermore it’s obvious that the mass population can’t in a direct manner implement reforms, the elites’ role in a transition to a fully fledged democracy is fundamental. (Diamond 1993 p.432)

The elite’s and the non-elite are both part of the same system, connected to each other. (Almond & Verba 1989 p.352-353) The consolidation of democracy requires both that the elites and the mass population supports the procedure, (Barkan 1997 p.8) but it’s the elites that has the greater ability to lead the way in large scale value shifts. (Diamond 1999 p.163) It’s also implied that the elites influence over the masses is stronger than the reverse. Therefore, a study of the elite political culture will indirectly tell us something about the mass population’s political culture and vice versa. (Stevens et al 2006 p.608) A specific political culture can also be associated with a certain degree of political performance. (Almond & Verba 1989 p.360)¹ Robert D. Putnam (1993) also discusses this subject in his influential work *Making Democracy Work* via the concept social capital and its influence on institutional performance.

¹ Almond & Verba argues that “the civic culture is appropriate for marinating a stable and effective democratic political process”

2.1.2 Indicators of the Dependent Variable

Elites are obviously of importance in this inquiry and can be defined in a either broad or narrow manner; elites are in the broad way defined as groups that hold central and influential positions with the power of exercise significant functions in the polity. (Stevens et al. 2006 p.607) However, in a more narrow definition, political elites are simply political parties. (Putnam 1971 p.651) Therefore, we are looking for indicators of the behaviour of political parties. This thesis will achieve that by a qualitative analysis of the political life in the respective countries.

The people faith in the political system is connected to the behaviour of the political elites. The support for the political system among the citizen is therefore a central measure of the political culture. (Diamond 1999 p.174) The casual relationship between the elite political culture and the mass political culture is an in itself an interesting field of study. In Putnam's seminal work *Making Democracy Work*, he claims that elite and mass attitudes are "*Two sides of a single coin, bound together in a mutually reinforcing equilibrium.*" The casual links between the elite and the mass is said to be impossible to get a clear picture of. (Putnam 1993 p.102) This thesis assumes simply that the attitudes of the elites influences the population, but doesn't aim to map these casual links. To measure the legitimacy of the political system and the political actors among the citizen is one method to get a perception of the political culture and this study will take into account mass-surveys from Afrobarometer.² (Pereira 2003 p.21)

The political performance will be measured by making a comparison of statistical data. This is based on the assumption that good political performance in a developing nation is reflected in the statistics. This part will feature basic macro economical statistical on growth of the gross domestic product, statistics of the evolution of the Human Development Index, which is an index measuring three dimensions. The first dimension is a long and healthy life, measured by life expectancy at birth. The second dimension is knowledge, measured by the adult literacy and the gross enrolment for primary, secondary and tertiary schools, and finally, the third dimension is a decent standard of living, measured by GDP per capita. The Human Development Index is constructed to be a summary measure of human well-being. (HDI Report 2005) Data on how well the citizen's consider the government delivers key welfare products and the development of the countries Freedom House rating during the years of multi-party elections will also be included. Freedom House measure political rights and the scale goes from 1 to 7, where 1 represents the best conditions and 7 the worst. (Freedom House 5)

² www.afrobarometer.org

2.2 The Independent Variable

The independent variable is not as complex to operationalize as the dependent variable due to its more fixed nature. In this study the independent variable will take on two basic forms, proportional representation (PR) and plurality or majority system. Mixed electoral systems are quite common in Africa but falls somewhat between two chairs, creating analytical problems and are therefore excluded.

The notion of using formal rules as independent variables derives from models on institutional choice that rules quickly shapes political actors patterns of behaviour. (Carey 1997 p.88) There exists many versions of electoral systems, PR for example can be divided into moderate PR, which sets out a perimeter towards small parties by using small districts and a threshold to the parliament or extreme PR, featuring very few barriers to small parties. (Lijphart 2006 p.74)

There exists a rich literature of the advantages and disadvantage of a specific electoral system; primarily it's concerned with the electoral systems effects on the party system. (Sartori 1994; Lijphart 1994) PR with a low threshold to the parliament promotes a fragmented party system, and a plurality system with single-member constituencies benefits the largest party and encourages a two-party system. (Weaver & Rockman 1993 p.20; Lijphart 2006 p.73-74) PR is said to promote consensual behaviour among the political elite by reducing the possibility that a single party wins an absolute majority, and a system which applies single-member constituencies favours the largest party and reduces the need for negotiations among elites. (Gunther & Mughan 2003 p.277) An argument for the case of PR is that it can provide ethnic and minority representation in order to work against threats to political stability and create legitimacy in divided societies. (Norris 2002 p.207) On the other hand, advocates of plurality claims that accountability in a two-party system is more obvious, (Lijphart 2006 p.76) and political stability which yields efficiency is achieved. (Lardeyret 2006 p.87)

In the light of this thesis African context, two scientists have especially made significant contributions, Joel Barkan and Andrew Reynolds. Barkan claims that the use of PR in African agrarian societies severely damages the links between the elected politicians and the voter. This hinders the devolvement of vertical democracy, the relationship between the elite and the none-elite who shares the same political interest, this could result in a "suspended state", which is a state that has lost all connections with the population and as a consequence its authority has vanished. (Barkan 1995 p.106-108) Barkan can find support for plurality elections in Lardeyret who claims that PR reproduces ethnic cleavages in the legislature and thinks Africa should apply single-members districts where candidates run on political issues across the ethnic lines. (Lardeyret 2006 p.91) On the other side of the debate Andrew Reynolds argues that plural systems produce disproportional results to a directly dangerous degree for a weak emerging democracy. (Reynolds 1995 p.124)

2.3 A Comparative Inquiry

The cases this thesis is set out to investigate are selected by the principle of most similar design, implying that an inquiry benefits from that everything except the independent variable is similar. (Esaiasson et al 2004 p.110) This represents an ideal situation, achievable only in theory. My main guideline in choosing matching cases was to pick two countries within the same geographical sphere, one with a majority or plural electoral system, and one with a proportional electoral system. Inspired by Lindberg, (2004) the importance of the introduction of a multi-party system at approximately the same time guided me in the search for suitable cases.

In southern Africa, Mozambique and Tanzania was chosen, having their first elections in 1994 respective 1995. Both countries have the experience of a socialist one-party rule but they are separated by one important thing; Mozambique has experienced a civil war, which Tanzania has been saved from. Furthermore, Tanzania has, as well as Mozambique, been engaged in an international conflict, Tanzanian with Uganda and Mozambique with South Africa. (Matthews 2003; Gravinho 2003) In West Africa Mali and Benin are the cases of investigation. They introduced multi-party elections 1992 and 1991, and have both a French colonial legacy as well as a modern experience of a Marxist regime. (Englebert 2003a; Englebert 2003b)

The method is qualitative, which implies that we can state, dependent on the result, that there exists some form of casual connection between the variables, but we can't tell anything about the strength of that connection. In order to achieve such an illuminating result a quantitative method is required. (Esaiasson et al 2004 p.83)

2.3.1 Methodological Problems


In the operationalization of the depended variable, validity is of fundamental importance. Do the indicators have a good connection with the theoretical definition? (Esaiasson et al 2004 p.62) In order to get a decent validity a three-front attack is applied. Let's sum up; the first attack consists of a qualitative investigation of the political elites behaviour, the second to scrutinize the mass population's feelings towards the system and the third of an examination of the political performance. To improve my validity significantly, a fieldtrip to Africa consisting of interviews with the political elites of the countries would indeed provide a more direct measure of their attitudes and perceptions, providing this thesis with substantial more empirical weight. Further more is the empirical material a bit unbalanced between the cases. A more general problem originates from the usage of political culture as a variable; the concept political culture can be criticised to reduce the complex texture of a state and present explanations with no connection to reality. (Dogan & Pelassy 1984 p.61) Another problem this inquiry may suffer from is endogeneity, which implies that it can be discussed if

it's the independent variable that causes changes in the dependent variable or if it's the contrary. (King 1994 p.185-186) An argument could be that it's the political culture that provides an explanation for different electoral systems. (Gunther & Mughan 1993 p.293) In my analysis I will try to be aware of the problems listed above.

2.4 The Analytic Framework

The rationale behind this thesis states that institutions as formal electoral rules, shapes the nature of a political actor's strategic behaviour. Different electoral rules create different behaviours. (Norris 2004 p.7-8; Diamond 1993 p.7)

Figure 2.2 the Analytic Framework



The analytic framework above illustrates the core assumption of this thesis, the electoral rules affects the elites behaviour and contribute to a specific culture that could be more or less beneficial for the consolidation of democracy. The behaviour of the elites is shaped on the basis of strategic considerations. Elites choose to adapt to a democratic way of thinking because the cost of not doing so is larger. (Diamond 1993 p.3) A problem with such an approach is the universal problem of assuming rationality. An electoral system may facilitate a specific set of incentives but it's not for sure that the elites shape their behaviours after the institutional incentives. (Gunther & Mughan 1993 p.293) Cultural modernization theorist claims that the rational responses to presented incentives from political actors have limited impact due to cultural reasons. (Norris 2004 p.16) The citizen will be affected of the elites behaviour and together they both will affect the political performance of the country.

3 Analysis Case 1

The third and fourth section of the thesis consist of the matching cases, first out are the neighbours in southeast Africa, Tanzania and Mozambique. The different sub-sections in each chapter will deliver the three-front attack summarized in section 2.3.1.

3.1 Tanzania

The United Republic of Tanzania consists of the two historical areas Tanganyika and the islands of Zanzibar. (Matthews 2003 p.1062) Until the end of the First World War Tanganyika was under German rule, but Britain was handed the administration of the state under a League of Nations mandate from 1920 to 1961 when independence was given. In 1964 Zanzibar entered a union with Tanganyika and Tanzania came into existence. (Klugman et al. 1999 p.75) Three years later an economical socialist experiment was launched and all major industries became nationalised. (Chaligha et al. 2002 p.4) A new democratic constitution was established in 1992, and it was decided that the elected parliament of 1990 ought to complete their five year term (Msekwa 2000 p.35)

The electoral system is FPTP, (NEC) and the national assembly consists of 323 members who are elected for a five year term. 232 of them come from the 232 constituencies, 75 seats are especially allocated to women, and these seats are assigned to the parties proportionally according to the election result. 10 seats are for the president to nominate, 5 seats go to representatives from the local government Zanzibar House of Representatives, and one seat is reserved to the Attorney General. (Parliament of Tanzania) The President is elected by an absolute majority system. (Fengler 1999 p.874)

3.1.1 The Political Life of Tanzania

The first multiparty election was held in 1995, (Matthews 2003 p.1063) resulted in a landslide victory for the ruling party CCM,³ receiving 59.2 percent of the votes which secured 80 percent of the seats in the parliament. The opposition party CUF⁴ won 28 seats; three other parties also became represented with a small

³ *Cham Cha Mapinduzi*

⁴ Civic United Front

amount of seats. (African Election 1) The election was infected by poor organization, fraud, administrative wrongdoing and CCM was heavily favoured due to the use of state broadcasting in their campaign. (Freedom House 1) On the islands of Zanzibar did neither the ruling party CCM nor CUF accept the election outcome resulting in a socio-economical deadlock (Mmuya 2000 p.86) and ten opposition parties demanded to the High Court that the election would be nullified due to fraud. (McLaughlin & Bandrapalli 1995)

The second election was held in 2000 and consolidated CCM's firm grip of the assembly, winning 202 of 232 constituencies. CUF ended up worse with 17 seats, compared to 28 in the election of 1995. 4 minor parties with 5 to 1 seats also gain representation. (McHenry Jr 2004 p.51; African Election 1) Before the election, seven parties agreed on a code of conduct in a meeting with the National Electoral Commission, most important in this meeting was that media closely connected to political parties was not to be used to discredit political adversaries, (Kessel 2000 p.63-65; Matthews 2003 p.1064) as was the case in 1995. The election experienced the same problems as the first and riots broke out in Zanzibar, killing 40 people. Overall the election of 2000 delivered only a modest improvement. (Freedom House 1) Zanzibar represent a conflict with an ethnic dimension, tensions has been present since 1988 reflecting both African and Arabian diversity and supporters and opponents of unity with the mainland Tanganyika.

During the campaign CUF declared that they would respond to any violence against its supporters and frequently clashes between CUF and CCM supporters occurred. CUF also refused to acknowledge that CCM won 67 percent of the votes to the Zanzibar House of Representatives and 11 members of the House of Representatives launched a boycott in May 2001. Furthermore CUF refused to acknowledge the presidential election of 2000, demanding re-election within four months. Due to the situation, CUF and CCM began to negotiate a peace accord in order to ease tensions. But tensions rose again when the House of Representatives made changes in the accord without consulting CUF. In January 2002 the local government decided that if any amendments in the accord would be done, both CUF and CCM would be consulate. (Matthews 2003 p.1066-1067)

The election 2005 became another success for CCM, receiving 70 percent of the votes conquering 275 of the 323 seats. CUF secured 31 seats by winning 14, 3 percent of the vote. The party CHADEMA⁵ gained 11 seats and two other parties' one seat each. 66 percent of the registered voters did participate in the election. (African Election 1) The election was just as the previous full of suspicions from the opposition towards the government, accusing them for multiple voting, underage voting and other illegal voting. Mainly is the CCM's domination of the politics the problem, the opposition parties are in general divided and weak. (Freedom House 1) Tanzania, as many other African states, are situated in the no mans land between democracy and autocracy, elections do occur on schedule but are poisoned by accusations of fraud, problems with voter registrations,

⁵ Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo

irregularities in ballot count and the results are often challenged by the losing part. (Bratton 2004 p.7-8)

3.1.2 Mass Attitudes in Tanzanian

This section will present the attitudes of the citizen in Tanzania using mass-surveys from Afrobarometer.

84 percent in Tanzania stated in a couple of years ago that democracy is the preferable way of conduct.⁶ (Chaligha et al. 2002 p.35) However, in more recent surveys performed in the same manner, support decreased to 65 percent, (Bratton et al. 2004 p.31) and more recently to 38 percent. (Bratton 2006 p.11-12) Related to the above is the citizen's trust in various political institutions and in Tanzania the levels of trust is extremely high; the army is the most trusted institution with 95 percent, the National Assembly received 92 percent and the President 91 percent.⁷ (Chaligha et al. 2002 p.43) The Tanzania case represents some form of paradox because the public perception of corruption is widely regarded as a fact without affecting the trust in the political institutions, indicating that Tanzanians are uncritical citizens. (Chaligha et al. 2002 p.48) The legacy of a stable one-party government (Mmuya 2002 p.76) can partly provide an answer to this phenomenon.

In the important perception of the opposition political parties, 36 percent expressed trust in the opposition, compared to 66 percent to the ruling party.⁸ (Bratton et al 2004 p.35)

A recent survey presents a comparison between the years 2002 and 2005 and shows that the satisfaction with democracy is down by 26 percent, from 63 percent to 37 percent, additionally has the support for multiple political parties decreased with 15 percent, from 67 percent to 52 percent. In the case of support for multiple parties, Tanzania represents an exception in Africa, overall the support for such democratic institutions grows. But in the case of satisfaction with democracy, Tanzania follows the general trend; the satisfaction with democracy is gradually sinking. (Bratton et al. 2006 p. 17-21) 43 percent of the Tanzanians believes that political parties only create confusion. Also worth mentioning is that 59 percent doesn't express an opinion about democracy. However does only two

⁶ The respondents were asked: "Which of these three statements is closest to your opinion?" A/ Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government. B/ in certain situations, a non-democratic governments can be preferable. C/ for someone like me, it does not matter what kind of government we have.

⁷ The respondents were asked; "how much do you trust the following institutions?" The average result of 81 percent in Tanzania was based on the respondents answered either "trust them somewhat" or "trust them a lot"

⁸ The respondents were asked; "How much do you trust each of following, or haven't you heard enough about them to say" The ones who was counted in the category that did express trust answered either "A lot" or "A very great deal". The other category did either pick "A little bit" or "Not at all" The Ruling Parties and Opposition Political Parties.

percent express that a non-democratic government would be preferable.⁹ (Bratton 2006 p.11-12) Only 23 percent of the Tanzanians believe in the right for citizens to start an organization and 43 percent supports freedom of speech.¹⁰ (Logan et al. 2006 p.27)

3.1.3 Political Performance in Tanzania

This section will present statistics in order to investigate how the Tanzania government has performed. The first table illustrates the economical evolution from 1995 to present day.

Table 3.1 Tanzania Economical Statistics (Statistics 1)

Subject Description	Units and Scale	1995	1998	2001	2004	2006
GDP per Capita, current prices	US Dollars, Units	189.94	259.83	273.69	295.12	353.14
GDP, current prices	US Dollars, Billions	5.631	8.365	9.443	10.831	13.49

Table 3.1 illustrates a stable positive economical trend for Tanzania. Moving on to other indicators of significance, table 3.2 presents data on the Human Development Index.

Table 3.2 Human Development Index, Tanzania (HDI 1)

Year	1990	1995	2000	2004
Human Development Index value	0.437	0.423	0.420	0.430

⁹ The respondents were asked: "Which of these three statements is closest to your opinion?" A/ Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government. B/ In certain situations, a non-democratic governments can be preferable. C/ For someone like me, it does not matter what kind of government we have.

¹⁰ The respondents were asked: "Which of the following statements is closest to your view?" A. Government should be able to ban any organization that goes against its policies. B. We should be able to join any organization, whether or not the government approves it. And: A. Government should not allow the expression of political views that are fundamentally different from the views of the majority. B. People should be able to speak their minds about politics free of government influence, no matter how unpopular their views may be.

As table 3.2 shows, the growth in GDP has not affected the Human Development Index in any positive way, but the trend since 2000 points upward. Table 3.3 presents Freedom House ratings on political rights in Tanzania.

Table 3.3 Freedom House Rating, Tanzania (Johansson 06)

Year	Political Rights
1994	6
1995	5
1996	5
1997	5
1998	5
1999	4
2000	4
2001	4
2002	4
2003	4
2004	4
2005	4

After multi-party elections were introduced in 1995, the rating has improved from 6 to 4, but the curve has levelled out. This number indicates on one-party dominance and unfair elections. (Freedom House 5)

The last part of this section deals with the citizen's perception of the delivery of key welfare services.¹¹ In Tanzania 70 percent believes that the government does well in improving the basic health services, 27 percent are unhappy and 3 percent answered that they don't know. (Logan et al. 2006 p.21) 85 percent claims that the government does a fairly well or a very well work in addressing educational needs, 12 percent declare that the government does a fairly bad or a very bad work, 4 percent answered don't know. (Logan et al. 2006 p.19)

3.2 Mozambique

Mozambique gained their liberty in 1975, but the struggle against the Portuguese colonial rule started a decade earlier, lead by Samora Machel. In 1975, Machel become President and his party Frelimo,¹² formed in the beginning of the 1960's out of different nationalist groups, seized power and a one-party state with a

¹¹ The respondents were asked; "How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven't you heard enough to say?" The results are categorized in three categories. Fairly well and very well is the positive category. Fairly bad and very bad is the negative one and the third are "don't know"

¹² Frente de Libertacao de Mocambique

socialist profile were introduced. (Gravinho 2003 p.700) Mozambique suffered from a civil war combined with an international conflict against South Africa. The conflicts was linked to each other, South Africa was a supporter of the guerrilla, Renamo¹³. In 1990 a new constitution was launched which allowed parties to be created and in approximate the same time Frelimo altered their political points of views, from Marxist-Leninist to social democracy. A peace agreement was presented in 1992 and eventually signed by Renamo and the state of Mozambique in 1993, elections could be held in October 1994. (Gravinho 2003 p.701-702) The transition was a work of the national elites; influenced by the West; (Harrison 1996 p.) the mass population didn't want to abandon the single-party system. (Carbone 2005 p.426)

Mozambique features a proportional electoral system, with 11 multi-member constituencies of different sizes. The votes are converted to seats with the d'Hondt method, which yields an advantage for larger parties and the threshold is set to 5 percent of the votes cast nation-wide. The president is elected by an absolute majority system. (Blais & Massicotte 2002 p.48; Krennerich 1999 p. 650)

3.2.1 The Political Life of Mozambique

The first election become dramatic, Renamo withdrew on Election Day claiming that the conditions for a free and fair election was absent. However, the boycott was abandoned due to international pressure. Frelimo secured a majority of the seats in the legislature, 129 of 250, Renamo manage to collect 112 seats and the electoral coalition UD¹⁴ nine seats. (Gravinho 2003 p.703) The UD coalition was the only of 18 minor parties who gained representation. (Carbone 2005 p.435) As President, the former President Chissano was elected, also chairman of Frelimo, securing 53.3 percent of the votes and avoided therefore a second round of voting. The opposition leader, Dhlakama, did accept the result but also stated that irregularities did have occurred. Renamo won in five provinces and demanded governorship of those five, however, Chissano rejected the demand and all important position was assigned to Frelimo. (Gravinho 2003 p.701-703)

The 1999 election became postponed with 1 month due to Renamo insisted that the voting registration process should be lengthen. But Renamo didn't gain anything on the delay. Frelimo increased their number of seats, winning 133 out of 250. The rest of the seats went to the opposition formed in an electoral coalition named Renamo-UE. International observers claimed that the election had been fair, but the result was rejected by Renamo who appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the election suffered from fraud and also threaten to establish a parallel government in central and northern Mozambique. The appeal was rejected in January 2000, which made the Renamo presidential candidate Dhlakama to accuse the Supreme Court of being controlled by Frelimo. The aftermath of the

¹³ Resistencia Nacional Mocambicana.

¹⁴ Uniao Democratica

election became turbulent and hundreds of people were killed in riots. Renamo was blamed for the violence in a parliamentary inquiry, dominated by Frelimo. (Gravhinho 2003 p.704-705) As a consequence Renamo deputies disturbed the political process in 2000 and 2001 by repeatedly walking out of the assembly or interrupting proceedings. (Freedom House 2)

The latest election was held in 2004 and consolidated Frelimo's legislative power even further, winning 160 seats. Renamo-UE was the only party besides Frelimo that received enough votes to enter the parliament. (Carbone 2005 p.422) The voting turnout was only 36 percent, compared to 90 percent in 1994. (Freedom House 2) The opposition rejected also this result, and international observers did state that some irregularities did occur but concluded they didn't affect the result as a whole. Violent clashes between political supporters of Frelimo and Renamo resulting in 12 deaths and 47 wounded during the election. (Freedom House 2; Carabone 2005 p.440) It's worth mentioning that Renamo has transformed itself from a guerrilla movement into a political party, (Carbone 2005 p.421) and has serious difficulties in operating within democratic institutions. (Carbone 2005 p.431) Frelimo is a well institutionalized and disciplined organisation, having the experience of two decades of monopolistic rule. (Carbone 2005 p.417)

In the parliament there are a general view among the Renamo MP's that one should not even talk to a member of the majority, the conflict between them is deeply rooted. Frelimo sees on the other hand the government as theirs and considers Renamo to be rural terrorist. (Carbone 2005 p.435) During the early days of the transition were the necessary negotiations held mainly between the Renamo president candidate Dhlakama and the Frelimo president Chissano, and Dhlakama never were a MP. President Chissano did try to involve Renamo in certain issues but did after the election 1999 leave that approach. (Carbone 2005 p.436-437)

3.2.2 Mass Attitudes in Mozambique

The support for democracy as "the only game in town" in Mozambique is considerable low. 58 percent expressed fully support for democracy as the preferable political system, only Namibia with 57 percent registered a lower support in that particular survey.¹⁵ The support did later fall to 54 percent, (Bratton et al. 2004 p.31) but increased in the most recent study reaching 56 percent. (Bratton 2006 p.11) Attention should be brought to the fact that 22 percent didn't want to answer or couldn't give an answer on their perception of democracy. (Pereria et al. 2002 p.5) This cognitive democratic debit is further

¹⁵ The respondents were asked: "Which one of these statements do you most agree with?" A/ Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government. B/ In certain situations, a non-democratic governments can be preferable. C/ For someone like me, it does not matter what kind of government we have.

confirmed when 32 percent can't give a response to what democracy means.¹⁶ (Pereria et al. 2003 p.6-7) Overall, in a comparative perspective the democratic culture of Mozambique are not very evolved, especially among the uneducated citizens. (Pereria et al. 2002 p.10) If we turn to what extent their exist trust towards political parties in opposition, only 24 percent express such trust, compared to the 64 percent of trust in the ruling party. The trust in different political institutions as the parliament is 54 percent; the president collects 75 percent and the army 49 percent.¹⁷ (Bratton et al. 2004 p.35) In general do the Mozambique's express a bit higher levels of trust than the mean Afrobarometer value. (Pereria et al. 2003 p.23) The support for a multi-party system is 55 percent and 33 percent believes that political parties only create confusion and division.¹⁸ (Bratton 2006 p.12) 49 percent supports the freedom of starting organizations and 55 percent supports freedom of speech.¹⁹

3.2.3 Political Performance in Mozambique

In the same manner as with Tanzania, key indicators of the political performance will below be presented.

¹⁶ The question was: "What, if anything, do you understand by the word democracy? When you hear the word "democracy", what is the first thing that comes to your mind?"

¹⁷ The respondents were asked; "How much do you trust each of following, or haven't you heard enough about them to say" The ones who was counted in the category that did express trust answered either "A lot" or "A very great deal". The other category did either pick "A little bit" or "Not at all" The Ruling Parties and Opposition Political Parties.

¹⁸ The respondents were asked which of the following statements that was closest to their opinion: A. Political parties create division and confusion; it's therefore unnecessary to have any political parties in [your country]. B. Many political parties are needed to make sure that the [citizen of your country] have real choices in who governs them.

¹⁹ The respondents were asked: "Which of the following statements is closest to your view?" A. Government should be able to ban any organization that goes against its policies. B. We should be able to join any organization, whether or not the government approves it. And: A. Government should not allow the expression of political views that are fundamentally different from the views of the majority. B. People should be able to speak their minds about politics free of government influence, no matter how unpopular their views may be.

Table 3.4 Mozambique Economical Statistics (Statistics 1)

Subject Description	Units and Scale	1994	1997	2000	2003	2006
GDP per capita, current prices	US Dollars, Units	143.61	214.54	210.80	233.10	354.75
GDP, current prices	US Dollars, Billions	2.222	3.449	3.628	4.321	7.067

Table 3.4 implies a somewhat unstable economic evolution with large economical fluctuations. Since 2003 the trend points in a positive direction. The statistical section continues with the evolution of Mozambique's Human Development Index in table 3.5 below.

Table 3.5 Human Development Index, Mozambique (HDI 2)

Year	1990	1995	2000	2004
Human Development Index Value	0.316	0.330	0.364	0.390

Mozambique's growth in GDP has also been followed by a growth in the human development index.

Below shows table 3.5 how Freedom House has rated Mozambique's during the years recent years.

Table 3.5 Freedom House Rating, Mozambique (Johansson 06)

Year	Political Rights
1993	6
1994	3
1995	3
1996	3
1997	3
1998	3
1999	3
2000	3
2001	3
2002	3
2003	3
2004	3
2005	3

Mozambique experienced a rapid improvement in the political rights rating after their first multi-party election in 1994. But just as in the case of Tanzania, the development hasn't proceeded any further.

Concerning how well the Mozambique government is regarded to manage the improvement of the basic health services, 70 percent of the population expresses that they are satisfied with what the government does, 25 percent are dissatisfied and 5 percent claims that they don't know. (Logan et al. 2006 p.21) On the matter how well the government address educational needs, we found that 71 percent thinks they do fairly or very well, 23 percent have an opponent view and 6 percent doesn't know.²⁰ (Logan et al. 2006 p.19)

3.3 Tanzania – Mozambique

Tanzanian and Mozambique features basically the same party system with one big dominating party that has consolidated its power during the multi-party era. This makes one a bit perplex, two different electoral systems "should" produce different party systems. FPTP in Tanzania has actually rendered more parties in the legislature than PR in Mozambique. Obviously does neither CCM in Tanzanian nor Frelimo in Mozambique have any parliamentary incentives to cooperate with others, their positions doesn't require it. In the case of

²⁰ The respondents were asked; "How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven't you heard enough to say?" The results are categorized in three categories. Fairly well and very well is the positive category. Fairly bad and very bad is the negative one and the third are "don't know"

Mozambique, deeply rooted differences between the opposition and Frelimo are a cultural barrier towards elite cooperation.

Overall the political climate in Mozambique seems more hostile than in Tanzania, this could probably be traced back to the civil war and the greater diversities a war creates. The higher level of loathe between the political groups in Mozambique is also reflected in the mass populations perception of the opposition, only 24 percent expresses trust in the opposition, compared to 36 percent in Tanzania. The party systems evolved in both countries states that the electoral system so far hasn't had any effect on the numbers of parties in a conventional manner. In the light of this, a search into the context could provide an answer, and one plausible explanation is the countries historical legacy of socialism, another could be that democracy has only been in practice for a short period of time, perhaps will a more fragmented party system evolves as time goes by.

The Tanzanians is said to be uncritical citizens, and has a substantial higher level of average trust than the citizens of Mozambique. However, both are united in a high trust towards the President; this might also be a legacy from their socialist history. The support for democracy in Tanzania has during the years decreased, and today, Mozambique features a higher degree of support of a multiple party system, 55 percent against 52. The connection between the electoral system of Tanzania and the lower degree of support for multiple parties is a conclusion with weak empirical weight, but disproportional election results could create more pessimistic views among the opposition's supporters. Tanzania has had a more stable GDP growth, and has also ha higher HDI, but the growth in GDP has not affected the HDI. In Mozambique the HDI has improved even when the GDP growth has been modest, suggesting that the political system of Mozambique performed better in improving the health and educational sectors. However doesn't the above shine thru in the citizen's view, were both countries express the same satisfaction on the delivery of health service, and 85 percent in Tanzania compared to 71 percent in Mozambique are satisfied with the government's educational aspirations. This could reflect the alleged uncritical ness of the Tanzanians. Mozambique features also a slightly better ranking on political freedom. They are both countries in the "partly free" category but Freedom House states that elections in Mozambique work better than in Tanzanian. (Freedom House 1; Freedom House 2)

Regarding Tanzania, an interesting finding is that the government has failed in transforming the growth in GDP into greater HDI, but the citizens is anyway quite happy about the delivery of the welfare system, at the same time the citizens become more and more displeased with democracy, support down to 37 percent, and multiple parties, support down to 52 percent. This indicates, in my mind, that Tanzania is driving in the wrong direction, away from pluralism and democracy, instead towards autocracy and a one-party system. Unlike Mozambique, Tanzania didn't suffered from a civil war, which could be interpret as they were more happy with the state of being during the socialist era than the citizens of Mozambique, and since things hasn't improved in the sense that the HDI haven't evolved, and since it's the same party in power, maybe people have the perception

that democracy is something overrated? Another factor connect to the above is that 59 percent doesn't express an opinion about democracy, indicating that people just don't care about the democratic evolution. The political culture in Tanzania doesn't seem to evolve in a direction beneficial for the consolidation of democracy. FPTP deliverance of close links between voters and elected, beneficial for democracy, can't be seen in the case of Tanzanian.

The question if a proportional system could have created a better evolution of the support for democracy in Tanzania is Mozambique's task to answer. Due to the low support for democracy in Mozambique, 56 percent express support in the most recent study, and the lower levels of trust in political institutions, a clear answer can't be provided. 24 percent couldn't express an opinion about democracy in Mozambique, compared to 59 in Tanzania, indicating that the level of awareness is higher in Mozambique. This awareness is also reflected in the greater support of freedom of speech and freedom of joining and starting an organization, 55 and 49 percent compared to the very low numbers in Tanzanian, 43 and 23 percent. Perhaps should support for democracy increase in both countries, if the party system was more fragmentised and the opposition parties really challenged the ruling party, but the evolution doesn't point in that direction in neither of the countries. The legitimacy of the political system is higher in Tanzanian, but for what reason is it higher? I think the elites behaviour in Mozambique is more hostile, then the support for democracy should be higher in Tanzania, with my analytic framework in mind, but the most recent surveys states the contrary, and the reason for the trust in political actors is higher in Tanzania could be that they are uncritical and not that the political climate is somewhat better. This problem makes the analysis more complex. Another explanation could be the use of FPTP, or the 75 reserved seats for women, or the five reserved seats for representatives of the Zanzibar House of Representatives that provides an edge in favour of Tanzania.

The legitimacy of the system is however under attack from the political opposition of both Tanzania and Mozambique, refusing to accept election results and acknowledging the winner. This doesn't lead the way towards moderation of politics. But the accusations towards the ruling party and the ruling party's accusation towards the opposition are not groundless. Fraud is a big problem in both countries, (Freedom House 1; Freedom House 2) and it create problems. Also, the more frequently outbreak of political related violence in Mozambique reflects that legitimacy of the state is low, and Renamo have threaten to form an own state inside the borders of contemporary Mozambique. Barkan (1995) did warn that proportional system could lead to a "suspended state", and the greater amount of violence on Mozambique indicate somewhat on that. However, the preconditions for violence were "better" in Mozambique than in Tanzania due to the civil war, and it's also hard to state if FPTP would have performed better than PR in Mozambique. Especially since the civil war makes the countries differ too much from each other. They are not a perfect match, according to the most similar system design theory. Maybe Mozambique should experience even more problems under a FPTP? It would have been beneficial for the analysis if neither of the countries did have the experience of civil war.

4 Analysis Case 2

This second case will move the scope to the French influenced north-westerns part of Africa, featuring Mali and Benin.

4.1 Mali

Mali became independent from France in 1960 and the President Modibo Keita declared a Marxists one-party state and developed close connections with the eastern block. In 1968, Keita and the ruling party US-RDA²¹ were replaced by the Army. New President became Moussa Traoré, leader of the party UDPM²² and a re-invention of the country's historical connection with France was implemented. In 1990 an opposition emerged and pro-democracy demonstration caused clashes between government security forces and protesters. The main opposition parties where ADEMA²³ and CNID.²⁴ It ended with the army's intervention and the arrest of President Traoré. It was announced that the first multiparty election should be held in 1992. (Englebert 2003 p.635-636) This historical decision was taken during a national conference, a special west-African phenomenon adopted by ten countries with results representing both ends of the success and failure scale. (Clark 2000 p.253) The use of a national conference is one of the factors that are believed to have had significance in explaining why democracy in Mali has been a relative success. Political legitimacy was won due to the broad representation of the conference. (Clark 2000 p.261-262)

Mali features a two-round absolute majority system with closed party lists in 55 multi-member constituencies. If no candidate or party list is able to gain an absolute majority in the first round, the first two competes in a second round. The president elections are an absolute majority system with two rounds if no one secures a majority of the votes in the first.(Mozaffar 1999 p.572)

²¹ Rassemblement démocratique africain

²² Union démocratique du peuple malien

²³ Alliance pour la démocratie au Mali

²⁴ Comité national d'initiative démocratique

4.1.1 The Political Life of Mali

10 parties did gain representation in the first election. ADEMA became the biggest party, securing 76 out of the 129 seats in the *Assemblée nationale*, CNID nine seats and the returning US-RDA eight seats. The turn out was low, only 20 percent. Elected president became the ADEMA leader, Alpha Oumar Konaré. The cabinet of Mali was naturally dominated by ADEMA, but three ministers also came from their new rival CNID. During this time, both members of ADEMA, CNID, RDP²⁵ and US-RDA explicit expressed dissatisfaction, claiming the executive power excluded the legislative power from the decision-making process. The co-operation lasted until the Prime Minister Abdoulaye Sekou Sow resign in February 1994. CNID and RDP claimed that they didn't become informed about changes and couldn't accept the new Prime Minister, Ibrahim Boubacar Keita, who was closely linked to the President. (Engelbert 2003b p.636)

Next election was held in 1997 and featured 1,500 candidates from 36 different parties. The first round indicated a clear victory for ADEMA, but the opposition accused ADEMA for fraud and boycotted both the second round and the presidential elections, leading to the Constitutional Court annulling the first round due to irregularities, not fraud as the opposition proclaimed. The presidential election the same year was followed by chaos. Konaré won a landslide victory with 95.9 percent of the votes, but the opposition refused to accept the outcome. Amplified tensions lead to violence and the arrest of five opposition leaders. The second attempt to implement the legislative election took place during the summer of 1997 and (Englebert 2003b p.637-637) ADEMA secured 129 of 147 seats. (African Election 3) The opposition had formed it self into a grand collation, COPPO,²⁶ a coalition with wings that spanned over a broad political landscape, consisting of various parties as US-RDA, CNID and MPR.²⁷ MPR was the successor to the old President Traoré's party UDPM, CNID's formerly adversary. But COPPO boycotted the election. Parties that did participate and gained seats were PARENA²⁸, a breakaway movement from CNID, with eight, CDS²⁹ with four, UDD³⁰ won three seats and finally two was won by PDP,³¹ a successor of the old UDPM. COPPO claimed that their appeal for boycott had been a success due to the low participation, only 22 percent, and hoped the assembly would be declared illegitimate. It wasn't. At this moment the president did seek reconciliation between the parts, and since ADEMA was disproportional favoured by the electoral system Konaré wanted to allow allocation of public funds to the opposition, but ADEMA refused, and they were neither willing to accept the opposition's main demand, to declare the election

²⁵ Rassemblement pour la démocratie et le progrès

²⁶ Collectif des partis politiques de l'opposition

²⁷ Mouvement patriotique pour le renouveau

²⁸ Parti pour la renaissance nationale

²⁹ Convention démocratique et sociale

³⁰ Union pour la démocratie et le développement

³¹ Parti pour la démocratie et le progrès

illegitimate. As violence continued, with for example the lynching of a police officer at an opposition rally, President Konaré invited the opposition's leaders to form a broadly based coalition government. (Englebert 2003b p.637-637) All the problems the election of 1997 experienced contributed to strengthen the legitimacy of the Konaré presidency. (Clark 2000 p.263) The new government featured the comeback of Keita as Prime Minister and he came to include moderate opposition parties like UDD and PDP in the cabinet. An illuminated picture of how infected the political life of Mali is can be illustrated by the fact that only four of 19 opposition parties came to the National Forum on Mali's political and institutional problems, and during the oppositions boycott of the elections, the National Assembly has in principal served "as a rubber stamp" for the President. (Smith 2001 p.76-77)

In the legislative elections of 2002, the fragmentation of the parliament increased. The biggest party became RPM,³² lead by Keita, with 46 seats followed by ADEMA with 45; CNID won 13 seats and was in the majority coalition with RPM. (African Election 3) An alliance between PARENA and US-RDA among others did won 10 seats. A newly initiated party, the *Parti de la solidarité africaine pour la démocratie et l'indépendance* won six seats, and six other seats was allocated to six individual candidates. Administrative flaws were significant for this election and eight constituencies were declared void. (Englebert 2003b p.638-639) In the presidential elections the same year did the former general Amadou Toumani Touré came out as victorious. (Freedom House 3) Just as in previous elections the election process was infected by allegations of fraud. (Englebert 2003b p.638-639)

Mali has been tainted by ethnic tensions since the beginning of the 1990s. The problems started when a large number of Tuaregs, returned to Mali after previously migrated to Algeria and Libya. Since then violence between Tuaregs and the government has been occurring on a regular basis. (Englebert 2003b p.639-640) In 2005 broke a big riot out in Mali due to a loss in an African Cup of Nations football match, resulting in hundred of arrests. This was interpreted as a signal of frustration on the political progress. (Freedom House 3)

4.1.2 Mass Attitudes in Mali

60 percent of the Malians believed in a survey from 2000 that democracy is preferable to any other form of government and 16 percent express non-democratic attitudes.³³ (Bratton et al. 2000 p.13) The support for democracy increased to 71 percent in a later survey (Bratton et al. 2004 et al. p.31) and in a more recent survey, the support for democracy had somewhat decreased to 68

³² Rassemblement pour le Mali

³³ The respondents were asked what statement is closest to your opinion. A. Democracy is preferable to any other form of government. B. In certain situations, a non-democratic government can be preferable. C. To people like me, it doesn't matter what form of government we have.

percent. (Bratton et al. 2006 p.17) A related statistic concerns to what degree the Malians is satisfied with the democratic state of their country. In 2000 it was 60 percent, 2002 63 percent and in 2005 57 percent.³⁴ (Bratton et al. 2006 p.19) A significant feature of the perception of the Malians is the different levels of expressed trust in different institutions. Political parties perform quite badly, only 42 percent expressed trust. The army with 77 percent of trust and the national broadcaster with 87 percent came out on top. Regarding the support for many parties, the result of 2002 was 55 percent and in 2005 it has increased to 59 percent,³⁵ that's a bit below the African mean, which lands at 63 percent. (Bratton et al. 2006 p.21) This distrust in politics can also be illuminated from another point of departure. The legitimacy of the State is closely connected to the trust in political institutions, and 53 percent of the people in Mali disagree on the question, "Our government has the right to make decisions that all people have to abide by, wheatear or not they agree with them."³⁶ This implies that the Malians not yet have come to accept the rule of the majority, and unpopular decisions can have trouble in finding widespread compliance. (Bratton et al. 2000 p.25-26) In the support of a multi-party system, 59 percent is positive and 39 percent negative.³⁷ (Bratton 2006 p.12) Further on do 56 percent supports organizational freedom and 60 percent explicit supports freedom of speech.³⁸ (Logan et al. 2006 p.27)

4.1.3 Political Performance in Mali

Below will table 4.1 and 4.2 present the growth in GDP and the human development index for Mali during the multi-party era which began in 1992.

³⁴ The numbers presented is based on the question; overall, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in [your country] today?

³⁵ The respondent was asked to agree or disagree on the statement: "Many political parties are needed to make sure that [citizen of this country] have real choices in who governs them."

³⁶ The respondents could answer; strongly disagree, disagree, agree, strongly agree or don't know.

³⁷ The respondents were asked which of the following statement is closest to their opinion. A. Political parties create division and confusion; it's therefore unnecessary to have political parties in [your country]. B. Many political parties are needed to make sure that [citizens of your country] have real choices in who governs them

³⁸ The respondents were asked: "Which of the following statements is closets to your view?" A. Government should be able to ban any organization that goes against its policies. B. We should be able to join any organization, whether or not the government approves it. And: A. Government should not allow the expression of political views that are fundamentally different from the views of the majority. B. People should be able to speak their minds about politics free of government influence, no matter how unpopular their views may be.

Table 4.1 Economic Statistics, Mali (Statistics 2)

Subject Description	Units and Scale	1992	1996	1999	2002	2005
GDP per capita, current prices	US Dollar, Units	320.733	285.139	268.326	286.798	443.746
GDP, current prices	US Dollar, billions	2.876	2.880	2.921	3.343	5.537

Mali had an economical tough start of the 90's and table 4.1 shows that growth just has begun to push upward after a staggering evolution during the 90's. About 80 percent of the labour force is involved in the fishing and farming business and Mali's economy is bleeding. (Freedom House 3)

Table 4.2 Human Development Index, Mali (HDI 3)

Year	1990	1995	2000	2004
Human Development Index Value	0.285	0.309	0.332	0.338

The human development index has in comparison to the GDP growth gone stable forward, increasing with 15 percent.

We are continuing this statistical section with data on how Freedom House has rated Mali during the latest years.

Table 4.3 Freedom House Rating, Mali (Johansson 06)

Year	Political Rights
1991	6
1992	2
1993	2
1994	2
1995	2
1996	2
1997	3
1998	3
1999	3
2000	2
2001	2
2002	2
2003	2
2004	2
2005	2

Mali improved radically from 6 to 2 in political rights rating after the introduction of democracy. In 1997 to 1999 the rating was 3 but been stable at 2 ever since.

Just as in the previous case with Tanzania and Mozambique, the citizen's perception of the delivery of welfare is one way to measure the political performance. In Mali does 75 percent believe that the government does decent work in improving the basic health services, 24 percent doesn't agree with them. (Logan et al. 2006 p.21) Concerning how well the government addresses educational needs, 71 percent believes they do a good job and 27 percent disagrees.³⁹

4.2 Benin

Formerly a French colony, Benin received its independence in 1960 and a Marxist-Leninist era began. In 1990 Benin experienced something as unusual as a civilian coup and a broadly representative movement towards democracy started. The national conference in 1990 represents the end of the one-party rule, (Creevey et al. 2005 p.471-472) and Benin held their first multiparty election 1991.

³⁹ The respondents were asked; "How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven't you heard enough to say?" The results are categorized in three categories. Fairly well and very well is the positive category. Fairly bad and very bad is the negative one and the third are "don't know"

(Engelbert 2003a p.60) This started what Joel D. Barkan refers to as the second liberation of Africa. (Barkan 2006 p.18)

Benin has adopted an unusual version of PR in that sense that no legal threshold exist. Furthermore there are 18 constituencies with an average low numbers of mandates. The party lists are closed and votes are converted to seats into the legislature by a largest remainder system using the Hare quota. (Hartmann 1999 p.84) Such a system yields a high proportional result, and consists of two operations. First is the number of votes for a party divided by a quota. In the case of Benin the quota is the Hare quota, which is the number of members to be elected. The unallocated seats are awarded to parties that have the largest surplus of unused votes, this referred to as reminders. (Balis & Massicotte 2002 p.48) The president is elected by an absolute majority system. (Hartmann 1999 p.84)

4.2.1 The Political Life of Benin

24 parties participated in the first multiparty elections of 1991 contesting about the 64 seats in the *Assemblée nationale*. No party was able to gain an overall majority, resulting in delays in the legislations process. The first President became Nicéphore Soglo who beat the former leader Kérékou in an election that was very ethnical and regional divided. (Englebert 2003a p.61) Politics in Benin are heavily influenced by ethnicity, (Creevey et al. 2005 p.472) no party dominates the politics and each party has a strictly geographical concentrated electorate. (Creevy et al. 2005 p.489)

President Sogol did soon established support in the legislature via the coalition *Le Renouveau*, consisting of ten parties who together came to control a majority of the seats in the parliament. But severe problems in the relationship between the legislature and the executive were present, and the coalition *Le Renouveau* was after a re-organization in the government weakened due to a general dissatisfaction with the President exclusion of the legislature from politics. Sogol leaned then against the party RB,⁴⁰ a party he became chairman of in 1994. (Engelbert 2003 p.61)

To the next election in 1995 the *Assemblée nationale* was enlarged to 83 seats and the Presidents party RB won the largest share of seats with 20 and his supporters gained 13 seats. They became however outnumbered by the pro-Kérékou alliance 49 seats and a shift in legislative power was a fact. Tensions were high in the aftermath of the election, culminating with a rocket attack against a building housing a government conference. Kérékou won also the 1996 presidential elections, campaigning primarily on social issues. The Soglo government did during the election decide that the second-round should be postponed by four days, a decision which was overthrown by the Constitutional Court. The runner-up Soglo claimed that the victory was his, but international observers stated that no irregularities occurred during the election and the

⁴⁰ Renaissance du Bénin

constitutional court also rejected the former Presidents appeal. Soglo then declared himself defeated. The other five candidates did directly confirm Kérékou's victory.

President Kérékou started a march towards national reconciliation at the beginning of his presidential term and made Houngbédji prime minister of a government consisting of members from eight parties. After budget problems, crises in the public sector and a general strike in February 1998, Houngbédji resigned and his party PRD⁴¹ pulled out from the cabinet. The government reorganized and 13 new ministers were appointed in a new coalition of seven parties with a parliamentary support of only 27 seats. (Engelbert 2003 p.62)

The 1999 election did again feature a shift in the legislative power. The pro-Kérékou parties won 41 seats compared to the oppositions 42 of which RB secured 27. The voting behaviour continued to follow clear ethnic lines. The new opposition declared to international observers that they intend to co-operate with the President when possible. The fragmentation of party politics in Benin can be illustrated by the fact that 10 parties were represented in the council of ministers at this time. There were electoral irregularities reported also from this election, especially in the voter registration process but even more serious became the situation after the election, when an accusation of planning an assassination of President Kérékou was articulated, directed towards the opposition, who on the other hand claimed that the government was planning the analogous aimed at their candidate Soglo. (Engelbert 2003a p.62-63)

In the 2001 presidential election Kérékou was re-elected and the campaign between him and his main opponent Soglo was characterized by accusations of fraud leading to Soglo withdrawal, this after his appeal to the Constitutional Court, declaring that the result of the first round of the election should be annulled, had been rejected. The second round was finally held in a relative peaceful manner and Kérékou received 84.1 percent of the votes. Soglo did appeal again to the constitutional court claiming that the CENA⁴² had no legitimacy to organize the election. (Engelbert 2003a p.62-63)

The 2003 election resulted in a defeat for Soglo's party RB, who only won 15 seats and the total seats secured by the opposition reached to 31 compared to the eight-party coalition called the President Movement who together possessed 52 seats. The voting turn-out was 55.9 percent, a decrease from the 75.8 percent in 1999. (African Elections 2) The opposition accused the ruling party for using threats before the elections, and this was the first time a ruling-party majority was achieved during the decade of multi-party elections in Benin. In general the election was considered fair. (Freedom House 4)

⁴¹ Parti du renouveau démocratique

⁴² The Electoral Agency

4.2.2 Mass Attitudes in Benin

Attention should be brought to the fact that Benin only have participate in one round of the Afrobarometer surveys. So data over time is not at hand.

The citizen of Benin are general supporters of democracy, 70 percent believes that democracy is preferable to any other kind of government and only 6 percent express feelings towards that democracy not always is preferable.⁴³ (Bratton 2006 p.11) 65 percent of the Beninese expresses support for a multi-party system, and 28 percent considers that political parties only creates confusion. (Bratton 2006 p.12)⁴⁴ The Beninese also express explicit support for pluralism, 67 percent supports the right to join an optional organization and 73 percent supports freedom of speech.⁴⁵ (Logan et al. 2006 p.27)

4.2.3 Political Performance in Benin

Just as in the other cases, data on the political performance of Benin will below be presented with statistics.

Table 4.4 Economical Statistics, Benin (Statistics 2)

Subject Description	Units and Scale	1992	1996	1999	2002	2005
GDP per capita, current prices	US Dollars, Units	427.84	394.82	390.17	406.10	641.79
GDP, current prices	US Dollars, billions	2.152	2.223	2.391	2.705	4.773

Table 4.4 shows that Benin during the last years has experienced a high growth level and the economical trend is stable pointing upward.

⁴³ The respondents were asked which of these three statements were closest to their opinion. A. Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government B. In some circumstances, a non-democratic government can be preferable. C. For someone like me, it doesn't matter what kind of government we have.

⁴⁴ The respondents were asked which of the following statement is closest to their opinion. A. Political parties create division and confusion; it's therefore unnecessary to have political parties in [your country]. B. Many political parties are needed to make sure that [citizens of your country] have real choices in who governs them.

⁴⁵ The respondents were asked: "Which of the following statements is closest to your view?" A. Government should be able to ban any organization that goes against its policies. B. We should be able to join any organization, whether or not the government approves it. And: A. Government should not allow the expression of political views that are fundamentally different from the views of the majority. B. People should be able to speak their minds about politics free of government influence, no matter how unpopular their views may be.

Table 4.5 Human Development Index, Benin (HDI 4)

Year	1990	1995	2000	2004
Human Development Index Value	0.372	0.397	0.416	0.428

The HDI has also evolved alongside with the GDP growth and has increased with 13 percent. Even if Benin shows good statistics in comparison to Mali, it would be false to give the impression of a high performance economy. The economy is mostly based on agriculture and the industry can't compete on the international market. (Freedom House 4) This section ends with political rights from Freedom House in table 4.6.

Table 4.6 Freedom House Rating, Benin (Johansson 06)

Year	Political Rights
1990	6
1991	2
1992	2
1993	2
1994	2
1995	2
1996	2
1997	2
1998	2
1999	2
2000	2
2001	3
2002	3
2003	2
2004	2
2005	2

Benin witnessed a very quick improvement in the political rights rating, and has, with the exception of 2001 and 2002, stabilised on a good decent level.

Benin is a country that somehow stands out in the afrobarometer survey about the citizen's view of how well the government does to improve the welfare. 59 percent claimed that they thought the government did fairly or very well. 40 percent disagreed with them and one percent didn't know. (Logan et al. 2006 p.21) When it comes to addressing educational needs the Beninese is even more unconvinced. Only 49 percent thinks the government addresses this issue fairly or

very well, 48 percent believes the government performs badly and 3 percent just doesn't know. (Logan et al. 2006 p.19) ⁴⁶

4.3 Mali – Benin

A fragmented party system and serious efforts in organising consociational arrangements are two aspects that characterise the countries of the second case. The commendable attempts by the politicians towards reconciliation reflects the quest of making the political system more legitimate; in Mali, boycotts has seriously disturbed the political process and voting turn out has in general been low, in Benin, a low-mark was registered in the accusations of planning an assassination alongside the normal problems, accusations of fraud and the reluctance from the opposition to accepted election results. The attempts toward reconciliation are also reflected in the Freedom House rating, both Mali and Benin performs better than Tanzania and Mozambique.

68 percent of the Malians explicit supports democracy and 59 percent is positive towards a multi-party system. Benin has a higher multi-party support, 65 percent, and also a slightly higher support for democracy, 70 percent. This could be linked to the fact that the voters in Benin has changed the government a number of times, giving the population a feeling that they can affect the politics. It can also be viewed as an indication that PR creates more legitimacy for the political system, and the voting turn-out in Benin is substantial higher than in Mali. Benin's significantly lower hurdles for entering the parliament could further increase the legitimacy of the system due to the relative easiness to gain representation for small groups. Benin also features considerable higher support for freedom of speech and freedom of starting an organization, 73 and 67 percent compared to 60 and 56 percent in the case of Mali. Do these more enlightened views among the citizen of Benin reflect a more serious attempt towards reconciliation and moderation at the elite level? With my empirical material in mind, I would lean a bit against that statement, because the elites of Benin has to a higher degree tried to sew together large coalitions, and with my analytic framework from section 2.4 in mind, the behaviour of the political elites affects the citizens attitudes.

Both Benin and Mali features competitive elections which are reflected in their fine Freedom House ranking. They also have experienced growth in GDP during the multi-party period and can present a stable positive HDI development. Benin's GDP per capita is on a higher level in comparison with Mali, and the HDI

⁴⁶ The respondents were asked; "How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven't you heard enough to say?" The results are categorized in three categories. Fairly well and very well is the positive category. Fairly bad and very bad is the negative one and the third are "don't know"

is superior. But Mali has improved their HDI more than Benin, however from a substantial lower level. Maybe should Benin have been able to achieve a better HDI development? This is reflected in the citizen's viewpoint of the government's efforts in the health and educational sectors, 59 percent are satisfied with the basic health service and only 49 percent are satisfied with the educational efforts. The Malians are more content with the situation, 75 percent were satisfied with the health service and 71 percent with how well their government addresses educational issues. But, as stated before, Benin has a significant higher HDI than Mali, and with the above numbers in mind; this indicates that the Beninese is more critical citizens than the Malians. Could this criticalness derive from the accusations of planning murder, the accusation of the CENA to lack legitimacy in holding elections or the general fraud has been going on for quite some time? The Beninese seems to have a larger faith in democracy as a concept, than in the government's capacity in governing. But Mali has also received their fair numbers of boycotts, fraud allegations and political related violence. Perhaps could one simple conceivable answer be that the demands raise as standards rises, and the Beninese enjoys a somewhat higher standard of living.

Why both Benin and Mali features such a high fragmented party system is an interesting question. In case one an answer was provided by the context and it could be rewarding to repeat that manoeuvre on this second case as well. Mali did move away from a socialist rule quite early, but they still had a one-party system until 1992. Benin was a socialist state until 1990, but both countries are united by a one-party history and a French colonial legacy. What unites the two countries even more is the use of a national conference in the transition to democracy. It's possible that the broad political representation during such conferences can provide a positive contribution in the creation of a more diverse political society. This second case indicates that the electoral system in Africa doesn't affect the fragmentation of the party system. (Barkan 1995 p.114) Both countries have shown attempts towards moderation of politics by something that almost look like a grand coalition, this is possible due to their electoral systems to various extends presents incentives to co-operate due to the fragmentation. But since they both have such incentives the material doesn't provide with the answer that it's the electoral system that provides those incentives.

5 Conclusions

In the case of Tanzania and Mozambique, the different electoral systems present the same, extremely low, incentives to co-operation and in the case of Mali and Benin, both systems feature many parties, indicating that the context within the electoral system works is a big influence on the development of the party system. But this thesis doesn't properly answer the question of what type of context that creates a specific party system. The one-party system of Tanzanian and Mozambique could be interpreted as a legacy of socialism, but both Mali and Benin has also the experience of a one-party rule, which makes the situation a bit more complex. Instead I lean on the use of a national conference in case two. A closer exam of the countries, regarding history of pluralism, ethnicity and other significant factors could certainly offer a much better explanation to this intriguing question. Time will tell if Mozambique and Benin in 20 years has higher fragmented party systems than Tanzania and Mali.

All four countries have severe political problems, but Mali and Benin features more attempts towards elite-co-operation, and the reason is the incentives that their respective context presents. I believe when such incentives are presents, a political culture more beneficial for the consolidation of democracy is likely to evolve and Benin and Mali has a better Freedom House ranking than Mozambique and Tanzanian. The citizens of Mali and Benin also support democracy to a higher degree, indicating on a more developed democratic political culture. The main finding of this essay is that's the context that delivers certain incentives towards cooperation and not the electoral system in emerging African democracies.

With regard to my empirical material, I can't state that a specific context produce better political performance than another, there are so many factors that affect for example the economical evolution in a country outside the governments control in today's world that such an analysis would be very problematic. I also think that the political elite attitudes effect on the citizen's attitudes is hard to say anything general about, the result this thesis presents aren't uniform. This very limited study isn't flawless and more comprehensive research with better empirical material involving additional cases and different methods could surely present a better analysis and perhaps a different result. Especially would it be interesting to compare the voting behaviour among African citizens with western behaviour and analyse the eventually differences in what's important in the choice of a political party.

References

Articles

- Barkan, Joel D. (1995) "*Elections in Agrarian Societies.*" *Journal of Democracy* 6:4.
- Bratton, Michael, Coulibaly, Massa & Machado, Fabiana (2000) "*Popular Perception of Good Governance in Mali*" Afrobarometer Working Paper No.9
- Bratton, Michael (2004) "*State Building and Democratization in Sub-Saharan Africa: Forwards, Backwards, or Together?*" Afrobarometer Working Paper no.43
- Bratton, Michael, Logan, Carolyn, Cho, Wonbin & Bauer, Paloma (2004) "*Afrobarometer Round 2: Compendium of Comparative results from a 15-Country Survey.*" Working Paper No.34
- Bratton, Michael (2006) "*The Status of Democracy, 2005-2006: Findings from Afrobarometer Round 3 for 18 Countries*" Afrobarometer Briefing Paper No. 40
- Bratton, Michael, Cho, Wonbin (2006) "*Where is Africa going? Views from Below – A Compendium of Trends in Public Opinion in 12 African Countries, 1999 -2006.*" Afrobarometer Working Paper No.60
- Carbone, Giovanni M. (2005) "*Continuidade na renovacao? Ten years of multiparty politics in Mozambique: roots, evolution and stabilisation of the Frelimo-Renamo party system*" *Modern African Studies*,43, 3.
- Chaligha, Amon, Mattes, Robert, Bratton, Michael & Davids, Yul Derek (2002) "*Uncritical Citizen or Patient Trustees? Tanzanians' Views of Political and Economic Reform.*" Afrobarometer Working paper No.18.
- Creevey, Lucy, Ngomo, Paul & Vengroff, Richard (2005) "*Part Politics and Different Paths to Democratic Transitions*" *Party Politics*, Vol. 11, No.4
- Harrison, Graham (1996) "*Democracy in Mozambique: The Significance of Multi-Party Elections*" *Review of African Political Economy*, March 1996.

- Lindberg, Staffan I. (2005) "*Consequences of electoral systems in Africa: a preliminary inquiry*". Electoral Studies 24.
- Lindberg, Staffan I (2006) "*The Surprising Significance of African Elections.*" Journal of Democracy, Volume 17, Number 1, January 2006.
- Linder, Wolf & Bächtiger, André (2005) "*What drives democratisation in Asia and Africa*"? European Journal of Political Research 44.
- Logan, Carolyn, Fujiwara, Tetsuya & Parish, Virginia (2006) "*Citizen and the State in Africa: New results from Afrobarometer Round 3*" Afrobarometer Working Paper No.61
- McLaughlin, Abraham; Bandrapalli, Suman (1995) "*Ten of 12 opposition parties will petition the high court*" Christian Science Monitor, NOVEMBER 1ST, 1995.
- Msekwa, Pius (2000) "*Reflections on Tanzania's First Multi-Party Parliament: 1995-2000*" Dar es Salaam University Press LTD, Dar es Salaam.
- Pereria, Joao C.G, Davids, Yul Derek & Mattes, Robert (2002) "*Mozambicans' Views of Democracy and Political Reform: A Comparative Perspective*" Afrobarometer Paper No.22
- Pereria, Joao C.G, Davids, Yul Derek & Mattes, Robert (2003) "*Eight Years of Multiparty Democracy in Mozambique: The Public's View*" Afrobarometer Working Paper No.30
- Pigenko, Vladimir, Wise, Charles R, Brown, Trevor L. (2002) *Elite attitudes and Democratic stability: Analysing Legislators' Attitudes towards the Separation of Powers in Ukraine*. Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 54, No.1.
- Putnam, Robert D. (1971) "*Studying Elite Political Culture: The Case of Ideology*". The American Political Science Review, Vol. 65 No.3
- Reynolds, Andrew (1995) "*The Case for Proportionality*" Journal of Democracy 6:4.
- Smith, Kay Zeric (2001) "*Mali's Decade of Democracy*" Journal of Democracy, volume 12, number 3.
- Stevens, Daniel, Benjamin, G. Bishin, Robert, R. Barr (2006) "*Authoritarian Attitudes, Democracy, and Policy Preferences among Latin American Elites*" American Journal of Political Science. Vol.50 No.3

Books

- Almond, Gabriel A. & Verba, Sidney (1989) *"The Civic Culture – Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations"* Sage Publications, Newbury Park.
- Barkan, Joel D. (1997) African Elections in Comparative Perspective. In. Elections: *"Perspectives on Establishing Democratic Practices"* United Nations publications, New York.
- Barkan, Joel D. (1998) Rethinking the Applicability of Proportional Representation for Africa. In: Reynolds A. & Sisk T.D. (Eds.) *"Elections and Conflict Management in Africa."* United States Institute of Peace, Washington, DC.
- Barkan, Joel D. (2006) Democracy in Africa: What Future? In. Ndulo, Muna (ed.) *"Democratic Reform in Africa – Its impact on Governance & Poverty Alleviation"* James Currey Ltd, Oxford.
- Blais, André & Massicotte, Louis (2002) Electoral System. In. LeDuc, Lawrence, Niemi, G. Richard, Norris, Pippa (ed.) *"Comparing Democracies 2 – New Challenges in the Study of Elections and Voting"* SAGE Publications Ltd, London.
- Carey, John M. (1997) Institutional Design and Party Systems. In. Diamond, Larry, Plattner, Marc F, Chu, Yun-han, Tien, Hung-mao (ed.) *"Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies – Themes and Perspectives"* The John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore.
- Clark, Andrew F. (2000) From Military Dictatorship to Democracy: The democratization Process in Mali. In Bingen, James, Robinson, David & Staatz, John M (ed.) *"Democracy and Development in Mali"* Michigan State University Press, East Lansing.
- Dahl, Robert A. (1997) Development and Democratic Culture. . In. Diamond, Larry, Plattner, Marc F, Chu, Yun-han, Tien, Hung-mao (ed.) *"Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies – Themes and Perspectives"* The John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore.
- Darnolf, Staffan (1997) *"Democratic Electioneering on Southern Africa – The contrasting Cases of Botswana and Zimbabwe"* Grafikerna i Kungälv AB, Kungälv.
- Diamond, Larry (1993) *"Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries"* Lynne Rienner Publishers, London.

- Diamond, Larry (1999) *“Developing Democracy Toward Consolidation”* The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore.
- Dogan, Mattie & Pelassy, Dominique (1984) *“How to Compare Nations – Strategies in Comparative Politics”* Chatham House Publishers, Inc New Jersey.
- Englebert, Pierre (2003a) Benin – Recent History. . In. Muriosn, Katharine (ed.) *“Africa South of the Sahara 2003”* Europa Publications, London
- Englebert, Pierre (2003b) Mali – Recent History. In. Muriosn, Katharine (ed.) *“Africa South of the Sahara 2003”* Europa Publications, London
- Esaiasson, Peter, Gilljam, Mikael, Oscarsson, Henrik & Wängnerud, Lena (2004) *”Metodpraktikan – ”Konsten att studera samhälle, individ och marknad”* Nordstedts Juridik AB, Stockholm.
- Fengler, Wolfgang (1999) TANZANIA. In Nohlen, Dieter, Krennerich, Michael & Thibaut, Bernhard (ed.) *“Elections in Africa – A Data Handbook”* Oxford University Press, New York.
- Glickman, Harvey (1998) Ethnicity, Elections, and Constitutional Democracy in Africa. In: Reynolds A. & Sisk T.D. (Eds.) *“Elections and Conflict Management in Africa”* United States Institute of Peace, Washington, DC.
- Gravinho, Joao Gomes (2003) Mozambique – Recent History. In. Muriosn, Katharine (ed.) *“Africa South of the Sahara 2003”* Europa Publications, London
- Gunther, Richard & Mughan, Anthony (1993) Political Insitutions and Clevage Mangement. In. Weaver, R. Kent & Rockman, Bert A (ed.) *“Do Institutions Matter? Government Capabilities in the United States and Abroad”* The Brookings Institutions, Washington D.C.
- Hague, Rod & Harrop, Martin (2001) *“Comparative Government and Politics – An Introduction”* PALGRAVE, New York.
- Hartmann, Christof (1999) BENIN. In Nohlen, Dieter, Krennerich, Michael & Thibaut, Bernhard (ed.) *“Elections in Africa – A Data Handbook”* Oxford University Press, New York.
- Horowitz, Donald L. (1991) *“A Democratic South Africa? – Constitutional Engineering in a Divided Society”* University of California Press, Los Angeles.

- Kessel, I. van (2000) Stability or Democracy: on the Role of Monitors, Media and Miracles. In. Abbink, Jon & Hesseling, Gerti (ed.) *"Election Observation and Democratization in Africa"* Antony Rowe Ltd, Wiltshire.
- King, Gary, Keohane, Robert O & Verba, Sidney (1994) *"Designing Social Inquiry- Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research"* Princeton University Press, New Jersey.
- Klugman, Jeni, Neypati, Bilin & Stewart, Frances (1999) *"Conflict and Growth in Africa – Vol. 2: Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda"* OECD Publications, Paris.
- Krennerich, Michael (1999) Mozambique. In Nohlen, Dieter, Krennerich, Michael & Thibaut, Bernhard (ed.) *"Elections in Africa – A Data Handbook"* Oxford University Press, New York.
- Lardeyret, Guy (2006) the Problem with PR. In. Diamond, Larry & Plattner, Marc F. *"Electoral Systems and Democracy"* The John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore.
- Lijphart, Arend (1977) *"Democracy in Plural Societies"* Tale University Press, New Haven.
- Lijphart, Arend (1994) *"Electoral systems and party systems : a study of twenty-seven democracies, 1945-1990"* Oxford University Press, Oxford.
- Lijphart, Arend (2006) Constitutional Choices for New Democracies. In. Diamond, Larry & Plattner, Marc F. *"Electoral Systems and Democracy"* The John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore.
- Lindberg, Staffan I. (2004) *"The Powers of Elections"* Intellecta Docusys, Lund.
- Matthews, Graham (2003) Tanzania – Recent History. In. Muriosn, Katharine (ed.) *"Africa South of the Sahara 2003"* Europa Publications, London.
- McHenry Jr, Dean E. (2004) Political Parties and Party Systems. In Kaiser, Paul J & Okumu, Wafula F. (ed.) *"Democratic Transitions in East Africa"* Ashgate Publishing Limited, Aldershot.
- Mmuya, Max (2000) Democratisation, Party Politics and Elections in Tanzania. In. Engel, Ulf, Erdmann, Gero & Mehler, Andreas (ed.) *"Tanzania Revisited: Political Stability, Aid Dependency and Development Constraints"* Institute of African Affairs, Hamburg.

- Mozaffar, Shaheen (1999) MALI. In Nohlen, Dieter, Krennerich, Michael & Thibaut, Bernhard (ed.) *"Elections in Africa – A Data Handbook"* Oxford University Press, New York.
- Norris, Pippa (2002) Ballots Not Bullets: Testing Consociational Theories of Ethnic Conflict, Electoral System, and Democratization. In: Reynolds, Andrew (ed.) *"The Architecture of Democracy – Constitutional Design, Conflict Management, and Democracy"* Oxford University Press, New York.
- Norris, Pippa (2004) *"Electoral Engineering – Voting Rules and Political Behaviour"* Cambridge University Press, New York.
- Putnam, Robert D. (1993) *"Making Democracy Work – Civic Traditions in Modern Italy"* Princeton University Press, Princeton.
- Reilly, Benjamin (2001) *"Democracy in Divided Societies – Electoral Engineering for Conflict Management"* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- Reynolds, Andrew & Sisk, Timothy D. (1998) *"Elections and Conflict Management in Africa"*. United States Institute of Peace" Washington, DC.
- Sartori, Giovanni (1994) *"Comparative Constitutional Engineering – An Inquiry into Structures, Incentives and Outcomes"* Macmillan Press LTD, London.

Electronic Resources

African Election 1

<http://africanelections.tripod.com/tz.html>

2006-12-06 "Elections in Tanzania"

African Election 2

http://africanelections.tripod.com/bj.html#2003_National_Assembly_Election

2006-12-06 "Elections in Benin"

African Election 3

http://africanelections.tripod.com/ml.html#April_1997_National_Assembly_Election

2006-12-22

Freedom House 1

<http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=22&year=2006&country=7071>

2006-11-22 "Tanzania Country Report"

Freedom House 2

<http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=22&year=2006&country=7022>

2006-12-06 "Mozambique Country Report"

Freedom House 3

<http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=22&year=2006&country=7011>

2006-12-06 "Mali Country Report"

Freedom House 4

<http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=22&country=6923&year=2006>

2006-12-06 "Benin Country Report"

Freedom House 5

<http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=35&year=2006>

2006-12-14 "Methodology 2006 Edition"

HDI Report 2005

http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2005/pdf/presskit/HDR05_PKE_StatisticalData.pdf

2006-12-13 "Human Development Report 2005"

HDI 1

http://hdr.undp.org/hdr2006/statistics/countries/data_sheets/cty_ds_TZA.html

2006-12-22 "Tanzania, U. Rep. of"

HDI 2

http://hdr.undp.org/hdr2006/statistics/countries/data_sheets/cty_ds_MOZ.html

2006-12-22 "Mozambique"

HDI 3

http://hdr.undp.org/hdr2006/statistics/countries/data_sheets/cty_ds_MLI.html

2006-12-22 "Mali"

HDI 4

http://hdr.undp.org/hdr2006/statistics/countries/data_sheets/cty_ds_BEN.html

2006-12-22 "Benin"

Johansson 06

Johansson, Leif. The SPSS file "länder06". Lund University, Department of Political Science.

NEC

http://www.nec.go.tz/electoral_system.asp?maintitle=Current%20System&menu=sub3

2006-12-15 "Electoral System"

Parliament of Tanzania

<http://www.parliament.go.tz/bunge/Structure.asp>

2006-12-15 “Structure”

Statistics 1

http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2005/01/data/dbcoutm.cfm?SD=1994&ED=2006&R1=1&R2=1&CS=3&SS=2&OS=C&DD=0&OUT=1&C=688-738&S=NGDP_RPCH-NGDPD-NGDPDPC&CMP=0&x=63&y=18

2006-12-01

Statistics 2

http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2005/01/data/dbcoutm.cfm?SD=1990&ED=2006&R1=1&R2=1&CS=3&SS=2&OS=C&DD=0&OUT=1&C=638-678&S=NGDP_RPCH-NGDPD-NGDPDPC&CMP=0&x=44&y=2

2006-12-07

Appendix 1 – Tanzania

Capital: Dodoma

Population: 37, 9 million inhabitants

Size: 945 000 km²

Freedom House Status: Partly Free (2006)

Life Expectancy: 45

Percent of the population infected by AIDS: ⁴⁷ 8, 8

Access to water: N/A

Access to sanitation: N/A

Fertility, birth per woman: 5.3 (2000)



⁴⁷ The statistics concern the population between 15 and 49 years old.

Appendix 2 – Mozambique

Capital: Maputo

Population: 19, 9 million inhabitants

Size: 802 000 km²

Freedom House Status: Partly Free (2006)

Life Expectancy: 42

Percent of the population infected by AIDS: ⁴⁸ 12, 2

Access to water: 60 percent (2000)

Access to sanitation: 43 percent (2000)

Fertility, birth per woman: 6.1 (2000)



⁴⁸ The statistics concern the population between 15 and 49 years old.

Appendix 3 – Mali

Capital: Bamako

Population: 13, 9 million inhabitants

Size: 1 200 000 km²

Freedom House Status: Free (2006)


Life Expectancy: 48

Percent of the population infected by AIDS: ⁴⁹ 1, 9

Access to water: 65 percent (2000)

Access to sanitation: 69 percent (2000)

Fertility, birth per woman: 7.0 (2000)



⁴⁹ The statistics concern the population between 15 and 49 years old.

Appendix 4 - Benin

Capital: Porto-Novo

Population: 8, 7 million inhabitants

Size: 112 600 km²

Freedom House Status: Free (2006)


Life Expectancy: 54

Percent of the population infected by AIDS:⁵⁰ 1, 9

Access to water: 63 percent (2000)

Access to sanitation: 23 percent (2000)

Fertility, birth per woman: 5.9 (2000)



⁵⁰ The statistics concern the population between 15 and 49 years old.