

Co-operation – on What Grounds?

An Assessment of the Democracy Work within the African
Union (AU) and the New Partnership for Africa's
Development (NEPAD)

Abstract

The study field of the thesis is regional integration in Africa. The focus is set on the *African Union* (AU) and its main programme for promoting democracy on the continent, the *New Partnership for Africa's Development* (NEPAD). By applying two theories, one on democratization through regional organizations and the other on hidden agendas within them, the thesis makes an assessment on the work for democracy in the two initiatives. The first analysis shows that within both the AU and NEPAD there exists a discrepancy between rhetoric and reality. It is stated that the theory on democratization is fairly applicable to the case but that the result is different from what the theory indicates. The reason for this is said to be a third variable that biases the result. This variable is taken from the second theory and in the analysis it is suggested that the so called "regime-boosting" phenomenon is present within the AU and NEPAD and is the reason as to why the two initiatives are malfunctioning on the democracy area.

Key words: AU, NEPAD, democratization, regional integration, regime-boosting.

Index

1	Preface.....	1
1.1	Background	1
1.2	Aim and Queris	2
1.3	Theories.....	2
1.4	Demarcations.....	3
1.5	Outline.....	3
2	Method.....	5
2.1	Research Design.....	5
2.2	Definitions.....	6
2.3	Material Critique	6
3	The AU.....	8
3.1	Previous Assessments	9
4	NEPAD.....	10
4.1	A Historical Overview	10
4.2	The Work for Democracy	11
4.2.1	The APRM	12
4.3	Previous Assessments	12
5	Regional Organizations and Democratization – the Theory of Jon C. Pevehouse.....	14
5.1	Theoretical Background	14
5.2	The Impact of Regional Organizations	14
5.3	The Nature of the Organization and its Members	15
6	The Theory of Pevehouse Applied on NEPAD and the AU.....	16
6.1	Testing the Criterias of Pevehouse.....	16
6.1.1	The Political Will to Work for Democracy and to Set Conditions on Membership	16
6.1.2	The Political Will to Enforce Conditions if They Are Not Being Adhered 17	
6.1.3	The Means to Enforce Conditions.....	17
6.2	Assessing the Democracy Work	18
6.2.1	The Record	18

6.3	A Litmus Test for the Democracy Work Within NEPAD and the AU – the Case of Zimbabwe	20
6.3.1	The Crisis in Zimbabwe – a Review	20
6.3.2	NEPAD’s and the AU’s Response to the Crisis in Zimbabwe	22
6.4	Conclusion No. 1	24
7	Regime-Boosting – the Theory of Fredrik Söderbaum	25
7.1	The Idea and Signs of Regime-Boosting.....	25
8	The Theory of Söderbaum Applied on NEPAD and the AU	27
8.1	The Signs of Regime-Boosting Within the AU and NEPAD	27
8.1.1	The Signs of Regime-Boosting in the Zimbabwe Crisis.....	28
8.1.2	The Context Behind Regime-Boosting	29
8.2	Conclusion No. 2.....	30
9	Conclusion	31
9.1	The Theory of International Organizations and Democratization	31
9.2	The Theory of Regime-Boosting.....	31
9.3	Final words.....	32
10	Bibliography	33
10.1.1	Articles	33
10.2	Books.....	35
10.3	Papers	36
10.4	Internet	36
10.5	Additional sources.....	37

1 Preface

1.1 Background

The picture of democracy in today's Africa is mixed. An assessment done by Professor Rwekaza S. Mukandala on African democracy, testing liberal democracy criteria from various prominent scholars, shows a diverse result. Many African countries score well on Samuel J. Valenzuela's *Second election test* (a re-election of a democratic regime), yet, in most cases these elections have been characterized by inequality amongst the competitors. Samuel Huntington's and Adam Przeworski's *Alternation in power hypothesis* (a peaceful replacement of one regime for another) is verified in some cases, notably Benin and Ghana whilst Dankwart A. Rustow's *Longevity test* (time-set survival of a liberal democratic regime) has a limited relevance for only a few African states. Finally, Juan Linz's description of democracy as "*the only game in town*" (no alternative to democracy) does not apply to any African country and Mukandala concludes that "liberal democracy is not fairing well in Africa". The reason for this is said to be continued domination of the logic of the colonial state as well as global capitalism and globalization (Mukandala 2002: 3ff).

Throughout the world globalization has led to intensified co-operation amongst states. Despite its marginalized role in the international community Africa is no exception. Regional integration is widespread on the continent and numerous regional organizations have emerged since Africa's independence. Some states are members of more than 60 regional organizations (Söderbaum 2003: 15). The thesis will look into the biggest one of these organizations, the *African Union* (AU) and its main initiative for promoting democracy on the continent, the *New Partnership for Africa's Development* (NEPAD).

The theme of the thesis is derived from the notion that African leaders choose to engage in co-operations aimed at working for widening democracy. This is indeed a puzzle since 49 of Africa's 54 states are said to be ruled by dictatorships and increased democracy indisputably leads to diminished power for these regimes (Taylor 2005: 154). Yet, 53 of Africa's states are members of the AU and NEPAD and have through the signing of various treaties undertaken to promote democracy. The thesis poses the questions why these leaders are so eager to join democratic co-operations and if they are giving adherence to the democratic principles that rest within them.

1.2 Aim and Queris

The aspiration of the thesis is to cast light upon the democracy work within NEPAD, and to some extent the AU itself. The framework document for NEPAD states that past attempts to set out programmes on the continent have failed, due to both internal and external reasons. According to the authors of this document a new set of circumstances has emerged which set NEPAD in a different position and with a higher possibility that the programme will be successful (www.nepad.org (a)). It will be the task of the thesis to scrutinize if this is the case or if NEPAD and the AU show deficiencies on the democracy area.

Queris:

1. Is NEPAD and the AU giving adherence to their emphasis on democracy?
2. Why do anti-democratic African leaders want to be a part of a democratic regional co-operation?

The thesis takes its point of departure in the supposition that anti-democrats do not want to promote democracy. Thus, deficiencies on the democracy area are likely outcomes in the following assessments. The thesis will argue that there exists a hidden agenda amongst African leaders and that this is the answer to the puzzle of why anti-democrats engage in democracy building.

1.3 Theories

The thesis will examine two theories on regionalism. Although that indicates a theory *testing*, this is not the aim of the thesis. Instead, the analysis is of a theory *consuming* character where the second theory aims at complementing the first.

The theory of Jon C. Pevehouse examines the role of regional organizations and their aim at promoting democracy in member states. He states that certain characteristics within an organization make it a successful promoter for democracy towards its members. Pevehouse's theory of regional organizations and democratization has a significant liberal approach and is a suitable theory for the assessment on how well the AU and NEPAD live up to their democratic ends.

The theory of Fredrik Söderbaum aims at explaining the poser of why anti-democratic leaders voluntarily engage in regional co-operation concerning democracy. Söderbaum concludes that there exists a hidden agenda behind the formal treaties of regional organizations in Southern Africa which aims at increasing the power of the leaders. The thesis will show that this argumentation

is highly applicable to the case in question. The theory of Söderbaum has a reflectivist as well as a constructivist approach.

1.4 Demarcations

The extent of the analysis does not allow an unlimited study area. Thus, the focus of the thesis has been narrowed to cover but one part of the democracy work within the AU, namely NEPAD¹. The reason why NEPAD was chosen before other initiatives incorporated in the AU is that it is considered the main programme for democracy in Africa and it is the most concrete, ambitious and well planned one. Furthermore, NEPAD has drawn the widest attention from the West of all African development programmes and its standing is therefore highly important for the aid dependent continent.

Another demarcation has been made concerning the choice of cases. Only one case, the Zimbabwean, was assessed more thoroughly for scrutinizing how well/badly NEPAD is promoting democracy. A one case study has indeed its shortcomings yet, the advantages outweigh the disadvantages (see further under 2). More cases could have been added to the assessment but whether or not, the result had been pointing in the same direction. Swaziland, Malawi, Equatorial Guinea, Nigeria, Gabon, Cameroon are all cases of a similar stance of NEPAD to an ongoing democratic crisis (Taylor 2005: 100, 112). Zimbabwe was chosen over the others for various reasons. First, the crisis overlapped in time with the emergence of NEPAD. Second, it is one of the most high-profile cases of denial of democracy in Africa. Third, it revealed a typical and clear example of the NEPAD stance regarding democracy (Taylor 2002: 406). Critics may point to the fact that Zimbabwe differs from many other African states, foremost due to the special position in African politics of president Robert Mugabe and the racialized aspect of the crisis. The answer to this is that it would be unreasonable for the members of NEPAD to be able to “pick and choose” between democratic crisis to take a stance against (Taylor 2005: 104).

1.5 Outline

After a review of the method employed and the material used in the study, follows an introduction to the study by a background description of the AU and NEPAD. Then follows a review over the theory of Pevehouse and an analysis on the democracy work within the AU and NEPAD, in the context of the previous

¹ The objectives of NEPAD and the AU often differ from one another. The reason is that the relationship between the two initiatives is still uncertain. The thesis will therefore deal with both NEPAD and the AU. Referring to the AU means that it is the over all stance of the union, not NEPAD’s alone and not some other programme within the union.

theory. A conclusion whether or not Pevehouse's theory is applicable to the AU and NEPAD case will end this part of the thesis. Thereafter the theory of Söderbaum will be launched, as a complement to the previous one. This will be followed by an empirical analysis over the AU and NEPAD as well as a conclusion. After that follows some final words with a summary of the results.

2 Method

2.1 Research Design

The choice of topic for the thesis has its origins in the notion that African regionalism is a neglected study area and that critical assessments on it often fail to present a complete picture of the problems that rest within it (Söderbaum 2003: 2). The will to cast light upon a fairly forgotten research area and to fill in the gaps that exist is what Peter Esaiasson and his fellow scholars refer to as a topic that has emerged from “within the field of political science” (Esaiasson et al 2005: 29). The shortness of previous studies within the area of African regionalism makes it an interesting and necessary subject to examine.

The study arises from the concrete phenomenon of NEPAD and the most relevant method for conducting the analysis is therefore a *case study*. As has been noted earlier a case study design has indeed its shortcomings, especially when it comes to the possibilities of generalising the result to other research fields (Esaiasson et al. 2005: 178f). However, the intention is not to generalize the result to other geographical or political areas, not even inside Africa. Due to a previous neglect of African regionalism it is the purpose of this thesis to make a deeper analysis of the topic in order to contribute to an opening for further analysis, perhaps with a comparative character. Furthermore, it is even possible to call the thesis a comparative study since it offers a comparison between rhetoric and reality, namely what is written in the documents of the AU and NEPAD and what is happening in reality (Esaiasson et al 2005: 119).

As has been mentioned in 1.3 the study has a theory consuming character, even if it examines two theories. This is evident in the motivation of the study as a will to foremost cast light upon NEPAD and not the two theories. The reason for using two theories is that they complement each other and offer a wider comprehension on the matter. It goes without saying that several theories have a potentially bigger explanatory value than a lone one (Esaiasson et al. 2005: 40f).

Since the study examines a few aspects thoroughly it could be said to have a qualitative character. In difference to a quantitative study the employed procedure is less formalized and might therefore be harder to follow for the reader. This may create intersubjectivity problems and the solution is to be as transparent as possible and to show every step in the analysis. This is important both for the scientific value of the result and for other student or scholars to remake the study and examine its value. The over-all ambition with the thesis is to continually tie

the theories to the analysis of the empirics (Bergström, Boréus 2000: 221, Lundquist 1993: 52).

2.2 Definitions

In order for the research to be as comprehensive as possible it is important to define some of the terms being used.

Democratization: The thesis chooses to use the definition of democratization by Jon C. Pevehouse as the process that precedes the consolidation phase, e.g. when the country starts to move towards democracy and the influence of the regional organization is at its peak (Pevehouse 2002b: 611, 615).

Good governance: The term has oftentimes been used interchangeably with democracy and the two are so closely related that one can hardly exist without the other. Good governance is therefore interpreted as governance practiced in a democratic manner (Melber 2006; 11).

Neopatrimonialism: According to Scholar Patrick Chabal the term means that "despite formal political structures, power is exercised essentially through the informal sector" (Chabal 2002: 450).

Regional integration: Paul-Henri Bischoffs states that regional integration is a "process where a group of states voluntarily and to various extents get access to each other's markets and establish mechanisms and techniques that minimize conflicts and maximize the internal and external economic, political, social and cultural profits of their co-operation" (Bischoff 2004: 121).

To reach good validity is crucial in order to get a trustworthy result. With the above definitions and others being defined throughout the thesis it is possible to state that the thesis has an approved validity (Esaiasson et al 2005: 59).

2.3 Material Critique

The thesis has mainly worked with a secondary material consisting of books, articles, reports and papers. A speech by Thabo Mbeki in his own book "*Africa Define Yourself*" as well as a letter from the Swedish embassy are the only primary material in the study.

It is important to consider the quality of sources when it comes to authenticity, independence, contemporariness and potential biases. The sources that are used

are mainly the works of scholars, politicians and other state actors. It is hard to make a judgement on how independent and authentic these actors are and the guiding principle has therefore been to rely on a source only if it is being verified by one or several others. Some of the material come from actors personally involved in the case at hand and fails therefore both regarding independence and bias. The solution has been to use them carefully and only when they describe an opinion or can be backed-up by several other sources (Esaiasson et al. 2005: 308ff).

Earlier research in the field of African regionalism, the AU and NEPAD is quite limited which creates both pros and cons. The fairly small material leads to a better overview and diminishes the risk of not having studied enough aspects of the subject. A potential disadvantage is that the picture is not yet complete and a lot of the interpretations therefore rest on the shoulders of the author of the thesis.

3 The AU

The AU was founded in 2002 as a successor of the *Organization of African Unity* (OAU). The OAU had been functioning since 1963 as the leading forum for African unity and with the main goal of freeing the African continent from Western colonialism and apartheid (Asaba 2002, Söderbaum 2005: 1). In contrast to the OAU's principle of *non-interference*, which had made the organization powerless against numerous corrupt and criminal leaders the AU set up the principle of *non-indifference*. Together with this goal the aims of the AU is to work for unity, peace, economic development, political integration and democracy. The AU is organized with the European Union as a role model and is hereby a more close-knit organization than the OAU which was designed like the UN ((Melber ed. 2006: 5, Nordlöf-Lagerkranz 2005: 5, Söderbaum: 2005: 2).

The AU consists of 53 of Africa's 54 states (Morocco has absented itself due to the acceptance of West Sahara as an independent member) and in contrast to most regional organizations there exists no entrance conditions. The organization has since its birth launched several ambitious plans in numerous different areas but due too the constant lack of money most of them has yet to be realized. The same goes for the vast number of institutions and organs that the organization is planning to create and critical voices consider them too many to be efficient even if they will come to be (Murray 2004: 268, Nordlöf-Lagerkranz 2005: 9ff). The lack of money can be traced back to the mangled budgets of the member states with economies not bigger than the size of a typical Western city of 60 000 habitants and severe problems such as brutal wars, famine and deep corruption. Due to several member states' inability to contribute to the AU budget the organization depends heavily upon a few, in comparison, rich countries such as South Africa and Nigeria (Brüntrup et al 2006: 33).

The achievements of the AU has so far been strikingly few. Most of the budget has gone to the organization's peace keeping troops in Darfur and Burundi and it is in the area of peace and security that the union has mainly advanced hitherto. Small accomplishments have been reached in the democracy area where disapprovals of the elections and temporary suspensions of Madagascar, The Central African Republic as well as Togo have given the organization some acknowledgement from outside the continent (Nordlöf-Lagerkranz 2005: 15ff, Tillander 2006: 2). The AU is also one of a few regional organizations that manage to hold annual summits with all member states being present (AU and Peace 2002: 18).

3.1 Previous Assessments

Despite the ambitious plans of the AU the results have, as concluded above, been poor, leading critics to call the union a “*paper tiger*” and a “*toothless discussion club*” (Nilsson 2004). One of the most prominent critique of the union has concerned the question of non-intervention. As already has been mentioned the AU has taken a giant step away from the OAU attitude as the union proclaimed the importance of non-indifference for promoting peace and democracy. The first proposals for an AU constitution contained several announcements of the importance of non-indifference and a fight against the principal of non-intervention. However, in the final constitution these lines have been struck, according to some critics with the purpose of creating loopholes for the member states’ governments to take advantage upon. In reality this means that the AU can only interfere in a member state’s domestic politics under the condition that grave crimes are being committed, such as genocide, and not, as it was initially intended, under the condition of malgovernance etc. (Melber 2001: 8). The union has due to this and other related actions been described as an internal club for Africa’s leaders, which has also been said along with the critique of not engaging the civil society. According to the critics the AU lacks a serious will to realize its grand plans and therefore runs the risk of becoming no more than “*old wine in new bottles*” (Nordlöf-Lagerkranz 2005: 19, Melber 2001: 9).

4 NEPAD

At a summit in 2001 of what was then still called the OAU African leaders adopted NEPAD which has later on been incorporated in the AU. NEPAD is considered the African continent's main official development programme and is sprung out of the idea of an *African Renaissance*, a concept first launched by Nelson Mandela and later on expanded and promoted by his successor Thabo Mbeki (Biswas 2003: 18, 23).

NEPAD is a political and economic programme with five core principles: good governance; entrenchment of democracy, peace and security; sound economic policy-making and execution; productive partnerships and domestic ownership and leadership (Hope: 2002: 387). The goal of the programme is that, with the help from the international community, NEPAD should promote the above objectives on the African continent and through this enable Africa to rise from her low position in the global society (www.nepad.org (b)). It is important to point to the fact that NEPAD is said to be *African-owned* – in contrast to previous recovery plans that the continent has undertaken in the past (Brüntrup et al 2006: 9). For this NEPAD has been enthusiastically pushed by the West, especially the G-8, and has been embraced by it and other external actors. The programme of NEPAD was first launched abroad before presented to the African societies and once approved by the AU NEPAD was endorsed as Africa's official development strategy through a UN resolution (Melber 2006: 5, Taylor 2005: 1).

4.1 A Historical Overview

NEPAD is not the first development plan for the African continent and for a clear understanding of the project a historical overview of what preceded it is of use.

In the 1970's the first debate emerged over Africa's inferior role in the global society and how the continent could better fit into the wider international political economy. The colonial legacy was to blame for all of Africa's predicaments, according to these first debates. This stance was clearly stated in one of the main programmes at the time; the *Lagos Plan of Action* (LPA) from 1980. Yet, according to many scholars the LPA and other programmes launched at this time failed due to their incapability of seeing malgovernance of African leaders as an obstacle to African recovery (Taylor 2005: 15ff).

During the 1980's a new and harsher stance towards Africa was undertaken by the credit institutes in the West. Aid and financial loans were to be given only under the condition of privatization and liberalization. Thus the 1990's saw a number of such programmes in numerous African countries, sadly, most often with extremely bad results (Taylor 2005: 29).

In the beginning of the new millennium the three most active African presidents for renewal and reforms, Algeria's Abdelaziz Bouteflika, Nigeria's Olusegun Obasanjo and South Africa's Thabo Mbeki requested a mandate from the OAU to draw up a new plan for Africa's development. Together with two other recovery plans launched between 2000 and 2001 this initiative was merged into one, named the *New African Initiative*. The programme was implemented under the OAU and in October 2001 renamed NEPAD (de Waal 2002: 466f). It should be noted that Thabo Mbeki has played the most important role in the NEPAD project so far. The promotion of the catchphrase African Renaissance in the late 1990's helped to rally policy-makers, bureaucrats and intellectuals behind the old idea of African uprising through African unity and by that managed to get attention for the African cause from the international community (Cornwell et al 2002: 6).

4.2 The Work for Democracy

Ensuring democracy on the African continent is one of NEPAD's main priorities (www.nepad.org (b)). According to the constructors of the programme democracy is spreading across the African continent, backed by the AU and marked by an increasing number of democratically elected leaders. Democracy is seen as a core condition for the objective of achieving sustainable development and under Paragraph 49 in the NEPAD Framework Document it is stated that African leaders will take joint responsibility for promoting and protecting democracy (www.nepad.org (a)). Furthermore NEPAD undertakes to respect "*global standards of democracy*" of which include political pluralism, allowing for the existence of several political parties and fair, open and democratic elections to be organized periodically. The work of NEPAD is said to be in line with the principles of democracy, accountability, integrity, transparency, promotion of the rule of law and respect for human rights and NEPAD demands the participating governments to commit to these principles. Through the implementation of these objectives NEPAD will become "*one of the pillars of world democracy...*" (Hope 2002: 393, www.nepad.org (a)).

According to many scholars NEPAD's intense stress for democracy and good governance separates it from earlier African attempts to seek external support for development issues. This has also been strongly emphasized by Thabo Mbeki who has labeled NEPAD as something "*unique in African history*" in that co-operation and accountability among the leaders in Africa and to their people are of primary

importance for the programme (Cornwell et al 2002: 11). This so called joint monitoring process where actors are accountable to one another also includes the donors of NEPAD (the international community) as well as the civil society in Africa. The process could, according to some sources, become the main means of democratizing both NEPAD itself and the participating countries (de Waal 2002: 474).

4.2.1 The APRM

Another type of monitoring process for promoting democracy is set out by the *African Peer Review Mechanism* (APRM) which seeks to monitor and advice governance issues. The APRM is said to be the most important of the practical plans within NEPAD and what sets it apart from similar previous attempts (Brüntrup et al 2006: 34). The APRM has drawn the widest interest of all NEPAD projects, especially from outside Africa and is considered a corner stone of NEPAD (Biswas 2003: 31, Jordaan 2006: 334). The objectives of the mechanism are to oversee and enforce democratization and respect for human rights amongst the states that apply for a review (Jordaan 2006: 334). The participation is thus voluntarily and is offered to all the members of the AU. The procedure of the APRM is an examination of a member state's governance by other members. In practice the work is carried out through different stages which contains written reports by the country under scrutiny and an APRM team as well as visits to the country. Depending on how well the country answers to the given critique NEPAD responds with either assistance to the country or condemnation and sanctions (Jordaan 2006: 337f).

Since the APRM is performed by the member states of NEPAD it relies heavily upon mutual trust and accountability among the states involved. The strong emphasis on sovereignty that African states are still devoted to might be the reason for the low participation in the APRM where less than half of the members in the AU had joined the programme by the end of 2005 (Melber 2006: 39, 46).

4.3 Previous Assessments

In contrast to earlier efforts for promoting democracy on the African continent NEPAD has practical solutions to the ambitious plans and various scholars see its strong emphasis on democracy and sound governance as something that makes it genuinely different from earlier initiatives (Melber 2002: 202). The notion of NEPAD that socio-economic development is dependent on democracy, human rights and good governance is said to be unprecedented in the history of African regional cooperation and this has contributed to the great attention NEPAD has received from outside Africa (Brüntrup et al 2006: 5).

However, NEPAD is facing numerous challenges and many critics are pessimistic about the future of the programme. One of these is the relationship between the AU and NEPAD which lately has been said to be frosty. The integration of NEPAD into the union has not been smooth and voices have been raised that NEPAD is becoming more of a “Mini-AU” and that the roles of the two projects collide (Tillander: 2006). According to many scholars the relationship between the AU and NEPAD is still vague and documents that aim to outline the relationship are often contradictory, sometimes expressing NEPAD’s subsidiary role towards the AU and other times suggesting an equal relationship (Karuombe 2003: 17). An example of the colliding roles of the two projects is the amendment in the AU constitution (se 3.1) which strictly goes against the principles for good governance of NEPAD. Some critics have called the NEPAD project *old wine in new bottles*, referring to the fact that the programme does not offer anything new to the situation in Africa, whilst other claim it to be *new wine in old bottles*, suggesting that the malfunctioning structures of the AU is holding NEPAD back (Cornwell et al 2002: 10, 13).

5 Regional Organizations and Democratization – the Theory of Jon C. Pevehouse

Assistant professor Jon C. Pevehouse has composed a study over the relationship between membership in international organizations and democratization. The study contains both a quantitative empirical test of the argument that membership in an international organization increases the likelihood for democratization and a theoretical approach to why this correlation exists. The task of this section will be to present an overview of Pevehouse's study, focusing on parts that has applicability to the thesis.

5.1 Theoretical Background

Albeit a vast literature on democratic transitions there exists hardly no studies, neither theoretical nor empirical, pointing to external factors as being important to the democratization process. Most of the democratic studies focus on the domestic arena where the role of civil society and various elites are popular objects to scrutinize. Certainly Jon C Pevehouse notices that there has emerged a literature over the influence of external actors, yet, this new subject is still too young to have been developing any theories as to why and how these actors influence the democracy process. Thus the aim of Pevehouse is to develop such a theory, backed up by a quantitative research on the topic. Given the prominent role of regional organizations in today's globalized society it is chosen as the focus of his democratization study. The hypothesis of the study is that regional organizations increase the chance for countries to democratize (Pevehouse 2002a: 515f).

5.2 The Impact of Regional Organizations

According to Pevehouse membership in a regional organization possesses a greater prerequisite for democracy than a no-membership. This is due to the fact that the organization with different mechanisms provides more incentives for democracy than a single country can provide alone. There are different ways in which the regional organization could be said to be a more efficient promoter for democracy. These are for example mechanisms to increase the costs for anti-

democratic behavior (diplomatic pressure, economic sanctions, expulsion) and audience cost for countries that go against the principles of the organization. Empirical research show that international organizations possess a great ability to constrain the actions of member states. In practice the pressure and coercion set out by the organization makes the country liberalize more than it would otherwise do (Pevehouse 2002a: 522, Pevehouse 2002b: 613f).

5.3 The Nature of the Organization and its Members

For the argument above to become real there must prevail certain conditions within the regional organization. These differences could be illustrated as three kinds of characteristics that the organization at least must comprise.

1. The political will to *set* conditions on membership in the organization. The member states of the organization must agree amongst themselves to implement certain conditions that all the members must live up to.
2. The political will to *enforce* these conditions if they are not being adhered. Again, this must come true through agreement amongst the members.
3. The *means* to enforce the conditions (Pevehouse 2002b: 615).

Along with the above prerequisites Pevehouse introduces the hypothesis of the *democratic density*. This implies that the higher the “*democraticness*” of each member state the more likely the organization will be to set and enforce the agreed conditions of liberalization. Empirically there are circumstantial evidences that regional organizations do inflict punishment on countries that break agreements. The importance of signaling credible commitments to reform is crucial for the whole process since a perception that conditions will not be enforced will lead to a minimal influence by the organization (Pevehouse 2002b: 616, 623).

The first and second of the criterias above suggests that there must exist a will amongst the members of an organization for the effect to arise. The reason why these countries would pressure non-democratic states to become democracies are also a part of Pevehouse’s theory. The most prominent of these is a will among the states to boost their own international status (Pevehouse 2002a: 522f). As Laurence Whitehead also suggests:

“(S)uccess in supporting democracy abroad has served to reinforce the legitimation of the democratic order at home, and to boost national pride and self-confidence” (Whitehead 1996: 248).

6 The Theory of Pevehouse Applied on NEPAD and the AU

The following text is an analysis of Pevehouse's theory applied to the case of the AU and NEPAD. Through empirical patronage the thesis will examine the democracy work within the two initiatives and see if the result coincides with the theory. The text begins with an overview of the written documents behind the AU and NEPAD to scrutinize if the prerequisites of the theory of Pevehouse exist. After this follows an analysis over the democracy work within NEPAD and the AU and an assessment of it. This is partly done through an overview of the situation in Zimbabwe and an evaluation of NEPAD's and the AU's actions concerning it.

6.1 Testing the Criterias of Pevehouse

6.1.1 The Political Will to Work for Democracy and to Set Conditions on Membership

The emphasis on democracy and good governance are obvious in the documents and papers of the AU. In the Constitutive Act of the union the stress for democracy is underlined already in the introduction where it is stated that heads of state and government of member states are determined to consolidate democratic institutions and to ensure good governance. Additionally, Article three expresses that the objective of the union will, amongst others, be to promote democratic principles and institutions, popular participation and good governance whilst Article four states that one of the principles of the union is the respect for democratic principles as well as good governance (www.africa-union.org). Moving on to NEPAD the strive for democracy is of deep concern for the co-operation. The importance of democracy and good governance are heavily emphasized throughout the whole framework document, ranging from the introduction to the conclusions (see further under 4.2).

Thus, it seems as if the AU and NEPAD are highly concerned with democracy building but do they have the will to set conditions on the member states concerning democracy? The AU is open to all African countries and therefore every country that applies for membership is welcome to join (Schoeman 2003: 18). The act does not put up any prepared conditions for entry nor does it state any specified conditions for the continuence of a membership (www.africa-union.org).

Since NEPAD is a programme within the AU there automatically should not exist any conditions on participation in this programme either. Yet, some scholars interpret the design of NEPAD as a club to which membership must be earned and because of the unclear relationship between the AU and NEPAD (see 4.3) it is uncertain how powerful NEPAD claims are in relation to the AU (Karuombe 2003: 17).

6.1.2 The Political Will to Enforce Conditions if They Are Not Being Adhered

Since there exists no specified conditions for membership in the AU there cannot prevail any will to enforce them. However, the AU contains distinct announcements of actions that will be taken against members that fail to live up to the rules of the union. Under Article 23 in the Constitutive Act of the AU it is stated that a member that fails to comply with the decisions and policies of the union may be subjected to sanctions, such as denial of communication with other members or other political and economical injunctions. Furthermore, Article 30 outlines that any government that comes to power through unconstitutional means will not be allowed to participate in the activities of the AU (www.au.org). Concerning NEPAD there exists no specific sanctions in the Framework Document that comprise the whole programme. Yet, since NEPAD is part of the AU the same sanctions imply for it. Moreover, the countries that have joined the APRM run the risk of penalties if they fail to take appropriate measures to implement the recommendations of the APRM committee (see 4.2.1). Furthermore, the Chairman of the Steering Committee for NEPAD, Wiseman Nkhulu, has stated that penalizing action will be taken against countries failing to obey the rules of NEPAD (Taylor, Williams 2002: 559).

6.1.3 The Means to Enforce Conditions

The Framework Document of NEPAD as well as the Constitutive Act of the AU state that the two initiatives will receive funding both from their members and from the international community, foremost the G-8 (www.africa-union.org, www.nepad.org (a)). Yet, as has been stated in Chapter three the AU lacks proper funding in every area of the organization. This should therefore also apply to the means to enforce conditions on the member states. Concerning NEPAD, although Mbeki and his fellow delegates have been on several funding tours to the West to collect finances for NEPAD the lack of money is evident in most areas of the co-operation (see further in 6.2.1).

The test on the wills and means of the AU and NEPAD has given a mixed result. The conclusion is that the theory of Pevehouse does not show an unquestionable applicability to the case of the AU and NEPAD. However, the test has revealed enough similarities with the preconditions of Pevehouse's theory to allow for a

further usage of it. This will not be in order to falsify the theory but as a background model to evaluate the democracy work within the AU and NEPAD. According to this it should be possible to show empirics pointing in the same direction as Pevehouse's. That is to say that an assessment of the two initiatives should conclude that both of them have worked positively towards an increased democracy within the member states. This is the task of the next section.

6.2 Assessing the Democracy Work

As already has been noted most of the objectives within NEPAD are not new for the African continent and many ambitious programmes have preceded it. The long record on earlier attempts that have failed is an obstacle to the programme's credibility and many scholars are pessimistic about why NEPAD should be any different. NEPAD is drawn up by state leaders where a majority have never before been faithful to the idea of democracy and many of them only support the demands for democracy because access to the state and to its resources will then become easier. African leaders have been said to be the source to the problems of the African continent, yet, in the work of NEPAD, these are the ones who are said to be the solution (Brüntrup et al 2006: 31, 35f). An example of this is the NEPAD initiator Olusegun Obasanjo whose ruling in Nigeria has become synonymous with corruption and malgovernance (Taylor 2005: 48f).

6.2.1 The Record

Concerning the AU some successful gains have been made regarding democracy. The most prominent accomplishments are rejection of the Madagascan government in 2002 and a condemnation of the military coups in the Central African Republic in 2003 and in Togo in 2005² (Nordlöf-Lagerkranz 2005: 15f). Yet, the overwhelming majority of the democracy work cannot be said to be in line with these actions and, according to many judgments, the democracy record has so far been neither good nor encouraging. Recent elections in Cameroon, Malawi and Nigeria were heavily condemned by the international community whilst the AU happily declared them free and fair (Melber 2006: 35). Other letdowns occurred during the summit in Banjul, the Gambia in 2006 with the failure of ratifying key protocols on human rights and corruption. At this occasion the member states also failed in agreeing in debate on the African Charter for Democracy concerning outlawing the extension of a president's tenure by changing the constitution (Africa Confidential 07.07.06: 1f). Furthermore the

² Despite the initial successful condemnations the negotiated deal between the coup-makers and the AU was not in line with the organization's democracy agenda since the hastily organized elections were in deep favor of the coup-makers (Melber 2006: 35f).

organization has failed to live up to Article 30 in the Constitutive Act (see 6.1.2.) when letting corrupt leaders such as Marshal Omer, Sassou-Nguesso and Yahya Jammeh all candidate for hosting AU programmes and when accommodating Mauritania's coup-makers (Africa Confidential 03.02.06: 6).

Regarding NEPAD almost the same pattern can be found. One of these is the immense discrepancy between what is written in the NEPAD Framework Document and what is happening in reality. For example, the promoters of NEPAD have, in contrast to what the documents say, not engaged the civil society or the African people in the work and according to critique NEPAD is alien to most Africans. This has led to a disapproval of the programme by virtually all NGO's and grassroots organizations in Africa (Karuombe 2003: 23; Matthews 2003: 73, Taylor 2005: 163, 167, 172). What the APRM concerns the outcome is a bit uncertain due to the programme's youth. The first two countries that signed up for a review were Rwanda and Ghana and the process is not finished with any of them. Hitherto the first report of the APRM group over Ghana is completed and it is said to be unexpectedly critical of the government's record of accountability (Africa Confidential 23.09.05: 6). The APRM process in Rwanda has gone further. A report is completed and the government of Rwanda has had the chance to comment upon it. Sadly, the Rwandan response has been insufficient and what the APRM group concerns they are said to be putting a too heavy focus on the Rwandan government and ignoring the participation of civil society. According to the APRM itself the latter should be of highest concern in the whole process (Jordaan 2006: 335, 344, 350).

Perhaps the biggest disappointment concerning the APRM is the change in attitudes by the African leaders backing the programme. From the beginning it was highly emphasized that the APRM was political and foremost aimed at promoting democracy and good governance. But due to emerged controversies inside NEPAD Thabo Mbeki suddenly changed opinions and declared that the APRM was not to handle political governance review but simply the less heated question of economic performance. The statement led to strong critique from the Western countries who had seen the APRM as something outstanding from previous African initiatives. Diplomats from the Western countries expressed that they perhaps had been naïve in believing the first declarations of the APRM but that they had been taken by Thabo Mbeki because he was going where no other African leader had ever dared (Taylor 2005: 65ff).

The overall picture of the achievements of the democracy work within the AU and NEPAD shows obvious deficiencies and huge problems. Much is due to the lack of finances which is said to be putting NEPAD on the same track as previous plans. In 2004 only 4 billion US dollars had been collected out of the requested sum of 64 billion US dollars. But the lack of money is not the biggest problem facing the programme. As scholars have said about other projects the attitude of the African leaders is posing the biggest threat to the future of NEPAD. The leaders are set to be the advocates of the programme but up until today only

Thabo Mbeki has spent significant time on the promotion. An even bigger problem lies in the prevalence of neopatrimonialism in many African countries. There is very little evidence that the emergence of NEPAD has changed this situation and most of the leaders have been able to continue business as usual where the personal gains always go before the public good. Due to this it is hard to see any concrete progress of NEPAD beyond the numerous meetings, summit and speeches (Taylor 2005: 155f, 159, 162).

As the president of Senegal ... recently complained:

“We have not had one project that has been realized. It is time to reflect... We are spending lots of resources on conferences and we still don't know our objectives” (Saturday Star, Johannesburg 23.10.04).

6.3 A Litmus Test for the Democracy Work Within NEPAD and the AU – the Case of Zimbabwe

Simultaneously with the emergence of NEPAD at the end of the last century was the rising crisis in Zimbabwe and it was from the beginning seen as the test case for evaluating the credibility of NEPAD. Various scholars refer to the crisis as the “*NEPAD litmus test*” and “*a test of the continent's leaders' commitment to democracy*” and this is also the way in which the thesis will use the Zimbabwe question (Melber 2002: 202, Taylor 2005: 112). If NEPAD's strong emphasis on democracy and good governance is more than lip service this should be demonstrated in reality by implementing the policy on a real case (Cornwell et al 2002: 12). An assessment of this is the task of the section.

6.3.1 The Crisis in Zimbabwe – a Review

The situation in Zimbabwe could be described as a deep crisis in most parts of society which has been paralyzing the country since the end of the 1990's³. President Robert Mugabe and the government party ZANU-PF have been in power since Zimbabwe's independence in 1980. The politics is a combination of authoritarian and democratic elements where elections are being held but are always more or less rigged by the regime. It is a politic in favor of the president

³ Before then Zimbabwe was one of the most robust economies in Africa with a newly launched and successful programme for market economy. The plunge into the current crisis started at the break of the new millennium with several shock events, one of them being the land reform in 2000 which left white farmers without land and the country without sufficient food supply (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2006: 4ff).

who has concentrated most of the power around his own person and a clear example of neopatrimonialism (Dansereau, Zamponi 2005: 29). The issue of democracy is at the centre of the crisis and Mugabe and ZANU-PF are famous for engaging in political violence. In every election since 1980 the strategies of ZANU-PF has been to deploy organized violence and intimidation of the opposition in order to maximize its power. In the 2000 elections the main opposition party *Movement for Democratic Change* (MDC) was the target of the brutal actions of ZANU-PF. The government made speeches in which they sanctioned the use of violence against the MDC and the Defence Minister Moven Mahachi declared:

“(W)e will move from door to door, killing like we did to Chiminya (member of MDC). I am the minister responsible for defence therefore I am capable of killing.” (Kriger 2005: 2, 26).

200 000 incidence of political violence were estimated for the first half of 2000 forcing the MDC to stop campaigning. Yet, the intimidation also concerned the ordinary population and before the elections people were told that there would be cameras in the voting booths to detect for whom people voted. It was made clear by the ZANU-PF that those who voted for the MDC would be killed (Kriger 2005: 27).

The elections in 2002 attracted widespread international attention but still the violence continued to be used as a campaigning tool by the ZANU-PF and only those election observers who were sympathetic to the regime were allowed into the country. The EU and the US government chose to not recognize the election and the reports that came confirmed that the voting process was neither secret nor free and fair (Raftopoulos 2002: 413, 417, 421).

The current situation in Zimbabwe is as destructive for the future as ever before. Political and economic paralysis has overtaken the country completely and the MDC is crushed and no longer seen as a serious threat to the government. International action has been ineffectual, partly due to Zimbabwe’s increased reliance of China as an economic partner. In the summer of 2005 at a UN summit Mugabe declared that he intends to step down at the end of his mandate in 2008. Sceptical voices have been raised about the seriousness in this statement and even if it is true the international community is afraid of the consequences. Chaos and perhaps an even deeper economical plunge could be some of the costs and the army has lately tightened its grip on the government, casting a dark shadow over the future (Africa Confidential 22.07.05: 8, 23.09.05: 8, 20.01.06: 5, 02.05.06: 1 and 17.11.06: 1).

6.3.2 NEPAD's and the AU's Response to the Crisis in Zimbabwe

"I have been saying to the...developed world that they need to respond positively (to NEPAD) ... to challenge us, to say 'this is what you say but we want to see practical action from you consistent with what you are saying'" (Mbeki 2002: 204).

The above are the words of Thabo Mbeki, declared only months before the 2002 elections in Zimbabwe. It is obvious that Mbeki encourages the surrounding world to critically examine the work of NEPAD and this is therefore the task here. The 2002 elections in Zimbabwe are particularly interesting since they were conducted at a time when NEPAD was newly launched and followed with interest by the rest of the world. Many international observers, politicians, Africans and foremost Zimbabweans were expecting a NEPAD stance on the matter and consequently these elections will be in focus in the assessment. It should be noted that the position of the AU and NEPAD have not changed during the period of 2002 and 2006 and thus it is possible to use this case as an example of the overall standpoint of both the AU and NEPAD (Taylor 2005: 104).

The Zimbabwean elections in 2002 were, as have been expressed earlier, a clear case of non-democratic procedures. The elections took place at a time when the Zimbabwe crisis was intensifying and the condemnations from the international community were pouring down on president Mugabe and the ZANU-PF. As an answer to all the critique the Zimbabwean government asserted that the international community were acting under the agenda of a white racist conspiracy towards Africa and that this project was led by Britain's Prime minister Tony Blair and his "*gay gangsters*" (Taylor 2005: 104f). The response from the AU and NEPAD to both the elections and the accusations was a disappointment to the rest of the world. Although the actions of the Zimbabwean governments both before the elections and during it clearly go against the democratic fundamentals of NEPAD an observer team from the AU saw the elections as "*transparent, credible, free and fair*" (Daily News, Harare, 15.03.02, Taylor 2002: 405). Meanwhile Tanzania's president Benjamin Mkapa called Mugabe "*a champion of democracy*" whilst Thabo Mbeki asserted that South Africa would help Zimbabwe regardless of the outcome of the election and that "*the will of the people of Zimbabwe had prevailed*" (Taylor 2002: 407). Concerning the accusations against Blair and the international community Mbeki proclaimed that any attempt to punish Mugabe for his malgovernance was "*inspired by notions of white supremacy*" (Taylor 2005: 114).

The statements above created widespread dislike within the international community and even some laughter from foreign journalists and diplomats attending the press conferences where the opinions were initially launched (Taylor 2002: 407). To the Western governments the reactions of the members of NEPAD were of great magnitude for their evaluation of the prospects of NEPAD and it was asserted that they wanted to see a clear dissociation from the behavior of

Mugabe and the ZANU-PF and an isolation of the country by all African leaders. Unfortunately, this will was clearly not being adhered by their African counterparts. Sadly, the strongest support for Mugabe has since the beginning of the crisis come from Thabo Mbeki who uses to be seen, by the West, as the most trustable of African leaders. Representatives of his government have made clear that South Africa will not criticize Zimbabwe “*no matter what*” and South African observers told Washington Post that they did not want to see Mugabe loose since he was still a hero to many of them. The South African support for Mugabe and his government has severely damaged the credibility of NEPAD and some scholars even go as far as saying that there would not be a Zimbabwe crisis without South African support (Taylor 2005: 111, 120, Taylor, Williams 2002: 559, 561). Instead of trying to change the agenda of the Zimbabwean government to be in line with the standpoints of NEPAD the African leaders, and particularly Mbeki, chose to try to change the core meaning of NEPAD and claim a non-applicability of NEPAD to the Zimbabwe case. The South African minister of Foreign Affairs launched this new standpoint as he was saying that NEPAD is not a “*relevant framework of reference*” in terms of the Zimbabwe situation and a recent analysis made by South Africa points out that “*NEPAD does not introduce the possibility of excluding countries not satisfying the political criteria for...democracy...*” (Melber 2002:207). The situation is said to be dealt with within other structures such as the framework of the AU but at the same time Thabo Mbeki is said to have gone to absurd lengths to block the issue of democracy and human rights abuses from being discussed within the AU framework (Melber 2006: 35, Taylor, Williams 2002: 563).

The previous summits of the AU in Khartoum, Sudan in January 2006 and in Banjul, the Gambia in July 2006 showed that Mugabe’s influence over the AU is still strong. Signs of this was that a report on Zimbabwe that had been prepared for the Khartoum summit by the AU’s African Commission of Human and People’s Rights was postponed “*thanks to... Harare’s diplomatic manoeuvres*” (Africa Confidential 03.02.06). During the Banjul summit Mugabe persuaded his fellow delegates to reject an extremely critical report on Zimbabwe by the same commission and prevented Kofi Annan to mediate in Zimbabwe (as had been planned) by appointing his own mediator and close friend Tanzania’s now former president Benjamin Mkapa (Africa Confidential 07.07.06).

The situation in Zimbabwe has shown that there is little commitment by the African leaders to the standards of NEPAD. Thabo Mbeki has earlier stated that if African leaders cannot unite through the initiative they will lose an opportunity “*that will not arise again for some time*”. NEPAD’s inaction over Zimbabwe has ironically enough produced this lost opportunity (Taylor 2002: 408ff). A South African analyst claims that “*so long as Zimbabwe (the crisis) exists, NEPAD and the AU are non-starters*” and even NEPAD Secretariat’s David Malcomson has admitted that “*Wherever we go, Zimbabwe is thrown at us as the reason why NEPAD’s a joke*” To answer the headline of this section – NEPAD has clearly failed the litmus test (Taylor 2005: 126).

6.4 Conclusion No. 1

The analysis in 6.1 showed that, even if some prerequisites lacked, the theory of Pevehouse had enough applicability to the case of the AU and NEPAD to be a useful model for the assessment. The evaluation in 6.2 and 6.3 then showed that neither the AU nor NEPAD provided the same result as the theory of Pevehouse, none of them are convincing promoters of democracy in the member states. It was stated that they both are disappointments on the democracy area and that they do not live up to their written agendas. The question one poses is why this is the case. Why is there such an obvious discrepancy between rhetoric and reality concerning the AU and NEPAD? The rest of the thesis will be dedicated to the answering of this question and it will be opened by a presentation of an additional theory that eventually will provide the answer.

7 Regime-Boosting – the Theory of Fredrik Söderbaum

In spite of an abundance of literature on regionalism political science often fail to explain the causes behind deteriorating regional cooperation attempts in Africa. According to Scholar Fredrik Söderbaum there is a need for a new theoretical approach to regionalism, which he seeks to contribute to by theorizing about the role of the state, state actors and how they contribute to the failures of cooperation in Africa. Söderbaum takes his point of departure in the established notion that states in Africa are weak but yet enjoying international recognition. This has led to a heavy emphasis by the weak states on sovereignty and on non-intervention in order to enhance the power of the governing elite and extend its time in power. The emphasis has been highly successful in Africa which has resulted in a paradox of weak states and strong regimes where personal leaders embody the idea of the state. The phenomenon is often referred to as neopatrimonialism, however, the theory of Söderbaum focuses on a special part of this form of governing, namely, what he refers to as *regime-boosting* (Söderbaum 2003: 9ff).

7.1 The Idea and Signs of Regime-Boosting

The personal ruling in Africa has, according to Söderbaum, led to a situation where the political power has become personal and where politics has become a business strategy, in the sense that the leader and the regime use the coercive instruments of the state to enhance their power and reach personal ends. In countries where the phenomenon occurs it is expected that the leader and the regime also use the regional channels that the country is a part of for promoting their interest and maximizing the sovereignty of the state rather than striving for what is best for the citizens. This type of action is by Söderbaum called regime-boosting and is common in countries where the state is not much more than what could be referred to as a neopatrimonial interest group or even a mafia syndicate (Söderbaum 2003: 10f, 14).

By participating in various regional co-operations the regime-boosting actors are able to raise the profile and status of their authoritarian regimes by praising the values of regionalism and co-operation and hereby enhancing their own power. The regional organization works as a façade where numerous treaties and resolutions are being signed which are short of any real demands on the

signatories and which lack the intention of ever being implemented. The meetings and summits of the organizations are highly formalized, making the organization look serious in the eyes of the surrounding world, but they involve no real debate and the implementation of programmes and projects are seen as costs rather than gains. The goal of these actors is to make the organization as inefficient as possible in order to focus on regime-boosting rather than regionalism. In the eyes of the regime-boosters it is therefore affirmative to create organizations that embraces numerous focus areas, contains a countless number of members and which work overlaps several other organizations'. In this way the regime-boosters are offered an extensive arena to promote their own interest while the overlapping of the organizations creates confusion and ensures that implementation of real policies are difficult or even impossible. In this manner it is also positive that the regional organization lacks a proper funding and that the funding demands on the members are limited. This enables the regime-boosters to pay tribute to the goals of regionalism while doing little to ensure the implementation or to pay for it (Söderbaum 2003: 11, 13, 15, 18f).

It has often been said that regionalism leads to a decrease of sovereignty of the participating parts and that sovereignty is an obstacle to the former. The theory of Söderbaum shows that this does not need to be the case and that regionalism in Africa is used to promote rather than to reduce absolute sovereignty. It needs to be said however that not all states participating in African regionalism are actors of regime-boosting. There are several sincere promoters of co-operation but unfortunately regime-boosting efficiently crowds-out these constructive attempts and often successfully hijacks the regional organization and drains it from all positive intentions. The result is undemocratically ruling where political elites increase their own power and wealth at the expense of an often exceedingly poor population and where the carefully kept façade holds the rest of the world unaware of these destructive actions (Söderbaum 2003: 12, 14, 21).

8 The Theory of Söderbaum Applied on NEPAD and the AU

The theory by Fredrik Söderbaum was presented in chapter seven as an attempt to show an alternative approach to regionalism in Africa and to fill the gaps of Pevehouse's theory. This chapter aims at substantiating why Söderbaum's theory could work as a complement to Pevehouse's theory. The intention is to show that a presence of regime-boosting within the democracy work of the AU and NEPAD is the reason for why the reality of the two projects does not resemble the idea behind them. Since many of the empirical signs of the regime boosting theory have been presented in chapter six and also to some extent in chapter three and four (although without a reference to Söderbaum's theory) this section will be considerably shorter than previous analysis.

8.1 The Signs of Regime-Boosting Within the AU and NEPAD

The co-operation within the AU and NEPAD could be described as a textbook example of the regime-boosting theory. All of the signs of occurrence of such a phenomenon are evident when scrutinizing the two initiatives and some of them have already been presented in the thesis. To start with Söderbaum suggests that regime-boosting arises in weak African states where the regimes put a heavy emphasis on sovereignty and non-intervention in order to enhance their power. The amendments in the constitution of the AU which put a stop to the strive for non-indifference and instead reassumed the idea of non-intervention is perhaps the clearest example of the reluctance towards decreased sovereignty among the member states (see 3.1). This attitude has also been evident in various statements and stance taken by African leaders, for example the Sudan unwillingness towards humanitarian intervention in the country by AU-forces and the Zimbabwean decision to stay out of the APRM (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2006: 19).

When it comes to the AU and NEPAD the initiatives in themselves contain several of the characteristics of the regime-boosting theory. First, as already has been noted, both the union and NEPAD lack financial support, both from the international society and the member states. This is perfectly in line with Söderbaum's theory which suggests that a lack of finances favours the regime-boosters since the result is an inefficient organization. Second, another positive aspect for regime-boosters is a high amount of members in a co-operation - the

AU and NEPAD consist of 53 states, only one state away from 100% participation. Third, both the AU and NEPAD have over-ambitious agendas and contain numerous working areas. There are fears that these are too many to ever become efficient or even implemented and the record has it that the fear is justified since only a small number of the numerous treaties that have been signed are implemented. All of the above are typical signs of regime-boosting which sees it as important to show the world a serious façade by signing treaties but then prevents them from becoming reality through over-loading the organizations and refusing to implement the agreements (Cornwell et al 2002: 12, Leshaba 2004: 4f, Melber 2001: 7). The behavior is also evident in the written documents of the AU and NEPAD. The Constitutive Act of the AU and the Framework Document of NEPAD are filled to capacity with principles and objectives, thus, giving the projects a serious impression. Yet, they are short of mechanisms for implementing the plans and the language of especially the NEPAD document is extremely vague. This aggravates the process of making theory into reality and that is just what the regime-boosters strive for (Gibb et al 2002: 148, Hansen, Johannsen ed. 2003: 14, Ross ed. 2003: 104). Fifth, other reasons for the lack of implementation is the constant overlapping, both between the AU and NEPAD and between the two initiatives and other African regional co-operations. The overlapping in working areas creates problems in more than one way. First, due to economic shortage many states have to choose between which regional cooperation they will play an active part in and allocate resources for. Second, the overlapping of agendas between the cooperations slows down the working pace which has been obvious in the overlapping between the AU and NEPAD (see 4.3) (Leshaba 2004: 5, 11, Schoeman 2003: 10).

A final important sign of regime-boosting is that despite both the AU's and NEPAD's emphasis on engaging civil society the record on this area is still very poor. Empowering civil society would mean decreasing the power of the African leaders and that would not resemble well with the regime-boosting theory. The NEPAD document was formulated quickly by a few leaders and it is highly possible that the sections in the document about engaging civil society were just another part of the façade. This is especially evident in the case of the APRM where the accession to a review requires an application by the government and both the Ghanian and the Rwandian cases show that civil society has been largely locked out from the whole peer reviewing process. This has led critics to call the APRM a "*club of mutually adoring ... actors who ... read the signs of the times without abandoning their policy that are inconsistent with ... good governance*" (Biswas 2003: 33, Jordaan 2006: 350, Melber 2006: 7).

8.1.1 The Signs of Regime-Boosting in the Zimbabwe Crisis

The Zimbabwe crisis is a clear example of actions of regime-boosting amongst African leaders. Mugabe's answer to the West's critique about the continued colonial racism against Africa allowed the African leaders to side-step the issues

of democracy and instead protect Robert Mugabe. The consequence of not showing a united front might otherwise have been that the criticism spread to other regimes and decreased other leader's power. Most African heads of state sit in democratic glass houses with several serious infringements on their consciences. The cost of losing credibility in the eyes of the people and the international community is therefore subordinate to the cost of diminished power (Karuombe 2003: 26, Taylor 2002: 406f). Furthermore, Mugabe has from the beginning been one of the biggest promoters for the AU and its work and is seen as one of the strongest leaders in the union. His status has, according to the regime-boosting theory, led to a position where his domestic actions are not questioned by the other leaders in the organization, leading the leader of MDC to refer to NEPAD as follows:

"You know this is the saddest thing about Africa, all these flowery declarations and all without commitment. There's no commitment because there is no holding to account... The declarations are not worth the paper they're written on..." (Taylor 2002: 406)

To sum up, the way NEPAD and the AU were handling the Zimbabwe crisis showed, to many observers, that the political will was lacking amongst the African elites to criticize even the most heinous of the continent's regimes (Taylor 2005: 170).

8.1.2 The Context Behind Regime-Boosting

As has been noted earlier many previous African initiatives have failed as a result of political leadership more concerned with acquiring or maintaining personal power and prestige than with wider regional interest. African leaders have always been averse to engaging in projects that can diminish their regional position to the benefit of another leader – in other words showing a great resemblance with the regime-boosting theory (Hope 2002: 398). In this context, why should the democracy projects within NEPAD be different from earlier attempts? The undermining of the democratic intentions within both the AU and NEPAD are natural regarding the fact that a majority of the state leaders are dictators who have been in power since independence and whose position is being deeply threatened by claims for democracy (Jordaan 2006: 350).

Due to the heavy emphasis on democracy building coming from the West the use of the democracy slogan is a way for the African leaders to disguise their despotic practices. The holding of elections have given these leaders an aura of democratic legitimacy that ironically has strengthened their power to rule (Chabal 2002: 462). The gathering of a few symbolic figures is therefore optimal for these men and observers claim that they will hardly do anything that will promote or further the AU and NEPAD agenda for democracy. At the end of the day NEPAD

is in this view nothing more than a boys' club of dictators (Melber 2006: 10, 18, Mills 2004: 28, Taylor 2002: 408).

As Söderbaum notes not all leaders in a regional cooperation practice regime-boosting and this is also the case with NEPAD. One of the leading promoters of NEPAD shows an opposing stance towards regime-boosting when stating:

“I am disappointed (with NEPAD). I have great difficulties explaining what we have achieved when people at home and elsewhere ask me that question... We're spending a lot of money and, above all, losing time with repetition and conferences that end and you're not quite sure what they've achieved” (Taylor 2005: 154)

But as Söderbaum's theory suggests and the analysis in this thesis has shown, the regime-boosters have in many ways crowded-out the sincere promoters of NEPAD and been able to use the programme for their own ends.

8.2 Conclusion No. 2

The analysis above has shown that all of the prerequisites of Söderbaum's theory prevail both within the AU and NEPAD. Certainly, it is not possible to hereby state that there actually exists regime-boosting within the AU and NEPAD. However, due to the amount of indicators (100% occurrence) this is highly probable. Furthermore the thesis has shown that history has it that many previous programmes have failed due to neopatrimonialism and the failure of seeing this as a threat to successful co-operation. As has been noted earlier regime-boosting is a part of the neopatrimonial phenomenon which has had a hard grip on Africa for decades. Scholars have claimed that neopatrimonialism has now reached its limits in many countries, due to the fact that most of the resources already have been plundered by the regime. It is said that this has led to a change in the pattern of the phenomenon. The thesis suggests that the new pattern is evident in the hi-jacking of NEPAD with the end of acquiring more resources from other states in the co-operation. This leads the thesis to conclude that there is a great risk that regime-boosting has taken its grip on the co-operation (Chabal 2002: 450, 453, Taylor 2005: 15ff).

9 Conclusion

The purpose of the thesis was to evaluate the democracy work within the AU, first and foremost through NEPAD. As a theoretical background the theories of Jon C. Pevehouse and Fredrik Söderbaum were picked and assessed on the case. It is now time to summarize and to get an overview of the results.

9.1 The Theory of International Organizations and Democratization

The theory of Jon C. Pevehouse stated that there must prevail certain prerequisites within a regional organization for it to successfully promote democracy in its member states. The result of the application of the theory to the case of the AU and NEPAD showed that not all of the prerequisites of Pevehouse's theory were present in the AU and NEPAD case. Even so, the empirical result was far too bad considering the preconditions that actually prevailed. It was stated that there must be a third aspect on the matter that twisted the result in a destructive direction.

9.2 The Theory of Regime-Boosting

The answer to the suspicion above was handed to the reader by the theory of Fredrik Söderbaum. The scholar showed how South African regional co-operations were being hi-jacked by neopatrimonial leaders who used the organizations for their own personal ends. The theory of regime-boosting was created from these findings. Since it is a very shady business it is hard to prove its existence and Söderbaum presented numerous occurrences that were signs of it. The signs were then used on the case of the AU and NEPAD and the result was strikingly clear, all of the indicators presented by Söderbaum were present in the case at hand. It was finally asserted that it is not possible to state that there actually exists regime-boosting within the AU and NEPAD. However, due to the amount of indicators and the history of Africa it is highly probable that regime-boosting prevails within them.

9.3 Final words

The study has provided answers to various questions regarding African co-operation. Since both the AU and NEPAD are new initiatives it should be noted that the task of the thesis was not to evaluate a well established and functioning organ and see how it had completed its tasks. Instead the result of the thesis could be seen as an assessment on the requirements of the democracy work within NEPAD and the AU which can be used to analyze the prospects for successful regional integration in the future. The case of Zimbabwe and the rest of the assessment showed that there are reasons to be deeply pessimistic about the future of both the AU and NEPAD regarding democratic issues. However, the future of NEPAD depends on the international community and despite the sad picture painted in the thesis it is not certain that it will abandon the programme. African co-operations is considered a good sign in itself and should in the views of many governments and organs be supported extensively. Having in mind the result of the thesis there are two ways for the international community to proceed. Either it terminates the co-operation with Africa through NEPAD due to the bad result and the notion of regime-boosting or it chooses to continue the co-operation in order to affect it positively. Which way the international community and NEPAD plan to go in the future was however not the task of this thesis. Instead, the author is looking forward to seeing more studies on the subject in the time to come.

10 Bibliography

10.1.1 Articles

Africa Confidential, vol. 46-47, dates: 18.03.05, 15.04.05, 10.06.05, 22.07.05, 23.09.05, 20.01.06, 03.02.06, 02.05.06, 07.07.06, 17.11.06.

Daily News, Harare 15.03.02

Saturday Star, Johannesburg 23.10.04

Asaba, William, 2002. "Afrika, från befrielsekamp till demokrati", *Utrikesanalys* nr. 30 2002, UI.

Biswas, Aparajita, 2003. "Africa's Quest for Recovery in the 21st Century: African Union (AU) and the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD)", *Africa Quarterly* vol. 43 no. 2, 17-33.

Chabal, Patrick, 2002. "The Quest for Good Government and Development in Africa: is NEPAD the Answer?", *International Affairs* vol. 78 no. 3, 447-462.

De Waal, Alex, 2002. "What's new in the 'New Partnership for Africa's Development'", *International Affairs* vol. 78 no. 3, 463-475

Jordaan, Eduard, 2006. "Inadequately self-critical: Rwanda's self-assessment for the African peer review mechanism", *African Affairs* vol. 105 no. 420, 333-351.

Hope, Kempe Ronald, 2002. "From crisis to renewal: towards a successful implementation of the New Partnership for Africa's Development", *African Affairs* vol. 101 no. 404, 387-402.

Kruger, Norma, 2005. "ZANU(PF) strategies in general elections, 1980-2000: Discourse and coercion", *African Affairs* vol. 104 no. 414, 1-33.

Leshaba, Marvin, 2004. "A Critical Analysis of Africa's Efforts at Regional Integration", *CPS Policy Brief*. June, s. 1-15.

Matthews, Sally, 2003. "NEPAD: Realising the Renaissance?", *Politeia* vol 22 no. 2, 62-77.

Melber, Henning, 2002. "The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) – Old Wine in New Bottles?", *Forum for Development Studies* vol. 29 no 1, 185-208.

Melber, Henning, 2006 (ed). "AU, NEPAD and the APRM. Democratization Efforts Explored", *Current African Issues* no. 32, 5-54.

Mills, Greg, 2004. "What works and why", *The South African Journal of International Affairs*. Volym 11, nummer 2, s. 21-19.

Pevehouse, Jon C. 2002a. "Democracy from the Outside-In? International Organizations and Democratization", *International Organization* vol. 56 no. 3, 515-549.

Pevehouse, Jon C. 2002b. "With a Little Help from My Friends? Regional Organizations and the Consolidation of Democracy", *American Journal of Political Science* vol. 46 no. 3, 611-626.

Raftopoulos, Brian, 2002. "Briefing: Zimbabwe's 2002 presidential elections", *African Affairs* vol. 101 no. 404, 413-426.

Schoeman, Maxi, 2003. "The African Union After the Durban 2002 Summit". Copenhagen: Centre of African Studies, University of Copenhagen.

Söderbaum, Fredrik, 2003. "The 'Success' of Regionalism in Africa: Regime-boosting and Shadow Regionalism", Article offered for publication in *Review of International Studies*, October.

Söderbaum, Fredrik, 2005. "African Union". Göteborg: Department of Peace and Development Research, University of Gothenburg.

Taylor, Ian – Williams, Paul, 2002. "The limits of engagement: British foreign policy and the crisis in Zimbabwe", *International Affairs* vol. 78 no. 3. 547-565.

Taylor, Ian, 2002. "Commentary: the New Partnership for Africa's Development and the Zimbabwe Elections: Implications and Prospects for the Future", *African Affairs* vol. 101 no. 404, 403-412.

10.2 Books

AU and peace = *The African Union and Peace and Security*, 2002. Prepared by the InterAfrica Group/Justice Africa.

Bergström, Göran – Boréus, Kristina, 2000. *Textens Mening och Makt, Metodbok i Samhällsvetenskaplig Textanalys*. Lund, Studentlitteratur.

Bischoff, Paul-Henri, 2004. *Regionalism and Regional Cooperation in Africa: New Century Challenges and Prospects*. s. 121-146 i Mbaku, John Mukum – Saxena, Suresh Chandra (eds) *Africa at the Crossroads*. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers.

Esaiasson, Peter – Gilljam, Mikael – Oscarsson, Henrik – Wängnerud, Lena, 2005. *Metodpraktikan, Konsten att Studera Samhälle, Individ och Marknad*. 2:a upplagan. Stockholm: Norstedts Juridik AB.

Gibb, Richard – Hughes, Tim – Mills, Greg – Vaahtoranta, Tapani (eds), 2002. *Charting a New Course*. Johannesburg: The South African Institute of International Affairs.

Hansen, Holger Bernt – Johannsen, Maj-Britt, 2003. *The Challenge of the New Partnership for Africa's Development. NEPAD*. Copenhagen: Reprocenter of the Faculty of Social Science.

Lundquist, Lennart, 1993. *Det vetenskapliga studiet av politik*. Lund: Studentlitteratur.

Mbeki, Thabo, 2002. *Africa Define yourself*. Cape Town: Tafelberg Publishers Limited.

Melber, Henning, 2001. *The New African Initiative and the African Union*. Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet.

Melin, Mia (ed), 1995. *Democracy in Africa. On Whose Terms?* Stockholm: Forum Syd.

Murray, Rachel, 2004. *Human Rights in Africa: from the OAU to the African Union*. Cambridge: The Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge.

Nordlöf-Lagerkranz, Ulla (red) 2005. *Organisationer I fickformat: Afrikanska unionen*. Stockholm: UI.

Ross (ed), 2002. *Africa Report. Assessing the New Partnership*. Ottawa: the North-South Institute.

Taylor, Ian, 2005. *NEPAD. Toward Africa's Development or Another False Start?* London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc.

Whitehead, Laurence: Concerning International Support for Democracy in the South in Luckham, Robin, White, Gordon (ed), 1996. *Democratization in the South: the Jagged Wave*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

10.3 Papers

Cornwell, Richard – Gathaka, Jephthah – Wanjala, Smokin, 2002. *The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) – African Perspectives*. Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet.

Dansereau, Suzanne – Zamponi, Mario, 2005. *Zimbabwe – the Political Economy of Decline*. Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet.

Karuombe, Barney, 2003. *NEPAD: A new Partnership between Rider and Horse?* Namibia: Labour Resource and Research Institute.

Mukandala, Rwekaza S., 2002. *The State of African Democracy: Status, Prospects, Challenges*. Copenhagen: Centre of African Studies University of Copenhagen.

Ndlovu-Gatsheni, Dr Sabelo J. 2006. *Bob is Peerless: Zimbabwe's Smouldering Edifice and the Quest for an African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) for the Beleaguered Southern African State*. Presented at the Electoral Institute of Southern Africa Annual Symposium in Johannesburg, November 2006.

Brüntrup, Michael – Melber, Henning – Taylor, Ian, 2006. *Africa, Regional Cooperation and the World Market*. Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet

10.4 Internet

www.nepad.org.a = www.nepad.org/2005/files/documents/inbrief.pdf

www.nepad.org.b = www.nepad.org/2005/files/inbrief.php

www.au.org = www.africa-union.org/root/au/AboutAU/Constitutive_Act_en.htm

10.5 Additional sources

Nilsson, Bengt, 2004. "Afrikanska Unionen i toppmöte i Etiopien." Sveriges Radio, 040705.

Tillander - genom Thomas Wiklund. *Afrikanska Unionen (AU) fyller fyra år: en lägesrapport*. Fax from the Swedish Embassy in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 10-05-06.