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Catering Sticks and Carrots for the Global Security

Comparing the EU and the US Non-Proliferation Strategies

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Abstract

The European Union (EU) and the United States (US) often use differing foreign policy strategies. In their non-proliferation policies they have had somewhat differing approaches towards the suspected proliferators. In this thesis the usefulness and effectiveness of these differing strategies, containment and engagement strategies, are studied within the question of non-proliferation of WMD. What kind of methods best answer to the threats facing the international security; those of positive or negative character? I compare the foreign policy actions of the EU and the US in the contemporary non-proliferation efforts with Iran and North Korea. By analysing the usefulness of differing positive and negative forms of statecraft I try to find indications of their usefulness in these recent foreign policy efforts.

The analysis of the cases suggests that the EU and the US use different means in these cases to achieve the results. Whereas EU policies are not totally coherent in these two cases, neither has the US one clear approach. The results show that both actors' strategies should be more mixed. Either radical containment or too positive engagement proves to be fruitful. Even though the engagement especially on the US side should not be underestimated, neither can the European Union rely only on engagement if it wants to become taken as a serious player in international relations.

Key words: Foreign Policy, Statecraft, Containment, Engagement, Effectiveness.

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1   Introduction

Indeed, if the United States over-militarises foreign and security policy, Europe tends to over-civilianise it, with the result that Americans and Europeans disagree profoundly over the method and manner of security management. (Lindley-French 2002:9)

1.1   The Subject of the Study

The question how to respond to the threats in the world is still very tangible, almost 20 years after the end of the Cold War nuclear proliferation disputes. In the 21st century these disputes have brought together old actors, new regional powers like European Union as well as regional actors like North Korea and Iran.

The EU has taken a role in the nuclear disputes, but it has constantly been accused of toothless actions and unwillingness to use harder policies in order to really affect the policymakers in Tehran. The US has approached problems with a different and harder strategy - by cutting all relations with the country.

According to Robert Kaplan, power and leadership capabilities in the world politics demands a pagan ethos, underlining the importance of military capabilities (2002). He is far from alone to formulate this view, pointing to the fact that without military instruments the EU does not have the capacity to have influence present. It can be even seen that the EU has itself also relied on the US example through gradually increasing its military capabilities in recent years in order to increase its credibility as an international actor.

On the other hand there are those who see that the traditional view on power and influence in world politics understands only half a story. The EU presence in non-proliferation question with Iran shows that it not only sees the threat posed by the suspected proliferation, but has the will to act in resolving this question. Also, it believes it has the right kind of capabilities to handle these challenges.

Differences in the view how to best answer new threats are tangible. As Hans Blix claims, the disagreements on Iraq were not about territory or ideology: they were about 'a best way to tackle a possible case of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction' (2005:1).

1.2   Purpose and Research Question

As the European Union is constantly developing its foreign policies and means to answer to the global questions, it is well-founded and logical to ask, *what kind of*

ways and means[1] are actually needed and effective to tackle the crises of the 21st century, i.e. how should the EU develop its capacities as a foreign policy actor.

To discuss these questions I am comparing in this thesis the US and EU policies in the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The main question of the paper is first of all to study, *what kind of answers they give to these problems, i.e. what are their means towards these threats.*

The second objective of this thesis is to find out implications of *which methods seem to best suit the non-proliferation challenges of the 21st century*, that of engagement or containment. By comparing how the EU and the US have acted towards the 'outlaws' of the system and how these efforts have functioned, I hope to be able to contribute to the thought of a better foreign policy making by drawing the lessons from the implications in the cases studied. Thus, I'll try to discuss which outputs can lead to wanted outcomes.

First of all it can be claimed, that the threat perception of the US and the EU is rather similar. They see basically the same challenges in the international system but then choose to fight these threats with different means to achieve the wanted outcomes. The EU is an actor in development. It seems to be important to notice, that the threats of the 21st century, especially posed by non-proliferation need new kinds of means to tackle them. In an ever more interdependent world greater understanding of the capabilities and limitations of different forms of statecraft is therefore needed. Therefore a study identifying the policy options to fulfil these goals as well as assessing the utility of these techniques in non-proliferation cases is important in order to develop right kind of tools for response. Thus, the purpose of this thesis is not so much to analyse or explain the different foreign policy outputs, but to study external effects and international impact they might have.

1.3   Material and Method

When analysing the foreign policies of the US and the EU, I have relied on primary sources, such as country files, statements, declarations, news, articles and sanctions databases. I have also relied on previous case studies, which give valuable picture of the developments of the different cases. Secondary material such as academic works has formed a theoretical framework for this research and ideas of scholars like Holsti and O'Sullivan have built starting ground for the study. As David Baldwin claims, the study of statecraft is based predominantly on case studies rather than on experimental or statistical research approaches, and previous case studies have proven useful when analysing the policies (1985:25).

As a result research material is very broad but concise: concentrating on the question of non-proliferation actions and the possibilities created by different instruments. Finally, analysing the external effects of foreign policy activity is difficult but not impossible. Careful and balanced documentation is critical, if the

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[1] Also in this paper referred as tools, instruments, levers and techniques as called by Baldwin 1985:12

evaluation of political impact is to be accurate. For this reason primary and secondary sources are broadly used.

The cases were chosen first of all because there still are not that many events in where the EU has taken a visible, common role. The case of Iran is considered as the first point of departure for the EU non-proliferation strategy in action. However, it has acted also in the North Korean case, even though not with the same intensity. These cases are relevant in order to analyse the counter-proliferation strategies of today and develop those of tomorrow. They can be justified also by the fact, that they most likely have produced a reaction both within the US and the EU, forcing the actors to create strategies to handle the cases. It is also expected, that even though the threats, challenges and end goals pursued to large extent are the same between these actors, i.e. the non-proliferation, they have chosen different means to address these issues. This makes the comparison of these differing approaches meaningful.

1.4   Disposition

The structure of the thesis will proceed as follows. I will start by discussing the central question of comparative study of foreign policy and how the study of effectiveness will be approached in this paper.

Third chapter presents the differing foreign policy means available to tackle the non-proliferation and divides them under containing and engaging strategies. Chapter aims at creating an analytical tool to analyse the empirical cases.

In the fourth chapter, which forms the core of the study, I will study the empirical use of statecraft in non-proliferation cases and finally draw conclusions from the EU and the US means and strategies by analysing their effectiveness in the cases studied. Finally, an attempt will be made to set the strategies into a broader picture by concluding the discussion with a more policy oriented discussion of a "perfect foreign policy actor" and what moral questions should be considered when developing the EU foreign policies in general and non-proliferation policies in particular.

2   Comparative Foreign Policy

As White claims, comparing foreign policy poses a number of conceptual and empirical problems which need to be clarified: The first one being, what is actually referred to with the term foreign policy? In this paper where the effectiveness and usefulness of certain foreign policy strategies is in central position, it is viewed as an action and *effort of influencing* another government, an action planned to serve specific purposes (1989:5f). Or as a more recent study of Smith defines, it's an activity of "developing and managing relationships between the state (or, in our case, the EU) and other international actors" (2003 p.2).

In this paper foreign policy is understood broadly, but more precisely it refers to the use of statecraft in order to have foreign policy influence. The forms of statecraft available for foreign policy actions should not be differentiated from other areas of public policy. On the contrary, foreign policy can happen on many different levels (Carlsnaes 2002:342). This is especially true when studying the foreign policy of the EU. As described by Smith: "[the] EU produces foreign policy within all three pillars, as well as 'across' them – in that decisions involve policy instruments from one or more pillars" (2003:2f:67).

As both actors have the most common foreign policy means available, it goes to compare the effectiveness of the means and strategies they use. Thus, comparison of actors should be possible as there are enough similar and comparable patterns in the range of instruments they have at hand (White 1989:5).

As Maria Strömvik claims, what can be questioned though in the comparison of the EU and the US foreign policies is the *influence* of the EU foreign policy (2005:9). According to Roy Ginsberg, comparing and assessing the EFP as if the EU was a state can be a "slippery slope", as "such a criterion for comparison is bound to result in the conclusion that the EU fails miserably as an international political actor because it does not have all the assets and sovereignty associated with statehood, including resort to military force" (2001:12). However, this study attempts to research the influence of differing means, also that of military capability. This is done by analysing the means used and outcomes achieved with the means at hand. I am interested not just in the foreign policy outputs, but also whether there are implications of the different effects of the different means.

The study of foreign policy has traditionally based on the question of how foreign policies are made, concentrating on the foreign policy processes, whereas the question of by which means the policies are fulfilled got lesser attention. After the US invasion in Iraq the dismissal of the foreign policy content became impossible and the discussion around the convenient statecraft and means used in reaching foreign policy goals flooded over the academic community. These studies have concentrated rather explicitly on questions of legitimacy and

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[2] Originally Cohen & Harris 1975:318

morality, whereas the question of effectiveness of different means available has received less attention at least within the comparative studies. In this study these two questions are to be bound together by analysing the effectiveness, and from this basis, the morality of choosing certain statecraft. However, there are many problems with the efficiency in the use of different statecraft, which should be taken into account when creating a foreign policy approach. (Baldwin 1985:9ff) The nature, implications and especially the consequences of statecraft have become very tangible after the pre-emptive non-proliferation in Iraq. After the US efforts the question of what kind of influence is likely to succeed: whether the carrot is more effective than a stick, as well as on what costs would deserve to be studied in more detail.

2.1   Analysing Foreign Policy Effectiveness

Baldwin states that literature on foreign policy evaluation is characterised by analytical and conceptual anarchy, where the authors not only disagree with whether various techniques of statecraft work, but also on the very definition of 'work'. Therefore, the meaning of the terms, the relevance of counterfactuals and costs are just some of the issues making the foreign policy evaluation more difficult (2000); perhaps a reason why the tools to measure the effects of the actions remain at a primitive stage (Ginsberg 2001:4).

First of all, both the US and the EU try to *influence* with their foreign policies in order to achieve their goals. In order to influence, the states mobilise their *resources*, the instruments of statecraft (1992:117). Finally, when resources or means are chosen, we come to the question of effectiveness of the strategies used.

According to Smith comparative evaluation of foreign policy performance implies some standards of quality, of possible 'success' or 'failure', of 'effectiveness' or 'ineffectiveness'. Because these qualities are often intangible, they are not easy to conceptualise. Smith proposes that in order to analyse these qualities, instead of simple attributes, a number of elements should be analysed in order to study the balance of policies multi-dimensionally. According to Baldwin a simple dichotomy between success and failure should not be made but a gradation in effectiveness should be searched (1985:130f).

The success is this paper is strongly related to the concept of costs. As Baldwin implies, the costs are important when analysing the success of a foreign policy and continues, that successful undertakings are those without excessive costs: *"[I]f success is defined in terms of favourable policy outcomes, it is necessary to consider both costs and benefits in assessing the success of an undertaking.* Therefore, the foreign policy techniques used in the non-proliferation are here analysed foremost from the basis of their costs *compared with other instruments available.* The comparison of the non-proliferation means with other techniques available is meaningful also because there are no accepted standard values measuring the success of foreign policy. For this reason rough

judgments for estimating the overall success of differing strategies are a useful tool to make distinctions between cases. (Baldwin 2000)

Baldwin's comparative view to usefulness of the tools is in line with Joseph S. Nye's idea of *counterfactuals*. In the international environment where the changes are occurring simultaneously, finding the causes for change might be difficult. However, as claimed by Nye, this kind of analysis where some causes are found stronger than others, the use of counterfactuals, tools of mental experiment, can be used. By using counterfactuals we imagine situations in which one thing changes while others are held constant and then construct a picture of how the world would look. With the help of this kind of thinking we can assess the means used by the EU and the US in the question of non-proliferation, and also analytically analyse the possible alternative means (Nye 1993:42f). In this thesis this is done by making comparisons between the actors and policies they use. By combining the ideological frameworks provided by Baldwin and Nye we can finally analyse the means used. Thus, a rational foreign policy actor compares the costs and benefits of a policy alternative with the costs and benefits of other alternatives. The cost comparison is done by following Baldwin's example, by analysing actor's costs and benefits with respect to the alternatives available (Baldwin 1985:121). This is done also to avoid one of the most serious shortcomings in the assessment of utility of techniques of statecraft: the failure to cast the analysis in comparative terms. Thus, even though one form of statecraft would be analysed as malfunctional, little has been achieved if no alternative instruments functioning better in non-proliferation situations can be pointed out. (ibid:123)

Hence, the meaning of this thesis is not to measure the utility of different strategies and statecraft in realist terms of utility maximation, where the outcomes are a product of rational choices seeking efficiency to the desired ends, but to compare the different strategies and their utilities in non-proliferation efforts and defining them based on how they are and how useful they are, i.e. basing on the indications from the cases. Additionally, the inclusion of such variables such as normative statecraft diminishes the possibility of making a quantifiable analysis based on pure utility terms. Variables such as norms and morals are difficult to measure and therefore, the analysis of such strategies can only be done by comparing the actor's actions to international norms.

2.2   Why Compare?

A great deal of the existing non-proliferation literature concentrates on one actor case-studies of counter-proliferation processes. Comparative studies are rare because the EU non-proliferation strategy is rather new. For this reason also the number of the cases is restricted, which makes the comparative method suitable to increase the amount of cases.

The study of the means used in the foreign policy would however deserve more attention especially within the field of European politics, as the EU is to

develop to a new and stronger international actor, and like Sartori concludes, comparing is learning from the experience of others (1996:21).

As the EU is a new non-proliferation actor, it is interesting to place its newly created strategies in comparison towards the established strategies of the US. Simultaneously we can compare whether the EU has something to learn from the US strategies in order to become a legitimate and effective actor reckoned on the international scene. I conclude with a discussion, whether the US and EU foreign policies with 'rogues' can lead to a recognition of 'best practices' and a 'perfect foreign policy', i.e. which approaches can be seen to answer best to the challenges of non-proliferation. Comparison therefore facilitates the evaluation of policy performance and can lead to better policies internationally (Smith in Clarke and White 1989:204). To compare different strategies available they have to be studied simultaneously and as Baldwin utters aptly: "*It is relevant to study all the means used in cases by making reference to the utility of alternative techniques. The only socially responsible alternative is to generate studies of alternative policy techniques at comparable levels of generality. Only then can a fair and objective evaluation be made of the relative merits of [different] means*" (1985:15:67).

2.3   Delimitations

When comparing foreign policy means and their utility in achieving outcomes, the number of variables affecting the policy outcomes can not be measured in a vacuum. It should be recognised that there are variables, such as decision-makers interest that affect the outcomes of foreign policy, not just intrinsically particular techniques (Baldwin 1985:123). Yet, as stated in the beginning, the meaning is to study the strategies of foreign policy actors to achieve outcomes wanted. Hence a comparison of the means and strategies used is motivated to study implications whether one of strategies can function better despite external pressures.

As stated above, the threat of force and use of force in traditional meaning are means which only can be deployed by the US. The EU's use of military statecraft can be seen as unrealistic, due to the lack of functioning military instruments and an effective co-ordination application of foreign policy tools (Marsh & Mackenstein 2005:54f). Yet, although this limitation of the EU capacity should be accepted, it applies only to military means. Also, it makes possible the comparison between a military and non-military actor's strategies and effectiveness. Thus, I am aware of the boundaries of comparative method, such as the amount of variables affecting the outcomes as well as the relative small number of cases available. However, as the aim of this paper is to search implications of a good non-proliferation strategy, these cases can give some indications of preferable techniques.

3   World of Statecraft

The foreign policy actors can not have external political impact without means. Statecraft is used here to describe ways of conducting foreign affairs of a state. Generally it refers to the very *selection of means* for the pursuit of foreign policy, i.e. actions taken in order to change the policies of other states (Baldwin 1985:8f).

In order to study different strategies in approaching global problems, the different statecraft at hand have to be evaluated and analysed, whether their use can lead to the wanted outcomes (ibid). In this paper the concept of statecraft will be understood in similar manner, and the usefulness will be discussed and analysed later on with the different cases and strategies studied.

When attempting to influence, actors may choose from a variety of means. I am comparing the effectiveness of four accepted techniques of foreign policy; propaganda, diplomacy, economic power and military means[3] (ibid:12ff). Additionally, I add a fifth accepted form of foreign policy technique, structural statecraft, referred to as 'leading by example' in the EU discourse[4].

After presenting different means of statecraft, I divide them into two groups, *engaging* and *containment strategies,* depending on their *positive (*carrots*)* or *negative* (sticks) nature, where the term strategy refers to a more long term plan of action. By so doing I aim creating a simplistic analytical tool to study actors' strategies in empirical cases. A division into engaging and containment is needed in order to see the differences in the general strategy and effectiveness.

Before moving on, an introduction of coming chapters can be of help: as the structural power can be seen as a non-threatening and cheap tool of power, means such as economic pressure and intervention involve a larger amount of threat and punishment (Holsti 1995:118), whereas military statecraft is considered as the most expensive tool. However, at least economic and diplomatic statecraft can be used as positive as well as negative foreign policy instruments, for which reason a more careful definitions and taxonomies within the statecraft should be made.

3.1.1 Propaganda as Statecraft

Propaganda is a phenomenon with various appearances. However, simplifications and taxonomies are needed to make this research possible. First of all it has to be stated that propaganda aiming to persuade foreign governments is not the same as diplomacy. Propaganda is a psychological means, where the communication is one-way and directed more to the people than to the governments (Elgström,

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[3] This categorisation was first made by Harold Lasswell's '*Politics: Who Gets What, When, How*' in 1958.
[4]Vogt makes a distinction between eight forms of EU power: civilian/economic; military/political; normative/discursive; model/structural (Vogt 2006:9).

Jönsson & Jerneck 1992:94). Literature on propaganda often refers to attempts of gaining influence relying on the deliberate manipulation of verbal symbols (Baldwin 1985:139). It is seen in negative light and is described to be performed through spreading of ideas, information, or rumour for the purpose of injuring the opponent. Or as Taylor claims, it tries to make a conclusion authoritative by disregarding other conclusions to gain public approval, therefore "[i]t is a systematic scheme created by one person or group in an effort to persuade people on insufficient grounds to believe what it wants them to believe" (1942:562).

When following Holsti's list of propaganda techniques we can organise them under word games such as 'name-calling'. It can be based on making false connections or on special appeals such as identifying with the values of targets, implying that the target is in a minority or 'fear', by making audiences aware of imminent threat (1995:159). From this view we can simplify, that the statecraft of propaganda builds on negative elements, as its techniques are all negative.

Even though it is rather difficult to study all the elements of propaganda, it will be considered here mainly as negative presentation of the enemy, mainly words in public speeches of policy makers such as Presidency or High Representative of CFSP as well as the White House Administrations statements about the objects of foreign policy, i.e. considering namely how the proliferators are presented in the public in the context of non-proliferation actions.

3.1.2 Diplomatic Statecraft

Diplomacy is often understood as a foreign policy approach based on negotiations, where actors try to influence each other and seek through negotiations a satisfactory compromise (Jönsson, Elgström and Jerneck 1992:79). Bulk of diplomatic communication is done to exchange views, probing intentions and convincing other governments (Holsti 1995:139). Thus, the communication can be seen as the 'essence of diplomacy' (Jönsson and Hall 2005:67).

Diplomatic negotiations involve some kind of bargaining for achieving the objectives through offers and threats, holding out of possibilities for concluding agreements on contentious issues (Holsti 1995.130). Negotiating can be soft, but also rude and threatening. In his book *Arms and Influence* Thomas C. Schelling portrayed military capability as the ultimate bargaining power and as a part of *coercive diplomacy* (1966:1). However, to make promises or threats, means to carry out them is needed. Hence, a distinction between the boarders of economic, military and diplomatic statecraft has to be pursued to enable the comparison.

As Holsti concludes, persuasion through argument, offers, threats, establishing commitment and managing risk are major techniques in the use of diplomatic statecraft. However, diplomatic negotiations where rewards and threats are proposed also require equivalent statecraft to fulfil such promises. Hence, in this paper diplomatic statecraft is purely seen as negotiations and efforts of finding solutions to problems, whereas the channels it uses, such as economic promises and military threats are seen as important components of diplomacy, but are categorised as a part of corresponding statecraft, economic and military statecraft.

3.1.3 Economic Statecraft

Economic strategies can be harnessed as an instrument of statecraft, as when the economic infrastructure is used for security purposes. The economic instruments of foreign policy should therefore be analysed in the same way as other means in trying to make influence (Baldwin 1985:3). However, distinction between positive and negative economic strategies should be made.

The positive economic tools, often called as incentives, are a crucial part of the engaging strategies. This category includes all positive measures aimed at the object, such as granting "most-favoured-nation" treatment, tariff reduction, subsidies, aid, investment guarantees, encouragement of capital exports or imports - in general actions which are not harmful towards the object (ibid:42).

Whereas the positive economic tools have so far remained a rather uncommon non-proliferation means, the negative economic tools have provided one of the main components of the counter proliferation. The main negative economic tools are sanctions. Sanctions form clearly a penalty for a violation of rules, and the goal is to cause damage on the target, for which reason the imposition of sanctions without UN resolution has been questioned (Anthony 2006: 204). Negative economic techniques in addition to sanctions are for example trade related issues such as embargo, boycott, tariff discrimination, blacklist, quotas and withdrawal of "most-favored-nation treatment" or threats of the above. Finance related negative sanctions can be freezing of assets, controls on import or export, aid suspension, withholding dues as well as threats of the above (Baldwin 1985:41). This broad leverage of instruments is here reduced to positive and negative foreign policy techniques that have been used towards Iran and DPRK in order to make the comparison of the effects of engaging and containing strategies possible.

The effectiveness of economic statecraft in general and sanctions in particular has been highly debated in the literature. The one common accepted position concerning the sanctions has so far been mainly that they are most likely effective when set multilaterally (O'Sullivan 2003:4). It is claimed that the sanctions can have favouring long term effects, such as increasing costs for proliferators; they can bear a moral message, strengthening the promises, act as a threat of the increasing pressure towards a military solution as well as demonstrate the power of the sender (Jönsson, Elgström and Jerneck 1992:93). Alternatively they can be costly for outsiders as well as have unintended consequences (O'Sullivan 2000:2). However, the very effectiveness must be analysed in comparison with other means so that effectiveness as well as the cost of the sanctions can be evaluated.

3.1.4 Military Statecraft

Military statecraft is most often defined attempts of influence relying on violence, weapons or force. But the question is where to draw the line between propaganda, threats and actual use of military capacity?

Military statecraft is referring here broadly to the actual use of military means or actual actions as well as threats of use of military force. As with the definition

of diplomatic statecraft, in order to make threats of a military reliance, one has to have the corresponding statecraft at hand. Therefore, also actions such as moving the artillery or threat of a military solution can be seen as a concrete sign of the reliance on military actions.

As noticed before, the EU capacity in the military field can not be compared to that of the US. Even though the European Security Strategy underlines a need to develop a strategic culture fostering 'early, rapid and, where necessary, robust intervention' (ESS 2003:11), it cannot yet address the problems of non-proliferation militarily, neither it is very likely that it could participate under CFSP in any time soon in US-like pre-emptive strikes. Even though military statecraft in a modern world is questioned as means, its relative importance is not prejudged but analysed in the context of cases.

3.1.5 Structural Statecraft

> By focusing on material possession and military capacity, realist perceptions and strategic studies easily over-emphasise the importance of a coercive mode of power and material capabilities. But political conflict is jus as much a struggle to control and acquire material resources, as it is a struggle to consolidate and legitimise power with as wide a public as possible (Blondel 2004: 18).

The question of structural power has become a topic of the political science and a recognised technique and source of power - not least because of the EU, but it has so far not been applied broadly to the non-proliferation discussion.

Structural power can be considered as a *leading by example*. Blondel speaks in the same vein of symbolic power, basing on non-material power such as honour, prestige, moral authority, norms and legitimacy (2004:17). Structural statecraft in foreign policy is therefore considered here to be a role-model kind of action, relying on international norms and through own actions creating a picture of a wanted outcome, thus, 'acting as one preaches', following the idea that the custom is often more important than possible capability (Kowert and Legro in Katzenstein 1996: 451). This form of statecraft is discussed and its possibilities as an effective tool and method of foreign policy are analysed in the last chapter, which approaches the question of tools used from a more normative view discussing the current non-proliferation rules and system.

3.2   Engagement and Containment

Now that we have defined the multiple options that the governments consider as tools of foreign policy, we have to reduce these different means into different categories on the basis whether they are engaging or punitive means, i.e. positive or negative strategies towards the proliferators.

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[5] Originally Cohen & Harris 1975:318

As Baldwin claims, the selection of a particular taxonomy is not just a purely arbitrary undertaking, but should be done according to some specified criteria (1985:12). Here, a taxonomy based on the *positive* and *negative* foreign policy means is used. Thus, in order to make a comparative research of how the foreign policy of the EU and the US is exercised in a set of cases, we need to first know what to compare (statecraft) and second, how to organise the results (strategy).

3.2.1 Strategy of Engagement

The term engagement has been understood in a rather multiple manner. It can be understood as opposite to isolation, as a general interaction between two states.

Here I will use the term of engagement to some extent in line with the definition of Haass and O'Sullivan. Thus, the term engagement is understood as a *positive* foreign policy strategy, which depends to a *significant degree* on positive incentives to achieve its objectives. However, the engaging strategy does not preclude the simultaneous use of negative instruments, such as sanctions or military force, but in order to be understood as engaging strategy the use of positive incentives should play leading role (2000:2). Thus, the term engagement is seen in a positive light, referring to constructive efforts in order to engage the country in case to the international community. Even though some negative means might be used to some extent by side of the engaging strategy, engagement means generally a conflict preventing approach which can be understood as tension reduction, conciliation, appeasement and incentives and use of positive methods to cooperate with proliferators (Baldwin 1985:111).

Whereas the economic statecraft such as incentives like trade agreements or lifting the sanctions are probably one of the most tangible engagement efforts, diplomatic statecraft can be considered as an engaging strategy as given in the form of diplomatic recognition and efforts of negotiating common interests (O'Sullivan 2000:5f). In the case of structural statecraft engagement is seen to base on legitimate policies, following the norms of the international system.

3.2.2 The Policy of Containment

Baldwin lists some general thoughts of war prevention or tension reducing approach. Whereas the first approach emphasises tension reduction, the second approach underlines military preparedness, toughness and negative sanctions in order to achieve the wanted outcomes (1985: 112). These characteristics fit to the policy of containment. More generally it can be described to base on *negative* techniques that seek to "attack, harm or otherwise diminish the capacities of the target country" (O'Sullivan 2000:1).

The policy of containment can be defined by what engagement is not: negative, containing policy techniques consisting of negative elements of economic statecraft, such as sanctions and boycotts. Thus containment can also be distinguished military statecraft as well as propaganda.

4 Strategies towards the Proliferators

This chapter takes an empirical approach towards the strategies for non-proliferation and studies the approaches of the EU and US towards the challenges of Iran and North Korea. My aim is to study, what are the dominant tools used; i.e. whether engaging or punitive strategies are used but also afterwards discuss and analyse, by paying attention to the problems different approaches face, what kind of an efforts can actually be seen of help in non-proliferation challenges.

4.1 The 'Good Cop' Strategy with 'Rogue's'

In the following I am studying the means and strategies used by the EU in the question of non-proliferation.

4.1.1 EU Strategy with Iran

In the EU summit in Edinburgh in mid-December, 1992, strategy of critical dialogue towards Iran was being chosen in order to influence Iranian regime. The positive and reformist development of the Iranian society led to this growing belief towards an engagement strategy, which through assistance in economic reconstruction could lead to "strengthening the hand of the pragmatic wing of the regime". This build-up of mutual relations was however suspended by the Mykonos trial in 1997, where Iranian authorities were accused of the killings of Kurdish opposition members. Suspension of diplomatic relations followed. But were later again established (Reissner in Haass and O'Sullivan 2000: 32-37)

EU-Iran relations have been imprinted by the efforts of creating a cooperative dialogue. The comprehensive dialogue emphasised non-proliferation with given incentives of possible co-operation in the field of trade and investment. In 2001 The European Council of Ministers mandated the Commission to research further cooperation, which presented the conditions for Trade and Co-operation Agreement (TCA) between the EU and Iran. These negotiations were linked to negotiations on a Political Dialogue Agreement in 2002 (EU relations with Iran).

The comprehensive Dialogue was suspended in 2003 and the negotiations for the TCA stalled after the nuclear issues were raised on table. Even though the relationship between the EU and Iran has discussed the nuclear questions from the very beginning, the EU participation in the non-proliferation process started visibly through the 'EU3', supported by the HR Solana. The negotiations were

based on economic incentives package in trade with the suspension of uranium enrichment and Iran signing of the IAEA 'Additional Protocol' to the NPT (ibid).

The issue of non-proliferation was raised up visibly in the relationship between EU and Iran first through the Paris Agreement of 2004, which was aiming to create a permanent solution for the Iranian nuclear question as an exchange the EU offered TCA trade talks. The efforts also led to the agreement of suspending uranium enrichment. The incentives offered were mainly trade-related, such as reducing trade deficit with Europe, negotiations on a TCA, giving easier access to export licenses and technology transfers as well as encouragement of European companies importing Iranian goods (ibid).

The EU negotiations continued fiercely despite the growing international pressure and unease towards the President Ahmadinejad's controversial public statements. The continuing talks however, were a way for the EU to hope for a diplomatic solution until the very end. Finnish foreign minister Tuomioja, leading the Presidency, stated in September 2006: "For the EU, diplomacy remains the No. 1 way forward […] this is not the time or place for the international community to hit Iran with sanctions". (Bilefsky & Myers, 1.9.2006)

As shown by the presidency announcements as late as at the end of 2006, the EU has been very cautious in lifting up sanctions, as a large unanimity was pressing against the sanctions, even though they finally were put into force (Bilefsky & Myers 2006). Through a common position in February 2007 the EU accepted the UN Security Councils resolutions, when the diplomatic solution finally started to look doubtful in the eyes of the European governments. Even though the reflection paper written by Solana seems to underline the problems, negotiations were emphasised until the last minutes by the officials. (Dombey, 13.02.2007) The EU seems to be willing to continue its strategy of engagement even when the strategy does not seem to lead to clear outcomes. The latest report is in favour of continuing the "twin track" policy of mixing incentives and disincentives, mainly economic carrots and sticks. In April 24th 2007, the EU foreign ministers complemented the UN sanctions before the EU-Iran high level talks led by Solana in Ankara on 25. April (Dombey & Smyth 23.04.2007). These talks however seemed to be rather fruitless, as the first remarks by Solana point out, parties were not even in a position of making breakthroughs during the negotiations (Solana, Javier 25-26.04.2007).

4.1.2 EU Strategy with North Korea

The European Union role with North Korea[6] has been so far rather limited. The EU took a step towards DPRK in the beginning of the 21st century to be able to play a supportive role in the Korean Peninsula. Though the EU is not officially participating in the Six-party talks led by China, the US, South Korea, Japan and Russia, it has continuously underlined its will to consult all partners and to contribute to a peaceful solution in the situation (EU's relations with DPRK)

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[6] Democratic People's Republic of Korea, also referred here as DPRK

The first DPRK involvement in the framework of CFSP was done by attaching the European agency Euratom to the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organisation (KEDO) in 1997. KEDO is a partly political and partly technical organisation aiming for the nuclear non-proliferation in the Korean Peninsula (EU Bulletin 1996). However, neither KEDO nor Agreed Framework was seen as sufficient policies. An independent EU policy towards DPRK and a coordinated EU approach were wanted.

Finally, after the delegations by the European Parliament in 1998, a relationship of dialogue developed. The Stockholm European Council 2001 discussed enhancement of the EU's role, followed by a top-level EU delegation formed by the Swedish Presidency led by Göran Persson, Commissioner Patten and the CFSP High Representative Solana. These meetings were followed by establishment of diplomatic relations in May 2001, despite the continuing strains in the DPRK relationships towards the West (EU's relations with DPRK). Starting the diplomatic relationships was an independent EU policy choice. Furthermore it was a sign of an effort to engage DPRK to discussions, allowing official talks for reconciliation (CNN 14.05.2001).

The EU has used economic incentives through its relationship with DPRK. The EU is the third biggest trade partner after China and Thailand, making it a rather important export area for DPRK (EU Trade with North Korea 2005). The EU-DPRK bilateral trade agreement has still been blocked through individual member states, which weakens the possibility to use incentives. However, some incentives have been at use, as the EU Council of Ministers threatened that the failure in resolving the nuclear issue would jeopardise future development of the relations between the EU and DPRK. Additional market access and technical assistance have been lifted up as well as cooperation frameworks for economic dialogue. Little has been achieved though, as the nuclear standoff has halted the development of the process (EU's relations with DPRK).

The latest nuclear disagreements blocked the co-operation between the EU and the DPRK. UN Security Council imposed sanctions after the nuclear testing of DPRK in October 2006. The EU joined the sanctions through a common position in November 2006, joining the sanctions regime and fully implementing the provisions of all relevant UNSC Resolutions (Common Position 2006/795/CFSP). A month after the adoption of these multilateral sanctions DPRK returned to Six-Party Talks (EU relations with DPRK).

4.2   The 'Bad Cop' Strategy with 'Rogue's'

Contrary to the EU, the US is often presented as the 'bad cop' of the international relations. In the following chapters I discuss and analyse the approach of the US to answer the current non-proliferation issues.

4.2.1 US Strategy towards Iran

The historical antagonism between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the US make rapprochement very difficult (Kile 2005: 128). The US policy towards Iran has been isolation; since the Revolution of 1979 countries broke up the diplomatic relations[7] (Katzman 2003:7).

From 1990's onwards, Iran was further isolated by the US by the strategy of 'dual containment' towards Iran and Iraq. In 1995 the US imposed a complete embargo for trade and investment in Iran. This was followed by a law in 1996, which imposed sanctions on foreign investment in Iran's energy sector[8].

At the end of 1990's there were signs of a growing interest in US to engage Iran in discussions. The sanctions were also momentary reduced in the field of food and medicine, coinciding with the entry of a more reformist Khatami in May 1997. These offers were made without substantive preconditions and lead to a positive response from Iranian side, even without an official dialogue being established. In 1998 the US was trying to increase mutual confidence through the Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, which lead to the US acknowledgement of past meddling in Iran as well as easing the sanctions. (Katzman 2003: 8)

The Bush Administration started from where the Clinton administration stopped. However, the efforts were tested with negative statements by both parties' (ibid). US minor changes in the attitude were criticised domestically. As Brzezinski, Gates and Maloney write, the efforts of engaging Tehran through unilateral gestures led finally only to a "frustrating exchange of missed opportunities as well as a continuation – and, in some important areas, an intensification – of the very Iranian policies that Washington sought to thwart" (2004:38).

The détente in relationships was soon interrupted by the September 2001 terrorist attacks and in January 2002 Iran was attached in the presidential speech to the "axis of evil" (State of the Union Address 29.01.2002). Moreover, Iran has been included on the list of state sponsors of terrorism since 1984 (U.S. Department of State – States sponsoring terrorism).

The Bush Administration has pursued some direct engagement with Iran, but the bilateral talks are still ruled out, even though high-ranked politicians have pleaded for this possibility (Katzman 2006:33). More diplomacy has been yearned from many directions, but the promises of the US to join the negotiations if Tehran suspends its nuclear activities have not proved effective. So far, the US has abstained from bilateral discussions with Iran, and the diplomacy has only been accepted within the context of broader multinational talks on other issues[9] (Kessler and Baker, 2006).

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[7] The relationship was officially broken on April 1980.
[8] Better known as ILSA – Iran-Libya Sanctions Act
[9] Iran and the US met in 2007 for negotiations for the situation in Iraq. However, non-proliferation questions were not touched upon.

The diplomatic efforts have been generally harder than in the European camp; even though the US has been backing up the EU efforts with Iran, the Bush Administration has more clearly used threats and been more open to strategies of containment. As O'Sullivan states, measures placed against Iran are one of the most comprehensive sanctions regimes the US maintains, thus the economic and political isolation of Iran from the US is nearly complete and it can be stated that the economic sanctions form the main policy towards Iran (2003:6, see also Katzman 2003:9). More recently, the US has been mainly aiming to expand the sanctions multilaterally, as the US sanctions in place since the 1979 have had only marginal effect (Katzman 2006: 36).

The cards of force have also been raised up with the increasing presence of military at the Gulf as well President Bush's statement that "all options are on the table" (CNN 17.01.2005; White House 18.04.2006). For the US, the possibility of a military solution has been present during the escalation of the conflict, even though diplomatic and economic solutions are underlined. The threat became even more apparent in 2007, when the US navy begun its most extensive manoeuvres in the Gulf after the Iraq war (BBC 27.03.2007). As Julian Lindley-French states, there seems to be little doubt that the United States under the Bush regime has returned to a concept of power that is by and large military-based (2002: 15).

The only incentives the US has been proposing for Iran have been lifting up blocks that have been placed on it, such as its membership in WTO. However, these incentives have been turned down by Iran as insufficient. (CNN 11.3.2005)

4.2.2 US Strategy towards North Korea

The US has had a continuing role in the non-proliferation efforts with North Korea. In the beginning of crises, the US was rather unwilling to cooperate with DPRK diplomatically. It is claimed that the early 1990's environment in the US was inhospitable to cooperative threat reduction, for which reason the use of positive inducements, reassurances and reciprocity were seen as ineffective (Sigal 2000:73). The early strategy was based on a policy of demonising DPRK to justify the coercive diplomacy and on a sort of crime-and-punishment strategy (Mazarr 1997:124). Diplomatic efforts were also regarded as politically risky and expensive in the case of DPRK non-compliance, for which reason isolation and coercive strategies were seen as a more effective tool.

As it seemed obvious that sanctions became politically too provocative and economically ineffective and the military options were judged too risky, the US reached for a diplomatic deal as the last alternative (O'Sullivan 2001; Sigal 2000:76). As Jimmy Carter stated at that time, "the threat of sanctions had no effect on them whatsoever, except as a pending insult, branding North Korea as an outlaw nation and their revered leader as a liar and criminal" (Sigal 2000:82).

From the beginning of the 1990's the belief, that the coercive strategies would only lead to responsive actions such a more aggressive military build-up in DPRK, led the US policymakers towards economic and diplomatic incentives in order to solve the nuclear disputes (O'Sullivan 2001). As the first diplomatic steps

were taken and a softer approach was applied by the Clinton administration, an Agreed Framework was achieved in only four months. DPRK pledged to remain as a party to the NPT and to freeze its nuclear program by not refuelling its reactor as well as it promised to cooperate with the US. In return, the US promised to move toward a political and economic normalization of the relationship between the countries, exchange liaison offices, and reduce barriers to trade and investment. Diplomatic relations would be upgraded as progress in the non-proliferation issues was made.

The achieved results through diplomatic engagement become clear in the case of Agreed Framework, where after four months of talks the US and DPRK were able to find a common solution for the nuclear dispute. (Sigal 2000: 82ff) Thus, the Agreed Framework can be seen as a result of softening strategies in Washington. Similar results were given by the Clinton administrations partial lift of sanctions in 1999 which led to DPRK's pledge to freeze long-range missile tests (CNN Timeline of North Korea).

However, clouds started to gather again to the sky when the US was not able to stand by its word; it had continuous problems with keeping up its promises and experienced continuing fuel delivery delays. Problems also occurred when DPRK demanded greater economic and political engagement from the US[10]. However, Washington did not respond the demands of Pyongyang by easing its unilateral sanctions towards DPRK – something that was promised in February 1995. This led again, to North Korean threats of abandoning the accord. Only after the US pledged in September 1999 to end sanctions included in the *Trading with the Enemy Act* did DPRK reciprocate. (Sigal 2000:86ff) Putting an end to the sanctions also improved the possibilities for a more far-reaching deal in four-party talks (ibid, see also Mazarr 1997:1).

The Bush Administrations inclusion of DPRK to the 'axis of evil' in the State of the Union Address 2002 as well as accusations of DPRK's participation in financing terrorism caused unease in the relationships. In the October 2002 the conflict peaked again, as the US allegations of illegal enriched uranium weapons program in north led into the historical withdrawal of the DPRK from the NPT (Huntley 2006:723). This action was partly seen to be caused by the difficulties faced by the US oil shipments and the incapacity to fulfil promises.

DPRK has challenged the system by testing its limits. The US' decision to withdraw from the ABM treaty led to the DPRK plans to withdraw from the NPT. Similarly, after Bush Administrations pre-emptive strategic doctrine Pyongyang stated that the pre-emptive strikes were not an exclusive US right. (Olsen 2003)

When DPRK in 2005 claimed to possess nuclear weapons, it simultaneously left the diplomatic table of Six-party talks. By 2006 the relationship between the US and Pyongyang had led to an ever-tightening and widening financial restrictions, intensifying especially after the DPRK missile launches in July 2006 and nuclear tests of October 2006. (Hart-Landsberg and Feffer 2007)

The US strategy, pushing for a total disarmament of DPRK, has been accused of not offering adequate incentives. However, in January 2007 negotiations led to

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[10] Problems had an internal political starting point, as the external policy commitments of the Administration did not receive the acceptance needed from the US Congress.

DPRK decision to dismantle its nuclear weapons in exchange for offered energy aid. The effects of the multilateral sanctions on a rather isolated small country finally started to have an effect. The late US incentives have also included the possible review of the DPRK's place in the list of terrorism. The negotiations aimed at follow-up meetings at the foreign ministerial level, which would be the first bilateral ministerial meeting between the DPRK and US after the break-up of relations (Kaufman and McKeeby 2007).

When the US finally entered the talks with the DPRK, it was unable to define the amount of reciprocity it was willing to give. This approach was harmful for the progress of negotiations, as DPRK was unwilling to comply with US demands in hope to get rewards later and vice versa. The problem of trust has been present during the whole process. In fact, the study of Sigal shows an interesting pattern, where DPRK was cooperating when the US cooperated and retaliating when the US did so. An example of this pattern is the suspending military exercises and withdrawal of US arms from Korea, which lead to DPRK's signing of denuclearization accord with Seoul as well as safeguards agreement with IAEA. Also opposite development occurred, when the US ignorance of DPRK's proposal for replacement reactors and incapability to fulfil its economic commitments, such as oil-deliveries led into the intent of DPRK to renounce the NPT. (Sigal 2000:72)

4.3   Comparing the Strategies

It is now that I'll try to conclude what strategies have been used and secondly, if there is a difference in the effectiveness of strategies. As already shown before, the strategies the actors have used have differed; whereas the EU strategies with Iran have for most part based on engagement, the US has been relying mainly on containment. With the DPRK, the US has used more engaging strategies. Also the EU has tried to create itself a role through engaging.

Actor Strategies	US – Iran	EU – Iran
Engaging Strategy	• Economic Statecraft: Promise of WTO membership	• Diplomatic Statecraft: keeping up the negotiations • Economic Statecraft: various incentives; TCA-Agreement,
Containment Strategy	• Diplomatic Statecraft: No diplomatic contacts • Economic Statecraft: threats, comprehensive sanctions, Sanctions Act • Propaganda: name-calling, glittering generalities, transfer, bandwagon, fear can be evaluated to be present. • Military statecraft: threats, moving artilleries	• Economic Statecraft: threats, backing of the UN sanctions; Drawing back the Incentives; • Propaganda

When analysing the US strategies, one can see that the tools have been imposing sanctions and demonstrating the ability and willingness to launch pre-emptive strikes against proliferators. These approaches have been visible in all the latest non-proliferation efforts such as Libya and Iraq. The US strategy with Iran can be deemed to base purely on containment, whereas engaging can not be seen.

The EU strategy with Iran is very engaging, although some sanctions are in force and economic co-operation has been put on ice. However, the EU containment is made according to the UN resolutions, whereas the US economic containment is very comprehensive. The EU acts seem to be in general more in balance, when the actors' policies towards Iran are analysed.

The strategies towards DPRK differ from the case of Iran. Here the US has participated in the discussions actively and with a more nuanced means, whereas the EU has been, despite of its efforts, incapable of contributing to discussions. As listed below, the US efforts with the DPRK have been more compromised than its strategy with Iran. The non-proliferation policy of US can't be presented as very coherent, as these two actors are given very differential treatment in same question. Also the EU policy has not been very intense with the DPRK's case.

Actor Strategies	US – North Korea	EU – North Korea
Engaging Strategy	• Economic incentives • Diplomatic incentives • Agreed Framework and lift of sanctions • Trading with the Enemy Act	• Opening up diplomatic relations • Economic incentives offered
Containment Strategy	• Diplomatic isolation • Propaganda • Sanctions • Military statecraft: threats, artilleries in the region	• Sanctions • Threats to halt trade negotiations

It is clear that the four approaches studied here have so far all failed to accomplish the political ends definitely, and it remains to be seen, which means finally lead to non-proliferation - if it is to happen.

To compare the strategies and their effectiveness in non-proliferation we should move to discuss the achievements of these different strategies and in order to be able to make conclusions from these cases, analyse the difficulties that face these strategies and weigh them against each other.

4.3.1 Analysing the Effectiveness of Engagement

The acceptance of the idea that non-military elements of conflict prevention fail should not lead to the erroneous conclusion that they *never* work. Non-military factors which contribute to conflict prevention, for instance the degree of interdependence which results from economic, political and cultural ties, may be less obvious and more difficult to identify or measure than military capabilities, but they do nevertheless *exist (Zadra 1992).*

Diplomatic Statecraft

Throughout the 1990's and 2000 the EU has believed in diplomatic and political engagement of Iran instead of a policy of isolation. In the beginning of the 2000 the EU reached towards DPRK in order to increase its leverage in the discussions of security of the Korean peninsula. Also the US chose to participate in multilateral settings in discussions of the Korean situation.

If the effectiveness of diplomatic engagement should be evaluated from the basis whether the discussions have led to non-proliferation, it could be said to have mismanaged disgracefully for example with DPRK, despite the participation of both actors. However, as Baldwin claims, no one strategy can usually lead to the goal all the way. Instead, diplomacy is seen as a precondition for other statecraft. It is needed in order to discuss the solutions and to stay attached and informed of the other parts goals. Additionally, even though accused of ineffectiveness in reaching direct goals, the EU-Iran dialogue has given the possibility for the EU to stay attached with the internationally somewhat isolated regime and to get closer to the processes taking place within Iran. The engagement strategy has given the EU a better possibility to maintain its understanding of the Iranian domestic and overall regional dynamics as well as to understand the underlying reasons behind the Iranian politics. Respectively, the lack of direct contacts between the US and Iran has concretely pushed countries further apart.

EU's diplomatic engagement with the DPRK has not been as active as with Iran, and its role has been of minor importance. It has not endeavoured for continuous diplomatic negotiations between the EU and DPRK. However, the timing of the opening of the relationship was rather strategic; the EU chose to involve itself in the beginning of the 2001, during a time when the DPRK relationships with West started to deteriorate. These efforts and opening of a diplomatic dialogue have been necessary for the EU to have a role in the process.

In May 2006 even the US seemed to move towards engagement when it announced its willingness to participate in multilateral talks with Iran if Iran suspended its nuclear enrichment. The statement however was considered to miscast the dispute between the US an Iran as a simple problem of disarmament (Takeyh 2007:18). Furthermore, the opening for diplomatic efforts offered too little too late. This seems to show that the diplomatic channels should be opened when the serious disputes begin and not too late during the escalation of conflict.

The view amongst scholars and policy-makers is increasingly pointing to the fact, that more US engaging through diplomatic efforts is needed in order to solve the conflict of Iran peacefully. Positive signs of diplomatic engagement can not only be seen in the origins of the Paris Agreement, but also in the case of DPRK, where the diplomatic efforts and engaging in the 1990's led to the Framework Agreement. Solution to the DPRK problem has only been possible through increased multilateral negotiation efforts.

Economic Statecraft

The effectiveness of economic statecraft is a broadly discussed topic in the literature. With the cases studied it can be shown that the use of positive economic incentives has been contributing to partial solutions in the nuclear disputes both with Iran and DPRK. The Framework Agreement of 1994 was largely basing on the promises of the US to safeguard the energy supply to the country as well as lifting up the sanctions. Likewise, it can be claimed that these efforts were nullified as the US did not succeed to fulfil the agreements because of internal political processes[11]. The use of incentives has had effect also in the case of Iran as the Paris Agreement was build exclusively on a vast incentives-package. Promises and realisation of positive economic efforts seem to have some positive effects in the non-proliferation. However, despite the temporal developments, the use of incentives alone does not guarantee positive results.

The problems in the positive economic approach towards proliferators can be many, but the main problems can be seen in the ineffective use of the economic incentives. The use of incentives by the EU has also been partly thwarted by the US opposition which has blocked the EU leverage. As Aldridge writes, the European diplomatic engagement has been partly unsuccessful due to the US intransigence which causes that the EU can't make meaningful concessions. Just one of the problems is the US veto towards the Iranian WTO -membership and its control of the nuclear power plant technology (2006:18). The functioning of economic incentives can also be blamed of too insignificant offers. EU diplomat was reported to say that the strategy of incentives has so far based on "a lot of gift wrapping around a pretty empty box" (quoted in Davis and Ingram 2005).

It has been also claimed that the EU's dependence of Iranian oil products has affected its policies. All in all, the Iranian oil represents 3.9% of the total EU imports in energy products and Iran ranks as 6th supplier of energy products. (European Commission, 'Bilateral…').

In the DPRK's case the EU has not been that visible and it can be accused of rather lame efforts of taking part in the process. The strategy has though been welcomed by many of DPRK's neighbours who prefer a softer approach. Through economic incentives and conditionality it has tried to use a carrot to charm Pyongyang. European economic incentives were not however interesting enough for the DPRK for it to abandon the nuclear program.

However, the engaging efforts of the DPRK are important. Lifting up the sanctions as well as offering trade agreements has more than once positively affected Pyongyang. As Sigal claims, change can only come to DPRK when more outsiders from the international community are let in, both governmental and nongovernmental (2000: 71). Similarly, Katzman points to a need of a broader participation with Iran. Iran has been officially complaining about a too narrow engagement of the West, demanding a broader roadmap. It has also demanded security guarantees of that the US policies would not aim for a regime change (2006:19).

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[11] The Congress was objecting to the agreements made with Pyongyang for which reason the oil deliveries were not provided in time.

In its engagement strategy the EU relies on the increasing global economic interdependence, on the fact that even the most introvert regimes must increase their contacts with the outside world. Even though credited as an important tool, there seems to be little belief within the EU countries that sanctions alone can solve the dispute. Negative, even non-violent measures in general are much doubted within the EU. On the contrary, strong weight is put on strengthening economic and political links. Smith points out, that the conditional use of engagement possibly can give the EU an increasing importance in its foreign policy, as also noted in its non-proliferation strategy (Smith 2003:106f). Although these policies have not led to direct outcomes and the EU has been blamed of impotence of creating real incentives to change the Iranian behaviour, the cases of Framework Agreement and Paris Agreement show the contrary. The effective efforts of providing economic incentives can affect governments' decisions. It is commonly agreed, that without a meaningful political and economic engagement, meaningful military disengagement can't be found (see also Mazarr 1997:88).

4.3.2 Effectiveness of Containment

Diplomatic Statecraft

A clear diplomatic case of containment can be seen in the US approach towards Iran. This US strategy has been unchangeable since 1979 revolution in Iran, despite occasional efforts for détente.

It can be claimed that this strategy based on neglecting diplomatic efforts has failed. As Warren Christopher claims, both the situation in DPRK and Iran confirm that the refusal of Bush administration to speak with those the US dislikes is only a 'recipe for frustration and failure' (2006). As the effort of not discussing with Iran has not been 'converting' the country in almost thirty years, the question remains, whether the strategy of isolation has any political leverage? Thus, it goes to question, what the results and achieved goals of this policy are – in addition to the parties getting further apart and respectively, the parties growing need of protecting themselves against each other. This US strategy of containment is even described as a *zero-policy*. As Danielle Pletka claims, "the Europeans appear to be the only ones with an policy towards Iran. The US is not comfortable with EU policy, but, on the other hand, you can't beat something with nothing and so far, we've got nothing" (2005 [sic]).

One negative development, which has been caused partly by the lack of communication between parties, is incapability of the actors to see each others goals. It can be that the level of threat assessed could lead to more effective policies towards the proliferators. However, the case seems to be that even though, or because of the threat assessment, the US is sending indirectly mixed messages towards the proliferators. First of all it is wrapping together non-proliferation with terrorism as well as discussing a regime change and nuclear halt as a solution to the problem in Iran. This strategy seems to cause increasing fear in the object government. The goals of the non-proliferation should be therefore

clearly and early put forward to the 'rogue' regimes especially because of the incapability of discussing these goals bilaterally. Propaganda should neither be used in a large scale to blur the stated goals. Thus, when the goals are manifested straightforwardly, one can wait more effectiveness as the object governments do not have to decipher mixed messages of regime change and non-proliferation.

There seems to be a far greater *positive* effect in the engaging diplomatic efforts, as shown by the cases here. For example, the decision of the US to participate in negotiations with DPRK led in a short time to an agreement. Through the policy of isolation one risks to lose more, as the possibilities to find solutions diminish when they are not openly discussed between the parties.

Propaganda as Statecraft

Use of propaganda in order to affect both Iranian and DPRK policies has been often announced as a failure. It is accepted that if the US continues to criminalise and demonise suspected proliferators, it only restricts it political options to solve the disputes. Portraying countries that cause concern as outlaws and enemies of the state, will most likely increase the threat assessment also on the other side causing a restrain for the further development of the relations. Scaring the opponent might be the wanted outcome of this strategy, but the very effectiveness of this strategy can be questioned when studied in the case of DPRK and Iran.

The use of propaganda has not improved the process. On the contrary, reduction of the non-proliferation strategies to a fight against terrorism has failed.

> Labeling countries--rather than their behaviours --as roguish suggested that certain countries were beyond rehabilitation, thereby removing any incentive that a regime might have to improve its conduct in the hope of moving out of the rogue category …. Finally, the rogue concept mandated policies of punishment; any approach that sought to incorporate incentives or limited engagement was incompatible with the rogue paradigm (O'Sullivan 2001:70 [sic]).

The negative presentation of the proliferators seems to serve only the policy-makers domestic goals of justifying the containment strategy, but as statecraft it does not seem to have direct effect as such towards the object countries. Mainly it has caused the difficulty of changing a strategy towards a more engaging one.

Economic sanctions

Sigal claims that despite Clinton administration's efforts to convince the audience that DPRK backed down under the threat of sanctions and military actions, it is commonly accepted that there is little evidence to prove this. In the light of empirical evidence it seems rather explicit, that the sanctions failed in several occasions (2000:83). Also in the case of Iran, as O'Sullivan claims, the unilateral US sanctions have been a weak effort to try to change the minds of the regime in Tehran. On the contrary, sanctions have even been counter-productive and played into the hands of conservatives (2003:1). The use of economic sanctions unilaterally seems to be a strategy doomed to fail.

Furthermore, the containment has been unsuccessful in Iran. This is because of the broad sanctions and means of containment were on place already before the escalation of the conflict. In the words of President Bush, Americans have "sanctioned ourselves out of influence with Iran" (Sciolino 2005). This seems to suggest that comprehensive sanctions should be used as one of the ultimate tools and chronologically favourably relatively late in the conflict. The US means at hand have been so far limited to the search of multilateral support for its containment strategy or military solution as well as of course, what could be called a swing-round strategy, putting more emphasis on engaging strategies.

The participation to sanctions should also not be guided by political concerns, of which the European governments are blamed, but the policy should be common and coherent. Under a common policy the EU economic leverage towards these two countries is greater than the US', which traditionally has had large sanctions placed on these actors. As the third biggest trading partner of DPRK the EU has the ability to have actual effect. The EU has also a lot of potential economic leverage towards Iran, as the EU is its main trading partner with 35.1 per cent of total market share[12]. In 2004 Iran's main suppliers were the EU (44% of total imports), followed long behind by China (7.8%) (European Commission, 'Bilateral trade issues: Iran').

If the sanctions are agreed multilaterally, the question is how hard they should be in order to have the wanted effect. As Hart-Landsberg and Feffer claim, the restrictions and sanctions have in the case of DPRK become "the main stumbling block in the negotiations". As the economic campaign was first seen as the only option to military campaign or regime change, the DPRK's response was missile and nuclear tests. Only the engaging strategies and lifting sanctions had effect on the DPRK willingness to co-operate. Also, broad sanctions tend to undermine the efforts of possible economic reforms in the countries and weaken the growth of international economic interdependence (2007)

The EU participated on the sanctions regime after the UN resolutions, but the multilateral sanctions have not had a visible effect on Iran. However, as the multilateral sanctions towards DPRK have shown, there are possibilities for a multilateral sanctions regime to succeed. Similarly, the history shows that the unilateral sanctions have been weak in order to make change in the proliferation. In worst cases sanctions have only led to high costs of these policies through loss of human lives (O'Sullivan 2001).

Military statecraft

We have here two actors, of which the other lacks the capability to effectively respond to threats with weapons. It should not be forgotten, that the lack of military capacity, can cause problems in a realist world. It is a fact that the military statecraft has a vast meaning in the international relations, being a "usable and effective instrument of policy" (Keohane & Nye 1977: 23-29). It can be claimed that the EU has not been reaching the definite goals with Iran because

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[12] The next biggest trading partners are Japan with 12.3%, China with its 9.1% and South Korea 5.7%.

of its lacking capability for military deterrence. It is usually considered that the deterrence can't be effective without sufficient credibility.

However, the effectiveness of military power can be questioned, i.e. whether the effects are purely positive or even negative. For example, the situation in DPRK eased as the US promised to diminish its military presence in the Korean peninsula in the beginning of the 1990's. But one can also claim that the very escalation of the relationship could originally have been *caused* by the military presence. Therefore, when analysing the strategies one can not think that all strategies could *only* have a positive effect towards the proliferation. As claimed by Mazarr, in the case of DPRK the proliferation can be likewise understood to be a reactionary response to US military presence. He claims that nuclear threats have strongly affected the strategic thoughts and actions since the Korean War, stimulating DPRK to decrease its strategic weakness (1997:17). Selig Harrison goes even further with this. Although the majority of commentators agree that mainly DPRK is to blame for the breakdown of the Agreed Framework, he points out that the US is at least partly responsible for its collapse. The Agreed Framework was violated by the US, he argues, when the Bush administration introduced a new US national security doctrine announcing the possibility of pre-emptive military strikes (Berkofsky 2003:7). Similarly, the Iranian case can be seen to point to the same reasons. The US military presence in Iran's neighbourhood as shown by Aldridge[13] can be understood easily as a *reason* for proliferation more than as deterrent and solution. Thus, military, and especially nuclear capability combined with aggressive foreign policy behaviour can rather feed than protect from proliferation.

The US approach towards the 'rogues' seems to miss the point of the underlining causes for acquiring nuclear weapons. The US presence in Korean Peninsula and Iranian neighbourhood undermines these countries security needs. Instead of seeing the underlying problems hindering the process of non-proliferation the US concentrates on its own threat assessment.

The statements of regime change as well as discussion of pre-emptive action and changes in the regional balance of power have at worst enhanced the potential deterrent value of strategic weapons (Brzenzinski, Gates and Maloney 2004: 23). It is therefore not irrelevant to ask whether conventional and nuclear weapons as well as pre-emptive strikes have an opposite role in the non-proliferation; instead of deterring proliferation they seem to provoke it, feeding the global security dilemma.

Finally, one can ask whether the preservation of the NPT is that important that it should be safeguarded with all means. Knorr, when studying the military power in the nuclear age, concludes that the non-military 'bases of power', i.e. statecraft, have gained in value. Costs of using this technique are a reason for the decline of military power. Not least is the legitimacy of the military force questioned but also the increases of the risks associated to it are understood better (quoted in Baldwin 1985:68).

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[13] See Appendix 1

4.3.3 Best Practices of Non-proliferation

As Waltz aptly writes in his book *Man, the State and the War*, "a patient who in one period of illness tries ten different medications may wonder just which pill produced the cure" (1959:13). When assessing the effectiveness of different strategies towards proliferators, one can find herself standing in front of the same dilemma. We can however assess though the comparison and counterfactuals, what kind of response different strategies have and could have had.

First of all, in order to give a clear picture of what the goals of the non-proliferation strategy are, threats should be underlined and not simplified to other questions such as terrorism. Thus, recognizing the underlying factors is essential. The policies practiced should to some extent follow same strategies to proof continuity and consistency in actors' strategies.

In order to guarantee coherent participation the EU has to be able to act united towards proliferators. The challenges for maintaining a common foreign policy position can at its worst lead to a risk that the lowest common nominator positions will prevail, especially when potentially contentious decisions, such as imposing sanctions, are involved. In the negotiations with Iran, this tendency has been partly present in form of inability to respond to Iranian proposals (Kile 2005:129).

On the other hand, if and when coherent policies within the EU are made, the weight of these policies should not be underestimated. Grant calls this power deriving from diversity as 'influence multiplier'. What gives the EU a good hand in the game is therefore a common 'culture' of non-proliferation, or what David Fischer and Harald Müller call '*a good nonproliferation microcosm with nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states […] If this group of countries can agree on points of substance, this may well* serve *as a basis of consensus in the Conference at large*' (Fischer and Müller in Grand 2000:36,48).

The functional capabilities become important also when making agreements and implementing them: The difficulties of the US administration to get the financial backing of the Congress to provide the funds in order to implement the engagement with DPRK has shown the need for a development of structural frameworks that can coherently support the policies decided.

Keeping open the channels for negotiations is vital to maintain somewhat friendly relations, but also to have a possibility to discuss mutual preferences. The EU approach of engagement increased the reformist thoughts in Iran, whereas the isolation has lead to unwillingness to rely on 'West' that alienates and abandons, giving more space for the hard-liners. As in the case of DPRK, signing of the Agreed Framework was seen as "the best of a number of mediocre alternatives", as it offered better means for encouraging the unification (Mazarr 1997:236).

The use of incentives and disincentives should also be balanced. Even though hard sanctions would be placed on an actor, one should keep the discussions going, in order to offer the proliferators a way out. Unilateral US sanctions have not been effective during the last decades, and the case of DPRK shows, that the development has been finally made mainly by lifting up the sanctions.

Also the timing of containment should be carefully considered. If the sanctions are in place very early in the process, the actor can only hope for multilateral efforts. Development of economic ties might seem to increase the losses of the proliferators whereas already inexistent economic dependence unlikely creates further oppression on the proliferators. Accordingly, Mazarr writes that the officials have started to recognise, that a motivational approach to non-proliferation is the only strategy with any hope of success (1997:183). Multilateral sanctions towards DPRK give some cause for hope, when combined to other engagement strategies such as multi-party diplomatic efforts and promises. At best, multilateralism should be endeavoured in all efforts.

The power of the 21st century relies on new kind of strategies, where the military means loose ground as the ultimate statecraft, for which reason the relationship between arms and influence should be carefully considered. As even the possession of this statecraft can be deterring, the possible counter effects should be taken into account.

It can be stated that the containment strategies have achieved less when comparing different means. The diplomatic containment, propaganda and broad sanctions have not led to direct effects. Instead, they have often had an indirect influence. Through the Agreement Framework and Paris Agreement, we can see that the engagement and mixing the economic sanctions with incentives as well as negotiations between the parties have led to positive outcomes.

Whereas the EU has been known of being reluctant towards "hard-power solutions" in solving crises, the US has acted in the role of Machiavelli's 'good man', occasionally being bad to achieve a greater amount of good. However, it does not seem to be clear that the harder strategies would automatically lead to a greater good. In the light of the cases studied it does not seem that the doing 'bad' is necessarily the way to achieve the wanted outcomes in the non-proliferation. When the effects of containment are as inexistent as those of the engagement, containment becomes sometimes only a necessary cruelty to be able to engage the proliferators in later phase.

It seems to be that both the EU and the US would have lessons to learn from each others policies to create more mixed and balanced strategies. A broad spectrum of antibiotics is needed, following Baldwin's claim that a given instrument can carry part of the way to a given goal, even though it most likely cannot carry all the way. As he continues, "*at one and the same time, an instrument of statecraft can usefully contribute to attain many goals and yet by itself be insufficient to attain any one of them*" (Baldwin 1985:130f: 2000). Most answers in political science are a matter of degree and the real question is when do certain factors matter most?

In cases like those of Iran and DPRK, the high stakes have made the resolution possibilities tough, but need for mixed approaches from the actors are needed. These findings are in line with those of O'Sullivan, who claims that successful engagement involves labour–intensive process of negotiations and cooperation, giving and getting: including both demands and tangible benefits towards the proliferators. Engagement requires a willingness to treat others with respect even if not always deserved, involving the leadership, i.e. personal engagement of the

political counterparts; defining clear goals as demands have to be specific, focused, achievable and consistent; maintaining domestic support - as well as keeping alternative policy tools at hand (2000:28f).

However, it has to be noted, even though the utilities of different strategies could be precisely measured, it doesn't guarantee that a better understanding of different statecraft would automatically lead to better policies. However, it is worth making an effort to expose the effectiveness of means and search for the most effective, least dangerous or costly alternatives to find the most policy relevant strategies. (Baldwin 1984:5) The analysis in this study implies that the balance between strategies should be found: importance of engaging strategies should at least not be ignored totally and more weight should be put on co-operative efforts.

5 Strategies and International Order

As Smith claims (1989), foreign policy effectiveness should finally be analysed in comparison with systemic norms. This chapter aims at weighing up the means used against structural statecraft and international norms.

5.1 Norms of the International Order

The concept of norms is a useful analytical tool in studying the international relations. They represent standards of behaviour, defining rights and obligations in the international system. They aim to respond to real and perceived needs of actors in the international system. (Björkdahl 2002:14-22)

When speaking about foreign policy behaviour it is claimed that international moral tone is lesser than within interstate politics. This does not mean that norms do not exist. On the contrary, norms are considered increasingly important to justify the means chosen. In fact, the majority of states are members of international society as well as their policies are practiced along accepted norms. (Shively 2001:369) Norms have a role which *derives from the need of ... understand the causal relationship between their goals and alternative political strategies by which to reach those goals*".(Björkdahl 2002:15f) I.e., norms shape means states find appropriate (Kowert and Legro 1996:463).

What defines international normative environment then? Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein say that there are three layers of formal institutions or security regimes in which security policies are made. First layer is the recognised layer of formal institutions, including arms control regimes such as NPT. Second layer includes elements like international law and norms for the proper enactment of sovereign statehood (in Katzenstein 1996:34). The idea of the use of different means and their legitimacy are examples of widespread political norms (Kowert & Legro in ibid:452f). With non-proliferation 'the permissive conditions for action', and appropriate behaviour are written and formalised in conventions such as NPT (Björkdahl 2002:19:22).

One simplistic realist view to the norms of international law is that it is determined by military power, reflecting the power relationships in the world (Matlary 2006:36). This can be analysed to be the position of have-nots: for these reasons the NPT itself is accused of fundamental unfairness; coherent and equal policies should be preferred in order to the policies to be legitimate. Thus, different strategies towards friends and foes can not be justified in the international level. However, Iran -expert Shahram Chubin sees that the case of Iran shows, how the country is testing the janus-faced nature of the NPT, as some

countries are allowed to have nuclear weapons and others not, increasing the gap between the nuclear and non-nuclear powers (quoted in Luomi, 2007:32).

Legitimacy is something that political subjects can accept and which follows "laws of the land". It can be understood as a political process related to three variables: legal rules, ethical values and power distribution of international system. As Matlary writes, one important component determining the legitimacy is law, and in international law UN Charter is often used as a starting point. (2006:7f:11) Legitimacy can refer to legal legitimacy alone – that something is correct according to legal rules themselves. Still, it can also refer to political legitimacy – that public opinion accepts and supports some norm of appropriate behaviour in a given society or culture. Such legitimacy, however, varies among states – not least between the US and Europe (Matlary 2006:36). Therefore the discussion here bases on the legal legitimacy, international norms. Thus, in this paper legitimate policies are understood as ones in line with international norms. I will compare the structural statecraft, referring to the question how the actors act as models, following themselves the discussed international norms.

5.1.1 The Normative Statecraft of the EU

The institutional architecture of EU creates a built in tendency towards institutionalism. As Ian Manners claims, the EU's differing form from previous political forms pre-disposes it to act in a normative way, making it a foreign policy actor conditioned to international norms (Manners 2002: 242).

The EU has the possibility to act as a normative leader, as all its 25 countries are signatories to the NPT, usually considered as the central component of the non-proliferation regime (Signatories of NPT). All 25 states have also signed and ratified the CTBT (Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organisation). The EU as an actor is not a nuclear power, even though two members have nuclear weapons.

The use of means such as incentives is seen as consistent with the changing nature of the threats. Therefore the policies trying to tackle the underlying causes of proliferation and terrorism seem to suit the 21st century more consistently. It is sure that the engaging strategies can easier than the strategies of sanction and coercion win international support and have a multilateral leverage. The EU policy should be to keep the NPT treaty in force, but not only concentrate on 'rogue's' but be coherent and legitimate and pay attention to the overall realisation globally, emphasising the same norms towards all actors. As Grand writes, the US benevolence towards Israel's supposed nuclear capability is differing from the view of EU, stressing the universality of the NPT (2000:27).

5.1.2 The Normative Statecraft of the US

The US policies during the Cold War based on the reasoning that the best way of preventing nuclear war was by creating a nuclear "ladder of escalation". In current affairs, the neoconservative winds in Washington have led to the abandonment of

the nuclear arms reduction agreements. Ending the ABM Treaty, new weapons in space program and funds for developing and producing new types of nuclear weapons and finally, the considerations of resuming the nuclear testing and discussions of using nuclear weapons against countries that do not possess such weapons are some of the policies made and considered in the US Administration. As Forsberg claims, this might escalate the international security questions:

> This tragically counterproductive nuclear policy includes virtually everything a would-be Third World proliferator might consider an enticement, challenge or provocation to acquire nuclear weapons. Far from strengthening US security in any way, the Helms-Bush actions of the last decade actually encouraged the proliferation of nuclear weapons in India and Pakistan in 1998, as well as the more recent steps toward proliferation in North Korea and Iran (Forsberg 2006).

As Huntley argues, the "US reliance on nuclear deterrence and coercion reinforces perceptions elsewhere of the political value of nuclear weapons and devalues the global norm of nuclear non-use" (2006:740). The incapability of the US to ratify the ABM Treaty and unwillingness to commit international agreements undermines the global need for nuclear disarmament and divides countries even more strongly to *have's* and *have not's*. The incoherence of the US policy to commit itself to what it expects from others makes the US, as President Carter claims, "the major culprit in this erosion of the NPT" (2005). Additionally, the re-emptive policies risk that the US itself will appear as a danger to the world (Gaddis 2005:5). This can be seen in the threat perception of the Europeans, as the US is regarded as a grave danger together with Iran and DPRK[14].

The US policies are regarded as a threat towards the state sovereignty, an untouchable principle of the international system. G. John Ikenberry sees that the US has become a global policeman who reports to no higher authority (quoted in Gaddis 2005:5f). However, this affects how others see the actor. Gaddis compares the US and Soviet spheres of influence during the Cold War; as the first operated with the consent of those within it, the second chose a different approach, which made a difference quite unrelated to the military, i.e. tangible strength the countries could bring to bear in the region. Thus, influence requires not just traditional statecraft, "but also the absence of resistance, or, to use Clausewitz's term, 'friction'". In the Iraq –crisis this was missing – "a proper amount of attention to the equivalent of lubrication in strategy, which is persuasion" (ibid).

Washington still maintains a nuclear arsenal designed for the Cold War, and it fails to take into account the impact of its nuclear policies on other actors. DPRK and Iran are vastly more concerned of the US conventional power than they are by its nuclear forces (Deutch 2005:50f). As said by Habermas, the US normative power after Iraq –war lies in ruins (2003).

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[14] The Eurobarometer shows that the United States is seen as great a threat for the peace as are Iran and North Korea, 53% of Europeans evaluate these countries to be similar threats (Ekman in Mayer and Vogt 2006:210)

5.1.3 Lessons for the EU – Perfect Foreign Policy Actor in Making?

How the EU should answer to the threats of the 21st century is a question still not answered. Answers to this kind of complex questions are never simple. In fact, forecasting the outcomes of different strategies can't really be analysed for sure. However, calculations and analysing the counterfactuals as done in previous chapters should be done in different cases.

There exist two positions about how the EU's role in the future should be developed. The first one is relying largely on the thought of state sovereignty, where the only possibility for the increasing role in the world politics is based on the means that the states use, also including the tools of force. This view is basing on the idea that without a credible force the EU would always be dependent on the countries building on military power (Tiilikainen 2007:10).

The normative elements have simultaneously become more significant. As Annika Björkdahl writes, moral values and norms may provide an inspiration for foreign policy development. As the EU instruments are developed further, they should be developed by values and normative convictions (2002:22). This view to the European role acknowledges the EU as a power of change, whose resources of power differ from those of traditional states (Tiilikainen 2007:10).

Hanna Ojanen claims that a new security thinking should be established as well as it should be redefined what security is and how it should be pursued (in Mayer & Vogt 2006:37). The new agenda for security is in line with the Japanese "comprehensive security" strategy, which represents a politically convenient use to counter American pressure for greater defence expenditures. It stresses the need for confidence building methods such as diplomacy, energy security and transparency as a means to enhance overall stability. As Katzenstein concludes, it is a notion that goes beyond simplifications such as 'us' and 'them'. (1996:8)

The EU has been this kind of an actor, blamed of a Kantian utopia undermining the realist world around it. It is however a *sui generis* institution whose pursuit for security has been challenging the means of the realism, relying on co-operative means; It has been aiming to create interdependence instead of independence in international relations, putting weight on the international institutions and international rules. As an institution it is buttressing the world of institutions, rules and a transparent shape (Zadra 1992).

Rousseau found the major causes of war neither in man nor in states but in the state system itself. One man could not begin to behave decently unless there was assurance that others would do that (Waltz 1959:6f). If this is seen as one of the reasons for proliferation, the international system really is to blame, at least indirectly. The way states act recreates the international system itself.

When developing the EU foreign policy one should consider the lessons and problems of different statecraft. As Monnet suggested, the EC was built to find a way out of the conflicts of the nineteenth century. Therefore the strategies and policies developed should be built both realistically as well as creatively. The

participation of the EU as an actor in international relations is necessary. However, the decision-makers should be aware of the limits of different statecraft and build the future realistically but in a legitimate and acceptable manner.

As neither of the strategies studied in this thesis have shown to be perfect, a balance in the means available should guarantee that both sticks and carrots are available for the EU in the future. Thus, it would be wrong and even dangerous to conclude that it is unnecessary to have means for both containment and engagement (Zadra 1992). Giving up of the 'stick' or the 'carrot', would only reduce the range of policy options. The EU has moved further away from this utopia through the development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. Also the formulation of the Non-Proliferation Strategy points to the fact that the foreign policies are not strictly limited with normative constraints which would directly lead to rejection of 'certain means as inappropriate to achieve their policy objectives'(Björkdahl 2002:22). It seems to therefore identify itself to lesser degree with Kantian utopia.

The EU is presented as a low politics actor, dealing with matters that can be handled with economic means, rather than with high politics where effective diplomacy and military affairs are involved. However, after studying the cases of non-proliferation, situated at the high politics square, one can ask, whether not positive economic statecraft and other engagement is a more secure as well as productive strategy to deal with "high politics" in the non-proliferation case?

The EU strategy it is a policy that is multifaceted, continual and aims at creating trust and interdependence between the actors. By so doing it is spreading the norms of European values forward. Finally, such a creation of interdependence and 'subjecting inter-state relations to the rule of law' aims at an expansion of it's role in the world governance as well as an efforts to expand the 'Kantian world of perpetual peace' into international relations, making the replication of the European experience on the global scale a 'mission civilisatrice' (Kagan 60f).

In order to get a more important role in the global questions of non-proliferation, the EU has to develop a strong framework for cooperation between the EU countries within this field, enabling putting more strategic weight on proliferators. In addition to a European cooperation, a common global view for a shared assessment of the threats in the world is needed as well as common understanding of obligations in addressing them. As Kofi Annan claims, the new security consensus could be "based on the recognition that threats are interlinked, that development, security and human rights are mutually interlinked, that no state can protect itself acting entirely alone and that all states need an equitable, efficient and effective collective security system" (Annan 2005).

The cases of EU and US efforts in Iran and DPRK have shown that a hegemonic non-proliferation policy does not succeed. Strengthening of the multilateral cooperation and obeying the established international norms, both by cops and rogues, is the only way for a functioning non-proliferation regime.

6 Conclusions

Joseph S. Nye writes that neoconservative analysts see that after the cold war the US was so strong that it alone could form the framework of 'right' in the international scene whereas others should follow after. This view, basing on unilateralism seems malicious and outdated (Nye, 26.3.2007).

In the contemporary world power and influence might mean something totally different from the military might and containment strategies. As Ojanen writes, it is difficult to say, exactly what kind of capabilities, or how much the EU should be capable of doing. As capacity is always relative, the EU capacities are most often assessed in comparison to those of other actors, so in this paper as well (2005:4), implying that statecraft such as military capacity do not always lead to wanted results. What this thesis has therefore attempted to do is to analyse the capacities on the basis of needs in the contemporary world politics by comparing their utility in achieving the ends. Even though no instruments have so far been able to solve the disputes, from the lessons learned it seems that a method like military statecraft has even less to offer than engaging techniques. When calculating the costs of a total containment, it has been as ineffective as engagement and many times more costly than the engaging strategies. The engagement strategies are vital to have the possibility to affect to the actors - it has also been the only way for positive openings in conflicts. Whereas the containment might show the objects that the actors are serious, the positive openings are needed for the actors to find some common ground.

As stated above, the question of whether the engaging or containing strategies or a combination of those is likely to work is different from the question what statecraft should be relied upon. As Baldwin writes, knowledge about the likely success of different foreign policy instruments does not answer the question whether it should be used. However, through a comparative analysis we can try to provide information about their usefulness (2000). I hope that this study can give implications of the versatile nature of tackling the nuclear proliferation. Most importantly this study has provided an empirical and comparative analysis in a research area that has been fairly unexplored. Even though drawing generalisations from one crisis to another can be dangerous if applied uncritically, some implications of strategies are possible from the contemporary cases.

As Holsti concludes, there are dangers in employing any theoretical model. Even though the models enable us to select data and relate them to different variables, they might as easily outplace some significant facets of the subject (1992:5). A broad research like this, without any clear previous examples in the academic world, certainly has its shortages. First of all, there are several questions to answer before starting the research, many standpoints to take and analytical tools to create, causing both moments of uncertainty, vanity and insanity. Even so,

I have let the theoretical frameworks to guide me and formulated a functioning categorisation. This research field deserves though greater interest and I hope that continuing disputes about the functioning of different statecraft will be provided.

It might still be rather early to draw lessons from the EU's experience with its strategy on Iran, but the comparison has given interesting implications for the EU in its task to formulate a coherent and comprehensive strategy to tackle future proliferation questions. First of all, this study has shown that it is difficult to find out a *perfect strategy* to solve non-proliferation questions. The US still has a lot to do in order to be even a good foreign policy actor. Non-proliferation is a multifaceted question in where the actors need to create an all embracing strategy in order to create accepted solutions. The problems the US faces should therefore lead the development of the EU strategy and actions it takes in the future.

What the contemporary cases show, is that it can be questioned whether two bad cops are needed to control the order. Instead, the tools the good cop has to offer through its cooperative role can become decisive; mediators, normative, accepted actors are needed at the time of turmoil and insecurity in the global arena.

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
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Appendix

(Quoted from Aldridge, Bob 2006: 39)

US MILITARY BASES SURROUNDING IRAN