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SECURITIZATION OF IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM:
A Critical Look at Security Structure in Europe

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Recent events suggest that cultural and economic differences between 'natives' and 'foreigners' in Europe tend to produce violence. This is because of the presentation of immigrants and refugees as a security problem in Europe. This thesis looks at the subject of immigration and asylum as securitized by recourse to xenophobic and stereotype-based political discourses and social practices of actors both at state and European Union level. The analysis will be done by deconstructing the discourses of political actors in Britain, France, and the EU so as to problematize the process of securitization of immigration and asylum. It is argued that the issue is placed onto the European security social structure, which is (re)constructed in an exclusionary way characterized by dichotomies between self and other. Critical Security Studies' (CSS) principles form the normative foundation of this analysis. The broader aim of this study is to problematize and criticize the existing structures and relations in this issue area, raise questions about taken for granted concepts, and posit that change is possible if discourses and social practices are concurrently transformed.

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"My life has been destroyed. I chose to be an airline pilot, I worked hard for it and I starved for it. But the reality is that because of my profile of being Algerian, Arabic, Muslim and an airline pilot, I suffered this miscarriage of justice. I believe a man is innocent until proven guilty. I *was guilty* and I had to prove my innocence and that's the bottom line."

Lotfi Raissi (arrested in Britain on suspicion of involvement 'terrorist' activities, proved not guilty)

"The authorities are playing politics with our lives. We do not want to get caught up in their agenda, their politics. I would like to live like a normal person. I am not sure why I am labeled as 'suspected international terrorist'. We're being treated worse than lifers in prison. We don't want to be treated as scapegoats. If they say we've done something, they should have charged us. If they've got anything against me then why not charge me through the normal criminal process?"

"H" (33-year-old Somali-born UK citizen, arrested many times without any charge, now suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder and depression)

"I am a Jew. Hath not a Jew eyes? Hath not a Jew hands, organs, dimensions, senses, affections, passions? Fed with the same food, hurt with the same weapons, subject to the same diseases, healed by the same means, warmed and cooled by the same winter and summer, as a Christian is?
If you prick us, do we not bleed?
If you tickle us, do we not laugh?
If you poison us, do we not die?
And
If you wrong to us,
Shall we not revenge?"

William Shakespeare, *the Merchant of Venice*

CHAPTER 1
WHY EUROPE AND WHY IMMIGRATION?

1. The Subject and the Purpose of the Study

There is one and only one subject of this study: Security. All questions, theories, research materials, analyses and discussions of the study are accumulated around and shaped by the concept of security. Each question is asked in order to understand, denaturalize, problematize, and (re)construct security and its elements, that are, what security, whose security, how security. Each analysis aims to engage with *the imminent critique* of the established and constructed security. Each material points out the underlying ideas, beliefs, and perceptions about security. The last but not least, there is only one and only one purpose of this study: Emancipation.

The comprehensive subject and purpose of the study, mentioned above, are operationalized in the areas of immigration and asylum policies in Europe both in supranational and national levels. In both levels, immigrants and asylum-seekers (generally speaking, foreigners) are presented as threats to social and national identities, welfare states, social security systems. The decision-maker elites speak of foreigners as the abuser of welfare systems, unassimilated people, incurable criminals. The discursive and social practices feed and are fed by xenophobia that is the modern name of racism. Therefore, foreigners are emerged as the threats to the European societies in the European security social structure. To put specifically, the subject of the study is the critique of European security structure by analyzing the relationship between the discourse and actions of actors in the area of immigration and asylum. Before stating research questions, it is necessary to explain why Europe and why particularly immigration and asylum policies are chosen as the area of the study.

1.1 Why Europe and Why Migration?

Security is a contested concept. Various definitions of security have been competing with each other to catch the essence of the word. The EU has long claimed its 'different' stance on security focusing on non-military conflict resolution ways, the primacy of international law and organizations, the promotion of democracy and human rights outside of its borders has brought the EU in a position where it differentiates from those who insist on the state-centrism, military solutions, and war. What about the security inside Europe? Is it possible to separate outside and inside security? This question leads us why the area of immigration and asylum is chosen.

Europe is attracted most of the people who are suffering from poverty, hunger, civil conflicts, human rights violations, unfair persecutions, and wars. For people who are searching for a better life Europe symbolizes a land without war, without poverty, without warlords. However, many immigrants and asylum seekers cannot find what they seek for. They are treated as non-European citizens

refraining from political, economic, and social rights. Moreover they are made scapegoats for the rising unemployment or economic recession. At worst, they become the manipulative tool of, especially right-wing, politicians. It is not wrong to say that Europe is again trapped by racism, under the new name xenophobia. In other words, the people escaping from various insecurities face with different insecurity in Europe that is called discrimination and racism.

In this point, it is necessary to indicate some statistics about the issue. Kessler and Freeman, in their analysis of the data of Eurobarometer, find that anti-immigrant attitudes of people who see immigrants as cultural threat are motivated by instrumental (such as economically competitive immigrants) and symbolic (such as out-group hostility and in-group favoritism) factors (Kessler and Freeman, 2005: 828-836). In 2000, in Europe, 39.9% thought that there are too many immigrants. The number rose to 44.1% in the UK, 42.0% in France, 58% in Greece, 54.5% in Belgium. The other important analysis highlighted the seriousness of the situation. The report of European Monitoring Center on Racism and Xenophobia clearly claimed that racism is everywhere. 55% of Belgians considered themselves as racist; only 42% of French people think that racist remarks (such as dirty Arab) should be convicted (1999: 20-45). Generally speaking, foreigners are presented and regarded as threats. This threat perception is placed onto the European security social structure.

In this study, we are analyzing two states (the United Kingdom and France) in the state-level; the Commission and the Council in the European level. The UK and France are the biggest immigration receivers in Europe (with Germany) and their acts have an effect upon the European level. On the other hand, the Commission and the Council are the most influential supranational institutions with regard to immigration and asylum policy in Europe. These actors have an ability to shape the internal European security structure.

However, considering the area of immigration and asylum, the artificial distinction between internal and external security is void. The insecurities beyond the borders lead to insecurity inside the borders. Whilst immigrants and asylum seekers feel insecure due to various racist and discriminative discourses and practices, the 'native' Europeans feel threatened by 'the invasion of foreigners'. The mutual insecurity gives the researchers essential clues about the security structure in Europe and its characteristics.

2. Research Questions

There are two main questions in the study: the empirical question with the normative stance and the theoretical question. Two main questions focus on the security structure in Europe in order to analyze:

- *What kind of security structure has been constructed by performing what kind of security discourse and social practice?*

- *How can we apply the Critical Security Studies and the Critical Discourse Analysis into this specific issue area?*

The practices in the area immigration and asylum, which is compatible with the theoretical underpinning of the study, both in the Member States and the EU level, will be deconstructed to understand whether these practices are the constituents and reflections of wider security structure in Europe.

3. Research Material

The main research material for the study is speeches of and texts produced by actors. In the state level, we will analyze the speeches of politicians whether they are government officials or MPs. The speeches of politicians both reflect and shape the public opinion. To put differently, we anticipate that politicians are magical mirrors of their societies. Unlike ordinary mirrors, the magical mirrors can affect what they reflect. Regarding the UK and France, we will analyze the MPs parliamentary speeches and the public speeches of main political actors. Some newspaper articles will be used because of their huge manipulative effects. In addition to them, we will analyze the speeches of French racist discourse used by Le Pen. Not only has the success of the Front National in the last Presidential election, but also its effect on French politics led us to use this discourse. In the light of findings of discursive practices, the social practices will be examined.

In the European level, the line between discursive practice and social practice blurs. In the state level, states are both decision-makers and executioners. However, the EU is mainly a decision-maker in this area. The decisions are executed by states themselves. From this point of view, what the Commission says is its discursive and social action. The communications, proposals, will be used. The directives and decisions of the Council will be evaluated.

4. Limitations

The limitations of this study are characterized by what the study is not. Firstly, this thesis is not about immigration and asylum policies in the European and state levels. We are not going to examine the details of policies, but to analyze how foreigners are presented and produced as threats to European security. In other words, the immigration and asylum policy is an area, not the subject of the study.

Secondly, this thesis is not about CFSP or other traditional security structure. We will analyze and problemitize the social security structure in Europe that is (re)constructed by discursive and social practices.

The third limitation may be non-falsifiable character of theoretical foundation. We will argue that discursive practices shape and are shaped by social practices. This preposition is difficult to accept or refuse, for many scholars. They will ask how it can be proved. However, this is a positivist critique to post-positivist methodology. As the student of critical and post-positivist social theories, the writer of this thesis will posit his normative and subjective position about the issue with the purpose of making critique and generating emancipation without making 'scientific' generalizations in traditional sense. It may be regarded as limitation from the positivist point of view, even if it is the main strength of the study.

CHAPTER 2
THE THEORETICAL FOUNDATION

1. The Critical Theory and Critical Security Studies

If it is the issue to categorize theories for the purpose of deconstructing and reformulating them, it will be most useful and necessary to start with Robert Cox's famous dictum that "theory is always for someone and for some purpose" (Cox, 1996: 207). This idea challenged to all ontologic and epistomologic claims of the IR theories of the Cold War and made many realities obvious embedded within the land of scientific explanations. Theories are mirrors of their formulators and proponents. Their perceptions, perspectives, lifestyles, income levels and gender contribute the establishment, formulation, and choice of theories. Although problem-solving theories claim their neutrality against the world, they provide guidelines for actors to deal with the problems within the existing system. These theories are pro-status quo.

On the other hand, "critical theory, unlike problem-solving theories, does not take institutions and social and power relations for granted but call them into question by concerning itself with their origins and how and whether they might be in the process of changing" (Cox, 1996: 208). The existing structures today work against the most of the world population who are suffering from economic, political and social inadequacies, inequalities and abuses. As to the normative side of it, "the critical theory intend not simply eliminate one or other abuses, but to analyze the underlying social structures which result in these abuses with the intention of overcoming them" (Devetak, 1995: 156). By problematizing existing social structures and exposing the power relations embedded in them, the critical theory aims to generate the equal, fair and just social structures that are in favour of everybody regardless their nationality, race, gender, or income level. Emancipation, which is identified as "freeing people from those constraints that stop them carrying out what they freely would choose to do" (Booth, 1991: 301) is the primary aim of the critical theory. To put it simply, the critical theory is for individuals and communities and for emancipation.

The critical theory whose roots lay in the Marxist tradition differs from the materialistic predecessors with respect to the effectiveness of ideas upon the social world. According to Cox, the forces in the social world are threefold; ideas, institutions, and material capabilities. They are interacting and affecting each other in all ways. Ideas are crucial to understand the importance of the cognitive processes. Ideas, for Cox, consist of, first, the intersubjective meanings that are shared notions about the social relations which provide the maintenance of habits and attitudes, such that states are territorial entities; second, the collective images on which the competitive views claim to hold the true meaning of them such as the competing views about the justice. "The clash of rival collective images provides evidence of the potential for alternative paths and developments and raises questions as to the possible material and institutional basis for the emergence of an alternative structures" (Cox, 1996: 219). It can be argued that the

cognitive processes are, by nature, political because of the different perspectives competing about the world. The critical theory, which "recognizes the political nature of knowledge claims" (Devetak, 1995: 155), aims to problematize the social structures and power relationships, which are the product of the continuous interaction between the ideas, institutions and material capabilities. Moreover its goal is to generate ideas that attempt to change the prevailing social and power relations in favour of the oppressed and suppressed groups. As the active participant in the construction and reconstruction of the world, the critical theory refuses the positivist distinction between the fact and value, and subject and object, reflecting the idea that theory is always for some purpose that is emancipation.

The Critical Security Studies (CSS) are the theoretical applications of the principles of the critical theory into the security studies in the IR discipline. It must be necessary to discuss two main and founder students of CSS, Richard Wyn Jones and Ken Booth.

Jones, in his famous book "Security, Strategy and Critical Theory", identifies the CSS with respect to legacy of Frankfurt School. He argues that traditional security studies do not only explain the existing power structures, but also strengthen and legitimize them by unproblematizing and accepting the present orders and relations (Jones, 1999). Like the Critical Theory, the CSS should commit itself to the concept of emancipation.

Booth, as the foremost contributor to the area, is the one who identifies security with emancipation.[1] He recognizes security as emancipation of individuals and groups. As long as peoples are subject to direct and structural violence, the world will not be secure.[2] In other readings of Booth, emancipation is defined more detailed. He argues that emancipation is not the concept transcending time and space; it is not gained at the expense of others; it is not Westernization (Booth, 1999: 31-69). From both classifications, it is possible to conclude that; first, the CSS is not Westernist. The diffusion of Western values into the rest of the world does not automatically lead to the emancipation of individuals. Each emancipation process should be carried on in accordance with the specific characteristics and specific violence types directed towards individuals. Secondly, individual freedoms should not be ignored for the security of community or state. This issue will be discussed in detail when we are comparing the Copenhagen and Welsh Schools. Thirdly, the CSS is not statist. The security of state is not prioritized at the expense of groups' and individuals'. Moreover states are becoming the agents of insecurity for their populations. "People in the world continue to suffer gross injustices, often at the hands of their

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[1] "[Emancipation] is the freeing of people from the physical and human constraints which stop them carrying out what they would freely choose to do. War and threat of war is one of those constraints, together with poverty, poor education, political oppression and so on. Security and emancipation are two sides of the same coin. Emancipation, not power or order, produces true security. *Emancipation, theoretically, is security*" (Booth, 1991: 319, Italics added).

[2] Direct violence is the threats that are directing against the physical existence of individuals. Structural violence, on the other hand, is a type of violence that is originated from the existing social structures and power relations which are preventing individuals to express their capacities. Poverty, poor education, sexism, discrimination based on race, religion, and nationality are such class of violence. Structural violence has the capacity to produce direct violence. (Booth, 2001).

governments" (Bilgin, 2003: 210). The CSS does not neglect the security of states, but it refuses the state security as an end in itself.

Another student of the CSS, Andrew Linklater, represents the ways going to emancipation in practice. He states three ways. First, the development of social arrangements that does not rest on problematic differences between individuals; the transformation of societies that are more respectful to differences; the reduction of material inequalities (Linklater, 2005: 120). Therefore, the concept of emancipation is operationalized by him.

The CSS as the reflection of the Critical Theory in the security studies refuses the distinction between fact and value and observer and observed. It turns to be the active participant of the politics with the purpose of problematizing existing power structures that are working against the bulk of the world population. To put it simply, the CSS is for individuals and for emancipation.

1.1 Whose security: The CSS as the Critique of the Copenhagen School

The ways in which security is studied are varied. Among all different approaches, the common way is to study security from the perspective of problem-solving theories. The problem-solving 'scientists' are observing the truth 'out there' without any normative claim in their ivory towers playing with game theories. States that are competing and cooperating under given anarchy are accepted as the main referent objects. Security matters if it belongs to states. However, these approaches have been criticized by those who realize that positivist way of studying security does not only fail in corresponding the various threats in the world, but also contribute the maintenance of the existing system. Concerning realism, Booth truly argues that "one of the reasons why political realism accurately described some of the reality of the time was because it had helped to construct some of that reality" (Booth, 2005: 5). However, some security studies, just like the Copenhagen School's teachings, are trapped with the same situation. The foremost vital point is that being *just* a critical without any emancipatory aim is not enough to be a critical. This sort of analysis is not only contributing the present oppressive power relations, but also, in some cases including the area of immigration and asylum, making it worse.

Barry Buzan's 1981 book *People, States and Fear* was one of the firsts who criticize traditional militaristic approaches to security. In his book, he widens the security agenda beyond the military sector in a way it includes four different sectors: political, economic, societal, and ecological sectors. However, for Buzan, states are still the main referent of security. Nearly ten years later from the first book, he insists on the statist approach of security by claiming that "the societal security is an integral and important part of the state security…Reducing contradictions between the state and societal security is a precondition for successful 'national' security policy" (Buzan, 1993: 57). For Buzan, all security sectors are the tools for the security of state. Although the widening of the security agenda is a courageous attempt to create more sophisticated security studies, it suffers from the same weaknesses that traditional security studies do, that is, statism. Statist security studies fail to recognize the fact that threats or

challenges are not always targeting states. Moreover states themselves become the agents of insecurity for their citizens and for international system. In other words, statist approaches fails to provide security for peoples of the world.

Waever argues that "the main units of analysis for societal security are *politically significant* ethno-national and religious identities" (Waever, 1993: 22). The threats which targets identity are the subject of security studies. He identifies identity as an exclusionary phenomenon in which religious, ethnic, national ties between individuals are threatened by those who do not posses these ties. Immigration is such a threat, for him. Therefore, he securitizes immigration in accordance with definition. Securitization is defined as "an issue is presented as posing an existential threat to a designated referent object" (Buzan, Waever, de Wilde, 1998: 21). Immigration is a threat to the existence of societal identity. However, he fails to explain how to deal with this threat. The most preeminent critique came from the sociologist Bill McSweeney. As opposed to given, 'out there' conceptualization of identity, he argues that "identity is not a fact of society; it is a process of negotiation among people and interests groups" (McSweeney, 1999: 73). The societal identity is subject to constant changes during negotiations among individuals. The religious or ethnic ties may become more and more irrelevant. The society may be constructed in more inclusionary ways. However, for Waever, identities are fixed, truth 'out there', just like positivist traditional theories.

The second critique is that "the security problem is not there just because people have separate identities; it may well be the case that they have separate identities because of the security problem" (McSweeney, 1999: 73). In other words, the conflicts are presented as the identity clashes. People are clashing each other not because they have different identities, but the issues are talked about in terms of identities. That is why "what is 'out there' is identity discourse on the part of political leaders, intellectuals and countless other, who engage in the process of constructing, negotiating, manipulating or affirming" identities (McSweeney, 1999: 77). Bilgin rightly asks the following question on identity after McSweeney; "when Bosnians, Serbians, and Croatians perceive threats to their identity as the cause of conflict over Bosnia-Herzegovina, how do we decide who the aggressor is and who the victim is?" (Bilgin, 2003: 213) As we will discuss in the following sections, immigration is presented as a threat to societies' identities by dominant political discourses. Therefore, the question will be asked; are immigrants really threat to societal identities or are they presented by political actors and hence conceived by audience as threats?

This question leads us to another difference between the CSS and Copenhagen School: society vs. individuals. For Waever, "societal security is not the security of the individual parts, nor is it the sum of the security of the parts" (Waever, 1993: 26). In order to be regarded as the referent object, the group should be *politically significant*. It is clear that, without any religious or ethno-national ties, it will not be easy to become the referent of security, according to Waever. This communitarian understanding may work at the expense of individuals, as it happens in the area of immigration and asylum. For example, as will be told later, *politically insignificant* individuals are exempted from Europe to

their home countries where their lives are at stake. The insecurity of discriminated refugees or immigrants is not the referent of Waever's security study. He is more interested in how these individuals have become threat to European societies' identities. On the other hand, the CSS deal with the human security whatever his/her racial, national, or gender background. "Individual human are the ultimate referent" (Booth, 1991: 319). The immigrants who are suffering from discriminative discourses and practices are the perfect referent for the CSS.

As discussed above, the Copenhagen School's security conceptualization is not only quite problematic, but also is far from being emancipatory and critical because their objective "is to make sure that the new agenda is carefully inserted into existing security theory" (Waever, 1993: 27). It is not reasonable to expect that the Copenhagen School is generating an alternative and more comprehensive security understanding. Their only aim is to add another perspective in traditional security studies. However, while the CSS does not refuse the existence of traditional security studies, it problematizes them due to their contribution to the existing power relations and structure that are working against the bulk of world population.

Throughout the study, the immigration and asylum regimes will be deconstructed and problematized in accordance with the principles of the CSS aiming to understand what kind of security structure Europe has today; is it new or old; is it emancipatory? We are looking at discourses and practices and their relationships. But before that it is necessary to explain how to look at discourses, in other words, methodology of the study.

2. The Methodology: The Critical Discourse Analysis

In the previous section, while the theoretical foundation of the study was being explained, problem-solving theories were criticized because of their apolitical stance although they are political in the sense that the problem-solving theories are for solving problems within the existing structure in order to maintain status quo. As scientists, the students of these theories claim that it is possible to study social world with the methods of natural sciences. They distance themselves from the observed world with the purpose of conducting scientific research in which there is no room for immeasurable norms, values, or identities. Therefore, they separate observer and observed; value and fact. However, "the critical theories reject the idea that human social behaviour can be studied with the same scientific method as the study of the behaviour of glaciers" (Booth, 2005: 10). In the natural world, the apple always falls down from the tree, but in the social world, it does not necessarily.

The methodology of the CSS should be the one which: (1) refuses the observer-observed and value-fact distinctions, (2) is reflexive that recognizes all people including social researchers are the parts of the reality they claim to explain and criticize, (3) acknowledges the necessity of emancipation.[3] The Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) is the methodology which meets these criteria.

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[3] For detailed information for stuying security in a critical way see Pinar Bilgin, Ken Booth, Richard Wyn Jones, 1998. "Security Studies: The Next Stage", *Nacao Defesa* 84:2 (1998), 131-

The discourse, at first, challenges the positivist concept of reality. Positivist epistemology treats relations, structures, processes in the world as the independent facts out there. Human beings and relations are governed by general rules transcending time and space. The reality is given, natural, difficult to change. Although discourse analysis does not refuse the reality of physical objects, as opposed to some post-modernist theories, it claims that "they acquire meaning only through discourses" (Jorgensen: 2002, 62). In other words, despite the physical objects are out there, the reality is constructed through discourses. For example, Turkey's geographic position is identified both as the bridge between the East and the West and, also, as the very dangerous position neighbouring the problematic parts of the world. Two different discourses are constructing two different realities based on the same object. What we say or write about the world gives meaning to it. In turn, the meaning which has been attributed to the world affects our perception about that world. When we speak about them, "discourses operate as background capacities for persons to differentiate and identify things, giving those taken-for-granted qualities and attributes, and relating them with other objects." (Milliken, 1999: 231) The reality is out there, whereas, the very meaning of it depends on us. When we are speaking through or writing in texts, we are contributing to and affected by social processes through which meanings are produced and reproduced.

Discourses are not just the reflection of reality but "are artifacts of language through which the very reality they purport to reflect is constructed" along with social processes (Riggens, 1997: 2). The Critical Discourse Analysis is critical to realities that are being constructed by discursive and social actions. There are three main aims of the CDA. First, "the aim of the analysis is to provide detailed description, explanation, and critique of the textual strategies writers use to naturalize discourses, that is, to make discourses appear to be commonsense, apolitical statements" (Riggens, 1997: 3). It is the textual side of the CDA. The researcher looks at the texts in order to understand what kind of verbs, sentences, adverbs etc. are used and what kind of strategies are exercised in order to reinforce existing structures and power relations.

The second aim of the CDA is contextual. "Texts can be understood in relation to other texts and in relation to the social context" (Jorgensen, 78). The contextual analysis is the main strength of the CDA for two reasons. First, evaluating texts in their contextual environment creates the possibility of establishing links between discursive and social practices that are assumed to be mutually constitutive. Secondly, the historical development of a particular discourse can be analyzed only in relation to a context. For example, the immigration discourse in France can only be understood in relation to the Republican tradition of citizenship.

The third, and the most important, aim of the CDA is to criticize existing structures and knowledge-power relationships. The CDA always asks these questions: who is benefiting from the particular type of discourse; which social

157; Ken Booth, 1991. "Conclusion: War, Security and Strategy: towards a doctrine of stable peace", 335-376 in Ken Booth (ed) *New Thinking about Strategy and Security*. London: Harper Collins.

groups are reinforcing their superiority by performing the discourses; who is loosing due to the particular discourses? The CDA is in complete consistency with the CSS which is the theoretical ground of this study. Both problematize the existing structures and relationships for the purpose of emancipation of the oppressed individuals and social groups.

The CDA has its own concepts that should be explained. They are borrowed from Jorgensen (66-89):

The order of discourse: the configuration of all the discourse types which are used within a social institution or a social field. It consists of discourses and genres which is a particular usage of language which participates in part of a particular social practice, for example, an interview genre, a news genre…

Intertextual chain: a series of texts in which each text incorporates elements from another text or other texts.

Ideology: a construction of meaning that contributes to the production, reproduction and transformation of relations of dominations. There is a hegemonic struggle between discourses and ideologies.

In this study, the parliamentary speeches of politicians, their election speeches, the treaties, the proposals of the Commission, the decisions of the Council are all the communicative events. These communicative events constitute the particular order of discourse on the area immigration and asylum in Europe. The texts will be analyzed through the intertextual chains in particular area in order to find out the similarities between different texts. The textual analysis will be followed by the contextual analysis whereby the social practices will be examined in order to understand what kind of ideology emerge in the area of immigration and asylum and who is benefiting from this type of ideology. With the contextual analysis, we will be able to understand the relationship between the discursive and social practices and their mutually constitutive relationships. Considering this aim, there are three levels of analysis:

1. *The level of the text*: the analysis of the linguistic structure (such as vocabulary, grammar, syntax and sentence coherence)

2. *The level of discursive practice*: the analysis of the discourses and genres which are articulated in the production and the consumption of the text.

3. *The level of social practice*: considerations about whether the discursive practice reproduces, or, instead, restructures the existing order of discourse and about what consequences this has for the broader social practice.

To put it simply, when the immigration and asylum policy of the particular actor is analyzed and criticized, we will look at, first, the structures of texts;

secondly, the strategies and uses of the language in texts; thirdly, the context (or social practice) that produces and is produced by discourses. As a result of this three-level analysis, we will learn the ideology of immigration and asylum policy of the particular actor and its security implications.

After explaining theoretical and methodological ground of the study, we can elaborate the research questions. In addition to understand the European security social structure, as to the aim of the study, the grounds on which the security structure is criticized will be explained such as:

- *Is there a consistency between what the actors say and do?*

- *Is the European security structure is emancipatory or is based on dichotomies?*

 - *Is the referent of security is states, societies, or individuals?*

It is possible to claim that these questions are generally normative questions in parallel with the idea of emancipation.

The critical theory will be applied to an issue area with the purpose of problematizing the existing social structures in this area. The second theoretical aim is to test the CDA's assumptions about discursive actions, social practices and their mutually constitutive relationships.

- *Is there a consistency or inconsistency between what actors say and do?*

The consistency or inconsistency between discursive and social practices will be the testing ground for CDA.

**SECURITIZATION OF IMMIGRATION IN NATIONAL LEVEL: The
Cases of Britain and France**

1. Framing the Analysis: The Common Discursive Strategies

In this chapter, the discursive and social practices in the area of
immigration and asylum policies in the UK and France will be analyzed and
problematized. In both cases, how immigrants, refugees and asylum-seekers will
be presented as security threats to respective national identities, social security
systems, and welfare states will be examined in a critical manner. Firstly, in text
level, the discursive practices (*the order of discourse* in the area immigration and
asylum policy in the nation-state level), namely texts and speeches of political
actors, will be studied. The texts will be investigated in relation to other texts, or
in *intertextual chain*, in order to draw common *ideology* that is visible in all texts
in different times. The different discourses will be paid special attention because
the hegemonic struggle between different discourses will be regarded as the main
tool for generating emancipatory security social structure in this specific issue
area.

In the second level, the texts will be contextualized in order to analyze the
constitutive relationship between discursive and social practices. Therefore, at the
end of the chapter, we will be able to understand and problematize securitization
process of immigration and asylum issue in the nation-state level in Europe, at
least for two European leading states in this issue area.

Before starting analysis, it is necessary to explain the discursive strategies
that are common both in the UK and France political discourse. These are:

a. *The positive self-representation:* It is the presentation of the country in
   more favorable terms in order to claim to what extent the country is
   democratic and respectful to human rights, against racial discrimination,
   and open to all foreigners regardless their ethnic origin.

b. *The negative 'other' presentation:* It is the presentation of the 'other',
   immigrants and refugees in our case, in negative words. The most
   common type is the presentation of foreigners as the abusers of the system.

c. *The criminalization of immigrants and refugees:* The attribution of
   illegality to immigrants and refugees assuming organic connections
   between criminal groups and foreigners.

d. *The securitization of immigrants and refugees:* The presentation of these
   groups as threats to national identities, social security and welfare systems.

Those four strategies, described above, work together in the process of
securitization of immigration and asylum issue. The first two are used in order to

differentiate between natives and foreigners as two separate and commonly conflicting communities. The last two are utilized with the purpose of securitizing "the other". As a result, similar to the security understanding the Copenhagen school, the nation-states construct exclusionary and even racist security structure based on dichotomies between 'the good self' and 'the bad other'.

2. The United Kingdom

2.1 The Political Discourse on Immigration

In this section, we will analyze the discourse examples of MPs in the 1980s and 1990s, the election and parliamentary speeches of David Davis, the leader of the Conservatives in 2005, and an example from a newspaper article. The articles are included in the political discourse genre because of the political character of the issue.

These are the examples of positive self-representation:

> "We'll give youngsters the opportunity that comes from learning in well-disciplined schools - where the minority isn't able to ruin the education of the majority. These are the people who are always ready to welcome genuine refugees to Britain, or families who want to work hard and make a positive contribution to our country. For centuries we've welcomed people from around the world with open arms. We have a proud tradition of giving refuge to those fleeing persecution. And we have always offered a home to families who want to come here, work hard and make a positive contribution to our society." David Davis, 2005

The aim of this type of discourse is to prepare the ground for negative other representation. In example, the speaker paid his attention on the receptiveness and hospitality of the UK and British people. The implication is that they are tolerant, kind, and warm to those who want to come to Britain. The problems, as we will see below, arise not because of the British people and state, but due to the criminal, irrational, abuser foreigners.

> "*Our* duties to *our* citizens include the duty to *protect our welfare and benefit budgets* and *our housing system* at a time of economic stringency. Those who should not be here but who have got round the system by false applications are of no benefit to *our own people*." Edward Garnier MP 1992 (Schuster and Solomos: 1999: 65)

> "One must, of course, always be extremely be careful about *the natural* tendency of those who belong to a minority, whatever it may be, that when they do not get what they want, they assume that their failure to do so is directly attributed to their membership of that minority, when that is frequently not the case." Andrew Rowe MP 1989 (Van Dijk, 1997)

The examples are from political and media discourse on the negative other representation. In the first example, the speaker continuously repeats "our". This implies the clear-cut boundaries between natives who have the possession of the country and foreigners who come to Britain to make benefit from the British system. Particularly, the word of "protect" implies that the system is under attack and needs to be protected. The second example is significant to highlight that the complaints of immigrants and refugees are attributed to their 'natural' tendency. Foreigners are complaining just because they are foreigners. This is one of the most explicit negative other representation stemming from racist ideas.

> "But today they feel that the British sense of tolerance and of fair play is quite simply being abused. It's not racist to talk about immigration. Only two out of ten people who claim asylum in Britain today are genuine refugees. If suspected *illegal* immigrants are stopped, they will almost certainly claim asylum. They know how to work our chaotic system. Once they mention the word "asylum" they can't be put back on the plane. And of course they'll also be logged on the official statistics." David Davis, 2005

> "Britain is not a health supermarket for the rest of the world. It is time we started standing up for our citizens and taxpayers rather than being a medical soft touch." Times 2000 (Hayes, 44)

> "We are seeing a gross and transparent abuse of the asylum procedures as a means of obtaining jobs, housing and perhaps social security benefits in the UK." Tim Ranton 1989 (van Dijk, 1997)

The three examples, from different time periods and genres, are the examples of criminalizing the immigration and asylum. The common point of three is the stress on the abuse of the British system by immigrants and asylum-seekers. "Illegal immigrants" are cheaters who know how to work the system, for Davis. For Ranton, on the other hand, the asylum-seekers are not really asylum-seekers, but people who are trying to make benefit from Britain. The criminalizing immigration and asylum is the first step of securitization of the issue. The last two examples will indicate the ways of securitization with the latest data from 2005.

> "[Britain has been] *swamped* by people with a *different culture*." Margaret Thatcher, the PM 1978 (Boswell, 16)

> "Over 150,000 people are now settling in the UK every year - that's the equivalent of a city the size of Peterborough. The Government's own predictions show that Britain's population will grow by six million over the next thirty years. Five million of that will be due to immigration - that's five times the population of Birmingham." David Davis, 2005

> "This is also playing fast and loose with our security. We face a real terrorist threat in Britain today - a threat to our way of life, to our liberties. Yet we

have absolutely no idea who is coming into or leaving our country." David Davis, 2005

"Across the country, vital local services are under increasing pressure as people find access to health care and schooling more difficult because more people are *fighting* over fewer places. The Government are very quick to remind us, when it suits them, that Britain is still *at high risk from terrorism*, but the public have little faith in the very system that is supposed to control who enters our country and who leaves it." David Davis's Parliamentary Speech, 2005

Among the many examples that construct foreigners as the threat, the words of Thatcher are chosen because of her representative power. Just before, her election victory in 1979, she clearly admitted that Britain was flooded by different, foreign culture. Her words are interesting in the sense that racism is well hidden. The word of 'swamp' was used in order to exaggerate the number of people coming to Britain. The similar strategy is used by using the words of 'flow, inflow, massive flow, invasion of foreigners' by other speakers. As Geddes puts it rightly, "words such as flooding, swamping and invasion can enter the anti-immigration vernacular, frame debates about international migration, and prompt the perception of international migration as a threat to security welfare or internal social cohesion" (Geddes, 2003:8).

The second point is her stress on 'different culture'. She did not define what she meant by 'different culture', whereas, the Britishness was characterized by the specific culture in which differences could not be included. Her strategy was the presentation of people with different culture as a threat due to their numbers. In the second example, the speaker focuses on numbers by giving statistical data. The strategy is the generation of fear based on numbers. In the latter, Davis clearly connects terrorism, an obvious security threat, with immigration and asylum. It is also considerable that this 'real terrorist threat' is directed to 'our way of life and our liberties'. The implicit link is that the weakness at borders is a threat to way of life, which is identity. Therefore, Davis implicitly, despite cleverly, links terrorism with immigration and therefore, securitizes the borders. In the last example, the speaker deliberately uses the word of 'fighting', which is a keyword of securitization. He also put immigration and risk of terrorism in the same framework and connected two phenomenon.

2.2 The Analysis of Discursive Practice

The order of discourse in Britain on the immigration and asylum constructs the ideology which is characterized by the identification of immigrants and refugees as threats to national welfare system. The main focus, unlike France, is not the cultural threat because Britain has had long tradition of multiculturalism. That is why the racist political discourse is produced by manipulating and provoking the economic fears of the society. However, it does not mean that the foreigners are not presented as threats to British identity. As the discourse of Garnier clearly indicates that British welfare system is included in British self-identification (*our welfare system*). On the other hand, criminalizing and securitizing foreigners are performed on the basis of identity differences such as that foreigners are cheaters and abusers just because they are foreigners (because of their *nature*). In the intertextual chain, the 'other' foreigners are

presented as threats to 'our welfare system'. Even in the aftermath of 9/11 and the London bombings, the construction of the foreigners as the cultural threat is not very common. The general securitization strategy is to connect immigration and asylum movement on the borders with terrorism. This reinforces the perception of immigrants as terrorists in the public eye.

2.3 From Text to Context: The Analysis of the Social Practice

In order to understand the immigration and asylum policy in the UK, we first need to explain the model through which the race relations are managed. The British model is multicultural model in which "definition of the nation as a political community…with the possibility of admitting newcomers, who may maintain cultural difference and form ethnic communities" (Castles and Miller,1999: 44). The British model allows and accepts the formation of ethnic communities and recognizes the existence of different ethnic communities in Britain, unlike French model. However, the acceptance of the newcomers mostly depends on the economic conditions and at the time of economic stagnation, the newcomers are not welcomed.

In the post-war period, as a result of the multicultural empire legacy, all people from former British colonies had a right to have British passport until 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act. The Immigration Act of 1971 not only restricted the immigration from former colonies more, but also "encouraged white immigration." (Sriskandarajah and Road, 2005). One of the first movements of the Conservatives, whose leader was complaining about Britain 'swamped by the different culture', was the British Nationality Act of 1981 which curbed the conditions of family reunification and brought to an end the automatic right of acquisition of British nationality for those on British territory.

In fact, the social practices of the Conservatives against immigrants and asylum-seekers had a political agenda. "It was an attempt to mitigate the destabilizing impact of neo-liberal reforms with a nationalist rhetoric which promised to guard citizens against external threats" (Boswell, 16). The most promising threat candidate was the immigrants and asylum-seekers. Therefore, the securitization of this issue was started mainly by the Conservative governments in the 1980s and 1990s.

However, the discourse against immigrants and asylum-seekers should not have been contradicting with the multicultural legacy in Britain. That is why anti-immigrant and refugee discourse was formed on the basis of the abuse of the British welfare system by foreigners. The main victims of the draconian measures were the asylum-seekers. "Prior to 1993 only around 16 per cent of all applicants were refused any sort of protection, but in 1994 the proportion of refusals rose to 75 per cent" (Boswell, 58). In 1996, the positive response was 19 per cent. The Labour government was on the same track. Although the acceptance rate arose to 36 percent in 2002, "in 2004, it fell to 11 percent and only 3 percent was entitled by the full refugee status" (Sriskandarajah and Road, 2005). These statistics falsify the politicians who tried to provoke the fear based on numbers.

In parallel with the discursive practice, the main 'war strategy' against asylum-seekers was to limit their benefits from the British welfare system. The Asylum and Immigration Acts of 1996 (the Conservative) and 1999 (the Labour) limited these rights more and more. They made financial aid and accommodation conditional. The Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act of 2002 restricted the

benefits further such as that it confined "asylum applicants from working or undertaking vocational training until they received a positive decision" (Sriskandarajah and Road, 2005). The Labour government social practice against asylum-seekers was more exclusionary and securitized. One of the most remarkable examples was the 2002 legislation of the Home Office. It introduced the provision on "the teaching of asylum-seekers' children within special centers rather than in the normal school system" (Boswell, 71).

In the British political discourse and social practice, the immigrants and asylum-seekers have been long presented as the threats to the British welfare system that is included in the British-self identification. The reasons vary. During the Conservative area, the unemployment rate was high and the economy was stagnated. For politicians, the easiest way of dealing these problems was the introduction of immigration and asylum-seeking as the security problem which threatened the societal security of the British people. The discursive and social practitioners preferred to provoke the fears of the people based on numbers who have different culture having tendency to abuse the British welfare system.

2.4 The Welcoming High-Skilled Immigrants: A New Discourse?

The Labour government has had impressive economic successes in the last decade. The unemployment rate was decreasing and the economy was growing. The British government has chosen to revitalize the labour recruitment schemes. In 2002, it published White Paper on Secure Borders, Safe Haven: Integration with Diversity in Modern Britain. It acknowledged that "migrants bring new experiences and talents that can widen and enrich the knowledge base of the economy." It is an attempt to turn back to the years before 1970s when the developing European economies needed the immigrant labour. The possible implication of this idea is that Britain needs not immigrants, but their labour. This approach has little to say about the xenophobia and social tensions based on cultural differences. What about the asylum-seekers who are not beneficial economically? From this point of view, this approach which is common in Europe today is far from being a new discourse which is inclusionary to reinforce peaceful co-existence of different cultures.

3. France

3.1 The Political Discourse on Immigration

> "We are a great nation, not only thanks to our material resources, but equally because of the idea that has been developed about our history and our identity." Laurent Fabius, PS (Van der Valk, 253)

In the parliamentary discussion on the new immigration law, the speaker started with the positive self presentation which highlights the French history and identity. The common characteristic of this strategy is that speakers refer to 1789 Revolution and the formation of civic French citizenship with the emphasis on equality.

"This article is a new flexibilization, which will allow *some parents* to ask for a residence permit not to come and take care of their offspring but *to profit from our country*" Rudy Salles, UDF (Van der Valk, 245)

"The role of Islam stands out more and more which refuses all adherences to our society" Pierre Mazeaud, RPR *Le Monde* 13 May 1993 (Hargreaves, 174)

"They [French people] know the significant fertility of these families [immigrant families] and know that thus several *more millions* of men, woman and children will be on our soil, if some of them may find work, they will largely *eat from the stablerack of the social budget*. While their unemployment rates are still more significant than *those of our compatriots*, this unemployment rate being high, you will admit this, Minister, *by their presence*." Bernard Accoyer, RPR (Van der Valk, 227)

"In an era in which one is at least used to posting a letter in order to be reimbursed for a tube of aspirins, one may perhaps be capable of writing a letter to say that one would like to become French." Francois Bayrou- Leader of UDF in Parliament (Van der Valk, 238)

"It is no longer enough to talk of Islam in France. There has to be a French Islam." Pasque, The Interior Minister, *Le Monde* 1 October 1994 (Hargreaves, 208)

In the various examples from different actors and in different times, the most striking characteristic is the presentation of immigrants and refugees as the ignorant, irrational, abuser, and cheater. In the first example, regarding the law of family reunification, the speaker separates the French (the self) and foreigners (the others) who are benefiting from 'our' country and accuses 'some parents' of manipulating the new law. For him, 'some parents' are not taking care of their offspring, but taking advantage of the French law to 'benefit from *our* country'. The second and fifth examples focus on the inconsistency of Islam with the French values. Islam that is 'the other' culture needs to be French. Otherwise, Islam and French culture are incompatible. The third example is significant. The speaker divides the self and the other (*our* compatriots and *their* presence), presents the other negatively (*eat from* the social budget), provokes the fear based on numbers (*several more millions*), accuses foreigners of unemployment (*by their presence*). The forth example is the classical example of presenting 'the other' as an ignorant abuser. The foreigners are burden for France because they are reimbursing even a tube of aspirin. In addition, they do not know how to speak or write in French.

Regarding the strikes in the automobile industry:

"The strikers were being stirred up by religious and political groups motivated by factors which have little to do with labour relations" Pierre Mauroy, the Prime Minister PS, *Nord Éclair* 1983 (Hargreaves, 182)

"It [the proposal] will surely favour the practice of white marriages or marriages of convenience for the acquisition of residence permits, which is manifestly contrary to the interest of the country and the control of immigration." Rudy Salles, UDF (Van der Valk, 245)

"The catch all category, of great impression, is an open door for all forms of abuse." Jacques Masdeu-Arus, RPR (Van der Valk, 245)

The third strategy, the criminalizing of immigrants and refugees, is common in French political discourse. In the first example, the speaker is presenting foreigners (religious groups) as the provocateurs who have nothing to do with labour rights. The rest of them are the examples of 'abuser and cheater' foreigners who can even get married to abuse the system.

The last and foremost important strategy is the securitization:

"The increasing number of foreigners implies *serious dangers* for the security of our country and its economic and social equilibrium…[France] are under *serious and lethal menace* by the continuous development of foreign immigration…" Le Pen, The Leader of FN 1989 (Van Dijk, 58)

"We now observe, on our national soil, a *clash* between two fundamentally different cultures. Islam, which already represents the second religion in France, is opposed to any assimilation and *threatens our own identity*, our Western Christian civilization." Jean-Pierre Stirbois, MP 1986 (Van Dijk, 58)

People of immigrant origin should be integrated into the very heart of the French society without this *threatening the cultural integrity of the nation*. Kofi Yamgnane, the Minister of State for Integration, *Le Monde* 10 October 1991 (Hargreaves, 196)

"Such a situation will contribute to the feeding of unemployment and the most perverse and *dangerous tensions* for our country." Bernard Accoyer ,RPR (Van der Valk, 227)

About the residence permits for foreign artists:
"This evening you not only discredit Parliament but you *damage the values* of France by presenting such proposals about such an important text." Christian Estrosi, UDF (Van der Valk, 232)

"In fact by opening our borders wide you will provoke a *massive influx* of immigrants, which risks to *harm the balance of our social tissue and to favour xenophobic conduct.*" Jacques Masdeu-Ares, RPR (Van der Valk, 246)

"The *struggle against illegal floods* of entrance on to our territory may not be undertaken without respect for the traditions of the Republic." Laurent Fabius, PS (Van der Valk, 253)

The political discourse examples from different actors of French political life include similar words: threat, threatening, fight, struggle, tension, serious and lethal menace, damage…The most marginal words were coming from Le Pen just after the election victory in some French districts which was the first fascist victory in the post-war Europe. However, other examples are from different speakers both from the left and the right. In fact, they have a similar strategy with Le Pen.

3.2 The Analysis of Discursive Practice

The ideology constructed by the political discourse in France on the immigration and asylum policy is based on the disability of assimilation of different and foreign culture. In the intertextual chain, the threat perception is voiced with the emphasis on the uniqueness and greatness of French social and political culture based on liberty, equality, fraternity and the massive influx of foreigners who are totally alien to this great culture. One of the common strategies is the focus on the illegality of immigrants. In this sense, criminalizing and securitizing are accompanied each other. The implication is that the criminal foreigners are threatening the French national identity.

The economic side of the immigration is less emphasized, unlike Britain. However, when it is done, it is always presented with the cultural side of immigration (culturally alien people are benefiting from the social system in France). The other important point is the accusation of foreigners for the xenophobia, social tensions, and the spoil of the social tissue. The possible implication is that immigration should be stopped in order to prevent xenophobia or social tensions.

The four strategies work together to securitize the immigration and asylum issue. In the following part, what kind of social practice is performed by the political actors under the effect of the exclusionary security discourse will be examined.

3.3 From Text to Context: The Analysis of the Social Practice

The French citizenship model is the assimilationist model in which newcomers are welcomed as long as they are assimilated to the majority culture. "Immigrants are expected to give up their distinctive linguistic, cultural or social characteristics and become indistinguishable from the majority population"

(Castles and Miller, 250). The examples of political discourse highlighting the French Islam and language inabilities of foreign population are the result of this social structure. The French definition of integration is the reducing social differences. Hargreaves identifies it as the acculturation which means "the acquisition of pre-existing cultural norms dominant in a particular society" (Hargreaves, 1995: 34). The failure in the acculturation process results in the securitization of different cultured people, be it immigrants, refugees or foreigners.

Like other European states, France benefited from the labour recruitment in the post-war economic boom years. "Policy makers and politicians had great confidence in the ability of French society to absorb and integrate the newcomers, because of the strength of the Republican tradition." (Hollifield, 1999: 60) Although the Republican tradition is founded on the principle of equality between citizens, it does not accept to recognize the existence of different cultures in France. In other words, the identities of people from different cultures are refused by the French political legacy. As a result of this perspective, parallel with the security understanding of the Copenhagen school, different cultures are securitized and regarded as threats to the French culture and national identity.

Although the restrictions were turning back to the period of Valerie Giscard d'Estaing, the most vital changes were introduced during the 1990s. In 1993, the rightist Interior Minister Pasqua introduced the zero immigration policy.[4] The measure of Pasqua law totally had criminalizing and securitizing effects upon the immigration and asylum policy. "He viewed control primarily as a police matter." (Hollifield, 1999: 68) The new law granted new powers to the Police de l'Air et des Frontieres (the Border Police) to deport immediately anyone who do not posses the papers. As to the internal controls, the police had a right to random and arbitrary identity checks of any foreigner. He also put an end to the automatic right of jus soli principle. Thanks to the protests of the civil rights movements and the refusal from the Council of State, many provisions had never been legalized. However, the securitization of immigration was successfully achieved, as a social practice.

What was the reason of these draconian measures? The common explanation is the Le Pen effect. During 1980s, the neo-fascist Front National performed successful election campaigns and won the government of some French cities. It even sent MPs to the National Assembly. "The conservative right responded it by embracing some components of far-right agenda, particularly the immigration one." (Hamilton, 2004) The right parties sent the massage to the electorate that they are sharing the worries of the Front National on the French national identity. The second Pasqua law in 1994 again reflected these concerns and again many provisions were refused by the Council of State. However, we should look at the problem from the reversed perspective. The right question may be: Is the FN a result, rather than a cause, of the securitization of migration? It can be arguable that the basis on which the FN rose had been prepared by the right-wing governments. The FN provoked the fears that had already been generated.

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[4] Pasqua announced the zero immigration policy in Le Monde on 2 June 1993. Due to the protests, he qualified his statement on 8 June as he meant zero illegal immigration.

Another key step on the process of securitization of immigration is the headscarf issue. In 1990s, some Muslim girls wore their headscarf in their schools. This issue was presented as the direct violation of laicism that is strict separation of Church and state. Hollifield's analysis is worth to quote:

> "The event also heightened the sense of crisis with respect to immigration control, because of the widespread *fear* that the new immigrants form North Africa, as well as the second generation, were increasingly prone to Islamic fundamentalism and therefore inassimilable in secular, republican society." (Hollifield, 1999: 72) italics added

The psychological 'warfare' against immigrants and asylum-seekers were carried on many different tools. Their social rights were denied; the police were given new powers to deport 'suspicious' foreigners; the health care benefits for foreigners were removed. The Debre Law of 1996 created worse atmosphere not only in terms of the freedoms of foreigners but also the rights of French citizens. The new provision required all French citizens to notify local authorities when a foreigner hires their homes. This provision generated the biggest civil right movement in the French history and, of course, refused the Council of State. This law has great importance because, for the first time, the securitization worked against the rights of native population, just like the restriction of the civil rights during the war times.

3.4 The Right to Be Different: A Pathbreaking Discourse of the Socialists

The Socialist governments restated the right of jus soli; loosed the tight controls of foreigners; and focused on external control of immigration. However, like their predecessors, they accepted the separation between legal and illegal immigration, therefore, reinforcing the criminalization of the issue. However, the policies in the 2000s have not worked well to 'assimilate' foreign cultures so that the shantytowns of Paris were stormed by the angry foreigners in the late 2005.

However, the subject of this section is not the unsuccessful policies, but the different discourse of the Socialist Party in the 1980s: *le droit a la difference*. This discourse is acknowledging the existence of different cultures in France and challenging all republican tradition based on indivisibility of the French nation. Therefore, it desecuritizes the immigration and asylum issue and replaces it into the normal political discussion.

To sum up, this chapter focused on the securitization of the immigration and asylum issue in the nation-state level in Europe by analyzing discursive and social practices of the political actors. We have found that immigration and asylum is constructed as the security issue threatening the national identities. This approach reflects the Copenhagen school security approach and far from being emancipatory. To put it differently, in this area, the security structures of states are not emancipatory which means that they are founded on the dichotomies

between self and other, native and foreigner. In this point, it is necessary to problemitize some conceptualizations of immigrants and refugees:

- *Voluntary Migration and Forced Migration*: Many European states have this distinction. Voluntary or economic immigrants are accused for abusing asylum channels. Here is the question: If the people are leaving their countries due to the poverty and hunger, is this a voluntary or forced migration?

- *Illegal Migration and Legal Migration*: This is the main tool for criminalizing migration, for the European states and for the EU institutions. The question is that: In the moment the passage to another state is nearly impossible legally, and if a person has to immigrate, is there any possibility other than illegal channels? The institutions in Europe should think about *their* contribution to human smugglers.

Andrew Geddes argues convincingly that:

"The fact that in March 2002 more than 900 Kurds risked their lives by crossing the Mediterranean in a resting old boat in an attempt to enter Italy is not a sign of lax policies or uncontrolled migration, but of restrictive policies and the high costs of entry into EU member states" (Geddes, 2003: 20).

Without criticizing those given definitions of states, it is not possible to understand and criticize the securitization of migration and propose the emancipatory migration policy. The next chapter, we will understand and problemitize the approaches to the immigration and asylum in the European level.

CHAPTER FOUR
SECURITIZATION OF IMMIGRATION IN THE EUROPEAN LEVEL:
The Commission and the Council

1. Framing the Analysis

In the European Union level, the line between the discursive practice and social practice blurs. The executioners of the decisions taken by the supranational institutions are member states. However, it does not mean that the EU institutions do not engage with the social practice. In fact, their discursive practice is their social practice and *vise versa*. This situation does not affect the three-level critical discourse analysis method, which will be the actor-based analysis.

The discursive strategies supranational institutions use show both similarities and differences from that of member states. The criminalizing and securitization of migration are common. However, there are four diverse ones:

The otherization of non-EU nationals: The strategy based on the refusal of economic rights granted to the EU nationals

The extinction of self-other dichotomy: This strategy is used by the Commission which aims to improve the rights of non-EU nationals.

The positive 'other' presentation: In general, the Commission uses it. It accepts the distinction between the self (EU citizens) and the other (non-EU citizens), albeit in more positive terms.

The desecuritization (politicization) of migration: It means the removal of migration from the security area and shifting towards the normal political discussion.

2. The Commission

2.1 The Discursive Practice

> "The Commission believes that the Member States would be better place *to combat what is presented as a real abuse of the asylum system* if they had a wide range of open and transparent immigration management policies taking better account of the economic and demographic situations of the Member States." COM(2000)755

In this example, the Commission presents 'the other' negatively who abuses the migration systems of member states. Therefore, it inherits the discourse of states on the 'abuser and cheater' migrants. It is necessary to say that the Commission implies that it does not agree with states (*what is presented as…*). However, in order to reinforce its own agenda regarding open immigration policies in Europe, it accepts the common idea of abuser immigrants and asylum-seekers.

About common procedure:

> "It would reduce the impact of the phenomenon of *asylum-shopping* that is widely criticized in many quarters and the frequency of the secondary movements that are associated with it." (Presenting asylum-seekers as the abusers) COM(2000)755

Another uncritical adoption of state definition is *asylum-shopping*. In many documents, the Commission is complaining about this issue. It means that asylum-seekers are applying member states whose qualifications are lower for granting refugee status. Then, once they get the status, asylum-seekers move to other member states. The implication of this type of discourse is that the Commission, like member states, thinks that asylum-seekers are abusing the system.

> "There is a clear link between illegal immigrants and the unregulated labour market." COM(2004)412

> "Strengthening the integration of third country nationals *legally* residing in the Member States is an essential objective for EU immigration policy." COM(2004)412

Those two examples indicate that the Commission has the same dichotomy between illegal and legal immigrants, like member states. Without considering what makes immigrants illegal (restrictive immigration policies), the Commission clearly links illegal immigration with other illegal activity. Moreover, in the second example, the Commission implies that integration is the right of legal immigrants. Its perception about illegal immigrants can be seen in the third example. It is against regularization programs which have made many 'illegal' immigrants 'legal' residing in many member states. The Commission is not only criminalizing immigrants and asylum-seekers, but also turns down one of the survival chance of 'illegal' immigrants in Europe.

Different Discourse

> "Third countries' labour is increasingly appearing as a major potential, which can be tapped to respond to both the continuing demand for low-skilled labour and as well as for skilled labour." COM(2004)508

The Commission adopts different discourse for member states here. It prioritizes the economic benefit of immigration. Therefore, it presents 'the other' in positive way (the positive other presentation). The idea is that they are beneficial to 'us'. However, the silence of the Commission remains about the economically unbeneficial migrants such as asylum-seekers.

> "The basic reference set of rights conferred on persons enjoying protection must be the rights conferred on TCNs residing lawfully in the EU, *which must in their turn be comparable to the rights of the citizens of the Union*." COM(2000)755

These three examples are considerable positive discourse about the decreasing dichotomy between EU and non-EU nationals. The implication is that the

Commission refuses the EU and non-EU dichotomy and inequality. This constitutes an important step for identifying self with the other, not against it.

> "Member States are also increasingly concerned about the integration of the newly arrived in particular ensuring that immigrants *understand and respect* the fundamental norms and values of the host society." COM(2004)508

> "After controlling for these observable characteristics [high fertility rate, low education level…], there remains only a small part of residual welfare dependency of migrants over and above those of natives." COM(2004)508

Finally, the Commission is obviously presenting immigrants and refugees as not threats to national identities. In the first example, the Commission says *understand and respect*, not assimilation. The implication is that different cultures may co-exist even if one of them is not assimilated by the other. Differences are not threats for societies, according to the Commission. The second example is more important because it is an attempt to remove discussion out of the identity related reasons. Previously, the Commission acknowledges the high number of children or low education level among immigrant communities. However, there are *observable characteristics* that can be changed, not cultural characteristics that are threat to national identities. The Commission has a different discourse that desecuritizes the immigration and asylum issue.

2.2 The Analysis of Discursive Practice

The discursive practice of the Commission can be summarized in a way that although it adopts some definitions of the member states about the immigration and asylum policy, it also introduces new style discourses aiming to reduce dichotomist relationship between the EU and non-EU citizens, and therefore desecuritize the issue by replacing in the normal political discussion. However, it is true to say that the Commission's new discourses are in favour of legally residing foreigners and their full integration. From one point of view, this new discourse aims to restructure the traditional anti-immigrant context with the purpose of forming new context in which different cultural affiliations are not regarded as threats. It is anti-racist and emancipatory. However, on the other hand, it is as strict as member states towards immigration considered as illegal. The criminalizing of immigration and asylum issue is performed by the Commission itself without deeming the causes of illegality of some migration. As discussed in the previous chapter, criminalization is a step towards securitization. In this sense, the Commission's discourse reinforces the structure constituted by states for decades.

3. **The Council**

3.1 The Discursive Practice

> "A worker who is a national of a Member State may not, in the territory of another Member State, be treated differently from national workers by reason of his nationality in respect of any conditions of employment and work, in particular as regards remuneration, dismissal, and should he become unemployed, reinstatement or re-employment." Regulation 1612/68

As early as 1968, the Council differentiated the status between the Community and non-Community citizens. The otherization of non-Nationals was the first step to the securitization of immigration. Even non-discrimination based on nationality clause of the regulation was structured in terms of member state nationality.

> "In the comprehensive plan to *combat illegal immigration*, the European Union has equipped itself with an effective means of bringing about proper management of migration *flows* and combating illegal immigration." Seville Presidency Conclusions (2004)

Just like in the political discourses in states, the Council adopts securitized discourse about the immigration and asylum. The words of '*combat*', '*illegal immigration*' and '*flows*' reflect all discursive strategies including securitization and criminalization.

Extraordinary Council Meeting JHA (2001) states that:

> "The Council recommends the Member States to exercise the utmost vigilance when issuing identity documents and residence permits (particularly in the case of duplicates). It also recommends more systematic checking of identity papers in order to detect any falsification."

> "The Council agrees to examine urgently the situation in relation to countries and regions where there is a *risk* of large scale population movements…"

Following the 9/11 attacks, the Council securitizes the immigration and asylum at foremost importance. In the second example, the Council identifies large scale population movement as a risk. However, it fails to explain why it is risk and for whom.

Council Directive on Minimum Standards for the Qualifications and Status of TCNs:

> "Member states may revoke, end or refuse to renew the status granted to a refugee…when there are reasonable grounds for regarding him or her as a danger to the community of that Member State in which she or he is present."

Regulation on Eurodoc 2000:

> "For the purposes of applying the Dublin Convention, it is necessary to establish the identity of applicants for asylum and of persons apprehended in connection with the unlawful crossing of the external borders of the Community."

In this provision that is against the Geneva Convention of 1951, the Council considers some refugees as *danger*. This is again the strategy of securitization. The second regulation is the example of criminalization.

The Austrian Presidency Work Program 1998:

"In recent years, the steep rise in *the number of illegal immigrants (and therefore potential asylum-seekers)* caught has revealed the increasing need to include their fingerprints in the system…"

In this Program that constituted the basis of many Council Regulations during the Austrian Presidency in 1998, the explicit link was established between illegal immigrants and asylum-seekers. For Austria, illegal immigrants are abusers and cheaters who are benefiting from the asylum system in Europe.

3.2 The Analysis of Discursive Practice

The Council as an organization of member states constructs an ideology that is not different from that of member states. The ideology lays on the otherization of immigrants, negative presentation, criminalization, and securitization of them. The Council, as a consequence of this ideology, explicitly connects the rights of individuals in the European level with the nation-state citizenship. In the nation-state level, foreigners are presented as threats due to the otherization processes. The supranational organizations have applied the same method in the European level. What is interesting is that the EU nationals, even if they are from different culture, are not perceived as threat as if none of the EU nationals are engaging with criminal activities. The hypocrisy of the EU can be the most vital implication of the ideology. The criminalization and securitization is working against immigrants, refugees and asylum seekers. In the EU level, they are converted to the enemy against which the suspension of fundamental rights is legitimate. The context shapes and is shaped by the hypocritical supranational political discourse.

4. From Text to Context: The Commission and the Council as the Co-workers

Institutions matter. To put it differently, "it is not so much the personality or character of asylum seekers [or immigrants] that matters, but rather the ways in which they are viewed by institutions and organizations." (Geddes, 2003: 3) The Commission and the Council have worked together to affect the context in which they employ. Their discursive and social practices constitute and are constituted by this context.

The context they have created has long been called 'fortress Europe' of which EU vs. non-EU and inside vs. outside dichotomies draw the main boundaries. In general, the Maastricht Treaty is accepted as the birth of 'fortress Europe'. However, the roots of it turn back to 1970s when the economic rights of Community citizens were determined. In Regulation 1612/68, the Council decided that free movement was granted to the workers from the member states. Therefore, the economic policy of the EC contributed to the self/other dichotomy in the supranational level. Although the Commission did not react to this discrimination, it focused on the social and political rights of TCNs. The Social Action Program of 1973 and the Commission's Action Program in Favour of Migrant Workers of 1974 suggested equal treatment of TCNs and granting voting rights in local elections. One the one hand, the Commission has had strict attitudes

towards 'illegal' immigrants; on the other, the Council has discriminated against them since 1970s. To put it simply, the context today has long been constructed.

The 1980s were the years of replacing immigration and asylum policy in the dichotomist framework of secure inside vs. insecure outside. The main consequence of this dichotomy was that people from outside, namely immigrants and refugees, were indicated as the source of insecurity for Europe. The public opinion was the reflection of this securitized approach. In addition to the restrictive policies of the Conservatives in Britain and the rise of neo-fascist party in France, other neo-fascist parties won seats in local elections in Germany. The separation between EC nationals and non-EC nationals can be seen in the Eurobarometer survey in 1989. When the question was asked to identify people of other nationalities, the high majority of people identified non-EC citizens. Besides, if the number of non-EC citizens was high, the tendency of EC citizens to equate non-EC citizens with otherness was also high (Eurobarometer, 1989).[5] The social practice of member states in supranational level was both the result and the reflection of this perception in the public opinion. In the wake of Single European Act, the member states quickly connected the formation of single market with the protection external borders. "One of the best examples is the 1990 Convention Applying the Schengen Agreement of 1985 which connects immigration and asylum with terrorism, transnational crime and border control" (Huysman, 2000: 756). In 1980s, the immigration and asylum policy was totally removed from the political area and shifted to security domain based on insider vs. outsiders and EC and non-EC citizen dichotomies. Therefore, the self/other distinction, which is the most necessary condition for securitization, was implied into the European level.

The inefficiency of intergovernmentalism that had been institutionalized in the Maastricht Treaty was replaced by the gradual communitarianism in the Amsterdam Treaty. In that moment, The Commission started to perform different discourse from the Council along with different social practice. It funded the European Union Migrant's Forum that has become one of the most influential pro-immigrant mobilization movements in the EU level. The EUMF proposed the extension of free movement right to those who are legally residing TCNs in the EU. As to parallel to that, the Commission, in its Action Plan of 1998, suggested the improvement of citizenship rights of TCNs (Geddes, 2003: 145). However, in Tampere (1999), the European Council "endorses the objective that long-term legally resident third country nationals be offered the opportunity to obtain the nationality of the member state in which they are resident."[6] Therefore, for the first time, the Council performed different discourse about TCNs to desecuritize the issue. However, it has not been ramified into the social practice, at least, so far.

The 9/11 terrorist attacks reinforced the already securitized character of immigration and asylum policy. For member states, the fact was obvious terrorists

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[5] Eurobarometer: Public Opinion in the European Community. Special Issue on Racism and Xenophobia (1989).
[6] Article 21 of Tampere Presidency Conclusions (1999) available at
http://europa.eu.int/council/off/conclu/oct99/oct99_eng.htm

who crashed the Twin Towers were immigrants trained in Europe so Europe needed more restrictive migration and asylum policy. Motivated with this impetus the JHA Council responded quickly. The Extraordinary Council meeting decided on the more systematic identity checks on borders, preparation for 'massive influx' from third countries, increasing the efficiency of Eurodoc. It is not surprising that arbitrary identity checks and seeing the immigration issue as the police matter were quite similar to the Pasqua and Debre Laws in France because "the EU can provide new opportunities for its member states to pursue restrictive policies" (Geddes, 2003: 63).

The asylum-seekers have been mostly affected migrant group suffering from these policies. In the European level, the asylum-seeking is linked with organized crime, but particularly with terrorism, through the introduction of new technologies. The Council Regulation 2725/2000 was adopted before 9/11 in order to form common database for electronic data of asylum-seekers. However, the implementation was speeded up as a result of the attacks (Regulation 407/2002). The terrorism and asylum link was acknowledged by the Commission. In the Working Document 743, it proposed the refusal of asylum application and expulsion of an asylum-seeker if he/she is active voluntary member of a terrorist organization. The Council, right after the Seville European Council, adopted a decision establishing a system for exchanging visa data (VIS). "Regarded by the Council as an essential instrument for reducing visa fraud and…in the fight against terrorism, civil liberty organization have expressed concern about VIS…as the erosion of privacy and surveillance of the movements of persons in the EU" (Monar, 2005: 136).

One of the main securitization strategies is the formation of dichotomy between secure inside vs. insecure outside. This may be called as the securitization of borders. "By placing security in territorial framework, the right to cross borders becomes a security issue" (Guild, 2003: 332). There are two explicit social practices in the EU. The first approach is the creation of safe third country approach. It was adopted in 1992 as a result of the Edinburgh Summit:

> "The European Council welcomed the progress made by the Ministers with responsibility for Immigration…on Resolution of Manifestly Unfounded Asylum Applications and on Host Third Countries." Art.22

The implication of these resolutions is that the asylum-seekers who are applying from host third countries that are safe would be regarded as 'unfounded' and their applications would more possibly be refused. The aim of the Council is to reduce the possibility of asylum-seeking in the EU, to keep the asylum-seekers out because "nationals of those countries who seek protection are thus defined as probable tellers of lies and untruths"(Guild, 2003: 333). This exclusionist approach was reinforced with the adoption of concentric circle system.

The second one is the adoption the concentric circle approach. The Vienna Action Plan of the Council described the four-circle system. The inner circle is the EU, the second circle is neighbours who are expected to have common migration standards with the first circle; the third circle is the buffer zone including Central

and Eastern European Countries, Turkey and North Africa; the final circle is where the EU is combating the push factors of immigration (Vienna Presidency Conclusions, 1998). The Commission inherited the same approach that can be seen in the Country and Regional Strategy Papers. (CEC, 2000). The concentric circle approach aims to 'protect' secure inside from the insecure outside. One of the main tools of protection is to control borders to prevent 'flow' of immigrants 'who are potential asylum-seekers'. In the same year, the High Level Working Group on Asylum and Immigration was created within the Council in order to deal with third countries where massive refugee influx is possible because "it has been seen as displaying the EU's intention to try to keep migrants closer to their countries of origin" (Geddes, 2003: 137). The cooperation with third countries which can be the buffer zone to 'protect' Europe from 'threatening flow of abuser immigrants' is on the high priority for the EU today so that the EU did threaten the non-cooperating third countries:

> "Inadequate cooperation by a country could hamper the establishment of closer relations between that country and the Union." Seville Presidency Conclusions, 2002, Art.35

The safe third country and concentric circle approaches are the reflections of insider-outsider distinction. The repercussion of it is that Europe that is threatening by the outside can only be secured by keeping the outsiders as much as possible. Consequently, this leads to further securitization of immigrants and refugees. It is also essential to argue that the EU is not only excluding TCNs, but also the countries who are not cooperating with it.

To sum up, the immigration and asylum policy is highly securitized in the EU, just like is in the member states. The Commission and the Council have long interacted with each other in order to create the area of freedom, security and justice. While freedom and justice are reserved for the EU citizens, security can only be achieved by not granting freedom and justice to 'the other'. Although the Commission has adopted new discourse on the rights of TCNs, it has not been fruitful so far. As Huysman rightly argues, "directly or indirectly, supporting strategies of securitization makes the inclusion of immigrants, asylum-seekers and refugees in European societies more difficult." (Huysman, 2000: 753) Both in state and European level, immigration and asylum policy is beyond the normal political discussion as a matter of societal security. However, the discursive and social practices of institutions do not help to politicize the issue. The security structure in Europe is constructed at the expense of millions of people who are regarded as aliens. Without the emancipatory understanding which aims to include 'the other', Europe will never be secure or never feel secure.

CONCLUSION

Three conclusions can be achieved concerning the questions at the beginning:

1. *The security social structure in Europe is exclusionary and based on dichotomies*

Even if it is not possible to argue that Europe is the melting pot for different cultures, ethnic groups, and nationalities, Europe is the continent of migration, especially since the 20th century. The migration from former colonies, labour recruitment systems for attracting the Southern labour, asylum-seeking from the Eastern Bloc, and migration from the Central and Eastern Europe, the North Africa, and the Middle East have made Europe a main receiving migration continent. However, the constructed security structure in Europe is far from corresponding to this reality.

In the nation-state level, political institutions and public opinion generally perceives immigrant and asylum-seekers as threats to their national identity whether through benefiting from welfare systems or through bringing 'inassimilable' alien cultures. Parallel with the security conceptualization of the Copenhagen School, the European national communities feel to be threatened by 'the other'. They are 'the other' because they have dark colour, different accent, different religious beliefs. The immigrants and asylum-seekers are largely excluded from the self identifications of national communities. Once the otherization process is successful, it is not difficult to accuse the other for unemployment or social unrest, for terrorism, even for xenophobia.

In the European level, on the other hand, the supranational institutions have inherited from the state discourses and practices. Some of them, like the Commission, tried to perform different discourse and practice in order to reshape the existing structure. However, politicization (or desecuritization) of immigration and asylum issue is not an easy task.

In the light of the findings of the previous chapters, we can now argue that, first; the reference of security in Europe is expanded to include national communities. In other words, the nation-states in Europe have lost their monopoly in terms of referring the subject of security. The factors, such as immigration, are perceived as threats for national communities whose identities are at stake due to the 'flow' of different cultures. However, the salience of societal security is engendering the majoritarian context in which individual liberties can be suspended if necessary. But who are these individuals? Thanks to the development of universal liberal human rights and democracy structure, minorities within the national communities are not direct target of securitization, although some ethnic and cultural minorities are still discriminated in the Central and Eastern Europe. In this situation, without any citizenship rights and international protection except continuously violated few international agreements, immigrants, refugees and asylum-seekers are perceived and presented as threats to national identities:

"The immigrant is a potential threatening Other because s/he crosses the national boundaries, thus challenging the in-group's identification with a specific culture, territory or ethnic origin, as well as the overall categorization of people into nationals and Others" (Triandafyllidou, 55).

Once the criminalization and securitization of individuals is achieved, any suspension of individual rights is legitimized. The ways of coping with insecurity of communities in Europe is working against the security of individuals by producing insecurity for them. However, as to one of the principles of the CSS, the securities of referents should not contradict with each other. Neither state nor society will be secure if individuals feel insecure within a society.

The second point is that the European security structure is exclusionary and based on dichotomies. Inside vs. outside, insider vs. outsider, EU citizens vs. non-EU citizens are some of these dichotomies. The core of them is the distinction between the self and the other. As discussed before, immigrant and refugees are subjected to intensive otherization process by both national and supranational authorities. As a result, public perception is shaped in accordance with these dichotomies whereby 'threatened self' is supposed to defend itself against 'threatening other'. However, as discussed above, this perception creates insecurity for 'the other' as well. Besides, insecurities are manipulated by, especially right-wing, politicians in a way that they are presented as an identity problems between the insecure European self and insecure non-European other. Now, we should revise the question that Bilgin asked before; considering the racist violence in Europe today when mutual insecurities produces violence, who is the aggressor and who is the victim? Within this exclusionary security structure, it is never possible to answer this question.

2. *The Critical Security Studies is the best theoretical foundation in order to problematize and reconstruct the security social structure in Europe.*

The CSS is a theoretical approach that deepens and broadens security in a way to include issues more than military and referents more than states. The strengths of the CSS are, however, its method of imminent critique and its aim of emancipation. Although Europe has transformed from the Hobbesian state of war to the Kantian perpetual peace within the continent, some groups are still living in the Hobbesian world in Europe. They are discriminated, even attacked. Because of the securitized character of the issue, many human rights violations are considered as legitimate, for the sake of security. It is worth to quote:

"Since immigrants are seen to challenge the basis of 'national' social and political cohesion upon which the integrity of the nation-state ostensibly depends, restricting immigration is often portrayed as an exercise of the right to self defense" (Kostakopoulou, 129).

As students of IR, how could we deal with this situation?

Firstly, the CSS is problematizing the existing security structure and power relationships with its method of imminent critique. During the study, the author did not take any concept as given such as illegal immigration, combating immigration, voluntary immigration, the abuse of asylum channels. The analysis had a critical approach to all concepts that had been defined by states in order to understand and problemitize the reasons underlying the existing power structure. Secondly, the CSS's deepened security concept to include individuals provided a normative perspective that has long been neglected. For the CSS, the individual security is utmost important and priority. Alongside with states and national communities, individuals in Europe regardless their nationality, ethnic background and religious beliefs need to feel secure in order to establish an area of freedom, security and justice.

3. *Discourses and social practices are consistent and mutually constitutive.*

Discourses and social practices are the sides of same coins. What we say affects what we do and *visa versa*. Discourses, which are the reflections of ideas, shape and are shaped by contexts in which they operate. However, this is not a vicious circle. Some actors, just like French socialists and the Commission, perform different discourse in order to prevail in the hegemonic struggle among discourses and they have similar social practices in accordance with their new discourses. The implication is that the change is possible. Ideas through discourses have power the very reality that many of us take for granted. This study was testing ground for the Critical Discourse Analysis in order to understand whether the discursive and social practices are consistent or not. We can argue that they are consistent. As a result, the positivist behaviouralism is not enough to analyze what is 'out there', without considering the power ideas and discourses. And when we consider the role of ideas, we have all reasons to believe that the reality is not 'out there', but our construction so it is possible to reconstruct new realities where all individuals can feel freedom and security.

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