

Mediation Strategies towards Spoilers

How the Behaviour of Mediators and Spoilers Affect the
Outcome of Internal Conflicts

The Cases of Angola and Mozambique

Abstract

Why do some mediation strategies towards spoilers in internal conflicts fail, while others succeed? The aim of this thesis is to examine how the mediation strategies towards spoilers affect the outcome of internal conflicts through the analysis of the mediator and spoiler behaviour. The analytical point of departure is the explanatory behavioural variables: spoiler type, spoiler locus, mediator impartiality or bias, and mediator leverage through resources. These are analyzed and compared in the case studies of Angola and Mozambique with the purpose of building theoretical developments on internal conflict resolution through mediation strategies towards spoilers. The research has showed that the correct diagnosis of spoiler type and the related mediation strategy is crucial for success. Meanwhile, a change in spoiler locus through changing leadership can influence the spoiler behaviour and the outcome. Furthermore, the cases have shown that mediator impartiality is most likely to lead to an outcome of success. Finally, the issue of mediator leverage depends on their adequate control and possession of resources in order to result in a mediation strategy towards spoilers, which leads to a successful outcome of peace in internal conflicts.

Key words: Internal Conflicts, Mediation, Spoilers, Angola, Mozambique.

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1 Introduction and Method

1.1 Field of Research

Today, the majority of international conflicts are internal conflicts characterized by long-term cycles of violence due to incompatibility of goals between different social classes or ethnic groups, where the government in most cases is one of the parties. Competition for resources, governance and authority, economic and political power, access and participation defines internal conflicts. The parties are often not capable of resolving their dispute by themselves and therefore mediation is frequently used as an extension and continuation of the parties' own conflict resolution (Jeong, 1999: 12, Rabie, 1994: 3, Rupesinghe, 1998: 26-7, 33, Cockell, 1998: 203).

Mediation is the most common type of international conflict resolution and can be defined as the efforts by third parties to prevent the eruption or escalation of violent conflict behaviour and to facilitate a settlement that makes renewed violent behaviour unlikely. Mediation is a non-coercive form of intervention of an individual, group or organization, which turns an original bilateral conflict into a triadic interaction (Bercovitch and Rubin, 1992: 4, Skjelsbæk and Fermann, 1996: 76, Karlsson, 1997: 131).

Mediation is a practical discipline concerning the dynamic process from war to peace, which leads to an outcome that, in the eyes of the parties involved, is a permanent solution. Conflict and peace are continuous processes of gradual change and transformation, where conflict is the opposite of peace. So the efforts to resolve conflicts cannot be separated from those meant to establish and foster peace, but peace is not always the outcome of mediation (Ohlson, 1998: 1, 9, Tillet, 1991: 1-2, Rabie, 1994: 4, 17).

Why do some mediation efforts fail, while others succeed? Many factors influence the outcome of internal conflicts and their resolution, and one of them is the issue of spoilers. Spoilers are leaders and parties, who believe that peace emerging from negotiations threaten their power, worldview, and interests, and therefore use violence to undermine the attempts to achieve peace. What causes the crucial difference between success and failure of spoilers is the strategy of the mediators. This makes the mediation strategies towards spoilers central to the outcome of the internal conflicts and influenced by both the behaviour of the mediators and the spoilers (Rupesinghe, 1998: 31, Stedman, 1997: 5-14). The focus of examination therefore becomes how mediator and spoiler behaviour influence the mediation strategies towards spoilers and thereby the outcome. The specific research problem is:

1.1.1 Research Problem

Why do some mediation strategies towards spoilers affect the outcome of internal conflicts leading to success in the resolution of the conflict, whereas others lead to failure?

1.2 Theoretical Framework

The theoretical framework introduces the concepts to be used in analyzing the research problem. The aim is to propose variables, which offer explanations of the behaviour of mediators and spoilers and their influence on the mediation strategies and the effects on the outcome of internal conflicts.

A mediation strategy is an overall plan, a mediator has as a method of resolving the conflict. The mediation strategy is clearly related to the mediator behaviour, since the behaviour directly affects the strategy. According to Bercovitch, who has done extended work on mediation, the main types of mediation strategies are communication-facilitation, formulation, and manipulation introduced by Touval and Zartman. Communication-facilitation is to establish contact and interaction by clarifying the situation and supplying missing information through a go-between. Formulation is to decide and control the settings, the agenda, plus the rules and norms, and to suggest substantive proposals and concessions through an indirect influence. Finally, manipulation is the more direct influence by keeping the parties in the mediation process, pressing them to be flexible, and promising resources or threatening withdrawal. When pursuing a mediation strategy, the issue of leverage is highly relevant, and the mediator's resources are the basis for leverage. The different types of strategic resources are reward, coercion, legitimacy, expertise and information, which all are connected to the behaviour of the mediator. Therefore the control and possession of resources is a major influence on the mediator's ability to achieve a favourable outcome (Bercovitch, 1984: 97, Bercovitch and Rubin, 1992: 16-9).

Furthermore, the issue of mediator impartiality or bias influences the mediator behaviour. The impartial mediator is balanced between the parties but not neutral and its strength lies in trust and fairness. A biased mediator has something at stake and is closer to one side than the other, politically, economically or culturally. The bias can be very effective, when it adds to the mediator's capacity and desire to influence, but it can also hinder when dealing with spoilers (Carnevale and Arad, 1996: 40-5).

The concept of spoilers was first introduced by Stedman who emphasized its connection to mediators and peace agreements, since without there is nothing to spoil and the concept of spoiler should not be applied. Spoiler behaviour is influenced by the characteristics of spoilers, which are the position, number, type and locus of the spoiler. Stedman's argument is that different spoiler

characteristics require different mediation strategies, which are inducement¹, socialization² and coercion³. So Stedman's typology of spoilers becomes the point of departure when posing explanations for the behaviour of spoilers. (Stedman, 1997: 5-14, Höglund, 2004: 12).

The mediation strategies towards spoilers can lead to either success or failure, which is either peace as the end of the conflict or continuation and escalation of the conflict through violence. The outcome is influenced by the situation today since the timeframe involves the whole period of the internal conflict. But the main focus is on the mediation processes, which involve the mediators and are related to the peace agreements and their implementation.

From this theoretical framework, the variables of spoiler type, spoiler locus, mediator impartiality or bias and mediator leverage through resources are chosen to be the focus of the analysis, since these variables influence the behaviour of the mediator and spoilers, and thereby affect the mediation strategies towards spoilers and the outcome of internal conflicts.

1.3 Scientific Perspectives

When examining the effects of the mediation strategies towards spoilers on the outcome of internal conflicts with the focus on the behaviour of mediators and spoilers, the scientific emphasis is placed on actor oriented explanations as the analytical answer to the research problem. However, this does not imply that the influences and explanations of structural factors are not recognized, but their explanatory force will not be the primary focus in this thesis. Furthermore, it is important to state that a clear emphasis on the relationship between the mediators and the spoilers as the focus of the analysis can not be the whole explanation. Since many issues can affect the outcome of internal conflicts, the mediation strategy and the behaviour of mediators and spoilers only hold some of and not the whole scientific explanation. The scientific differences lie in to what degree you ascribe the actor the ability to change the societal relations and how the structure dominates the societal relations, plus how the actor and the structure affect each other. My scientific perspective is that the actors do not totally control the societal changes, but on the other hand the society does not consist of totally controlling structures, where the societal changes only are possible within the structures themselves.

With this scientific perspective in mind, the scientific discussion of whether the societal reality exists objectively or whether everything is dependent of the

¹ Inducement is giving the spoiler what it wants and meeting its demands of protection, benefits, recognition and legitimacy in order to get the spoiler involved in the mediation process (Stedman, 1997: 12-3).

² Socialization is changing the behaviour of the spoiler to adhere to a set of established norms, through the use of sticks and carrots, persuasion and the setting of values, concerning democracy or human rights (Stedman, 1997: 13).

³ Coercion is to punish the spoiler or reduce the capacity of the spoiler to destroy the mediation process with the use of threat, either through coercive diplomacy or the direct use of force (Stedman, 1997: 13-4).

subjective perception of reality is relevant. Internal conflicts include both objective facts and subjective perceptions of the issues at stake, which makes the resolution of such conflicts through mediation a symbiosis of dealing with the objective demands of the conflicting parties and also the issue of handling and changing the parties' perceptions of each other and the conflict in general. These scientific elements are influential to the ontology, being what the world consists of and the perception thereof, and the epistemology, encompassing how the world is studied and the knowledge thereof, seen as the theory of knowledge (Olsen and Fuglsang, 2004, 20-30).

My scientific view and approach is that the relation between the subjectively constructed and the realistic objective is dialectical, assuming an objective world, but on the other hand also assuming a subjective perception of the world. The reality can therefore both be objectively observed and have a subjective symbolic meaning, which is the case with conflicts, mediation and their outcomes, which are dependent on the relationship between the parties and the mediator, related to both the objectives of the conflict and the actors subjective perception thereof.

1.4 Model of Analysis

The model of analysis concerns the purpose and the basis of the analysis, which has either a theoretical or empirical foundation, and illustrates how the variables from the theoretical framework are to be used in practice (Rienecker and Jørgensen, 2002: 293).

The purpose of the analysis is explanatory and descriptive by analyzing how the behaviour of mediators and spoilers influence mediation strategies towards spoilers and the effect on the outcome. In order to do so, four variables affecting the mediator and spoiler behaviour are chosen as the focus of the analysis. The aim of the analysis is to empirically examine these variables and inductively derive explanations here from. This makes it a theory building model of analysis, which seeks not only to establish the relationship between the concepts of mediation strategies and the behaviour of mediators and spoilers, but also attempts to identify the explanatory variables of the relationship and its relation to the outcome of the conflicts.

The basis of the analysis is then empirical, where the conclusions of the thesis are induced by the empirical observations leading to theoretical developments on how the mediation strategies are influenced by variables of the behaviour of both mediators and spoilers. But it is not a causal model of analysis, since one specific type of mediation strategies cannot in all cases lead causally to one specific outcome. The aim is to examine the influence of certain behavioural variables of the mediator and the spoilers on the mediation strategies as the explanations of why some mediation efforts lead to an outcome of success, while others lead to failure. See Appendix 1 for an illustration of the model of analysis.

1.5 Research Strategy

In order to research the model of analysis empirically a qualitative strategy is chosen focusing on comparative analysis of the four explanatory variables influential to mediator and spoiler behaviour. The choice of qualitative research is made since behaviour is explained through the perception and understanding of people as human interaction and relations that cannot be statistically accounted for. The choice of empirical comparative research is made in order to induce theoretical developments from the qualitative empirical findings with the aim of theory building. In order to do an empirical comparison, the research must be done through case studying. This kind of comparison provides a basis for making statements about empirical regularities and for evaluating and interpreting cases relative to substantive and theoretical criteria. Furthermore, qualitative research can build theory through the input provided by careful and detailed study of a few cases (Höglund, 2004: 48, 50).

The aim is not to compare many cases with an extensive amount of variables, since it will make the comparison and theory building less precise. The focus on a few cases can give a much more elaborate comparison and more specific theoretical developments, but the aspect of generalization connected to the issues of case studies and theory building is not possible with few cases. With the aim of in-depth research and specific building of theoretical explanations, the research strategy is to compare two cases. The criteria for selection of cases concern internal conflict, mediator involvement, spoiler existence and a completed mediation process in order to determine the outcome. By extending the frame of comparison to the same period of time and area of conflict, the choices are narrowed down and the selected cases are Mozambique and Angola, since they both fit all the above criteria.

The main empirical source of material on the cases of Mozambique and Angola is secondary material related to the development of the conflicts and the mediation process written by scholars and researchers familiar with the conflicts. This is chosen since it gives analytical and qualified information and explanations on the mediation strategies, the behaviour of spoilers and mediators plus the outcomes. However the writers of such secondary sources on internal conflicts are never totally objective and neutral in their portrait of the conflicts, since impartiality in such violent internal conflicts is difficult. The consequences are that the portrayed situations may be biased in favour of one of the parties. In order to overcome this issue, more than one secondary source is used to secure the validity of the information. Furthermore, primary sources of the agreements are also used as empirical material. These are mostly documented by the UN, whose aim is to act as an impartial actor in the mediation processes.

In order to structure the analytical research of the cases in Angola and Mozambique, specific research questions are posed. The research questions concern how the spoiler type, spoiler locus, mediator impartiality or bias, and mediator leverage through resources influence the behaviour of the spoilers and the mediators. See Appendix 2 for a complete design of the research questions.

1.6 Introducing the Cases

In Angola, the situation has changed from a conflict of independence from Portugal, 11th of November 1975, over a conflict involving the superpowers of the Cold War, ending in an internal conflict of competing personal power and natural resources, such as oil, diamonds and minerals. The result has been the killing of 500.000 people and half of Angola's population of 10 million people being displaced (Kjær and Thygesen, 2002: 82, Knudsen et al., 2000: 5-9, Wesley, 1997: 98).

With the focus on the internal conflict in Angola, the main conflicting actors are UNITA⁴ and MPLA⁵. The main mediation processes are those leading to the two peace agreements and the implementation of them. The first is the Bicesse Accords of May 1991 mediated by Portugal and supported by the USA and the USSR/Russia, which failed within a year. The second is the Lusaka Protocol of November 1994, mediated by the UN after 12 months of mediation and two years of violence. In December 1998 after four years of ceasefire and the establishment of a Government of Unity and National Reconciliation, both agreements collapsed and the violent conflict began again. For 40 years, Angola has been locked in a violent internal conflict with little hope of a future of peace (Knudsen et al., 2000: 5-9, 12, Rothchild, 1997: 12, Vines, 2004: 74, Wesley, 1997: 98, Ohlson and Stedman, 1994: 107).

The case of Mozambique also started as a conflict of liberation from Portugal in the 1960's, which ended with independence, June 25th 1975. But in 1976 an internal conflict started between the marxist FRELIMO⁶ government and the anti-communist RENAMO⁷ formed by external groups supported by Rhodesia and South Africa. By the end of the 1980's Mozambique had become the poorest state in the world with major security concerns, plus political, social and economic uncertainties. With the mediation of representatives from the Roman-based Catholic community Sant'Egidio and Italian politicians supported by the UN and several African countries, the Rome Accords were signed in October 1992 between the FRELIMO government and RENAMO. This ended 16 years of violent conflict, which had killed 1 million people and displaced 4.5 million inside or outside Mozambique (Birmingham, 1992: 53-8, Ohlson, 1998: 52-8, Wesley, 1997: 81-2, Msabaha, 1995: 205-10).

The main mediation process of the internal conflict of Mozambique is that leading to and implementing the Rome Accords with the UN peacekeeping force overseeing the settlement. The first democratic elections were held in Mozambique in 1994, where the FRELIMO government won the majority of the votes and the Presidency. The new free and fair elected government was installed on December 8th 1994 and afterwards the UN left Mozambique (Hill, 2004: 71, Wesley, 1997: 82). See Appendix 3 and 4 for timelines of the respective conflicts.

⁴ Uniao Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola founded in 1966.

⁵ Movimento Popular da Libertacao de Angola founded in 1956.

⁶ Frente de Libertacao de Mocambique founded in 1964.

⁷ Resistência Nacional Mozambicana founded in 1975.

2 Analysis of Spoiler Behaviour

This chapter analyzing the spoiler behaviour focuses on the spoiler type and locus in Angola and Mozambique and ends with a discussion and comparison of the variables' influence on the spoiler behaviour and the effects on the mediation strategies and the outcome.

2.1 Spoiler Type

Analyzing the spoiler behaviour starts with the diagnosis of the spoiler type as either total, greedy or limited. The type of spoiler is indicated by its goals and commitments towards the mediation process. The interesting analytical issue is how a certain type of spoiler behaviour can influence the mediation strategy, since certain mediation strategies towards the different types of spoilers are necessary in order to reach an outcome of success (Stedman, 1997: 14).

2.1.1 Angola

In the case of Angola, the main role of spoiler lies with UNITA, who repeatedly spoiled the peace process through the use of violence during the mediation processes leading to both the analyzed peace agreements. UNITA's spoiler behaviour was affected by the MPLA government, who at first was committed to a centralized one-party state, which left little room for power sharing. By March 1990, realization of no resolution through military violence led to the seeking of political solutions. But both parties showed no interest in power sharing and no commitment to democratic governance or human rights, when the mediation process at Bicesse began (Knudsen et al., 2000: 10-3, Rothchild, 1997: 112).

When the MPLA changed their behaviour by altering the constitution to permit multiple parties, an opening towards peace was created. But even then, UNITA never really respected the ceasefire of the Bicesse Accords and kept certain groups of soldiers and forces hidden and moved others to the newly left areas of the MPLA (Kjær and Thygesen, 2002: 71, Knudsen et al., 2000: 11).

UNITA's spoiler behaviour was clearly visible during the time of the election campaign, when Savimbi repeatedly declared in public that he would resume the violent conflict, if UNITA did not win the elections. So when UNITA lost the 1992 elections, they accused the MPLA government of fraud, even though the UN claimed the elections as free and fair, and resumed the violent conflict. This shows that UNITA would not accept defeat, which defines UNITA as a total

spoiler, who pursues total power and exclusive recognition of authority, and has unchangeable goals of all or nothing (Knudsen et al., 2000: 12, Ohlson, 1998: 76, Stedman, 1997: 10-1).

The problem was that the Bicesse Accords had no post-election and power sharing possibilities with an outcome of winner takes all. This could not hinder the total spoiler behaviour due to the insufficiency of the mediation strategy of inducement of UNITAS' demands for total power and control of the government. But after the failure of the Bicesse Accords and resumed violence, UNITA's behaviour gradually changed due to external pressure, lack of support, prospects of political division, and some military defeats, which all led to their participation in the mediation process again (Kjær and Thygesen, 2002: 69, Knudsen et al., 2000: 12-3, Rothchild, 1997: 131-7, Rothchild and Hartzell, 1995: 200).

With the new mediation attempts in 1993 by the UN, the MPLA government demanded UNITA's withdrawal from 60% of their occupied areas and the disarmament of civilian supporters but they were willing to discuss power sharing. Meanwhile, UNITA was willing to make military concessions in exchange for recognition of their representation and inclusion in national politics. So the behaviour of both parties in the violent conflict in Angola were changing, but for a long time they shared the understanding of aggression, and Savimbi was the most committed hereto. The primary reason for Savimbi's continued behaviour as a spoiler was that Savimbi was more interested in gaining absolute power than he was in peace, since UNITA showed incomplete willingness by only disarming and demobilizing 10% of their troops (Hill, 2004: 54, 216, Kjær and Thygesen, 2002: 83, Wesley, 1997: 103-4, Knudsen et al., 2000: 15, Ohlson, 1998: 78, 80).

The mediation strategy towards UNITA throughout the mediation processes was inclusion through inducement, instead of marginalization by following the departing train strategy, where the mediation process goes on without the total spoiler, since the total spoiler is not willing to give up total power. So the efforts to tie UNITA into the political process through power sharing were insufficient to alleviate UNITA's security concerns and their goals of total power and authority. For Savimbi, the security concerns continued to outweigh the political benefits of joining the government, particularly given the continuous military support from external actors. Furthermore, the UN and the international community were placing too much emphasis on satisfying political officials rather than protecting the Angolan people. But the dilemma was that the strategy of the UN to create national reconciliation could not be achieved without the full participation of UNITA, the second largest party, whose legitimacy concerns should have been addressed (Hansen, 2000: 310-1, Wesley, 1997: 101, Knudsen et al., 2000: 22, Stedman, 1997: 14).

Elections were scheduled as part of the Lusaka Protocol to be held in 1997, but many violations of the ceasefire by both sides were reported and the elections were postponed in the interest of national reconciliation. The UN threatened with sanctions, which were imposed on October 30th 1997 against UNITA for the lack of implementation. This led to UNITA's instant break of contact with both the UN and the MPLA government, and the violence increased on both sides. With UNITA's last attempts against the mediation process and peace in the late 1990's,

there was increased agreement within the international community that Savimbi was the total spoiler responsible for the continued violent conflict. This led to the mediation strategy of the UN to cut off UNITA by toughening the direct approach of sanctions imposed with regard to the import of weapons, fuel, and the distribution of diamonds (Kjær and Thygesen, 2002: 75-6, Vines, 2004: 82).

2.1.2 Mozambique

In the case of Mozambique the spoiler behaviour was visible through RENAMO's continued use of violence in trying to gain recognition and influence. The breakthrough came, when President Chissano of the FRELIMO government announced that he would meet with RENAMO leader Dhlakama, which symbolized the recognition of equals. Furthermore, both parties recognized, the loss of support that continued violent conflict would entail, and the mediation process was begun in 1990 (Hill, 2004: 60-1, Ohlson and Stedman, 1994: 115-6, Wesley, 1997: 88).

The FRELIMO government changed behaviour in November 1990 by introducing a new constitution that ended one-party rule, proposed multi-party elections, freedom of press, legal rights to strike and the possibility of abolishing the centralized agricultural production. This was done since the ending of the conflict was connected to the access to foreign aid, which was much needed in Mozambique. RENAMO also changed behaviour as a spoiler by demanding power sharing with the FRELIMO government with a guarantee of major portfolios, irrespective of the outcome of the elections, and discussion of the Mozambican constitution. But RENAMO continued to spoil the mediation process by breaking the ceasefire established on December 1st 1990 and by refusing to recognize the legitimacy of the FRELIMO government. No progress was made until May 28th 1991 where both parties signed an agenda for the negotiations leading to a concrete agreement. This agreement included a future electoral system, military issues, a ceasefire, a law on political parties, a donor conference, and guarantees for implementation. The same day UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali wrote to FRELIMO President Chissano offering the UN's assistance in the mediation process (Hill, 2004: 68, Ohlson, 1998: 63-4, Ohlson and Stedman, 1994: 113-4, UN, 1995a: 16, Wesley, 1997: 85-6).

RENAMO spent most of the mediation process leading to the Rome Accords trying to extract security guarantees for both the implementation and post-election phase. After the involvement of the UN in the mediation process, RENAMO became more flexible and accepted the FRELIMO government's legitimacy and the establishment of a commission to oversee the implementation. The FRELIMO government was more opposed to greater UN involvement due to sovereignty concerns, but accepted when presented with the direct offer from the UN Secretary-General. A transformation of understanding among the parties from one of aggression to one of competition in the pre-election period, and also the fact that RENAMO was willing to accept electoral defeat without significant internal security guarantees, helped the development from violent conflict to peace in

Mozambique. This socialization of the spoiler was fostered through the UN's sensitivity to RENAMO's initial inability to compete in democratic elections. By following a mediation strategy of delaying the elections and letting the process proceed, while RENAMO was provided with money and resources, the UN was able to give them sufficient security and the incentive to stay in the electoral process. The primary reasons for success in the disarmament and demobilisation were therefore increased resources and planning, and the result was that RENAMO came to accept the principles of a single administration throughout Mozambique (Hill, 2004: 61-2, 82-3, UN, 1995a: 17-9, 34, 62-5).

The UN mediation strategy was based on the experience that unless the parties carried out their commitments to demobilize, there would be no elections. Furthermore, in the process leading to the Rome Accords, the mediators shared the view that the key problem was how to make RENAMO behave as a responsible political actor and reduce its spoiler potential through the strategy of inducement with respect to economic support and security guarantees. The UN mediation therefore involved the correct diagnosis of RENAMO as a limited spoiler, and the mediation strategy of inducement made RENAMO committed to resolution by meeting its goals of recognition and influence. Therefore the mediation strategy produced an outcome of success, which resulted in peace in Mozambique (Stedman, 1997: 10-1, Wesley, 1997: 83, Hill, 2004: 79, Ohlson and Stedman, 1994: 116, Ohlson, 1998: 109).

2.2 Spoiler Locus

The spoiler locus is whether the spoiler behaviour comes from the leader or the followers, or at times both. The interesting indicator is how a change in leadership can alter the spoiler behaviour and thereby influence the mediation strategy leading to an outcome of success or failure (Stedman, 1997: 11-2).

2.2.1 Angola

The locus of the UNITA spoilers in Angola is the leader Savimbi, who thrived on power and found it more lucrative to sustain the conflict than to surrender. This is related to the fact that UNITA controlled the richest areas of resources, e.g. diamonds, in Angola, which gave them the financial capability to be a spoiler. The competition for power and control of resources goes back to the conflict of independence from Portugal, where the liberation movements of Angola all were fighting for these possessions (Knudsen et al., 2000: 19-20).

The Lusaka Protocol involved a strategy of re-establishment of a ceasefire, the withdrawal and demilitarisation of all UNITA military forces, the disarming of civilians, and the completion of the formation of united Angolan armed forces. Eugenio Manuvakola, the Secretary-General of UNITA signed the Lusaka Protocol instead of Savimbi showing his lack of support for the peace agreement.

Later Manuvakola was punished by Savimbi for signing and had to flee to the capital. The following years included further meetings between the parties, where Savimbi was offered the position of vice president, but declined. This also shows that he was the source of the total spoiler behaviour by pursuing total power and authority and would not settle for less (Kjær and Thygesen, 2002: 72-3, Knudsen et al., 2000: 18).

The locus of UNITA's spoiler behaviour is also shown through Savimbi's dragging his feet in the mediation process and failing to implement both the Bicesse Accords and the Lusaka Protocol. Where Savimbi showed signs of willingness to implement the agreements was by stating that: "I consider that the war is over ... and we want to go forward to consolidate peace and to create the conditions for national reconciliation. I am here to tell you that I will never again take to the paths of war, nor will my organisation." However, these words of commitment to peace were never fulfilled. This shows that the outcome of Savimbi's behaviour as a spoiler was always violence, and even though he expressed commitment to the peace agreements, UNITA never fully implemented them (Hill, 2004: 54, 216, Kjær and Thygesen, 2002: 83, Wesley, 1997: 103-4, Knudsen et al., 2000: 15, 19-20, Ohlson, 1998: 78, 80).

Internal power struggles within UNITA had occurred through out the mediation process, but a clear change in UNITA behaviour happened, when the UNITA's parliamentarians became part of the Government of Unity and National Reconciliation in April 1997, while Savimbi was not present. Furthermore, a split of the party became visible in 1998 with the formation of a breakaway group, UNITA Renovada led by former UNITA Secretary-General Manuvakola as a more peaceful opposition. Not until Savimbi was shot and killed by the MPLA government in 2002 was peace again an option, when the breakaway party was reunited with UNITA, democratic elections were held, and the MPLA government expressed support for further negotiations with UNITA. With the locus of the spoiler behaviour gone, a ceasefire was signed in April 2002. Furthermore, a change of UNITA leadership became possible, and in June 2003 Samakuva became the new leader of UNITA., which created a change in behaviour with the disbanding of UNITA's military wing. This change has opened up the future possibilities of peace in Angola (Kjær and Thygesen, 2002: 64, 72, 84, Knudsen et al., 2000: 8, Ohlson, 1998: 82, Vines, 2004: 85).

2.2.2 Mozambique

With the creation of RENAMO through outside support from Rhodesia and South Africa, the locus of RENAMO spoiler behaviour came from these outside leaders, who established the anti-communist opposition to the FRELIMO government and initiated the spoiler behaviour of RENAMO. The primary goals for RENAMO were at first legitimacy and recognition, but the FRELIMO government would only offer amnesty for RENAMO supporters, which the RENAMO leaders would not accept. But a change of leadership in FRELIMO to Joachim Chissano in 1989 opened up the possibility of talks, since he supported resolution of the violent

conflict through negotiation. Also a change of leadership in RENAMO to Afonso Dhlakama in 1979-80 had after 10 years created a change from military action towards the creation of a political platform with the goals of creating a multi-party system through power sharing in Mozambique. The change of behaviour in both actors initiated a process of dialogue mediated by Mozambican church representatives, which led to the direct mediation process in Rome, where Sant'Egidio acted as the official mediator together with Italian politicians (Msabaha, 1995: 211-7, Ohlson, 1998: 58, 63).

With a change of leadership in RENAMO, Dhlakama became the locus of spoiler behaviour, since he was focused on his security concerns and legitimacy, and hungered for recognition. The day before elections, RENAMO leader, Dhlakama, announced that he would not participate, accusing the FRELIMO government of fraud, but was persuaded by the UN Security Council to participate. Even with the results of the elections favouring Chissano and the FRELIMO government, Dhlakama accepted the situation and did not resume violence. So by having a mediation strategy, which induced RENAMO's guarantees for security, influence and recognition, depending on Dhlakama's commitment to peace, the outcome became a success. Furthermore, the factor of giving RENAMO economic support was influential, since RENAMO was deprived from resources and commitment to resolution became the key to financial gains (Hill, 2004: 61-2, 82-3, UN, 1995a: 17-9, 34, 62-5).

2.3 Discussion and Comparison of Spoiler Behaviour

When comparing the spoiler behaviour in Angola and Mozambique the main distinction lies with the type of spoiler, since there is a great difference in the behaviour of a total and a limited spoiler and therefore also of their effect on the mediation strategies dealing with the spoilers. Furthermore, when discussing the spoiler behaviour, the locus of the spoiler was in both cases the leader of both UNITA and RENAMO. But with two different types of spoilers, the effect on the mediation strategies was not the same.

UNITA's unchangeable goal as a total spoiler focused on total power and authority meant that a mediation strategy of changing these goals of winner takes all was necessary. But the Bicesse Accords were of a winner takes all character. Therefore the mediation strategy of inducement of the total spoiler behaviour of UNITA was a failure. The mediation strategy concerning the mediation process of the Lusaka Protocol involved no transformation from the zero-sum character of the Bicesse Accords to a win-win situation. The need to ensure both the development of a sizeable military force and the negotiation of adequate power sharing arrangements in order to handle the total spoiler behaviour of UNITA was not part of the mediation strategy in Angola. So the lack of UNITA commitment and ownership of the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol made it difficult to implement peace in Angola and continued spoiler behaviour through the use of violence was the outcome.

The mediation process in Mozambique was dealing with the limited type of spoiler behaviour of RENAMO, whose goals were primarily legitimacy and recognition. These goals were met by changing the political system to a multi-party system, which helped commit RENAMO to the mediation process and the implementation of the Rome Accords. Furthermore, the basic issues connected to the spoiler behaviour of RENAMO were the security concerns and the economic support related to the transformation of a military movement to a political party. Since the mediation strategy connected to the Rome Accords was inducement of these issues and resulted in a much more successful outcome of the Mozambican internal conflict than in the case of Angola.

With the spoiler behaviour coming from the leader in both cases, the issue then becomes how a change in leadership may affect the spoiler behaviour. In Mozambique the change in leadership to Dhlakama began a development from military movement to political party. This changed the spoiler behaviour towards a stronger commitment to mediation, which made the mediation strategy of power sharing more likely to succeed. In the case of Angola, Savimbi was committed to aggression and total power, and the prospects of power sharing did not change the spoiler behaviour of UNITA until his death in 2002. A change in leadership has become influential to the change in the spoiler behaviour towards a more peaceful opposition and can thereby affect future mediation strategies and the outcome.

3 Analysis of Mediator Behaviour

The focus of the analysis is how the mediator impartiality or bias and leverage through resources influences the mediator behaviour and thereby affects the mediation strategies. The chapter ends with a discussion and comparison of the two variables in the cases of Angola and Mozambique.

3.1 Mediator Impartiality or Bias

Mediation is a voluntary form of intervention, and therefore the mediator has to be interested in the conflict and its resolution. The issue then becomes, whether the mediator behaviour is impartial or biased, and how this influences the mediation strategy and its outcome, leading to success or failure.

3.1.1 Angola

The internal conflict in Angola was influenced by the fact that the USA and South Africa supported UNITA and the USSR and Cuba supported the MPLA government. They both supplied their respective clients of the Cold War era with military equipment through most of the conflict, while they at the same time were involved in the mediation process. This influenced the lack of success of the mediation strategies, by making it possible to uphold the violent conflict and keeping UNITA in a spoiler position (Rothchild, 1997: 117, Vines, 2004: 91-3).

With the first attempts at mediation in Angola in the late 1980's, Zairian President Mobutu was chosen to mediate. This was based on the hope of getting UNITA to participate in the mediation process, since Mobutu was supporting UNITA and therefore could put pressure on UNITA, like the USSR was doing to MPLA. The bias of both Mobutu and the USSR was a way to get the conflicting parties involved in a mediation process in the first place, where the bias could be used as a stronger influence. Mobutu was working as a communication facilitator between the separated parties and had a strategy of both the parties' goals being the basis for discussion in order to persuade the parties to meet and initiate a mediation process. But the strategy led to failure, since Mobutu was more focused on international prestige and misled the parties to believe that the other was agreeing and making concessions (Knudsen et al., 2000: 10, Rothchild, 1997: 125-6, Ohlson and Stedman, 1994: 108).

Since Mobutu's mediation attempts failed with no real ceasefire being implemented, the MPLA government called for new mediators. Portugal took on

this role from 1990 chairing a series of talks between UNITA and the MPLA government with the supporting roles of the USA, the USSR, and the UN leading to the Bicesse Accords of 1991. Portugal was closely connected to the conflict in Angola due to its past as colonial power, which could be an incentive for Portugal to get involved because of a sense of responsibility and relationship (Rothchild, 1997: 131, Ohlson, 1998: 74).

The mediation process leading to the Bicesse Accords involved six rounds of negotiations between the parties from April 1990 to May 1991. The mediation by Portugal concerned the working out of a set of principles that could serve as a framework for subsequent negotiations on ceasefire and political settlement. Related to the mediation process, the USA and Russia were as supportive mediators showing change in their zero-sum behaviour of the Cold War by stating a stop in the supplying of lethal material to their respective clients, once a ceasefire was reached. But since biased support from the USA and South Africa to UNITA continued until well into the mediation process, no real mediator influence could be exercised, and the bias was mostly hindering an outcome of success. This meant that they did not press for true power sharing and legitimized the spoiler behaviour by continuing support, when UNITA broke the agreement (Kjær and Thygesen, 2002: 69, Knudsen et al., 2000: 12-3, Rothchild, 1997: 131-5, Wesley, 1997: 106-7).

A change did not happen until the UN used its contacts with UNITA and its economic links with the MPLA government to maintain a constant insistency on mediation. With greater involvement of the UN in the mediation process leading to the Lusaka Protocol, the impartiality was strengthened, since the UN as a mediator is based on a perception of impartiality, due to its international status and role. This way a change in mediator behaviour followed, which created greater trust and fairness, and thereby influencing the possibility of reaching a peaceful outcome through the Lusaka Protocol.

With the Lusaka Protocol there was consensus among the mediators concerning how to modify the Bicesse Accords in order to accommodate both parties and better ensure a successful implementation. But the USA, Russia, Portugal and the UN did not share a similar assessment on the degree of risk for a reversal to violent conflict after the 1992 elections or on the source of the main threat of such a reversal, due to some mediators' bias. But the USA supported the Lusaka Protocol until 1998, when they did not condemn the MPLA government's offensive against UNITA, possibly due to the extensive American oil trade with Angola. Also Portugal showed support for the Lusaka Protocol, but as Angola's main non-oil trading partner, Portugal kept close relations with the MPLA government, even though Portugal was part of the mediation process. So the international mediators could have used their bias but chose not to due to the lack of political will because of economic interests. This made it extremely difficult for the UN as an impartial representative of the international community to mediate a peaceful solution to the internal conflict of Angola, since the UN's influence depends on the economic and political support of its member states. So when the UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Beye was killed in a plane crash in June 1998, it lead to the official failure of the Lusaka Protocol in

December 1998, due to lack of trust among the parties (Knudsen et al., 2000: 19, Vines, 2004: 99, Ohlson, 1998: 109-10).

After Savimbi's death in 2002, Portugal agreed to participate in a mediation process, and the UN started to examine the possibilities of mediating again. Furthermore, the USA made a change in behaviour by condemning UNITA's continued violence (Kjær and Thygesen, 2002: 84). So the former mediators are examining their future possibilities of getting involved again in the mediation process after their previous failures to resolve the internal conflict successfully.

3.1.2 Mozambique

In Mozambique, the first sign of biased mediator behaviour was the mediation attempts of 1984 by South Africa, which did not succeed. This was because South Africa had broken the non-aggression agreement with Mozambique and continued to support RENAMO, and also due to pressure from Portugal, who had an interest in denationalization of assets formerly attained by Portuguese investors (Msabaha, 1995: 212-4, 220-1, UN, 1995a: 10). This shows that biased mediators could not influence the parties to meet and perceive the mediation process to be trustworthy and fair.

Until the late 1980's, the Mozambican internal conflict had strong international ties. FRELIMO was supported by the USSR until 1989, where their military supplies were reduced and military advisors withdrawn. RENAMO was supported by South Africa, but also their military support declined in the late 1980's (Hill, 2004: 58-9, Msabaha, 1995: 217). This opened up for greater international pressure for a peaceful solution to the internal conflict in Mozambique.

Mediation was then attempted again in 1988 by the Mozambican Catholic Church, Zimbabwean President Mugabe, and Kenyan President Moi. This time the greatest issues were mutual recognition and the setting of a negotiation agenda. Also larger states like the USA and South Africa put pressure on the parties to negotiate. One of the most difficult aspects of the mediation process was establishing a basis for contact between the conflicting parties through the strategy of communication-facilitation, since RENAMO was very isolated and reluctant to meet due to security concerns. So it was not until the mediation intervention of the Roman-based Catholic community Sant'Egidio with the providing of their Good Offices for negotiation that the establishment of contact was made and the official mediation process started in Rome. Many African countries were suggested as the role of mediator, but no mutual acceptance was possible. In accordance with the Sant'Egidio's suggestion of Italy, the mutual decision became Marion Raffalli, an Italian Socialist parliamentarian, Archbishop Gonclaves of Beira, Mozambique, Andre Riccardi and Fr. Matteo Zuppi, the President and a member of Sant'Egidio as the official mediators through all 12 rounds of meetings from July 8th 1990 to October 4th 1992. Ergo, when the impartial mediators from Italy got involved in the mediation process, it began in earnest, and here the bias of South Africa in favour of RENAMO was

instrumental in delivering RENAMO to Rome during the mediation of the agreement. Later on, the Italian mediators were supported by Portugal and the USA cutting of the support from South Africa (Hill, 2004: 59-60, UN, 1995a: 14-6, Wesley, 1997: 90-1).

The UN became directly involved in the mediation process in June 1992, when it was clear that the UN was the only mutually accepted and most appropriate mediator, which could bring a successful end to the mediation process through the implementation of the agreement. The role of the UN in the mediation process was that of providing technical assistance on the monitoring ceasefire (UN, 1995a: 14, 18, 22, Hill, 2004: 57, Ohlson and Stedman, 1994: 116).

The Rome Accords were signed by President Joaquin Chissano of the FRELIMO government and the RENAMO leader Afonso Dhlakama on October 4th 1992. The agreement concerned the demobilisation of all armed forces or the incorporation of them into an united Mozambican army under UN supervision by April 1993, and the setting of elections on October 4th 1993 (Ohlson, 1998: 63-4, Ohlson and Stedman, 1994: 113-4).

Problems with the stationing of UN peacekeeping troops and the additional demands of especially RENAMO, delayed the demobilisation and created deadlock. So the UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali came to Maputo, in October 1993 and persuaded the parties to find a solution to the outstanding issues concerning the elections, which strengthen the implementation of the Rome accords. This resulted in the agreement of a new timetable, which put the mediation process back on track and demonstrated the influence of the impartial mediator (Hill, 2004: 61, UN, 1995a: 5, 38).

Considerations of the UN operation in Mozambique included the need for impartiality, responsibility of the international community in helping to rebuild Mozambique, and the issue of insecurity. Therefore the UN applied a strategy of cooperation of both sides, and concluded that the political willingness of the parties to achieve a peaceful settlement must be demonstrated through action. In order to make this possible, the UN insisted on the chairmanship of the implementation committee as an impartial third party, rather than any of the parties themselves, which became the key to successful implementation of the Rome Accords in Mozambique (UN, 1995a: 20, 25, Wesley, 1997: 89).

3.2 Mediator Leverage through Resources

A mediator can impact the outcome of the process through the mediator's control and possession of resources of both an economic and political kind, which can affect the mediation strategy in different ways.

3.2.1 Angola

In Angola, the USA and Russia had the leverage to put pressure on both parties to negotiate the Bicesse Accords, because of their military support of the parties. But because they were biased their economic concerns and lack of political will were too great to produce any real leverage, which could strengthen the mediation strategy towards spoilers. So the mediation strategy was marked by ambiguity, since the practical implications on military and political conditions were not defined and elaborated on in the agreement, and responsibility was instead placed on the parties themselves to work out the details, the supervision and the implementation (Hill, 2004: 36, Ohlson, 1998: 74-5,112, Rothchild, 1997: 136, Knudsen et al., 2000: 14, Rothchild and Hartzell, 1995: 199-200).

After the signing of the Bicesse Accords, the UN's role was to observe and verify the elections, not to organize them, which was done by the parties themselves. The UN's leverage was limited at this time with only 70 mio. dollars and 800 people for the implementation of the Bicesse Accords. This was due to vague interest among its sponsoring coalition, which was keen to end as cheaply as possible a conflict resolution from which its attention had moved on. Deprived of adequate resources, the UN tried to gain the support from member states to achieve leverage after UNITA's rejection of the election results in 1992, when violence broke out again. The UN then used its Good Offices to foster dialogue between the parties and got more directly involved in the following mediation process leading to the Lusaka Protocol (UN, 1995b: 2, 4, Ohlson and Stedman, 1994: 110, Wesley, 1997: 99-100, 108).

The UN put pressure on the MPLA government to have peace talks again in 1993 and threatened to impose international sanctions, if UNITA did not resume negotiations, which showed UN's commitment to mediation. Again limited leverage of the UN made it difficult due to the lack of political will and economic support of the international community. The UN Secretary-General informed the parties that the UN could not renew its mandate and strength unless both parties were willing to be genuine in their adherence to and fulfilment of the Bicesse Accords. Even though the parties agreed thereto, the attempts to restore dialogue between the parties, including the UN Secretary-General's personal invitation to dos Santos and Savimbi to meet, failed. By September 1993 sanctions against UNITA were imposed by the UN Security Council involving oil and arms embargoes products. But Portugal and Russia still involved in the mediation process continued to supply weapons to the MPLA government, even though it was against the Bicesse Accords. Furthermore, the UN Security Council passed a resolution singling out UNITA as the sole entity responsible for the internal conflict (Knudsen et al., 2000: 16, Rothchild, 1997: 138, Vines, 2004: 90, UN, 1995b: 5, 8). The UN thereby tried to use its influence through its legitimacy as a representative of the international community to weaken the position of UNITA by imposing sanctions. This shows that the UN only has leverage through the support of its member states by following of the UN embargoes.

Resumed mediation by the UN in 1993 persuaded the parties to talk, and through the mediation strategy leading to the Lusaka Protocol, the UN created

mutual confidence, and imposed a press blackout in order to isolate the representatives from outside concerns and force interaction among them. Furthermore the UN involved the USA, Russia and Portugal, where the two former superpowers used leverage on their former clients in trying to isolate UNITA by threatening to impose sanctions and by trying to extract concessions from MPLA. That strategy resulted in the signing of the Lusaka Protocol on November 20th 1994 under the control and presence of the UN, since the peace agreement included a much more flexible demobilisation timeframe, provided provision for power sharing, and gave the UN sufficient resources and leverage to implement it (Knudsen et al., 2000: 6, 15-7, Hansen, 2000: 215-7).

But in 1997 UNITA was still not respecting the issue of demobilisation of soldiers as part of the Lusaka Protocol, and Savimbi resumed the role of spoiler. The UN's sole strategy of forcing compliance was to threaten and eventually impose sanctions on military equipment and petroleum, freezing of bank accounts, forbidding UNITA officers to leave the country, and prohibiting direct or indirect trade through air and sea travel to UNITA areas. Strategies of threatening UN withdrawal had worked before, but by 1998 both parties were immune to UN pressure, and the imposing of sanctions failed to produce the much needed leverage of the UN. So even though the UN's means of applying pressure and measures to force compliance were attempted, they were unsuccessful, since neither threats of withdrawal nor sanctions had any significant effect on the parties, since UNITA had financial gains from the black market for arms and diamonds. The sanctions could have been successful, if they had been more coordinated, but unfortunately for the UN as the main mediator the financial gains for many countries were far too great for them to have any interest in enforcing sanction. With the establishment of the Government of Unity and National Reconciliation in April 1997, the UN Security Council decided to withdraw most of the UN peacekeeping troops in June and replaced them with a smaller force of observers. This was drawn back in Jan.-Feb. 1999, when violence again erupted and peace was lost, ending the UN mediation efforts in Angola at the moment (Hansen, 2000: 307, Kjær and Thygesen, 2002: 73-4, Vines, 2004: 100-1, Knudsen et al., 2000: 21).

3.2.2 Mozambique

In the mediation process of Mozambique leading to the Rome Accords, the mediation strategy concerned inducement of RENAMO leader Dhlakama by granting him legitimacy and money in order to secure the implementation of the agreement. This was possible and successful since Dhlakama's control over his forces was not as great as Savimbi's. So the mediators had leverage by guaranteeing all parties competing in the elections the distribution of subsidies and logistic support for the election campaign and access to the international donor community. Furthermore, in May 1993 the UN established a specific trust fund to help RENAMO transform from a military movement into a political party. The UN also gained influence by mobilizing and coordinating huge emergency

and humanitarian relief and support to Mozambique, where 330 million dollars were donated from the international community (Hill, 2004: 80-1, UN, 1995a: 4, 12, Ohlson, 1998: 112, Wesley, 1997: 86).

So this mediation strategy for implementation of the Rome Accords gave the UN greater leverage through their provision of these resources. But since the UN at first had no involvement in the unification of the new Mozambican defence force, it had little influence on the parties, when the implementation process began to fall behind. The UN therefore insisted on a large military and electoral observer presence and greater interference in the commissions designed to oversee the implementation. The timeframe was first set for one year, but was found unrealistic and extended to two years through negotiation with the parties, since a significant delay occurred. This was due to the lack of definite financial and military contributions to the UN budget and of the deployment of troops from member states, especially the USA. This influenced the leverage and the opportunities of the UN with respect to implementing vital aspects of the agreement. But in the end with 332 mio. dollars worth of resources contributed to the ONUMOZ, the UN had enough leverage to successfully carry out the mediation strategy of inducement of the RENAMO spoiler, which resulted in the outcome of peace in Mozambique (Msabaha, 1995: 224, UN, 1995a: 4, 27, 157, Hill, 2004: 71-4, 76-8, Ohlson, 1998: 112).

3.3 Discussion and Comparison of Mediator Behaviour

When comparing the mediator behaviour in Angola and Mozambique, it is clear that both impartiality and bias have influenced the mediation strategy, but in different ways. The influence of the mediator behaviour is also different when it comes to the leverage of the mediators through their supply of resources of different kinds.

In the case of Angola, many mediators involved throughout the mediation process have been biased, where the outcome never was the success of peace. This meant no great pressure for power sharing and legitimation of the spoiler behaviour through continued support. The change towards greater impartiality happened late in the mediation process with the UN's greater involvement leading to the Lusaka Protocol, which influenced the mediation strategy. But impartiality was not enough to change the spoiler behaviour, since the mediation strategy still was inclusion of Savimbi's UNITA. The UN tried to use their impartiality with a mediations strategy of changing both parties' perception and enforcing demobilisation before elections. But at that time UNITA's spoiler behaviour had been legitimized through biased mediator support for decades and the UN had little leverage and credibility. So even though a change in mediator behaviour happened in Angola from that of mediator bias towards impartiality, the outcome was still a failure. The interesting issue then becomes why both the influence of mediator behaviour through impartiality or bias affected the mediation strategies to fail. The explanation is connected to the use of mediator leverage, because the

biased mediators in the Angolan mediation process could have put greater pressure on the parties by exercising their leverage through resources. But due to economic relations and gains, plus the lack of political will often connected thereto, the biased mediators never used their leverage. So the outcome of failure is maybe more related to the lack of leverage through resources, which also was constraining for the more impartial UN, when it became the leading mediator in Angola. Still the UN could have put greater pressure on both parties and used their leverage through their status of representative of the international community. But this shows, that the UN can only exercise leverage with the support of the international community through its member states, where the ones in the mediation process in Angola were biased towards either one of the parties, which hindered a successful outcome leading to peace in Angola.

A different scenario was the case in Mozambique, where the official mediators from the start were impartial mediators. This influenced the mediation strategy in getting the parties to meet and change a situation of conflict into one of consensus. So in this case, the issue of impartiality in mediator behaviour led to an outcome of success in mediation strategy. Furthermore the successful outcome in Mozambique is related to the leverage of the mediator, since the mediators were provided with much greater resources than in the case of Angola. So by having adequate resources, it was possible to follow a mediation strategy, which encompassed inducement and socialization of the actors and made the implementation and change of the violent conflict into reconciliation and peace a success.

4 Conclusions

The final chapter contains a summary of the thesis' principal findings, the resulting theoretical developments, and guidelines for future research as the conclusive statements of this thesis.

4.1 Summary of the Analysis

By analyzing, comparing and discussing the explanatory variables: spoiler type, spoiler locus, mediator impartiality or bias, and mediator leverage through resources of the two cases of Angola and Mozambique, it is possible to summarize some more general conclusive statements. This gives a broader picture and a better understanding of the connections between the mediator and the spoiler behaviour and their influence on mediation strategies and the outcome thereof in internal conflicts. These conclusions may not apply in all cases, which is not the scientific understanding and perspective of the thesis. So this is not meant as an overall generalisation, but is done in order to lead to preliminary theory building and future empirical research of the field.

The analysis of the spoiler behaviour shows that the mediation strategy towards a certain type of spoiler is crucial for the outcome. This part of the analysis was based on Stedman's concepts and understanding thereof. The empirical analysis of the cases of Angola and Mozambique have shown that when dealing with a total spoiler as UNITA, the mediation strategy of inducement through out most of the mediation process led to failure, while the mediation strategy of inducement works much better towards a limited spoiler like RENAMO, where the outcome of the mediation was a success. The interesting thing is now, whether the change of mediation strategy towards UNITA namely the departing trains strategy, which involves cutting of the spoiler from the mediation process, will lead to success or just decrease the possibilities of peace in Angola by isolating UNITA.

Also affecting the spoiler behaviour is the locus of the spoiler, and here the analysis has shown that when dealing with spoiler behaviour coming from the leader, a change in leadership can influence the spoiler behaviour and affect the outcome. This is especially the case with a total spoiler as in Angola, where Savimbi kept spoiling a successful outcome of the mediation strategy leading to peace. While Dhlakama in Mozambique was persuaded to stay in the mediation process through the mediation strategy of inducement and the providing of legitimacy, which led to a successful outcome. The interesting issue with the changing of the leadership is that a new leader needs to be found in order to

resume the mediation process, and this leader needs to be interested in finding a peaceful solution. This scenario of changing leadership has been the case in Angola after Savimbi's death in 2002, which has opened up the possibility for success in the future.

When dealing with mediator behaviour one thing is clear, that in order to get an outcome of success through what ever mediation strategy, it is necessary for the mediator to have influence, either through their economic and political resources, but also through the mediator's impartiality or bias. As seen in the two cases, the crucial effect on the outcome lies in the actual action through mediator leverage, whether impartial like the UN or biased like the USA and Russia. The cases of Angola and Mozambique have shown that the impartial mediation of the UN has had the greatest influence in providing results in the mediation process, but in the case of Angola the overall outcome was failure, while in Mozambique it was success. The interesting issue then becomes why and how. First of all, some explanation lies in the fact that all through the official mediation process in Mozambique, the official mediators have been impartial, since the biased attempts did not produce results in getting the parties to meet. Furthermore, the UN as a mediator was provided with a lot more supportive resources in the case of Mozambique than in Angola. Perhaps the UN had seen how things had failed in Angola before getting involved in Mozambique. Also the fact that in Angola, the UN was not included in the mediation process for a long time, and by the time the UN became the mediator, the conflict had been going on for decades and had intensified greatly. Prolonged internal conflicts and previous failures always makes it more difficult for any mediator to conduct a mediation strategy leading to success. What greatly influenced the outcome of failure in Angola was the fact that the mediators did not use the right strategy when following a strategy of inducement towards a total spoiler like UNITA. To change that behaviour became very difficult after a long mediation process without a successful outcome. Today the challenge still remains to create sustainable peace in Angola, where the lessons of success in Mozambique might be helpful, but in some ways it is a very different internal conflict, when it comes to mediation strategies towards spoilers.

4.2 Theoretical Developments

The aim of the analysis of the thesis is the theory building on internal conflict resolution through mediation towards spoilers as the answer of the research problem. The analytical line of thought is that the outcome of internal conflicts is affected by the mediation strategies towards spoilers. The strategies are influenced by the behaviour of the mediators and spoilers, which again is influenced by the four variables. Therefore the outcome of the mediation strategies towards spoilers is affected by the type of spoiler, the locus of the spoiler, the issue of mediator impartiality or bias, and the mediator leverage through resources. So when it comes to the research problem of why some mediation strategies towards spoilers affect the outcome of international conflicts leading to success in the resolution of

the conflict, whereas others lead to failure, the preliminary theoretical developments derived from the empirical findings of the cases of Angola and Mozambique are:

When dealing with potential and present total spoilers, the mediation strategy of inducement is most likely to lead to an outcome of failure. While dealing with potential or present limited spoilers, the mediation strategy of inducement and socialization is most likely to lead to an outcome of success.

When dealing with potential or present spoilers, where the locus of the spoiler is the leader, a change of leadership can lead to an outcome of success. Especially when dealing with total spoilers. But it depends on the behaviour of the new leader.

When dealing with potential or present spoilers, having an impartial mediator is more likely to lead to an outcome of success in mediation strategy than a biased mediator, which is most likely to lead to an outcome of failure.

When dealing with potential or present spoilers, having adequate resources provide mediators with leverage, which is most likely to lead to an outcome of success, while lack of resources is most likely to lead to an outcome of failure.

4.3 Guidelines for Future Research


There are various improvements and new related issues connected to the theoretical developments, which can be explored in future research. One could be the further research of the influence of foreign intervention in internal conflicts, when it comes to mediation and spoilers. This new related issue could improve the preliminary theoretical developments by analyzing the roots of the conflict and their connection to finding the roots of peace, when a mediator is impartial or biased. The focus on the variable concerning mediators involved in the conflict themselves, could shed some light on what effects this influence has on the outcome of the mediation process. Furthermore, future research could be conducted on what mediation strategies to follow, when dealing with how to change spoiler behaviour through a change in leadership. These are all new theoretical issues and improvements of the theory building. But the most important empirical improvement would be the future research of the preliminary theoretical developments on a larger set of cases, in order to strengthen the theoretical developments and also modify them according to other types of internal or international conflicts.

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Appendix 1 Model of Analysis



Appendix 2 Research Questions

Research Problem:

Why do some mediation strategies towards spoilers lead to an outcome of success in the resolution of the conflict, whereas others lead to failure?



What mediation strategies are available towards spoilers?

Inducement, socialization and coercion through communication-facilitation, formulation and manipulation



What affects these mediation strategies towards spoilers and thus affect the outcome of internal conflicts?

The behaviour of the spoilers and the mediators as actors affecting the outcome of the conflict



What affects the spoiler behaviour?

The type & locus of the spoiler



What affects the mediator behaviour?

The impartiality or bias & the leverage through resources of the mediator



How does the type & locus of the spoiler behaviour affect the mediation strategies?



How does the impartiality or bias & the leverage through resources of the mediator behaviour affect the mediation strategies?

Appendix 3. Timeline: Angola

- 1483** The Portuguese arrive and start colonizing Angola.
- 1956** MPLA is founded as a socialist liberation movement.
- 1966** UNITA is founded as an opposing liberation movement.
- 1974** The Portuguese revolution leads to the collapse of the colonial system
- 1975** Independence of Angola November 11th with MPLA in government, but the conflict continues.
- 1979** Dos Santos becomes president after death of MPLA leader Agostinho Neto
- 1987** South African forces enter Angola to support UNITA.
- 1988** The MPLA government sign agreement with South Africa and Cuba of withdrawal of their troops.
- 1989** MPLA and UNITA agree ceasefire, which fails soon afterwards, but resolves the issues of the Cold War?.
- 1990** Portugal becomes the mediator with the support of the USA and USSR after the failed attempts of Zairian President Mobuto.
- 1991** In April, the MPLA government introduces a multi-party system.
In May, MPLA and UNITA sign the Bicesse Accords.
- 1992** Elections are held, MPLA wins majority, UNITA resumes violence after first accepting the results.
- 1993** The UN becomes the mediator and imposes sanctions against UNITA.
- 1994** In November, MPLA and UNITA sign the Lusaka Protocol.
- 1995** Dos Santos and Savimbi confirm commitment to Peace, UN starts peacekeeping mission.
- 1997** In April, the Government of Unity and Reconciliation of Angola is established, without the presence of UNITA's leader Savimbi.
UN imposes new sanctions and UNITA breaks all contact.
- 1998** In December, the violent conflict is resumed.
- 1998** UN ends its peacekeeping mission.
- 2002** In February, UNITA's leader Savimbi is killed by MPLA troops.
In April, MPLA and UNITA sign an agreement of ceasefire.
In August, UNITA disband its military wing.
- 2003** In May, USA lifts all sanctions against UNITA.
In June, UNITA as a political party elects Samakuva as its new leader.

Appendix 4. Timeline: Mozambique

- 1498** The Portuguese arrive and start colonizing Mozambique.
- 1964** FRELIMO is founded as a Marxist liberation movement and begins fighting for independence.
- 1974** With the Portuguese revolution the colonial system ends. Portugal and FRELIMO sign Lusaka Accords establishing a transitional government.
- 1975** Independence of Mozambique on June 25th with FRELIMO as government of a single-party system.
- 1976** RENAMO is founded with the external support of Rhodesia and South Africa as an opposition to the Marxist FRELIMO, which starts the internal conflict between the parties.
- 1984** The FRELIMO government and South Africa sign the Nkomati Accord of non-aggression, but South Africa does not observe the agreement.
- 1986** President Machel is killed in air crash. Joaquim Chissano becomes the President and leader of FRELIMO.
- 1990** The FRELIMO government changes the constitution for a multi-party system and talks begin between FRELIMO and RENAMO with mediation of Sant'Egidio and Italian politicians.
- 1992** In May, the UN becomes involved in the mediation. In October, RENAMO and FRELIMO sign the Rome Accords.
- 1994** Elections are held in October and FRELIMO wins majority. The new government is installed in December and the UN mission leaves.
- 1999** FRELIMO is re-elected.
- 2002** FRELIMO chooses new leader for the Presidential elections in 2004.
- 2005** FRELIMO's leader Guebuza becomes the President of Mozambique.