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# **PAKISTAN**

## **POLITICS IN A POST-COLONIAL STATE**

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**ABSTRACT**

This thesis attempts to explain why the military is still a powerful political institution/force in Pakistan. Its purpose was to test a hypothesis that the colonial authority structure along with partition (1947) oriented structural dynamics provides an important structural construct to explain politics and the military in post-colonial state of Pakistan.

To explain and analyse the problem, the study used books, journals, news papers and government documents for quantitative/explanatory analysis. The analysis included the military in the colonial authority structure where the former along with the civil bureaucracy and the landed-feudal class formed an alliance to pursue politico-economic interests in British India. The study also explains and analyses the partition oriented structural dynamics in terms of territory (Kashmir) and population (Indian refugees). The findings proved that these 'structural dynamics' affected politics and the military in Pakistan.

The theoretical framework in terms of 'praetorian oligarchy' is applied to structurally explain colonial politics as well as politics and the military in Pakistan. The study treats Pakistan as a praetorian state which structurally inherited the pre-partition 'praetorian oligarchy'. This praetorian oligarchy constructed 'Hindu India' as enemy to pursue politico-economic interests. The military, a part of praetorian oligarchy, emerges as a powerful political actor due to its coercive power. It seeks political power to pursue economic objectives independently.

**KEYWORDS** Pakistan, the Punjab, politics, praetorian oligarchy, military, colonial politics, strategic partition, structural dynamics, civil-military bureaucracy, the landed-feudal, the urban-rural poor

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## INTRODUCTION

### 1. Background

The partition of British India gave birth to two independent states of India and Pakistan in August 1947. Contrary to India which got established democratic institutions, Pakistan set for the opposite. The bureaucrats ruled the country with the military as an ally till late 1950s (Alavi 1990). In 1958, the military overtly intervened into politics and governed the country till 1971.

A civilian, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, served as prime minister for almost five years till late 1970s. In July 1977 martial law was again declared in Pakistan by general Zia led military. The military regime led by him ruled the country for next eleven and a half years. However, the post Cold War period permitted the civilian politicians to perform on the political platform of Pakistan. The civilian leadership, after a decade or so, was once again sent home by an other military coup led by general Pervez Musharraf in October 1999. Since then, the soldiers run the country.

One wonders why the military is still a powerful political institution/force in Pakistan in 21st century where most of the formerly military-ruled- countries such as Turkey have witnessed procedural democracy.

The present study considers the military rule in Pakistan as an important structural development which has extremely influenced the state and society. An attempt to explain the nature of military rule would help us analyse the nature of politics, state and the civil society in Pakistan.

Even contemporaneously, the US-led war on terrorism, the unresolved issues between nuclear-India and Pakistan and Washington's geo-strategic concerns in South Asia in terms of China's containment- a military role of Pakistan is demanded by such geo-strategic developments. Thus, Pakistan governed by soldiers offers little for the admirer of parliamentary democracy and peace. In this complex national and regional geo-political scenario, it becomes necessary to explain politics and the military in Pakistan.

## 2. Aim of the research

This thesis is about the military and politics in Pakistan. The research problem posed in this study is to explain why the military is still a powerful political institution/force in Pakistan. The purpose of the study is to test a hypothesis that the colonial authority structure along with partition (1947) oriented structural dynamics provides an important structural construct to explain politics and the military in post-colonial state of Pakistan.

In this respect, the study would deal with following questions:

- Did the military play any political role under the British?
- What are the factors which help military become politically a powerful institution in Pakistan?
- How did the military achieve its powerful political status?

As I would explain the country has witnessed a power game among various political and non-political forces i.e., civil-military bureaucracy, political community. It is, however, the structure of the state which determines the power dynamics in the country. Therefore, I tend to explain the research problem from historical-structural perspective.

## 3. Literature review

There is abundance of literature on military, civil-military relations, and general politics in Pakistan. I have used the following typology in order to categorise different literature. In this respect, I got inferred from Siddiqa's forthcoming in which she used this typology. However, I have given my own sources, language and analysis to the present typology. Moreover, I have added the elite bargain theorists in it.

- Propagandists- who looks at military as an instrument of nation building and a modernising force,
- Conspiracy theorists- who view military conspiring with foreign powers especially the US to gain and consolidate its power at the expense of political forces,

- Instrumentalists- who see military from the prism of external forces,
- Elite bargain theorists-who tend to view political developments from the elite perspective,
- Structuralists- who explain military in the larger context of the Pakistan's state.

To begin with, authors such as General Fazle Muqeem Khan (1960:67-199), Huntington (1968:250-255), Burki (1991:1-16) and Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema (2002:135-158) view the military as a nation builder. Being the most modern institution, the military gets into politics. The incompetent political leadership compels otherwise a reluctant military to govern. This propagandist literature virtually regards military as a neutral political umpire with a natural desire to serve as protector of the state. It simply does not explain the causes which forces the military to intervene in politics.

The work of Ayesha Jalal (1991:27-135), Saeed Shafqat (1997:7-15, 35-57), Tariq Ali (1970:74-144) and Husain Haqqani (2005:41-250) constitutes the second type which finds the military as highly exploitative in fulfilling its institutional and organisational interests. Jalal even argues that the Pakistan army aligned with Britain and then with the US in an attempt to underscore the national political forces.

Her narrative, however, is based on a linear-historical description of events that explains the inactivity of the civilian leadership. The civil bureaucracy is viewed as a rent seeking institution materially and politically benefiting through its alliance with Washington. The relative strength of political institutions is next to nothing as there is an underlying conspiracy to strengthen bureaucracy at the expense of social and political forces in Pakistan.

Jalal (1995:16-38) has further elaborated her previous work with no significant analytical modifications. In her both accounts the author has treated bureaucracy particularly the military as a post-independence phenomenon. Similarly, Shafqat while taking military as a post-independence phenomenon develops 'military-dominant party hegemonic system' to discuss politics from Zulifqar Bhutto to Benazir Bhutto.

He has treated the pre-1971 period as partially hegemonic which is arguable. In addition, the writer has only emphasised the political hegemony of the military thus ignoring socio-economic dimensions of the concept.

The third type comprises Stephen Cohen (2004:87-130 see also 1984). He, in his two books on Pakistan and its army, has shed light on the regimental and organisational aspects of Pakistan Army from the prism of the US interests. The author, however, has not touched the domestic factors in analysing the civil-military relations in the country.

The so called elite bargain approach as applied by Maya Chadda (2000:13-97, 226-232) narrates the politics in Pakistan from the elitist mindset which is essentially marked as a supreme force capable of using even 'coercive' measures to democratise, integrate and 'consolidate' the state in Pakistan. One simply wonders did the elite i.e., civil-military bureaucracy, politicians, 'consolidated' the country in 1971? This approach is defective as it creates the myth of an elitist leadership riding over a monolithic nationalism. Moreover, it reduces or better ignores the role of the masses in shaping the political developments in the country. In addition, it implicitly encourages the armed forces to apply unnecessary violence in the name of national consolidation to fulfill their own institutional and organisational interests.

The military's power is studied as a structural problem by Hamza Alavi (1988, 1990), Hassan Askari Rizvi (2000:51-240), Mohammad Waseem (1994:42-59, 85-101) and Ayesha Siddiqi (forthcoming). Alavi's theoretical work with respect to state and its dominant classes is doubtlessly monumental.

According to him the state in his Marxian context is an 'overdeveloped' structure having strong capitalist links with the 'metropolitan bourgeoisie'. The 'landed-feudal' class along with the 'indigenous bourgeoisie' strives to collaborate with the civil bureaucracy to further their interests politically, economically and socially.

The thrust of Alavian thought is that the bureaucracy is central to the state structure in Pakistan whereby the state functions 'autonomous' of the dominant 'classes'. In their bid for political power

the three 'classes' i.e., landed-feudal, indigenous bourgeoisie, metropolitan bourgeoisie, engulfed by some political crisis resort to the bureaucracy and the 'charismatic' military for arbitration.

Despite the significance of Alavi's work, the room for improvement is always there. For instance, the author is not clear about the concept of 'overdeveloped' state. How and why does he assume so? Is the state 'overdeveloped' vis-à-vis the civil society? If yes, then the dominant landed-feudal and indigenous bourgeoisie classes are part of the society and they are developed at least functionally in enhancing their politico-economic interests.

An other way to understand Alavi's thesis is by looking at the state's institutions. If we look at the state's elective institutions such as parliament, then sadly we find they have not established themselves even after 58 years in Pakistan. The only developed state's institution, as we see later, is the civil-military bureaucracy which, it seems, Alavi in his Marxian 'peripheral capitalism' paradigm has equated with an 'overdeveloped state'.

Similarly, Rizvi's work is mainly about the corporate interests of the officer cadre. Their personal interests are dubbed as national interests. Unfortunately, the author is more descriptive than analytical and takes military as a post-independence phenomenon.

On the other hand, Waseem has very convincingly established the transformative links of the colonial civil bureaucracy with that of Pakistan. The civil bureaucracy was well trained and disciplined in the art of administration and politics under the British. Pakistan inherited a good share of this 'colonial legacy' which underscored the existence of political and social forces due to the structural nature of the colonial state.

Waseem, however, has paid little attention to the non-civil bureaucracy - the military- which was a part and parcel of the colonial state structure as I shall explain later. Besides, the author believes in the continuum of the 'rule of law' from partition till present. I would challenge this argument by emphasising the 'superficiality' of the rule of law.

Finally, Ayesha Siddiqa's forthcoming explains, for the first time ever, the internal economy of the military. The military economically emerges as a "class" in Pakistan due to its economic ventures. The originality of this work aside, the author like others takes military as a post-independence phenomenon. In addition, she, like Alavi, seems to have equated the state with the military class. Besides, military is explained as an instrument of the civil bureaucracy and political leadership.

#### **4. Theoretical framework**

Having reviewed the literature I found that none of the work has touched military has a pre-partition phenomenon. None has attempted to explore and explain the colonial authority structure in terms of identifying the colonial military, its politics and its economy. In addition, there is a lack of analysis in terms of explaining the structural links of colonial military and its economy with that of Pakistan.

To explain the politics in Pakistan where the civil-military bureaucracy, as we shall see, plays an important role in terms of influencing state's institutions and the civil society, I tend to apply the concept of 'praetorian oligarchy' or praetorianism which pertains to a society or/and state where religious, feudal and armed forces form an alliance to rule the roost.

Praetorianism has theoretically been defined and developed by many authors such as Perlmutter (1974:5) who argues that "praetorianism has existed in all historical periods". Military intervention in politics in the democratising societies is analysed as a common phenomenon by such authors.

The level of political culture of a given society to a large extent determines the course of its political development. In this respect, Huntington (1968:80) has introduced the concept of 'praetorian polities'. Among the praetorian polities he identifies 'oligarchical praetorianism' where the influential social forces are "the great landowners, the leading clergy, and the wielders of the sword" (Huntington 1968:199). He (1968:194) further argues that "the most important causes of military intervention in politics are not military but political and reflect not the social and

organisational characteristics of the military establishment but the political and institutional structure of the society”.

Similarly, Amos Perlmutter (1974:4-20) has also developed the praetorian perspective in terms of military praetorianism whereby the military plays “a highly significant role in key political structures and institutions”. In addition, he has identified two types of praetorian armies: the arbitrator army and the ruler army. The arbitrator military having established its writ prefers to return to barracks due to time limit, acceptable social order, lack of independent political organisation and fear of civilian retribution etc. The ruler type military has a propensity to stay in power. The military remains the dominant political power bent on maximising its power and perks.

In *Modern Authoritarianism*, Perlmutter (1981:1-13) has categorised praetorianism as one of the types of modern authoritarian system. The modern authoritarianism is populated and dominated by ‘oligarchic political elite’. The military as a ‘parallel and auxiliary’ institution is used as instrument by the political elite in praetorian-authoritarianism.

Thus, the thrust of the abovementioned theoretical framework is on oligarchy/alliance of landed-feudals, armed forces and clergy. This oligarchy theoretically becomes praetorian when military is included in it. Overall, the existence of praetorian oligarchy marks low level of political culture in a given society as argued by Huntington.

To explain my research problem, I tend to apply ‘praetorian oligarchy’ as theoretical framework on the colonial state and society. I argue that the Alavian landed-feudal class and civil-military bureaucracy formed ‘praetorian oligarchy’ to pursue their politico-economic interest in British India.

Similarly, I shall apply the same framework on the post-colonial state of Pakistan where the state, as I would explain later, inherited the ‘praetorian oligarchy’ consisting of landed-feudal class and the civil-military bureaucracy.

I, however, have excluded clergy from Huntingtonian ‘oligarchical praetorianism’. Instead, I argue that clergy is auxiliary/supportive to landed-feudals and civil-military bureaucracy. Besides, I, unlike Perlmutter and Siddiq, do not take military as auxiliary and an instrument of the civil bureaucracy and the landed-feudal class.

Rather, I argue that military is a colonial phenomenon which structurally was a part of colonial praetorian oligarchy which existed in British India as we shall see. In post-partition Pakistan the military, as I would explain, intervened in politics due to its structural understanding with the pre-partition praetorian oligarchy to perpetuate their politico-economic interests.

I also argue that the military in Pakistan’s politics does not function independently. It is part of the praetorian oligarchy. However, within this praetorian oligarchy it, as I shall explain, has become Perlmutter’s ‘ruler’ military.

Besides, adhering to the new version of structuralism, I use state as ‘autonomous’ of dominant classes. In addition, I tend to emphasise the ‘centrality’ of state. The dominant classes and even institutions e.g. civil-military bureaucracy function within the state and not as state (Steans and Pettiford 2005: 55-58, 86-88).

## **5. Methodology**

The research problem in this thesis is to explain why the military is still a powerful political institution/force in Pakistan. The existing material on military and politics in Pakistan is mostly descriptive, theoretically ambiguous, and highly pro-military. More importantly, it does not take military’s politics as a pre-partition phenomenon as mentioned earlier. Therefore, there are many missing links which need explanation.

Thus, to try to explain the research problem, I tend to test a hypothesis which is also the purpose of this study. The hypothesis is that the colonial authority structure along with partition (1947) oriented structural dynamics provides an important structural construct to explain politics and the

military in Pakistan. This hypothesis is expected to help us explain the military and politics in the post-colonial state of Pakistan.

In order to test the hypothesis, I came across a book published in 2005 by Tan Tai Yong. The book is first of its kind and was originally a doctoral dissertation. It convincingly discusses the colonial military and its politics in the Punjab from 1849 to 1947. So, I have relied on this book in terms of quantitative/qualitative facts to explain the military's role in the colonial authority structure. This is a secondary source, however.

In addition, I have referred another book (originally a doctoral dissertation) to explain the role of civil bureaucracy in the British authority structure. The book also covers general politics of colonial India.

To explain the phenomenon of 1947 partition, I was able to go through an other original work published for the first time in 2005 in the form of a book. This secondary source has helped me a lot in terms of explaining the partition from colonial perspective. This work refutes the earlier theories with respect to London's plans to divide India. In addition, I got accessed to some primary material in terms of Pakistan Census Report (1951) to quantitatively explain the impact of Indian refugees (mohajirs) on Pakistan's politics.

I had a plan to conduct some interviews of the military personnel in order to get some information and insight on the military's politics and economic ventures to explain my research problem. Unfortunately, the accessibility to the concerned persons was made difficult due to their engagement in earth quake relief work in Northern Pakistan and parts of Pakistan held Kashmir. The time constraint too proved a setback in this respect.

To solve this problem, I got accessed one (Pakistani) security analyst's forthcoming on Pakistan's military and its economic activities. I have used this source quantitatively to explain military's economic role. Her source, however, is treated as secondary. Besides, I have cited another primary source in terms of Parliamentary Directory (government document) to explain the socio-cultural background of Pakistan's present parliament.

Besides, I have used an other primary source in terms of Pakistan Planning Commission's Report on poverty incidence during the last four years. This source is used quantitatively. Thus, I have used secondary sources i.e., books, journals, and newspapers, at times quantitatively to explain and analyse politics and the military in Pakistan. In addition, primary sources such as reports are mostly used for quantitative analysis. I have relied on quantitative facts in the data collected because it would help to test my hypothesis, answer the questions and analyse the problem with the help of theoretical framework.

Finally, I am aware that I have mainly focused on Pakistan's military and general politics. And that I have excluded otherwise very useful narration of political developments such as a detailed description of Pakistan's partition in 1971 or nuclear tests in 1998. I did it knowingly because it is very difficult to include all in this ten thousand words paper. And the ambition is to explain the problem which has not been dealt with the way the present study does. Therefore, unnecessary details are avoided to fully concentrate on the problem.

## **6. Disposition**

I have divided this thesis into three chapters. The first chapter explains and analyses the colonial authority structure. It argues that the praetorian oligarchy existed in British India. The 1947 partition is also explained from colonial perspective. In addition, this chapter highlights the partition oriented structural dynamics.

The second chapter deals with politics in post-partition Pakistan. An attempt is made to explain if the colonial authority structure and the partition oriented structural dynamics have any bearing on politics and the military in the post-colonial state of Pakistan. Besides, this chapter argues that the pre-partition praetorian oligarchy was structurally inherited by Pakistan's state. The military being a component of this oligarchy emerges powerful politico-economically due to the structure of the state and society.

The last chapter explains the partition and disintegration of Pakistan's state in 1971. The new state inherits Punjab based 'praetorian oligarchy' from the old state of Pakistan. This chapter generally

explains politics and the military's politico-economic activities from partition till present. The findings of the three chapters shall be surmised in the conclusion.

## **1. COLONIAL POLITICS**

This chapter explains the colonial authority structure. It explains how the civil-military bureaucracy and the landed-feudal class formed praetorian oligarchy/alliance to pursue their politico-economic interests in British India. The chapter also explains the partition of British India in 1947. The partition oriented structural dynamics are also highlighted in this chapter.

### **1.1 Colonial authority structure**

The authority structure of The British Empire comprised the governor-general, the viceroy and the state bureaucracy. This power system was answerable via the secretary of state to the British parliament in London. The state bureaucracy was an integral part of this authority structure.

The state acted as an interventionist force to pursue its capitalist interests. In this respect, it was the bureaucracy which enjoyed an 'arbitrary' position in terms of bureaucratic paternalism. The landed-feudal's role was effectively reduced by the state-led economic mechanism affected and regulated, in turn, by the market. The state penetrated and influenced the civil society through the bureaucracy (Waseem 1994:27-28).

The forces of colonialism replaced the Moghul state (empire) structure gradually. Bengal and the Punjab succumbed to the British East India Company in the mid 18th and mid 19th centuries respectively. The British developed operative 'institutional' set-up for the administration of the colonial society. The political economy of colonialism made the state to act as 'promoter' 'guarantor' and 'protector' of British capitalist interests in India. On the other hand, the state functioned as an organisation 'relatively autonomous' of these interests as well as the local politico-economic forces (Waseem 1994:21-27).

Waseem, however, has not differentiated between the types of colonial state bureaucracy. His sole emphasis on the civil bureaucracy does not make a complete picture of the colonial authority structure. Tan Tai Yong, has, however, convincingly established the linkage between the landed-feudal class and the British military which formed the ‘praetorian oligarchy’ to pursue politico-economic interest as we shall see.

Yong has emphasised the ‘culture of militarism’ of the pre-colonial Punjab. India throughout its history witnessed invasions from its northern parts called the Punjab. In the wake of the Moghul decline, the Punjab was conquered and governed by Maharaja Ranjit Singh. He raised his own army mainly comprising Punjabi Sikhs. The East India Company regime annexed the Punjab in 1849. The next decade saw demilitarisation of the defeated Ranjit’s army. The 1857 mutiny, however, made the British to reevaluate the strategic importance of the Punjab as well as the Punjabis who had earlier supported the ‘military-fiscal state’ of the company rule (Yong 2005:19-51).

In 1880s soon after the Second Afghan War, the colonial masters perceived the so called ‘great game’- the Russian threat. Now, the ‘martial races’ concept was developed by the British authorities to ‘divide and rule’ not only the armed forces but also India. The punjabisisation of the colonial military initiated the recruitment of Punjabi Sikhs, Punjabi Muslims and Pathans of north India- the military districts- into the restructured Bengal Army (Yong 2005: 57-89).

In 1890s the opening of “canal colonies” initiated a process of “land allocation” by the colonial masters to win the “loyalty” of the soldiering classes. In 1900 the Land Alienation Act was passed by the state to stop land slip out of landed-feudals hands. Coincidentally, this landed-feudal class consisted of ex-soldiers, pensioners and relatives of in-service army personnel. From 1914-1919, the Punjab provided majority of recruits to safeguard the colonial interests in Asia, Africa and Europe (Yong 2005:90-108).

The war years brought a close collaboration between the civil and military authorities giving birth to the concept of “militarized bureaucracy”. The post-war chaotic economic situation along with the political uprising i.e., Khilafat movement etc, threatened the socio-economic balance in the

rural-military districts. Resultantly, the civil-military cooperation in terms of Punjab Soldiers' Boards was further consolidated (Yong 2005: 141-182).

This civil-military integration was a planned mechanism to prevent the recruiting districts being influenced by the post-war nationalist politics. In other words, the British authorities were instrumental in the creation of praetorian oligarchy. Thus, during the inter-war period (1919-1939), the Board functioned as an 'institutional' part of the district administration (see Alavi 1988).

However, the nationalist movement gained momentum during the inter-war period. The raj was political too. In revising the 1909 Morley-Mitno reforms, it blessed the Indians with limited representation by introducing Montagu-Chelmsford reforms in 1919. However, in post-reforms India, both the Congress and the League failed to make political inroads in the praetorian Punjab which provided sixty percent of the Indian army by 1927. Instead, the Punjab based Unionist party, an alliance of Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs landed-feudals, held on to power till the last days of the raj. The Unionist party clearly represented the praetorian oligarchy especially in the military districts of northern Punjab (Yong 2005:241-280).

Thus, it is argued that the colonial authority structure comprised both civil and military bureaucracy along with governor-general and viceroy. The British recruited Punjabis in large numbers from late 19th century onward in the British Indian Army to secure the Imperial boundaries from the Russian threat. The British won the loyalty of the military districts in northern Punjab through a systemic allocation of land. In the inter-war period, the civil-military bureaucracy and landed-feudals collaborated with one another politico- economically. Their collaboration gave birth to praetorian oligarchy in the British India.

## **1.2 The strategic partition**

There are numerous theories with respect to the partition of British India. Hamza Alavi (1988, 1990) gave the 'salaried theory' which means that the salaried classes such as lawyers of United and Central Provinces as well as Bengal and the Punjab strove constitutionally to safeguard their economic interests. However, Khalid bin Sayeed has emphasised on 'Muslim separatism'. His

thesis is based on civilisational differences between the Muslims and the non-Muslims of India. Sayeed, undoubtedly, represents the two-nation theorists (Sayeed 1967:4).

Waseem, on the other hand, has based his findings on multiplicity of variables. Structurally, the Pakistan Movement started in the Muslim-minority provinces i.e., CP, UP. Ideologically, it was the two-nation theory that served as an ideology. Organisationally, it was the Muslim League which provided the platform to the Indian Muslims. Personally, it was Jinnah's Weberian charisma that was the driving force. Nonetheless, Waseem, if studied deeply, also belongs to two-nation strand (Waseem 1994:59-83).

Similarly, Jalal (1991:16) also laid emphasis on the personality factor. She, however, differs from others in the sense that Jinnah was not necessarily struggling to win independence. His acceptance of the Cabinet Mission Plan in 1946 marks his political resilience. Jinnah used the demand for Pakistan as a 'bargaining' chip to maximise the Muslims interests argues Jalal.

The academic value of the abovementioned theories appreciated, I, instead, tend to explain the partition phenomenon from the colonial perspective. After all, it was the British, not the Congress or the Muslim League which partitioned the sub-continent.

In this respect, in his recently published work *In The Shadow of the Great Game*, Narendra Singh Sarila has convincingly unfolded the story of India's partition. His thesis is based on declassified archival facts about the way the British made policies to preserve its geo-strategic concerns during the Second World War.

The Congress due to its own nationalist politics resigned from the office in 8 out of 11 provinces in 1939 just after the war broke out in Europe. On the other hand, the British wanted to have a strife-free Punjab (recruiting 50% of the British Indian Army). In this respect, the Muslim League and its leadership especially Jinnah was appeased by Lord Linlithgow who in announcing the British declaration on 8 August 1940 acceded the 'veto' to Jinnah on India's future constitutional developments. Even the Unionist leadership, which was part of the praetorian oligarchy, was urged by Lord Linlithgow to enter into electoral alliance with the League. Jinnah, who thought on

communal lines much earlier in 1939, conversed with Lord Linlithgow that the “Muslim areas should be separated from “Hindu India” and run by Muslims in collaboration with Great Britain” (Sarila 2005:34-64).

In the wake of poor British performance in the war, the division in the Imperial army, the Congress’s demand for a free-India and the League’s ‘autonomous’ rhetoric- it was Lord Wavell, not Mountbatten, who first blueprinted the future of Pakistan on 6/7 February 1946. Responding to a telegram to the secretary of state for India, Wavell, while forwarding his scheme, gave great importance to the communist interventionist designs towards Middle East (the wells of power) and rest of Asia (Sarila 2005:194-196).

To contain and combat this menace, the support of the Muslims was crucial. In this respect, an independent Pakistan was perceived to serve as a military base in fulfilling the British strategic aims. Hence, the British India was partitioned into India and Pakistan. Bengal and the Punjab were too partitioned into East Bengal (in Pakistan) and East Punjab (in India) in August 1947. The princely states including Kashmir were denied independence by London. Soon after the transfer of authority to India and Pakistan on August 15, 1947, the two countries started integrating the princely states under the partition formula (Sarila 2005:330-336).

Therefore, it is in this context of partition that the issue of Kashmir’s integration and the cross-boarder migration need explanation as I would do later. Moreover, I have termed such developments as ‘partition oriented structural dynamics’ because they were part of the colonial state in terms of territory and population. I would explain later how these ‘structural dynamics’ affected the military and politics in post-partition Pakistan.

Thus, it is argued that the British authority structure was decisive in terms of policy making and implementation. Moreover, the Punjab proved crucial as a recruiting ground for the Imperial army. The soldiering classes were granted land in order to win their loyalty and depoliticise them. The British strategically partitioned India on communal lines in August 1947. Moreover, the partition left a legacy of ‘structural dynamics’ which affected the state of Pakistan as we see in the next chapter.

## **2. PRAETORIAN PAKISTAN**

This chapter argues Pakistan as a praetorian state which inherited the pre-partition praetorian oligarchy. The chapter also explains if the colonial authority structure and the partition oriented structural dynamics affect politics and the military in Pakistan.

### **2.1 Punjab based praetorian oligarchy**

Territorially, Pakistan inherited North West Frontier Province, West Punjab (onward Punjab), East Bengal, Sind and a few princely states i.e., Bahawalpur whose rulers under the partition formula acceded to Pakistan. The British Balochistan comprising princely states of Kharan, Lasbela, and Kalat was raided by the Pakistan army in March 1948 to annex it with the latter (Tariq Ali 1983:123; Jalal 1991:93). In addition, the country had to struggle to get its material i.e., bank balance, arsenal etc., and non-material i.e., military personnel, bureaucrats etc., share (Rizvi 2000:35-61; Haqqani 2005:11-12).

Besides, Pakistan received in total more than 7 million Indian refugees ( mohajirs) of which more than 5 million settled in Punjab alone; 2 % of which came from United Provinces and mostly settled in urban Sind i.e., Karachi ( Census of Pakistan 1951:11-25). Muslim League and its leadership including Jinnah were migratory as well. Punjab and Bengal emerged as two largest provinces area and population wise.

Scholars and analysts so far have focused on those mohajirs who spoke Urdu and got settled in urban Sind (Waseem 1994:102-111). I, instead, argue that the politics of Punjabi mohajirs in particular and (local) Punjabis in general is crucial to explain their influence on politics and the military in Pakistan.

The colonial authority structure in terms of civil-military bureaucracy was structurally transformed into Pakistan's state. As mentioned earlier, till partition the Punjabis made 50 % of the British Indian Army. Therefore, Punjabis, both local and mohajirs, outnumbered even majority Bengalis in the armed forces of Pakistan. Similarly, Pakistan inherited a good share of colonial civil

bureaucracy. The local-mohajir Punjabis outgrew all other ethnic groups in Pakistan Civil Services (Waseem 1994:108).

Besides, landed-feudals of Punjab were institutionally well organised to assert themselves politically (Alavi 1990). So, this overwhelming position of Punjabis is one of the dynamics of partition which affected the structure of state and military in Pakistan.

Thus, it is argued that the over-representation of Punjabis in civil-military bureaucracy along with Punjabi landed-feudals confirms the structural significance of pre-partition praetorian oligarchy which institutionally remained unaffected by the partition. Pakistan inherited this praetorian oligarchy, it is argued. In addition, I have termed this punjabicisation as ‘Punjab based praetorian oligarchy’ which, as I shall explain, exploited the country politico-economically.

## **2.2 Overdeveloped civil-military bureaucracy**

The Punjabis outnumbered all other ethnic communities in the civil-military bureaucracy as explained earlier. The civil-military bureaucracy consolidated its numerical strength in the absence of indigenous leadership and any political organisation. In other words, the migratory political leadership, as we shall see, proved ineffective to put the civil-military bureaucracy under permanent civilian control.

In post-partition Pakistan, Jinnah, the governor-general, was all powerful under amended 1935 India Act (Alavi 1990). However, Jinnah and the Muslim League had little say in areas now constituting the state of Pakistan. The praetorian oligarchy remained unaffected by the partition process. It provided little space to ailing Jinnah and disenchanted Liaquat Ali Khan, the first prime minister of Pakistan (Alavi 1990).

Instead, owing to the peculiar nature of the state which inherited an ‘overdeveloped civil-military bureaucracy’ and an ill-representative Muslim League, the civil bureaucracy emerged from within the praetorian oligarchy as a powerful political actor due to its expertise in the art of administration. In the name of governor-general, the Punjabi bureaucrats established a hitherto

unknown post of 'secretary general' and his 'planning committee' directly responsible to Jinnah who by that time was bed-ridden. Choduary Mohammad Ali, the secretary general and later prime minister of Pakistan, bypassed Liaquat Ali Khan and his cabinet in terms of policy making and its implementation (see Alavi 1990).

It was this Punjab based praetorian oligarchy which feared the majority Bengalis who demanded a constitution and general election. To do injustice to the Bengalis, it was Jinnah himself who declared Urdu a national language in East Bengal in March 1948. It is not to suggest that Jinnah represented this oligarchy.

It is, however, argued that the civil bureaucracy was the real power holder and a think tank responsible for policy input for the administrative state of Pakistan. Thus, the praetorian oligarchy had no objection to Urdu in the name of so called nation-state building (Rahman 1998:200-209).

On the other hand, the military as part of the praetorian oligarchy did not lag behind in terms of power projection. I explain it by again looking at the partition. As mentioned before, the 'strategic partition' was done in order to use Pakistan as a military base. Therefore, the British had opted for a joint defense council for India and Pakistan. Claude Auchinleck was joint commander-in-chief of Indian and Pakistani armed forces. All three services of Pakistan were headed by British officers in the initial years (Rizvi 2000:41).

Jalal (1991:118), in this respect, argues that the British deliberately did so as they wanted to make Pakistan dependent on London for its defense needs. Her argument is in line with Sarila as we have seen before.

However, this type of argumentation underscores the value and the purpose of partition. Instead, it is argued that the British did want to see Pakistan as an ally in its global power calculations i.e., anti-communist force. The assumption of the office cadre of Pakistan armed forces by Britishers was primarily due to the ineffective political leadership of Pakistan which failed badly to take defense in its own hands.

Instead, the civil bureaucracy as a policy making body decided the things for itself as well as for other organisations including military with whom it had strategic understanding. Thus, the civil bureaucracy led praetorian oligarchy perceived and projected 'socialist India' as chronic enemy (Cohen 1984:37; Haqqani 2005:26). This enemy construction, as we shall see, was done to pursue economic benefits at the expense of democracy and peace. Therefore, it was necessary to externally defend Pakistan against the perceived Indian threat. Those who opposed this view were called anti-Pakistan forces such as Bengalis and the Baloch.

To turn the so called Indian threat perception into reality, the Pakistan Army planned an operation in Kashmir in 1947-48 in order to institutionalise India as an enemy (Tariq Ali 2002:235; Haqqani 2005:28). The subsequent war over Kashmir marked the significance of partition oriented 'structural dynamics'. Thus, the legal debates between India and Pakistan on Kashmir aside, its geo-strategic location strengthened the (Punjab based) praetorian oligarchy in Pakistan onward.

In addition, it is argued that the military intervened in Pakistan's politics in 1947-48 and not in 1958 as is assumed so by many analysts such as Cheema (2002:135-158). This intervention turned Pakistan's military into Perlmutter's 'arbitrator' (Perlmutter 1974:8-14).

Besides, it is argued that this military intervention in politics tilted the institutional balance in military's favour though within the praetorian oligarchy. Earlier, Jalal (1991:135) had assumed so at Liaquat Ali's assassination in 1951. Moreover, at this juncture, the military as an institution disengaged from politics on account of organisational weaknesses. Finally, it is argued that it is not the state which is 'overdeveloped' but the civil-military bureaucracy in Pakistan.

### **2.3 The praetorian oligarchic rule**

Pakistan was ruled not by one organisation but by the civil bureaucracy led praetorian oligarchy from 1947-58 as we shall see. The non-Punjabi landed-feudals also allied with this oligarchy to further their politico-economic interests.

The country witnessed seven prime ministers from 1947-58 of which one was Punjabi landed-feudal; two of them (one Punjabi) were staunch bureaucrats. Of four governor-general, two were (both Punjabis) bureaucrats. The only president in this period was a unique bureaucrat who had served in both the bureaucracies- civil and military. Ayub Khan, who became the first Pakistani commander-in-chief in 1951, also joined this oligarchic rule in 1954 as defense minister in Prime Minister Bogra's cabinet.

This praetorian oligarchy ruled the country at the expense of democratic and legal norms. Ghulam Mohammad, governor-general from 1951-55, extended the oligarchic power by arbitrary amendments in the 1935 India Act. He was assisted by the Punjabi chief justice who introduced the legal norm in terms of 'doctrine of necessity' to secure the oligarchy politically in 1954. This necessity doctrine empowered the governor-general to dismiss assemblies sans reason. Therefore, the following year West Pakistan was arbitrarily turned into One-Unit to underscore the majority Bengalis. In 1956, a Punjabi bureaucrat blessed Pakistan with a constitution which rendered the Bengalis into a minority (Waseem 1994:137-141).

The military, during this period, strengthened itself organisationally, politically and economically. Organisationally, the three services gradually nationalised their command structure. The military personnel received training from the US rather than Sandhurst. Politically, domestic and global developments such as the rehabilitation of the Indian refugees, self-launched war in Kashmir, the partial martial law in Lahore in 1953, Ayub Khan as defense minister in 1954 and military's Cold War alliance with the US i.e., CENTO, SEATO, gave confidence to the military as an institution (Chadda 2000:29; Sayeed 1967:76-86).

Economically, huge defense budget and massive military aid from the US in 1950s boosted the organisation's national standing. Besides, the most significant development was the establishment of Fauji (soldier) Foundation in 1953 which ventured in textile, sugar and cereals in the name of army personnel's welfare (Siddiqi 2003). In addition, the military personnel largely benefited due to its political position in the praetorian oligarchy with respect to redistribution of evacuee land (left by non-Muslims who migrated to India in 1947). This land was leased for 99 years to the

military for operational purposes which the latter appropriated for personal gains (Siddiqa, forthcoming).

This aspect of military's economic activism makes one remember the pre-partition land allocation to the military classes by the British. Thus, in independent Pakistan, the military as an important component of the praetorian oligarchy strove on its own to secure its economic interest in the security state of Pakistan.

#### **2.4 Political military**

On 8 October 1958, President Iskander Mirza declared martial law in the country. The 1956 constitution and the national-provincial assemblies were abrogated and dismissed respectively (Rizvi 2000:86). This episode has been analysed by many scholars.

Alavi views it a '(civil) bureaucratic coup' because it was Iskandar Mirza, a bureaucrat, who declared martial law. In addition, the new set-up included a secretary general and his planning committee which gave more power to civil bureaucracy than military. Besides, Alavi and Jalal among others argue that the fear of general election supposed to be held in 1959 was the main cause for this martial law (Alavi 1990; Jalal 1995:54).

Alavi, unfortunately, has focused at the means and not the end. How strange it is that a 'bureaucratic coup' leads to military intervention and sends Iskandar Mirza in exile. In addition, why did election, which has been postponed many times since 1947, become the cause for the coup?

It is argued that it was a "military coup" initiated by the military and which rested all powers in its hands. The main cause was not election but the projection of military as 'ruler' in the Punjab based praetorian oligarchy. The military achieved this seniority due to its overwhelming politico-economic position in the security state of Pakistan. In addition, it sought political power to expand and consolidate itself as an independent economic actor. I shall explain it later.

Besides, the abrogation of the constitution may be seen in the light of ‘necessity doctrine’. It means, it is argued, that the legal and constitutional norms are irrelevant to the state of Pakistan and the so called constitutions are superficial in nature and character. The superficiality of legal-constitutional norms also shows the weakness of parliamentary institutions and the civil society in Pakistan.

From 1958-69 the country was arbitrarily ruled by soldier-president general Ayub Khan who got himself elected president through arbitrary referendum. He introduced the system of ‘Basic Democracies’ supposedly to democratise the country. The Muslim League was factionalised. Resultantly, Muslim League Convention was the king’s party.

Ayub also blessed the nation with a constitution in 1962. A war with India in September 1965 was too planned via Kashmir to humiliate the chronic foe. A year before, the soldier-president got re-elected as president through the self-created Electoral College- the basic democrats (Hashami 2005:147; Tariq Ali 1970:132; Haqqani 2005:43-50; see also Ziring 1971:12-85).

Ayub led military rule further benefited the praetorian oligarchy. For instance, his economic policies were carried out by the civil bureaucracy which was a medium to penetrate the state into the civil society. The regime’s cronies be that landed-feudal or a bureaucrat was favoured in terms of ‘superficial’ land reform and industrial licenses (Ziring 1971:88). In addition, the regime amended Colonisation of Land Act, 1912, in 1965 to allot land (approx. 100000 acres annually) to military (Siddiq, forthcoming). Besides, the Fauji Foundation gathered assets worth Rs 152 million by the end of his rule (Siddiq 2003).

Ayub’s era was anti urban-rural poor. His policies were discriminatory and the more depressed and discriminated were the majority Bengalis politically, economically and culturally. This mega-discrimination led to the six-point politics of Awami League and its leader Mujibur Rehman in mid 1960s. Besides, the urban-rural poor of West Pakistan were too discriminated to such an extent that they took to the streets in late 1960s (Ziring 1971:174-191; Tariq Ali 1970:23). The public uprising against Ayub led military rule marked the flaws in the work of propagandists such as Huntington (1968:250-255) who echoed military-led modernisation.

A newly created Pakistan Peoples Party led by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was instrumental in articulating the Poor's concerns. Awami League did the same in the Eastern Wing. A defamed Ayub Khan proved a liability for the military which removed him from office in March 1969 (Tariq Ali 1970:210). The deposed soldier abrogated his own constitution and dismissed pro-regime assemblies. Martial Law once again engulfed Pakistan in March 1969. Constitutional norms once again proved irrelevant and 'superficial'.

Thus, it is argued that the civil bureaucracy led praetorian oligarchy ruled the country from independence till 1958. The 1958 military coup registered military as a senior partner within the praetorian oligarchy. The military regime of Ayub Khan further consolidated military both politically and economically. Legal and constitutional norms remained superficial and irrelevant. The urban-rural poor were extremely discriminated in both wings. This led to agitational politics capitalised by Peoples Party and Awami League. Resultantly, Ayub Khan unleashed an other martial law.

### **3. BIRTH OF A NEW STATE**

This chapter explains the partition and resultant disintegration of the state of Pakistan in 1971. This chapter also explains the new state, its politics and the military. Finally, this chapter attempts to explain how the military consolidated its politico-economic position within the praetorian oligarchy from 1971 till present.

#### **3.1 Partition of Pakistan**

General Yahya Khan assumed office of the chief martial law administration in March 1969. The military regime under Yahya is seen as continuation of the earlier military rule by Ayesha Siddiqa (forthcoming). I, however, would put Yahya led military rule in the praetorian oligarchy which remained undisturbed in post-Ayub period.

Having assessed the public mood, Yahya under his Legal Framework Order undid the One-Unit and promised general election in the country in February-March 1970. Peoples Party, Awami

League and other smaller parties started canvassing with no pronounced agenda. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto played upon the poor's emotionality in terms of promising them food, fabric and flat. Mujibur Rehman sold the 'autonomy' maxim. The smaller parties including Jamaat-e-Islami aspired for pan-Islamism. And Muslim Leagues were lost with the fall of Ayub Khan (Waseem 1994:243-254).

The election was staged with least reports of rigging. Though the military intelligence agencies predicted a mix-mandate yet Peoples Party and Awami League had a clean sweep in West Pakistan and East Pakistan respectively. From a simple parliamentary democracy principle, the majority party was entitled to form government in the centre as well as East Pakistan.

But the Punjab based praetorian oligarchy could not see Bengalis rule them. Therefore, Yahya Khan and Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto (a Sindi landed-feudal) while representing the oligarchy dismissed the public verdict. When the Bengalis resorted to agitational politics, Yahya Khan allowed military means to solve a political issue. In the wake of the civil war, the Bengali refugees burdened India socio-economically. No wonder then that India exploited the situation through war against Pakistan. Resultantly, on 16 December 1971, Pakistan got partitioned into a sovereign state of Bangladesh (Waseem 1994:255-277).

Scholars so far have bypassed this partition and its ramifications. However, it is argued that this partition marked the importance of non-religious identities. The creation of Bangladesh shows the victory of two-culture theory whereby the two-nation theory could not bind the two wings together. In addition, the partition of Pakistan confirmed the significance of 'structural supremacy' of the Punjab based praetorian oligarchy which for its own politico-economic interests underestimated and degraded the majority Bengalis.

More importantly, the state of Pakistan virtually disintegrated. It was run by non-elective apparatus at the time of partition which means the legality and rule of law was absent. Moreover, it lost more than half of its population and territory that means the state collapsed even physically.

Thus, the partition of old Pakistan gave birth to a new state which inherited the ‘overdeveloped civil-military bureaucracy’ and influential landed-feudal class. In other words, the new state structurally inherited the Punjab based ‘praetorian oligarchy’ from old Pakistan. In addition, Punjab once again emerged as a powerful province in terms of population and resources.

### **3.2 Politics of appeasement**

Post-1971 Pakistan’s state structurally forced the military to retreat because the latter has been discredited by the masses due to its failure to guarantee even the territorial defense of the state. Therefore, the military handed over power to Zulfikar Ali Bhutto with whom the civil-military bureaucracy had developed institutional understanding during the former’s association with the Ayub-Yahya regimes. For instance, Bhutto was sent to China by Yahya regime at a time when military operation in East Pakistan was at its peak (Siddiq, forthcoming).

In addition, he retrospectively represented the old West Pakistan. Therefore, he was the only leader of national standing who could be transferred authority. Therefore, Bhutto acted as the country’s first civilian chief martial law administrator as well as president from late 1971 to 1973.

Bhutto and his politics (1971-77) have been discussed by many scholars. For instance, Burki (1980: 81-89), K.B. Sayeed (1980: 91) and Jalal (1995: 77-84) have analysed Bhuttoism from a personalistic perspective: that he was a feudal and once in power wanted to maximise it at all costs. Shafqat (1997:115-159) and Waseem (1994:285-348) have, however, analysed the ‘Bhutto phenomenon’ from party politics perspective. These scholars argue that Bhutto came to power due to vote. To fulfill the campaign-based promises, he turned to politics of ‘reformism’. It was in the structure of reforms that some groups or classes got resented and brought him down.

The ‘politics of reformism’ thesis of Shafqat and Waseem is partially true. Shafqat (1997:10-16), while formulating his ‘dominant party political system’ for 1971-77 period, has ignored the organisational weakness of Peoples Party. Thus, it is argued that the Peoples Party period was not what Shafqat formulates.

Waseem has though highlighted the organisational weakness of Peoples Party which caused Bhutto's downfall. However, he has not touched the military's politics which appeased Bhutto by returning to barracks in the wake of 1971 defeat. I, therefore, tend to argue that it was politics of appeasement (politico-economic concession) both on Bhutto and military's part during this period.

Bhutto was transferred power by the discredited military. In other words, he was appeased by an organisation which is a senior partner of the praetorian oligarchy that represents landed-feudal as well. Bhutto being a landed-feudal wanted to become authoritarian. For that, he were to curtail the powers of a military which had ruled the country in past.

Therefore, he restructured the military command and control structure. In addition, he abolished the civil service of Pakistan and unified all services though with military's consent (Haqqani 2005:95; Shafqat 1977:167). Besides, he appeased the socialists of his party and gave them important portfolios e.g. finance ministry (Burki 1980:140-143).

However, very soon he deployed the very military in Balochistan in the name of national consolidation (Cohen 2004:220). The Balochistan operation continued from 1973 till Bhutto's downfall (Waseem 1994:323-327). The intelligences agencies of the military, however, exploited the situation in former's favour (Haqqani 2005 :172) The underlying assumption was to rejuvenate the morale of the armed forces so as to regain its previous political position.

Bhutto, in his appeasement rhetoric, projected India as enemy when the latter tested nuclear device in 1974. The dynamics of the security state urged Bhutto to initiate country's first nuclear programme in mid 1970s. In addition, during 1972-77 period the defense budget stood around 6 % of GNP (Shafqat 1997:167). Thus, Bhutto appeased the military to prolong his stay in power.

By mid 1970s, Bhutto restructured his cabinet and replaced staunch socialists with landed-feudals the majority of whose came from Punjab. The entry of landed-feudal class in power corridors marked their importance in the praetorian oligarchy. In addition, he also appeased the religious forces by introducing Islamic measures i.e., banning alcohol (Burki 1980:193).

However, the religious forces along with the discriminated urban-rural poor took to agitational politics and demanded Islamic system. The Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) assisted and aided the religious forces in this respect (Haqqani 2005:105-116). Thus, it is argued that the clergy was auxiliary to the military.

Bhutto having sensed the situation decided to hold general election in March 1977. His Peoples Party emerged as a majority party. However, the opposition in the form of Pakistan National alliance (PNA) refused to accept the results. They alleged Bhutto of massive rigging (Rizvi 2000:232-235). Thus, the agitational politics of the PNA requested the military to take over.

### **3.3 The military matters**

The new state witnessed martial law imposed by general Ziaul Haq led military regime on 5 July 1977 on charges of corruption and mismanagement of economy by Bhutto. The latter was arrested and his polices reversed; the 1973 constitution was abrogated. Two years later, Bhutto was hanged by the military (Rizvi 2000:239).

Politically, Zia, like Ayub, held referendum and became soldier-president. The other partners in the praetorian oligarchy, especially those affected by Bhutto's policies, applauded the military rule. The Afghan jihad in 1980s against communist Soviet Union made Islamabad a frontline state in Washington. Subsequently, massive military aid (US\$ 3.2 bn.) and increased defense allocation strengthened the military at home. It became belligerent: it banned political parties, arrested anti-regime politicians and journalists, delayed oft-promised election, criminalised the civil society through weapon-drug culture, islamised the legal system and spilled ethnic-sectarian violence in Pakistan ( Waseem 1994:367-388; Burki 1991:16).

Despite this political colouring, the July coup was economic in nature. The prime factor was armed forces' own economic interests. To pursue its economic interest independently, the military established Army Welfare Trust in 1977- the intervention year. The Trust runs 26 independent projects in agriculture, real estate, housing, and manufacturing. It valued at Rs 17 billion in 2003. Similarly, the Pakistan Air Force established Shaheen (air) Foundation with annual turnover of Rs

600 million. In addition, the Pakistan Navy also established its Bahria (sea) Foundation in 1981. Besides, the National Logistic Cell established in 1978 profited in trucking and transformation (Siddiqa 2003; also forthcoming).

Thus, it is argued that the military (overtly) intervened into politics for its own economic interests. It also wanted to reestablish itself among the masses as a powerful political force as it was once under Ayub in the old state of Pakistan.

### **3.4 Institutionalised military rule**

Zia got amended the constitution and inserted article 58 (B) 2 as 8th amendment in 1985. This empowered the president to dissolve the parliament and dismissed national-provincial assemblies sans reason. In other words, the military rule was institutionalised.

Very soon the 58 (B) 2 was operationalised. The first victim of this article was Zia's own selected prime minister Junejo (landed-feudal) who was sent home when the latter differed with Zia especially on Geneva Accords. However, before Zia could appoint another pliant person, he died in a mysterious air crash in August 1988 (Burki 1991:16).

The post-Zia period could not affect military institutionally. It remained a strong component in the praetorian oligarchy. The military rule being institutionalised, landed-feudals (a part of praetorian oligarchy) ran the country in the 1990s (Rizvi 2000:327). The military continued with its economic activities in this period as I shall explain later.

In a changed geo-strategic environment where Washington no longer required Pakistan's defense establishment, the new Army chief, Mirza Aslam Beg, allowed the political forces to compete for 1988 general election. However, the election was rigged with the help of ISI (Haqqani 2005:201). Despite this, with a slim majority Peoples Party's Benazir Bhutto (landed-feudal) became prime minister. Nonetheless, after two years her government was dismissed on the basis of corruption etc., charges by an other component of praetorian oligarchy- civil bureaucracy (Rizvi 2000:327).

This process of arbitrary dismissal through 58 (B) 2 by bureaucrat-feudal presidents under military's auspices continued till 1997-98 when the then prime minister Nawaz Sharif (industrialist) repealed this clause (Shafqat 1997:225-233). It took authority away from overdeveloped civil-military bureaucracy.

In addition, Nawaz Sharif, in order to maximise his political power, got attacked the supreme court of Pakistan. He also played with the Islamisation rhetoric which Vali Nasr (2005) has termed as 'Muslim democracy'. Besides, Sharif attempted to reduce military led Foundations' economic role (Cohen 2004:251). In other words, Sharif was becoming authoritarian like Bhutto.

### **3.5 The praetorian oligarchy prevails**

Sharif attempted to normalise Pakistan relations with India in order to maximise his personal powers. In this respect, he invited Indian prime minister Vajpayee to Pakistan in February 1999. The mastermind of military saw through Sharif's intentions. Therefore, the entire peace process was jeopardised when Pakistan's military planned and fought another war against India in Kargil (Kashmir) just a few months after Vajpayee's historic visit (Chadda 2000:211).

After having bore heavy losses the military asked Sharif to arrange a face saving. Washington arranged one due to fear of nuclear escalation. But the onus of defeat was laid on Sharif's shoulders. The military, it is argued, had achieved its non-military target: Sharif got discredited nationally.

Thus, it was in this context that the military led by general Pervez Musharraf took country's control after having deposed and later exiled Sharif and his family in October 1999 (The News 13/10/99). The lack of agitational politics marked the weakness of political organisations in particular and the civil society in general. The coup's cause was military's economic interests as I would explain later.

History repeated itself in the post-coup period in terms of military's politics: Musharraf got declared himself president through referendum; the Clinton administration criticised the military

rule; the Supreme Court once again activated the ‘necessity doctrine’ and juridically provided relief to the soldier-president; once again the US-led war in Afghanistan in the wake of 9/11 strengthened the men in uniform; an other king’s party, Muslim league (Quaid-i-Azam), was created by the intelligence agencies ( Haqqani 2005:259).

In addition, ‘armored democracy’ was imposed on the country in an election ceremony held in October 2002 in which the King’s party formed government in alliance with MMA (an alliance of six religious parties) under military’s auspices (Shah 2003). This electoral exercise brought the landed-feudal and ex-military men (praetorian oligarchy) into parliament. Two-thirds in the present parliament are landed-feudals. Among the 33% reserved women seats, one-third are occupied by blood-relatives of landed-feudals (PILDAT 2003).

The MMA, as auxiliary to the praetorian oligarchy, supported the military led 18th amendment to 1973 constitution in the hang parliament. Thus, the military- hated 58 (B) 2 clause was reincorporated in the 1973 constitution. This reinstitutionalised military rule in the country.

Regionally, the Musharraf regime tried to normalise ties with India. Ironically, the soldier-president himself visited India in 2002. It exposed the military’s claim that India is a chronic enemy.

Socially, the rural-urban poor suffer much; overall 32.1 % were living below the poverty line in 2001. In addition, poverty increased from 30.6 % in 1998-99 to 32.1% in 2001 (Planning Commission 2005:55).

Politically, there is no organisation which could articulate their interests. The mainstream political parties did not form the military led government. In addition, the mainstream exiled leadership, Sharif and Benazir, are not allowed to visit Pakistan. Besides, political dissidents are harassed and arrested. For Instance, Javed Hashami, a former parliamentarian, is a political prisoner who the military thinks has attempted to defame the armed forces. Hashami denies the charges in his book written behind the bars (Hashami 2005:150-250). Not only this, the military intelligences agencies were even busy to harass and factionalis even the ruling party (The Friday Times 18/11/05).

Economically, the defense expenditure is almost 75% of the total budget. In this respect, Musharraf's regime finalised with Sweden the purchase of six Saab 2000 surveillance aircraft fitted with Erickson Erieye radar. The deal is worth 8.3 bn. SEK. It was negotiated a few days after the October 8 earthquake which explains how serious the regime is about the poor (The Nation 01/11/05).

Above all, the systemic allocation of land to military personnel could be viewed from table 2 below. This land may be sold/ bought in the market at higher prices. For instance, general Pervez Musharraf bought farmland worth Rs 40 million in Islamabad. The total estimated worth of Musharraf's disclosed land assets is around Rs 500 million.

**Table 1**

<b>Land Entitlement for Military Personnel</b>	
<b>Rank</b>	<b>Acreage</b>
Maj. General and above	240 acres
Brigadiers and Colonels	150 acres
Lt. Colonels	124 acres
Lieutenants to Majors	100 acres
JCOs	64 acres
NCOs	32 acres
<i>Source: Ayesha Siddiqi (forthcoming)</i>	

The present regime is more belligerent in terms of coercion to achieve economic targets. The mode of association with the civil society is through (physical) violence. The military literally raided and beat the poor peasants in Okara where the military forcibly grabbed 17000 acres of land in 2003 (Dawn 25/05/2003; Cohen 2004:262; Siddiqi, forthcoming).

During 1965-2004 (see table 2 on next page), the military personnel amassed more than 2.7 million acres of agriculture land worth Rs 675.92 billion.

**Table 2**

<b>Land Allotment to Military Personnel, 1965-2004</b>		
<b>District</b>	<b>Province</b>	<b>Acreage</b>
DI Khan	NWFP	185000
Muzaffargarh	Punjab	173000.7
DG Khan	Punjab	153000.5
Rajanpur	Punjab	133000.3
Vehari	Punjab	170987
Pakpattan	Punjab	193676
Multan	Punjab	123793
Khanewal	Punjab	143283
Sahiwal	Punjab	173407
Lahore	Punjab	273413
Kasur	Punjab	387283
Sheikhupura	Punjab	193863
<b>Sub-Total</b>		<b>2303706.5</b>
Sindh		400000
<b>Total</b>		<b>2703706.5</b>

**Source:** Ayesha Siddiqi (forthcoming)

Likewise, the current military operation against the nationalist Baloch in Balochistan can be explained in this context. The military led government started Development Projects in Gwadar which favoured Punjabis including military (70% Punjabis). The Baloch resented it militarily and the conflict continues (The Friday Times 29/10/2004).

Thus, it is argued that the apparent goal of October coup was to reinsitutionalise the military rule and make the politicians and the civil society know that military is a powerful political force in Pakistan. However, the underlying objective of the coup was to gain political power to pursue economic interests authoritatively.

## CONCLUSION

This thesis attempted to explain why the military is a powerful political institution/force in Pakistan from historical-structural perspective. In this respect, I explored the hypothesis with respect to the colonial authority structure and partition oriented structural dynamics. My analysis included military in the colonial authority structure. The colonial military along with the civil bureaucracy and the landed-feudal class formed praetorian oligarchy to pursue their politico-economic interests in British India. In addition, I analysed that the partition oriented structural dynamics in terms of territory (Kashmir) and population (Indian refugees) affected politics and the military in Pakistan. Thus, it is argued that the hypothesis holds and I have theoretically operationalised the hypothesis in terms of pre-partition ‘praetorian oligarchy’ to explain my research problem.

The post-colonial state of Pakistan inherited the pre-partition praetorian oligarchy based on Punjab. The civil-military bureaucracy structurally emerged as ‘overdeveloped’ institution which in alliance with landed-feudals projected and institutionalised ‘Hindu India’ to pursue politico-economic interests. The military being part of the praetorian oligarchy planned and fought war against India over Kashmir in 1947-48. This exercise helped the oligarchy to rule authoritatively in the 1950s. The civil bureaucracy led the praetorian oligarchy in this period.

However from 1958 onward, the military has, from within the praetorian oligarchy, emerged as a powerful political actor due to its coercive power. It has become leader of the oligarchy. Though in the 1970s it disengaged from politics due to its defeat in 1971 war and country’s disintegration yet it regained its prestigious position in 1977. It ruled belligerently in the 1980s. However, it again disengaged from politics in the 1990s due to changed geo-strategic environment. But the real power remained with the men in uniform in terms of 58 (B) 2 during this period.

The bureaucrat-feudal presidents, a part of praetorian oligarchy, dismissed the so called democratic governments formed by landed-feudals. In other words, the praetorian oligarchy politically remained dominant. In October 1999, the military overtly intervened to exile an authoritative

civilian who attempted to curtail military's politico-economic activities. Since then the military led praetorian oligarchy rules the country. The clergy is auxiliary to this praetorian oligarchic rule.

As the study explained, all the coups were primarily economic in nature. The military sought political power to act as an independent economic actor. It allocated land among its personnel to expand the institution socio-economically. The other components of the praetorian oligarchy ally with the military to pursue their politico-economic interests. Thus, the political power lies with the Punjab based praetorian oligarchy from 1947 partition till present. This power was exercised on none other but the urban-rural poor. In the absence of any (lower) middle class leadership and political organisation, they suffer and die in despair.

Finally, it is argued that the theoretical framework in term of praetorian oligarchy is useful to explain politics and the military in Pakistan. In addition, this thesis has developed theoretical concepts such as Punjab based praetorian oligarchy, overdeveloped civil-military bureaucracy, politics of appeasement and military as pre-partition phenomenon. They may be useful for the future researchers. Besides, the present study would be further elaborated at doctoral level in future.

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