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**Insider? Outsider?
The Identity of Taiwanese
in Shanghai**

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Abstract

The aim of this thesis is to discuss the construction of Taiwanese identity in Shanghai and compare with the studies on identity formation in Taiwan itself. The thesis is divided into three parts: cultural identity, ethnic identity and political identity. A total of 10 male and female students from Taiwan who had resided a year and above and enrolled in higher education in Shanghai were interviewed. They were asked to explain the reasons for studying in mainland albeit the accreditation policy on academic background acquired in mainland hasn't been put into practice thus far. They were also asked to express their cognitions in response to cultural, ethnic and political identity. Their responses were interpreted within the context of the historical formation of Taiwan as well as the summary results of identity-related studies in former days. The results show that Taiwanese and Chinese identities were mutually compatible in cultural domains and help to dispel myths about the Taiwanese identity has been shifted, localized and substituent consonant with different demographic groups, the passage of time and education in mainland whereas their advocacies of different parties in political spectrum are reconstructed to the middle-of-the-road in light of staying in Shanghai. The results also help to illuminate the differences between Taiwanese identity and national identity. Ultimately, more pluralistic, flexible, and pragmatic criterion of Taiwanese identity in response to the peaceful milieu, business climate, and sustainability of offspring are manifested.

Key words: Taiwan, China, Shanghai, sovereignty, identity, cross-Strait relations

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1. Introduction

What do Taiwanese students think of their Taiwanese identity after studying in mainland over a year and what explains their attitudes and behaviour toward culture, ethnicity, and views on the complicated cross-Strait relations? This article discusses results from interviews with Taiwanese students residing and studying in Shanghai and tries to offer the cross-Strait authorities options whether they are seeking reunification or independence *in futuro*. Informants were asked to express their views comparing life, culture, and governments in Shanghai (or mainland) and Taiwan and reasons for their self-identity. All the interviews were conducted in Mandarin Chinese by the principal investigator and translated into English for analysis and interpretation. In order to help interpret the micro-level findings concerning the experiences of contemporary Taiwanese students' identities, it is significant to comprehend a macro-level concept of the historical formation of the emergence of Taiwanese identity during the past five decades on Taiwan and the current condition of cross-Strait relations.

2. Theoretical Concerns and Methodology

2.1 *The Origins of Informants' Sample*

The informants for my study were selected on the criteria that they were Taiwanese who have resided in Shanghai a year and above and enrolled in higher education in mainland. Semi-structured interviews have been held with a number of respondents and informants. The interviews took place from September 2005 to October 2005. The informants were contacted at Fudan and Tongji universities in Shanghai through the Taiwanese Student Union webpage (TWSU) and through the introduction of other informants¹. However, the introduction from the informants was controlled so that not more than one person was introduced by another informant, which means the probability sampling was used in the interviews in order to achieving objective interviews. Thus, I believe that selection bias won't be a factor to affect the reliability and accuracy of the thesis.

2.2 *The Form of Interview*

To provide in-depth information on why informants' think as they do and in a language that is native to both researcher and the informants, the interviews were conducted in Mandarin Chinese with ten informants. Except one informant who was interviewed by telephone and one that was interviewed on the internet, the rest of informants were interviewed face to face. The form of interviews was based on their inclinations. Interviews were conducted at a quiet coffee shop or tea house close to the

¹ Taiwanese Student Union (TWSU)
<http://www.twsu.org/modules/ipboard/index.php?showtopic=11495> ;
<http://www.twsu.org/modules/ipboard/index.php?showtopic=11496>

informants. For those informants who had an interest to have face-to-face interviews, each of them was offered a free drink and snacks for his/her cooperation. The general topic areas of life in Shanghai, culture identity, ethnic identity, Party leaning and the attitude toward cross-Strait governments were the same in the face-to-face, internet, or telephone interviews. However, the semi-structured, open-ended questions permit the researcher to probe why people hold certain opinions and concepts. Each session basically lasted for 50 minutes, but some sessions lasted for as long as 70 minutes. These interviews were recorded on tape by first asking for the informants' approval. Because of the technical restriction, however, the interviews conducted by telephone and internet were exceptions. The transcription and translation into English were carried out by researcher who is native speaker of Mandarin Chinese and has English as a minor at the undergraduate level.

2.3 *The figuration of Taiwanese in Shanghai*

After the KMT's (*Kuomintang*) ban on home visits was lifted in 1987, the cross-Strait contacts have dramatically improved. According to statistic from Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council in mainland, the number of Taiwanese arrived in mainland has reached the peak of 4,109,188 person time in 2005 and totally reached 37,994,440 person time after 1987. Similarly, the number of mainland citizen arrived in Taiwan has gradually increased every year.²

The number of Taiwanese students enrolling in mainland is still unknown of Taiwan official resource in virtue of academic background acquired in mainland hasn't been accredited by Taiwanese authorities. However, according to the statistics in mainland, the numbers of Taiwanese students enrolling at undergraduate level were 2,895 persons and at postgraduate level were 864 persons from 1985 to 2000; and 2,875 persons at undergraduate level and 2,766 persons at postgraduate level from 2001 to 2004. The number has peaked at 1,777 persons in 2004.³ It is foreseeable that the number would progressively increase in the future due to the lure of highly economic growth, extensively job market and several incentive policies, *e.g.* Taiwanese student scholarship, the fee of Taiwanese student is on a par with mainland student and the subsidy for universities and research institutes to recruit Taiwanese students etc., have come into force.⁴ Except the lure in economic factor, the common ancestry and language have fewer barriers for studying in mainland. Further, the quality and reputation of Taiwanese universities have generally gone down after the expansion of higher education in Taiwan. Therefore, historical universities in mainland hold a

² Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council <http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/jlwl/rywl1.htm> (in Chinese)

³ Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/xwfbh/xwfbh0.asp?xwfbh_m_id=53 (in Chinese)

⁴ "Taiwanese Students Scholarship" has been established in 2005 and the total is 7 million RMB to benefit about 20 percent of Taiwanese student studying in mainland currently. Not only the tuition fee but also the rent Taiwanese student is on a par with mainland student. It also forbids charging any other fee to Taiwanese student. Further, the subsidy for recruiting Taiwanese student is 8,000 RMB person/year. See more at Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/xwfbh/xwfbh0.asp?xwfbh_m_id=53 (in Chinese)

exceedingly special attraction for Taiwanese students. In addition, the tuition fees and living expenses relatively are cheaper than studying in Taiwan or other western countries.⁵

Basically, Taiwanese students have showed special favor to different subjects of studying in mainland by different periods. On the other hand, it has also reflected the connection between academic degree acquired in mainland and the job market of cross-Strait and an epitome of Taiwanese business in mainland in recent years. As a result of orthodox values in profession and the competitive nature of medicine in Taiwan, the monism of Chinese medicine and modern medicine is majority of Taiwanese student's choice before 2000. Later, several professional subjects e.g. lawyer, accountant, and architect are the mainstream of Taiwanese students studying in Shanghai from 2000 to 2003.⁶ Apparently, Taiwanese students who have professional degrees above would employ in mainland or worldwide after graduating since academic background acquired in mainland hasn't been accredited in Taiwan. However, the "mainland-knowing" professions above are highly preferred after several Taiwanese enterprises set up in mainland and undeniably, this has excited and influenced the subjects of Taiwanese student. Likewise, according to the recent investigation, finance, marketing and insurance have become new loves among Taiwanese student and this phenomenon has reflected not only the diversification of studying in mainland but also the ongoing trade between cross-Strait.⁷

It is coherent with the academic background acquired in mainland hasn't been accredited by Taiwanese authorities thus far, more and more young Taiwanese male stay on in mainland could be perceived as a way to avoid military service in Taiwan as long as possible. Thus far, Taiwanese still need to apply for "Taiwan Resident Certificate" (*Taibouzheng*) by producing valid Taiwan identification card to be in and out mainland. Taiwan Passport is considered as a "forgery" (*weizao*) of the Chinese passport and "invalidity" (*wuxiao*) in mainland.

2.4 Data of Informants

A sketch of the informants is listed in Table 1 below. It includes seven males and three females. According to the early years of the KMT government of Taiwan, a person's ethnic identity was officially decided by one's father lineage. For this reason, five informants are from Mainlander Taiwanese, four from *Minnan* family and one from *Hakka* family. Their ages range from twenty-one to thirty-six. Three are PhD, two are postgraduate, and five are undergraduate students. The average year of living in Shanghai is four years. In terms of academic background, one has the junior and senior high school degrees of academic background acquired in mainland, except one

⁵ National Policy Foundation <http://www.npf.org.tw/PUBLICATION/EC/094/EC-R-094-010.htm> (in Chinese)

⁶ Taiwan University <http://news.lib.ntu.edu.tw/?p=2767> (in Chinese)

⁷ Taiwan University <http://news.lib.ntu.edu.tw/?p=2767> (in Chinese)

has the postgraduate degree of academic background acquired in the USA, the rest of them have the senior high school, undergraduate, or postgraduate degree of academic background acquired in Taiwan. In terms of marital status and family, two have mainland wives.⁸ Their wives and kids are living in Shanghai as well. The others are still singles; however, two have their whole families living and doing business in Shanghai, which means that they don't have any families in Taiwan at present. There is one informant who has dual nationalities, Taiwanese and Canadian, but was educated and grew up on Taiwan and has no affinity with Canada except through being a Canadian passport holder.⁹

Table 2 Informants List

Case	Gender	Year of Birth	Education	Year to Mainland	Family Background (Father/Mother)
N1	Male	1973	PhD	2000	Mainlander Taiwanese; <i>Minnan</i>
N2	Male	1969	Postgraduate	2003	Mainlander Taiwanese; <i>Minnan</i>
N3	Male	1973	PhD	2002	<i>Hakka</i> ; <i>Hakka</i>
N4	Female	1984	Undergraduate	2001	Mainlander Taiwanese; <i>Hakka</i>
N5	Male	1970	PhD	2002	<i>Minnan</i> ; <i>Hakka</i>
N6	Male	1972	Undergraduate	1996	Mainlander Taiwanese; <i>Minnan</i>
N7	Male	1982	Postgraduate	1997	<i>Minnan</i> ; <i>Minnan</i>
N8	Female	1984	Undergraduate	2002	<i>Minnan</i> ; <i>Minnan</i>
N9	Male	1984	Undergraduate	2003	Mainlander Taiwanese; Mainlander Taiwanese
N10	Female	1982	Undergraduate	2004	<i>Minnan</i> ; <i>Minnan</i>

Note: N9 informant has dual nationalities, Taiwan and Canada

2.5 The Interaction of Qualitative and Quantitative approaches

As a result of the fact that some parts of the research touched upon sensitive political issues, some informants refused to accept the face-to-face interview and be recorded during the interviews. In general, the researcher's Taiwanese background was certainly a benefit to approach the informants. Basically, the informants were accommodating to the researcher because of the similar student identification. Further, some of the interviews were liaised by the informants' own accord. According to

⁸ Interview No.5 and No.6


⁹ Interview No.9

some informant’s experience before that the oppression and pressure for informants expressing their opinions about political issues did not only come from one unitary government, but meted out from the binary governments of cross-Strait. In order to mitigating the anxiety of informants, the interviews were tapped from some accessible topics, such us the informants’ lives in Shanghai etc. Thus, it didn’t bring about the psychology of the self-defense and affect the accuracy of the research in spite of some parts of research touched upon political issues. However, it is inevitable that the hard quantified facts may appear more trustworthy than qualitative descriptions and interpretations. It also runs the risk of returning only a limited number of respondents’ interpretations. Therefore, it is significant to supplement the information from the interviews with quantitative methods to obtain more nuanced data. Furthermore, in the practice of social research, qualitative and quantitative approaches interact.¹⁰ In order to form the thesis more complete, I also tried to make some use of some statistics and empirical data published by other scholars and government bodies to corroborate my own findings in the thesis.

3. Research Questions and Hypotheses

The thesis focuses on the identity of Taiwanese students to verify if the identity shifted by the process of being educated and living on the mainland. On the other hand, it also tries to investigate the scale of “localization” of their existence in Shanghai. Further, the connection of Primordial Ties Hypothesis, which is the provincialism and identity, will be discussed in the thesis. The thesis can be tabulated below:

Figure 1 The Frame of thesis



When whole families immigrate to Shanghai, having the estate, or the core of the life in Shanghai, where is their “home”? The core of the thesis is the question of identity.

¹⁰ Steinar Kvale (1996) *Interviews*, London: Sage. 66-70

The direction of writing is influenced by the questions below:

- (1) Does the dual recognition occur on the interviewee? Is it an impermanent phenomenon or finally will it turn to unitary recognition?
- (2) Do they localize and integrate to the life in Shanghai? Why they feel like that they are insider or outsider? How's the progress and background?
- (3) What's connection between their new identity and ethnic background? Have there been any shifts in the Taiwanese party affiliations and sympathies?

The thesis will discuss two hypotheses below:

- (1) Primordial Ties Hypothesis¹¹: *Minnan*, *Hakka*, Mainlander Taiwanese and Aborigines, these four groups are the main residents on Taiwan in the 90's in demographics.¹² The different groups have different attitudes toward Taiwanese identity and national identity resulted from historical background. People feel more intimate with those with whom they feel share a common culture and lineage.¹³ However, the ethnic identification depends not only on a common language, history and culture, but also on the psychological feelings of closeness and belonging.¹⁴ Therefore, Mainlander Taiwanese will easier accept the "Chinese identity" than *Minna* and *Hakka* who migrated from mainland to Taiwan since 400 years ago for both historical reasons and as a result of lineage nepotism. As soon as going to mainland, their Taiwanese identity will be superseded by their Chinese identity.
- (2) Acquired Reconstruction Hypothesis: The reason why the accreditation policy of academic background acquired in mainland is still being delayed is that Taiwanese authorities not only worry that once mainland degrees are accepted, many Taiwanese universities will have to close their doors and many teachers will lose their jobs, but also and most significant, they worry about the loyalty of Taiwanese students in mainland. Their "impure" educational background might affect the national security if they would serve as officials.¹⁵ Like most of the advocators of Taiwan independence, Taiwanese authorities argued that Taiwanese students studying in mainland will become guinea pigs in mainland's "united front laboratory" and be "brainwashed" to push for unification on the cross-Strait issue.¹⁶

¹¹ National Policy Foundation <http://www.npf.org.tw/PUBLICATION/IA/091/IA-R-091-061.htm> (in Chinese)

¹² Comparing with four groups in 90s, the fifth group in demographics, foreign immigrant, emerged on Taiwan. See more at Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan, R.O.C. <http://www.dgbas.gov.tw/public/Data/533116342171.pdf> (in Chinese)

¹³ M.K. Wang (1997) *The Borderline of General China: Historical Memory And Ethnic Identity*, Taipei: YuenChen press (in Chinese)

¹⁴ Mei-chih Li (2003) "Bias of Ethnic Identification in Taiwan", *Asian Journal Of Social Psychology*, 6:3, 229-237

¹⁵ National Policy Foundation <http://www.npf.org.tw/Symposium/s90/900302-EC.htm> (in Chinese)

¹⁶ Taipei Times <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2005/09/04/2003270350>

Is Taiwanese identity related to ethnic background, which means Mainlander Taiwanese identity is prone to “Chinese” rather than “Taiwanese” because of the lineage nepotism? Or is, On the other hand, the identity of Taiwanese students in mainland weaker as time goes on? These two hypotheses are the main cores to be pursued by way of conducting the interview among Taiwanese students in Shanghai. In addition, they will be discussed in the thesis as well.

4. The Formation of Taiwanese identity: A Brief Historical Review

4.1 Earliest Inhabitants

The political identity has always been tied with cultural identity in Chinese history and society.¹⁷ It also indicates that the term “China” (*zhongguo*) is more nationalistic than cultural in meaning. There is still a political debate for the dates of the earliest Chinese travel and migrate to Taiwan. However, it is proved that some twenty-five thousand Chinese had come to the Dutch colony to grow and sell rice, vegetables, sugarcane, and indigo, as well as fish and hunt, during the three years that Chinese law allowed them to reside abroad by 1650. While Chinese migrated to Taiwan, the original aborigines moved into the central mountainous areas. Later Zheng Chenggong (*Guoxing*) defeated the Dutch and sought to make the island the base of his movement to overthrow the newly founded Qing dynasty in the name of restoring the vanquished Ming. Zheng Chenggong, a son of Chinese pirate and a Japanese mother had implemented diverse modern political policies on Taiwan and ironically against China’s ruling Qing. Zheng’s anti-Qing efforts also became an important symbol for a later regime in exile, the Chinese Nationalists. For him, Taiwan was a homeland more than a temporary refuge. The independence activists, on the other hand, signify Zheng Chenggong as an evidence of Taiwan nationalism hundreds of years ago.¹⁸ Zheng Jing, the son of Zheng Chenggong, had hoped to negotiate independence from the Qing, promising to remain a loyal tributary state like Korea, However, it was rejected by the Kangxi emperor in the name of no ethnic Chinese state could exist separately form the dynasty. Taiwan was attacked by Qing naval commander Shi Lang in 1683. Shi Lang attempted to sell the island back to the Dutch, and other high Qing officials planned to abandon and evacuate it altogether.¹⁹ But for the reasons of the very practical wish to keep the island out of the hands of foreigners, Taiwan was integrated into the empire in 1684 as an “agricultural colony” of Fujian Province.²⁰ During this period, Han from mainland undoubtedly viewed themselves

¹⁷ Meihui Liu, Li-Ching Hung (2002) “Identity issues in Taiwan’s history curriculum”, *International Journal of Educational Research*, 37:6-7, 567-586

¹⁸ Steven Phillips (2005) “Building A Taiwanese Republic.”, in Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, ed.,: *Dangerous Strait*. NY: Columbia University Press.46

¹⁹ Wills John E., Jr. (1999) “The seventeenth-century transformation: Taiwan under the Dutch and the Cheng regime.” in Murraray A. Rubinstein, ed.,: *Taiwan: A New History*. NY: M.E.Sharpe.102

²⁰ Andrew D. Morris (2004) “Taiwan’s History: An Introduction” in David K. Jordan, Andrew D. Morris, and Marc L. Moskowitz ed.,: *The Minor Arts of Daily Life: Popular Culture in Taiwan*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. 10

different from Aborigines and Dutch; however, the common economic interests were more significant than ethnic identity. Feuding based on ethnicity, lineage, and place of origin bursted frequently in Taiwan, thus, showing no signs of ethnic solidarity. In another word, people in Taiwan didn't consider themselves as a unified group.²¹

4.2 From Japanese Colony to "Motherland": 1895-1949

When the first Sino-Japanese war happened, Japanese naval force defeated China, the ailing Qing Dynasty ceded Taiwan to Japan in the 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki. However, the various Han groups in Taiwan formed a short-lived "Republic of Taiwan" to resist Japanese occupation of the island. Thus, the first Taiwanese identity was related to national one but unsuccessful formation.²² The fifty years under Japanese ruling, Japanese colonial rule brought economic modernization and stability to Taiwan. However, Taiwanese also paid the price of institutionalized discrimination and a brutal police state which means that they could be only second-class imperial subjects under Japanese colonial rule. Further, some Taiwanese experienced the transition called their island "Asia's Orphan" (*Yaxiya de guer*), a place cast off by China and accorded second class status by Japan during the final year of Japanese colonial rule. America's entrance into the second Sino-Japanese conflict raised Chinese hopes of recovering the island. Following an agreement made at the Cairo Conference in 1943, Taiwan was given to Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist (Kuomintang, KMT) government upon Japanese surrender in 1945. Dora Shu-fang Dien in her article describes the complicated and contradictory feeling in her mind after the transition from being "Japanese" to becoming "Chinese" at that historical moment:

*"This sudden and total shift in my cultural identity involved a shift of perspectives. Before then, we were chanting derogatory songs about the Chinese, our enemy, such as 'The Chinese have long legs; they don't know how to fight'. All of a sudden, we became the long-legged awkward Chinese, but we were the victors. I was then 8 years old, nearing 9, presumably at Piaget's concrete operational stage of cognitive development. We had no difficulty seeing ourselves as more graceful than the 'dwarf' Japanese (as they were referred to by our new teacher). This was not necessarily true for those who had had a few more years of schooling, especially for those who had gone through high school under the Japanese system. They had varying degrees of difficulty with the changeover, depending upon their familial background and individual capacity for adjustment. The negative experiences with the mainland Chinese further intensified their ambivalence."*²³

The Nationalist government (KMT), however, had disappointed most Taiwanese

²¹ Chang Mao-kuei (2000) "On the Origins and Transformation of Taiwanese National Identity", *China Perspectives*, 28:53-54

²² Ka Chih-ming (1995) *Japanese Colonialism in Taiwan: Land Tenure, Development, and Dependency, 1895-1945*. Boulder: Westview Press

²³ Dora Shu-fang Dien (2000) "The Evolving Nature of Self-Identity across Four Levels of History", *Human Development*, 43:1, 1-18

expectations. Peng Ming-min, an enthusiastic advocate of Taiwanese independence and a candidate of president election in 1996 described his memory of the first impression of the “victor” of the Nationalist troops from China:

“The ship docked, the gangways were lowered, and off came the troops of China, the victors. The first man to appear was a bedraggled fellow who looked and behaved more like a coolie than a soldier, walking off with a carrying pole across his shoulder, from which was suspended his umbrella, sleeping mat, cooking pot, and cup. Others like him followed, some with shoes, some without. Few had guns. With no attempt to maintain order or discipline, they pushed off the ship, glad to be on firm land, but hesitant to face the Japanese lined up and saluting smartly on both sides. My father wondered what the Japanese could think. He had never felt so ashamed in his life. Using a Japanese expression, he said, ‘If there had been a hole nearby, I would have crawled in!’”²⁴

Not only the carriage of troops disappointed Taiwanese at that moment, further, some people criticized blisteringly that the first batch of officials sent to Taiwan by the Nationalist government of Chiang Kai-shek in the fall of 1945 and early 1946 were looters and exploiters who tried to enrich themselves and before returning to their mainland home.²⁵ Due to the turmoil of the Taiwanese society, the Nationalist government adopted joint party-government-military administration which enjoying a very broad mixture of civilian and military powers shockingly reminiscent of early Japanese governors.²⁶ Comparing with the period of Japanese colony, Taiwan has been transformed into a relatively stable, peaceful and prosperous land, but the Taiwanese society at the beginning of Nationalist government was chaos. The island’s economy progressively deteriorated due to mismanagement, corruption, and the heavy drain of resources siphoned into the war effort on the mainland. Taiwanese people didn’t enjoy the achievements what they’ve contributed either during Japanese colony or the New Nationalist government. In some statistics, around 17 percent of Taiwan’s gross domestic product (GDP) was nationalized and disposed of and it is estimated that as many as 36,000 Taiwanese were forced out of public sector jobs.²⁷ Mandarin Chinese, which few Taiwanese spoke, was eventually imposed as a “national language (*guoyu*)” to replace Japanese. Further, Chen Yi’s brief administrative tenure on Taiwan from October 1945 to April 1947 filled most significant administrative posts, such as the police force and nationalized the largest industries previously owned by the Japanese. These activities has resulted in a debate that the KMT was another

²⁴ Peng, Mingmin (1972) *A Taste of Freedom: Memoirs of a Formosan Independence Leader*. NY: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. 51-52

²⁵ Dora Shu-fang Dien (2000) “The Evolving Nature of Self-Identity across Four Levels of History”, *Human Development*, 43:1, 1-18

²⁶ Steven Phillips (1999) “Between assimilation and independence: Taiwanese political aspirations under Nationalist Chinese rule, 1945-1948.” in Murraray A. Rubinstein, ed.; *Taiwan: A New History*. NY: M.E.Sharpe. 282

²⁷ Lai Tse-han, Ramon H. Myers, Wei Wou (1991), *A Tragic Beginning: The Taiwan Uprising of February 28, 1947*, Stanford: Stanford University Press. 170

“colonial” regime: recolonization rather than decolonization.²⁸

4.3 *The Ethnic Laceration: February 28 Incident in 1947*

On the evening of February 27, 1947, several KMT agents beat a forty-year-old widow for the offense of selling black market cigarettes in Taipei. When the tidings of incident was spread, the oppressive Taiwanese anger at the Nationalist regime poured out in forms organizing protests to level at the KMT officials and soldiers. Protesters removed the term “China” from the official and commercial signs, and roared slogans in Taiwanese language such as “Beat Mainlanders!” “Kill the Mainlander pigs!” “Let Taiwan rule itself!” and so on.²⁹ Chen Yi declared martial law on national radio and denied that any deaths had occurred. Later, the authorities were conscious of the severity of circumstances establishing the Resolution Committee and promised that the central government would not dispatch troops to Taiwan. However, it was a lie. The troops were transferred from mainland to Taiwan and started to arrest the opponents. Thousands of Taiwanese elites such as professors, lawyers, professionals, doctors, college and even high schools students and teachers were systematically arrested and executed in cold blood. The bloody chaos ended by the intervention of the KMT army arrived Taiwan. The KMT investigation, however, interpreted the Incident as the struggle against Japanese aggression, and the civil war against Chinese Communist Party (CCP):

Background cases: The Taiwanese people have received a sordid, evil education from the Japanese, and had been misled by depraved propagandists.

Proximate causes: The CCP and mad ambitious leaders had used the case of an arrested smuggler to launch their uprising.³⁰

After the initial investigation, martial law was lifted briefly. Later, Chiang Kai-shek himself “fled” or “retreated” to Taiwan together with his governmental officials and his remaining troops after the Nationalist was defeated by CCP in Chinese civil war in 1949. Chiang then set upon the task of rebuilding his party and transforming Taiwan into an anticommunist bastion capable of recovering the mainland. The martial law was reimposed on May 20, 1949 in anticipation of the mass exodus to Taiwan of the Nationalist administrative and military apparatus in August. Due to the official state of “civil war” continued, martial law was in force until 1987. During these long decades, public discussion of the February 28 Incident was outlawed and Taiwanese had to have “the obligation to forget.” Thus, the February 28 Incident disappeared, becoming

²⁸ Robert Edmondson (2002) “The February 28 Incident And National Identity.” in Stephane Corcuff, ed.; *Memories of the Future*. NY: M.E. Sharpe. 27

²⁹ Andrew D. Morris (2004) “Taiwan’s History: An Introduction” in David K. Jordan, Andrew D. Morris, and Marc L. Moskowitz ed.; *The Minor Arts of Daily Life: Popular Culture in Taiwan*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. 21

³⁰ Lai Tse-han, Ramon H. Myers, Wei Wou (1991) *A Tragic Beginning: The Taiwan Uprising of February 28, 1947*, Stanford: Stanford University Press. 5

a lost footnote of “Chinese” history.

4.4 Repressive Era-Double Chiang Period: 1949-1987

Under the Nationalist declared martial law (1947-87) for “security” reasons, Taiwanese identity became a “regional” identity. Contrasting the terms “*Taiwan ren*” or “*Bengshengren*” (Taiwanese) whose ancestors came to Taiwan before 1895 both *Minnan* and *Hakka* included, the term “*Waishengren*” (Mainlander Taiwanese) referred to people came to Taiwan with the Nationalists between 1945 and 1949 and their children and grandchildren born and raised in Taiwan.

The 1950s and 1960s can be described as a period of “White Terror.” Dozens of Taiwanese and Mainlander Taiwanese were arrested by the KMT in the name of eliminating the CCP. After Chiang died in 1975, his son, Chiang Ching-kuo assumed the presidency of Taiwan. Taiwanese official histories present Chiang Ching-kuo as a reformer responsible for beginning the period of the “Taiwanization” of the KMT and the creation of a Taiwanese identity. On the other hand, it is also a debate on the evaluation of him. In 1979, a group of political opponent of KMT (*dangwai*) had created the magazine *Meilidao* (Formosa) that gathered the dissenting views of *dangwai* and this is also the forerunner of Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) later in the late 1980’s. The *Meilidao* magazine and Taiwan Human Right Committee applied for an outdoor assembly in the name of International Human Right Day but denied by the KMT officials. Further, the KMT used the coercive power to arrest opponents at the “illegal” demonstrations in Kaohsiung. Ironically, the collapsing Kaohsiung Incident (*Meilidao* Incident) and February 28 Incident were interpreted as a single economy of meaning for the Taiwanese people not by the opposition but by the machinations of the KMT security forces.³¹ However, Chiang, Ching-guo lifted martial law on Taiwan in 1987.

4.5 The Transition of National Identity under Lee Teng-hui: 1988-2000

The membership of the KMT was still predominantly composed of mainlanders, Lee Teng-hui’s statements in the first two years of his presidency were consistent with the past ROC position which was “one China” policy, that is, China must be reunified.³² In his inauguration in May 1990, he asserted that Taiwan and the mainland are indivisible parts of China, and that all “Chinese” were compatriots of the same flesh and blood who should together seek peaceful and democratic means to achieve the common goal of national unification. However, the premise should hinge on Beijing renouncing the use of arms and desist from blockading Taiwan internationally.³³

³¹ Robert Edmondson (2002) “The February 28 Incident And National Identity.” in Stephane Corcuff, ed., *Memories of the Future*. NY: M.E. Sharpe.32-33

³² Lee Teng-hui (1989) “International Press Conference.” in *Accepting the challenge, creating victory: Collected speeches of President Lee Teng-hui, January-December 1989*. Taipei: Zongyang wenwu gongyingshe. 129-153

³³ Lee Teng-hui (1992) “Termination of the Period of National Mobilization for the Suppression of

Lee's position began to shift during 1993. Because of the DDP won 36 percent of the vote of the election for the Legislative Yuan in 1992, Lee decided to co-opt the opposition's issues such as international space in order to blunt its momentum.³⁴ He regarded that two sides of cross-Strait as real, equal political entities and described the KMT as a foreign (*wailai*) regime. If Beijing still believe as before that they should rule the people on Taiwan, it will certainly result in events like the February 28 incident.³⁵ Beijing and some dissenters *prima facie* argued that Lee raised again the matter of Taiwan's distinctive identity. However, it is also a debate that Lee as Moses was leading Taiwanese out of a repressive past, not out of China.³⁶ Undeniably, what we can be sure that after Lee was retired, *ipso facto*, he is the spiritual leader of Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) which the party programme aims at Taiwan independence. However, there is no doubt that Lee has established a concept of Taiwanese identity. His statement of "community of life (*shengming gongtongti*)" which showed lofty ideas of being in the same boat or sharing the same fate based on a common experience and values. This concept is more acceptable and appreciative by general Taiwanese and has crossed the hedge of the ethnic background and political affiliation which were the main discrepancies on the island.

5. Taiwanese in Shanghai

5.1 Life in Shanghai

By the way of in-depth interview with ten Taiwanese who have resided in Shanghai a year and above and enrolled in higher education in mainland, preliminarily analysis of the motive for migrating to Shanghai could be summed up by its economic position and cosmopolitan climate.

5.1.1 Why Shanghai?

"I've been to Beijing in winter and summer. It is extremely bitter cold in winter for us coming from the subtropics. The bone-chilling wind blowing over the body really makes me unforgettable. The temperature reached to 40 degrees Centigrade easily and the most awful thing is there are couple "sauna" days in this season. It really makes me feel uncomfortable. Besides, there is sandstorm from Mongolia in spring. {.....} Further, it is the facilitation and convenience of the city makes me choose to live Shanghai. The living standard in Shanghai might fall behind Taipei for the first couple years after Chinese opening policy was implemented. However, the enhancement of

Communist Rebellion." in *Creating the Future; Striding toward a New Era of the Chinese Nation*. Taipei: Government Information Office. 70

³⁴ Richard Bush (2005) "Lee Teng-hui And 'Separatism.'" in Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, ed.; *Dangerous Strait*. NY: Columbia University Press. 78. 91

³⁵ Lee Teng-hui (1999) *The Road to Democracy: Taiwan's Pursuit of Identity*. Tokyo: PHP Institute. 96-98

³⁶ Richard Bush (2005) "Lee Teng-hui And 'Separatism.'" in Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, ed.; *Dangerous Strait*. NY: Columbia University Press. 82

its faculty is in the wake of urban construction. In terms of living standard, Shanghai, China's business capital and most cosmopolitan city, is the closet city with Taiwan if you make the comparison of other cities in China at present.”³⁷

“I've spent my undergraduate education at Fujian province. First, I have relatives who are doing business there. It offers me a sense of security in psychology. Especially at beginning I don't have any friends here, and this feeling is an important comfort to me. Second, it also resulted from the filiations and ancestry, I felt comfortable while using the same dialect (*Minnan*) to communicate with people, even though it is hard to compare Fujian and Taiwan if speaking of living standard. However, by chance of traveling to Shanghai, I cannot realize the countless skyscrapers and constructions far and wide displaying before my eyes is China. No, I should say Shanghai. Comparing with Shanghai, I felt like I am living in the desolation (Fujian). While seeing the rising and flourishing urban development in Shanghai, I thought that the chance for the future employment is more than Fujian as well. That's why I moved to here (Shanghai) since 1998.”³⁸

The superior geographic location and the policy guidance not only attracted the international capitalists but also the employee from both domestic and foreign areas to Shanghai. And the motive power of going west for Taiwanese is basically resulted from the lure of economy and self-development of the future.

Photo 1 Taiwanese bridal veil business is highly popular in Shanghai.



Note: Photo by author.

“I've acquired my master degree of architecture from Tamkang University in Taipei.

³⁷ Interview No.5

³⁸ Interview No.6

In terms of the domain of the architecture, it is obviously the future is here on mainland. While walking on the street in Shanghai, you can see the constructions of skyscrapers and infrastructure everywhere. For me, I feel like this is the place which I can fully display my talent and skills. Chance could be found everywhere for me. I've acquired the architect license in Shanghai. Now I formed a partnership with my local friends and established our architects and associates in Shanghai. On the other hand, I am doing my PhD programme at Tongji University. My friends asked me that why I need to study further since I am not going to get into the academia. The reason is very simple: first, I want to acquire the aspect of architect here on mainland and make the comparison with I've learned in Taiwan. Interchanging idea with local people always sparks a new idea in my mind. Second, it is an excellent chance for me to establish the relationship (*guanxi*) here in this society. In Taiwan, the relationship is something of an advantage for you in the daily life. It is not a must as long as you work hard and full of talent. Here is mostly an opposition; however, everything goes smoothly without a hitch as long as you have relationship with the right people. All classmates in our programme might go into the same job functions. Some of them might work for the official in the future and they might be assistance for you as long as you established the relationship with them. This is a very practical concept.”³⁹

Guanxi could be considered one of the most traditional ideologies in Chinese culture. Once *guanxi* is recognized between two people, each can ask for favour of the other with the exception that the debt incurred will be repaid in the future.⁴⁰ Effective use of *guanxi* can reveal not only the face but also the prestige. The five relationships (*wulun*) emperor-subject, father-son, husband-wife, brother-brother and friend-friend are the core of the Confucian social hierarchical theory, and the word “*lun*” is actually a concise description of the *guanxi* among these five relationships.⁴¹

5.1.2 Localization-Social Life in Shanghai

Basically, the social life of Taiwanese in Shanghai is still restricted to Taiwanese here. It is observed that the value is different between cross-Strait. For example, going to karaoke and or movie during the leisure time are very common activities among students in Taiwan. It seems however, not common activities among the students on mainland. It might not be absolute the difference resulted form financial alternatives but due to lifestyle. The interpretation of lifestyle would be people from the same culture background and value are naturally cluster together, and they could talk or exchange information outright without any misgiving. One of informants added that “these activities would not be considered as extravagance in Taiwan. However, you always don't know what's people's thinking here. On the other hand, I'd like to say that Taiwanese identification is fairly special here. Most of Taiwanese students here

³⁹ Interview No.3

⁴⁰ Yang Mayfair Mei-hui (1994) *Gifts, Favors, and Banquets: The Art of Social Relationships in China*, Ithaca: Cornell University. 1

⁴¹ Tsui Anne S. and Farh Larry J.L.(1997) “Where Gunxi Matters: Relational Demography and Gunxi in the Chinese Context”, *Work and Occupations*, 24:1, 56-79

are keeping low key as far as they can so that it is impossible for telling other mainland students that you are going to doing these activities. People will think about the activities are expensive just because you are Taiwanese. It is doubtless that people who spent more time with each other easily become friends. And the most significant thing is that nobody needs to explain that the topic or the activities we've done. It is a really enjoyable and precious feeling while living abroad.⁴²

On the contrary, the "localization" has come about on Taiwanese in Shanghai, and can be observed by scales and times. Two informants who have married Mainlanders have different opinion and attitude toward their social life. So far their families all reside in Shanghai. They are working here; further, one of them is working in a mainland enterprise with a local standard payment. Apparently they've decided to live in Shanghai for a long term or permanently since both of them have bought real estate. Maybe because of the intention of settling here permanently, they preferred and spent their social life with the locals.

"It is natural for you hanging out with locals. Since I worked in the mainland enterprise, all of my colleagues are Mainlanders. I don't have many contacts with the Taiwanese in Shanghai except some of the friends form studying and are still settling here like me."⁴³

"My friends are mostly Mainlanders. Taiwanese here are always related to business not friends really. Sometimes I felt more arduous to get along with Taiwanese than Mainlanders. You can always hear that the veteran Taiwanese businessmen cheated the latter migrating one. Especially most the relationship with Taiwanese for me is established on the business. It is really dubious. {.....} I told to myself since I am going to live and start my business here I should live like locals. Now I always took the public transportation rather than taxi and estimate the products by local values."⁴⁴

"Taiwanese circle is too small so I don't restrict myself to Taiwanese only. I will hang out with locals and go to karaoke or movies, too. Besides, I lived in the dormitory with three Mainlander roommates before. I didn't feel any difference of lifestyle between each other. However, Taiwanese students are more innocent or pure if making the comparison with mainland students."⁴⁵

It is relevant that localization has the connection with scale, time, and location. For those Taiwanese students who study here earlier, it is much more flexible and adaptable for them to hang out with Mainlanders than the new coming one. Besides, if the whole family also reside Shanghai and have bought the real estate, it is also the transparent attraction to force them to localize earlier since they realize that the future

⁴² Interview No.1

⁴³ Interview No.5

⁴⁴ Interview No.6

⁴⁵ Interview No.7

is going to be here.

5.2 Cultural Identity

5.2.1 Characters and Language

The same language and the Han ethnicity of Taiwan and Shanghai are the benefits for not only the Taiwanese businessmen easier to promote their products into the market but also the Taiwanese students easier to take lessons in the class. The traditional Chinese characters are reserved and put to use on Taiwan, however, the simplified Chinese characters are more common and orthodox on mainland and the whole world after the PRC government published a document called “A Scheme for the Simplification of Chinese Characters” in 1956 and the “Second Scheme for the Simplification of Chinese Characters” in 1977. Even though the language, Mandarin, is the same used on both sides of the Strait. However, it is perceived easily that the characters differ when Taiwanese people first come to the mainland.

“Maybe I used to it; I don’t feel any incongruity between the simplified Chinese characters and the traditional ones at present. There are no difficulties for me to read and write the simplified Chinese characters and mostly I will use them in writing papers even though my professor didn’t force me to use them. I think it is a natural feeling for using them, because you are in this environment. On the contrary, my local friends told me to write the papers in traditional Chinese characters. They thought that the professor will give me a bonus point because it makes the paper more formal and academic.”⁴⁶

“While I was doing the entrance examination in Hong Kong, I used the traditional Chinese characters even though I feel like using the simplified Chinese characters is the most ‘correct’ way in morality. On the one hand, I cannot write all of them at that moment. It is better to use a unitary way for the whole papers. On the other hand, it is also ‘incorrect’ in morality for me to use the simplified Chinese characters. You can realize that they are not mine. The simplified Chinese characters belong to them (PRC). For the pronunciations and language, the characters should be the traditional ones. I still used the traditional Chinese characters in spite of I can read and recognize the simplified Chinese characters now. And luckily, my professor didn’t ask me to write the simplified Chinese characters, either.”⁴⁷

It seems that all the informants haven’t experienced the compulsory regulations of writing simplified Chinese characters while studying in mainland. Some of the informants still maintain their habit of writing traditional Chinese characters even though in the significant examination. On the prevailing information-exchanged board among the Chinese undergraduate students, Bulletin Board System (BBS), some of

⁴⁶ Interview No.4

⁴⁷ Interview No.2

the university, further, offered the traditional Chinese characters version to facilitate the overseas Chinese students who came from the use of traditional Chinese characters and mainly from Taiwan and Hong Kong. For example, on the BBS of Fudan University, changing to the traditional Chinese characters version merely add the dot beside the username. It is no longer to download the software of simplified Chinese characters version. Thus, all informants seldom feel that they are eliminated or isolated by the society or outsiders because of uncalled-for changing.

Photo 2 Traditional Chinese characters still could be seen frequently in show business. Hong Kong and Taiwan show business dominated the market in mainland.



Note: Photo by author

Language is the same doesn't mean that the interpretation of every phrase is also the same. By the autonomous of cross-Strait for over half century, however, the diversity occurred in the phrase and idiom as well. Generally speaking, the phraseological expression on mainland is much more direct and earthed than Taiwan. On the contrary, the most obvious feature of Taiwanese when they are speaking except the upward tone and accent is always talking pedantically for Mainlanders. Further, some terms without a totally different commendation and derogation in some circumstance of cross-Strait. For example, "*xiaojie*" (miss) could be used in the restaurant in Taiwan as calling the waitress, however, it referred to the prostitute in mainland. When calling the waitress in the restaurant on mainland, "*fuwuyuan*" (waiter or waitress) is the most common term. Nevertheless, it is considered a little bit "impolite" to call people's position especially for people doing the service business in Taiwan. The Chinabiz.org

which belong to the mainland Affairs Council under the Executive Yuan on Taiwan and businessmen-oriented website, also listed contrast between the differences of expression between cross-Strait for reference.⁴⁸ What I want to emphasize that there is no superordinate or subordinate judgment between these term and expression in linguistics. But these diversities, on the other hand, added the consciousness of them and us.

5.2.2 Attitudes and Values

Regardless of the small section of different expression in Mandarin, it is also paradoxical perspectives that Taiwanese identity is gradually weaken stem from the KMT's ban on visiting mainland was lifted in 1987, or further, the flourishing economic performance on mainland after economic reforms since 1978. The informants in interviews conducted by other scholars also elaborated that "except for the blood, skin, and language, everything is different from what we have. Their education is different. Theirs is materialism." And also the others also mentioned that people on mainland are atheists. They are not like Taiwanese believed that "Heaven is watching over our behavior on the earth." "For atheists, there is no constraint for their action. Anything is possible for them."⁴⁹

"Sometimes I feel that I am different with locals especially when I took the public transportation. There are always some people try to cut in a queue to buy the ticket. Even though you tried to restrain them form cutting in a queue, they will pretend to hearing nothing form you. Some of them, surprisingly, quarrel back with you. It seems that as long as you speak louder than others you are correct even though it is incorrect essentially."⁵⁰

"You seldom see the young passengers give their seats to the elders on the public transportation here in Shanghai. Needless to say that expecting the cars give the way to pedestrian courteously. As 'thank you' or 'sorry' are common words for using every moment. However, here nobody or I should say that less people use it. I always argue that Taiwan has the worst traffic in the world before. Since I've been here, however, I think that Taiwan is really advanced and full of politeness now."⁵¹

"Shanghai is the God's great love deigning to Taiwanese businessmen, giving them the second chance for enjoying the joy of economic blooming in their lives."⁵² The prosperous outlooks and boundless chances for doing business in Shanghai are the most attracted lures for informants studying in mainland. However, most of the informants also pointed out the heteromerous dispositions between cross-Strait

⁴⁸ Chinabiz.org <http://www.chinabiz.org.tw/integration/R2-9-c.asp> (in Chinese)

⁴⁹ Kuang-chun Li (2002) "Mirrors and Masks." in Stephane Corcuff, ed.,: *Memories of the Future*. NY: M.E. Sharpe. 113

⁵⁰ Interview No.1

⁵¹ Interview No.9

⁵² Chen Chang-yu (2003) "New Shanghainese." *Global Views Monthly*, 202:5, 100-112 (in Chinese)

societies, and the heterology also accelerate alienation between each other. And their impression of Shanghai today is characterized more by frustration than excitement, more by disappointment than satisfaction.

The politeness is one of the critical values. During ten-year Cultural Revolution carried out on mainland by Mao, “four olds” which were old idea, old culture, old customs and old habits were advocated to eradicate. Many schools were forced to shut down, the traditional values and “bourgeois” things were attacked by Red Guards. This social moment could not only be considered as the havoc of Chinese culture but also brought the somberness and legacy that continued to trouble mainland. For example, the generation gap of education between those who experienced the Cultural Revolution while in their teens and early twenties and those who were educated before or after. During the Cultural Revolution, this generation was taught to redress grievances by taking to the streets. The competition between each other was extremely fierce. Further, the new generation was born under one child policy. Every child is the apple of their parents’ eyes. While the “little prince” and “little princess” encounter each other in the outside world, the anticipation of giving precedence out of courtesy is hard to produce. The five relationships (*wulun*) of the traditional values of Confusion social hierarchical theory which mentioned above, forfeit in the contemporary society on mainland, or I should say it is inconspicuous make a comparison of contemporary Taiwanese society. The “*lun*” which represents hierarchy is destitute during the revolution in history. In the above, just like one of the informants feeling, “the phenomenon of “impoliteness” or “hustle” is the outcome of history and times.”⁵³ Although the living standard in Shanghai has no difference with Taiwan, the sociocultural gap between Shanghai and Taiwan is till sizable. And it is also a crucial point of the divergence and also affected the inclination of Taiwanese or Chinese identity among Taiwanese in Shanghai.

5.2.3 Taiwanese Culture or Chinese Culture?


If the distinction of them and us really existed among Taiwanese students and mostly resulted from the negation of the Cultural Revolution, what is the difference between Taiwanese culture and Chinese culture? There are no inconsistency that all informants agreed that Taiwanese culture is the traditional Chinese culture (*Zhonghua wenhua*). The paradoxical concepts of the term “Chinese”, is Taiwan current dilemma of identity. Because the ethnic identities are usually covered within a dominant national identity, culture and the identities associated with culture can be either superordinate or subordinate to national identities.⁵⁴ The cultural commonality but political division might be the reason why Taiwanese authorities unceasingly put effort on the slogan of “Taiwan priority.” But here I want to add that, the answer of the informants is Taiwanese culture has maintain the traditional Chinese culture (*Zhonghua wenhua*)

⁵³ Interview No.1

⁵⁴ Li-Li Huang, James H.Liu, Maanling Chang (2004) “The double identity of Taiwanese Chinese: A dilemma of politics and culture rooted in history”, *Asian Journal of Social Psychology*, 7:2, 149-168

but not China culture (*Zhongguo wenhua*). “Hua”, described “Cathay” in English, might be more appropriately than “Chinese.” Likewise, the compromise name of “Chinese, Taipei” (*Zhonghua Taipei*) rather than “Taipei, China” (*Zhongguo Taipei*) is more acceptable for Taiwan to participate in international events. Here the “Chinese” (*Zhonghua*) implies being part of a cultural entity and “China” on the other hand, clearly indicates belonging to a state. Albeit, the flexible interpretation of one-China principle is only applied to cultural and sporting events and non-governmental organizations. Taiwan was forced to the use of “China, Taipei” after mainland joined the Asian Development Bank (ADB) in 1986, although Taiwan was a founding member of the organization.⁵⁵

Figure 2 Cathay Culture, Chinese Culture and Taiwanese Culture



It is evident that Taiwanese culture is most easily characterized as transported culture of Fujian Province. In response to historical experiences and milieu, Taiwanese culture has leavened with other southern Chinese cultural ingredients and flavored with the interactions with Japan and the West. This version can be summarized by one of my informants: “I think Taiwanese culture contained a lot of culture, they are Mainlander culture, *Minnan* culture, *Hakka* culture, aboriginal culture, Japanese culture and western culture. And the China culture contained the Han Chinese culture, Man culture, Mongolian culture, Muslim culture, Tibetan culture and CCP’s governance nowadays. The China culture and Taiwanese culture should be at the same level but subordinate to Chinese culture.”⁵⁶

5.2.4 De-Taiwanization and De-Sinicization

Dora Shu-fang Dien has cited Penuel and Wertsch’s theory in 1995, “identities are often contrastively defined and in dialogue with others” and the impressions were

⁵⁵ Christopher Hughes (1997) *Taiwan and Chinese Nationalism*. NY: Routledge. 49

⁵⁶ Interview No.2

presented in some kind of “us-vs.-them” binary constructs *e.g.* “normal/deviant, public/private, ecologically sensitive/ insensitive, responsive/unresponsive and so on.”⁵⁷ And the pattern could be seen in the Taiwanese society during the past decades.

When the Nationalist arrive Taiwan after 1945, it considered that many of the residents had been overly influenced by Japan. In response, KMT established policies that were intended to re-Sinicize Taiwanese. They were taught by a form of orthodox, Chinese gentry’s culture and represented it as national culture. The efforts such as the “Chinese Cultural Renaissance Movement” implemented in Taiwan to counter any possible devastation of the “Cultural Revolution” in mainland. Mandarin was adopted as the national language (*guo yu*) and the use of Taiwanese language was restricted in school. It was reported that of the forty-two items pertaining geography, four were related to Taiwan, and of the thirty-two items dealing with history, only one dealt with Taiwan of the standardized college entrance exam in 1987.⁵⁸ Mainland-related education were fostered in school notwithstanding, the information were related to former KMT-mainland instead of current CCP-mainland.

In the atmosphere of mainland priority and de-Taiwanization, cultural prejudice has been observed in Taiwanese society. It is often said among Mainlander Taiwanese that Taiwanese are rich but “they are no culture.”⁵⁹ The term “*taike*” is extensively used as a metaphor of “redneck” but has now come to encompass a youth-focused lifestyle that celebrates both the *déclassé* (flip-flops, Long Life cigarettes) and the haute (Gucci, Macallan).⁶⁰ Ironically, in the derogatory term “*taike*”, “*tai*” referred to “Taiwanese” and idea of “acting not like a Taiwanese” has driven people’s behavior in the real life, which means “behave properly and elegantly not like Taiwanese.”

Following the lifting of martial law in 1987, the liberalization of publications gave voice Taiwanese need to redefine their culture and Taiwanese consciousness has been out of the yoke of KMT ideology. And the social pluralization has not only occurred in Taiwanese consciousness but also mother tongue and dialects education has been put into practice in the school.⁶¹ However, the rising of Taiwanese consciousness has also galvanized the activists into action for de-Sinicization. Lin Chia-lung has observed that “Taiwanese” and “Chinese” have become political weapons for distinguishing different group consciousness in Taiwan.⁶² Somehow, cultural identity has been lumped with national identity together in Taiwan society nowadays. Like the

⁵⁷ Dora Shu-fang Dien (2000) “The Evolving Nature of Self-Identity across Four Levels of History”, *Human Development*, 43:1, 1-18

⁵⁸ Alan M. Wachman (1994) *National identity and Democratization*. NY: M.E. Sharpe. 83

⁵⁹ Stephane Corcuff (2002) “Taiwan’s ‘Mainlanders,’ New Taiwanese?” in Stephane Corcuff, ed.,: *Memories of the Future*. NY: M.E. Sharpe. 175

⁶⁰ New York Times <http://travel2.nytimes.com/2006/02/12/travel/12going.html>

⁶¹ Government Information Office, Republic of China (Taiwan) (2004) *Taiwan Yearbook 2004*. Taipei: Government Information office. 27-31

⁶² Lin Chia-lung (2002) “The Political Formation of Taiwanese Nationalism” in Stephane Corcuff ed.,: *Memories of the Future*. NY: M.E. Shape. 224

proposition of Peng Min-min, who is an activist of Taiwanese independence, “it is important to distinguish between political identity and cultural identity.”⁶³ From this point of view, Taiwan is still on its way.

5.3 Ethnic Identity

Drawing upon the Taiwan Election and Democratization Studies (TEDS) 2001, the distribution of responses to the question about one’s father’s ethnic background is 75.9 percent, 12.2 percent, 10.1 percent, and 1.5 percent for *Minnan*, *Hakka*, Mainlander Taiwanese, and aborigines, respectively.⁶⁴ The first three groups are Han Chinese, and within them the first two refer to those whose ancestor came to Taiwan 300 or 400 years ago which so-called “*Benshengren*” (Taiwanese) nowadays, whereas the “*Waishengren*” (Mainlander Taiwanese) refer to people who arrived in Taiwan in late 1940s and their descendants who were born in Taiwan are also classified in this group.

The term “minority” refer to an ethnic group occupying a subordinate position in a multiethnic society, suffering from the disabilities of prejudice and discrimination, and maintaining a separate group identity.⁶⁵ However, the situation is uncanny in Taiwan. When the Nationalist retreated to Taiwan in 1949, the minority, Mainlander Taiwanese, not only maintained a separate group identity by residing in “*juancun*” (lit., the villages of military families and single veterans), but also were dominant in the government and military. The majority, Taiwanese, were prevailing in economic sphere *vis-à-vis* Mainlander Taiwanese in the political sphere. Basically, the main differences with the majority Han population at this period were political and economic.⁶⁶ This situation could be described as a kind of social division of labor: one group governed while the other ran the economy.⁶⁷ However, the circumstance was challenged by the ongoing opposition movement operated by Taiwanese and Mainlander Taiwanese in the 1970s and 1980s. The regime in Taiwan has transferred to democratic in the 1990s and Taiwanese has come into power after the DPP substituted the KMT as the ruling party. The ethnic identity, particularly Mainlander Taiwanese, is always a controversy in the process of Taiwanization during the past decade resulting from their articulated linkage with mainland. Therefore, Mainlander Taiwanese would be the main group when I discuss the connection between ethnic identity and national identity here.

⁶³ Alan M. Wachman (1994) *National identity and Democratization*. NY: M.E. Sharpe. 86

⁶⁴ John Fuh-sheng Hsieh (2005) “Ethnicity, National Identity, and Domestic Politics in Taiwan”. *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, 40:13, 13-28

⁶⁵ Dora Shu-fang Dien (2000) “The Evolving Nature of Self-Identity across Four Levels of History”. *Human Development*, 43:1, 1-18

⁶⁶ Winckler, Edwin A. (1988) “Taiwan in the 1990s”, in Harvey Feldman, Michael Y.M. Kau and Ilpyong J. Kim ed.; *Taiwan in a Time of Transition*, New York: Paragon House.

⁶⁷ Johnson, Marshall (1992) “Classification, Power, and Markets: Waning of the Ethnic Division of Labor”, in Dennis Fred Simon and Michael Y.M. Kau ed., *Taiwan: Beyond the Economic Miracle*, Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.

5.3.1 Collective Memory

The term “*Waishegren*” means “people from the outer provinces.” However, it is hardly used at all in China. People prefer to use the term “*Waidiren*” to refer to people who have come from other parts of China. The term “*Waishengren*” is peculiarly used in anthropology while analyzing the composition of Taiwanese population. Nevertheless, “*Waishengren*” shouldn’t be considered as an ethnic group in a more precise criterion based on the biological and anthropological definition.

The sociologist Maurice Halbwachs has mentioned the term “collective memory” showed that there exist as many memories as there are groups in a society, as long as their members stay in contact with each other and it has given a more adequate ground to explain the *Waishengren* and Taiwanese as different ethnic groups in Taiwanese society.⁶⁸ For Taiwanese, *Waishengren* as the majority of officials in the Nationalist government, they are the colonizers who came from outside to rule the island. KMT is a “power arrived from outside.” They shared the collective memory of the sorrow of Feb 28 accident and escalated their antagonism toward the uncouth and uneducated *Waishengren*. They classified “bad” and “good” *Waishengren* into a group sharing the homogeneous cultural and enjoying the privilege of official resources. On the other hand, the *Waishengren* has forsaken their hometown, living in Taiwan with a “guest mentality.” Further, a residential separation on the basis of ethnicity was put in place by the system of “*jauncun*” and most *Waishengren* have no interests or less perception toward outside world until they have married or remarried with Taiwanese women. The *Waishengren* or Taiwanese, *de facto*, might come from different backgrounds and customs and speaking distinct dialects, however, the collective memories are the determinants to tie people together.

Melissa J. Brown has indicated that “one of the most fundamental misunderstandings about identity is the widely accepted view that ethnic and national identities are based on common ancestry and culture”. However, they are not what ultimately unite an ethnic group or a nation. Rather, “identity is formed and solidified on the basis of common social experience”, includes economic and political experience.⁶⁹ Likewise, Stephane Corcuff has referred that historical events, namely assimilation within a group seen as a homogeneous whole could be characterized as a “historico-optical illusion.”⁷⁰ However, the “historico-optical illusion” has played a significant role in Taiwanese society. The politics and history has turned *Waishengren* into actors, authors, or scapegoats, arguing and judging their “guest mentality” and “allegiance” on the island especially coming to the Taiwan issue.

5.3.2 Taiwanese First or Chinese First?

⁶⁸ Stephane Corcuff (2002) “Taiwan’s ‘Mainlanders,’ New Taiwanese?” in Stephane Corcuff, ed.,: *Memories of the Future*. NY: M.E. Sharpe. 167

⁶⁹ Melissa J. Brown (2004) *Is Taiwanese Chinese?* Berkeley: University of California Press. 2

⁷⁰ Stephane Corcuff (2002) “Taiwan’s ‘Mainlanders,’ New Taiwanese?” in Stephane Corcuff, ed.,: *Memories of the Future*. NY: M.E. Sharpe. 167, 170-171

As a matter of fact, Mainlander Taiwanese, Taiwanese, and Aborigines as groups do not share the same ancestry and culture disturb their classification. However, the common sociopolitical experience has distinguished the heterogeneity and crossed the culture and alliance in the traditional values of ethnic identity.⁷¹ The Nationalist ruling Taiwan for 60 years were largely controlled by Mainlander Taiwanese and their national identity was conducted by the complex of the “the greater China” even though its sovereignty, *de facto*, merely exercised on Taiwan, Penghu, Jinmen and Mazu. Thus, this is a common ideology for people realize that Mainlander Taiwanese will show more identification with China than those who incorporate Taiwanese or New Taiwanese into their ethnic identity.

However, I couldn't find any evident connection between identity and ethnicity in my interviews in Shanghai. Since the informants who preferred the Taiwanese identity are from the various ethnic backgrounds, I assume that the connection between ethnicity and identity is limited. But one informant also expressed his grievance of being the second generation of Mainlander family:

“In Taiwan, we were considered as Mainlander Taiwanese by Taiwanese, but here we are considered as Taiwanese by Mainlanders. It is a sorrow of being a “rootless” person. If I can choose, I will choose to be described as Taiwanese. After all, I drink the water from this land; I ate the food from this land. I have much stronger connection with the land whether which background I came from.”⁷²

Various alternative ethnic identities exist among two main groups, “*Waishengren*” and “*Benshengren*”, of Han Chinese living in Taiwan could be recognized as a result of social representations from their past and their relationship, history in general, with mainland. In terms of social representation theory, it can be expected that Mainlander Taiwanese and Taiwanese would have acquired different representations of their past and their relationship with mainland even though both of them share a number of ethnic characteristics with the Mainlanders, such as language, history and cultural heritage.⁷³ As such, ethnic identification in Taiwan is complex and, at times, polemical. Further, Scholar V. D. Volkan has indicated that the two elements, “chosen trauma” and “chosen glory”, have formed a bond with group identity.⁷⁴ The “chosen trauma” is the panic of the past memory that cast shadows onto the future. Conversely, the “chosen glory” is the myth of a glorious future from a reenactment of glorious past. February 28 Incident of 1947 is a critical historical event in the collective memory of Taiwanese. For those advocators of Taiwan independence, February 28 Incident is

⁷¹ Melissa J. Brown (2004) *Is Taiwanese Chinese?* Berkeley: University of California Press. 10

⁷² Interview No.6

⁷³ Liu, J.H., Ward, B.L., Ward, C. & Brahm, S. (2002) “Social representation of history in Malaysia and Singapore on the relationship between national and ethnic identity”. *Asian Journal of Social Psychology*, 5:1, 3–20

⁷⁴ Carol Lee Hamrin, Zheng Wang (2004) “The Floating Island: Change of Paradigm on The Taiwan Question”. *Journal of Contemporary China*, 13:39, 339–349

their “chosen trauma”, and an independent Taiwan is their dream of “chosen glory.” And the KMT for them is as the slogan “Kill Many Taiwanese” rather than a glory.⁷⁵ Thus, a person in Taiwan may be culturally and politically Taiwanese, culturally and politically Chinese, or a mixture of the two.

However, the cultural ascription has been an indivisible with political movements especially the Nationalist imposed their cultural models on locals and despised the Taiwanese culture as a local culture without particular interest over 50 years. The “cultural chauvinism” and quasi-monopoly on language and cultural models has permeated Taiwanese cultural canons and transmitted them to its offspring in both cultural and political perspectives. Even though “Taiwanization”, “Taiwan priority” and “let culture return to culture, politics return to politics” were clamored and have become the most popular propaganda by Taiwanese activists and elite during the past decades, it has been bound to political concepts tacitly. Therefore, it is hardly to observe people in Taiwan who are culturally Taiwanese but politically Chinese.

5.3.3 The Differences between Ethnic Identity and National Identity

Two possible categories of nationality exist for Taiwanese: Taiwanese or Chinese. Because of the current political complexities surrounding Taiwanese *de jure* sovereignty, the categories of “nationality” and “ethnicity” are mutually interpenetrating. The “Taiwan issue” is resulted from PRC claims that Taiwan is ethnically and culturally Han and therefore should be part of Chinese nation. In the interviews, I asked the question that “if your foreign friends introduce you to their friends, which identity you can accept?” and offered three options for choosing, i) Taiwanese ii) Chinese iii) Taiwanese and Chinese. At the end, there are three informants revealed their leaning to the both Taiwanese and Chinese identity.⁷⁶ Generally speaking, they agree their identities resulted from the macro-historical views and considered their Chinese ethnic background by the cultural factors but rather than the political ones. They considered their identities based on common ancestry and common cultural and therefore that identity is grounded in antiquity. The rest of informants all chose the Taiwanese identity and the reason for that is almost the same of why they feel different with Chinese, which are afraid that they were classified by the “impoliteness” and “illegal activities” and so on. And ultimately, they also argued that the status quo of cross-Strait, *ipso facto*, is a separatist condition; Taiwan is under the governance of the ideology of “Three Principles of the People (*sanmin zhuyi*)” which was conducted by Dr. Sun Yet-sen, however, mainland is Socialism, Marx-Leninism or “Socialism with Chinese characteristic.”⁷⁷

Between 1945 and 1991, Taiwanese authorities portrayed Taiwan as ethnically Hand

⁷⁵ Andrew D. Morris (2004) “Taiwan’s History: An Introduction” in David K. Jordan, Andrew D. Morris and Marc L. Moskowitz ed., *The Minor Arts of Daily Life: Popular Culture in Taiwan*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. 23

⁷⁶ Interview No.5, No.6, No. 10

⁷⁷ Interview No.2

and nationally Chinese. Since 1987, People in Taiwan have increasingly claimed Taiwanese identity because of the political purpose or the differences of values between cross-Strait after KMT lift its ban for Taiwanese people visiting mainland. Ironically, the PRC was more comfortable when Taiwanese authorities claimed legal authority over China except competing with the representation of China in the international society, because at least then there was no questioning of whether Taiwan belonged within the “Chinese” nation.

Undoubtedly the PRC authorities nowadays and the Nationalist on Taiwan between 1945 and 1991 stand the view of Han imperialism (*da han zhuyi*) to gloss over China status, including Taiwan, as a united nation of diverse ethnicities (*tongyi duominzu de guojia*).⁷⁸ There are ninety-one percent of the population is the Han ethnic majority and the nice percent of the population is constituted by fifty-five minorities. However, they ignored that there are also many unofficially recognized “regional” or “subethnic” differences among the Han, for example, like *Hakka* and *Minnan* etc. Further, in order to mobilize people behind their political agendas, governments and ethnic leaders actively hide the fluidity and changeability of identity and discuss identity in terms of ideologies: a conscious falsification, a conscious selection of some of the available evidence of the past over other evidence for political purposes, and this constructed “narratives of unfolding.”⁷⁹ Both of cross-Strait authorities called this narratives history to achieved their political purposes, the sovereignty and orthodoxy of mainland former and Taiwan sovereignty later, they are in fact constructed ideologies. Although ostensibly about the past, they are really about the present.

5.3.4 Pluralistic Identification and National Allegiances of Mainlander Taiwanese

Taiwanese anthropologist M. K. Wang has proposed two foundations of ethnic identity: (i) lineage nepotism; and (ii) cultural nepotism.⁸⁰ In Taiwan, numbers of “*tongxianghui*” were established after the Nationalist’s evacuation to Taiwan. Most first-generation Mainlander Taiwanese identify strongly with a particular *xiang* of a particular province and present themselves as coming from that province. This is a precise presentation of lineage nepotism in Taiwanese society which people tend to feel more intimate in psychology with those people who are assumed to have the same lineage than with those who aren’t, whether it is actually shared or not. Cultural nepotism has similar implication, which is people feel more intimate with people they share a common culture.

After the separation over sixty years of mainland and Taiwan, there must be a non negligible dint which is stronger than the lineage and cultural nepotism in biological

⁷⁸ Melissa J. Brown (2004) *Is Taiwanese Chinese?* Berkeley: University of California Press. 6

⁷⁹ Melissa J. Brown (2004) *Is Taiwanese Chinese?* Berkeley: University of California Press. 5-7

⁸⁰ M.K. Wang (1997) *The Borderline of General China: Historical Memory And Ethnic Identity*, Taipei: YuenChen press (in Chinese)

and anthropological fields to foster Taiwanese to recognize themselves as “Taiwanese.” Li Mei-chih proposed a third basis, “life space”, for ethnic identification in the case of identification for people living in Taiwan.⁸¹ Life space nepotism contains a more broad interpretation in psychological field, which considered each individual has a primordial attachment with the living space he lives and shares the institutions, modal behavior patterns and social events with the people living in the same space. Whether which ethnic backgrounds and or the order of arrival to the island, all inhabitants are in a “community of fate” and it also makes up a common social identification because of the sentiments of mutuality and familiarity.

The tables below are the survey conducted in 1997 has shown that Mainlander Taiwanese informants might have a pluralistic identification of being “*Waishengren*” and “Taiwanese.”⁸² However, when they were questioned to choose the expression of mainland’s attack if Taiwan had been the *casus belli* because of Taiwan declared its independence *de jure*-what it already is *de facto*. Surprisingly the majority would consider mainland’s attack as an invasion of Taiwan and choose to resist the attack even though they are in favor of identifying themselves as “*Waishengren*” rather than “Taiwanese.” And the younger the informants are, the clearer pluralistic identification has been observed.

Table 3.1 *Waishengren*’s Theoretical Reaction to a Chinese Attack in Case of a Declaration of Independence (1), 1997 (percent)

	An invasion of Taiwan	An annihilation of the traitor but at the same time an invasion	An annihilation of the traitor and a liberation of Taiwan	No answer; Doesn't know
<i>Waishengren</i> born in China	30.5	40.5	16	13
<i>Waishengren</i> born in Taiwan (1945-1967)	37.2	43	9.6	10.2
<i>Waishengren</i> born in Taiwan (1968-1981)	63.3	30.7	2	4

Note: Source by Stephane Corcuff (2002) “Taiwan’s ‘Mainlanders,’ New Taiwanese?” in Stephane

⁸¹ Mei-chih Li (2003) “Bias of Ethnic Identification in Taiwan”. *Asian Journal Of Social Psychology*, 6:3, 229-237

⁸² Stephane Corcuff (2002) “Taiwan’s ‘Mainlanders,’ New Taiwanese?” in Stephane Corcuff, ed.,: *Memories of the Future*. NY: M.E. Sharpe. 169, 184

Table 3.2 *Waishengren's* Theoretical Reaction to a Chinese Attack in Case of a Declaration of Independence (2), 1997 (percent)

	Resist	Accpet	Emigrate	Discuss	No answer; Doesn't know
<i>Waishengren</i> born in China	23.2	5.8	11.6	53.6	5.8
<i>Waishengren</i> born in Taiwan (1945-1967)	32.1	9	11.5	38.5	8.9
<i>Waishengren</i> born in Taiwan (1968-1981)	40.8	12.2	10.2	34.7	2.1

Note: Source by Stephane Corcuff (2002) "Taiwan's 'Mainlanders,' New Taiwanese?" in Stephane Corcuff, ed.: Memories of the Future. NY: M.E. Sharpe. 184

Table 4 *Waishengren's* Self-Ascription in a Two-Possibility Choice: *Waishengren* or Taiwanese, 1997 (percent)

	<i>Waishengren</i>	Taiwanese	Checked both answers	Added their own answer (Chinese etc.)	No answer
<i>Waishengren</i> born in China	59.4	10.1	11.6	1.4	17.4
<i>Waishengren</i> born in Taiwan (1945-1967)	45.5	27.6	10.9	10.3	5.7
<i>Waishengren</i> born in Taiwan (1968-1981)	40.7	42.9	8.2	4.1	4.1

Source by Stephane Corcuff (2002) "Taiwan's 'Mainlanders,' New Taiwanese?" in Stephane Corcuff, ed.: Memories of the Future. NY: M.E. Sharpe. 169

The term “*Waishengren*” contains the word “*wai*” has the meaning of external, extraneous, or foreign. It is anticipation that the first generation *Waishengren* whom have been displaced and uprooted from their hometown, families and relatives would have an inevitable tropism toward their motherland, mainland. And this tropism has a tremendous connection with the concept of “*luoye guigen*” (lit., when the leaf falls, it returns to the root.) And this has been related to a strong identification power in the Chinese mentality.⁸³ However, how many generation and how long can we still consider the foreign cohort as being foreign? And how many generations and years can an ethnic group from external places maintain its ethnic specificity? The survey above has presented conspicuously that second and third generations of Mainlander Taiwanese are more inclined to pluralistic identification and Taiwanese consciousness as time goes on. Thus, like the Lee Yuan-Tse has referred and Stephane Corcuff has also observed that Mainlander Taiwanese born in Taiwan are more likely to “strongly” share the “*luodi shenggen*” feeling (lit., the leaf or seed falls on the soil and takes root.)⁸⁴

5.4 Political Identity

Undeniably, ethnicity was a critical point for the opposition movement to mobilize the citizenry when Taiwan was under the regime of authoritarianism. KMT’s national policies in response to Confucian civilization viewed ethnic Han as a single group in the Middle Kingdom (*Zhongguo*). If Han had been broken up into different groups, none could have claimed to be the exclusive inheritors of the Confucian mantle.⁸⁵ However, when Taiwan shifted to democracy, and DPP has substituted KMT as the ruling party, ethnicity lost some of its salience in politics and national identity has become the dominant cleavage shaping Taiwan’s party configuration. And this is particularly true for distinguishing between the Pan Blue camp (KMT) and Pan Green camp (DPP).⁸⁶

Comparing with Taiwanese authorities haven’t accredited the academic background acquired in mainland, Chinese government adopted a constructive measure to benefit Taiwanese students. The reduction of tuition fee and scholarships policies was enacted on August 2005. During the interview, it is relevant to the political party affiliation and studying on the mainland. For those Pan Blue (KMT) advocates, studying in mainland is a time of thinking the differences between Mainlanders and Taiwanese. On the other hand, for those who were Pan Green (DPP) advocates, they start to think about the feasibility of “one nation, two systems.” It is also observed that family background still plays a significant role on the political party affiliation by the

⁸³ Stephane Corcuff (2002) “Taiwan’s ‘Mainlanders,’ New Taiwanese?” in Stephane Corcuff, ed.: *Memories of the Future*. NY: M.E. Sharpe. 178

⁸⁴ Stephane Corcuff (2002) “Taiwan’s ‘Mainlanders,’ New Taiwanese?” in Stephane Corcuff, ed.: *Memories of the Future*. NY: M.E. Sharpe. 185

⁸⁵ Melissa J. Brown (2004) *Is Taiwanese Chinese?* Berkeley: University of California Press. 6

⁸⁶ John Fuh-sheng Hsieh (2005) “Ethnicity, National Identity, and Domestic Politics in Taiwan”. *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, 40:13, 13-28

interview. For example, Mainlander Taiwanese family is more inclined to the Pan Blue (KMT) camp and Taiwanese family is more inclined to the Pan Green (DPP) camp. However, by the times of living in mainland, the shifted of political party affiliation could be observed. Their ideologies of the extremely negative pole and positive pole are shifting to the middle-of-the-road which means more flexible for voting.

Further, since the national identity has played the more significant role of distinguishing different parties, the term “middle-of-the-road” *per se* and manifestation of Taiwanese students in Shanghai we can also witness as a representation of maintaining status quo of cross-Strait relations in national identity. According to the survey conducted by the Opinion Research Taiwan in 1992 and the Election Study Center of National Chengchi University in 1995-2000 and Taiwan Election and Democratization Studies in 2001 (cf. Table 4), majority of Taiwanese exhibited a high degree of stability, which means they are more in favor of maintaining status quo of cross-Strait relations rather than advocating independence or reunification. Albeit tensions between independence and reunification may be high, there haven’t been resulted in serious conflict. The major reason, undeniably, there is a compromise position, so-called the “status quo” between the two extremes of political spectrum.⁸⁷ This situation is not perfect, but may be tolerable.

Table 5 Voters’ Own Attitudes toward the National Identity Issue

Year	Independence	Status quo	Unification	Total
1992	12.4%	30.6%	56.9%	99.9%
1995	15.3%	51.1%	33.6%	100.0%
1996	21.4%	53.5%	25.1%	100.0%
1999	27.7%	43.5%	28.8%	100.0%
2000	21.5%	46.1%	32.4%	100.0%
2002	24.0%	48.3%	27.7%	100.0%

Note: Source by John Fuh-sheng Hsieh (2005) “Ethnicity, National Identity, and Domestic Politics in Taiwan”. *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, 40:13, 13-28

5.4.1 The Blurred National Identification

“I disagree with KMT because of my father. My father is a Mainlander Taiwanese; we still have relatives on mainland. My father always declared that he is Chinese again and again and never identify himself as Taiwanese. I was thinking then why don’t you go back since you never identify this land. That’s the reason I approached to Green. While Lee, Teng-Hui brought up the two states theory, however, I realized that if there

⁸⁷ John Fuh-sheng Hsieh (2005) “Ethnicity, National Identity, and Domestic Politics in Taiwan”. *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, 40:13, 13-28

is an unavoidable war between cross-Strait, I will immediately protect Taiwan rather than approving mainland. But I always think that what is the country I am protecting? Is this the Republic of Taiwan or Republic of China? I identify this land and the name of this land is ROC and ROC is on Taiwan,”⁸⁸

“*Wei he er zhang? Wei shui er zhang?*” (lit., fighting because of what and for whom) has become a significant motto and been imprinted in the Taiwanese troop. It is elaborated that fighting because of the existence and development of ROC was damaged and fighting for the citizens of ROC. However, it is palpable that the national identification with the ROC on Taiwan for some Taiwanese is blurred by the ethnic identification with Han race and the cultural identification with Chinese regarding the cases.

Photo 3 The board with political implication in Taiwan.

“Whether you are *Bengshengren*, *Waishengren*, Aborigines, elder immigrant or new immigrant, the one who wants to be governed by China is Chinese; who doesn't want to be governed by China is Taiwanese.”



Note: Photo by author

Regarding the blurred national identification, the Taipei authorities have adopted several steps to “rectify” the “name” of the nation (*zhengming*). A new version of passport with the word “Taiwan” added to its cover has been come into force in September 2003. Adding Taiwan not only solved the predicament of Taiwanese travelers were treated as citizens from PRC who “faked” being Taiwanese since the passport before shows merely “China” without referring to “Taiwan” anywhere in the document, but also, more significant, it has enhanced the linkage between individuals

⁸⁸ Interview No.1

and the state.⁸⁹

Further, Taipei authorities tended to “abolish” (*feichu*) the National Unification Council (NUC) *de jure* in 2006. This movement has been interpreted by Washington as a unilateral alteration of the status quo and certainly, exasperated Beijing. Regarding to the international reactions and concerns, President Chen Shui-bian announced that NUC “ceases to function” in Feb 2006 with different interpretations of Washington and Taipei. In a word, the dispute of NUC turns to a “word game.”⁹⁰ Thus, the ambivalence not only from the internal education and recognition during the past decades but also the external plight of international climate have resulted the blurred national identification.

5.4.2 Where Is Home?

Taiwan’s dynamic society consisted by the immigrant form overseas during the past 400 years. The dwellers of this island were endowed by nature with the characteristics of adaptation and modification by the variety of different identification. It is easily observed that the localization occurred on the Taiwanese people in Shanghai, especially on those informants with whole families, and mostly their parents, moved to Shanghai. When I asked the question about the concept of home, two informants with their families are also in Shanghai answered me that their home is in Shanghai.⁹¹ On the contrary, two informants, who married Mainlander wives but their families still in Taiwan, considered their homes are still in Taiwan just like the rest of informants.⁹² For this point of view, I also assumed that the traditional concepts of patriarchy and lineage still play a significant role in Taiwanese society. Undeniably, the isolation in international and uncertainty in political during the past decades have created the general concept of “common life community” (*shengming gongtongti*) among different ethnic groups. However, the “orphan” of international society and the turmoil between cross-Strait relations also give the namby-pamby of “sorrow of the Taiwanese.”

“Basically, I really don’t know where my home is. My parents have immigrated to Canada and lived there for couple years. Their apartment in Taipei right now belongs to my brother’s family. My apartment in Shanghai is rented. In another word, I am a “rootless” person.”⁹³

6. Conclusion

⁸⁹ Horng-luen Wang (2004) “Regulating Transnational Flows of People: An Institutional Analysis of Passports and Visas as a Regime of Mobility”. *Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power*, 11:3, 351-376

⁹⁰ The China Post <http://www.chinapost.com.tw/archive/detail.asp?cat=1&id=78507>

⁹¹ Interview No.4, No.7

⁹² Interview No.5, No.6

⁹³ Interview No.6

This research represents a preliminary attempt to understand the contemporary identity of Taiwanese students in Shanghai. The results dispel myths about the Taiwanese identity being shifted, localized and substituent. Rather, informants in the in-depth interviews expressed many sophisticated and context-sensitive remarks. All the informants agreed that Taiwanese culture contained the traditional Chinese (*zhonghua*) culture if making the comparison with contemporary mainland. It is a culture with tolerance, hospitality and courtesy. However, the culture and value on mainland nowadays shouldn't be ignored. It is an outcome of Chinese history and social movement, in another word, a "new" Chinese culture is happening on mainland.

The words "Taiwanese" and "Chinese" are increasingly using by politician in Taiwan as political weapons for distinguishing between "them" and "us" in the promotion of group consciousness. However, the research has showed that the nature of the two identities is not absolutely competitive but relatively complementary. It turns out that most informants could treat his or her Chinese identity as a cultural expression (*Zhonghua wenhua*) or an ethnic origin (*Hua ren*) and treat his or her Taiwanese identity as a political identity. Interestingly, none of them deny Taiwan as a sovereign political entity despite their different party sympathies and ethnic identities.

On the other hand, the results also dispel myths that the allegiance of Mainlander Taiwanese toward Taiwanese identity has been blurred and swayed after the KMT government lifted the ban on home visits in 1987. By contraries, hometown visits has helped Mainlander Taiwanese to consolidate their settler identity as Taiwanese, though they do not necessarily dissipate their self-identity as Chinese.⁹⁴ In addition, what I observed that the second and third generation of Mainlander Taiwanese of informants do not all express themselves as "*Waishengren*" in the beginning of the interviews. Rather, they expressed that "I am from a *Waishengren*'s family" or my parents/grandparents are *Waishengren*. It also indicates that the provincialism has played a blurred role in Taiwanese identity issue.

Further, Dora Shu-fang Dien referred that "identity formation as an ongoing integrative process with a certain amount of situational variation and possible shifts because of changing sociocultural as well as historical contexts."⁹⁵ In early periods, Taiwanese might be conceptualized by the central doctrine of Chinese nationalism as promoted by the KMT, which was "Taiwan is part of China and Taiwanese are Chinese." However, the political separatism of cross-Strait and democratization in Taiwan after 1987, the residents and settlers whether which ethnic group they belong to and how standard of their Mandarin is, they are considered as Taiwanese by their

⁹⁴ Kuang-chun Li (2002) "Mirrors and Masks" in Stephane Corcuff, ed.,: *Memories of the Future*. NY: M.E. Sharpe. 112

⁹⁵ Dora Shu-fang Dien (2000) "The Evolving Nature of Self-Identity across Four Levels of History". *Human Development*, 43:1, 1-18

accents of “Taiwanized national language” (*Taiwan guoyu*) and more profound, the island they come from. Therefore, a pragmatic ideology emerged, like current KMT’s Chairman Ma Ying-jeou, who is known as a second generation of Mainlander Taiwanese has said, “I am Taiwanese who grew up drinking Taiwanese water and eating Taiwanese rice.”⁹⁶ Former surveys and my interviews in Shanghai show that age is a fundamental variable for Mainlander Taiwanese to identify themselves as “Taiwanese” rather “*Waishengren*” in Taiwan. In a sense, the concept of “*luodi shenggen*” (lit., the leaf falls on the soil and takes root) plays a more significant role in Taiwanese identity rather than “*xie nong yu shui*” (lit., blood is thicker than water) or “*louye guigen*” (lit., when the leaf falls, it turns to the root) among Mainlander Taiwanese. Therefore, it is a parallel with Chia-lung Lin referred, “one should not equate ethnic identity with national identity.”⁹⁷ To be sure, ethnicity and national identity are related, but they are not the same.

In respond to KMT leader’s visit, the mainland authorities have implemented several policies to benefit Taiwanese in mainland.⁹⁸ I assumed that these policies *per se*, whether they are out of political interests or not, are based on the status quo that “Taiwan is a renegade province” of mainland. It has implicated that Taiwanese couldn’t benefit more in their daily life either reunification or independence in politics which has also reinforced and concreted Taiwanese identity potentially. Therefore, it has interpreted why Taiwanese students in mainland have nonetheless recognized their Taiwanese identity rather Chinese identity, albeit the positive policies have been implemented, as well as Taiwanese identity has rooted among Taiwanese nowadays, whereas leaning to status quo rather than independence is still the mainstream of Taiwanese toward their national identity. Taiwanese independence is only one of the manifestations of Taiwanese identity but not the dominant one? Rather, “collective memory” has underpinned the matrix of Taiwanese identity. It is a sorrowful memory of February 28 Incident; a fearful memory of White Terror; a orphan memory of withdrawing from United Nations; a drastic memory of political party rotation; an enshrined memory of home. Ironically, the “collective memory” that once divided Taiwanese into several groups, today rallies the Taiwanese and constitutes Taiwanese identity.

Lin Yang-min has illustrated that Taiwanese have been on the island as long as Americans have been in America. If Americans emigrated from different parts of the world considered American as their fatherland, why Taiwanese shouldn’t take Taiwan as their one and only fatherland?⁹⁹ Stephane Corcuff has drawn a parallel that how

⁹⁶ Stephane Corcuff (2002) “Taiwan’s ‘Mainlanders,’ New Taiwanese?” in Stephane Corcuff, ed.; *Memories of the Future*. NY: M.E. Shape. 187

⁹⁷ Lin Chia-lung (2002) “The political Formation of Taiwanese nationalism” in Stephane Corcuff, ed.; *Memories of the Future*. NY: M.E. Shape. 234

⁹⁸ There are fifteen preferential treatments announced after the second visit of KMT, including accrediting higher academic background in Taiwan, measuring Chinese tourists to allowing Taiwanese to practice medicine in mainland and so on. See more at Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/gzyw/gzyw1.asp?gzyw_m_id=1021 (in Chinese)

⁹⁹ Alan M. Wachman (1994) *National Identity and Democratization*. NY: M.E. Shape. 104

many year generations and years can an ethnic group, *e.g.* Jewish diaspora and Tibetan refugees, coming from outside maintain its ethnic specificity? A large outdoor concert which named “*Taike* Rock Music Festival” was held in Taichung in April 2006. Several politicians have been to the festival and labeled themselves as members of “*taike*”, which would be peculiar and uncanny no long ago.¹⁰⁰ The political spectrum has witnessed the term “*taike*” has transferred from a derogatory meaning to a representation of Taiwanese identity and more distinct that Taiwanese identity is the mainstream of the political climate. Similarly, my research in Shanghai has also reflected the kaleidoscope versions of Taiwanese in Shanghai toward the cultural, ethnic and political identity toward Taiwan. Precisely, more pluralistic, flexible, and pragmatic criterion of Taiwanese identity in response to the peaceful milieu, business climate, and sustainability of offspring are manifested. And this salience might be the matrix of Taiwanese identity.

¹⁰⁰ ETToday <http://www.ettoday.com/2006/04/02/329-1924203.htm> (in Chinese)

7. Glossary

<i>Kuomintang</i>	國民黨	国民党
<i>Bengshengren</i>	本省人	本省人
Chen Shui-bian	陳水扁	陈水扁
Chen Yi	陳儀	陈仪
Chiang Ching-kuo	蔣經國	蒋经国
Chiang Kai-shek	蔣介石	蒋介石
<i>da han zhuyi</i>	大漢主義	大汉主义
<i>dangwai</i>	黨外	党外
<i>feichu</i>	廢除	废除
<i>fuwuyuan</i>	服務員	服务员
<i>guanxi</i>	關係	关系
<i>guoyu</i>	國語	国语
<i>Hakka</i>	客家	客家
<i>Hua ren</i>	華人	华人
<i>juancun</i>	眷村	眷村
Kangxi	康熙	康熙
Lee Teng-hui	李登輝	李登辉
<i>luodi shenggen</i>	落地生根	落地生根
<i>luoye guigen</i>	落葉歸根	落叶归根
Ma Ying-jeou	馬英九	马英九
<i>Meilidao</i>	美麗島	美丽岛
Ming	明	明
<i>Minnan</i>	閩南	闽南
Peng Ming-min	彭明敏	彭明敏
Qing	清	清
<i>sanmin zhuyi</i>	三民主義	三民主义
<i>shengming gongtongti</i>	生命共同體	生命共同体
Shi Lang	施琅	施琅
Sun Yet-sen	孫中山	孙中山
<i>Taibouzheng</i>	臺胞證	台胞证
<i>taike</i>	台客	台客
<i>Taiwan guoyu</i>	臺灣國語	台湾国语
<i>Taiwan ren</i>	臺灣人	台湾人
<i>tongxianghui</i>	同鄉會	同乡会
<i>tongyi duominzu de guojia</i>	統一多民族的國家	统一多民族的国家
<i>Waidiren</i>	外地人	外地人

<i>wailai</i>	外來	外来
<i>Waishengren</i>	外省人	外省人
<i>Wei he er zhang?</i>	為何而戰？	为何而战？
<i>Wei shui er zhang?</i>	為誰而戰？	为谁而战？
<i>weizao</i>	偽造	伪造
<i>wulun</i>	五倫	五伦
<i>wuxiao</i>	無效	无效
<i>xiaojie</i>	小姐	小姐
<i>xie nong yu shui</i>	血濃於水	血浓于水
<i>Yaxiya de guer</i>	亞細亞的孤兒	亚细亚的孤儿
Zheng Chenggong	鄭成功	郑成功
Zheng Jing	鄭經	郑经
<i>zhengming</i>	正名	正名
<i>zhongguo</i>	中國	中国
<i>Zhongguo Taibei</i>	中國臺北	中国台北
<i>Zhongguo wenhua</i>	中國文化	中国文化
<i>Zhonghua Taibei</i>	中華臺北	中华台北
<i>Zhonghua wenhua</i>	中華文化	中华文化

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