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Modern European Mythmaking:

The Use of Myth in the European Union

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Abstract

This thesis explores the idea of a united Europe, while treating this idea as a political myth. A discussion will be given on how myths work in politics and how they have been used in certain past events in Europe. The ECSC and Eastern enlargement will be used in explaining different aspects of how the idea of a united Europe has been used. These two instances represent different aspects of the European project and serve as a means of showing how the use of the myth has changed over time. The paper will also highlight some of the shortcomings of the application of the myth. For example, until recently, it has not been used in such a way as to help integrate the people of Europe. Though Europe may be growing towards unity in many areas, the people of Europe do not seem to be thinking of themselves as being European, which keeps Europe from being seen as united. Though this issue does not speak negatively on the myth itself, it does point to some of the shortcomings of its effectiveness as an idea to help Europe achieve unity.

Key words: European myths, Eastern Enlargement, European Coal and Steel Community, identity, political mythmaking

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1. Introduction

In the 60 years since World War II, the political environment in Europe has undergone significant changes. Before World War II had ended, calls were made for Europe to become united in order to put an end to its history of conflict and eliminate the possibility for future war. Over time, we have seen the emergence of a Europe that seems to be slowly becoming united. Before unity could exist, however, past differences had to be overcome. In order to do so, the idea emerged that Europe needed to be united if it were to achieve peace. The founders of the European project built upon this idea when they set out to lay the foundations of what we know as the EU.

1.1 Statement of Purpose

The aim of this paper is to trace the usage of the idea of a united Europe through some of the major developments in the history of the European project. European politicians have worked upon the premise that Europe needs to be united. This paper will strive to answer the question of how the myth of a united Europe has been used. In doing so, I hope to also explain why it has been used and whether or not it has changed over time.

This paper will treat the idea that Europe needs to be united as being a political myth. It is an ideal that has been used throughout the history of post World War II Europe and still carries a great deal of weight. It has been used as a principle for decisions that have been taken in modern Europe, and it serves as a foundation on which to build a more closely united Europe. Why did Europe choose this ideal after World War II and is it still relevant today?

This paper will explore the idea of a united Europe by looking at two cases: the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the Eastern Enlargement. These cases have been chosen because they deal with the earliest and latest major developments in the history of uniting Europe. And since they focus on different aspects of European unity, they help to give a better picture of how the myth has worked in different areas. They can also serve as a way of seeing whether or not the myth has changed throughout the evolution of the European project and help in judging how relevant it still is in the current workings of the EU.

The idea of a united Europe first truly came into play with the creation of the ECSC. The ECSC itself did not unite Europe, but it did pave the way for more regional cooperation and had the idea of creating a more closely unified Europe. The ECSC also came into being right before World War II formally ended and is symbolic of learning from past mistakes. The Treaty of Versailles had crippled Germany after World War I, and instead of choosing the route of punishment (which could have led to new conflicts), they chose the route of cooperation. It also laid the foundation for actors to become socialized into a more European way of thinking.

One of the most important recent developments in the EU has been the Eastern Enlargement. In enlarging, they have taken a step towards destroying the divide that existed in Europe throughout the cold war. This enlargement also represents one of the boldest steps taken by the EU. They have reached out to countries less wealthy and less stable. They also symbolically helped to eliminate a similar divide as the one that the ECSC did. Throughout the Cold War, the East had been on a different side than the West, much like the Franco-German divide of previous times. The enlargement was a decisive step towards showing that the divide was no more. It also helps to strengthen the idea that some form of common identity exists among the peoples of Europe, at least the elites.

With every new regulation, member states see a small amount of power being transferred to the EU. Though major developments, such as the introduction of the Euro, show that Europe is becoming more unified, it is the everyday actions in the EU that lead to a degree of unity that is much less discussed. Both accomplish the same goal. Power is slowly transferred from the member states to Brussels. More decisions become Europeanized, which lessens the amount of sovereignty that each member state has. These actions help to set the course for European unity.

This paper will not seek to evaluate or criticize the intentions of creating a united Europe. It is an attempt to understand the desire for a united Europe and how that desire fits into the activities of the EU. In gaining a better understanding of the myth, we are better able to understand the political environment within Europe. At the same time, I will attempt to remind the reader of Europe's past. History is, of course, essential in understanding the developments of the EU, but it is also important in working to understand whether or not the myth has really helped Europe to overcome its past. For the myth to truly be successful, it will have to be strong enough to overcome the myths that are already an integral part of the history of each member state.

Much of what has been written on modern myths in Europe seeks to argue that there is not a mythological foundation in the form of common history in order to truly justify the creation of a united Europe. It is argued that Europe needs common myths on which to build, for example, societal norms. This subject will not be explicitly discussed within this paper. I will keep the focus of this paper to dealing with the creation and evolution of the myth of a united Europe rather than delving into what these other myths would entail.

1.2 Methodology

This paper will examine how the myth of a united Europe has been used to unite Europe by looking at two cases. The first case examined will be the ECSC, as it was the first step towards uniting Europe. The second case examined will be the Eastern enlargement, as the reasons for this enlargement have more to do with non-economic factors. These two cases represent the earliest and latest major developments in the history of the EU, and they help to illustrate how the process of European integration

has changed over time. They will also help to show that the motivation for further integration is not simply based on economics.

This paper will examine these cases in several ways. It will examine the historical significance of the cases and some of the rhetoric and arguments used for the justification of the development. I will also show how each development fits with the idea of making Europe more united. In employing these methods of examination, it should help the reader to understand that European unity is one of the goals behind these actions. From the earliest developments of the European project, I will show that many of the motivations behind the process were political, even though they may seem to be primarily economic in nature.

This sort of methodology will also help the reader to see the primary areas on which the European project has engaged in integration. In doing so, this methodology will serve as a means of highlighting some of the strengths and weaknesses of the European project. These strengths and weaknesses will be important when evaluating the myth. Since the myth has shown great strength in certain areas of integration and has failed to work in others, it will help in judging how successful this myth has been and how much of its goal it seems able to accomplish.

Myths must be examined from different angles if they are to be understood. It is important to know the historical environment from which the myth was formed in order to get a general understanding of what led to the formulation of the myth. From there, cases where the myth has been used serve as examples of how the myth works and how strong it is. By incorporating functionalism into this paper, I hope to show how the founders of the European project set their idea in motion towards something that could be a reality on the surface. Social constructivism helps to address more factors that arise when considering myths, such as linguistics, symbols, and identity. With these factors in mind, it becomes easier to see the areas that myths must address on a social level, and, for a myth to truly work, it must be believed on a social level.

1.3 Theoretical framework

This paper will incorporate several theories. Functionalism will be used when looking at the ECSC as it gives strong insights as to why they began the European project in that particular way. In the section on Eastern Enlargement, social constructivism will be used as it deals with factors on identity formation. The overall analysis will be primarily social constructivist in nature, especially in reference to the later developments and the possible shortcomings of early integration.

Functionalism is one of the earliest theories on European integration. Though it is not used very often today, it does a very good job of explaining early integration in Europe. The concept of spillover is especially helpful because it explains that cooperation in one area will lead to cooperation in other areas. Functionalism also concerns itself with how national preferences (especially in the business sphere) can lead to further integration. Since, the earliest developments in Europe were based primarily around economic integration, functionalism serves as a means of understanding how cooperation in certain areas could lead actors to wanting cooperation in more areas. This idea of spillover will help to illustrate the genius of

the founders of the EU. They realized that people would see that cooperation was mutually beneficial, making them want to develop further cooperation.

Social constructivism will be especially helpful because it concerns itself more with developments within the social sphere. It helps in explaining how ideas come about and how they take shape in society. Furthermore, it helps to shed light on the effects that ideas can have and the process of socializing people into those ideas. Social constructivism works to evaluate some of the sociological and psychological factors associated with European integration, as well as including what effects actors have on the process. In this sense, actors do not only include individuals. They also include institutions, member states, and societal norms which all play a role in shaping the modern political sphere in Europe. Additionally, it also helps to highlight what effects the process has on actors. By looking at the European project from both angles, it becomes easier to see the differences in the socialization of the European elite and the masses.

Together, functionalism and social constructivism can lead to a better understanding of the idea of a united Europe. Functionalism will serve in explaining the reasons for the early developments, while social constructivism will show how these early developments have shaped thought within Europe, which is very important when looking at the Eastern enlargement. Functionalism, itself, is also indicative of some of the problems with the method of early integration. Functionalism does not delve into integration on the social sphere, in part, because the social sphere was a later development in European integration.

These theories also represent the evolution of how thought on European integration has changed over time. Functionalism is one of the earliest theories, whereas social constructivism is one of the latest. They are symbolic of how integration has evolved over time which is indicative of some of the shortcomings of the original myth. They will also serve to show how the application of the myth has changed over time and where it is believed more strongly.

The study of myth has been approached from almost every angle possible. Myth "reaches its full force when man has to face an unusual and dangerous situation" (Cassirer 278). For the purposes of this paper, the situation is the rebuilding of Europe after World War II. It also represents an overcoming of Europe's mythic past through the use of rationalism. Hansen and Williams write that:

> the entire argument concerning the mythic necessity of the EU hinges on an opposition between myth and rationalism that simply cannot be sustained, for the opposition between rationality and an historical, mythic culture of identity represents one of the most powerful and defining myths of the modern world – that of modernity as a whole (Hansen and Williams).

Thus, myth must be looked at in this context as being in conflict with the rationality of modern Europe, yet it also represents a necessity in the creation of the European project.

This rational versus mythical conflict will be important throughout this paper. Certain aspects of European integration seem to make the project seem purely rational, but other areas will certainly seem to have their roots in myth. It also becomes clear that myth is an essential part of the European project and that the lack

of acceptance of European myths by the masses has caused some difficulties for the project. European myths also face a difficult task in working to supersede the myths that already exist in European history, which are typically central to the individual member states.

1.4 What is meant by myth

In this paper, myth refers to "a foundational principle that is deemed to be true, where no empirical basis for the principle exists" (Daniel Fernald). A myth can never become truth; it can only be accepted as truth. Myths also serve as a basis on which to work towards goals. Acceptance is the essential factor that can give a myth power; without acceptance, it loses its meaning. Myth also does not necessarily denote something bad. For example, "all men are created equal" is a myth (Declaration of Independence). We, however, accept it as truth, and it serves its purpose. Myths come about because they are needed to accomplish a certain task. They serve as the foundation for what can become a rational process, though it should be noted that the mythic foundation will continue to exist regardless of how rational the process may be.

The idea that Europe needs to be united if it is to achieve peace and prosperity is a myth. There is no historical evidence that a united Europe would be a peaceful Europe. This myth, however, has taken root in the European elite. It is taken as truth, which can be seen in the workings of the EU. Furthermore, there is little debate today on whether or not Europe should be united. The debate focuses more on how much Europe should be united. This debate, however, never really seems to derail the European project, and Europe continues to become more interconnected.

2. The nature of Myth

Cassirer states that, "the new political myths do not grow up freely; they are not wild fruits of an exuberant imagination. They are artificial things fabricated by very skilful and cunning artisans" (Cassirer 282). The myth of a united Europe is certainly no different. The politicians behind the foundation of the European project knew that European unity could not be achieved instantaneously. They also knew that economic interdependence was the best means of working to unite Europe, so that is where they began. They knew that they had to prove that a united Europe could be possible, and they also had to prove that it would be beneficial to all the member states. In essence, they could bring the myth into being, but they required the support of the people to really give the myth life.

Cassirer states that "politicians know very well that great masses are much more easily moved by the force of imagination than by sheer physical force" (Cassirer 289). Modern Europe knows this better than almost anyone. Attempts have been made in the past to bring parts of Europe together by force. Never was force truly successful. Part of the EU's success is its slow evolution. They work to show how unity is mutually beneficial, which, in turn, helps to strengthen the desire for further integration. They also work to show why further integration is important to the continued success of the European project, thereby creating a situation where moving the project forward seems like the only logical option.

Even during World War II, visions of a peaceful, united Europe were beginning to unfold. "The Ventotene Manifesto" states that "the question which must first be resolved, and if it is not then any other progress made up to that point is mere appearance, is that of the abolition of the division of Europe into national, sovereign states" (Spinelli and Ernesto 4-5). Spinelli and Ernesto saw unity as a necessity and went on to paint a picture of why they believed it to be so critical. World War II should be seen as the major turning point for Europe. 19th Century philosophy was greatly based on the idea of power. World War II served as a means of showing Europe just how destructive power could be. They also knew that the divisions between European countries would fuel the desire for countries to be more powerful in order to be more influential. Learning these harsh lessons, they grew to believe that the only way to end violence on the European continent was for Europe to become united. To them a united Europe was essentially considered a necessity if Europe were to survive. They also reference one of the primary issues that the myth was set up to destroy: nationalism. In destroying the nation state structure in Europe, it would seem that nationalism could also be vanquished. People would be united under a single government, rather than multiple ones.

2.1 How this Myth was Formed

The modern idea of a united Europe came about, in part, as a result of Europe's past. 19th Century Europe especially can be characterized by power politics. We also saw the creation of a unified Germany and Italy during this time. This era also showed the rise of philosophies on nationalism within Europe, which turned out to be a forceful idea. After World War II, some among the European elite were anxious to put this idea of power politics and nationalism behind them. They preferred the path of cooperation in economics to bring Europe together.

In order to truly understand some aspects of the need for a united Europe, however, we must go back to colonial times. Most European states had colonies. Colonies provided European countries with raw materials, new markets, and wealth to name a few. After World War II, colonialism was over. The need for markets and raw materials continued. Cooperation between European states would help these problems to be less. Additionally, proximity makes them a logical choice. With the death of colonialism, some of Europe's influence throughout the world was lessened as well. If they were to regain their influence, they needed to cooperate.

World War II served as the ultimate reason for Europe to become united. It needed to be assured that Germany would end its history of aggression, thereby making war on Europe less likely. Past animosities between states in Europe were also a factor that needed to be overcome. To do so, strong nationalistic tendencies would have to be overcome, and cooperation was seen as the best way of ensuring that this animosity was defeated.

The project of creating a united Europe did not come because of a desire from the masses; it was and is a project of the elite. The masses did, however, go along with the project with little (if any) resistance. The project has grown from its roots in the Schuman declaration, and Europe is now in the process of ratifying a constitution. The question still remains, however, of how strong the idea of a united Europe is with the European citizen. The idea is certainly alive and well among the European elite, but Europe can only travel so far by elite actions. Europe can never truly be united if the people of Europe do not want to feel as though they are united in some way.

Myths have always been used in the sphere of politics. The EU is no different. The origins of the EU can be traced back to the post-World War II calls for a united Europe. In 1948, Winston Churchill stated that, "we must build a kind of United States of Europe" (Churchill 8). Churchill believed that this action was necessary in order for the survival of Europe. It is debatable on what exactly Churchill envisioned when he discussed a "United States of Europe", and he did not include Great Britain in his idea of a united Europe. His prominence in Europe after World War II does help to give strength to his statement though. He was no stranger to the brutality that the continent of Europe had experienced, and he was insightful enough to see that some form of a united Europe would help to curb the possibility of future war on the continent.

2.2 How myth works

The political myth in metaphysics fulfills two functions. In the first place, it provides the core of ideological animus which is projected upon the universe.

Secondly, in its metaphysical form, the political myth provides the political theorist with an underpinning for his political philosophy, The political myth is a projection of social values upon the world as a whole; it then returns as a metaphysics to provide the 'foundation' for those values (Feuer 332).

 In a sense, this circle makes political myths invulnerable. To an extent, they are created within their own context and are self-contained entities. Myths can work because they serve as an answer to a question that has otherwise not been answered, they can also support themselves because they have not yet been tried. Additionally, the more widespread the values are, the stronger that the myth becomes. It then seems as though the myth could actually be truth because the values are so widespread.

Political myths can start on a metaphysical level as an idea. In Aristotelian terms, these myths can serve as a first cause. They become the original platform that is accepted so that other developments can take place. They are initially accepted as being 'truth' even though there is no real proof behind them. They are then accepted, changed, or rejected depending on whether or not they prove to be useful. Once their use has been determined, or, in other words, after they have been put into practice, the process of socialization is the next major step. People have to grow into the myth. It must appeal to them in some way that makes them willing to accept it as being something that is 'real'. It needs to appeal to some part of their being that will make them willing to accept it and follow the people that are pushing it upon them.

Myths do not have to be feared, but they must be understood. Without understanding them, it is more difficult to grasp their power. It is also important to understand myths for what they are before choosing to accept or reject them. Since myths make up much of our political environment, they have become almost commonplace in our society. Myths can be used, for example, in creating a social framework; however, people still have to understand its meaning, strengths, and weaknesses in order to truly accept it.

Language and symbols play an important role in socializing people into myths. Language is always important because over time it can change the way that people perceive their environment. Many philosophers have argued that we are bound by language, which can keep us from being able to express certain things. Language also gives us insight as to how people perceive their environment. The Sámi, for example, have 12 different words for snow. It shows the significance that this force plays in their world. In EU studies, we have seen the development of Eurospeak which can also help to shape the way that the EU is perceived. In entering into the language, these European ideas become more commonplace, which helps them to become a more present part of people's everyday environment.

Language is, however, not enough. As Cassirer states, "the skillful use of the magic word is not all. If the word is to have its full effect it has to be supplemented by the introduction of new rites" (Cassirer 284). With the use of the Euro, 12 countries in Europe are exposed daily to European symbols. In addition, they are using a currency named after Europe, not their own countries. The EU also has its own flag which can be seen throughout Europe. These symbols may not seem terribly

significant at first glance, but they are methods of helping to socialize people into a more "European" way of thinking.

Language and symbols also serves as a way for Europe to seem more united. Over time, these actions can affect the psyche of people. Cassirer writes that ""he no longer questions his environment; he accepts it as a matter of course" (Cassirer 286). These acts help create the impression that Europe is locked into a path towards unity (which it may well be), and it can work towards creating an environment where people no longer question the political actions because they seem like they are simply a matter of course. New generations will grow up seeing these symbols of European unity, and it could work to create an environment where the idea seems commonplace.

Barnett informs us that "EU cultural policy is understood primarily at face value, as an attempt to reshape the affective identifications of citizens around a set of coherent symbols of European unity" (Barnett 407). The use of symbols serves as a reminder for the advances that have been made in European integration. Evidence, however, suggests that these symbols have not been as effective as would be desired by some. They do help to give a reminder of what degree of unity has been achieved in Europe though, and they serve as symbols which can help in shaping the long term identification that citizens can have. Symbols do not lead to immediate identification, but their increased presence can aid to a gradual socialization. It takes time for symbols and language to take root within a society and be recognized.

"A political myth, as Sorel emphasized, is a construction in which men who are participating in a great social movement picture their actions as part of an on-going battle in which their cause is certain to triumph" (Feuer 332). The political myth is a way of helping people in achieving their goals. It gives them a basis on which they can build where no foundation previously existed. The founders of the EU were no different. They saw their project as an essential movement for the survival of Europe. A united Europe was seen as a means for spreading peace and prosperity throughout Europe, and they felt that it would gain support as people saw how beneficial it could be. They felt that the project would succeed even though it would take time. A situation is also created where these people are seen as great figures in history, which helps to give their ideas more strength.

The idea of creating a united Europe has to do, in part, with ending conflict between different groups. As Bartelson writes, "the creation of a state reflects a successful attempt to overcome antagonism between the members of a given society. Internal strife has compelled them to submit to a sovereign authority" (Bartelson 268). In uniting Europe, it is thought that Europe would undergo this transformation as well. It would be a way of creating harmony internally, which would be a way of solving the problem of war on the European continent. It also serves as a way of overcoming past nationalistic tendencies and create an environment of understanding among the people of Europe.

Bartelson also states that "when the modern system of states emerged, the question of peace ceased to be a matter of mediation between God and man. Instead, the problem became conceived of in terms of the distinction—drawn in theory and practice alike—between the domestic and the international" (Bartelson 255). From this logic, by increasing the area that is considered 'domestic', peace could be

achieved on a wider scale by enhancing the area that was thought of as being 'domestic'. Through the advances in Europe, we have seen the abolition of internal borders. Actions such as these help the EU to be seen as more of a domestic area. In viewing the EU as being a single area, affairs of each country in Europe affect every other country in the union. For example, an economic decline in one country will create problems for other countries in the union as well. Problems in a member state are no longer the problem of just that member state, it is an issue for the entire EU.

These ideas build on Kant's concept of perpetual peace. This idea has to do with the overcoming of nature through the use of reason. In using pure reason, we should be able to overcome the obstacles that exist in nature (nature refers not only to the natural world but also human nature). For example, the European project can be seen as an attempt to overcome the nationalistic tendencies of the member states in order to achieve peace. The European project speaks to the positive aspects and shortcomings of this idea. The process itself had a logical starting point and has progressed in a logical way from that point. The motivations for beginning the process; however, have their roots in an idea. The idea may have come in part from the use of reason, but it is still only an idea.

The building of a united Europe upon mythic foundations does not make the project a bad idea. It is just important to realize that there is a distinction between myth and reason. In discussing the ECSC, the process of integration seems quite rational, but the reasons for enlargement have more in common with the myth of creating a united Europe. What we can learn is that even though reason may play a significant part in the process of uniting Europe, the process is not based on pure reason.

Myths are not a new phenomenon in the political sphere. Many, if not all, societies have been built on some mythical foundation. In Japan, for example, it was believed that the emperor was a direct descendant of the sun god. In Plato's <u>Republic</u>, attempts were made to do away with myth by casting the poets out of the city for writing falsities. At the same time, however, Plato was doing little more than creating his own mythology.

3. The Use of Myth in Europe

A discussion on the Middle Ages and Nazi Germany can serve as two of the best illustrations on how myths can be used in politics. In both cases, we can see myths having deep cultural influence and creating a strong motivating force within the society. We also see the dangers of allowing myths to go unchecked and not being understood. These myths are some of the past myths that we have seen coming out of Europe, and though they do not speak directly to the current European myths, they do give a good idea of how powerful myths can be.

The idea of uniting Europe is nothing revolutionary. It has never been tried in its current manifestation, but other myths exist in Europe's history which sought to accomplish the same goal. These past myths will be discussed as a way of showing that Europe has great experience with mythmaking, especially when it comes to unity. These myths illustrate some of the factors that must be considered when examining myths, such as social conditions, history, and philosophy of the time. These factors will be important in examining the myth of a united Europe.

3.1 The Middle Ages

In the Middle Ages, the church was the supreme entity. Myth existed under the name *fides* (Latin for faith). Faith dominated most aspects of Medieval life. One needs to look no further than many towns in Europe to see this phenomenon. The cathedrals are almost always the largest and most spectacular buildings. The transition from Romanesque to Gothic architecture even shows the desire to reach closer to heaven. God was the most important figure in Medieval life, and the pope grew to immense importance since he was God's voice on Earth. Country leaders also grew to believe that they had been ordained by heaven, which helped in creating justification for their rule via divine right.

Cassirer states that, "the totality of mankind appeared as a single state founded and monarchically governed by God himself and every partial unity, ecclesiastic or secular, derived its right from this primeval unity" (Cassirer 107). One state united under God would be the most perfect ideal. This type of leadership could also provide everyone and everything with its proper place in the scheme of things. God, however, is not physically manifested on Earth. The pope, however, is considered to be His most important emissary on Earth. Thus, it becomes logical to create the unified state under the authority of the pope, since he is directly associated with God. In doing so, all problems can be solved because a situation is created where a ruler is thought to be gaining guidance from an infallible being.

This idea would make sense in a time when faith is supreme. If God really exists, then it would be a perfect society if He were to rule it. Seeing that this is impossible on Earth, it would make sense to give authority to His most important apostle on Earth. It also helps to free people from responsibility. If the rule of law is

being handed down directly from God, then it is infallible, making it impossible to justify not respecting it.

To a certain extent, we saw power become centralized in Rome as faith grew to penetrate many aspects of people's lives. Eventually, we saw the rise of myth going against logic during the Inquisition. In *Monty Python and the Holy Grail* there is a famous scene about witches. The logic is that if the woman is made of wood and weighs the same as a duck, then she is a witch (*Monty Python and the Holy Grail*). The logic is certainly faulty, and it was obvious from the beginning that the woman had been set up by the villagers, yet the charge of being a witch was brought against many people for various reasons. The Inquisition grew to an extent that defied all logic, yet it fit perfectly with the myth. *Exodus 22:18* states "you shall not permit a sorceress to live" (The Bible). The Church could stand on the words of The Bible when it came to matters concerning witchcraft. No other justification was needed. The Bible was the word of God, so it had to be obeyed.

Through the Middle Ages, we see the dangers associated with blind acceptance of myths. It even led to the killing of millions. The Middle Ages serves as an exemplary example of what can happen when myth is allowed to go unchecked. The problem did not necessarily lie in a problem with faith but rather with acceptance of actions in the name of religion and fear that faith could be compromised by outside forces.

The Middle Ages can also be seen as one of the first attempts to unite Europe. We saw the emergence of the idea of Christendom, which would have created a form of a united Europe. Europe would have shared a common faith and seen a form of common leadership in the pope. Though the pope may not have served as the only leader and countries would still have their own leaders, he would have been the supreme authority because of the power of faith. This idea represents one of the earliest attempts to unite Europe under a single banner, and though it was not successful, the idea of Christianity has been used to show that the member states of the EU do have something in common.

3.2 Nazi Germany

Nazi Germany provides an example of one of the most elaborate mythologies to be accepted by people. Due to the philosophical thought that had predated Nazi Germany, it became possible for the Nazis to justify themselves by building on these ideas. It also shows how strong myths can appeal to people when the social conditions are ripe. Like the Middle Ages, the Nazi mythology was able to function as a way of ensuring that people were able to justify any action when ordered by the state. People were not encouraged to think for themselves. They were taught to take the word of the government as being infallible; therefore freeing them from any emotion about whether their actions were right or wrong.

The Nazi mythology came to life via Franz List. He felt that the Austro-Hungarian Empire was being overrun by the Czechs. The myth, however, never gained full power until the time of Hitler. The Nazis combined hero worship theories of Carlyle with the race theory of Gobineau and turned it into a method for making it

seem as though the Aryan race was the supreme race. They were able to effectively transform this theory into creating a scapegoat for the problems in Germany: the Jews. The Judeo-Christian culture could be seen as the culture that had destroyed the true Germanic spirit; thereby being responsible for the decline of Germany. The logic may be flawed, but in desperate times human nature tends to work towards looking for a way of placing blame for problems on someone or something else.

In 1840, Carlyle introduced the idea of hero worship. He believed that hero worship could serve as a means for stabilizing society. People can cling to the idea of a hero, and people like strong figures. In theory, the idea does show promise because it lays a framework for people to follow these strong characters. The effects of his speech ended in a rather different manifestation. For Germany after World War I, the idea was especially able to take root. Hitler was able to restore order and some prosperity in Germany which turned him (and the Nazi Party) into a form of a hero. Under Carlyle's theory, it makes sense for people to rally behind him. After all, he was able to present himself as a strong character and was able to restore economic order to Germany.

Gobineau's race theory helped to compliment Carlyle's idea of hero worship into something that could be truly explosive. By using history, Gobineau set out to prove that the white race was superior to all other races. He pointed to the advances that had been made in Europe as compared to those in the rest of the world and used his logic to make it seem as though all the important advances in the rest of the world were due to influence by the white race. Arguments that could have refuted his belief were simply left out of his works in order to make them appear solid. It also could appeal to people in Europe simply because feeling that one is superior is a novel thought. For Nazi Germany, this idea could become an extremely powerful tool.

First, the idea of hero worship helped to set up the foundations for the following of someone, even if he was extremely radical. Then, the idea that the white race was superior helped to create a way for the blame of Germany's past troubles onto other groups of people. After all, the most white of all people would be the Aryans since they seem to be the most pure blooded. These ideas helped to bolster support for Hitler's cause, and they served as a way of providing some form of evidence that the Nazis were right, as well as helping in the creation of propaganda.

Though Hitler's logic was completely flawed, he was able to create a mythical structure that appealed to an almost destitute Germany. Furthermore, his success in helping Germany to work its way out of the Great Depression only helped to support his ideas and increase his popularity. In being able to rebuild Germany and bring some amount of stability to the country, he was able to gain support and be thought of as a hero. He was able to show that he had the qualities to restore Germany to greatness, and he had proven himself.

The Nazi mythology shows how a myth can appeal to people in a desperate state. The Germans suffered from the Treaty of Versailles, and Hitler was able to create a scapegoat by using the Jews. He was also able to appeal to the German spirit in such a way that they truly felt that they did not deserve the life that they had. In doing so, he was able to gain support for his cause.

Nazi Germany was also an attempt to unite Europe in its own way. The Nazis used several methods to work towards this goal. First, they sought to unite Europe

through the use of physical force. More importantly, however, they sought to cleanse Europe so that only one race would exist. They even experimented on people in order to figure out a way of creating a unified race.

It also served as a catalyst for the creation of a united Europe. It was felt that Germany must be held in check. The destruction of World War II was too great for Europe to let it happen again. They knew that past differences would have to be put aside, especially differences between France and Germany, if peace were ever to exist on the European continent.

The myth of a united Europe was set up, in part, to fight against the past myths in Europe, particularly the myths associated with nationalism. In creating a form of a united Europe, they felt that they would be able to create a counter balance to nationalism. If it could be proven that Europe can be united, then it would essentially serve as the fatal blow to nationalism within Europe and all of the destruction that had come along with it. This modern myth of a united Europe can be seen as a rational approach to fighting off past myths. The fight could not, however, be started without implanting another myth that could possibly grow stronger than the previous myths within Europe.

3.3 Conclusion

As can be seen, the use of myth is not a new development in Europe. The idea of creating some form of a united Europe is also not a new idea. These previous attempts also show us that there is some feeling of kinship that has existed in Europe for over 1000 years. Though it is difficult to know how strong this kinship is, it does help us to see that Europe does have some historical commonality.

The difference in previous attempts to unite Europe and the present one lies primarily in the method. In the Middle Ages, the idea for unity was based on a common element that ran throughout most of Europe. In Nazi Germany, it was based on the idea of force. The previous attempts would also have created more of a centralized authority than seems to be the intention of the EU. Though power in the EU is becoming somewhat centralized, member states do still have competence in many areas.

4. European Coal and Steel Community

The ECSC marks the beginning of the myth of a united Europe being more than simply rhetoric. "The myth projects upon the world the values of the myth-maker" (Feuer 332). With the creation of the ECSC, we see a definite step taken in the direction of making Europe united. It is important to know that myths are biased. The fathers of the European project did have a bias towards creating a united Europe, and it can be seen in their work. This bias, is, of course, well known, but it should be remembered when examining the evolution of the EU.

Functionalism helps to explain why the founders chose this method of uniting Europe. The first step is taken and cooperation in the original field will lead to cooperation in other areas. In the beginning, cooperation in one economic area should cause a spillover effect leading to cooperation in other areas as well. Eventually, economic integration should spillover into the creation of political union. This idea will also serve as a way of seeing the shortcomings of the ECSC. The spillover concept focuses primarily on economics and eventually politics. It, however, fails to address the social sphere.

4.1 History of the ECSC

In 1952, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxemburg, Germany, France, and Italy joined together to form the ECSC. As Robert Schuman wrote, "the pooling of coal and steel production should immediately provide for the setting up of common foundations for economic development as a first step in the federation of Europe" (Schuman 14). The ECSC was a small but decisive step towards integrating Europe. It was the beginning of cooperation between European states that would continue to grow. Schuman assumed that integration in the field of coal and steel would serve as a catalyst for more cooperation which would help to create a federation. The member countries would see the gains that had come about because of cooperation in these two important areas, and they would desire to continue the cooperation in order to have more economic gains.

Coal and steel were a logical starting point. Both are essential for military development and for more general industrialization. Europe had been plagued by two World Wars and reconstruction was essential. In creating the ECSC, they could better help each other to rebuild. The products themselves were essential for rebuilding, but the need for economic growth also existed. Raw materials are not the only entities needed to rebuild a society; capital is also necessary, so it was important to choose a good that would lead to increased capital as well.

Hass states that "the European Coal and Steel Community was initially accepted because it offered a multitude of different advantages to different groups" (Haas 147). One of the reasons behind the success of the ECSC was that groups did benefit from it. It created an environment where businesses were able to profit from

the earliest stages of integration, which always helps to bring a powerful force on board. In proving economic benefits, the project gains some practical and immediate benefits that are able to be realized by all.

Groups did use the ECSC to their advantage. "As far as the industrial groups—business and labor—are concerned, they tend to unite beyond their former national confines in an effort to make common policy and obtain common benefits" (Haas 147). From the early stages, interest groups did take advantage of the freedoms that an integrated market offered them. In organizing beyond national boundaries, they could gain more support for their cause, and they could exert their influence on a supranational level. It gave interest organizations a chance to pool their common concerns and exert their force for more widespread change. This new found influence also helped to support the idea of further uniting Europe. In working beyond the national borders, groups had a way of working towards more widespread change and having more influence on a global scale.

"Aspirations were high on 9 May 1950 when Robert Schuman in proposing the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), in fact announced a plan whose primary goal was to make a future war between Germany and France impossible" (Rittberger 674). The ECSC was seen as a way of to unite Europe's economies in such a way that they would not go to war with each other again. Peace was something that Europe certainly desired after World War II, and they knew that finding a way to end the age old conflict between France and Germany was essential in accomplishing this goal. They also realized that Europe could never be as influential in the world as it would like to be unless they put aside their differences and worked together. Europe had once been the center of Western civilization, and they saw unity as a way to help them regain their status in the world.

The formal institutions of the ECSC did little to address the issue of helping people to feel European. "At the foundation of the European Community in the 1950s, culture did not formally lie within its range of responsibilities" (Barnett 409). The early agreements in Europe did not deal with the issues of culture, which would undoubtedly have been a harder issue to address. The economic issues that were dealt with served as a way to make Europe united on an economic level without really working on the core issue of uniting Europe which would be uniting people. In essence, they started with an area where they could create a form of unity in such a way that the people would almost certainly have to follow. People could not easily go against the developments of the European project if it meant that they would end up losing their jobs and way of life. This action, however, also led to the issue of culture not really being examined until much later in the life of the European project.

4.2 Significance of the ECSC

For Europe to become united, trust between states must exist, especially between France and Germany. These two countries had fought thrice within 100 years. If Europe were to even begin the process of unity, France and Germany would have to gain each other's trust. By starting small with cooperation on coal and steel,

both sides were able to show that they could work together in a way that would benefit each other. They were able to build a trusting relationship.

The preamble to the ECSC Treaty states, "RECOGNIZING that Europe can be built only through practical achievements which will first of all create real solidarity, and through the establishment of common bases for economic development" (Nelson and Stubb 16). This statement fully illustrates two things Europe needed after World War II: solidarity and development. Europe needed these two things to overcome their past and to move forward. Europe could not continue down the path of its past. There was no real hope of prosperity in that path. As Cassirer states, Myth is "the collective desire personified" and "The call for leadership only appears when a collective desire has reached an overwhelming strength and when, on the other hand, all hoped of fulfilling this desire, in an ordinary and normal way, have failed." (Cassirer 280). The elite knew that more war was not in the best interest of Europe. Europeans were weary of war, which helped to give power to the idea that Europe needed to be unified. Europe had to work together if it were to continue to be an important part of the world.

Coal and steel were essential to the rebuilding of Europe. As <u>De Economist</u> states, "by establishing common markets for coal and steel, trade between the countries involved was no longer subject to tariffs; trade with third countries was dealt with uniformly, preventing trade diversions" (Groenendijk and Hospers 602). This action can be seen as having two great benefits. First, it kept the countries within the ECSC from having to pay as much for reconstruction because there were no tariffs. It also meant that no one country could benefit more than the other members through external trade because external tariffs were uniform. In accomplishing these goals, they were able to take the first steps towards creating what would become the internal market.

Coal and steel were chosen for specific reasons. "The set up of the ECSC reflected the strategic importance its founders attached to the coal and steel industry for reconstructing the post-war European economy. Both industries were thought to be the drivers of economic growth…" (Groenendijk and Hospers 606). The members of the ECSC saw cooperation on these products as a way of giving themselves a comparative advantage in the global market. They also saw them as a means to not only rebuild their infrastructure that has been destroyed during the war but also as a way of rebuilding their economies which were left in rough shape after years of war.

In integrating one of the most important products in Europe at the time, they were able to show how integration could be beneficial. If integration led to gains with these essential products, then it could be seen as beneficial to integrate other areas. This action would begin the spillover process and lead to more integration. It was essential, however, to show that integration would be a good thing before more integration would take place, making the choice of coal and steel even more genius.

4.3 Opinions on the ECSC

After the founding of the ECSC, public opinion polls give us an idea of how people perceived it in the early days. Kriesberg found in Germany that "once the ECSC was

functioning, however, general approval rose to 61 percent in October 1952 and ranged even higher for the period afterward" (Kriesberg 29). These numbers were above the approval ratings for the ECSC before it came into force. This rise in approval helps to illustrate that even in the beginning people did have a favorable view towards cooperation in Europe.

Kriesberg also reports that "the political debate leading to the ratification of the treaty establishing the ECSC was highly partisan" (Kriesberg 30). The Christian Democratic Union was in favor and the Social Democratic Party was against. Party affiliation played a role in public opinion in the beginning but tended to be less important after the debate over joining had subsided. What the debate does show us is that differing views between political parties has influenced the debate about the future of Europe since the beginning. When the debate subsides, however, political affiliation loses some of its influence on public opinion, and, in Germany at least, it created a situation where people did tend to feel more favorable towards the ECSC.

The influence of political parties on the debate leads to a larger issue regarding public opinion: the influence that people have on others. Kriesberg's data does not include the influence by friends of the people polled. The influence of other people, however, would be of great importance. To refer back to one of my original points: a myth can only gain life if people believe it to be true. What others think does play an important part of how people think. Environment is one of the most important factors of socialization and much of that is made up of family, friends, and peers.

In regards to the ECSC, Schuman stated that, "in this way there will be realized, simply and speedily; that fusion of interests which is indispensable to the establishment of an economic community; that will be the leaven from which may grow a wider and deeper community between countries long opposed to one another by bloody conflicts […] The proposal will build the first concrete foundation of a European federation" (Groenendijk and Hospers 602). His words help to illustrate that the ECSC was about far more than just coal and steel. It was a way of helping to patch up age old rivalries and, more importantly, a way of building a foundation of a unified Europe. The architects of Europe were insightful enough to know that it would take time to truly unite Europe. They also realized that economic cooperation was one of the best ways to show that European integration would be beneficial.

Schuman was not the only person that saw the ECSC as a step towards European unity. De Economist reports that, "German Chancellor Adenauer was of the same opinion: I was in full agreement with the French Government that the significance of the Schuman proposal was first and foremost political not economic. This Plan was to be the beginning of a federal structure for Europe" (Groenendijk and Hospers 604). Chancellor Adenauer's comment shows that there was little doubt among European politicians as to what the motivations behind the creation of the ECSC were. They saw it as the first step towards creating a unified Europe, and they gave their support to that idea.

4.4 Conclusion

The ECSC helped to give life to the myth of a unified Europe. It was the first step towards creating cooperation within Europe, and it would serve as the groundwork for all things that would come after. It by no means truly united Europe, but it did unite six countries in a way that had never existed before. It helped to create a community of European states that were working together, and it engaged them in dialogues together. More importantly, however, it was the first step towards tying their economies together. It fit with the idea at the time that if countries were economically tied then they would have too much to lose by becoming aggressive towards each other. The ECSC laid the foundation for these countries becoming more interdependent economically, and it would soon lead to a situation where the six would speak with one voice on certain economic issues. These actions could be seen as minimal, but they are very significant when considering the history of Europe.

One important thing to take notice of with the ECSC is the difference in sentiments between the elite and the business groups. The elite saw the ECSC as being politically motivated and as an attempt to unite Europe. Business groups saw European integration as something that could be advantageous for them. They saw it as a way to mobilize beyond transnational borders, and they were in support for the integration process where it could be beneficial, but they were not as keen on integration if it was not economically beneficial. They seem to have seen integration in economic terms, whereas the elite saw it as the foundations of a political process.

Hansen and Williams write that "it was because early functionalist integration embodied and relied upon a certain set of myths and identities (utilitarian, liberal, economistic – what can be termed rationalizing) that it was successfully able to brand this process as 'non political' or 'functional' and to carve out a political space in which it could develop" (Hansen and Williams). One of the reasons that early European integration was so successful is because it was built on mythical foundations that are not as difficult to grasp. The aforementioned ideals can certainly be seen as being important in Europe during the early integration period, and they still play an important role today. They did not, however, constitute a strong political development of any type of really new European identity. In effect, the idea of a united Europe was used only at a functional level in the beginning. It only dealt with issues that were not in an area that could lead to much disagreement. It also served as a way of creating an early European area that was interconnected without really connecting people. It never really dealt with the harder issues of creating a united Europe.

5. Eastern Enlargement

In 2004, the EU enlarged to include ten countries, most of which had formerly been part of the Soviet bloc. Symbolically, it showed that the EU was not a club comprised of only Western Europe. It also helped to eliminate the invisible line that had divided Europe throughout the Cold War.

With the demise of the Soviet Union, the political environment within Europe changed. Central and Eastern European countries became autonomous and were no longer controlled by Moscow. These countries became allowed to make their own political and economic decisions, and they chose to leave behind their authoritarian past in favor of democracy.

Several countries in the East had been an integral part of Europe before the rise of communism, so they felt that they had more in common with Europe than with Russia. In becoming members of the EU they were able to make a great step towards regaining their status in Europe and the world. It also was a way of showing the world they were committed to the idea of democracy and free markets. Within the EU, opinions varied on enlargement. The idea behind the creation of the EU, however, was to create a united Europe. A united Europe could not really become a reality without the inclusion of countries from the former Soviet bloc. These countries were also especially important because they did not have the degree of stability that had been realized by the West. Furthermore, fears existed that the instability of these countries could spread to the West.

5.1 Arguments Surrounding Enlargement

After the end of the Cold War, Friis reports that "relatively quickly, however, member states came to the conclusion that enlargement was the only tool that stood a credible chance of stabilizing Central and Eastern Europe" (Friis 187). There were fears associated with enlargement. After all, the countries of the East were far less developed than the member states, and they were not as stable. The chance for EU membership was, however, a way to help stabilize Eastern Europe. It gave them a set of guidelines for membership in the form of the Copenhagen criteria, and it gave them a credible reason to attempt these reforms. EU membership would bring subsidies and a larger market to these countries from which they would certainly benefit. It also gave the former Soviet bloc countries a way of showing that they were committed to democracy and capitalism.

Friis also informs us that "it is fair to assume that European stability and the success of the EU's foreign policy will very much depend on enlargement" (Friis 188). Europe could not achieve true stability without enlargement. In choosing to include the Eastern countries, they were able to spread the stability that the EU had helped to create in the West to the East. It also served as a powerful tool to help create more stability in the East. Instability could have spread from East to West, and

it was not in the EU's interest to have unstable neighbors. It was to everyone's advantage to see a more stable Eastern Europe. Furthermore, the idea of a united Europe could not truly work if it were limited only to the wealthier West.

One argument given as a reason for enlargement is economics. After all, Eastern enlargement would lead to the EU having access to more resources and more cheap labor. These factors could increase the EU's competitiveness on a global scale. Helene Sjursen, however, states that "most studies of enlargement have come to the conclusion that the economic cost of enlargement will outweigh the gains in the short and medium term" (Sjursen). Her statement seems to suggest that economics may not be as strong of an argument for enlargement as people make it seem. This issue is especially relevant for the net recipients of the EU. They have the most to lose by enlargement because they will no longer receive as much of the EU budget, as money will be going to the new member states.

Another of the major arguments for enlargement is security reasons. Within the EU, however, agreements on security matters could become more difficult. "Due to their geographic location and different historical experiences, the new member states of Central and Eastern Europe will bring new foreign policy perspectives and interests into the EU. Together with different foreign policy interests also come new neighbours and different relations with third states" (Sjursen). Though EU enlargement will certainly help to stabilize the new members, the EU will now be bordering countries that are more unstable than their neighbors before enlargement. It will also be more difficult to form a cohesive Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The opinions of 25 will, of course, be more varied than that of 15, and the new member states do not share the same modern history and relationships that the countries of the West have. These factors will make a cohesive external policy far more complicated than it was before enlargement.

Another argument for enlargement is moral duty. "Indicators of a feeling of a community of values can also be references to 'duty' and solidarity to those that are seen as 'one of us'" (Sjursen). In effect, this leads us to the idea that Europe is made up of a community that shares some common thread. From this, we can also gather that because the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC) are part of this community that there is a moral duty to include them in the EU. These ideas that it was the EU's duty to include these countries must come from somewhere, and that is where myth comes into the picture. In using myth, there is a principle to support why the duty to include these countries exists.

Eastern Europe was regarded as a part of Europe.

> The underlying argument is that Eastern Europe is a part of 'us' that must now be returned: We in Western Europe must not disappoint the great hopes which the peoples of Eastern Europe have of receiving our aid in their current emancipation process. Our credibility depends on how consistently we set our course towards integration to achieve a new European identity (Sjursen).

This statement suggests that a kindred spirit played a large role in the choice for an Eastern Enlargement. It also alludes to the creation of a new European identity. Both of these suggestions show that there was more involved in the debate for enlargement

than simply economics, which helps to reinforce the supposition that the idea of a united Europe still plays a role in shaping decisions within the EU.

5.2 Identity formation

Identity played an important role when considering the choice of enlargement. "It would seem that in order to understand the EU's prioritizations on enlargement should be understood as a form of politics of recognition in which the combined crucial effects of respect for democratic traditions and a sense of shared identity are crucial" (Sjursen). The EU is built on certain values, and the new member states were seen as having these same values. It would also appear that the new member states shared some of the characteristics of what should constitute some form of a European identity. Though there are disputes on whether or not this European identity really exists, it does seem to carry a great deal of weight in the mind of the elite. It was important in the factors for enlargement, and it is important for the future legitimacy of the EU.

A new European identity would have to combine ideals of both Western and Eastern Europe. Though the ideals are similar, recent history will lead to some differences. These identities would, however, have to be reconciled in a functional way for Europe to be united. Time and interaction will be important in helping this culmination of differing identities to take place. In going ahead with the enlargement, Europe has put itself in a position where this combination can happen more quickly. Though at first it seems that enlargement would most assuredly hinder deeper integration, it may serve as beneficial in the social sphere. After all, cultural changes, which are essential in identity formation, take far longer than institutional changes.

The identities of Eastern and Western Europe, however, are not regarded as being entirely different. "The notion of a common destiny between East and West Europe was maintained and gradually reinforced throughout the Cold War. Although the Iron Curtain constituted a border, it was one that was considered imposed by outsiders" (Sjursen). Europe felt a commonality even though it was divided for almost 50 years. More importantly, however, is that this idea was reinforced during the Cold War. We also see that Europe felt divided by outsiders, which makes the divide less influential than if it had been self imposed. It also helps in understanding why the enlargement took place. If a mutual feeling of belonging already existed, then an EU enlargement to include these countries seems to be a logical step. After all, if these countries felt that they had a common destiny; then it makes sense for them to be part of the same order.

As can be seen, the reasons behind enlargement have more to do with social factors than economics. Looking back to the myth helps us to gain a better understanding of this decision. "A society is thus receptive to that philosophy which provides it with the kind of political myth which for non-logical reasons it desires" (Feuer 341). The myth of a united Europe is not based solely on economic gains. Social factors are very important as well. For example, Europe sees itself as being humanitarian and environmentally friendly. In enlarging, they help to show that they are humanitarian, and they spread these ideals. It is immediately obvious that EU

membership will help the CEEC, so the EU can see itself as having done a good thing. The new member states will also be required to adopt the EU's environmental standards, which help in spreading environmental well being.

Though I will not dwell on the debate of identity formation, it is important to mention in the context of enlargement. In order for Europe to be truly united, some form of a European identity will have to exist. Without this identity, people will most likely continue to see their own member state as their primary concern. Recently, with the debate on Turkish accession coming to the forefront, we have seen a rise in the identity debate. Are Turks European or not is a question that has been asked many different times. This question was not as important in the previous enlargement.

The new member states were regarded as being European. They constituted some part of the European identity. They also fit with a preconceived concept of Europe that exists. People would, for example, not question whether Poland was truly a part of Europe. These ideas about Europe help to shape what people perceive as Europe and who they see as being European.

These notions of Europe were essential in the most recent enlargement. It goes back to the idea of uniting Europe. The EU is regarded as a project for Europe, so it does have some basis in what people perceive as being European. How strong this feeling of kinship is remains to be seen, but it will have to grow much stronger for people to first see themselves as Europeans. Whether or not this feeling must exist for Europe to truly be united is, however, another issue.

In enlarging so quickly after the Cold War, the EU helped itself in the process of identity formation in Europe. It could have been that the CEEC could have undergone their own process of regional integration, or they may have joined the Commonwealth of Independent States. Regardless of which path they could have taken, the almost immediate possibility of EU membership suggests an EU sentiment that these countries are a part of 'us'. It helps Eastern Europe to be able to see themselves as belonging, which could be instrumental in building a European identity. If these countries had been shut out, they may have begun to develop their own identities that were somewhat of a contrast to Western Europe. If this action had taken place, it would most certainly have made it harder to create a common identity in the future.

Enlargement was not only an important step for the EU to take, it was also a major step for the new members. Most of these countries had only gained their independence a few years before beginning negotiations with the EU. Due to their recent history, they had to feel that EU membership would be beneficial as well as feeling a sense of belonging. Without the idea of a feeling of kinship, it becomes difficult to understand why these countries would be willing to give up some of their autonomy so soon or undergo the very rigorous reforms that were necessary in order to become members.

5.3 Conclusion

As can be seen, the idea of a united Europe did play a role in the Eastern enlargement. The economic and security arguments simply do not satisfactorily explain the most recent enlargement, and it has been argued that this enlargement could hinder the process of deeper integration. This enlargement does, however, make a large step towards uniting parts of Europe that had been divided essentially since World War II. It also helps the broader process of creating a more common European identity, while fighting the possibility of another one emerging.

6. Has the myth changed over time?

As previously stated, the original idea of why Europe needed to be united was based on achieving peace. Peace has certainly been achieved, yet the integration process continues. At present, it seems unfathomable to think that European states could go to war with each other. Integration, however, is not the only factor to explain this dynamic. Developments in military technology which help to almost ensure mutual destruction make war within such a small area seem completely far fetched. The integration process has also ventured much more in political matters which makes the idea of a united Europe not only seem possible but real.

The European project has changed its use of the myth over time as well. In 1958, Haas asserted that "the 'good Europeans' are not the main creators of the regional community that is growing up; the process of community formation is dominated by nationally constituted groups with specific interests and aims, willing and able to adjust their aspirations by turning to supranational means when this course appears profitable" (Haas 148). This statement refers primarily to the early developments within the ECSC, and it helps to show how group preferences played an important role in the early shaping of the European project. It also shows that the idea of a united Europe was not what motivated some to welcome a more integrated Europe. A united Europe would also be a way in which certain groups could gain economically, which was especially important during the early stages of the European project.

In the arguments for the most recent enlargement, we gather a slightly different train of thought being expressed in Europe. Integration based purely on profit seems to have become less important. The EU has evolved over, and it appears that the norms associated with European integration have become more complex. Interests based solely on economic gains no longer seem to play the same role that they did in the earlier stages of European integration. These new aspects of integration also suggest that the scope of the EU has changed over time. It has become far more involved in the political side of integrating Europe in more recent years, and political integration is far more complicated than economic integration.

One reason for this change is that socialization has taken place within Europe, even if it has been primarily limited to the elite. It is no longer a far-fetched idea to see Europe as being a single entity, and through the promotion of free movement, people and ideas are able to travel much easier than before. One should not also forget the effects of the technology revolution. Communication is no longer timely and expensive. People all over Europe have the ability to talk online which was unavailable 15 years ago. These methods help in the exchange of ideas and promote a mutual understanding between people would have been more difficult to have existed when the ECSC first began. Reports suggest that greater contact between different nationalities within Europe help to lead to people feeling more European, especially when this contact is contrasted by contact with non-Europeans (Bruter 32). This

contact is, however, still limited and not enough to give people a true sense of being European.

Communication between the peoples of Europe will be essential in uniting Europe. "Social communication is the key to building and sustaining communities" (Howe 37). In order to build a community, it is necessary to develop some type of mutual understanding. For the EU, this understanding is especially important between France and Germany, due in part to their history. Through communication, understanding one another becomes easier, which can lead to realizing what a party's motives are. In order for the EU to build a strong community, it would be necessary for people to be working towards the good of Europe as a whole, and it would also be necessary for people not to be worried about the motives of other member states because they would be seen as sharing the same ideals. Through communication, a degree of understanding can be realized that is not able to exist otherwise, and it also leads to people feeling more connected than they would without communication.

In 1998, The European Commission(COM) stated that "if people are to give their full support to and participate fully in European integration, greater emphasis must be placed on their common cultural values and roots as a key element of their identity and their membership of a society founded on freedom, democracy, tolerance and solidarity" (CEC, 1998b, 5). This statement by the COM helps to point to one method of trying to promote a European identity. It is an attempt to remind Europeans of what they do have in common in hopes that it will help them to see that they do have certain things in common with each other. The values mentioned are, however, a bit vague. These values are shared by many countries that are not in Europe, and it does not address some of the deeper aspects of common cultural values. It does, however, show that the formal European institutions are recognizing the need for some integration to take place among the people of Europe which is a major step.

There are no longer as many people calling for a united Europe as there was in the beginning. Many even regard Europe as being run by a technocracy in the form of the COM. This statement would seem to hold some truth as it is mostly made up of experts. Though these experts may drive the day to day activities of the EU, they still do not make up the most essential ingredient for a united Europe to truly exist. Regulations only create artificial developments towards creating a more unified Europe. They are actions that lead to more cohesion between European law, but they do not play as much of a role in socializing people into a more European way of thinking. In essence, they hide the area where true integration is needed.

One area where integration seems to be greatly lacking in Europe is when the average citizen is considered. In order for the European project to truly be successful, a sense of community between the people of Europe will have to exist. Bruter reports that, "with European integration becoming an increasingly political process, questions regarding the political legitimacy of the European project have become more and more salient in the mass media as well as in political sciences literature: (Bruter 22). He goes on to state that "it seems that without identity, there can be no true, durable, legitimacy attached to a political entity" (Bruter 22-23). The issue of identity has become a much more important issue in the EU than it has ever been before, and it is an area where integration will be essential.

One of the prerequisites for becoming a member of the EU is to be a liberal democratic society. The idea of democracy rests on the idea of rule by and for the people. Voter turnout in European elections is already far below that in national elections. Without the support of the people, it makes the European project seem as though it is undemocratic, making the EU itself severely lacking when it comes to democracy. Without the support of the people, European countries may become more integrated, but the people of Europe will not. This issue seems to go against the COM's appeal for people to think of democratic values as being one of their common cultural similarities. If they are being ruled by a supranational body that is not democratic in nature, then this value becomes more difficult to express as a commonality on a European level.

Past differences in Europe do not only deal with conflict between nations. These conflicts also deal with disagreements between the people of Europe. The lack of integration in the way that the people in the member states of the EU perceive themselves seems to suggest that the idea of a united Europe is still not as strong as the European elite would hope. Without the support of the people, the European project does not have the foundation in order to be seen as legitimate. More importantly, however, the lack of integration also shows that the idea that Europe needs to be united does not exist as strongly in the minds of the average person as the elite should hope. Without the cooperation of the masses, the myth never can truly come to life. People will be associated with each other through governmental structures, but they will not be concerned with more than the well being of their own member state. Without at least some transference of allegiance, it becomes difficult to imagine the idea of a united Europe truly coming into being.

Before his death, Jean Monnet is credited as saying ""if I were to set the process of uniting Europe in motion once more, I would start with education" (Volker 1998: 11, Savvides 2005: 6, Sprokkereef 1995: 340, quoted in Ertl 2003: 4). This statement has also been translated as saying 'culture' instead of 'education'. From his statement, we can see one of the major faults in the integration process. For true integration to take place, people must be integrated as well. Europe has come a long way in economic integration and has even made great advances in political unification, yet the average European was left out of the integration process for far too long. Thus, a situation has been created where Europe has become somewhat united but Europeans have not. Without Europeans being united, the problems of the past still have yet to be overcome. Past differences may still not exist between governments, but if they exist in the hearts of the people, then they are still alive in Europe.

The myth of a united Europe is in a position where it needs to be expanded. The myth has primarily been used to help create a physically united Europe, while ignoring the creation of a European mentality. Since its origins, the European project can be seen as being very rational. It created economic cooperation and sought to bind Europe through the forces of economics. With the 2004 enlargement, we saw the strong emergence of a process that had really started in Europe in 1992 with the Maastricht Treaty. At this time, the realization that a type of European identity needed to be created came to the forefront. As discussed before, this idea also served as one of the important reasons for the most recent enlargement. To date, the aspects

of a European identity that has been proposed by the EU have been vague at best. The original myth explains why Europe should be united, but it failed to have the compelling force necessary to be able to make Europe truly united. It has yet to fulfil its primary function: the overcoming of nationalism. Much of the EU's development has been based on a rational approach to politics and integration. It is, in effect, a way of overcoming Europe's past, which had mythical origins. It, however, needed a myth in order to set the process of European integration in motion, and it appears that it will need to create new myths in order to be able to truly construct some form of a European identity.

In regard to the recent debate over the possibility of France voting 'no' to the EU constitution, Romano Prodi stated that "the problem will not only be a catastrophe for France, but the fall of Europe" (Financial Times). A vote against the constitution by the French would not lead to the fall of Europe. The European project has faced many challenges in the past, and it always finds a way to continue forward. What we can learn from the French debate, however, is that the lack of understanding about the EU is a problem, and Prodi is using this ignorance in order to try to persuade people to vote in favor of the constitution.

The debate over the constitution in France also shows the conflict between the elite and the masses. There is a difference in what degree the elite and masses regard themselves as being 'European'. In order for Europe to be united, this feeling of being 'European' will have to be accepted by the masses as well. The elite will have to work in showing the people why they are 'European'. It has already been shown that European integration can be beneficial for all parties in the union, but it still must be shown that the different nationalities of Europe have enough of a common thread that they can be united.

7. Conclusion

This paper has been an attempt to examine some of the history behind the myth that Europe needs to be united and some of the actions that have been taken to work towards this goal. The evolution of the EU has been slow, but it is progressively working to unite Europe. Greater interdependence has created a situation where it would be difficult to imagine countries actually leaving the EU, especially those within the Euro zone.

At the same time that the EU has evolved institutionally, steps have been taken towards socializing citizens into a more European way of thinking. Getting people to think of themselves as European will be the biggest task that the European elite has to accomplish, as well as the one that will take the most time. Though measures have already been taken in this field, success has proven to be very limited. The democratic deficit within the EU also makes the worries over the idea of people growing to feel European more worrisome. Since the EU claims to rest on liberal democratic values, it is necessary that the people support the project for it to meet its own standards.

To truly understand the EU it is important to understand its origins and its goals. As Cassirer states, "to know him [myth] means not only to know his defects and weakness; it means to know his strength" (Cassirer 296). It is important to know the rationale behind why it is believed that Europe needs to be united, but it is just as important to know what this action means. There is still a gap in Europe between the elite explaining why certain actions are good and what the end result of the European project could be. Without this information people could fail to understand the significance of the project until it is too late. The EU cannot afford for people to feel resentful towards the project. It needs people to be as committed to it as the elite in Europe are, and understanding the mythic foundations of the EU can help in achieving this goal. The founders saw that there was enough common in Europe that it could become united, and they felt that it was in the best interest of everyone if it did become united. They, however, did not work towards integrating the European people in such a way that could help lead to people feeling that they were indeed European.

A truly European identity does not seem to have yet emerged. Every society in Europe has its own myths, and some form of a meta-mythology would be needed in order to overcome these old myths. These myths would be difficult to create because they would be partially dependant on changing interpretations of history and expecting people to appeal to ignorance of certain events in order to accept themselves as European. Seeing that this route seems rather unlikely, it would appear that time is the best weapon that the European elite have in making Europe united. Changes can be made on the governmental level, but it will take a great deal of time for there to be a transference of allegiance from the masses. In essence, a new history will be the deciding factor on people to grow to see themselves as being European. Though history does tie much of Europe together, it is also the story of constant

division in Europe. Time or an appeal to ignorance are the only two paths that will be able to lead Europeans to overcome their past differences and unite in brotherhood.

The European elite also have an important task which needs to be fulfilled. The citizens of Europe need to be a significant part of the European project. People need to feel as though they are important to the process and that their opinions really do matter. They will also need to be socialized into the process. Past differences between European states included issues between groups of people. Without work to create mutual understanding and a stronger sense of community within Europe, a truly united Europe cannot exist. In completing this task, the elite can give the EU true legitimacy, and they can make people feel as if they are important to the future of Europe. It could also help Europeans to see that they have more in common with each other than they may have otherwise thought.

The myth of a united Europe is still in use today, and it is still very strong. It has helped to carry Europe towards being more united than ever before, and it has helped to create a peaceful, stable area in Europe. With further expansion, it would seem that these positive forces could be carried throughout Europe. It does not seem, however, that the myth has really taken root in the minds of the people of Europe. We have not seen the transfer of allegiance that would be necessary to make the myth seem to be a complete success, and the process of uniting Europe continues to constantly run into problems. The project does continue to move forward though, and it seems that the myth will become even more important as the issue of legitimacy and European identity become increasingly important to the European elite.

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