



**LUND**  
UNIVERSITY

Department of Political Science

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Tutor: Ole Elgström

# The EU as a soft power: does discourse mean practice?

The EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy through a critical feminist lens

Kathleen LaZelle

# Abstract

Extant work on the European Union's (EU) Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) argues that it is unique as a 'soft power' in the international system, especially in comparison to the United States. The term's recent attachment to gender, through Robert Kagan's 'Mars vs. Venus' analogy in his popular work on *Power and Weakness*, is an important development in research that seeks to bring gender studies to the forefront of foreign and security studies. Thus, scholars are given the impetus to question whether the CFSP truly deviates from notions of elite masculinity that have traditionally constructed and enforced foreign policy, as the discourse of 'soft power' might suggest. Is the 'soft power' discourse of the European Union's military a feminist discourse? And if so, has this discourse led to a deviation from the traditionally gendered *practices* of foreign policy implementation?

The recent European Union Police Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina (EUPM) will be used as a test case for the 'softness' of the EU's military action. Whereas, the incorporation of United Nations Security Resolution 1325 (UNSC 1325) shall be used as an example of successful integration of feminist perspectives, or indeed, gender mainstreaming. This case study will be assessed based on critical security studies and gender and feminist theory.

*Key words:* military discourse, hegemonic masculinity, soft power, security studies, feminist perspectives

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# 1 Acknowledgments

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## 2 Introduction

In the last few years there have been a remarkable number of times during which the European Union (EU) was referred to as a 'soft power'<sup>1</sup>. Made popular by Robert Kagan's analysis of *Power and Weakness*, (Kagan (2003)) the buzzword seems to have stuck—sometimes to the disadvantage, but often to the benefit of the EU. In fact, it is difficult to engage in a dialogue about the EU's military capabilities that does not reference the term's prominence. Thus, we take one of the surrounding discourses of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)<sup>2</sup> to be one of 'soft power,' an alternative to the United State's more aggressive foreign policy. Having first noticed this in news media a couple of years ago, I saw the vehicle for this distinction as having been the US invasion of Iraq without United Nations approval in March 2003. Although I believe there to be reason behind this, in the following study, what is not under investigation is whether there is any 'truth' behind the 'soft power' discourses<sup>3</sup>

I must admit that I believe 'soft power' to be an accurate interpretation of the EU's foreign and security policy, given the recent actions of the US, as well as the EU's very short history as a collective military force. Nevertheless, as an American living in Europe, I have felt rather torn about the comparison. Based on analyses by Kagan, as well as others, 'soft power' implies a preference for coalition building, a rejection of power politics and a belief in the value of negotiations (Kagan (2003)). If these ideals hold true to Europe and do not stand up in the US, then I find myself forced to side with the polity of my present home, rather than the one of my birth. However much this might not be a great tragedy, over the last year it has begun to bother me that Americans are understood as so rough and unyielding. The first example that comes to mind is the Abu Ghraib prison scandal of late 2003, was an event that that upset the U.S. military's image both domestically and internationally.

Certainly, the prisoner abuses (and the consequent photographs taken thereof) were acts committed solely by American soldiers, against Iraqis. However, I still

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<sup>1</sup> In fact, a simple search on 'soft power' can produce no less than three notable books on the topic, by such IR authors as Robert Kagan, Joseph S. Nye and Zbigniew Brzezinski.

<sup>2</sup> The EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) is the mechanism for foreign policy coordination within the EU (Smith (2003): 2). Sometimes referred to as the EU's 'second pillar,' the CFSP is often discussed in conjunction with the EU Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), launched in 1999 as the first European Security Strategy. Within both academic literature and Commission documents, the reader will often find CFSP/ESDP listed as though they were one in the same, and for all intents and purposes they practically are. Throughout the paper I will most often use CFSP to connote both the institution and the policy it produces.

<sup>3</sup> It would be impossible to assess whether a discourse were 'true,' since in the study of discourses it is understood that language creates culture which acts as its own 'truth' or 'reality,' separate from whatever 'practices' might really exist.

refuse to read it as a violence that was any more connected to *American culture* than it was to the *cruelty of warfare* in general. Instead of linking these hideous images to my home nation, I wanted to link them to what I see as a much greater problem; the hegemonic ideologies of masculinity so ensconced in military practices as to allow such things to happen<sup>4</sup>. “Historically such institutions have exclusively included male bodies and norms of masculinity have dominated their practices, marking them as institutions of hegemonic masculinity” (Kronsell (2005)). Whether we examine the sexualized language of dominance present in foreign policy texts, the behavior of soldiers on military bases or the importance of physical strength, a particular ‘ideology of manhood’ exists within the military; one that might have allowed these things to take place.

It was my ruminations on this—my personal belief in the primacy of gendered practices within the military as having been the impetus for Abu Ghraib, as well as the reports on sexual abuses by UN peacekeepers in Congo, that motivated my interest in researching the EU as a ‘soft power.’ Certainly, the term has stuck, but when it comes down to it, is it truly possible to deviate from the traditionally gendered practices of foreign policy implementation? I wanted to assess if there was a link between the ‘soft power’ discourse of the CFSP and its practices as a military and police force.

I realize that the scope of my project is large and perhaps somewhat daunting. I do, however, hope that it is able to provide the reader with a more nuanced lens through which to read Europe’s military force. In order to do so, in the following paper I will first introduce the reader to critical security studies and feminist/gender studies. Before proceeding I will discuss the process of gender mainstreaming that has been embraced by the European Commission as a policy priority within other areas. These will be the principle theories used in my analysis of the EU’s foreign and security policy, as well as its practices. Once having provided this foundational knowledge, I will proceed to a basic overview of the EU’s CFSP, as well as a discussion of how this has been construed as a ‘soft power’. From there I will proceed with an explanation of the methodology used in my evaluation of the topic, drawing from those theories mentioned above. Lastly, I will introduce and assess my case study for evaluation of the practices of the EU’s military forces—the EU’s Police Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina (EUPM) and the implementation of United Nations Resolution 1325 (UNSC 1325) on Women, Peace and Security will be studied.

I will use the EU’s incorporation of UNSC 1325 as a test case for whether a gender perspective has been adopted in ground operations. Through this, the linkages between CFSP discourse and practice shall be investigated. Using the EUPM, I will assess whether the ‘soft power’ discourse affected CSFP practices—whether gender mainstreaming has occurred at the implementation level of the CFSP.

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<sup>4</sup> I realize, however, that arguments have been made to connect the crimes to particular aspects of American society. I’m certain many of these points are well founded, but believe that hegemonic masculinity should be under just as much scrutiny.

## 3 Theoretical Background

As an introduction to the main bodies of theory to be used in this paper, the following sections will discuss some of the basic principles underpinning feminist theory and critical security studies. Both theories will be used to assess foreign and security policy within the EU. Within this section and throughout the paper I choose to define ‘foreign policy’ as “the activity of developing and managing relationships between the state (or in our case, the EU) and other international actors, which promotes the domestic values and interests of the state or actor in question” (Smith (2003): 2). The primary theoretical framework from which I shall assess ‘security policy’ is critical security studies, which shall be elaborated on within the following section. Feminism, on the other hand, will be introduced to the reader in order to provide a basis of knowledge for assessing gender perspectives within the CFSP. Although the rationale for using these theories will be further discussed within the methodological section, I hope to provide the reader with the impetus behind relying on this literature for my study.

### 3.1 Critical Security Studies

Critical security studies have recently had a growth in interest, first as the end of the Cold War brought on the next phase of drastic alterations to the international security system. And recently when international security was galvanized by the September 11, 2001 attacks. This most recent development has moved critical security studies away from “state-centric and military-focused [approaches]” (Hyde-Price (2004): 335) to a more fluid understanding of security situations and actors. Critical security studies pose questions about global security that have hitherto been unexplored. Questions such as ‘what is security?’ were finally explored. In an article by Aninia Nadig, in which the term ‘security’ is reconceptualized to include such issues as the trafficking of humans and AIDS, it is explained that “security issues are traditionally associated with the Cold War and military and nuclear deterrence strategies rooted in a realist perspective in which the entity to be secured is the state” (Nadig (2002)): 1). However, this is changing. Relying on previous scholarship of the constructivist discipline, critical security studies is most directly a reaction to realist discourses. Realist scholars have defined ‘national security’ as the top priority of nation states and their policy makers, whereas critical security studies have attempted to debunk this conception. Needless to say, the two disciplines rarely see eye-to-eye. What constitutes a legitimate use of force and then *how* that force is going to be enacted

are such stable understandings in Western thought, that theories of the international system do not often challenge them (Nadig (2002): 12).

One of the reasons for realism's permanence as the theory of choice for international relations has been its ability to reasonably predict nation-state actions in the past. However, as mentioned above, recent events have left realism without the means to explain the current international system's disorder. For although realism holds anarchy to be the natural state of world politics, it cannot account for the movement away from state actors. "A realist perspective views the sovereign state as the 'only possible locus of political life' (Williams and Krause (1997): x). This view restricts the realm of the political, excluding society from it. The state may need society as a source of legitimization, but societal actors on a sub-national as well as trans-national level, are not seen as political partners" (Nadig (2002): 13). In regard to Nadig's area of concern, human smuggling, she defines the EU as *overly* realist because of their insistence on "[striving] for their own relative advantage" by rejecting efforts at a joint asylum policy for refugees (Nadig (2002): 13). Nadig insists that critical security studies "[acknowledge] that 'societal facts' are not independent from their societal framework and that the observer is a part of the society he is studying." Thus, critical security studies question the production of knowledge and the nation state becomes the focus of analysis in a way that realist frameworks do not account for (Nadig (2002): 15). This distinction is one of the fundamental reasons for why I chose critical security studies over realism for this project. Acknowledging the possibility of non-state actors (or quasi-state actors, as the case of European governance may seem at times) is very important to an analysis of the CFSP that questions the level of involvement of gender perspectives. Likewise, critical security studies offers a much more nuanced view of foreign and security policy, as is needed for a supra-national body such as the EU.

Critical theory's focus on change is additionally attractive to European studies because of the transitory condition of the polity. "[T]he very concept of the 'state', and with it the concept of 'security', are re-politicized: security is a social construct and therefore inherently political [. . .] Society participates in this construction of the state and of security. Construction implies change, and so the notion of change becomes central: critical security studies focus on how the order of power and domination has evolved beyond a pure inter-state system into a globalized world system" (Nadig (2002): 15). The EU, despite Nadig's claims to the opposite currently functions at a level that is very fit for critical security studies. Additionally, critical theory is an important tool in evaluating the discourses of the CFSP because of the non-traditional, non-state aligned projects that have taken place within its framework.



## 3.2 Gender Theory and Feminist International Relations

Just as critical security studies challenges the common understandings of 'security,' 'force,' the 'state' and 'power,' so do gender studies and feminist scholarship challenge common understandings of 'gender,' 'sex,' 'man' and 'woman'. Taking this simplified understanding of the purposes of feminist studies into consideration, we move on to feminist international relations. Feminist international relations is that is easily bridged to critical security studies and, above all, to the investigation of whether the EU's CFSP deviates from notions of elite masculinity that have traditionally constructed and enforced foreign policy.

Understanding masculinity as a primary reason behind (or the principle agenda of) foreign policy might seem strange to those without a background in gender studies. However, this is not meant to claim that top foreign policy makers in the EU or the US go around understanding their respective initiatives as constructing Western norms of masculinity abroad. Rather, claiming that hegemonic masculinity operates within militarized institutions is to assume that the institutions of foreign and security policy-making are constructed by and imbue its workers with a particular "ideology of masculinity." (Dean (2001): 5). As Robert D. Dean explains in an introduction to *Imperial Brotherhood: Gender and the Making of Cold War Foreign Policy*, "an ideology of masculinity is [. . .] symbolic system of meaning by which social relations of power and privilege are rendered "natural" and transparent by reference to sexual biology, a supposedly fundamental and unquestionable set of relationships" (Dean (2001): 5). The process that creates particular ideologies of masculinity is one studied by many gender scholars. Although of personal interest, this subject will not be expanded on, since it is not the *construction* of hegemonic masculinity within the EU's foreign and security policy that is under scrutiny.

We assume that all institutions of militarization contain norms of a similar dominant masculinity, however the ramifications of these norms might vary. "As Joshua Goldstein has shown, (2001:10-34) in comparison to other institutions in society, defense and military institutions have been associated with specific gender stereotypes, surprisingly consistent across both cultures and time. Military and security institutions have been historic sites of hegemonic masculinity" (Kronsell (2005)). The historical exclusion of female bodies from many of these institutions led to heightened sense of what could be conceived as 'male space' and 'female space.' Such an artificial homogenous community must have contributed to practices and norms "defined around male bodies and masculine practices" (Kronsell (2005)). The construction of gender within military institutions was often used to give reasoning to the aggression expected from soldiers. Obviously, things have changed within the last century. However,

hegemonic masculinity still primarily defines how the military addresses, or rather, *fails* to address gender perspectives.

Scholars within the discipline of international relations do not often make the distinction between ‘gender theory’ and ‘feminist theory’. Often, in fact, the terms are used interchangeably. However, there is a difference, and one that it is best for the reader to understand while assessing my project. *Gender* perspectives are those that study diverse perspectives on the social construction of gender and sex. It is possible to incorporate gender perspectives into nearly every discipline because, indeed, if we agree that “reality is socially constructed and material outcomes depend largely on shared beliefs, the ubiquity and salience of beliefs about sexual difference [. . .] are worthy of study” (Carpenter (2002): 153). Feminist perspectives—now so developed as to belong to the canon of *feminist international relations*—on the other hand, focus primarily on issues particular to *women*. Of course, the difficulty here is that those studies that concentrate on women’s issues often fall victim to “affirmative essentialisms”—they also risk reinforcing patriarchal values, trapping women into domestic roles and excluding them from formal political activities” (Helms (2003): 16). Queer theory, on the other hand, although often grouped in the same category as feminist theory or gender theory, will not be used in this study. Its exclusion from my research is primarily based on its total isolation from disciplines such as international relations. Queer theorists understand gender as performance. It is “a practice rather than a category, an actively constructed performance rather than a pre-existing role” (Bucholtz, Liang and Sutton 1999; Hall and Bucholtz 1995). Thus, gender [. . .] is a complex and fluid social construct located in interaction” (Speer (2002): 394). Such a sociolinguistic-discourse theory has a hard time finding a place among the traditional social sciences, however much its scholarship might be both revolutionary and highly important, defining gender as ‘contextually variable’ (Speer (2002): 394) renders it simply too difficult to use in project of this size and scope. Additionally, queer theorists often clash with the feminist scholars on whom I most heavily rely.

Indeed, feminist theorists’ historical alignment with traditional liberal feminist movements has come under critique by queer theorists and others for its incapacity to address those issues of concern for women of color and women living in poverty—two examples of groups that have habitually been denied access to mainstream feminist political movements (Tickner (1992): 16). Thus, the challenge to the researcher is to locate a method that both addresses those issues of direct implication to women’s inequality, while managing to address the broader context of sexual norms and social and racial identities at the same time. Feminist priorities of empowerment and transformation are by no means illegitimate goals—women risk marginalization at a much greater degree than most men do. However, incorporating gender to a fuller degree will in the end be to the advantage of all movements.

Despite the differences between feminist scholars and gender theorists, the disciplines operate in the same sphere in regard to security studies. As with critical security studies, feminists assess the world system based on patriarchal structures of oppression. In response to those readers that might scoff at such

‘radical’ language, I refer here to the aforementioned importance of masculinity within the rationale and production of military institutions. ‘Patriarchal structures of oppression’ is a broad term. I trust that it is a large enough term to encompass the a marked lack of women within the highest levels of foreign and security policy groups, the persistent existence of a significant income disparity between men and women and the frequency with which domestic and sexual violence against women act as de facto war tactics. Although critics, such as Carpenter have claimed that “framing gender analysis as feminism [. . .] has reduced incentives for scholars not committed to feminism to take gender seriously,” I disagree (Carpenter (2002): 157). Bridging the two theories, while taking into consideration their variations and distinctions, does nothing but enrich the study of gender—and in this case, the study of foreign and security policy as well.

### 3.3 Gender Mainstreaming

Now that some of the basic theories have been introduced, I will give a brief overview of the ways that public policy has integrated feminist perspective. What I refer to here is the practice of gender mainstreaming, which within the EU is formally acknowledged as the process of incorporating “equal opportunities between women and men in all the Community's policies and actions”<sup>5</sup>. The EU adopted gender mainstreaming in 1996, resulting from the 1995 Fourth UN Conference on Women that was held in Beijing. In Article 2 of the Treaty establishing the European Communities (the EC Treaty), the legal framework is laid for enforcing equality between men and women. Not surprisingly, these policies and actions have been interpreted as both the most necessary and the most easily integrated within the employment sector. Being that the EU has always been first to create regulations concerning the market, there has been little resistance from national governments in regard to these initiatives. However, the workforce initiatives do have the more reaching goal of “[combating] inequalities between the sexes in economic, political, civil and social life, and to change roles and remove stereotypes in this area” Thus, despite what might be interpreted as fairly simplistic affirmative action programs, the European Union’s gender mainstreaming actually has more of a ‘total approach’. As Alison Woodward explains in her article on European gender mainstreaming, “the various policy-making fields should be imbued with gender awareness to incorporate equality goals into traditional policy areas” (Woodward (2003): 66). Thus we should not be surprised that it has yet to formally be integrated into other are.

The concept and process of gender mainstreaming is important to consider during a discussion about integrating gender perspectives within the foreign and

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<sup>5</sup> “Equality between men and women: Introduction” *Activities of the European Union: summaries of legislation*, <http://www.europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/cha/c00015.htm>

security policy of the EU. It provides us with a clear outline of how women's rights activists and gender studies scholars have managed to push their priorities into the realm of dominant culture. As Woodward writes:

[Gender mainstreaming] is attractive to social movements for at least three reasons. First of all, it allows social issues to escape from marginal policy ghettos. It transforms the woman question from a vertical special issue to horizontal general concern. Second, mainstreaming is innovative, as it spurs the development of new policy instruments. Mainstreaming simply means doing policy with varied citizens in mind, as yet as it is framed in a rational public management language, the ambitions are tested and evaluated [. . .] gender mainstreaming links a revolutionary goal, e.g., the end of sexual inequality, to rational public administrative tools (Woodward (2003): 68-9).

To this I would like to add that gender mainstreaming is the first *institutionizeable* effort at altering the way women's roles are constructed within public policy. Moving beyond the traditional notion that 'women's issues' requires *special* and *separate* structures and institutions within the system of governance in order to handle the *personal* and *sensitive* issues at hand, gender mainstreaming attempts to fully integrate gender equality within currently existing structures. The risk here, however, is that often referred to as 'malestreaming'—essentially working so hard to make the language and goals of gender equality accessible to all bureaucrats, that the "the transformative potential of asking the gender questions and questioning structures of power may be lost" (Woodward (2003): 70).

Within development efforts, gender mainstreaming has received few critiques in relation to this worry. Incorporating gender concerns into development policies, particularly those of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), has involved "pushing for a greater sensitivity in government policies, for awareness of the problems of women's double burden, for equal access to and control over land and property, and for equal access to credit" (Steans (1998): 151). But these efforts have been initiated not by the women of these underdeveloped communities, but rather by the bureaucracies of aid agencies that control the disbursement of funds—those who instigated gender mainstreaming in the first place. Perhaps the biggest success of gender mainstreaming, rather than transformative changes in the lives of women within a particular community, has been the widespread collection of data concerning women's issues in development. Although I do not wish to downplay the importance of developing statistical predictors of the status of women and the relative success of gendered policy, it is important to highlight how far this 'triumph' is away from what gender experts would have intended. We must take this distinction into account as we evaluate the relative advances within the CFSP.

## 4 Foreign Policy in the European Union

Recent discussions over the EU as a ‘soft power’ are nearly always based on a comparative with the United States as a global military force. Brought to popularity by Robert Kagan, in his now infamous article on the relative “Power and Weakness” (Kagan (2003)) of Americans and Europeans, the term has become somewhat deluded. By focusing on the gendered nature of the concept’s popular analysis, as well as etching out its strategic particularities, this section introduces the reader to the basic history and components of the EU CFSP, then makes a case for ‘soft power’ as ‘feminized’ and primarily ‘normative.

### 4.1 The European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)

The Maastricht Treaty on the European Union established the CFSP in February of 1992. Of the foreign policy objectives, six are listed for joint action:

- strengthening democratic principles and institutions and respect for human rights;
- promoting regional political stability and contributing to the creation of political and/or economic frameworks that encourage regional cooperation or moves towards regional or sub-regional integration;
- contributing to the prevention and settlement of conflicts;
- contributing to a more effective international coordination in dealing with emergency situations;
- strengthening international cooperation in issues of international interest such as fight against arms proliferation, terrorism and traffic in illicit drugs; and
- promoting and supporting good government (Smith (2003): 13)

It does not take a specialist in foreign and security policy to assess that these are not particularly shocking or specific goals. Their ambiguity is both a strategic choice and inevitability—detailed goals would have been nearly impossible to agree on during negotiations between Member States. However, the importance of these goals, despite their vagueness, should not be overlooked. They might not clearly identify the EU as the ‘unique normative power’ that some claim it to be, but the joint action objectives do represent a formalized commitment to

*coordination* (perhaps with organizations, individuals and states). This commitment stands to reason, given the EU's concentration on multilateralism.

Creating the tools for making common positions and joint actions was one of the greatest accomplishments of the Maastricht Treaty, as it got the ball rolling for more change. In 1997, further coordination within the Union was accomplished through the establishment of the High Representative to the CFSP, that would also head the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit. Then in December 1999, the European Union Security and Defense Policy was launched at the request of the Helsinki European Council (Smith (2003): 40). Reaching political consensus within the EU on such nationally sensitive issues has always been difficult. "Negotiations over the commitment to a Common Foreign and Security Policy [. . .] proceeded in parallel with post-Cold War cuts in defense budgets and two major external crises: the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait" (Giegerich and Wallace (2004): 165). Of course, these experiences shaped the various Member States in different ways, mostly leading to the steady deterioration of European military forces. Though not until the Kosovo war was this realized and action taken to shape European forces that would have the capabilities of handling their own ground operations. Thus, it is seen as a remarkable accomplishment that the CFSP has managed to achieve as much as it has

Having only existed as a tangible agenda for the last five years, the institutional set up of the CFSP has developed while its number of operations has increased. Now it is able to boast a police mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina, a military and crisis management operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo and both a police mission and military crisis management operation in Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) (Gnesotto (2004)). An increase in the number of ground operations is helping to add legitimacy to the EU's military forces. However, suggestions that 'enhanced defense cooperation' might be in the near future seem a bit naïve, as the Community seems fairly satisfied with the current set-up. As Bastian Giegerich and William Wallace note in a recent article, "the further development of European defense capabilities is likely to be driven by external events and pressures, as it has been in the past five years, more than by any ideological predisposition to build an autonomous foundation for the protection of European power" (Giegerich and Wallace (2004): 178). Indeed, recent developments in European security coordination seem to be much more in response to the changing security environment (and US pressures), than they do for other reasons. But to be fair, some sort of balance will need to be reached, one where the EU is able to assert its own international identity through a unique security agenda, while at the same time acting in response to those security and peace concerns that are sure to arise in the coming years.

## 4.2 The Discourse of 'Soft Power'

The changing nature of power that emerged in reaction to the end of the Cold War brought on considerations about alternative strengths to military force. In an effort to create a tool for evaluating new situations of peace, conflict, resolution and interdependence, scholars such as Joseph S Nye, Jr. preferred to examine the central players of the Cold War—namely the United States and the former Soviet Union. In 1990, Nye wrote:

To evaluate American power at the end of the twentieth century, it is necessary to understand the changing nature of world politics. Strong elements of continuity make concern for the traditional military instruments and balance-of-power strategies a necessary condition for a successful policy. But the new elements in the modern world contribute to the diffusion of power away from all the great powers. Thus, any successful strategy must incorporate both continuity and change (Nye, (1990):182)

Although this analysis comes before the ultimate paradigm shift of September 11, 2001, I believe that Nye nonetheless makes a case for the growing importance of new alternatives in military strategy—perhaps a predicator of the confrontations and resolutions that would define the first part of the twenty-first century. The transformation of power, as it were, that needed to take place at the end of the Cold War was highly involved. The structure of world politics had fundamentally changed, altering in its wake what Nye refers to as 'power behavior' (Nye (1990): 190). It was thus necessary for power actors to adopt new modes of coercion and uses of resources that would not threaten the growing level of interdependence among those militarily advanced polities that in the past would have been characterized as opponents.

Here, Nye describes what he believes to be the primary goal of foreign policy, a "stable global military balance and geopolitical framework". In this discussion, he goes so far as to insist that the US be the champion of interdependence, leading the way with soft power tactics. In fact, what he describes as 'soft power' he recommends be America's strategic choices for the new millennium. First, Nye describes the importance of maintaining an open international economy (Nye (1992): 249), which will necessitate "institutions to govern interdependence," (Nye (1992): 253) thus placing increased power in the hands of institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, the World Health Organization (WHO) and the United Nations (UN). In a nutshell, the United States is encouraged to move away from traditional notions of force and power and adopt new, non-combative and multilateral approaches to foreign policy initiatives.

I shall here resist the temptation of allowing this section of the paper to critique how the United States has either failed or succeeded in regard to Nye's challenges for the new millennium. Although a fascinating topic, it is not the focus of this study, nor does it advance the thrust of my argument in any substantial way. However, Nye's analysis is still valuable and from it I form a working definition of 'soft power' for my paper<sup>6</sup>. Later, of course, 'soft power' is to be found in Robert Kagan's aforementioned article as a euphemism for 'weak power' (Kagan 2003). Nye's basic outline, however, emphasizing global interdependence and open markets will be elaborated on and made more complex due to the complications of the EU's foreign policy. By this I mean that the ways in which the EU has adapted 'soft power politics,' as it were, are a bit more specific than those aspects listed by Nye in his 1990 book.

Both Kagan's article and Ian Manners' investigation of 'normative power Europe' (Manners (2002)) set the EU apart from the United States as an 'idealist' actor in international relations—a polity that, thereby makes attempts to promote a particular set of norms through its use of soft power tactics. Manners' study introduces the reader to the need for re-vamped notions of power politics, similar to that discussed in Nye's work. However, the type of power that Manners focuses on is *normative*, tracing the increased global abolition of capital punishment as a way in which Europe has affected influence in global affairs. Manners' study is not just about soft power *strategies* that are used (i.e., carrots versus sticks), but about soft power *goals* (the diffusion of 'European values' vs. territorial dominance). However, the EU's promotion of regionalization throughout the world could be argued not so much from a *moral* or *normative* standpoint, but from of capitalist concerns—regional organizations provide the EU with a slightly better forum for trade than individual nation-states. However, even if we disregard the affects that the EU has had on regional organizations like Mercosur or ASEAN, a strong case exists for what Manners calls a "[predisposition to] act in a normative way in world politics" (Manners (2002): 252). From a purely discourse perspective, Manners describes the EU as the ultimate soft power.

Nye's belief that "in the traditional view, military force is the dominant instrument of power" (Nye (1990): 180), places the nation state at the nexus of this system, just as in realism. Thus, the EU, with its quasi-supranational system of governance already deviates from this model, giving credence to Manners' argument. Connecting this discussion to feminist theory, Tickner asserts that "thinking about security in multidimensional terms allows us to get away from prioritizing military issues, issues that have been central to the agenda of traditional international relations but that are the furthest removed from women's experiences. Many of the values promoted by supporters of common security [such as the EU] are similar to the characteristics that, in [Western] culture, are associated with femininity" (Tickner (1992): 23).

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<sup>6</sup> Discourses of soft power will therefore refer to those extant texts that list such things as interdependence and balance as policy priorities, while encouraging an open international economy.



The fact that the EU defines power through different means should therefore not come as a surprise to scholars. These terms, Manners insists, are normative, such that the EU has been acting “to define what passes for ‘normal’ in world politics” (Manners (2002): 236) through its civilian power mechanisms. Although “the trend towards military power Europe is now to be found in the common European security and defence policy (ESDP) agreed at the June 1999 Cologne European Council which committed the EU to having a 60,000-person rapid reaction force (RRF) ready by the end of 2003,” (Manners (2002): 237), Manners argues that this physical power has *not* been the central force of EU’s international affairs. This is where Manners introduces ‘normative power Europe,’ which gives fodder to Kagan’s argument that “Europe’s rejection of power politics [and] its devaluing of military force is a tool of international relations” (Kagan (2003)).

However, when ‘normative power Europe’ is compared to ‘Bush’s unilateral America,’ this analysis loses some of its strength. As Karen E. Smith describes in her book on *European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World* (Smith (2003)):

the EU may not be the ‘gentle giant’ that it might appear to be when set against the US: it too imposes sanctions (though not as often as the US does), and it can negotiate fiercely to protect its own interests. Secondly, the US could rightly claim to pursue many of the same foreign policy objectives as the EU (promotion of democracy and human rights, for example). (Smith (2003): 16)

Despite this disclaimer, however, Smith maintains that even when the EU uses ‘negative measures’ such as aid suspension and trade sanctions against nations violating human rights, they are not taking independent military actions. However, while it is important to understand the EU as an international actor of many capabilities and motivations, this portion of the paper was intended to provide the basis for understanding the discourse of the EU’s CFSP as one of ‘soft power’. I believe that both Manners and Kagan provided us with that.

## 5 Methodology

Deciding upon a methodological strategy for a comprehensive study is always a challenge for the researcher, but particularly so when the case is to come from feminist studies. This can be attributed to the canon's widespread distrust for dissident schools of thought (especially one lacking a positivist epistemology) and feminist scholars' refusal to claim a "single 'feminist way' to carry out research" (Tickner, J. Ann (2005): 5). Ergo, the construction of my methodological strategy attempts to integrate those feminist principles that I feel particularly committed to, as well as those critical security studies approaches that seek testable methods. Connecting the 'soft power' discourse of CFSP with its ground operations would involve Gender Studies in order to evaluate to what extent gender perspectives had been included. Thus, I chose feminist research methods to provide me with a base of knowledge on how to deal with the gender aspects of my topic. However, the importance of pitting European foreign and security discourses against those current European operations, would rely on discourse analysis and policy/practice comparisons.

The following section will first briefly outline the methodological schools from which I have drawn inspiration and technique. Once the foundation has been laid for understanding from where my methodological impulses have come, I will outline how it is that I have chosen to combine feminist methodology with recent work on 'strategic culture' and 'practice.' The goal of such a project was to construct a schema for determining whether or not the 'soft power' discourse of the CFSP has led to a deviation from the traditionally gendered practices of foreign policy formation and implementation. My inclusion of UNSC 1325 as the independent variable will also be elaborated on. I believe the interaction between these schools of thought to have been an appropriate and effective tool for investigating my subject.

### 5.1 Feminist Research Methods

Feminist studies, having come to Political Science and International Relations out of the historical context of the West's widespread societal unrest during the 1960's, have taken some time to be integrated into the greater discipline. Even today, a negative connotation persists. Rejecting claims of universal truths and challenging the idea that power is merely a negating force (Wandel (2001): 369), feminist scholars came to *l'Académie* with a subversive response to "the often unseen androcentric or masculine biases in the way that knowledge has traditionally been constricted in all the disciplines" (Tickner, J. Ann (2005): 4). Of

course, the resulting critique launched against feminist scholars by academics such as Bob Keohane, has been plentiful (Ticker, J. Ann (2005):3). In a discipline primarily dominated by male researchers committed to positivist quantitative studies, it is not surprising that the quest for knowledge as 'transformative and emancipatory' would come under scrutiny. In fact, the debate over feminist methodology continues to be rich with literature, J. Ann Ticker arising as the primary advocate for bridging the gap between feminist researchers and international relations scholarship. Thus, because of both the quantity and quality of her work, for the feminist methodological aspect of this project, I shall rely heavily on Tickner's research.

In a recent article of Tickner's, she responds to the challenge posed by Keohane that feminists should "build a research program using neo-positivist methods" familiar to those of traditional social science research (Tickner (2005): 2). Unfortunately, it is a task easier said than done, as Tickner explains that feminist studies are at times too different from the ontological assumptions of international relations to evaluate or compare the one to the other. "Whereas much of IR is focused on factors that explain the behavior of states, feminists are motivated by the goal of investigating the lives of women within states or international structures in order to change or reconstitute them" (Tickner (2005): 7). The goal of my research is similar in that I would seek a better understanding of how gender perspectives are integrated in the EU beyond the level of policy discourse.

However, feminists are quick to point out how such a partiality might, in fact, unfairly influence a study's findings. So much so, in fact, that researchers are encouraged to place themselves "in the same critical plane as the subject matter" (Tickner (2005): 7) in order to create a debate about the study that one might not be required to engage in given traditional understandings of social science research methods. This is something, as an American woman that I tried to be conscious of throughout the research process, positioning myself as an individual with pre-formed ideas that might indeed be challenged by my findings. The fact that heterosexual men continue to dominate global foreign policy institutions, as well as the groups of trained soldiers and police forces used to enforce these policies, is something that I was aware of long before this study had begun. Likewise, my feelings toward the institutions that I see as having promoted hegemonic masculinities were not going to be severely altered through the course of this study, unlike my understandings of a different subject might have been changed throughout my research. Of course, this dual-positionality is rendered simpler when the research techniques are able to involve such things as interviews, narratives, ethnographic studies and other such 'participatory action research techniques.' My study has not, however, involved any such techniques. The reasons for this being the time constraints on the project, as well as the difficulty in locating individuals that would be able to authoritatively comment on whether CFSP projects were being implemented in such a way as to incorporate gender perspectives, without actually going to the sites of these initiatives and asking the women of the communities themselves, something unrealizable for this project because of financial constraints.

Thus, as mentioned before, I decided to combine research techniques to involve critical security studies and feminist research. In doing so I hoped to stay committed to feminist analysis that highlights the importance of transformative studies and the subjective researchers, while at the same time considering the importance of a structured analysis that would lead to more definitive results. Although Tickner asserts that “measures, such as women’s participation in politics and percentage of women in the workforce, do not adequately capture the fact that states have been constituted historically as gendered entities with all the attendant problems that this has created for women,” (Tickner (2005): 17) other types of research that may perhaps not have ‘feminist emancipation’ as their goal can still be helpful to scholars. The Gender Development Index (GDI), developed by the United Nations Human Development Program (UNHDP) in 1996 to factor in to national development rankings has made an arguably significant impact on issues such as women’s illiteracy and gendered income inequity (Tickner (2005): 18). Likewise, I believe that many feminist research questions should attempt a similar methodology, one that respects positivist social scientific traditions and recognizes the counter hegemonic strength of using such practices for ulterior aims (emancipation, rather than maintenance of the status quo).

### 5.1.1 Discourse Analysis

Although this project will not engage in active or in-depth discourse analysis, I find myself frequently referring to ‘the “soft power” discourse of the CFSP,’ ‘the discourse of the EU’s military project’ and ‘discourse vs. practice’. Thus, I believe it important to inform the reader as to how I am understanding the term, as well as what assumptions are being made with its use. How is it that I can reference ‘discourse’ so many times throughout my paper, without making discourse analysis part of my primary methodologies? Well, because I have been engaging in this project with the assumption that:

Discourse sets up a constitutive relationship between meaning and power within social practice: every move to signification comes about from a position of power—power both structuring and structured by the social positions available within a practice (Choulionaki (2002): 84)

Thus, a *feminist* discourse analysis would study the ways that gender is represented in language. “Language, it is suggested, does not reflect reality but itself constitutes and naturalizes a sexist and heterosexist *version* of reality” (Speer (2002): 348). Assuming that the discourse of European military force is one of ‘soft power,’ does thus not mean that Commission-produced documents must explicitly reference ‘softness.’ Rather it means that things written about the CFSP use the language of those ‘soft power’ principles outlined earlier. Although I believe it could have been fruitful to go into greater detail about *how* and *when* the ‘soft power’ discourse performs in more specifics, due to time and resource

constraints for this project, I was unable to do so, but hope the current evidence suffices.

## 5.2 Critical Security Studies

As mentioned above, attempting to rectify differences in 'soft power' discourse and actual practices of the CFSP is a challenge. The inclusion of gender, and thus feminist methodology, further complicates my research question. However, a recent study on "Grand Strategy, Strategic Culture, [and] Practice" by Iver B. Neumann and Henrikki Heikka (Neumann and Heikka (2005)) has provided me with a suitable epistemological structure. Taking from Neumann and Heikka's work on the "dynamic interplay of potential grand strategy, on the one hand, and specific practices such as doctrines, civil-military relations and procurement on the other," (Neumann, Iver B. and Henrikki Heikka (2005): 5) I create a methodology for evaluating the relative level of gender perspectives (or conversely, hegemonic masculinity) operating in military practices. For the purposes of my study, the institution under scrutiny shall be the EU's CFSP. I will assess the discourses of 'soft power' and thus feminized military tactics of the CFSP while evaluating their interplay with the actual *implementations* of this institution. Neumann and Heikka's article having provided me with inspiration, I have chosen two practices to be my chief subjects of study for gender-perspective evaluation, those being (1) the European Union Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia-Herzegovina and (2) the successful integration of the principles of UNSC 1325.

Contributing to a dialogue of strategic culture and grand strategy, Neumann and Heikka first choose to remind the reader of the complexities of 'culture'. Although work within the disciplines of anthropology, sociology and gender studies have been using the term in such a way for many years, questioning the system of knowledge creation (and thus 'culture') is still a relatively new process among international relations scholars, and among security scholars even more revolutionary. Thus, we are brought back to the feminist dilemma highlighted in the previous section, how to study a subject "with such notoriously fuzzy boundaries" (Neumann and Heikka (2005): 10) However, Neumann and Heikka construct a schema that tests culture by relying on a continuous dialogue between discourse and practice


Culture is thus conceived of as "a dynamic interplay between discourse and practice" (Neumann and Heikka (2005): 10), which effectively addresses the concept in a 'holistic way.' Simple enough, it would seem, to make such a generalized statement. But Neumann and Heikka do not stop there. In fact, using practice theory, they proceed by first drawing the delicate line between discourse and practice (or behavior) to be used for their study:

A focus on discourses, or on 'semiotic codes' permits attention to meaning without having to focus on whether particular actors

believe, think, or act on any specific ideas. Like language, discourse is conceived to be the impersonal medium through which (with which) thought occurs [ . . . ] The old terrain of ideas and actors thus split into two domains, that of practices and that of discourses (Swindler (2001): 75 in Neumann and Heikka (2005): 11)

Such a focus allows the researcher to consider discourse and practice as separate, but mutually constitutive (Neumann and Heikka (2005): 11). Thus the interplay of discourse and practice is made to constitute culture, which is seen as a constantly re-organizing dynamic. From this assumption, Neumann and Heikka move to the principal aim of their study—to come up with a working definition of grand strategy. This definition, when substituted for ‘discourse’ allows them to evaluate those “*preconditions for* formulating [military] doctrines” and evaluate grand strategy as though it were “a snapshot of discourse on strategic matters, taken at a specific time, in a specific place” (Neumann and Heikka (2005): 13). The idea of a ‘snapshot’ allows the researcher space in which to evaluate grand strategy through those practices determined to be in constant interaction with it, and indeed, to constitute it. Neumann and Heikka choose doctrines, civil-military relations and procurement as the components of their ‘snapshot’ because of the associations of these practices with *preconditions for strategy*. Beginning with a section on military doctrines, Neumann and Heikka explain how such a practice is indicative of the grand strategy of a particular polity because it “sets priorities among various military forces and prescribes how those forces should be structured and employed to achieve the ends in view” (Neumann and Heikka (2005): 14). The second practice elaborated on is civil-military relations, used as the representative component of preconditions for deployment of troops. And lastly, the third practice investigated by the study is procurement due to the fact that it essentially “covers the existence and the status of a domestic military industry, networks for material procurement abroad and the like” (Neumann and Heikka (2005): 17).

The figure used to explain strategic culture as interplay between grand strategy and doctrines, civil-military relations, and procurement is reproduced below:




(Neumann and Heikka (2005): 17)

The authors admit that this construction still has shortcomings in that it continues to treat culture as “a clearly bounded and homogenous phenomenon” (Neumann and Heikka (2005): 17). However, they believe that the diagram’s utility lies in its ability to be varied, depending on the different structural pressures that might exist at any given moment, including those strategic cultures of other polities with which a particular case might be interacting. But more than that, the scholarship of this study, along with the diagram involved move us to bringing security studies closer to those cultural studies projects that focus primarily on discourse analysis without any attention being paid to practices and vice versa as well.

### 5.3 My Methodological Choices

Due to the goals of my investigation, I have chosen to replace ‘strategic culture’ with ‘Gender culture of the CFSP/ESDP’. In regard to ‘grand strategy,’ I go back to Neumann and Heikka’s initial assertion, that grand strategy was, in fact, just a specified rendering of discourse, and thus replace it with ‘soft power discourse of the EU.’ The practices I shall evaluate will be the EU Police Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina (EUPM) and the relative inclusion of UNSC 1325 in ground force operations. I have determined these practices to be constitutive of the CFSP discourses of gender through my study of feminist theory, mentioned in a previous section. Thus, deriving from Neumann and Heikka’s research, the figure best representative of my study shall be:



Given additional resources, I could have investigated a greater number of practices. However, due to time and resource constraints, I shall not be able to systematically evaluate the entirety of the CFSP, and instead will focus on the police mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina as being a representative case study for those *practices* found throughout implementation of CFSP policy. I believe this location, as well as the European Union’s involvement in it, to be an ideal case study for determining possible linkages and disconnections between gendered discourses of the CFSP for two primary reasons. The first of those being that the importance of *identity* and *reconstruction* surrounding the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina place any study of it within the discourses of cultural studies and sociology, and thus gender and feminist studies as well. The second reason being

that the police mission to Bosnia-Herzegovina, enacted by the European Union in 2003 as the “first civilian crisis management mission under the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)” (*European Union’s Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina Annual Report*), and thus might exist as one of the best representations of how the emerging CFSP implements its policy goals. Additionally, it is not a military mission in the traditional sense, but rather a police mission that aims to contribute to local infrastructure for sustainable peace and reconstruction. Whether or not the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325, on Women, Peace and Security is being or has been successfully implemented within this context will be of importance in the case study of this project, as I derive it to be representative of all three of the ‘practices’ that I highlight as being indicative of gendered discourses of the CFSP.



## 6 Case Study

In this section of the paper I will introduce my case study, used as a tool to evaluate the relative levels of gender awareness that exists in CFSP practices. The focus will be the European Union Police Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina (EUPM) and the incorporation of gender perspectives will be primarily evaluated through feminist theory, with the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 (UNSC 1325) as the independent variable for investigation.

As described earlier in the methods section, there are not many EU CFSP actions from which to choose. Being that the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) only just became operational in 2003, at the moment forces on the ground only exist in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (Gnesotto (2004): 111). Each of these operational missions is highly distinctive due to each situation's respective geopolitical variations in each situation and because of the EU's different operational choices to address the security issue. I chose to focus on the EUPM because of the uniqueness of the conflict situation, as well as the EU's collective response to it. Thereby, my assessment of the relative incorporation of gender perspectives within the EU's military operations will use the EUPM as a test case. The evaluation of the EUPM will rely on those feminist principles discussed in earlier chapters, with special attention paid to the inclusion of the UNSC 1325, as it is the only extant international agreement that addresses gender perspectives in peace-keeping and conflict resolution situations. However, the breadth of literature about the dialogue between the EUPM and gender perspectives (in this case represented by UNSC 1325) is severely lacking. Just as there exists a "seeming inability of 'conventional IR' to engage meaningfully with feminists" (Carpenter (2002): 154), it is fair to say that there exists a similar refusal of engagement between foreign policy elites and gender experts. Unfortunately, this has limited the depth of my findings. I do, however, hope that the linkages drawn between the EUPM and UNSC 1325 contribute to a growing dialogue between the two institutions.

### 6.1 United Nations Security Resolution 1325

The United Nations Security Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security was passed on October 31, 2000. UNSC 1325 is viewed by the women's rights groups as the first significant international commitment to addressing women and gender issues within peace-keeping and conflict resolutions contexts (*Lives blown apart: Crimes against women in times of conflict: Stop violence against women* (2004)).

Feminists and realists alike have received the resolution both negatively and favorably. The advocates of UNSC 1325 maintain that it marks a major step in bringing global awareness to the importance of gender within both peace and conflict situations, as well as addresses the realist security threat of gender-based crime. The critics of UNSC 1325 insist that it merely reinforces the normative stereotypes of women as 'natural peace-makers and caregivers,' (Helms (2003): 15) does an injustice to the number of war crimes involving sexuality, or conversely, is too radical a document to ever be fully enforced. However, one thing is certain, it comes as the result of years of growing awareness about gender, representing the creation of a gendered international security discourse that has hitherto not existed (*Lives blown apart: Crimes against women in times of conflict: Stop violence against women* (2004)). For this reason, as well as the EU's active involvement in gender mainstreaming, UNSC 1325 is an appropriate tool for analysis of gender perspectives in foreign and security actions.

Because all 25 Member States of the European Union are also Members of the United Nations (with currently 4 states sitting on the Security Council), the European Union is obligated, under international law, to abide by the provisions set out in UNSC 1325. Without going into the full detail of the text, I will just highlight some of the principal aims:

Article 1: Urges Member States to ensure increased representation of women at all decision-making levels in national, regional and international institutions and mechanisms for the prevention, management and resolution of conflict

Article 8: Calls on all actors involved, when negotiating and implementing peace agreements to adopt a gender perspective, including inter alia:

a) The special needs of women and girls during repatriation and resettlement and for rehabilitation, reintegration and post-conflict reconstruction

b) Measures that support local women's peace initiatives and indigenous processes for conflict resolution, and that involve women in all of the implementation mechanisms of peace agreements;

c) Measures that ensure the protection of and respect for human rights of women and girls, particularly as they relate to the constitution, the electoral system, the police and the judiciary (Solon-Helal, 2004)

Besides obligating the United Nations to more fully integrate women into decision-making levels and in its field missions, Member States are pledged to fund gender-sensitive training for peacekeeping and security actions. Of course, it has only been five short years since UNSC 1325 went into affect, so in many ways it is still too early to claim achievements. However, I believe that the fact that states might be able to begin conducting peace-keeping and security issues

under an international agreement that holds them accountable for keeping gender at the forefront of policy initiatives is significant enough for the time being.

As Tickner asserts in her groundbreaking work on *Gender in International Relations*, feminist international relations should assess “the extent to which realist assumptions about the international system and the states that compose it rely on the experiences of men and the privilege values that we have come to associate with masculinity” (Tickner (1992): 23). It is with this goal in mind that Tickner makes her claim that realist understandings of security fail to acknowledge “how the boundaries between public and private, domestic and international, political and economic, are permeable and interrelated” (Tickner (1992): 23). When UNSC 1325 is examined through this feminist lens, we see it as a primarily feminist text that seems to prioritize gender perspectives. It most certainly uses the *language* of gender discourses, though not in a way that would isolate it from mainstream international relations theory. Whether or not UNSC Resolution does an effective job of ‘bridging theories’ (Carpenter (2002): 162) is, however, up for debate. Will such an international agreement, so *obviously* created with women in mind as the beneficiaries (not even the title of the Resolution is shy about this), actually manage to expose male dominant power relations and work toward sexual and gendered emancipation? It’s certainly an interesting question to entertain. But unfortunately, not one that we’re able to address just five years after implementation.

## 6.2 European Union Police Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina (EUPM)

The European Police Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina (EUPM) was created in January of 2002. Concerned about preventing “the recurrence of conflict and the outbreak of new conflict” (Smith (2003): 151), the EU stepped in to replace a United Nations International Police Task Force (IPTF) that had been in place since the Dayton Peace Accords of December 1995 (Gnesotto (2004): 112). Although European troops had already been stationed in Bosnia “under peace-enforcement terms of engagement” (Giegerich and Wallace (2004): 169) since the war erupted in 1992, the EUPM was the first truly coordinated unit to be deployed under the CFSP. As of January 2004, the EUPM involved personnel by all Member States, with a total of 449<sup>7</sup>. Since 2004 it has been funded by the general budget of the European Union and is expected to last through 2007, at which point the situation will be re-evaluated (Gnesotto (2004): 115). The choice to take over UPTF responsibilities involved a fairly smooth transition for the CFSP, as the

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<sup>7</sup> Austria: 8, Belgium: 11, Denmark: 13, Finland: 18, France: 88, Germany: 82, Greece: 12, Ireland: 6, Italy: 57, Luxembourg: 3, the Netherlands: 35, Portugal: 10, Spain: 26, Sweden: 16 and the UK: 64 (‘Weekly Establishment of EUPM Personnel by Countries (Member States)’, The European Union Police Mission, 30 January 2004).

operational environment had been stable, at that point, for some time (Gnesotto (2004): 111). However, once established in Sarajevo, additional mission objectives were created, enlarging the European commitment to the region and further developing a sustainable environment. Those mission objectives were to:

- develop police independence and accountability by:
  - depoliticising the police;
  - strengthening the Directors of Police;
  - monitoring performance of these officials;
  - promoting transparency;
- fight organized crime and corruption by:
  - carrying out a joint strategy with the Office of the High Representative;
  - supporting the local police in operational capacities;
  - strengthening the investigative capacity of the local police;
  - supporting the establishment of a state level police agency
- ensure financial viability and sustainability of the local police by:
  - supporting their efficiency and effectiveness;
  - auditing local police, with a focus on affordability;
  - supporting preparations for salary increases for police officers
- create institutions and help to build capacity by:
  - generating management capacity;
  - supervising the creation of local recruitment and promotion procedures;
  - consolidating the State Border Service and the State Information and Protection Agency (SIPA)

(Gnesotto (2004): 114)

These objectives, as well as the overall goal of increasing “the competency of the police to a level comparable to the best European and international practices of policing” (*European Union Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina*) are carried out by corresponding programs. They are more or less the same tasks as were carried out under United Nations supervision during the preceding years (*United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Hervegovina*). However, the United Nations, having been the peacekeeping force from the beginning of the cease-fire, had a certain number of more civilian-oriented goals.

## 6.3 Analysis

In previous sections I have established the existence of a ‘soft power’ discourse within the EU. Based on the methodology section, it is here where I will assess the EUPM as a representative case study for those practices found throughout CFSP ground forces. The principle mechanism for evaluating whether gender perspectives have been incorporated at the implementation level will be UNSC

1325. This portion of my paper is based primarily on information I collected through NGO resources on evaluating UNSC 1325, as well as that information provided to me by the Swedish Ministry of Justice and the Swedish Police Peace Support Operations.

Although there have been numerous independent papers written on the importance of promoting the principles of UNSC 1325 through increasing women's involvement in all levels of conflict and peace processes, not much has come from these efforts. The European Women's Lobby (EWL), in particular, has been very vocal about its desire for the EU to 'invest in civil society' as a means of combating the violence women have historically suffered in armed conflict and peace-building. In particular, in 2004, during the 48<sup>th</sup> session of the Commission on the Status of Women, the EWL demanded that Member States:

- Provide clear gender focused "Regulations and Rules" similar to the "Code of Conduct" issued by the United Nations and to those of national EU Member States on the standards of conduct of military and civilian peacekeeping and humanitarian staff while on mission in areas of armed conflict. Such regulations and rules should clearly stipulate the consequences of breaching the high standards of conduct especially in relation to any form of gender-based violence; and
- Provide a Code of Conduct, inspired by the Plan of Action proposed by the UN Inter-Agency Standing Committee on Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in Humanitarian Crises, to ensure that humanitarian aid workers are fully aware of their responsibilities and duties stipulating that sexual exploitation constitutes acts of gross misconduct that can lead to the termination of their employment as well as sanctions (CSW 2004)

The CFSP has failed to respond directly to the requests made by the EWL. Granted, at least in regard to the EUPM, it's difficult to see how much incorporation could truly occur. What the EWL and other organizations like Amnesty International are requesting is heightened involvement in community organizations and the like, that perhaps a police force might not have the best access to. And yet, the UN International Police Task Force (IPTF) that was in place through December of 2002 (up until the EUPM took over), was able to incorporate such issues into their operational priorities:

IPTF was involved in changing the primary focus of the local police from the security of the state to the security of the individual. The police forces were largely downsized from their over-represented ethnic groups and wartime numbers to the cap set by restructuring agreements. IPTF helped to recreate multi-ethnic police forces [. . .] IPTF was also closely involved in the recruitment, selection, training and deployment of police cadets from under-represented ethnic and gender groups at the two police academies [. . .] IPTF was responsible for basic training courses in human dignity and transitional training and for advanced training courses for command and senior officers in both entities of Bosnia and Herzegovina. " (*United Nations Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina*)

From this excerpt of the UN mission, we are perhaps given a taste of what even partial commitment from the EUPM might amount to. But instead, no current operations for the EUPM have any listing of 'gender,' 'ethnic,' 'men' or 'women.' This *lack* of signification—this silence—on the part of gender, only leads me to assume the practices of the EUPM are as sexist as their policy objectives.

However, there are some Member States that have taken it upon themselves to institute programs of gender focused briefings before both civilian and military forces are sent abroad. For instance, in response to an inquiry I made to the Swedish Police Peace Support Operations, I was informed that since 2004, all Swedish police deployed to international missions are given a copy, as well as a briefing on UNSC 1325. The Swedish Ministry of Defense considers these practices to both be in line with an international agreement that was signed by its nation state, but also an important act of commitment toward larger scale gender mainstreaming within the EU. In addition to this information, however, I was informed that thus far, actions of this type in regard to UNSC 1325 have been made on the sole initiative of Member States.

Since January 2001, the Swedish Police have sent 16 police officers to the EUPM—only 3 of them have been women. However, compared to the 4% of the Republika Srpska police force that they make up in Bosnia-Herzegovina, this number seems rather high. Unfortunately, Sweden was the only Member State from which I was able to receive statistics about the gender composition of their police sent, as well as what their respective ministry's implementation of UNSC 1325 have been. However, I believe that based on Sweden's strong history of gender mainstreaming, it is safe to assume that it is the exception and not necessarily the rule. Besides, within the first four years of implementation, Sweden became one of three countries to host women's civil society organizations as 'experts on UNSC 1325'<sup>8</sup>.

However, although this information provides us with how Member States and indeed the CFSP might be (or might not be) implementing UNSC 1325, it hardly gives a representation of what the society of Bosnia-Herzegovina is experiencing. Fortunately, recent literature on Women's NGOs in the region, sheds some light on how the communities of Bosnia-Herzegovina are reacting to those goals set out by the "international community". The study I reference, by Elissa Helms, complains that "women's rights are paid lip service under a more general rubric of human rights, but specific efforts to address gender inequalities have been relatively rare" (Helms (2003): 18). I see this not just as a malfunction of international donors and the EUPM, but also perhaps of UNSC 1325, which despite its aspirations, does not provide an adequate framework for how to accomplish the larger issues of inequality, systemic throughout so many communities. Helms asserts that the suffering of women within Bosnia-

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<sup>8</sup> Thailand and West Africa being the other two (NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security, October 2004).

Herzegovina has not decreased with the discourse that connects them to peacemaking. The type of suffering might have changed due to the post-conflict situation, but “women belonging to hostile ethnic groups” continue to be victims of gendered violence (Helms (2003): 21).

I believe that the material here, however brief, provides evidence for the lack of impact that the EUPM has had in regard to UNSC 1325, as well as the more general situation of women in Bosnia-Herzegovina. I believe it is significant that in comparison to the UN IPTF actually *less* is being done by the EUPM to incorporate gender perspectives in their police operations. Perhaps all one really has to do is go to the website of the EUPM<sup>9</sup> and click on the link to Local Voices, a section of the website that provides visitors with interviews of local actors. Perhaps it is not surprising that they are all men, as the 4% of women on the local police force is hardly going to exist among the elites. However, what is surprising is that there is no attempt to incorporate women into this venue of discussion and knowledge. Instead it is simply left to be as the location of men.

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<sup>9</sup> <http://www.eupm.org/Local%20voices.asp?lang=eng>

## 7 Conclusion

In conclusion I would like to reiterate the goal of the study, which was to assess whether the ‘soft power’ discourse of the CFSP was affecting the practices of its ground forces. I was hoping to locate evidence that gender perspectives were being integrated at the level of implementation, using UNSC 1325 and the EUPM in Bosnia and Herzegovina as my case study. Unfortunately, it’s still too early since UNSC 1325’s implementation, to make any generalizeable statements about gender mainstreaming within all operations. However, the results that were gathered do not look good. In essence, this returns us to the difficulty of feminist research discussed in the methodology section of this paper about whether institutionalized emancipation from gendered constraints was possible when successful mainstreaming requires the absence of these women’s voices to be effective within previously constructed policy areas? Woodward suggests that

the demands of policy transformation reveal contradictions. More rationally inclined bureaucracies, less infiltrated with gender awareness, will be resistant to mainstreaming in its transformative sense of empowerment, and will develop responses that are symbolic waves at gender awareness (Woodward (2003): 74)

Certainly the foreign and security policy sector can be counted among those ‘more rationally inclined bureaucracies.’ However, at the very least, symbolic waves at gender awareness create opportunities for future alterations to be made. To have an institution of hegemonic masculinity, such as any system of governance to date, be able to even mention gender and produce a formalized commitment to its inclusion in future policies is meaningful. However, transformation from current structures of male domination is going to take many years to change. Woodward believes that there are a few things that are able to make the transformation process one of effective gender mainstreaming—one that both works within the confines of bureaucratic language and pushes the complexities of gender issues. She states that there are three important factors to consider in the potential “depth of transformation of public policy discourse and its gender sensitivity: commitment to a gender mission, the level of sophistication in terms of gender/policy issues, the environmental context of resistance to gender initiatives, and the role of gender experts” (Woodward (2003): 71). Taking this analysis to the level of European governance yields further complications, as suddenly people within the bureaucracies of Brussels, dealing with gender mainstreaming most likely come from varied traditions as to the relative importance of gender issues. For instance, those bureaucrats coming from the Nordic states have been known



to encourage and participate in gender mainstreaming practices (Woodward (2003): 80). However, advances have still been made

by focusing on the ways in which attention to gender can enhance not only *equality* but also the efficiency of EU policies. For this reason, the shape and content of a ‘gender perspective’ in EU public policy is not uniform but varies substantially across the various Commission DGs and their respective issue-areas and dominant frames (Hafner-Burton and Pollack (2002): 296)

And advances can be made in accordance with the gender-mainstreaming mandate. In fact, the findings that gender mainstreaming has not yet occurred at the level of the CFSP is not what I find meaningful about this project. Rather, it is the fact that discourses surrounding the ‘soft power’ of the EU’s military force exist as an entity in and of themselves—relying on foreign and security policy produced without the civil society actors that critical security studies insists be included in the process.

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