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Tutor: Ole Elgström

The Art of Adaptation

Explaining changes in Nordic security and defense
policy

Josh Meltzer

Abstract

Changes in Nordic security have been discussed often recently in light of the emergence of the European Security and Defense Policy. Taken up primarily by constructivist arguments, much of the work asserts that Nordic security policy is changing in light of the increasing significance of the European Union's security dimensions and even becoming Europeanized. However, this essay argues that security and defense still lie close to the heart of sovereign states. Using Nikolaj Petersen's adaptation theory, the argument presented here brings the focus of Nordic security change back within a rational theoretical lens. Using Finland and Sweden as examples, the discussion aims at demonstrating how member states use a calculated strategy of balanced adaptation to secure national interests, but also remain credible partners in the integration process. It is a game of give-and-take, which ultimately results in visible influence exerted onto the ESDP by two small countries from the North.

Key words: European Security and Defense Policy, Sweden, Finland, Adaptation, Europeanization

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1 Introduction

1.1 Sweden, Finland and the ESDP

In the past few years the European Security and Defense Policy has taken center stage in discussions revolving the deeper integration of the European Union. Since the Maastricht Treaty, moves to formalize a Common Foreign and Security Policy have gradually led to an interest in developing a means for Europe to have a military force of its own—with its own European flavor—to strengthen its role as a serious player in international security.

Historical considerations played a large role in the emergence of the ESDP, as well. The fall of the Soviet Empire and the emergence of the United States as the sole superpower left Europe questioning its security situation both internally and externally. Questions surrounding the existence and purpose of NATO and the continued involvement of the US in European defense repeatedly arose throughout the 1990s. Additionally, with the collapse of Yugoslavia, it was seen from an early stage that Europe could not even handle crises in its own backyard.

It was thus the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997 that began to cement the development of what has become known as the European Security and Defense Policy. Of notable significance, Sweden and Finland requested that the Petersberg Tasks of the WEU be integrated into the ESDP within the Amsterdam Treaty, adding a distinctly Nordic-flavored civilian/conflict prevention dimension to the policy. It was a bold and interesting move for two states that had only been in the EU for three years and had spent the greater part of the century officially as militarily neutral countries.

Sweden and Finland have been active in the formulation of Europe's Security and Defense Policy from the beginning, albeit in sharply contrasting ways. As members of the European Union and thus the ESDP mechanism, the two traditional "neutrals" have steadily stripped that title from their international identity—a process that is more than a decade in the making. Additionally, changes in their own national security and defense policies have been noticeable—particularly in the case of Sweden.

The question thus arises: What is the reason for these changes in security and defense policy for Sweden and Finland? Taken in a European context, many scholars have argued that Europeanization is the primary reason behind the significant contributions made to and structural changes developed for the emerging European Security and Defense Policy. They often assert that the

security identities of these two countries have undergone noticeable changes since the end of the Cold War and have aligned with the emerging security identity of the European Union. However, I see these explanations as relatively incomplete. As their research is in-depth and substantial, the theoretical framework and use empirical evidence that leads to their explanation is somewhat lacking in a broader context. Sweden and Finland have only been members of the EU since 1995, and arguments that an issue as sacred to sovereignty has already been Europeanized raises some red flags. Additionally, the concept of Europeanization is somewhat blurry, and as it lies under the umbrella of constructivist theory, it runs the risk of being un-testable (Moravcsik in Christensen et al 2001: 178-9) and therefore its legitimacy questionable. Other factors beyond European integration have also greatly impacted states' security environment during the 1990s, including most significantly the end of the Cold War balance of power doctrine and the rise of asymmetric security threats.

1.2 Purpose and plan of analysis

My primary questions for this essay are:

- If not Europeanization, what best explains the changes in security and defense policy for Sweden and Finland?
- How significant are these changes and in what context should they be viewed?
- How can this be applied to explaining the development of the ESDP in general?

Because of the somewhat theoretical nature of the question, much of the initial discussion (Chapter 2) will deal with theoretical considerations revolving around both general approaches and Sweden and Finland's specific approaches to the ESDP. It will be important to examine the theory that I suggest best explains their actions—which is a version of Nikolaj Petersen's adaptation theory (1998)—as well as discuss why approaches from the constructivist camp do not go far enough in explaining the current state of Nordic security. Chapters 3 and 4 deal with examining the specific security policies of Sweden and Finland, and how they are applied within an ESDP context.

The primary purpose of this study is to examine at the same time the security and defense policies of the two most active Nordic EU member states within an ESDP context. This should also help to explain developments within the ESDP itself. In most current research in this area, not enough attention is paid to the actual influence that the member states have (especially small ones) in determining Union policy in such a highly sensitive area. This paper will argue that both Finland and Sweden have defined interests and preferences within the realm of security and defense policy, and thus play the integration game using strategies that will have the best chance of achieving these objectives. This is a rational approach at examining developments within the ESDP, which is in sharp

contrast to much of the constructivist work that has been done on the subject. This is the explanation for the other aim of this analysis, which is to offer a new perspective in a dynamic, exciting and current area of European integration studies.

A final note on defining “Nordic security”: although this is an analysis of primarily the changes in Sweden and Finland’s security and defense policies in the context of the ESDP, a brief discussion about Denmark will both add to my argument and fulfill to some extent a truly Nordic-EU dimension of this analysis. Because of the current Danish opt-out in any defense dimension of European integration, a thorough discussion of Danish security and defense policy will not be fruitful in adding significant understanding to the questions posed by this essay. Also, although Norway is incorporated into some of the EU’s security and defense structures, the limitations inherent in this research project will omit it from discussion purely because of its non-membership in the EU.

Finally, I understand that this analysis goes against the grain of what is currently in vogue for academic research in Nordic security and defense policy, and given limitations in space and time, my discussion of the theoretical and empirical elements that construct my argument will not be as thorough as I would like. However, I hope that the insight within this analysis contributes to a more complete understanding of Nordic security and defense policy in specific and the ESDP as a whole.

1.3 Methodology

This essay seeks to compare theoretical approaches to a somewhat under-theorized subject area. In this case, it can be classified as a theoretical-qualitative analysis. Primarily, the objective of the study is to analyze a popular approach to applying theory to the European Security and Defense Policy, particularly in the case of the EU’s Nordic member states and their responses and actions relating to its development. Constructivist approaches to the subject vastly dominate the academic analysis (see among others Carlsnaes et al 2004, Christiansen et al 2001, Rieker 2003), and this discussion aims at bringing in rational approaches into the academic discourse.

Additionally, this argument can be seen as a comparative exercise, contrasting with a particular argument generated recently from a constructivist scholar. Pernille Rieker’s dissertation “The Europeanization of Nordic Security” is the primary work with which this analysis seeks to contrast. Many of the arguments presented are in direct opposition to the arguments presented by Rieker. The dissertation, in my opinion, is the most complete contribution made within the constructivist framework in attempting to theorize policy change in the Nordic EU member states in relation to the ESDP. It stands at the top of the mountain, and thus is the most visible target for an analysis based on an alternative approach. Thus, while the research contained within the project is

thorough and well-explained, the conclusions drawn do not always seem to adequately account for certain significant elements that are part of Nordic security policy.

The first and most substantial part of this analysis deals with the primary theoretical discussion. I first look at the work done in the constructivist camp and point out where the theoretical application to this phenomenon is incomplete or insufficient for explaining or predicting behavior. Because constructivism is a meta-theoretical ontology, encompassing not only political science but the whole realm of social science (Moravcsik in Christiansen et al 2001: 176), the discussion will be narrowed primarily to what has been most often applied to the subject of ESDP, which is the concept of Europeanization. The discussion then turns to an alternate theory—adaptation—and argues that empirical actions observed within this framework are stronger and more adequate for explaining and predicting Nordic approaches to ESDP. Because adaptation theory has not been applied specifically to this area of European integration, a thorough discussion of the theory is necessary in this section.

Chapters 3 and 4 deal with applying and testing adaptation to Finnish and Swedish security policies. These are not exhaustive case studies by any means, but should serve to provide a new lens through which to view Nordic security policy in a modern context and explain changes therein. The basic function of this section is to confirm the arguments presented in the theoretical comparison section. Some historical elements are brought up for this purpose, but most of the examples in the country-specific section deals with the period of time immediately following the collapse of the Soviet Union and continuing through the present.

Finally, because this essay deals mainly with a theoretical debate, the bulk of the research material is deals with theoretical explanation, primarily dealing with constructivism and adaptation. However, the empirical sources are a mix of primary and secondary sources. The most significant primary sources being the CFSP Watch 2004 from both Finland and Sweden, and the Finnish Security and Defense Policy 2004—Government Report. Secondary sources have been collected through various academic journals, articles, and work from the ESDP's/CFSP's more notable scholars.

1.4 A divergence: The importance of NATO

Much of what this essay will attempt to clarify depends on understanding the role of institutions that are significant to Europe but not a part of the EU. Although the importance and lifespan of NATO has been much-debated during the past decade, the institution still retains validity as a source of territorial defense and international crisis management for the members of the alliance. This is especially true in the case of the ten new EU members, who joined in May 2004.

Although Sweden and Finland are not Alliance members, both have extensive ties to the organization—significant enough to affect defense policy and planning within their national ministries (Herolf 2004, Strand 2004). Through the Partnership for Peace (PfP) mechanism and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), both countries have formally contributed materially to NATO peacekeeping and policing missions in various ways (which will be discussed further in sections dealing specifically with each country). Even during the Cold War Sweden maintained extensive ties to the Western Allies, which directly challenges the assumption of neutrality as the definitive element of the Swedish security policy.

Most of the efforts to theorize national responses to the ESDP have downplayed the significance of NATO, but to an unconvincing degree. The organization still exists and is relevant (albeit in varying degrees) to all states that participate in one way or another within its various structures. Even in Finland and Sweden, the question of formal NATO membership remains an option and is often a hot topic of public debate. Additionally, the enlargement of NATO has been analyzed alongside the enlargement of the EU (Fierke and Wiener in Christiansen et al, 121-39: 2001) and, although the institutions differ greatly in scope and depth, the continued growth and development of both organizations demonstrates their durability and survivability. Even a European security and defense dimension incorporates many of the existing NATO structures within its framework, adding more weight to the Alliance's continued importance (see the Draft Constitution for Europe).

1.5 A divergence: The importance of Denmark

“...as the domestic politics of the Maastricht Treaty has proved, Danish foreign policy is increasingly characterized by a balancing of strong external and internal forces”

Carsten Due-Nielsen and Nikolaj Petersen, 1995

This essay deals with developing a theoretical explanation of national responses to the ESDP, particularly in the case of the Nordic EU members. However, the empirical evidence to support the argument deals only with the security and defense policies of Finland and Sweden, with Denmark being noticeably left out. Those familiar with European integration know that Denmark has voluntarily opted out of any security and defense dimension of the EU. This decision was made after the Danish public voted no to the Maastricht Treaty (The Treaty on European Union) in 1992. In order to salvage the treaty, a separate agreement was

signed at the Edinburgh Summit, with Denmark allowing for opt-outs of security and defense policy and monetary integration.

The opt-out makes Denmark a tricky case for testing against theories that attempt to explain integration in the security and defense arena. This does not mean that Denmark's national security and defense policy is not significant to this kind of study, however. There will be times in this essay that I will reference Denmark's influence in overall Nordic security and defense policy change. Denmark's position outside of the ESDP structures also provides an important point of reference for the influence of non-European institutions in determining change in security and defense policy—specifically, the fact that Denmark is the only European state to abandon territorial defense is highly significant to the assumption that EU pressures are only one factor in the big picture that determines a member state's policy preference in this issue area.

Of the three Nordic EU member states, Denmark is by far the one with the longest history as a member of the Union. With a more than two-decade advantage, it would be assumed that if any Europeanization would occur over time that Denmark would experience it greater than both Sweden and Finland. In fact the opposite is true. Even constructivist studies on the Europeanization of Denmark cede that Denmark's security policy has been greatly influenced by its participation within NATO structures (Rieker 2003: 186) rather than European structures. This says a great deal about the applicability of Europeanization theories to national defense policies.

Finally, it is important to note that the theory that will be used to explain Finnish and Swedish policy change was originally formulated in Nikolaj Petersen's analysis on Danish foreign policy (Due-Nielsen and Petersen 1995, Petersen 1998). Although the security identity and preferences of each Nordic state is unquestionably unique, the matrix through which adaptation theory is explained involves grouping member states together according to characteristics such as: size, strength and nature of economy and stability (Petersen 1998: 40). These traits in mind, Finland and Sweden are certainly similar to Denmark and thus will be suitable for analysis within the same theoretical framework. More will come later on the specifics of adaptation theory.

2 Attempting to theorize national responses to the ESDP

2.1 The lack of theoretical approaches

Although volumes of literature has been devoted to the theoretical explanations of European integration (Wiener and Diez 1004, Rosamond 2000), few heave dealt specifically with security and defense policy. Many scholars recently have turned their attention certain dimensions of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (among others: Smith, K 2003; Carlsnaes et al 2004) but these volumes include one or two chapters at best on the study of ESDP, often employing a theoretical framework that umbrellas all aspects of CFSP.

Pernille Rieker has produced arguably the most complete analysis of the EDSP (also within a Nordic context), utilizing the theory of Europeanization to explain her findings. Although a well-researched and complete body of empirical work, many of the assumptions made through the use of Europeanization as a theoretical framework neglect important elements of Nordic security and defense policy that may be best explained through another theoretical lens. After a brief note about security identity, the discussion will turn to an examination of the constructivist framework, particularly the various modes of Europeanization, to find shortcomings in analyzing the ESDP generally, and in the case of Nordic strategic policy change, in specific. I will then introduce the theory of adaptation and give it relevance to the application of ESDP.

A note on the theoretical implications of security identity

The concept of security identity is often interwoven throughout analyses dealing with member states' security and defense policies and the development of a Common European Security and Defense Policy. Because this essay does not attempt to debate the role of values in determining national preferences, national security identities will not be thoroughly addressed. This is not to dismiss them entirely; however, as one of the main goals of this analysis is to offer a more rationalist perspective of national approaches to the ESDP, discussion will be mainly focused on interests and preferences *themselves* rather than the role of (traditionally constructivist) ideas of identity and values in forming them. Ideas and values matter in rationalist approaches, however, as Andrew Moravcsik states:

Collective ideas are like air; it is essentially impossible for humans to function as social beings without them. There are ubiquitous and necessary. In this (trivial) sense there is little point in debating whether ‘ideas matter.’ *Existing rationalist theories claim only something far more modest, namely that ideas are causally epiphenomenal to more fundamental underlying influences on state behavior* (italics in original) (in Christiansen et al 2001: 181).

The promotion of ideas and norms as strategic foreign policy, on the other hand, is different. In the section dealing with Swedish policy analysis, I will argue that Sweden uses norm projection to gain influence in and credibility in other area, thus values here are consistent with Moravcsik’s assertion that underlying material actor interests are inherently determinant of behavior predictability.

Finally, the argument that the EU has a defined security identity is somewhat problematic. Because the ESDP is purely intergovernmental and thus determined by what the member states are willing to commit to, it is difficult to say that an EU security identity is anything more than the lowest common denominator of the member states’ security interests or identities. This is a debate that is far too encompassing for the scope of this discussion. Noting its weakness, however, is necessary in justifying its exclusion.

2.2 Constructivism

Constructivist explanations to European integration emerged as a popular theory after the demise of neo-functionalism (Haas in Christensen et al 2001: 22) and in response to the increasingly out-of-date hard power assumptions of the neo-realists (citation!!). Constructivists sought to provide a “middle ground” theory between the materialism of rationalism and the liquidity and “slash and burn” nature of reflectivism (Haas in Christiansen et al 2001: 26). In doing so, they emphasized the importance of structure and process rather than actor and result. Its primary assumptions lie in the importance of norms and values in the structures that determine the rules and relations in the international system. In a European context, this involved the dense network of institutions—formal and informal—and how these institutions had developed norms and rules that influenced actor preferences and allowed for the prediction, to a certain extent, of actor behavior (Risse in Wiener and Diez 2004: 162-3).

Constructivist explanations within of CFSP emerged almost as soon as the formalization of it within the Maastricht Treaty came into effect. Many constructivist arguments claim that Europe’s foreign policy has been greatly influenced by a set of European norms and values—perhaps even more so than material interests. Helene Sjursen notably argues this point in explaining why the EU-15 decided unanimously to enlarge to ten much less developed economies and democracies in Central and Eastern Europe. She asserts that, even though the short and medium term material costs were to be high, EU-15 member states felt a sense of obligation and responsibility to include these former Communist

countries into the European project, which promoted human rights, democracy and rule of law (see Sjursen 2003: Arena Working Papers WP 01/6)

The much referred-to “logic of appropriateness” guides the process of decision-making within the constructivist framework, and this has been elaborated in their response to institutionalism. To compliment the rational choice and historical explanations of the importance of institutions, constructivists argued that sociological institutionalism was a theoretical approach that best explained decisions such as the one to enlarge the EU to almost double its size. According to constructivists, the appropriateness norm, thus, was what trumped the logic norm (assumed in rational choice institutionalism) because enlargement was deemed to be ideologically right and just as opposed to materially beneficial and rewarding (Sjursen 2003).

The problem with constructivist approaches, however, is that their application to other areas of European integration (and rationale, therein) does not effectively extend to the ESDP. Sociological institutionalism is a prime example of this. The demonstrated intergovernmental nature of the relatively newly formalized ESDP doesn't allow for much of an established history of an institutional culture of values and norms to constrict actor interests and preferences. Additionally, there have been very few cases where dramatic political situations have tested the resolve of actors to be guided by the “logic of appropriateness.” If one references the EU missions to the Balkans and the Congo, it must be stated that these were politically acceptable missions to all parties involved. The Balkan operation was handed to the EU by NATO forces and the Central Africa operation was approved by the UN. It could be argued that the African operation was not a “hot zone” for international security issues (as compared to the Middle East, Central Asia and the Korean Peninsula, for example). However, discussions about situations with much greater international security policy sensitivity have demonstrated that state interest and other commitments sometimes supercede Union obligations. This was seen most evidently in the case of Iraq.

The primary constructivist explanation for national responses to ESDP has been through various interpretations of the concept of Europeanization. The next section will deal with examining these concepts and identifying when and where they stand on shaky ground.

2.2.1 The problem with Europeanization: an overview and its misapplication to the ESDP

Europeanization has become a much-used and much-misunderstood concept in the theoretical and empirical discussions surrounding European integration. Constructivism embraces the concept, however, as an overall transmission or projection of a developing European identity and values system onto/into the structures and agents of all member states. In her analysis of Nordic security and

defense policy change, Pernille Rieker's breaks the concept of Europeanization into five interpretations:

- The export and promotion of European culture and norms to third (non-European) countries.
- A synonym for integration process, in general.
- The special system of governance that has emerged at the supranational level.
- The concept of a developing European identity.

And, finally, the concept that Rieker uses most frequently in her work: "the adaptation of domestic political structures (institutions, public administration, inter-governmental relations, the legal structure, structures of representation, cognitive and normative structures) to European pressure" (Rieker 23). According to Rieker and others, much of this adaptation is due to socialization of national agents in a European context, which then produces an agent that has "learned" the values and norms of the European system (and may even become "European at the core," placing EU interests above national interests) and may thus work to change structures in his/her home country to operate more efficiently with systems at the European level (Risse in Wiener and Diez 2004: 168). In her model of explaining Europeanization of the Nordic security policy, Rieker presents the following concept:




Figure 1. Rieker's Europeanization of the security approaches and identities of the Nordic states

This diagram seems to assume that: 1. The EU has a security identity and that it is stronger than the security identities of its member states, and 2. that the relationship to the EU is the only significant external factor determining changes in the Nordic states' security approaches. Examining the first assumption, constructivist explanations for a European security identity usually assert that it is based on the notions of civilian crisis management and conflict prevention with the use of peacekeeping and sometimes peace-enforcing to assist the preservation of the first two elements (Rieker 2003: 43-83). If this is truly the EU's security identity, then I assert that it is firstly the lowest common denominator of all member states' security identities and secondly, heavily influenced by both Finland and Sweden policy preferences. Additionally, as Rieker points out (2003: 39), these elements of security are present in both the UN and NATO, and to

assert that they are European in nature is questionable. Furthermore, the Petersberg Tasks, which were a part of the WEU framework—were championed by Finland and Sweden because of the task’s political salience within their official non-aligned policies (Rieker 2004: 377). If an EU security approach were to be based off of these principles, the status quo would be nicely preserved, avoiding the need to make any significant changes to satisfy European demands. It’s hard to see, given these elements, that member states have been Europeanized. Rather, the contrary seems to have taken place, as member states themselves shaped what would become the ESDP during the crucial points of its development. The second important omission from this diagram is the absence of institutions like the UN, which has significant experience in combined civilian-military operations. NATO’s influence on interoperability and experience in Balkan peacekeeping would also be determinants in post-Cold War security policy of states that participated in NATO-led operations.

Europeanization also neglects to explain the resistance in the draft Constitutional Treaty for Europe to make decision-making within the ESDP more communitarian, i.e. through qualified majority voting. In fact, the overall nature of the ESDP in the draft constitution supports the rationalist assertion that states will adapt and cooperate when politically feasible and resist and refrain from participation when politically sensitive. First, the heralded solidarity clause is not as binding as a Europeanization theoretical approach would predict, as it depends on an act of intergovernmental decision-making (unanimity) to commit to a plan of action, if one is requested. Additionally, this clause only refers to situations where a non-traditional disaster occurs, such as a terrorist attack or a nuclear reactor meltdown. When it comes to territorial defense, however, member states are less inclined to use the European Union as their defense mechanism. Although the treaty does call for a collective response to armed aggression against any member state, certain member states “with a tradition of neutrality or non-alignment” did not allow for any binding commitments in the case of such an incident (see Final Report of Working Group VIII-Defense 2002: 21). There are also multiple instances where the treaty also calls for compatibility with NATO commitments, demonstrating the continued importance of NATO to member states that rely on that organization for their territorial defense—again not what would be expected from a Europeanized policy area.

Looking at another part of the draft constitution, Europeanization also fails to explain the intergovernmental nature of permanent structured cooperation. First, when examining the areas that call for increased cooperation and interoperability of forces, it could be argued that permanent structured cooperation is inspired by NATO’s Capability Development Mechanism, and scholars crying Europeanization usually use NATO as the “other” in promoting the European-ness of ESDP (Ojanen 2002, Rieker 2003). Also, it can be argued that permanent structured cooperation allows for a kind of “coalitions of the willing-and-able” approach within a European context—hardly asserting the kind of participatory pressure that would justify a definitive explanation through socialization and learning and more justifiable through a rational approach based on the importance of defined state interests.

The primary use of pointing out these elements within the draft constitution is to highlight that, even in the most recent development within security and defense policy EU member states still view the ESDP as primarily an intergovernmental regime, clearly asserting their preference for sovereignty in the most sensitive areas of security and defense. The changes that have occurred to various member states' security and defense policies may, thus, correspond and converge with the emerging ESDP, but it is highly unlikely, based on these facts, that they have been truly Europeanized.

2.2.2 The problem with Europeanization: Finland and Sweden

The concept of Europeanization in general is especially problematic when applying it to states that have been part of the EU for barely ten years. Even if one assumes that socialization and identity-change is possible, it is highly unlikely that ten years of participation will produce a change in policy that is explainable through this framework. The constructivist work done by Marcussen et al assert that France has to some extent become Europeanized, but only after a long period of identity transformation, and this became empirically visible only during the Mitterrand economic failures of the early 1980s—decades after French entrance into the (then) EC. Even if this is assumed to be true, Marcussen et al admit that French “Europeanized” policy is usually also identified as fitting well within the French national interest, therefore weakening the argument that Europeanization actually occurred (in Christiansen et al 2001: 108).

Again using France as an example, Marcussen et al also explains that critical junctures are necessary in order to produce windows that allow for the alteration or change of identity and national interest. Andrew Moravscik points out that determining these “critical junctures” is problematic, in the first place (in Christiansen et al 181: 2001). Assuming that they exist and do in fact lead to change, it is still arguable whether such a critical juncture existed to allow for a substantial change in the security identities of Finland and Sweden, thus allowing for a reconsideration and, even further a “Europeanization” of their security and defense policies. This will be examined further in the sections dealing with Finland and Sweden's individual experiences throughout the 1990s.

If learning and interaction are assumed to be important catalysts for change, the concept of Europeanization is also too narrow in its definition to offer a complete explanation of what can determine changes in security and defense policy. As the concept depends on interaction and participation within a *European* context, it minimizes or excludes influences that exist beyond Europe—and highly influential institutions, which both Sweden and Finland participate in (albeit at varying levels) such as NATO and the UN are irresponsibly reduced or left out of the debate. Even if it is assumed that security identity plays an important role in determining member state policy preferences, security identities are determined by a state's influence and sensitivities on a *global* (not only

regional) level, making theories that overly emphasize a regional dimension seem shortsighted.

Finally, the concept of Europeanization in this policy context implies that changes made to a member state's security and defense policy would not have occurred if not within a European context. Although the EU may be a driver for policy formation in this area, this theory does not demonstrate the clear linkage between the policy change within the member state and its uniquely European roots. For example, Sweden's move away from territorial defense (Rieker 2003: 122) has no model of reference in a European context. However, Denmark provides a model for such a policy change (Clemmesen in Due-Nielsen and Petersen 1995: 123-131), and Denmark is removed from all aspects of ESDP (see annex to the Treaty on European Union 1993)

The application of a constructivist framework to explaining the ESDP and member states' reaction to it does not seem to paint a complete picture. It is clear that, given the hesitance of certain member states to commit to mutual defense, (the core of a multinational defense policy) a logic of appropriateness does not rise to the surface. Relying on individual member states' territorial defense (Finland), defense through alliance membership (Denmark), or defense through multiple security arrangements, including national, UN, EU and association with NATO (Sweden), it is clear that national self-interest triumphs over a collective "appropriate" strategy. Also, socialization and learning can take place in non-European security arrangements (i.e. interoperability through NATO mechanisms), thus limiting its explanatory power. According to the Final Report of Working Group VIII-Defense,

"Defense policy is a special policy both at national and at European level. By nature it belongs to the most sensitive areas of sovereignty and calls upon essentially national resources. The decision to take part in an operation is for national authorities, which will always wish to be involved in the conduct of operations which have national security implications and are also likely to endanger the lives of their soldiers and their citizens" (2002: 10).

This statement, drafted by some of Europe's leading experts in security and defense policy, drips with references to national interest. Let us now look at a theoretical framework that may better suit this issue area.

2.3 Towards a theory of balanced adaptation

2.3.1 The Integration Dilemma

In order to adequately understand the theoretical dimensions of adaptation in relation to European integration, it is essential to first discuss the concept of the

integration dilemma. Nikolaj Petersen describes the integration dilemma (in contrast to the security dilemma) as follows:

“While alliances form against an external adversary, ‘the enemy’, and hence derive their main motivation from the adversary game, integration projects form in order to reap the benefits of cooperation among the members themselves. Integration projects are thus more inward-looking than alliances, and the dilemmas associated with the internal integration game, the union game, thus dominate the dilemmas of the external game.”

He goes on to point out that the integration dilemma presents more of a problem to national governments because, while alliances seek to preserve the status quo (territorial integrity and sovereignty) the integration process develops in ways that may challenge the supremacy of the national government.

In this respect, the choice to integrate is based on rationality: integration provides, through both negative and positive integration, both the elimination of transaction costs in the former and developing rules and institutions to ensure a level playing field in the latter. However, there are drawbacks as well, which mostly deal with challenges to sovereignty. Petersen specifically points out the challenges integration presents in the realm of security and defense: “Some member states may see it as a possible threat to other objectives, such as trans-Atlantic cooperation, while others may find it difficult to see themselves as part of a regional power and prefer to view the Union as a pure civilian power” (1998: 36-7). These decisions must also be made in light of national public opinion, which is usually more skeptical about integration than national governments. Insecurities about what Europe is and should be for the particular member state can halt the integration process as demonstrated by some reactions to Maastricht (the Danish no and the French “petit oui”) and currently in the debate on the constitution and the strength of the “no” camps throughout Europe (see *New York Times*: 18 May 2005). For member states, the integration dilemma is often met with pragmatism, keeping in mind the “threshold of intolerable encroachment on national interests” and how much the public will be able to tolerate (Petersen 1998: 37).

How member states respond individually to the integration dilemma depends on multiple factors. For those who were involved from the beginning of European integration, the dilemma is likely to be less intense than for new members, as the founders have had influence over the “nature of the beast” at every step. However, even some new members may not be significantly affected by the integration dilemma if they accede to the Union already close to the “ethos of European integration” (Petersen 1998: 37). Hans Mouritzen argues that Poland may be an example of this because it never viewed itself as outside of Europe in the first place. Its periphery status was forced upon it by external factors that never managed to change its core European identity (Mouritzen 1996: 265).

Petersen asserts that, regardless of these factors, member states (as rational actors) are presumed to want the benefits and to avoid the drawbacks of integration. Thus, on the one hand strategies will be formulated that seek to maximize the receiving of collective goods brought about through integration, while at the same time attempting to increase their relative influence and reputation of their country. On the other hand, member states will attempt to

minimize loss of sovereignty and prevent Union encroachment on national priorities while also avoiding loss of influence or even marginalization (1998:37).

As security and defense policy are among the most sensitive issues dealt with for national decision-makers, the incorporation of this issue area into the EU presents exactly the kind of dilemma expressed here. The benefits of working together in security issues present the possibility of an effective and powerful system of response to internal and external crises. However, the drawbacks are also substantial, as pooling defense resources and structuring security systems around a more community-based interest may redirect crucial resources away from national security interests. Also, decision-making within this area is highly sensitive, as allowing for the community method (QMV) would potentially mean that a member state would be forced to accept a security/defense policy that it did not support. For these reasons, the application of adaptation theory to the development of the ESDP may provide the most sound framework through which one can explain national responses, particularly in the case of the Nordic countries.

2.3.2 Adaptation

Although the term “adaptation” is used frequently in discourse on theorizing security and defense integration, it is usually in the constructivist context, which implies that a kind of re-adjustment based on learning and socialization has occurred (Rieker 2003, Sjursen 2004). Adaptation in that context is brought on by day-to-day interaction at the European level and the power of communicative discourse, or argumentation (Sjursen in Carslnaes et al 2004: 59-74). This form of adaptation, however, tends to assume that: 1. external structures can influence actor interests/preferences regardless of the sensitivity of the issue at hand. And 2. that the actor will not have a high level of influence when it comes to determining the nature of the external structure itself (see Rieker’s diagram of Europeanization). Adaptation from a rational perspective, however, explicitly point out that sensitive issues are safeguarded and loss of sovereignty is minimized while the actor attempts (if possible) to exert significant influence on the nature of the structure or policy outcome.

Petersen explains that adaptation as a theory:

“assumes that foreign policy consists of policy-makers’ actions to manipulate the balance between their society (i.e. the internal environment) and their external environment in order to secure an adequate functioning of societal structures in a situation of growing interdependence.”

Interdependence theory (Keohane and Nye 1977) is assumed to be relevant and complimentary to adaptation, thus further bringing adaptation within a more rationalist fold. For the purpose of this discussion, however, I will not elaborate on the complexities of interdependence theory and its effect on European integration. The basic principle that actions in one state can and increasingly do significantly effect situations in other states is a basic assumption for adaptation theory in many of its contexts (Petersen 1998: 37).

Adaptation in the context of this discussion, however, is a theoretical tool for explaining approaches to European integration, particularly in the highly sensitive area of security and defense policy. As mentioned, the concept of instrumental adaptation *in this case* has its roots in rational choice theory and is based on strategic preference formation based on national interests and adjustment according to existing commitments and external pressures. The theory of adaptation was initially formulated by James Rosenau in 1970 and further developed (in the context of this discussion) by Hans Mouritzen (1988 and 1996) and Nikolaj Petersen (with Carsten Due-Nielsen in 1977 and alone in 1998). The concept of adaptation here deals with what is termed as “non-essential actors” maintaining their core interests in relation to a “pole.” This pole can be a state, such as the Soviet Union during the Cold War or a non-state entity, such as the European Union. Mouritzen’s work aims at explaining the strategies of adaptation of Nordic states using the controversial concept of Finlandization. He examines Sweden’s and Denmark’s pre-war and Finland’s post-war policies of “give-and-preserve” (Mouritzen 1988: 369) method of adapting to interests of the respective great powers (Germany being the pole for the former and the Soviet Union for the latter) while keeping core interests and preferences preserved and intact. Petersen further applied adaptation theory to Danish foreign policy during its adjustment to NATO membership and its accession to the EU (then EC) (1967) and through its response to the Maastricht Treaty (1993). Also in reference to great power balance, the Danish case in Petersen’s analysis first seems to seek balance through its position in NATO vis-à-vis the United States during the Cold War and then to the European Union in the early post-Cold War years (Due-Nielsen and Petersen 1995). It is in his elaboration of this concept in a 2001 article in the *Journal of Common Market Studies* that Petersen most recently and relevantly brings adaptation theory into the realm of current integration theory discussions. It is from the framework presented in that article that this analysis draws its argument for explaining Nordic responses to the ESDP, particularly against the current of literature flowing towards the Europeanization paradigm.

It is important to highlight the significance of the rational elements within the type of adaptation that this essay argues. When examining policy change in Sweden and Finland, I will assert that, through the framework of this type of adaptation, both member states have a set of defined and historically consistent interests which are safeguarded and advanced onto a European setting through a strategy of give-and-take. The specific interests and methods for securing them are unique for each member state. The strategy of adaptation has been used as explaining the policies of “non-essential” actors throughout much of the twentieth century (Rosenau 1970, Mouritzen 1988 and Due-Nielsen and Petersen 1995) and often with reference to the Nordic states (be it during the interwar period, World War II, or the Cold War). This essay will examine how the ESDP is a part of the overall strategy of policy formation regarding the EU for both Sweden and Finland, and also how the strategy is used to determine the specific parts that make up what is currently formalized in the ESDP.

Adaptation theory is most easily understood in its four modes: dominant, balancing, acquiescence and quiescence. These modes are demonstrated on Figure

2 and are placed on a matrix according to where they fall in relation to the two determinants of adaptive strategy: influence capability (IC) and stress sensitivity (SS). Influence capability is defined as the ability of an actor to influence the overall nature and final outcome of a policy or structure (Petersen 1998: 38-9). Definite examples of European states with high IC in the area of ESDP are the United Kingdom and France, as they are the only EU member states with the capability to project and sustain (relatively) significant force internationally, possess nuclear weapons and have seats on the UN Security Council. Stress sensitivity, on the other hand, is the level of vulnerability that an actor has in a given policy situation (Petersen 1998: 40). For example, states that are in the accession process to the EU have a high SS, as they must adapt to preferences and demands of states within the Union (given that accession requires unanimity) to achieve their prioritized policy preference (membership).

Moving clockwise on Figure 2, high IC and low SS yields a dominant adaptive position, high IC and high SS yields an adaptive strategy of balance, a low IC and high SS yields a policy of adaptive acquiescence and finally a low IC and low SS yields a policy of quiescence, or negligible adaptation. Examples of each of these policy types can be found in various contexts when examining European integration (Petersen 1998) but a discussion aimed at explaining policy change in Nordic security and defense policy will be best suited through analysis based on a policy of balance.




Figure 2. The Four Adaptive Modes (Petersen)

According to Petersen, the balance mode of adaptation is the mode most suitable to explaining European integration, however understanding the other modes is essential for any discussion dealing with the specific application of the theory. A dominant approach would suggest a lower stress sensitivity than is likely among EU member states. Also, because many sensitive issues are decided by unanimity, making outright demands from integration partners will likely produce negative

reactions to future calls for cooperation. This is not often seen in a European context; however DeGaulle's France and Thatcher's UK demonstrated elements of dominance approach (Petersen 1998: 43). The opposite of dominance is acquiescence, as it allows for little influence but significant concessions. This mode is also unlikely for Union member states as EU processes are "based on shared interests and cooperation" rather than pure bargaining and exploitation. However, this mode is often descriptive of applicants to the EU, as they must conform to the Union's *aquis* without any formal powers of influence or decision-making (Petersen 1998: 43). Quiescence is the most difficult to place within a European context because it contrasts sharply with the high level of interdependence that the EU is based on. Quiescence stems from a low level of involvement and thus a low level of both influence and sensitivity. However, in some specific issue areas, this policy may arise. For example, if a Union member removes itself completely from a certain area of cooperation, it will be neither effected by nor have influence over the resulting community decision. This is best illustrated by Denmark's opt-out of the ESDP.

Balance, thus is the result of a high vulnerability combined with a high capacity to influence. This is because, according to Petersen, "taking part in the integration process in itself provides important influence capabilities, such as access to all formal policy bodies and a formal veto in many questions," and because of voting rules:

"No member, however weak in material terms, is therefore without important influence in an integration project. Likewise, the very fact of integration presupposes mutual sensitivity among partners and increasing interdependence among them" (1998: 40).

It is this in this theoretical framework that we turn to examining how Sweden and Finland adapt to the development of a European security and defense dimension.

3 Sweden—adaptation for influence

3.1 Swedish security policy during and after World War II

“Sweden conducted a double policy during the Cold War—seeking Western military help yet claiming to be neutral.”

Johan Eriksson, 2003

Any discussion on Swedish security policy change after the Cold War must first examine the presumed Swedish policy of neutrality. Because arguments based on the Europeanization explanation of Swedish policy change depend so heavily on neutrality, any dismissal of its legitimacy destabilizes such an explanation. However, shortly after the Cold War ended, evidence surfaced that Sweden’s ties with NATO allies were quite significant and there were, in fact, even secret plans for allied assistance to Sweden should a Soviet attack commence. Reports commissioned under the conservative Karl Bildt government (1994) and authored by Rolf Ekeus (2002) agree that “Sweden, contrary to the official rhetoric of neutrality, was prepared to seek military help from the West in the event of a Soviet attack” (Eriksson 2003). Although brushed aside by some scholars, the truthfulness of this evidence raises serious questions about Sweden’s security and defense policy ambitions. This should not be too surprising, however, because as Mouritzen points out, Sweden played the double policy game of non-commitment and acquiescing to the Germans during World War II in order to preserve its core interests (1988: 161-214)

It is the hypothesis of this section dealing with Swedish policy change that will assert that Sweden’s security and defense policy throughout the Cold War was officially neutral and that this was a means of securing greater global influence and credibility—particularly through the UN. Sweden was often seen in this context as a bridge-builder between the blocs (Rieker 2003: 108). Unofficially, however, Sweden managed secure defense ties with the Western Allies. This strategy of adaptation has continued vis-a-vis the European integration process as a way to maintain international credibility and exert leadership within the regional project, while maintaining sovereignty over issues of national importance.

3.2 Before the EU: organizational diversity

Swedish entrance to the European Union (like any other candidate) depended on acceptance of the *acquis communautaire*, and thus necessitated a strategy of adaptive acquiescence. As would-be insiders, Sweden had to accept the new provisions for a Common Foreign and Security Policy, as was laid out in the Maastricht treaty. The new CFSP was particularly problematic in that it formalized moves towards a common security and defense policy. Sweden's interest in joining the EU was motivated almost exclusively by the economic benefits, and its small majority approval on the membership referendum was won based on arguments that extolled the economic benefits of membership in the context of a Swedish economic crisis. Thus, Swedish entrance into the Union was reluctant and based on the advantages of the internal market. Tackling the problem of neutrality in this context was to be a part of Sweden's pragmatic strategy of balanced adaptation.

As pointed out earlier, abandoning the policy of neutrality would not be a huge obstacle to overcome because its existence, in reality, was weak. As the security situation in the world was changing, so was Sweden's interest in defining its role within the new security system. Of course, as a small power, Sweden still remained loyal to the United Nations system as the only legitimate forum for international security issues, especially when the use of force was in question. But the concept of neutrality almost immediately began to phase out of official rhetoric, as Pernille Rieker points out. However, less a product of Europeanization and more a product of its traditional "cool-headed, moderate, forward-looking" (Eriksson 2003) policy making, the Swedish move away from this official policy was consistent with Sweden's already-established pattern of cooperation with the West. Although not a NATO member, Sweden participated in NATO operations in the former Yugoslavia and has integrated as much as possible for a non-member (Eriksson 2003). Sweden's choice, thus, to join the European Union was part of this overall strategy of "organization shopping" in order to participate in and ultimately have influence in international affairs.

3.3 Balanced adaptation: taking initiative

As Sweden is one of the few members of the European Union to have an established defense industry, its usefulness in having a say in the future of European military affairs would likely be significant (in relation to its size). Thus,

joining the Union for economic reasons (and thus approved by the public) opened the door for eventual participation in a Union-endorsed security community, albeit on terms that would be acceptable to Swedish interests. And Sweden, along with Finland as pointed out earlier, took the reins in the area of security and defense at an early stage of its development with the promotion of the Petersberg Tasks within the Amsterdam Treaty (Hjertonsson in Herolf 1997: 41-2). This is overtly an example of balanced adaptation policy: as Sweden had accepted the existence of the CFSP and eventual ESDP in its accession agreements (acquiescence), it took the opportunity as a full-fledged member to have as much influence as possible in how the policy would eventually be shaped. The matrix in this case would place would place the IC high because, as a former “neutral” Sweden had high credibility in helping to shape a security and defense policy for the Union as whole (Björkdahl 2002: 112) and, by allowing for non-aligned states to help in determining the policy would avoid the threat of a veto or no consensus being reached further down the road in stages of the policy’s development. Additionally, the SS was high because any move into the realm of security and defense policy would potentially cause problems at a domestic/national level. Calling this process Europeanization does not give the credit that is due to a successful strategic move that allowed for a member state to seemingly act progressively in a new area of integration (security and defense) while maintaining its national interests and satisfying its public desire to remain “non-aligned.” This idea was substantiated by then Deputy Prime Minister Hjelm-Wallén who “indicated in an interview that a political ambition behind introducing conflict prevention [of the Petersberg Tasks] into the EU crisis management debate was to provide an alternate interpretation of the EU defense dimension” (Björkdahl 2002: 112)

While seeking membership to the EU, Sweden also remained active in other not-exclusively European institutions, primarily NATO and the UN. In fact, Sweden’s promotion of conflict prevention in international security discussions was first seen within a UN context. According to Annika Björkdahl, “Already when Sweden emerged in 1992 as a candidate for membership in the Security Council for the period 1993-1994, conflict prevention together with peace-building and peacekeeping were singled out as top priorities (2001: 108). This element is important to note because conflict prevention would also be pushed strongly onto the European stage by Sweden during the development of the ESDP (Björkdahl 2001: 112-123). Sweden’s multi-institutional approach to promoting the issue suggests that there is recognition that its interests are best achieved when not dealing exclusively within one institutional environment. Interacting often and as an active contributor to the institutions of which Sweden is a member or partner raises doubts about a suggestion that an issue becomes Europeanized simply because it has been in contact with European structures. Furthermore, as Sweden saw greater potential in formalizing conflict prevention within a European (rather than international) setting, it again is prepared to use a strategy of balanced adaptation to achieve its desired policy interest. This is evident in the trade-off that occurred between countries like Sweden and Finland who championed the (more non-aligned flavor) of conflict prevention over the more militarized policy of crisis management (Rieker 2003: 113-14). However, as balance requires a give-

and-take approach, Sweden allows for the incorporation of both within a European framework. Sweden succeeds: according to the final report of the constitutional convention's Working Group on Defense, "Conflict prevention is a key element in the approach followed by the Union in international relations" (2002: 4).

It is this situation that brings this discussion to an explanation of Sweden's increased military participation in the EU. As Sweden must accept a certain amount of militarization, a policy of influence over the situation becomes the preferred strategy. This has become obvious in Sweden's active participation in EU military and police missions, notable being one of only two (along with France) EU members to participate in the EU's (first and so far only) military mission to the Congo (Missiroli 2003). Also Sweden will lead the Nordic battle group, supplying 1100 soldiers with the remaining 400 provided by Finland and Norway (Herolf 2004). As mentioned earlier, Swedish national defense forces are also being restructured to be more international in nature and rapidly deployable. SWEDINT is developed for deployability within an EU, NATO or UN context (Rieker 2004: 378). Another forum of influence in this policy area arises from Sweden's uniqueness as the only small state to participate in LoI (Letter of Intent), which is comprised of six member states with national defense industries (see Final Report on Working Group VIII—Defense 2002: 12). At the same time, however, Sweden maintains its commitment to a multi-institutional framework of security: "Sweden's continued attachment to collective security has been particularly evident in its emphasis on the need for a UN mandate for future EU operations" (Rieker 2003: 123).

Taking an active role in the ESDP supports the theory of adaptation also being applied to Sweden's overall integration policy, especially when referencing the "troops for influence" hypothesis. As mentioned in the integration dilemma, Sweden will most likely adopt a policy that maximizes influence while minimizing marginalization. Because Sweden has the means to participate on a significant level in this area (relative to its size) and the credibility of at least seeming non-aligned (see Tarvitie 1999), Sweden's military influence on a Union level, as well as credibility when dealing with third countries, gives it a disproportionate amount (again, relative to size) of influence in security and defense policy. At the same time, going above-and-beyond in this issue may decrease its marginalization in the integration game as a whole, due to its continued "outsider" status in the EMU.

3.4 Conclusions for Sweden

The nay-sayer in many areas of integration (most-notably EMU) has thus become one of the largest contributors to the security and defense dimension of Europe. This would seemingly signal a dramatic shift in security policy, as suggested by much of the previous research on current Swedish security policy. However, although it is a change—a more active role of Swedish security and defense

policy outside of Sweden—it is not a change of alignment. Official Swedish policy is still unclear: “Even today, Swedish security policy remains confusing, despite the country’s membership in the European Union since 1995” (Eriksson 2003). But this is a continuation of Sweden’s double policy and strategy of adaptation that has allowed it to stay out of wars for more than 185 years and act as a credible, moral voice in international politics. In overall integration strategy, Sweden has been quite adept at responding to stress sensitivity by either taking a leadership role in formulating policy, as seen through security and defense policy, or by staying out all together, as seen in monetary union policy. At the same time, its influence capability has been high when taking an active role, as again demonstrated by ESDP participation. It would appear, thus, that Sweden’s approach to Europe is a pragmatic and carefully calculated method of preserving national interests while remaining credible among those with which it must cooperate with in an international setting.

4 Finland—the adept adapter

“Finland has made a national strategy out of being a good pupil, a strategy that is supposed to pay off.”

Hanna Ojanen, 2000

4.1 A history of Finnish adaptation

Adaptation theory has been applied to Finland in the past through the Finlandization concept as explained by Hans Mouritzen. Finland’s adaptive stance, in this case, was vis-à-vis the Soviet Union from the end of World War II until the USSR’s definitive collapse at the end of 1991. In this sense, it can be argued that Finland is a master adapter: of all of the states that the USSR had in its sphere of influence, only Finland did not have a puppet government selected and controlled by and answerable to Moscow. However, in order for Finland to maintain its independence and Western democratic identity, concessions had to be made to the Soviet Union, and the FCMA was signed. Mouritzen describes these concessions as “cession of territory, the paying of war reparations, the abstention from Marshall Aid, and the trials against the ‘war responsible’” (1988: 367). These concessions, in turn, ensured Finland the preservation of its core interests, including territory, welfare and identity (Mouritzen 1988: 367). Finland spent much of the remainder of the Cold War in this type of situation, which made it an ideal candidate for handling the integration dilemma when the possibility of EU membership arose. Moving from one pole of influence (Moscow) to another (Brussels) of course demanded another adaptation strategy. This time, however, the new alignment was voluntary and offered the possibility to gain much from integration even if certain interests had to be compromised. The strategy, thus, moved from adaptive acquiescence within the sphere of Soviet influence to adaptive acquiescence with the aim of a policy of balanced adaptation in relation to European integration (Mouritzen 1996: 155).

Finland quickly asserted its preference for EU membership in 1992 and began to abandon its policy of neutrality soon thereafter (letting go of neutrality in favor of non-alignment was relatively easy for Finland, as it was a policy based on survival in its geopolitical position) (Rieker 2003: 138). Finland’s strategy of adaptation was targeted towards the Western European sphere, with the aim

during the accession process of proving that they were not on the outer margins of Europe:

During the 1989-94 period, membership of the EEA and later the EU gave Finland the opportunity of emphasizing this Western European identity, and thereby to some extent getting away from her periphery image” (Törnudd in Mouritzen 1996: 132-3).

This is important to note because Finland’s strategy of adaptation also relied on the assumption that, by ceding certain powers to the EU and behaving as a core member, the potential for influence in policy-making in the future would be substantial (Mouritzen 1996, 293). Unlike Sweden, Finland recognized a more limited place in the world and sought to focus its EU membership advantages on regional developments and solutions to Finland’s constant insecurity vis-à-vis Russia (Heikka 2004: 1-2). This element defines much of Finland’s strategy of integration during the first ten years of membership.

4.2 Finland as a “good European”

To assert that Finnish approach to the ESDP is based on adaptation is quite consistent with Finland’s behavior throughout its experiences with the EU, from candidate to full member. Fulfillment of the extensive *acquis* accession criteria required that Finland release its national control over some areas of welfare (including the eventuality of monetary union), but at the same time it offered a multilateral rather than bilateral response to any potential problem that a new and unstable Russia might pose (Mouritzen 1996: 146). Mouritzen’s theory actually predicts in 1996 the Finnish initiative within a EU framework for a regional strategy for dealing with stabilizing Russia and building up the Baltic states. In its 1999 Northern Dimension program, Finland used its built-up political influence capital to propose a Union-wide formal recognition of Finnish anxiety over Russia’s northwestern security threats, including most significantly the poor state of nuclear reactors, the deterioration of a fleet of nuclear submarines on the Kola peninsula and the negligible pollution of the Baltic Sea from St. Petersburg (Ojanen 1999: 13-26). In addition, Mouritzen predicted that Finland would use the influencing end of the balanced adaptation strategy to shine light upon the dangers of border problems (Finland shares a 1269 km border with Russia), including illegal immigration and organized crime (1996: 293). It is probably no coincidence that the Tampere European Council meeting produced a decision to cooperate closer in the area of Justice and Home Affairs, particularly in the area of border protection (see Tampere European Council Presidency Conclusions: Oct. 1999).

These issues are examples of Finland’s approach to security problems as EU members before the formalization of the ESDP. Finland has been a “good pupil” within a European context in order to achieve the desired policy preferences in these areas. Thus, the non-essential actor adapted to the pole by

releasing some of its economic sovereignty to the European level, but in essence demanded a return-on-investment when the opportunity presented itself—in the form of agenda-setting powers held by the presidency in the case of the Northern Dimension and Tampere Council. Additionally, these examples demonstrate Finland’s willingness to deal with soft security issues within a European context. When it came to discussing a formal European defense dimension in talks leading up to the Amsterdam Treaty, Finland was quick to assure that hard security issues would still be a matter of national policy only and, together with Sweden, championed the elements prescribed in the Petersberg Tasks as the formalization of the ESDP (Rieker 2003: 113-14).

Defense policy remains one of the core areas of sovereign policy-making within Finland. Finnish defenses depend on universal male conscription and extensive territorial defense planning mechanisms. An analysis of both the Finnish Security and Defense Policy government report (2004) and the Finnish CFSP Watch—2004 reveal that approaches to security are still very Finnish (as opposed to European) in nature. The commitment to territorial defense is an example of this. While discussions on a European level revolve around restructuring national defense forces to be more rapidly deployable internationally, Finland’s policy still aims at protecting Finnish territory from an armed attack. Although not often explicitly stated, this means most certainly an attack from Russia (Heikka 2004: 1-2).

4.3 Conclusions for Finland (and Finland’s willingness to be the “naughty boy”)

Finland’s “good pupil” strategy has often taken a backseat in negotiations over ESDP. While Finland does see EU membership as an effective way of dealing with the Russia problem, a policy of non-alignment (still strongly supported by public opinion) causes Finland to be somewhat of a “brakeman” when it comes to issues dealing with a European approach to territorial defense. According to the 2004 CFSP Watch for Finland, Finnish resistance led to modifications in the final wording of both the solidarity clause and the mutual defense clause within the draft Constitution Treaty (2004: 4). This exemplifies Finland’s give-and-take approach to integration and is consistent with Finland’s historical adaptation strategy. Finland can be depended upon to be a team player, often advocating the community method for decision-making (Lipponen in Nelson and Stubb 2003: 83-8). However, there are certain issues for which Finland is not yet willing to cede sovereignty, and issues challenging national supremacy over defense decisions have been summarily rejected.

Finland has, of course, responded to the ESDP in ways that are acceptable for its national security and defense policy. By supporting the humanitarian and conflict prevention dimension of the ESDP, Finland is able to support security and defense integration while maintaining its limits on binding cooperation in

territorial defense. Specifically, Finland is contributing to the Swedish-led battle group and has been an active participant in the EU's Balkan projects. However, unlike Sweden, Finland's traditional desire to project influence internationally has been almost non-existent. As long as Finland's backyard is secure, all is well. Finland does, however, keep the NATO door open. Finland has participated in NATO activities through EAPC and PfP, most notably taking a leadership role for a period of time in the KFOR operation (see www.nato.int). This demonstrates that Finland is willing to be an active contributor to an organization that it sees as a legitimate option for defense alignment should the need arise. This sentiment is also felt in public opinion. According to a recent poll on Finnish military alignment:

“Just over half of respondents, 52%, reckon that NATO would be the best alternative if Finland *were to choose* a military alliance. 40% would support joining a military capability developed by the EU” (STETE 2004) (italics added).

Both the political elites and the public desire a mix of responses in dealing with the current international security situation. However, This suggests that, as terrorism and asymmetrical threats are dominant topics in the Finnish 2004 Government Report on Security and Defense Policy, the adaptation strategy (and thus changes) has been even relatively *global* in nature, not just regional.

To sum things up, Finland started with an adaptive acquiescence policy, which included digesting the new CFSP framework created in Maastricht. Thus Finland started abandoning its policy of neutrality (albeit painlessly) and sought to be a core European. These strategies paid off, as Finland was able to exercise its influence capabilities (gained from a balanced mode of adaptation) as “insiders” and develop policy programs in areas that were important to it, most notably those with regional security dimensions. Finland did risk a bit of its prestige and credibility, however, with its persistence in toning down plans to further integrate territorial defense (Strand in CFSP Watch 2004: 7)—a trade-off that demonstrates its firm commitment to its own national security objectives.

Scholars that suggest that Nordic security policies have been Europeanized recognize that the Finnish insistence on traditional security priorities as a weakness in their argument. However, they assert that Finland's has been “Europeanized to some extent due to its increased interest in soft security dimensions (Rieker 2003: 172-3) However, this interest is not new. Examples of this lie in the Finnish contribution to the establishment of the CSCE and the Helsinki Final Act. This Finnish bridge-builder between the rival blocs in 1975 that incorporated a “human dimension” that called for increased attention to be paid to human rights (Pentikäinen in *European Security* 2004: 6). This was quite a novel idea (encompassing comprehensive security) during the *realpolitik* of the Cold War era. Also, Finland discussed and executed plans of interoperability with NATO prior to its accession to the EU and deployed troops with NATO peacekeeping forces long before a European security dimension had been finalized. Thus, even though Finland has changed its forces (to some extent) to be more internationally deployable, these changes are not solely the result of a European process.

5 Conclusions

The changes in Nordic security policy are certainly evident. Most significantly, the policy of neutrality (whether actual or not—they were official, at least) has been abandoned and even non-alignment is inconsistently referred to, being used primarily when each state needs it as a shield against Union encroachment on an area too sensitive to deal with on a community level. Also, both countries have gone from participation in one major international security organization to multiple, including NATO and most significantly the EU. This has given both Sweden and Finland to multiple tools for rebuilding an effective security policy in the face of new threats resulting from the post-Cold War world order. Whether it is through NATO in ISAF or through the EU in the Balkans or the Congo, both countries have also been able to visibly contribute to these major forums of security, also enabling them to have influence—sometimes an impressive amount given their relative size—to determine the shape and direction of the greater organizational security goals. This is particularly evident in the ways in which Sweden and Finland first teamed up to solidify a position favoring the Petersberg Tasks as the first move towards ESDP, then to taking the Policy in their own needed directions and turning their national security priorities into European security priorities.

Sweden's overall approach to ESDP has been highly successful. Although the concept was determined to be problematic when they entered the Union in 1995, Sweden took active initiative to ensure that, if there were to be a common security and defense policy, it was going to be in a form that best suited Sweden. This proved to be true, for the most part, as conflict prevention became a core element to the ESDP. Additionally, when militarization and crises management became inevitable, Sweden responded again with a desire for leadership. By heading the Nordic battle group, cooperating with Europe's biggest member states in the defense industry coordination, and participating in significant EU military and police operations Sweden shot to the top of the influence list in the area of European security and defense. Not bad for a member state with less than ten million citizens. But not surprising from a country that has a history of calculated, pragmatic and progressive policy-making. The changes in Sweden's security and defense policies are evident, but they represent an adaptation to a new regional and global security environment. But the core of policy and decision-making remain decidedly Swedish, rather than European in their approach and in their overall objectives.

Finland's reactions and contributions to the ESDP are also significant, albeit on a different scale than Sweden's. The strategies and changes apparent in Finland's approach to the European security dimension primarily result from Finland's historical relations with and geopolitical position to Russia. Like

Sweden, Finland also was forced to accept the inevitability of a common security and defense policy, which was called for in Maastricht, prior to either country's membership. The Petersberg Tasks, thus, allowed Finland to maintain a policy of non-alignment in order to ensure strict sovereign control over national defense. The most obvious change that began to occur in Finnish security and defense policy was the increased significance of soft security. This was a strategic move on Finland's part because it was seen as the best way to approach security threats that were emanating from the new Russia and gave increased legitimacy for pulling in EU support for a Union-based regional approach. Finland also became more active in peacekeeping and conflict prevention. The Headline Goals were concluded at the Helsinki European Council, providing the framework for the Union's first rapid reaction force (RRF), capable of being deployed quickly to some of the world's hot zones. This change can also be explained in the context of adaptation to a new global security situation, but unlike Sweden, the vast majority of its defense resources were still focused on national defense and regional security. Finland's priorities, thus, had not changed drastically, but its security dimensions were broadened to view other threats (not *just* the neighbor to the east) as possible sources of instability. Obsession with territorial defense and the hesitance to engage in or allow any sort of EU defense alliance has cost Finland a bit of its credibility in the integration game. But Finland has still succeeded in shaping the foundations of the ESDP while preserving what is sacrosanct in its own security and defense policy.

The complexities of explaining national responses to the development of a common European Security and Defense Policy may be the reason for such little theoretical analysis done on the issue. When dealing with an issue as nationally sensitive as security and defense, it is often difficult to get at the core of what motivates actors to make certain decisions. In a world of increasing interdependence and in a Union that is the most extreme form of interdependence, strategies must be made that can both allow a member state to secure its interests while also demonstrating that it is a responsible and dedicated member of the team. This balancing act is precisely what allows for the effective application of adaptation theory, especially when examining the tough situations that small, "non-essential" Nordic member states find themselves dealing with. Strategies of give-and-take are not new to these countries, but they allow for much more influence in a situation where all members are equal. Traditionally, the give-and-take revolved around giving great powers whatever they wanted in return for the preservation of sovereignty and territorial integrity. Now, through the liberal mechanisms of the European Union, small states have the ability to shape and influence policies that will affect the same large states that freely exercised their will over them less than a century ago. It is no surprise that the Nordic states have been quite effective in maximizing the benefits of this strategy—their very survival depended on it for many years!

Theories that attempt to overplay the role of values and ideas as motivations for policy change often do not recognize the significance of these elements that allowed for national survival under difficult circumstances. Europe finds itself in a current situation of peace and prosperity, and rightly so members

of Europe have and will attempt to promote the values and norms that have contributed to making the EU the site of peace and stability that it is today. And while member states increasingly depend on each other for economic well-being, security and defense issues will likely remain close to the heart of the member state. That is not to say that cooperation will not occur. On the contrary: the rise of terrorism and other asymmetrical threats has called for increased cooperation. However, based on the evidence presented in the case of Finland and Sweden, this cooperation will be based on an overall national approach that draws from multiple arenas to design a comprehensive defense strategy. That is why NATO continues to exist alongside the development of the ESDP. That is also why so much importance is placed within the UN (especially by the Nordic countries)—because any regime that emphasizes the equal importance of countries, regardless of size, will be a primary forum for security issues.

Scholars arguing in favor of Europeanization have brought important issues into focus in attempting to explain new Nordic security approaches. But the difficult-to-define nature of Europeanization casts a doubt on whether it can possibly be applied to this issue area in the first place. This analysis has shown that national preferences have been stated and achieved within a European context. It has also demonstrated that national interests have been projected upon the development of the overall European security dimension. Adaptation allows for learning, socialization and argumentation—it is through these methods that national actors discover the preferences of their partners-in-cooperation and thus chose the most effective approach in their national strategy of balance.

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