

**Primed for Peace?**  
Reflections on Theoretical Explanations  
for use of economic power in a New World Order

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**Abstract:**

The initial puzzle of the paper concerns the sudden increase in use of economic sanctions among western democracies in the years 1993 to 1996. Sanctions are briefly debated and defined in order to progress to the theoretical part of the analysis. The main analysis addresses the relationship between international relations and the use of economic sanctions in the immediate post-cold war period. Interdependence, Neo-Realism and Democratic Theory are investigated from the perspective of answering the change in policy in western democracies. The main conclusions on the theoretical part of the paper, argue that the theoretical approaches each has ways of explaining the increased use of sanctions in the immediate post-cold war period. A variety of references are used to support the arguments made, special emphasis on Waltz, Rosecrance and Van Evera has been made. A second theoretical cut is given on the post-9/11 world order as an appetizer to readers to pursue the idea of theorizing on international relations and explanations of foreign policy choices.

*Keywords:*

Globalization, Interdependence, Neo-Realism, Economic Sanctions, Political Theory, Democratic Theory, Security Politics

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# 1. Introduction

## 1.1. Searching for Puzzles

Human society is guided by a need for answers and solutions to problems. This behavior has dominated our existence from the day we as a species embarked on the first journey out the cave and into the light. The foundation of such behavior is rooted in our drive for identifying what, where, who, when and how? To satisfy our ever more demanding desire for transcendence, we are by our own nature forced to see what is wrong with our world. For the last half century, our world has been dramatically dominated by several events, yet though, only just that many, that we are still able to cope with them in our minds. For political science, the last 50 years have brought an armada of potential solutions to theoretical, practical and even virtual problems. But as any students are taught within the first few hours of their scientific life, the only thing that really matters, in a relative science as social sciences are by nature, is that it is the problem you seek an answer to, that drives us forward in our quest for transcendence. With the end of the cold war, and the transition period that the world has experienced through the 1990's, we are faced with a situation where many of the old dogmas were discarded due to the fact that they were conceived in another time.

The puzzle that I will invite you to think about and to investigate through this paper, concerns the evolution of western democratic international relations. The main reason for this choice is that I find international relations to be defining almost everything that the modern nation state is. Everything from definitions of the state, cooperation among states and human behavior can to some extent be studied through the field of international relations.

For human beings, labels and headlines seem fascinating and are drawing attention, clearly many scientists knows this and have through time sought to label some period to their theory. Through the 20'th century, labels and headlines, like the century of war, the century of democracy, the decade of realism etc. have been a constant part of scientific writings, but clearly something has happened and a "clash" of theories on what is going on is occurring in scientific societies. This "clash", which is taken out of the headline of Samuel P. Huntington's most famous work, "The Clash of Civilizations", might be fictional and generated through the fact that we live in an age of instant messaging and global search engines that provide us with endless amounts of information. But nevertheless, we are as scientists forced to accept that we indeed are faced with such a chaotic situation, we are forced into identifying why we are in such a mess, or if even is a mess. To do this I will direct your attention to some of the theoretical work done over the past decades to try explaining one particular problem that is of great importance: *The change of policy in matters of conflict.*

The approach that this paper will take, is to look at the policy of foreign affairs in the years after the end of the Cold War, when observing statistical material, the use of sanctions seems to have exploded in the immediate years after the collapse of the Soviet Union and newfound western uniform dominance. Depending on how one defines the term “economic sanction”, the number of cases over time changes a bit. If you accept the definition made by the American organization National Association of Manufacturers (NAM) in the 1997 report<sup>1</sup> on unilateral American economic sanctions over time, the number of cases since World War I had by 1996 reached 115, since World War II 104 cases and in the period from 1993 to 1996 61 cases<sup>2</sup>. In 1998 another NAM report was released, this time highlighting both results of the 1997 reports and the current legislative progress in the US House of Representatives and the Senate, with the results that 26 unilateral sanctions were pending the 105<sup>th</sup> congress<sup>3</sup>. The trend continued so to speak, and even though that the definitions of sanctions made by an export oriented organization might be somewhat biased, the legislative record doesn’t lie<sup>4</sup>.

There are two key points to these numbers:

- The development in the post-cold war period of 1993 to 1996 has showed a significant change in the usage of economic sanction as a US foreign policy tool.
- The sanctions that are being discussed are concerning unilateral actions by the US, not multilateral sanctions through the United Nations or other IO’s.

Similarly we can observe the number of EU cases of economic sanctions. Since the EU in terms of conducting common foreign policy only has existed for a short time compared to that of the United States, the history of EU cases varies a great deal from US cases. Despite this, the EU still has a significant history and impact in this matter.

When observing the data available on current EU sanctions we can identify two basic kinds of sanctioning:

- Union-to-country: The classic type of sanctioning, where an entire country is sanctioned on exports, imports and trade of particular products<sup>5</sup>

#### Notes and References \_\_\_\_\_

<sup>1</sup> The NAM 1997 report is not published online on [www.nam.org](http://www.nam.org), instead see <http://www.usaengage.org/archives/studies/nam.html> for the report. The number of sanction cases are not mentioned explicitly but rather through the data assembled in the report.

<sup>2</sup> As described by Stuart E. Eizenstat in a testimony before the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1999 – see <http://www.un.int/usa/99eiz71.htm> for complete testimony.

<sup>3</sup> See 1998 NAM report - [http://www.nam.org/s\\_nam/doc1.asp?CID=473&DID=223559](http://www.nam.org/s_nam/doc1.asp?CID=473&DID=223559)

<sup>4</sup> See also Hufbauer, Schott & Elliot 1991 for similar numbers on US unilateral use of sanctions.

<sup>5</sup> To see the current list of sanctions on a country level see [http://europa.eu.int/comm/external\\_relations/cfsp/sanctions/measures.htm](http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/cfsp/sanctions/measures.htm)

- Union-to-individual: The EU has a massive list of individuals that in some way are restricted and sanctioned in matters of travel and financial services with members/citizens of the union<sup>6</sup>

The key fact that should be the focus now, is that clearly sanctions are playing a bigger role in government international politics than it did only 20-30 years ago. The questions that we could ask are many, why, how and who are just some of the many interesting scientific questions to such a puzzle. In this paper I shall try to focus on the why and how questions. Therefore, as the problem statement in the next chapter will outline, the focus in this paper is to present some theoretical explanations to why sanctions have become so popular among the modern democratic nation states.

#### Notes and References \_\_\_\_\_

<sup>6</sup> To see the complete list of individuals sanctioned by the EU see [http://europa.eu.int/comm/external\\_relations/cfsp/sanctions/list/version4/global/e\\_ctlview.html](http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/cfsp/sanctions/list/version4/global/e_ctlview.html) - please note that this list is very long and can take several minutes to download. Most of the entries on this list is suspected members of terrorist organizations.

## **1.2. Problem & Thesis Outline**

### **1.2.1. Identifying the Problem**

As a regime type evolve so does its tools of policy, as democracy has been evolving since the ancient Greek philosophers initiated the debate of state politics and democratic decisions, the politics of democracies are complex and often conducted with the use of “smoke and mirrors” to fool the opposing forces. Modern democracy has developed through painstaking tests and waves and counter waves of democratization<sup>7</sup>, and has since the end of World War II been the most successful regime type in terms of economic development and political accountability of its leaders. With the end of the Cold War, the last great enemy of the 20'th century disappeared, which seemed to leave democracy to proliferate around the world, and with that to found a sort of moral superiority towards war and unethical policy choices. Whether morality or ethics have been crucial to the development of modern international relations, would clearly be argued by some approaches to politics. Political globalizers would probably argue that morals are crossing boundaries and borders to influence other cultures and societies, thereby playing a central role, realists would argue that no such consideration would be taken since the survival of the state in the end cannot rely on something as elusive as morals and ethics. But as we dig into human behavior we cannot simply dismiss these factors totally, but rather accept that we need to account for these new democratic institutions for our explanations to how international politics are conducted in the post-Cold War era.

### **1.2.2. Methodology**

I will seek to explain how the toolbox of democratic nations have evolved, or perhaps declined, dramatically since the days before and during the World Wars, through the cold war and finally emerged into a new doctrine of conflicts concerning western interests and security. The focus of the paper will be on some of the major theories of our time, and how they might explain the use of sanctions in the extent we have witnessed in the years that followed the end of the Cold War. But before I go on to outline the thesis in more details, I would like to take some time to argue why I have chosen the approach that I have.

Whenever one is attempting to explain why or how someone acted in term of political decisions, depending on the topic, the author are presented with a choice concerning which type of material the explanations will sought in. The two basic choices of research material are:

Notes and References \_\_\_\_\_

<sup>7</sup> Ref Huntington 1991 – The Third Wave, Democratization in the late 20'th century

- Primary material: Firsthand knowledge from people who were active in that decision process.
- Secondary material: Secondhand compilations of historical events and scientific material such a theoretical work.

This paper is almost purely based on secondary sources, which is quite intended. Even though it would be immensely interesting to have direct input from knowledge of the leaders of that, which most of are still alive, it is not relevant to the type of discussion this paper presents. The type of material for this kind of paper is less relevant, since the theories are in focus rather than the actors.

The goal of this paper is to highlight a problem, in this case the fact that the actions of modern democracies in term of conflict management, have changed dramatically over the last 15 years compared to earlier, and to test the theoretical aspects of some modern political science, and present the reader with a potential answer to why economic sanctions has apparently emerged as a favorite among foreign policy choices. To do this I will take 3 important theoretical viewpoints/concepts of modern political science, and do a test of their conceptual framework to whether they can give some answer to our original problem.

During the testing of each theoretical approach to the post-cold war period a certain methodological distinction between one and the two other approaches will be made. The reason for this is clearly that no two theories tend to share their methodological foundation 100%, which is clearly the case with these three approaches. The distinction that will be made refers to the scientific approach of “comparing to test”<sup>8</sup> concerning foundational-variables and complementary-variables. The reason for this distinction is that the two approaches of “Interdependence” and “Democratic Theory” both rely on some level on the original variable of our question and puzzle. On the other hand the approach of “Neo-Realism”, which stands out as more of a direct theoretical approach, is less dependent on the original question and the approach we take on that.

Whether the explanations presented in the paper will be eligible for use to predict future events are somewhat ignored, this is done to avoid the temptation to generalize the problem and reshape the theory to fit into the world as I see it. The goal with the explanations is to present the reader with the idea that all three theoretical approaches can, or cannot, in their own way account for the policy change we have observed.

#### Notes and References ---

<sup>8</sup> As described in Metodpraktikkan p. 106



### **1.2.3. Thesis Outline**

The content of the paper is:

- Definitions of the scientific concepts and ideas that central the overview of theoretical explanations.
- A historical overview of the world events which have been part of shaping foreign and security policy. This section is relevant in terms of identifying how policies have evolved from conflict to conflict with a possible link to the politics of the post-Cold War period.
- An overview of theoretical work related to the issue of evolution of foreign policy and the use of sanctions. This section is the main section of the paper, and each chapter has a subchapter on how that theoretical work might be adapted to explain the use of economic sanctions in the post-Cold War world order.
- A second theoretical cut, where the events of the recent years are debated briefly. This section is somewhat more speculative than the theoretical portion of the paper, since most of the events that postludes 9/11 and the invasion of Iraq are very recent and less tested over time.

The primary goal of the paper will be to present some of the possible explanations to the developments of foreign policy choices, in terms of foreign economic policy and international political economic measures as a tool of conflict management and statecraft of the modern western democracy.

## **2. Definitions**

Before I set out to explain how history has helped shape the politics of international relations that are the key to the theories debated later on the use of economic sanctions, I would like to take some time give short definitions on the key concept of economic sanctions. This is highly relevant since the definition of sanctions could affect how one particular theory might apply to that policy choice.

### **2.1. Sanctions**

#### **2.1.1. What is Economic Sanctions?**

In its most basic term, economic sanctions are when one state denies access to some resource to another state. Depending on the situation between the two states the resources may be military materials, raw materials, trade export/import restrictions due to trading disputes. The latter would by some not be defined as a classic economic sanction since trade disputes rarely ban trading between the competing states but merely introduces an obstacle to the trade process<sup>9</sup>. The key point to this argument is that economic sanctions as a whole, depends on the definition of sanctioning. “Different situation requires different solutions”, an often stated quote that in term of international disputes is truer than ever. The explanation for this is that one case a classic sanction of military materials may be the appropriate response in that case, but in a similar situation but with different actors (states), the results of military embargos may not produce the desired results, and the threat of trade sanctions or restrictions may produce better results. One interesting fact that most forget when talking of sanctions, is that a trade sanction is almost always imposed on the domestic exporters or importers of any given resource<sup>10</sup>. The results of sanctions are therefore often a net-loss domestically in matters of the trade balance and GDP growth.

#### **2.1.2. Players in Economic Sanctions**

An important part of the paper concerning the theoretical aspects is to have a clear understanding of who are able to impose sanctions in the modern world. In today’s world there are four major players in the field of economic sanctions and the management of these.

- The United Nations Security Council  
Article 41 of the UN charter sets out some definitions on how the UN are

Notes and References \_\_\_\_\_

<sup>9</sup> Ref Frieden & Lake 2000: p. 305-308 for classic trade restrictions.

<sup>10</sup> Ref Elliot & Hufbauer – Sanctions - <http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/Sanctions.html>

authorized to call upon member states to suspend economic activities with sanctioned states<sup>11</sup>.

- **The World Trade Organization**  
The WTO has no real power to impose direct sanctions on countries like the UN has, but has through the framework of rules instated as the operating law of the WTO, the possibility of to influence policy in member states concerning economic punishment and virtual sanctions on particular countries and industries<sup>12</sup>.
- **The European Union: The Common Foreign & Security Policy**  
EU is one of the most, if not thee most, active players in terms of economic sanctions. A key fact is that EU sanctions are often closely linked with UN resolutions<sup>13</sup>, however the EU are also capable of acting autonomous and impose unilateral measures.
- **United States Congress, The Department of Treasury and Executive Orders:** The US has a long history of economic sanctions, and remains probably the only player where one person holds the ability to impose economic sanctions on another country without going through a slow moving legislative process. The use of executive orders to impose sanctions increased dramatically after the end of the cold war like the general amount of unilateral US sanctions<sup>14</sup>.

There are other international organizations that could play part in economic sanctioning; such organizations might count the IMF, the World Bank, OPEC and G7/8. What should be noted though is that these organizations often has less incentive to impose sanction in some format, since the four actors mentioned before often do the job, and leave the more specialized organizations to their main tasks. Furthermore, despite from the WTO, the other three players all wield some military force behind its decisions, for many that particular fact is the key to why sanctions are possible in the first place.

### **3. Conflict History**

#### **3.1. A Quick Glance at post-Democratic Conflict**

To understand current political behavior we need to understand the foundation for the policy choices and actions made and in particular those not taken. It is

Notes and References —————

<sup>11</sup> See <http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/chapter7.htm> for Chapter 7 of the UN Charter.

<sup>12</sup> The idea of virtual sanctions would likely be embraced by both globalizers and advocates of interdependence theory such as Rosecrance and Baldwin.

<sup>13</sup> As mentioned in [http://europa.eu.int/comm/external\\_relations/cfsp/sanctions/index.htm](http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/cfsp/sanctions/index.htm)

<sup>14</sup> As mentioned in introduction and NAM reports of 1997 and 1998

often said that to understand the present, you need to understand the past; this is partly true for politics and conflict resolution. All conflicts in the present tend to be rooted in the past, and the resolution to the conflict can often be found in the past and it often is.

The evolution of the type of conflict, that western democracies have fought since the democratization process began in the late 18<sup>th</sup> century, has been tremendous. The conflicts of the 19<sup>th</sup> century tended to have flair of nationalism to it, and the erupt of World War I showed that Europe had been in deadlock of control and power balancing up to that point. World War I seems today to have been a war of control over land and resources in the new industrialized Europe. The outcome of World War I, in form of the allied victory and the defeat of the German/Austria-Hungary alliance by the signing of the treaty of Versailles ultimately lead to World War II. It seems today that the victories became much to greedy and had the defeated pay for practically the entire war. This policy of severe punishment leads to the buildup of hyper-nationalism in 1920's & 30's Germany, which culminated in Hitler's path to power, ultimately triggering World War II. Where World War I had been a battle for territory and resources, World War II became a battle first for survival, later for freeing the people of Europe that Nazi-Germany had occupied. When looking back on the events of the inter-war period, it seems easy to explain that the policy of the Anglo-Saxon/Franko alliance would backfire and cost them much more in the long run, but the world were quite different, and the defensive measures available at that time were quite different for the situation of today.

With the end of World War II, the buildup of the Cold War started and with that the coming of the Korean<sup>15</sup> and the Vietnam War which both were conflicts about ideologies in satellite countries away from the homeland of the fighting forces. The nature of both wars are identified in the fact that neither Korea nor Vietnam were of any real strategic interest to the US and western world, but were rather a prestige project, concerning the idea that democracy should prevail over communism. The ceasefire of the Korean War, which lasts to this day, terminated the war in a kind of status quo. Neither side could claim victory, neither were anyone defeated. The tension on the Korean peninsula remains to this day, and is a prime example of conflict roots in the past, the outcome of the Vietnam War was quite different though. With the final defeat of American forces in Saigon, the communists stood victorious and the Americans had suffered a fatal blow, not only in military terms, but the faith in conflict resolution in matters of military force would be dominated for decades by the events of the Vietnam War.

#### Notes and References \_\_\_\_\_

<sup>15</sup> The Korean War may have started out as defensive war, but quickly became a matter of the US vs. Chinese Communism

For the next two decades the American military machine did not see large scale combat and politics became the preferred tool of American foreign policy. Ultimately these policies lead to the collapse of the Soviet Union, who could deal with the Americans and Europeans in military strength, but had no way to compete in economic wars. The collapse became inevitable and the Cold War subsided in a peaceful manner.

The first post-Cold War conflict that western democracies participated in were the first Gulf War against Saddam Hussein's ill-fated attempt to take control of Arab peninsula. For the first time since the Vietnam War did American forces participate in large scale combat, and since Iraq had no powerful allies, the outcome of the war were given before the fighting ever started. The nature of the first Gulf War were rooted a battle for control over one vital resource which was the oil in the underground of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, when observing that history of past conflict, this reminds somewhat of the situation leading up to World War I, where the states of Europe were fighting for control of coal and steel resources and territory which at that time had a bigger value that it had in 1991.

The great success of the first Gulf War presented the world with the fact, the western forces could now be introduced anywhere and any time, and would defeat the enemy, with this a conventional non-nuclear military deterrent were created, and possible opportunistic dictators like Saddam were deterred from attempting attacks similar to the Iraqi 1990-91 campaign. The next western participations in combat were also far from similar to the situation in the Middle East in 1991. The outbreak of civil war in Yugoslavia proclaimed a return of war to the European continent, and though hesitant, the western leaders did intervene with military force to stop the fighting. The incentives to do so were twofold. On the one hand the western democracies could not afford the situation to escalate and spreads to other Eastern European countries and were therefore trying to minimize the area of the conflict, on the other hand, the rumors of new acts of genocide horrified many western leaders and publics, which also contributed with a clear incentive to intervene. As later conflicts have shown, the human rights aspect of western politics has indeed be a powerful one. And to this day, the argument of intervention in Sudan is being debated in the UN, US and EU. However the relative quick intervention in Yugoslavia can probably be acclaimed to its proximity of European democracies.

### **3.2.Military and Political Outcomes**

The evolution of democratic participation in conflict in the last 2 centuries has helped create a post-Cold War democratic perception on military force as a last resort. The western democratic nation states had no desire for more territory, neither did they have an arch enemy such international communism to fight any

longer. To simplify the model for the post-Cold War military force appliance the four following point help illustrate that:

- **Public support:** For any democracy to participate in actual combat a certain level of public support is necessary. As part of this element a time factor has be taken into account since the length of a conflict equals the amount of casualties inflicted on the troops (force depletion)
- **Demand of victory:** The end of the Cold War has helped produce a feeling, among the populations in western democracies, that they are somewhat invincible and are therefore bound to achieve an extraordinarily large victory with little causalities, the ratio of military power before entering a conflict is therefore a major issue in the planning of entering a conflict with military forces. It has been said by some generals and military officials that a ratio of 10-1, or more, is not unlikely to needed to fulfill the public demand for total victory.
- **Legitimacy:** Any conflict that a western democracy is to enter needs to be legitimized in some way. To understand legitimizing a particular conflict one needs to dig into the domestic and the international political situation. Alliances may change slightly over time and domestic pressure on democratically weak leaders may force them to steer clear of certain conflicts because of legitimizing problems.
- **Human rights:** A major outcome of the public's outcry to the atrocities committed by US troops in Vietnam was the demand for more decency by western forces when they were in combat. The results include that certain weapons were banned from use by public demand and that civilian casualties (collateral damage) was to minimized at almost all costs, sometimes even when it meant that loss of significant military advantages such as the element of surprise and attacks of strategic targets located in civilian populated areas.

These four elements all operate as obstacles to military action, and can arguably be identified as the Vietnam Syndrome in western politics, which has dominated western and in particular US policy since the 1970's and up until very recently.

### **3.3. A New Approach?**

Whether the military events of the 20'th century alone can explain policy shifts in foreign affairs depends on position to applying of force one takes to modern politics. However the events of particularly the Vietnam War, left the democratic culture with a sort of deficit in force legitimacy, and other means had to be applied for some time. The time from the end of Vietnam War to the end of The Cold was a period of great economic instability bordering depression and economic measures would like be hard to apply for many practical and strategical reasons. But to simply argue that economic sanctions became practical after the end of the Cold War is simply not scientifically justifiable, though it may seem

possible to some, and a deep look into the field contemporary theories on international relations and political affairs is necessary. The next chapters will, with the historical events in mind, highlight three very popular theoretical approaches in order to show their relevance in this discussion.

## **4. Theoretical Aspects on the World Order**

The three theoretical aspects that are being modified here, to give possible explanations for the foreign policy of democracies in the post-Cold War period of the 1990's, are all chosen with the idea that they should highlight different parts of modern political science. I have tried to give justification for each approach in the introductions on the theories.

### **4.1. Interdependence**

The key to interdependence lies in the theory that trade brings peace by binding the trading states together, this has been argued many over time<sup>16</sup>, similarly has many sought to explain if this actually is true<sup>17</sup>. The theoretical birth of trade dependency and interdependence is probably impossible to claim to one author. Marx, Smith and Rousseau have all used the term of interdependence in their work, whether their ideas were similar is clearly debatable. One scholar though, who has contributed with many articles and books on the subject is Richard Rosecrance and in particular his book "The Rise of the Trading State" in which he describes what he calls "the new world of trading states"<sup>18</sup>. The basic thesis of trading worlds, is that modern technology, transportation and communication bring more interdependence to the trading world and thereby less incentives act in the Military-Political tradition<sup>19</sup>, this trend could also be identified as "Globalization" since developments in transportation and communication both are key factors to the spreading of globalization. One could be intrigued to identify interdependence and globalization as synonyms, but they are two different aspects of the modern trading world, however they are clearly linked to one another.

The idea that the resources utilizes by one state benefit states that are trading partners, is far from new, that is ever since Adam Smith proved his economic thesis that trade benefits both parts in term of absolute gains, trade has been observed as a positive element of state business. Some theorists argue that trade in itself is not the key to lasting peace, but rather a combination of trade, scientific

#### Notes and References —————

<sup>16</sup> Ref Herge 2000,

<sup>17</sup> Ref Barbieri 1996 p. 42, where she disproves an empirical relationship between trade/asymmetrical interdependence and peace in the pre-World War II period

<sup>18</sup> Ref Rosecrance 1986

<sup>19</sup> Rosecrance 1986 p. 77-78 & Herge 2000 p. 6-9

progress, development and democracy together create a state of content where neither state feels any desire to expand by use of force<sup>20</sup>. One key element of interdependence which is often neglected in the debate is the mere definition of interdependence or dependence itself. David A. Baldwin presented a scientific framework of interdependence in 1980 in the article, “Interdependence and Power: A conceptual analysis”. He continues in the scientific tradition of Malthus and Oppenheim<sup>21</sup> presenting a framework which emphasizes the natural scientific evolution of concepts such as dependence and interdependence. When defining interdependence for our use, it is important to highlight that no two states are ever interdependent on each other on the same level<sup>22</sup>, this has been described by Wrong as interscursive power. The key to interscursive power is that when one group exerts some control over other, it is important for that power balance to remain stable, that the dependant power also has some power over the other part, otherwise the path to disagreements and conflict would be more tempting for the weaker power<sup>23</sup>. A key fact to remember is that not in all situations do both parties feel that situation is in balance<sup>24</sup>, this leads us to the very core of interdependence, since situations that are in some way not mutually accepted as in balance, are the first step towards some dispute between the parties, this can evolve into conflict or be settled by diplomatic measures. The conclusion to this is that the more interdependent two or more parties, in any interrelating situation, the smaller is the likelihood of armed conflict since the interdependence operates as a damper in the process of conflict escalation due to the increased cost of conflict<sup>25</sup>.

Some concepts introduced by interdependence supporters are those of “head” and “body” states<sup>26</sup>, in the terms that the head and the body are reliant on each other on some level. The head with know-how, and the body with the power to produce the products, this observation is classic to interdependence theory, since the analogy to human anatomy creates an understandable framework for just how interdependent states operate.

#### **4.1.1. Interdependence Theory on Economic Sanctions**

There are two key issues to take into consideration when trying to adapt interdependence to any given policy explanation:

#### Notes and References —————

<sup>20</sup> Herge 2000 p. 25. He argues that there is a link between the level of development and interdependence.

<sup>21</sup> Baldwin 1980 p. 505-506

<sup>22</sup> Baldwin 1980 p. 503-504

<sup>23</sup> Ref Barbieri 1996 on symmetrical and asymmetrical dependency relationships

<sup>24</sup> Baldwin 1980 p. 504

<sup>25</sup> Also see Van Evera 1990-91 p. 11-16 for insights to European interdependence

<sup>26</sup> Ref. Rosecrance 1996



- The relative cost of war/armed conflict is higher in a system of high interdependence than in one with a lower one.
- Interdependence can only explain behavior so far as the actor is rational and obeying the rules that dependence builds.

As for this attempt to explain the use of economic sanctions in a world order as the one during the years of the post-Cold War period of 1990's, we observe clear indications that interdependence among the west were high and rising<sup>27</sup> in terms of western relations with the third world, in particular the Middle East and southeast Asia. The economic growth of India, and China created new markets for western products and new production capabilities for western manufacturers, increased trade between the two worlds led to more and more interdependence. The west relied on the east for cheap labor and new consumers, the east relied on the west for financial investments and technology. As for Latin America and Africa, both these regions were somewhat forgot in all of this and were once more left to deal for themselves, the political situation in Africa after Cold War has ended were often chaotic due to the lack of interest from the only superpower left. The African continent saw some of the worst human catastrophes ever in 1990's, some nature created in form of hunger, flooding and failing harvests several years in a row, others were brutal genocides committed by men among different cultures in the name of religion, territory or old clan. In this period of disaster in Africa and increasing tension in Gulf after the first Iraqi war, the west sought to define a foreign policy that would both be a clear answer to those who committed the atrocities. The preoccupation of west with economic growth and regionalization combined with a high level of interdependence between the west and the Middle East and Southeast Asia presented a situation where military interventions where not desirable by many western leaders. Many were already active with military resources in either the Middle East or on the Balkans; the clear choice would be to sanction those who did not behave well. This choice is clearly linked with the fact that the level of interdependence were high and that military operations were expensive and the economic growth of some of the new "body" states could be jeopardized a conflict torn world. With the use of sanctions, the head maintained control over the body, and body did not loose out on economic growth.

Despite that interdependence in the case of the post-Cold War period worked as catalyst for politicians to apply sanctions as a tool of the state in foreign relations, interdependence cannot be said to be the only reason for this. There are two key reasons for this:

#### Notes and References \_\_\_\_\_

<sup>27</sup> Ref Van Evera 1990-91, Waltz 2000 and Rosecrance 1996

- The level of interdependence among the nations of pre-World War I Europe was if not higher, at least at somewhat the same level as the post-Cold War world experienced<sup>28</sup>.
- The post-Cold War world saw a brand new world order consisting of only one superpower, with the lack of a strong adversary in international relations the United States and its allies in Europe were left to dictate much of the world politics throughout the 1990's. The conclusion to this is that even though interdependence were a two-way street between the west and the east, the east were far more dependent on the willingness of the west, since the technology were a must for them and economic expansion for the west were a mere desire<sup>29</sup>.

The conclusion to how interdependence has affected the policy shift towards economic sanctions must therefore be that the incentives to apply military force to interests around the world were much smaller than during the Cold War since there were no one else to do business with for the third world, use of economic punishment were more than enough in many cases, at the same time military intervention as a punishment operation were growing out of fashion<sup>30</sup>. Interdependence can therefore be said to have played a crucial part, but have hardly been the only factor to the policy shift of 1990's western democratic foreign relations.

## 4.2. Neo-Realism

The face of neo-realism takes many forms, but the old ideas of Morgenthau's classic realism are far from gone from in its modern variants. The new approaches to realism in international relations take concepts, such as Waltz's Structural Realism and the introduction of offensive and defensive realisms, into account, in other words, there are quite a few realisms in the scientific field of politics. The most famous neo-realist is probably Kenneth Waltz who is a strong advocate for structural realism and the classic battle for power and influence when explaining interstate relations. The classic distinction between classic realism and structural realism lies in the observation on state power. The classic realism sees power as an end result and desire for the state, where power can measured in a number of ways, but are generally what the state strives for<sup>31</sup>, whereas structural realism observes power not only as military power in terms of who has more and the damage they can inflict, but looks rather on how states can apply their power within the system of international relations. An attribute shared for all approaches

### Notes and References

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<sup>28</sup> Ref Waltz 2000

<sup>29</sup> The last argument is a key Neo-Realistic argument to why interdependence and globalization are not the only guardians of peace.

<sup>30</sup> Ref Rosecrance 1996

<sup>31</sup> Ref. Baylis & Smith: Lamy p. 185

to realism, is that the goal of all states is survival within the system, which also governs the core of structural realism. Due to the observation that states act accordingly to the structure of system, which in the minds of realists are anarchic in nature, states therefore tend to try to modulate the default anarchic behavior into behavior of their preference, for which power is the tool.

The end of the Cold War created an unprecedented situation of power shifting in the system of international relations. The sudden fall of the Soviet empire left the Americans as the sole superpower in military, economic and political terms, and by that started a period for many neo-realists of great uncertainty on the future of the world order. Since the economic interaction between the Soviet Union and the United States were close to nothing, the only thing that operated as deterrents against the other side for both parties where the military force they wielded, in particular the nuclear arsenals which could practically destroy the other part hundreds of times. With the fall of communism, economic integration between the old enemies could begin, which would again be part of shifting in the power balance. With increasing trade, economic integration and thereby according to some theories, higher levels of interdependence among the old east block and the west, the path for nuclear disarmament seemed clear for some, neo-realists vigorously argued against this, quoting Waltz:

*“Globalizers even more so, argue that the international economic interests of states work against their going to war. True, they do; yet if one asks whether economic interests or nuclear weapons inhibit war more strongly, the answer obviously is nuclear weapons”*<sup>32</sup>

Others have made similar arguments to the strength of nuclear deterrents in Europe<sup>33</sup>.

Waltz and other neo-realists do not dismiss some of the effects argued by globalizers in interdependence and trade, but claim that the key to international stability is maintaining of the power balances between opposing interests in an anarchic system, the core of modern security between contesting states, and the reason for the absence of war lies mainly in the hands of the nuclear capabilities.

#### **4.2.1. Neo-Realistic Approach to Economic Sanctions**

When the key observation that to achieve international stability for neo-realists, is to maintain the power balance within the system, the west, with focus on the American, could not afford to play the imperial card, and dictate every little detail in international relations, such an effort would likely be considered as major disruption of the balance both by the old Soviet states, but also by the neo-

Notes and References \_\_\_\_\_

<sup>32</sup> Ref Waltz 2000

<sup>33</sup> Ref Van Evera 1990-91 p. 9-14

independent states that no longer had to serve a superpower. The fact that neo-realists consider nuclear power as the main reason for the lack of war throughout the Cold War and in the post-period that followed it, does not allow them neglect some critical changes to the system. Two key events that have been part of shaping the world cannot be entirely dismissed by neo-realist thoughts:

- The emergence of new markets in the old east block of Europe and Southeast Asia presented new economic power possibilities for the west
- Democratic proliferation through the post-Cold War period in former soviet satellite states, the third world and Southeast Asia.

Despite that Waltz and others argue that interdependence is not as important a factor as others claim<sup>34</sup> and that trade and liberal democracy in itself not an answer to why states do not fight wars with each other<sup>35</sup>, they accept that both are vital in shaping the system. The neo-realistic main argument against the strength of interdependence and globalization as peacemakers is that interdependence, globalization and democratic proliferation are not global at all<sup>36</sup>. With this, Waltz and other structural realists, can with some reason dismiss these changes to the system, and argue that the nuclear balance indeed have been shifted, but not for the better, quite the opposite in fact.

Throughout the Cold War the two superpowers held each in a deadlock of power; neither seemed to be able to gain the upper hand even though both tried in several cases<sup>37</sup>. With the end of the Cold War the world saw these old games between the two rivals be put to an end, only for it to witness new rivals start their own nuclear battle. The escalation of the old conflict between India and Pakistan to nuclear dimensions meant that neither could nuclear weapons be dismissed as powerbrokers of the two old cold-war rivals, nor by the neighboring countries of India and Pakistan, who had to prepare for the worst. Some believed that Japan, South Korea and possibly Taiwan would soon emerge as nuclear powers also, since the stability of the region had severely deteriorated.

The world order that had emerged seemed in many ways to be uni-polar, but would in the eyes on neo-realists quickly turn multi-polar, the main reason this is that observation that the nuclear threat were as big, if not bigger than at the same levels of the Cold War. From both military, economic and political perspectives, the United States were still far the strongest, but could not wield the same power around the globe as before since most countries now sought to be their own master and fight their own battles, to serve their own survival. To maintain their

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<sup>34</sup> Ref Waltz 2000

<sup>35</sup> Ref Barbeiri 1996 p. 42

<sup>36</sup> Ref Waltz 2000

<sup>37</sup> Ref. to such events as the Vietnam War, The Cuba missile crisis in 1962, the annexation of Czechoslovakia in 1968 by the Warsaw Pact, NATO posting of Nuclear weapons in Turkey 1954.

position in system, just like Europeans now would seek to do, a new set of foreign policy tools needed to be crafted, and the right tool for the job, in a world of nuclear proliferation and high levels of economic interdependence and globalization, could be created with economic incentives, and sanctions being somewhat peaceful<sup>38</sup> in nature could play a crucial part in power balancing from a realist's perspective.

The arguments from a neo-realistic perspective to the use of economic sanctions are many, but the most central would be "preservation of power", and by that the balance of power. Both the US and the Europeans would try to maintain their leading position in the world order, and since there were no incentives to build more military power, the objective to maintain their power would be shifted to economic and political means. Economic sanctions are can be effective in terms of keeping the sanctioned to a status quo economically and thereby power wise by forcing the sanctioned to look for new suppliers, and much less effective in terms of promoting democracy and freedom<sup>39</sup>. Indeed some sanctions cannot be argued to be created with a power focus, but were rather founded in the eyes the liberal fight for freedom and human rights. From a neo-realists point of view these sanction has little impact, if any, on the balance of power between those who actually has any power wield. All sanctions that were related to nuclear powers would however be observed as part of the power game of the new world order.

### **4.3. Democratic Theory**

Whether one accepts the thesis of Immanuel Kant concerning internationalism as the key paradigm for perpetual peace<sup>40</sup> and results that would bring, or one takes a more pessimistic approach to the influence of democracy, many studies have shown that democracies are friendlier towards each other than any other regime type<sup>41</sup>. Despite this, scholars of political theory, and their international relations counterparts, have had tremendous problems with the definition on how to theorize on international politics in the tradition of political theory, Ian Clark identified the problem of linking the politics inside and outside the nation state as "The Great Divide"<sup>42</sup>. Many have in the literature of political theory sought solutions to The Great Divide; examples of this could be Archibugi, Held, Kohler

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<sup>38</sup> Ref Lenway 1988 p. 424 quoting Baldwin: The economic sanctions are more benign than other political state actions (military)

<sup>39</sup> Cases such as Iraq, Iran, Libya and North Korea all tell the same story, the regimes survive, but at a cost for the population

<sup>40</sup> Ref to Doyle 1986 mentioned by Hess & Orphanides 2001 p. 777 – war and democracy

<sup>41</sup> Ref to Maoz & Russett 1993 p. 636 – causes of the democratic peace

<sup>42</sup> Ref to Ian Clark 1999 as referred to by Brian C. Schmidt 2002 p. 125

and many more. Held made an interesting contribution to the attempts to link democratic theory and IR theory by arguing that globalization brought a situation where examinations of the democratic state and the global system were mutually linked to one another<sup>43</sup>, other claim that democracies are not pursuing politics of legitimately dominating other democracies<sup>44</sup>. This approach to democracy presents us with a clear incentive to include democratic theory as model for explaining the shift in foreign policy of western democracies in world order apparently dominated by democracy.

With arguments such as those based on Kant's Internationalism as a bringer of peace, we are given an opportunity to look for alternative behavior of states in international politics than that of war. Because of the acceptance that democracies are peaceful by nature in terms of armed conflict, there should be no such thing as democratic imperialism, since that would be a violation against other sovereign nation states and against the moral code of democracy. There can be little doubt that not all cultures share the perception that democracy is right and just, and thereby peaceful. When observing the world of today, the signals that are sent by political extremists, from either the extreme left or right, Islamic fundamentalists and of course by large numbers of concerned citizens in democracies protesting on a variety of issues and decisions, we are faced with the fact that democracy and freedom go hand in hand for some, and are not at all interrelated for others. The main thing to remember in this case is that the "democratic peace" is a theoretical term identified in theory by use of historical data, and not a question for the individual to decide on.

Despite these different observations on democracy, it does indeed provide citizens, both within the state and outside of it, with some level of guarantee that random decisions about war and "who the state likes today" is not part of the scope of democratic activities<sup>45</sup>. When observing the time that has passed since the western world started to be democratized<sup>46</sup> several large wars have indeed been fought, but not between democracies<sup>47</sup>.

With these observations in mind we can also observe the work of authors who put more emphasis on the link between culture, religion and political culture and

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<sup>43</sup> Ref. D. Held 1995, p27 as referred to by Brian C. Schmidt 2002 p. 127

<sup>44</sup> Ref Van Evera 1990-91 p. 26-28

<sup>45</sup> Ref Maoz & Russett 1993 p. 626 – Structural Assumptions 1 + 2

<sup>46</sup> The democratization of the western world can be argued to have started in many places, one key event though was probably the French Revolution which sent the first clear signal of public demand for power.

<sup>47</sup> Ref to Howard 1983 by Hess & Orphanides 2001 p.3-4

democratic peace<sup>48</sup>. As Henderson describes in his article “The Democratic Peace Through the Lens of Culture” the likeliness of lasting peace between states are highly dependent on the political environment that leaders deal with each other in. This environment is shaped from the political culture of the interacting parties. Therefore if the two parties share some fundamental cultural aspects the likeliness of interstate conflict is decreased significantly.

### **4.3.1. Democratic Approach to Economic Sanctions**

Observing the key arguments of democratic theory concerning interstate conflict:

- Democracy are by nature peaceful towards other democracies
- War<sup>49</sup> is less likely to be initiated by democracies
- Democracies operate within a predefined legislative process that protects both citizens within and outside the state from imperial behavior.
- A shared culture and political culture are key to lasting peace

Despite that democracies are more peaceful than other regime types, they do still seek influence over others in international politics, the quest for influence must be explainable with a combination of these four arguments: When combining these four arguments to the task of explain foreign policy in democracies, the first argument seems clear, since no war between two established democracies have been fought since the democratization of the west, furthermore we can indeed, despite cultural globalization, observe some cultural differences in the world today, perhaps even more than during the Cold War where the two superpowers where defining the two major cultural entities the world of that time. The second and third arguments are based on two key aspects of democracy:

- The rule of law/people: Together these two constitutes the political power in democracies. For an incumbent political leader to go to war, he needs both public support and a political majority. Since most democratic people are more concerned with domestic issues than international affairs, the combination is rare and other approaches must be taken if international influence is to be achieved.

With the quest for influence and that the possibility of military action is often ruled due to the domestic political situation, and plurality of cultural entities, conflict seems inevitable and methods of non-violent action are preferred. The clear cut answer of democratic theory and conflict management is the use of economic sanctions. The nature of sanctions is non-violent, and is empirically

#### Notes and References \_\_\_\_\_

<sup>48</sup> Henderson 1998 p. 480, Huntington 1996

<sup>49</sup> Depending on how one defines “war”, military intervention could be considered as a separate issue or part of the concept of war. In this case I consider all types of military action as acts of war with one reservation, which is the difference between offensive and defensive wars.

exerted by one cultural entity on another, thereby fulfilling all four requirements of the presented theory.

## **5. Another New World Order?**

The theoretical works discussed in the paper so far have in most cases been written before the events of 9/11 and the emergence of the second war in Iraq. All three approaches have been written from a perspective founded in the years of the immediate years after the closing of the Cold War and have of course been influenced to try to find a model that would fit the new world order. It has been argued many times that when the first plane hit its target at the World Trade Center in New York a new world order was emerging once more. Should this be the case we would likely see attempts to adapt the theoretical approaches to politics as in the years that followed the end of the Cold War, if this is the case would the three approaches, discussed so far, react differently to the new situation and the use of economic sanctions as the primary tool?

### **5.1. 9/11 & the Iraq Experience – A Second Theoretical Cut**

Two key facts concerning the events of 9/11 and the invasion of Iraq would be of great importance when theorizing on foreign policy and how states might act in a new world order.

- Most classic theories on international relations do not take the threat of international stateless terrorism into account.
- Limiting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear ones in particular, are once more the first priority of many western states that fear for their national security.

With these facts in mind I would like to give some input to just how the three theoretical approaches would likely observe the emerging world order.

#### **5.1.1. Interdependence**

As described in the chapter on interdependence and globalization, the theoretical work done of this emphasizes trade and evolution of market rules within international affairs. There can be little doubt that both globalization and trade among western democracies and the new economic powers, in particular India and China are very much in focus, and are being nurtured by both politicians and lobbyists of manufacturers. However, the blow that the United States suffered on September 11<sup>th</sup> 2001 helped start a sort of political soul searching in the west. That search led to a desire for more security from terrorist attacks and attacks by so-called rouge nations such as North Korea and Iran.

Despite some talk about a new form of isolationism in the US, the emphasis put on trade and development in particular in Asia, one could argue that many US



politicians indeed see opportunities to increase the levels of interdependence between China and US, and if possible in a way where China are more dependant on the US more than the other way. By doing this, the US can create security for its citizens in a peaceful manner since good relation with China are the key to overcoming the increasing threat of North Korea.

The post-Cold War presented good options for usage of economic sanctions and global governance by the western world, in a world order of international terrorism and increased interdependence, the same tools could be applied, but since most of those who are likely to subject to future sanctions are stateless actors, the definition of sanctions and how they are imposed are likely to be reconsidered.

### **5.1.2. Neo-Realism**

For neo-realists the events of 9/11 and emergence of international terrorism are likely the worst possible outcome of the unipolar situation at the end of the Cold War. For many neo-realists the immediate years after the Cold War were insecure, however it were still quite easy to identify the threat, since the major threat were and are, nuclear weapons.

In the “old” system of the post-Cold War period, neo-realism identified the major threats by identifying who had nuclear weapons and who their allies were, with increase in nuclear proliferation to Pakistan, India, North Korea and possibly Iran, the picture changes very much, in particular with the events of Pakistan’s head developer Abdul Qadeer Khan, who had been selling nuclear technology secrets on the black market. The virtual proliferation of nuclear weapons could be global.

The events of the invasion of Iraq, were a natural response to the events of 9/11 and the increased nuclear proliferation, despite that no such weapons have been found in Iraq, the mere suspect were alone enough to convince people in charge of US security that action was needed. The pace of war is almost always the same, at first the nation unites together in the name of nation, but slowly war weariness emerges in the public, just as it has in the case of Iraq. The problem for neo-realists is that no weapons were found in Iraq, and the next time it might not be so easy to convince the public that action is absolutely necessary. With this in mind a future of increase in sanctions as neo-realistic response, to halt many countries’ efforts to acquire a nuclear deterrent, could be the case, the difference from the 1990’s post-Cold War sanctions to the post-9/11 sanctions in a neo-realistic perspective, would be that the new sanctions would likely be more harsh and more intensively monitored by US intelligence agencies.

### **5.1.3. Democratic Theory**

With the events of 9/11 and the invasion of Iraq, democratic theory must have suffered a little blow. Despite that the war in Iraq was presented as a defensive war necessary to protect the homelands of the western democracies, the aftermath has been severely difficult for the political leaders of the coalition. Sanctions were abandoned for military force, and from an immediate security point of view with great success. Iraq is no longer any threat to the western world but rather a threat to itself and the region in terms of internal collapse and civil war, which in the long run could prove as a bigger threat than a sanctioned Saddam Hussein.

The biggest setback for democratic theory is however not the Iraqi war, but the events of 9/11 and international terrorism. The introduction of powerful non-state actors in national security matters, who can actually do real damage, unlike the occasional crazy individual, the citizens of western democracies, with the US as the prime example, has been forced to deal with the fact that immortality had not been achieved and that military action might have to be enforced to keep them safe in the future.

From a democratic perspective on foreign policy, the idea that sanctions are a tool that can be used with great success, depends on how democracy evolves in Iraq. If the efforts to create a free and peaceful Iraq are successful, democracy could emerge as the key argument to perpetual peace as foreseen by Kant, military power might be applied again to help secure the western world and export democracy by force, however if it fails, military force is probably unlikely to be applied, in the scale seen in Iraq, for some time. In the last case sanctions could be the tool that democratic states would have to rely on once more to inflict some control in international matters by enforcing the economic power that the west still holds over the world. Whether a democratic Iraqi syndrome emerges depends as argued on the development of democracy in Iraq in the next few years.

## **5.2. Actual Change or a Cyclic Pattern?**

A question that any political scientist or historian would have to ask by now, is whether we are faced with an actual conceivable change in international matters, or we simply are playing the same song over and over? By observing the transition period of the 1980's and 90's, from a cold war cynical attitude to hope for global peace and back to fear and preemptive strikes in the name of security, democracy and freedom, one could get tempted to draw parallels with the interwar and pre-World War I periods, where the world also was dominated by insecurity and lack of stable politics and economics. The neo-realists have one clear answer to this, which is rooted in the observation that a bi-polar world order offers stability when the power balance was as it were during the Cold War. The outbreak of World War I was a result of a breakdown in the balance of power among European nations, not one of the medium powers could allow the others to

gain the advantage at that point, which seemed and perhaps were the major political and socioeconomic event of the century. The peace settlement of World War I founded the roots of hyper nationalism and thereby World War II which served to create the neo-realist ideal power structure among nation states. The two superpowers of the Soviet Union and the United States battled for almost half a century for dominance, perhaps by miracle they instead achieved a long lasting peace in Europe.

To argue that we are faced with the same questions over and over are hard to do, clearly some assumes the same shape, but the structure of game changes all the time. Interdependence plays a crucial role in the world order today, so does nuclear weapons, the spread of democracy in the Middle East, and lately in some of last of the old soviet states that had not seen their democratic revolution yet, all of this adds up to a world order that has not been witnessed by anyone to this day. We are therefore likely to face similar questions, but the answers might not be the same at all.

## **6. Conclusions**

This paper seeks answers to why sanctions became so popular in the aftermath of the Cold War. The answers are sought in popular concepts and approaches to political science, and some are indeed found. The disturbing feeling that emerges, is that even though interdependence, neo-realism and democratic theory are three very different approaches to international relations, they can be used to explain the use of sanctions and economic power. The explanation for this is of course, that even though these three concepts or theories on international relations are different in nature, they share one common objective. They all seek peace, as well as most democratic leaders through time have. The desire for peace and peaceful politics has helped shape the democratic system, no matter which politics that where applied, into being in search for peace. The key to understanding how politics are conducted lies in the links between the theoretical aspects of this paper. Neo-Realists' argue that nuclear weapons are the most vital reason for the lasting peace of the last half of the 20'th century, but at the same time they cannot dismiss some of the effects of democracy and trade and interdependence. Globalists and interdependence supporters can't dismiss the power of freedom and democracy and neither can they look aside form the nuclear proliferation of our time. And supporters of democratic theory and the proliferation of democracy to ensure lasting peace can't look aside from the effect of the other two approaches. The link is clear, all three aspects on international relations are mutually linked through the quest for peaceful solutions to a world order of chaos, violence and human catastrophes, they each simply emphasizes one factor a little more than the others.

## **7. Self Critique**

In the forum that this paper is being presented the idea of self critique is central idea to the understanding of why your paper might be loved by some and bashed by others. I would like to take a few minutes here at the end by identifying what I believe is the major weaknesses of this paper:

The nature of this of paper is that builds on the work of others, and rely less on conceptualizing political themes into neat theories, the major weakness will therefore always be references, and the interpretation of these. Some readers with certain ideas on world politics and methodology will tend to find the analysis done in this paper dull, wrong or even misplaced at times. To satisfy all in scientific manners in terms of a relative science such a political science are likely impossible as the different aspects of this paper clearly is a prime example of.

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NGO of USA Engage:

<http://www.usaengage.org/>

The United Nations Archives:

<http://www.un.int/usa/99eiz71.htm> &

<http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/chapter7.htm>

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