

Lund University
Stv102 ht04
Department of Political Science
Supervisor: Jakob Gustavsson

European security

Turkey's role in the new global context

Johan Ahlner
Magnus Grubbe

Abstract

Turkey has made countless tries to join the European Union in the past. It's a member of all the other European organizations but the question about a full EU membership has always been controversial. However during the last year great steps forward were made. And in this year (2005) Turkey will initiate membership negotiations. The aim of this thesis is to try and find out what has led to this new stance. The new international context that emerged after the 911 attacks is greatly emphasised. The "new" relations between the EU and Turkey are observed in the direct correlation of these events that changed the international system forever.

Keywords: EU, Turkey, Security, integration, European identity

Table of Contents

1. Introduction	4
1.1 EU-Turkey relations from past to present	5
1.2 Turkey's role in the question about security; the world of today	6
1.3 The geopolitical advantage	7
1.4 American involvement	8
2 Perspective Framework	9
3 Methodological and material discussion	10
3.1 Theoretical base-ground and a motivation to engage in this thesis	11
4 First perspective	13
4.1 regional security complex	13
4.2 Regional Security Complex Theory	14
4.3 Descriptive Regional Security Complex Theory	15
4.4 EU-Europe as a RSC	16
4.5 A new "other"	17
5 The second perspective	20
5.1 Pre-negotiation phase theory vs. liberal intergovernmentalism	20
5.2 The world after 9/11 – the new narrative of Turkey	22
6 Conclusions	24
7 References	25

1. Introduction

Ladies and gentlemen, tonight, the European Union has opened its door to Turkey," European Commission chief Jose Manuel Barroso at a press conference December 16th, 2004 in Brussels

The republic of Turkey has made countless tries in the past to join the European Union (EU); the most recent attempt took place at the enlargement summit in Copenhagen 2002, when the Turkish prime minister came asking for a date when Turkey could initiate membership negotiations. No date was given and the Turkish prime minister returned with a number of criterias, the so called "Copenhagen Criteria", which needed to be fulfilled before membership negotiations could be initiated. Along with these criteria the Council of Europe put the Commission in charge to examine Turkey's will to and actual realization of these criteria with the purpose of giving a recommendation whether or not membership negotiations with Turkey should start.

On October 6th 2004 The European Commission stated that Turkey had not completely fulfilled the Copenhagen criteria, but they were certainly moving in the right way, therefore the Commission gave Turkey the green light for negotiations. It was then up to the Council of Europe to decide. On December the 16th the Council of Europe decided to welcome Turkey to the negotiations table. But this welcome does in no way to guarantee a full membership. Turkey will initiate membership negotiations with the EU October 3rd, 2005.

This position change toward Turkey is what we are trying to analyze in this thesis or more precise why it is accruing now. We can therefore formulate our main question for this thesis like this: Why has the EU decided to initiate membership negotiations with Turkey now?

As it is stated in the commissions report, Turkey has been undergoing serious reforms the last one to two years and these reforms have no doubt an impact on the position change, but the reforms in Turkey, especially because Turkey not yet has fulfilled all the requested Copenhagen criteria, doesn't explain why the EU necessary should engage membership negotiations with Turkey. Turkey has applied for membership for ages but that also doesn't give a full account for engaging negotiations if we contemplate it through a negotiation theory framework. This is due to the fact that it seems plausible to ask: what do the present member states get out of it? All this means that we will analyse the changed position toward Turkey as a consequence of contemporary changes not necessarily directly related to Turkey itself. Subordinated to the above question we can furthermore ask: given that the reforms in Turkey are only necessary but not sufficient conditions for the changed positions toward Turkey, why has the EU then decided to initiate membership negotiations with Turkey now?

We can already here identify the first antecedent. The [Minister] council's decision on December 16th 2004 was a direct consequence of the same council's decision in Copenhagen in 2002. That means when we say contemporary changes we primarily should turn our interest towards the year 2002.

Logically we can in this occasion distinguish three different explanation types for the new EU stance: 1) As already mentioned, the new stance toward Turkey is Turkey's own accomplishment, 2) the events of 9/11 changed global security politics considerably; this also

have inflicted the EU's position toward Turkey, and 3) negotiation and decision mechanisms within the union triggering "enlargement".

It should be stated, early on, that this thesis only focuses on the enlargement mechanisms from an EU and global perspective; hence we will only focus on the latter two of the explanation types.

The reason for this bias is that the change in Turkey is obvious, but this is only a necessarily condition and not sufficient to inflict changes within the EU, furthermore there is nothing around this period that indicates a culture radical or pluralistic revival. In this perspective our main assumption in this thesis will be that the question of security in a "new" world plays an ever-underlying role. That counts for both of our discussed explanation types. The security issue plays the role of an unmoved first mover.

1.1 EU-Turkey relations from past to present

The sudden media attention towards the EU-Turkey relations might give one the idea that these changes have occurred over night. This is of course not the case.

Ever since the foundation of modern day Turkey in 1923, the country has always been close to the west. The relations between Turkey and the EU commenced when Ankara began its co-operation with the then European Economic Community in 1959. Turkey's prospective membership in the EEC's successor, the European Union, has been a source of much debate ever since.

In 1987 Turkey applied for a full membership. In 1989 the commission endorsed the application but delayed the assessment of the application. In 1996 Turkey entered the EU customs union. This was a great step forward for Turkey. But at the Luxembourg summit in 1997 Turkey was denied candidate status (euractiv.com).

But at the Helsinki meeting Turkey was finally accepted as a candidate country.

In March 2001 the EU council adopted the EU-Turkey accession partnership which states that Turkey is a candidate country destined to join the European Union. The Pre-accession partnership stated a number of areas were Turkey needed to improve in order to be eligible for membership. In the following months the Turkish government adopted a national program for the adoption of the acquis. In September the same year the Turkish parliament adopted 30 constitutional amendments to meet the Copenhagen criteria. More reforms followed in August 2002 as the parliament passed a number of reforms to meet the EU human rights criteria.

The reformat work taking place in Turkey was firmly acknowledged by the union. At the Copenhagen summit in 2002 it was stated that that Turkey was heading in the right direction but more reforms needed to be implemented. The council also increased the financial pre-accession aid to Turkey (ibid & Sen: 2004).

In January 2004 the death penalty was finally abolished, this was more than welcomed by the EU. As a result of this the council of Europe concluded that "Over the last three years Turkey has clearly demonstrated its commitment and ability to fulfill its statutory obligations as a Council of Europe member state and the monitoring procedure under way since 1996 should therefore be closed" (press release from the council of Europe 03.03.04).

And finally in October 2004 the commission, in their annual report stated that Turkey fulfilled the Copenhagen criteria to some extent and therefore should be allowed to initiate membership negotiations and hence recommended the council to initiate negotiations.

The council greeted the recommendation on December 16th, and Turkey will start negotiations in October 2005. This is a truly historical decision which will inevitably change Europe forever.

1.2 Turkey's role in the question about security; the world of today

“I was previously one of those people who were 51% in favour of Turkey's accession and 49% beset by doubts. I have fundamentally changed my position following the attacks of September 11th. Since then it has become ever clearer that European integration also has a strategic dimension.” Joschka Fischer in *Berliner Zeitung* February 28th 2004¹

In the discussion about a Turkish EU-membership the German foreign minister Joschka Fischer has been in the forefront promoting a membership, therefore we have chosen the quotation above to discuss some of the security issues that have been brought to light.

But what is this strategic dimension? A strategic dimension against what? What is this new “enemy”? What role does this give Turkey?

Fischer's statement above sums up the new concerns that have emerged in a rather satisfactory way. As mentioned before, the EU cooperation began as pragmatic project in order to make balance in the historic dimension.

However after the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989 a completely new threat emerged in Afghanistan. A threat that emerged in the third world against the first. This was no military threat as none of the west's military might has been affected by the new terror wave. This is not really a military war as there is no singular state that can be called guilty; this is a war against a new “invisible” enemy. The terrorist group (Al-Qaeda) had declared a war driven by a totalitarian ideology. And this is a danger towards the west's open society and way of life; Europe needs to unite in a new way as “We Europeans have to ask if we can grow close enough together to bring our weight to bear. One must also view the debate on Turkey in this light.” (Fischer in *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 06.03.2004).

A Turkish membership is essential in this” new” unification as” Narrow visions of Europe simply do not work any more. They do not enable our continent to achieve the necessary strategic dimension. And that is indispensable.” (ibid)

Turkey has emerged as one of the leading actors in the fight against global terrorism. Turkey rigorously supported the international coalition against the Taliban and al-Qaeda, when it became clear that the September 11 attacks had originated from Afghanistan. (Bagci & Kardas, 2003)

The events of September 11 have proven that Turkey is strategically important, not only for the Americans but also for the Europeans.

Turkey has therefore taken advantage of this opportunity in order to boost up relations with the U.S. and Europe by emphasizing its importance as a pro-Western power in such a critical context (ibid).

There is no doubt that even if the EU separates itself from the Middle East by oceans, it has a clear interest of being influential in the region, and will not be able to avoid that at any rate,

¹ Translation taken from the German embassy in Washington website.

even if the involvement is quite reluctant. The Middle East is at the core of the unions' problem spots.

The Middle East profoundly affects the EU with its oil, terrorism, migration, human trafficking, narcotics, arms proliferation, etc. At the present, the EU is affected by problems originating from the Middle East, but it lacks the means to deal with them. The Palestinian-Israeli conflict is a typical example. Even though the EU allocates vast resources to this region, and others for that matter, the EU has difficulty in obtaining results. It has been unable to attain a role in the Middle East on par with the US. Neither in terms of impact, nor in prestige, has the EU raised to the status that their effort warrants. On the other hand, the September 11 attacks and the Iraq War clearly proves that Middle Eastern events are going to affect Europe, just as they do with the rest of the world. A Turkish membership may grant the EU the desired means and the power to affect the region (LACINER 2004)

1.3 The geopolitical advantage

Turkey has always played an important role when it comes to global security politics. Turkey has always seen itself as a part of Europe, that is the reason that Turkey, despite its Islamic heritage, has stayed out of the Middle Eastern conflict, in fear of being regarded as a Middle Eastern country.

During the cold war Turkey played an active role on the allied side with membership in NATO, OECD and the council of Europe. Its geographical position made it strategically important.

With the end of the cold war Turkey's international importance began to fade, though it continued to play an important role during the gulf war. But this was in no way near it former importance, but more of a logistic importance. The Kurdish question played here also an important but somewhat different role. (Emerson & Tocci 2004)

But this changed fundamentally after the 911 attacks and the second war in Iraq. And this is the strategic dimension Fischer talks about.

A Turkish membership would truly generate the region a lot making it a more "heavy weight" player in the international system, From a security perspective Turkey's military might is of substantial size, this would make the union as a whole a lot more dominant.

The security political gains of a Turkish membership are substantial. Turkey would be a unifying link between Europe and Asia. Sending two clear messages to the world; the European Union is not a wealthy Christian club and that a secular Islamic country *can* implement democracy in the western sense.

Also Turkey, as the only secular and democratic Islamic country in the region, can, as mentioned, contribute to the war against international terrorism.

Turkey is the pillar of NATO's south east defence system. The countries surrounding Turkey supply 60 percent of the natural gas and petroleum demand of Europe. The importance of Turkey, with regard to security and defence policy, has been apparent in several crisis situations such as the September 11 attacks and the Iraq war. In consideration of the new political objective and the security concerns of the EU, Turkey is vital in terms of providing stability in the regions of the Eastern-Mediterranean, the Middle East and the Caucasus. These are regions were the European Union has been criticized for a lacking involvement.

1.4 American involvement

The United States have always advocated a Turkish membership, in the past America expressed this outline quite clearly, and as America is the only remaining superpower in the international system we need to characterize its impact in this process .

The American stance in the EU- Turkey question was very evident at 2004 NATO summit in Istanbul.

But it has proven difficult for the Americans to support Turkey and thereby inflicting actual changes in the unions' policies, without jeopardizing relations with its states. One might call it a double edged sword, as American lobbying efforts are greatly appreciated in Ankara, some European leaders regard the US efforts as an interference with Europe's internal affairs (Bengtsson 2004); Jacques Chirac has been one of the main critics of the US involvement, saying that America should mind their own business. America has though tuned downed their lobbying efforts because they realize that this might hurt the transatlantic relations even more. (Larrabee: 2004)

The American support is largely driven by strategic concerns, particularly a desire to see Turkey firmly integrated to the West at a time when the Greater Middle East have become a key U.S. strategic priority. The financial costs of Turkish membership and its impact on EU institutions are viewed in Washington as secondary issues.(Ibid)

In the recent years transatlantic relations has not been on par with those just a couple of years ago, but a Turkish membership might not all be all that good for The United States. Because a Turkish membership in the EU could change the nature of U.S.-Turkish relations. As a Turkey integrated into the EU will be a more "European" Turkey—one which will have to act in conjunction with its new European identity. This would inevitably affect the nature of U.S.-Turkish relations. (ibid)

Defence alliances in particular could be affected. The U.S. is the largest supplier of goods and services to Turkey. Once in the EU, however, Turkey will come under increased pressure to buy European weaponry, as been the case in many of the new eastern European members. Thus over time, Turkey is likely to broaden its defence relationships with other European suppliers. (Ibid)

2 Perspective Framework

To analyse our object of question we plan to apply two different theoretical perspectives in this thesis, furthermore which will introduce a third theory in connection with our discussion about the theoretical base-ground and motivation of this thesis. The theories applied are as follow:

- 1) To assert how to structure the further theoretical framework of this thesis we apply a so called Grand Bargaining Theory, which is based on a position of liberal intergovernmentalism. The discussion in connection with the GBT is not intended to be a part of our explanation but to lay out a starting point and a direction for our investigation.
- 2) Regional Security Complex perspective. This perspective uses a form of realism also implying an element of constructivism. Following the path of describing EU security and the role of Turkey through a regional perspective we will assert possible reasons for adopting Turkey into the EU as a mean to deal with a new security threat: Islamic fundamentalists.
- 3) We may find that the perspective above doesn't sufficiently explain our object, and therefore it may be fruitful to add a further perspective. This perspective, which is taking a starting point turn the role of Turkey 180 degrees around, i.e. Turkey is not the mean to deal with the new situation after 9/11 attacks on the USA, on the contrary the 9/11 attacks is the mean to a Turkish membership of the EU. That is off course more radically said than meant and needs to be further explained. For now we can say, that the 9/11 attacks (and for that matter also the 3/11 attacks) have made a political and public discourse within which a common EU identity that includes a Turkish membership as a possibility.

3 Methodological and material discussion

In the methodical discussion two empirical factors are to be deliberated: 1) the object of our analysis, i.e. our question, and 2) our empirical material.

This should not be a discussion about realism and idealism. It has been seen all too often that authors have involved in such a discussion without knowing why they are doing it. We will not engage in this discussion mainly because there is not only one realism or one idealism. The range of different positions within these two conceptions is so wide, that it far from possible to deal with it here². Also for our task it's not necessary to make this distinction to define our method.

The nature of the object for our question, about why the EU initiating membership negotiations with Turkey now, is to be classified as an action. It seems at first like two different approaches to explain this action can be selected: either a positivistic or a hermeneutic method. There are, however, some problems with the positivistic approach, which already letting us to discuss the use of empirical material. Our empirical case frame – the EU – is in some aspects a *sui generis* case that means that it is as such unsuited for a statistic analyse. There are simply not enough cases to carry out a statistic analyse. But as already said only some aspects of our case are to be classified as a *sui generis* case. The EU as a whole is in general classified as a *sui generis* object due to it's exceptional structure, but the processes involved in our case such as negotiation, decision-making, and securitisation are general concepts of processes that can be compared to other cases, that means they can be analysed in a comparative analysis. However it is not the single aspects we want to explain but the case in question as a whole.

What we will carry out in this thesis will be some kind of single case study. In a headline terminology we can call our method for this analyse for a hermeneutic hypothetic-deductive method. Hermeneutic because meaningful objects such as an action in general is subject to a hermeneutic analyse (Føllesdal et al 1999: 86). The analysing process will in overall take the form of a so called hermeneutic circle, which means that we will from our specialized question proceed to a general perception by involving relevant theories (the relevancy of the theories is dependent of their capability to fit our question) and then return and explain the original question with the generalisation. In this process the theories imported will be used to formulate hypotheses, which we will exam as we return to the case in question. This is the conception of the hypothetic-deductive method. Further more the reason why we formulate the generalisation as a hypothesis to be verified or falsified is that the theories available aren't capable of explaining our case in question and therefore need to be further developed.

This structure of analysis chosen doesn't necessarily require a large amount of empirical material because the hypotheses involved are to be tested in their capability of explaining a

² However two statements must be made. It is misleading to claim that idealism doesn't accept the existing of things independent of the human mind. Things exist all right independently of the human mind; we just wouldn't be able to talk about them. The meaning of things is constituted by the human mind, and therefore when we talk meaningfully about things we must always assume some kind of idealism. Realism as a theoretical position is also only possible because of idealism because it cannot consistent explain how it itself use the conceptions of identity and diversity.

The other statement is quite obvious in relation to the first. If the object intended for analysis is something meaningful, i.e. is a product of the human reason the analysis bases itself on some kind of idealism. The distinction between realism and idealism could with advantage be made accordingly to if the object in question is a natural fact or some kind of rational artefact, i.e. products, statements, or actions, and persons.

single case. However a more extensive use of empirical material would most likely have given this thesis a higher reliability.

3.1 Theoretical base-ground and a motivation to engage in this thesis

This paragraph, which has the function of motivating this thesis, is based on the following distinction: Either the reason for the EU decision about giving Turkey a firm date for initiating membership negotiations is no other than it looks like, which of course is possible, or it is somewhat different or not the only reason, or not the reason at all. It would be naive to choose the first alternative without supplying some very good arguments for this position. In our context, which means in a scientific context, good arguments means explanations based on motivated theory applied on relevant empirics. This, which is already deeper discussed under the concepts of scientific explanation and hypothetic-deductive method in the paragraph about method and material, will be the paradigm for this thesis.

What will be our first task and the function of the paragraph is to set the base-ground for this thesis, which means to assert the basic concepts. This base-ground will be important for the thesis because it will prescript which factors that counts as antecedents for our case of investigation, and therefore enables us to operationalize our theories (those presented in the two perspectives). Such a base-ground must be based on a theory itself. That we in this thesis therefore must take something for granted is inevitable.

A “side-effect” of the following deliberation will be a motivation of engaging in this thesis at all. Given that we can argue for some metaphysical factors involved in the case of investigation we are simultaneously arguing for the need of explaining the case of investigation through a kind of speculative deliberation that means the need for this thesis.

The following construction of a theoretically base-ground is driven forward by the question mentioned in the foreword: What do the present member states get out of it [a Turkish membership]? This highly intuitive question first of all excludes that the reason for the decision about initiating membership negotiations with Turkey should be no other than what it looks like, and secondly it provides us with a tentative alternative [self-interests]. The task now is therefore to give this question a theoretical fundament.

Such a fundament derives from Moravcsiks and Vachudovas perspective of the EU eastern-enlargement, which relies on a basic bargaining theory that operates within the conception of national interests and state power. Their theory counts as a general theory about EU enlargement but furthermore their case of study seems to share important characteristics with the contemporary initiated negotiations with Turkey. Both cases seem to impose what is called rhetoric idealistic arguments for an enlargement. In the case of Turkey this means that we should seek an explanation for an accession of Turkey into the EU in wishes to promote certain norms like further democratization or securing the rights of the Kurdish minority, or picture EU as a multi religious association. But such explanations, although that they may be somewhat right, overlook the fact (according to Moravcsik and Vachudova) that “Interstate idealism seems never to be as powerfully professed as when it runs parallel to material self-interest.” (Moravcsik & Vachudova; 2003: 50) What drive the willingness of the existing EU member states to let new members in is fundamental self-interests, and the fact that they are capable of achieving these interest according to their given bargaining power towards the applicant(s).

According to this hypothesis we seem to be on the right track when we seek to explain EU's decision to initiate negotiations with Turkey from the perspective of promoting self-interests in form of security through geopolitical strategic motivations. This, however, doesn't exclude economical self-interests.

From this perspective the case of Turkey does however contain a substantial difference from the case of the eastern enlargement. Although economical interests also may play a substantial role on both sides after all, the question of security, the very question of the life and death of EU citizens, put the conception of negotiation power in a somewhat different light. If security is the main motivation for absorbing Turkey it would seem unlikely that the EU would jeopardize the admission by posing to radical or absolute demands on Turkey. This is however what happens at the time, but this could be seen mostly as an attempt to satisfy certain movements within the EU, and these demands may end up being not so radical and absolute after all. However Turkey would probably accept most demands from the EU because they themselves seem in addition to economical interests to have the same interest in security.

What we can see is that the EU (and Turkey for that matter) has an incitement for initiating negotiations about Turkish membership. Or formulated in the terminology from the beginning of this paragraph: some kind of self-interests should be considered as a relatively dominating element in our base-ground, but as we have seen such an element is likely to be escorted by rhetorical idealistic arguments. For the following thesis this means that our operationalization of the theoretical perspectives will be based on this ground.

This theoretical ground for our investigation, accepting the position of Moravcsik and Vachudova, makes us accept some form of liberal intergovernmentalism. At a later point in this thesis this position will however be challenged by another theory. At the same occasion we will also present and discuss some deeper details about liberal intergovernmentalism.

4. First perspective

Aiming to talk about Turkey as a strategic security subject from a theoretical perspective we need first to specify an adequate theory to explain patterns of contemporary EU securitization. This, we think, should enable us to give a theoretical framework to explain why EU security concerns about Islamic fundamentalists can have a positive impact on a Turkish EU membership. This, we shall see, is due to the fact that the way to securitize in the EU (especially after the end of the Cold War) has been through integration, i.e. a common identity. The fact that this has had an influence on how the EU deals with Islamic fundamentalists is due to the way EU interprets this problem. The problem regarding Islamic fundamentalists isn't related to any specific nation states (all though it's related to the middle East region), but never the less the USA attempts to see it in a global perspective, whereas the EU sees it in a regional perspective (this doesn't necessarily point in our direction), and further as "ultimately caused by problems of resources and lack of development." (Buzan & Wæver 2003: 360) The Middle East region (as a RSC) is distinct from the EU region by Turkey as the insulator, and stand as it seems against each other on a global level. This perspective, however, does both theoretically and in practice implicate essential problems, and having this brought down to a regional level could offer a fruitful way to solve the problems. Here integrating Turkey into the EU could make her play an essential role in the middle East RSC and thereby creating a, what Buzan and Wæver calls regional supercomplex (Buzan & Wæver 2003:374). Here we should be able to see how, though some alterations, integration keeps on being the primary way to securitize. All this will be further unfold in the chapters below.

What we need now is to apply a theory that can explain securitisation in the EU today. This takes its starting point at a definition of a regional security complex.

4.1 Regional Security Complex

In short a regional security complex can be defined as: a cluster of nation states within which "security interdependence is relatively more intense inside it than across its boundaries." (Buzan & Wæver; 2003, 378)

The development of this theoretical framework has taken a long time. The original definition which was stated as early as 1983 stated that a security complex was: "a group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot reasonably be considered apart from one another" (Buzan 1983:106). This formulation totally neglects the sovereign states independence, which together with the conception of power balance are the essential elements of traditional realism in IR. In 1998 a reformulation was called for stating that a RSC constituted: "a set of units whose major processes of securitization, de-securitisation, or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one another" (Weaver &

Buzan 1998:201). This theoretical framework was in urgent need for a redefinition of international relations after the end of the Cold War. According to Buzan and Wæver this new theoretical framework has, however, been a relevant perspective applicable, more or less, during the last 5000 years. The central idea of these definitions is that securitization and desecuritisation in the international system will manifest themselves in regional clusters (Weaver & Buzan 2003:44).

The processes in these clusters are both durable and distinct from global processes of securitization. Though this redefinition of IR is meant as a reaction to traditional realism, it doesn't reject it. It is perfectly possible that the world is still largely state-centric, even if our framework is not. That means that multilevel dynamics can happen simultaneously.

This theory was originally meant to be a theory to capture the international dynamics in the international system after the cold war, due to the failure of traditional realism to predict and explain these new dynamics³. According to traditional realism the end of the Cold War and the removal (or partial removal) of the American and Soviet overlay would revive the dynamics of power balance in Western Europe, that means a new fragmentation possibly between Germany, France and England as power centres. As we all know this didn't happen, and it therefore stands clear that realism in its traditional form must retire. Its successor is the Regional Security Complex Theory.

4.2 Regional Security Complex Theory

The analytical framework which we intend to use in this perspective is called RSCT (Regional Security Complex Theory), developed by Ole Wæver and Barry Buzan.

There are three principal theoretical perspectives on post-Cold War international security structures ("principal of arrangement of the parts in the system, and how the parts are differentiated from each other"): neorealism, globalism and regionalism (Buzan & Wæver 2003: 6). It is not in the nature of this thesis to discuss the two first perspectives; it is only to say that the regionalist perspective, that will be our future object, contains elements of the first two.

First of all we need to narrow down the definition of RSCT to the level position. It is first of all a higher level than the unit-level. This is obviously because the regional-level must exist of more than one unit. On the contrary the region-level is lower than the system/global level. This is quite obvious as the part is smaller than the whole. The problem with this weak (but absolute true) definition of a region is that the borders can be floating. For our task it is, however, not that important to give an exact definition of the RSC level position⁴. An RSC are in short terms "*defined* (at the more 'superficial' or contingent level) by the actual patterns of security practices." (Buzan & Wæver 2003: 41)

When it's important to locate the regional (security) level, this is due to the circumstance that a state is primary interrelated with its neighbor(s). Regarding security matters that also means that its neighbor(s) is/are its primary threat. Neighbours are simply more likely to go to war against each other than distant states. Or said in another way: "we stress that security

³ It must be added that the Regional Security Complex Theory is a general theory applicable at all cases that seems to form a pattern of security interdependence, and it is therefore not a specific theory about Europe.

⁴ The definition is mostly mentioned due to its ontological trueness.

regions form subsystems [subordinated under the global level⁵] in which most of the security interaction is internal; states fear their neighbours and alliances emerge with other regional actors, and most often the borders between regions are –geographically determined – zones of weak interaction, or they are occupied by an *insulator*...not strong enough to unify its two worlds into one.” (Buzan & Wæver 2003: 41) Therefore the regional perspective is also the primary perspective, although it doesn't in any way exclude other perspectives.

The dynamics inside a regional security complex is not much different from those at the global level. There are patterns of rivalry, balance-of-power, and alliance patterns among the main powers. These dynamics are formed by general patterns of amity and enmity, which most often is generated by a mixture of historic, political, and material conditions⁶ (Buzan & Wæver 2003: 47). This, however, should not lead to the misunderstanding that a regional security complex can be understood through historical, political, or material perspectives (Buzan & Wæver 2003: 43). What defines an actual RSC is only the actual security structure, - what actually creates this structure is another story, though not unimportant, as we shall see.

4.3 Descriptive Regional Security Complex Theory

This paragraph will present how to use RSCT as a framework for understanding empirical studies. In our case this means to understand the EU through the optics of the RSCT.

Using RSCT to describe a specific empirical case the following four analytical levels of must be taken into account. Some levels can be said to be more descriptive than others but they only when taken together do they constitute a total *security constellation* (Buzan & Wæver 2003: 51 (see also Buzan et al. 1998: 201ff).

1. Domestic level; Vulnerabilities are formed from the domestic scene (strong or weak political structure). The specific vulnerability a state has defines its security fears. Sometimes this makes a state feel a structural threat from another state even though it might not have any hostile intentions.
2. State-to-state relations level; which generate the region as such.
3. The regions interaction with other regions; as already mentioned this interaction is limited according to the nature of RSC's.
4. The role of global powers in the region (the interplay between the global and regional security structures). (Weaver and Buzan 2002:51)

The overall meaning of this scheme is to distinguish between the different levels of dynamics. It's important to be aware not to confuse the dynamics of the different levels.

One cannot talk about RSCs as a whole; there is a clear distinction between standard and centred RSCs.

A standard RSC is a broadly Westphalian construction with two or more powers with a predominantly military-political security agenda. Since there is an ever going shift in the power balance in this kind of RSC it by nature becomes very fragmented because of a

⁵ Here the reference is the Huntington theory of international relations.

⁶ The power relation and the amity and enmity relation can also be seen as two distinct patterns (Buzan & Wæver 2003: 49).

constant fear of outside domination, the domestic vulnerabilities plays a substantial role. Europe was before the EU-project a typical standard RSC with different power centres and power-balances, and this, as European history has shown, led to wars and rivalry.

After World War II Europe was filled by big void, either the old RSC could be re-implemented or a new era could begin. This was the beginning of a new RSCT which would be based on amenity instead of enmity. This led to the emergence of a new centred European RSC. The central idea of a centred RSCs is that power in these RSCs is unevenly distributed. A good example of a centred RSC is North America. In the international system USA has the most structural power. Therefore the US, off course, has the predominant power in its own geographical constituency.

Centered RSCs comes in four different kinds, the EU falls under the third (Weaver & Buzan's numeric).

The third kind is very different; as it refers to a region as being integrated through institutions rather than a single power. The EU provides an excellent example of this institutional integration. (Weaver & Buzan 2002:54). Because of this institutional integration there is no span deriving from the security dilemma. Nations self-interests are in these integrations emphasized to a much smaller extent. States within this type of RSC work for a common good. Hence their interests are correlated through a European identity, this European identity is being coordinated by the EU and this ultimately leads to a unified RSC where state to state relations are based on cooperation, and ultimately unification.

This very special kind of RSC substantiates a sui generis approach to the European Union. Weaver and Buzan states that the EU is "hanging halfway between being a region in the form of a highly developed security community, and being a great power in its own right with actor quality at the global level"(2003:55).

4.4 EU-Europe as a RSC

The European Union (in its original form) was founded after the Second World War in an attempt to make sure that nothing of the sort would ever occur again. Even though the association was originally based on pure economical cooperation aiming towards an inner market, which through economical interdependence should cause stability in Europe, the association has moved constantly towards an ever increasingly degree of political integration, which among others aims to secure stability. The security dimension is even more explicitly articulated in the European integration project especially after the Cold War (Buzan & Wæver; 2003, 356). Here stability is bound together with a European common identity. "the idea that European integration is *moving* enables images for the future where the meaning of one's own state and nation is tied in with that of Europe." (Wæver 1997: 1)

Identity through integration is the response to centuries of precarious power balance on the continent. The core concept of European security is the rejection of a European balance of power principle and to crack down on hegemonic ambitions of singular states, the way to do this is as mentioned earlier through integration. This is due to the constructivist element in the social structures determining the international security dynamics. That identity and integration are the European way to securitisation can be described clearly with two scenarios by using the conception of RSC. These scenarios are dealing with post-Cold War Europe. They are

describing the possible structures determining the balance of power and rivalry in Europe without any super-power overlay, i.e. without any intervening or penetrating super power as the USA or the Soviet Union in the European regional security complex. According to the different possible forms of RSCs given in the paragraph about descriptive RSC the European post-Cold War scenarios are as follow:

- 1) Fragmentation: Returning to the old standard RSC of Europe with several numbers of power centres, this means a return to the old dynamics; power balancing, rivalry, and war as a “normal” consequence.
- 2) Integration: Replacing the old RSC by concentrating the power in one centre, i.e. a centred RSC. Differently from other centred RSC is, that the power concentration is through constructed political institutions and not a single dominating state. The single nation states are however far from abolished, and this gives the EU its special characteristics compared with other centred RSCs. (Wæver 1997: 16)

The possibilities of these scenarios are made through an element of social construction. It must be added, that this doesn't neglect a realist perspective to explain this structure. The realist logic of balance of power is contained within this social construction. EU as a joint project based on a joint identity in opposition to the old Europe is an encounter with laws about international relations that traditionally have been regarded as natural laws; it's a rejection of the traditional realistic perspective about power balance and nation-state self-interest. The EU is yet to be analyzed from a constructivist perspective, i.e. that “takes social forms – regional orders, state interests – to be more or less solidly entrenched, but always dependent on the continuation of certain practices and therefore in principle open to change.” (Wæver 1997:2) What is open to changes are the regional structures. We will not be occupied so much with constructivism at this point; we will give it further attention in our second perspective. For now our object of interest will be European integration and identity as a redefinition of the *old* European regional security complex of dynamics of balance of power and rivalry to a new centred RSC constellation.

With a European identity comes an “other”, i.e. identity is only possible in relation to something different. Europe's “other” is fundamentally Europe itself (after the Cold War), that means Europe's own past (Wæver 1997: 4).

Wæver insists on this definition of the “other” but as he mentions himself, it is also argued that the “other” is Russia or Islamic fundamentalists. These alternatives don't seem to be excluding one another (the USA doesn't seem to have any problems having more enemies simultaneously) and therefore it seems adequate to adopt the theory of security, identity and integration in our task of explaining the initiated negotiations about EU membership with Turkey. This implementation needs, however, first to be explained further.

4.5 A new “other”

The conception of identity and an “other” does furthermore apply a conception of recognition⁷. Identity is conceived through a dialectic reflection with something un-identical, i.e. different, or simply an “other”. The one or the other is further more only realized as self-identical through a reciprocal recognition. This recognition can’t come from the past of Europe. A fact that has made certain debaters ask: Does Europe exist? Meaning that existing qua identity needs an external recognizing “other”, an “other” which at the moment is not present. Simply the EU needs to be a real player on the global scene to constitute its own existence (Wæver 1997: 19). This purely academic discussion would probably not have much validity if it weren’t for much similar tendency in the political reality. There’s a new articulated wish of having EU playing an active international role; a shift from EU security being only an intra-regional process to a global or at least interregional (Buzan & Wæver 2003: 373). For some the wish of an active role on the global scene has been motivated by a kind of culture-centrism or euro-nationalism. This is not so much the case anymore as is the case an indignation about the global scene. This feeling is originally born out of the Balkan wars but is today mostly concerned with the upcoming of Islamic fundamentalists – and to some extent the way this problem is tackled by the USA. That means the new primary “other” is the Islamic fundamentalists. The question is then: how does the EU come to play an active role on the global scene?

For many the answer is: through Turkey! We find this tendency also in the statements of German foreign minister Joschka Fischer.

“Since [the attacks of September 11th] it has become ever clearer that European integration also has a strategic dimension.” (Joschka Fischer in *Berliner Zeitung* February 28th 2004)

This quotation strongly points towards an EU identity with an external reference. But how does Turkey make the EU capable of being an international actor?

We should be able to exclude one reason right away. An essential problem for the EU having an influential foreign policy is that the EU has serious problem having a foreign policy at all. This is due to disagreements about how the foreign policy should be. A clear example is the Second Gulf War. And having an additional member state is unlikely to promote a wider agreement simply because of the increased numbers of actors involved. This argument seems implausible.

But having Turkey integrated in the EU may create a more static advancement of the EU foreign policy. Besides it may imply some agreement about how the foreign policy should look in the future. The latter speculation is, however, not the task for this perspective to discuss further. Before we discuss which advances a Turkish membership may apply to the EU foreign policy we should in brief sentences describe Turkey’s position on the international scene today.

Since the collapse of the greatness of the Ottoman Empire about 200 years ago Turkey has been conducting a rather passive foreign policy, what mostly is due to internal reasons. This passivity has changed in recent time. Turkey is however still relatively reluctant in its involvement in the Middle East because of an ambition of being a part of the West which means not being defined as ‘Middle Eastern’ (Buzan & Wæver 2003: 392). This has placed Turkey as a so-called insulator state that means outside any regional security complex. The problem for Turkey is that Turkey itself can’t reject its role as insulator. A change in this position has to come from the outside. Adopting Turkey into the EU would bring Turkey out

⁷ A conception first funded in the philosophical position of German idealism.

of its insulator role and being a key player in the Middle East, and this may give the EU as a whole an increased influence in the Middle East region, or even more. “[Turkey] is a strong and active insulator with ambitions to play a role as a ‘regional’ great power within the loose European super complex formed by EU-Europe and the CIS (and to the extent that it includes also the Middle East: an interregional constellation).” (Buzan & Wæver; 2003, 344)

Another (or simultaneous) possibility is that the joint competences of the EU and Turkey would give the EU (as a whole) the advancements needed to be a substantial actor at the global level.

However plausible these assertions may be they definitely can’t be counted as the whole explanation.

5. The second perspective

The Regional Security Complex Theory as Buzan and Wæver presents it has an explicit constructivist element. We have isolated this element apart from the rest of their theoretical framework in the first perspective but we will now present it in this perspective due to various reasons.

First of all the first perspective was dedicated a realistic theoretical discussion, i.e. we have talked about how patterns of dynamics on a inter-state level function and not about how these patterns are constituted, changed, etc. This is due to a deeper theoretical reason, which is to develop a second theoretical perspective from the same basic social ontology, but which will lead to a different descriptive output.

This basic ontology contains two elements. The first one is already fully described as the security interdependence emerging in a cluster of states forming a region. Territory is a determiner of security interdependence within which certain dynamics of power necessarily exist (Wæver 1997: 1, 17). This element doesn't play any active role in this second perspective but is still accepted. If not already clearly stated this perspective doesn't reject any existential parts of our assumptions, or parts of our first perspective, in contrary, it offers a supplementary or even a complementary theory. The second element is the constructivist assertion that the necessary existence of dynamics of power doesn't mean that they are naturally determined. The dynamics are determined by social constructions or forms, and furthermore "social forms – regional orders, state interests – [are] more or less solidly entrenched, but always dependent on the continuation of certain practices and therefore in principle open to change." (Wæver 1997: 2) In short terms this means that the regional dynamics follows a nomothetic structure, but this structure itself, is however in opposition to the view of the traditional realistic position, open to changes through social processes.

This is the starting point in the second perspective. The task now is to develop it further, and we will do this by mixing it with a theory of Lykke-Friis about agenda-setting within the EU. This aims to develop a theory about the impact of the pre-negotiation processes in the EU decision processes. This theory is what will constitute this second perspective. The central conceptions of this perspective will be pre-negotiation phase, identity, and narratives.

5.1 Pre-negotiation phase theory vs. liberal intergovernmentalism

The pre-negotiation phase theory by Lykke-Friis that we are applying in this perspective is essentially formulated as a critique of the explanations about the decision-making in the EU delivered by the liberal intergovernmentalist perspective by Andrew Moravcsik.

This critique is directly aimed at Moravcsik but is like the RSCT highly motivated by a general theoretical crisis. The EU eastern enlargement actualizes or constituted this crisis. The fact that the EU decided to initiate membership negotiations with nearly all eastern candidates simultaneous came totally unpredicted for most observers.

In short according to liberal intergovernmentalism (LI) the following characteristics exist in connection with a grand negotiation process in the EU: each state acts as a unitary actor and in line with this the states pursue their own interests, i.e. they act egoistic. Also according to LI states are goal rationalists. Being rational acquires an adequate⁸ account of information available, which in this case means that preferences are given and articulated before the negotiation starts, and these preferences are unaffected by outside norms or other influences, and they are not up to changes under the negotiations (Gegout 2003: 4).

If we sum up the critique of Lykke-Friis of Moravcsiks' theory and why it offers an inadequate explanation regarding the eastern enlargement, we should be able to conclude that this decision didn't fulfil the interests of existing unitary member states, and therefore seen from a liberal intergovernmentalist perspective the actors acted irrational and against their own nature. That means if the liberal intergovernmentalism theory asserts that states pursued to fulfil their own interest according to the actual circumstances of the respective bargaining, this doesn't seem to encompass the eastern enlargement decision. On the contrary, according to Lykke-Friis, in this case a few actors were actually able to influence the final outcome of the negotiations.

This empirical fact challenges the main assumptions of Moravcsik's 'grand bargaining' theory: that the following two variables can influence a negotiation outcome: 1) pre-fixed preference of the various member states (actors) and 2) their respective bargaining power (Lykke-Friis 1998: 1). The rejection of pre-fixed preference is what interests us.

Moravcsiks assumption, that interests are something that is given to the member states, totally neglects some essential ontological characteristics about EU, namely that the EU is a complex construction in constant change. This means "Every time a government settles down at a specific negotiation table to delineate its preferences, it will have to keep an eye on all the other past, present and coming negotiation tables – a fact which we assume triggers uncertainty." (Lykke Friis; 1998, 2 orig.) It's therefore impossible for the member states to enter a negotiation process with pre-fixed preferences, although it does exist moments of uncertainty;"governments have great difficulties in narrowing down their concrete preferences before the negotiation game has been launched. EU negotiations do not take place in an environment characterized by almost perfect knowledge, but in environment where uncertainty is the defining factor." (Friis 1998: 2) this is the core of Lykke Friis *pre-negotiation phase theory*, which will be the main theoretical fundament in our second perspective.

Pre-negotiation phase theory in its entire simplicity means that before the actual negotiations commence there is a framing process occurring inside the EU this is called context or agenda setting. This process consists of two elements, partial a simplification through a framing of the respective question, and partial an intentional interpretation within the made framework, that means producing an essence of the case, which enables articulations of preferences within the respective framework. The nature of the case is therefore not *uncovered* but *produced*, - it is an artefact. A basic assumption in this theory is that this "making-possible-through-framing" is not only a possibility itself but a necessity for negotiations at all, or qua the structure of the EU, setting a discourse is the necessary condition for a discussion.

But the framing itself doesn't follow any specific necessity and is therefore open for competing agenda-settings, and further more winner of the agenda-setting phase or the policy-problem framing, has a major influence over the outcome of the negotiation. This is the

⁸ Different definitions can occur.

crossing point of the RSCT of Buzan and Wæver and the Pre-negotiation Phase Theory of Lykke-Friis.

This is due to two circumstances. First, Lykke-Friis's critique of Moravcsik is based on a distinct fundamental assumption; the fact that Moravcsik neglects the pre-negotiation phase is because: "Moravcsik does not acknowledge that problems are not just 'out there', but are in fact socially constructed." (Lykke-Friis 1998: 2)

Secondly, what in the end emerges as the winning policy-problem framing or agenda setting is the one that offers a framing within all member states (actors) can see a joint interest or their own interests encompassed. This is more or less what is to be understood under the conception of a EU identity according to Buzan and Wæver. The identity is what determines interests. "In Europe today, concepts of nation and state have been fused with concepts of Europe. This changes the 'self' of 'self-interest'." (Wæver 1997: 6) That means that the concept of common interests isn't assimilation, i.e. an abolition of the original 'self' but a redefinition of the 'self'. The single national identity is not to be European but Europeanized. This changing of states interests is conditioned of social constructions, which are encompassed in the constructivist assumption.

As the Pre-negotiation Phase Theory seems to be more or less encompassed in the Regional Security Complex Theory what is then the meaning of emphasizing the first? Because it gives us another answer to our question: Why is the EU position towards Turkey changing now?

5.2 The world after 9/11 – the new narrative of Turkey

"I was previously one of those people who were 51% in favor of Turkey's accession and 49% beset by doubts. I have fundamentally changed my position following the attacks of September 11th. Since then it has become ever clearer that European integration also has a strategic dimension." Joschka Fischer in *Berliner Zeitung* February 28th 2004⁹

We have already used this quotation by Joschka Fischer as a starting point for the analysis within the framework of our first perspective. Within the framework of our second perspective we will now analyze it for its rhetoric contents or narrative qualities, or simply as an agenda setting within the pre-negotiation phrase. What we mean with this should be easier to comprehend if we recall the link between integration and identity.

The European integration process is pointed towards something, which is conceptualized as a kind of European identity. This identity is partially real, because of its realization through the integration process, and partially fictive in the form of an idea – or maybe even a utopia. This idea or utopia is in the European project expressed as a narrative, which after the end of the Cold War has been referring to the European history; the European identity as an opposite to its own past. "Increasingly, a dominant narrative is forming around the EU project which defines its larger, historical meaning – and thereby a European identity – through a danger of Europe returning to its past of wars and power balance." (Wæver 1997: 17) This self-reference is certainly not the case when it comes to the Turkish EU membership as a question

⁹ Translation taken from the German embassy in Washington website.

about European integration. This becomes clear from Joschka Fischers definition of “a strategic dimension” a dimension, which is neither pragmatic nor historical (*Berliner Zeitung* February 28th 2004). This negative definition is rather weak but it strongly indicates that the integration project has reached another dimension distinct from that, which was determining the eastern enlargement. And here comes the point: obviously the EU had several objective good reasons (read self-interests) for an eastern enlargement (We have already mentioned that in the paragraph about engaging in this thesis) but never the less it came as a surprise from theoretical perspective, that the enlargement was as extensive as it was. The reason for this according to Lykke-Friis was that the enlargement primarily was a result of a specific foregoing framing and not a rational deliberation about self-interests, through such self-interests most likely have made the enlargement process possible at all. Moravcsik would argue that without any optimistic material outcome in the horizon, no enlargement would be possible.

What made the decision about enlargement possible at the end and determined its final form was the EU post-Cold War narrative - likewise with a Turkish enlargement. What can bring the rather sceptical existing EU member states to an agreement about Turkey is a policy framing from within where every member state can identify their own interests. This policy framing is a narrative referring to the global situation after the terrorist attacks on September 11th. This assertion regards the global situation as a mean for a Turkish membership of the EU, and not Turkey as a mean to deal with the same situation. This is of course only at a rhetorical level, which at the same time in the framing defines Turkey as a mean.

6 Conclusions

Given the different assertions that we have come to, it seems plausible to consider the 9/11 terrorists attacks on the USA and the following change in the way of perceiving security as having a certain impact on the decision about initiating membership negotiations with Turkey. However the words of Moravcsik should be recalled: “Interstate idealism seems never to be as powerfully professed as when it runs parallel to material self-interest.” (Moravcsik & Vachudova; 2003, 50) That means economical interests at least may also play a substantial parallel role. The question then becomes relevant: would Turkey ever have been given a date for initiating membership negotiating if it wasn’t for the Islamic fundamentalists? This contra factual question is of cause impossible to answer due to its nature, but it seems possible that Turkey would if another narrative with Turkey playing a main role could be toll, which all EU politicians and publics could relate them self to.

This conclusion is due to our conviction that the conception about narratives as an important element in the European project seems adequate or to encompass the reality of the processes of the European Union. That means we still accept the position that self-interests do play an important role but they are by themselves not enough and therefore needs to be either supplied with, manipulated by, or articulated by some kind of narrative.

At the end we can in addition conclude without being very detailed that a hybrid of the theories of Wæver & Buzan, Moravcsik & Vachudova, and Lykke-Friis presented in this thesis seems adequate to explain the question about why the EU changes its position toward Turkey “now”.

References

- Buzan, Barry & Wæver, 2003, *Ole, Regions and Powers – The Structure of International Security*, Cambridge Studies in International Relations
- Larrabee, F. Stephen, 12.12.2004, *American Perspectives on Turkey and Turkish-EU Relations*, AICGS Advisor
- Emerson, Michael & Tocci, Nathalie, 17.12.2004, *EU Foreign and Security Policy: Would Turkey be an asset or a liability?*
<http://www.euractiv.com/Article?tcmuri=tcm:29-133548-16&type=Analysis>
- Laciner, Dr. Sedat, 24-12-2004, *Turkey's EU Membership's Possible Impacts on the Middle East*, <http://www.turkishweekly.net/news.php?id=993>
- Bagci, Hüseyin and Kardas, Saban 15.12.04, *Post-September 11 Impact: The Strategic Importance of Turkey Revisited*, <http://www.eusec.org/bagci.htm>
- Bengtsson, Anders at the Turkey desk at the Swedish ministry of foreign affairs, interview conducted on December 6th 2004
- Euractiv.com, 04.11.2004 *EU-turkey relations*
<http://www.euractiv.com/Article?tcmuri=tcm:29-129678-16&type=LinksDossier>
- Lykke-Friis, 1998, 'The End of the Beginning' of Eastern Enlargement – Luxembourg Summit and Agenda-setting, <http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/1998-007a.htm>
- Moravcsik, Andrew & Vachudova, Milada Anna, 2003, *National Interests, State Power, and EU enlargement*, *East European Politics and Societies*, Vol. 17, No. 1, pages 42-57. ISSN 0888-3254
- Wæver, Ole, 1997, *Integration as Security: European international identity and American domestic discipline*, Copenhagen Peace Research Institute
- Sen, Faruk 08.01.2004, *the impact of a Turkish entry in the EU*,
(<http://www.euractiv.com/Article?tcmuri=tcm%3A29-131676-16&type=Analysis>)
- Føllesdal, Finn, Walløe, Lars & Elster, Lars, 1999, *Politikens bog om moderne videnskabsteori*, Politikens Forlag, København
- Gegout, Catherine, 2003, *Liberal Intergovernmentalism and CFSP policy-making*, London School of Economics and Political Science Department of International Relations,
http://www.fornet.info/documents/Gegout_presentation.pdf