

Lund University  
Department of Political Science  
Master's Programme in Global Studies  
Master's Degree (Two Years)

SIMT  
Spring term 2009  
Supervisor: Kristina Jönsson

# Beyond the End of History

A Quantitative Study of the Correlation Between Political  
Globalisation and Democratisation in Developing Countries

Caroline Nilsson

# Abstract

The end of history was announced by Francis Fukuyama as a result of the fall of the Berlin wall and the end of the Cold War. These happenings were seen as evidence of the victory of democracy and capitalism. Democracy has however not been as triumphant as expected and this is especially true for the developing countries. At the same time globalisation has become one of the major phenomena of our time. This study is set out to investigate the link between political globalisation and democratisation in the developing world. The purpose is to put focus on political globalisation on its own, not just as a part of globalisation or as a complementary factor to economic globalisation.

The analytical framework is based upon the theory of Jeffrey Haynes, which states that political globalisation is affected by three sets of factors/actors; state actors, non-state actors and background factors. This study focuses on the state and non-state actors.

The study is a quantitative study and the statistical material comes from the KOF Index of Globalisation and the Global Civil Society Yearbooks, the former is used for the state actor component, the latter for the non-state actor component of political globalisation. The years chosen are 1991, 1992, 1993, 2001, 2002 and 2003. 80 developing countries are included in the analysis, divided into three main categories. The statistical analysis is carried out according to the theory, from a state actor and a non-state actor perspective, which then are combined in a final part.

The results show that there is no correlation between a country's level of democratic development and level of political globalisation. It does, however, show that there is a correlation between the state and non-state actor components, which confirms the theory that they are interconnected.

*Key words:* globalisation, political globalisation, democratisation, developing countries, quantitative study

Words: 17504

*If you are totally illiterate and living on one dollar a day, the benefits of globalization never come to you.*

- Jimmy Carter

I would like to thank my supervisor Kristina Jönsson and Anders Sannerstedt who helped me with the statistical analysis. My thesis has benefited a lot from their suggestions and ideas.

# Table of contents

<b>1</b>	<b>Introduction</b> .....	<b>6</b>
<b>2</b>	<b>Purpose and Questions</b> .....	<b>7</b>
2.1	Thesis Outline.....	8
2.2	Delimitations .....	8
<b>3</b>	<b>Key Concepts Defined</b> .....	<b>10</b>
3.1	Globalisation.....	10
3.2	Political Globalisation .....	11
3.3	Democracy and Democratisation.....	12
3.4	Developing Countries .....	15
<b>4</b>	<b>Previous Studies</b> .....	<b>17</b>
<b>5</b>	<b>Analytical Framework</b> .....	<b>24</b>
<b>6</b>	<b>Method and Materials</b> .....	<b>29</b>
6.1	Method.....	29
6.2	Materials .....	31
6.2.1	Globalisation Indices .....	31
6.2.2	The Centre for the Study of Global Governance – Global Civil Society Yearbooks .....	32
6.2.3	Freedom House – Freedom in the World Ranking.....	33
6.2.4	World Bank Country Classification and Human Development Index .....	34
6.3	The Countries .....	35
6.3.1	Relatively New Democracies .....	35
6.3.2	Countries in Transition .....	36
6.3.3	Countries Where Transition Has Not Begun .....	37
6.4	The Database and SPSS.....	38
<b>7</b>	<b>Result and Analysis</b> .....	<b>39</b>
7.1	State Actors.....	39
7.2	Non-State Actors .....	41
7.3	State Actors and Non-State Actors Combined .....	43
7.4	Discussion on Outcome .....	45
<b>8</b>	<b>Conclusion and Final Note</b> .....	<b>47</b>

<b>Executive Summary .....</b>	<b>50</b>
<b>References .....</b>	<b>53</b>
<b>Appendix .....</b>	<b>56</b>

# Figures

Figure 6.1 Freedom House Numerical Ranking Specified.....	34
Figure 6.2 Countries in the Study Divided into Categories.....	37
Figure 7.1 Scattergram on State Actor and Non-State Actor Component of Political Globalisation.....	44

# Tables

Table 7.1 Political Globalisation Score (State Actor) for the 1990s and 2000s.....	40
--	----

Table 7.2 Average Political Globalisation Score (State Actor) for the 1990s and the 2000s.....	41
--	----

Table 7.3 Range in Number of INGO Secretariats and Memberships According to Category, All Years Combined.....	43
---	----

# 1 Introduction

The end of history. That was what Francis Fukuyama envisioned with the fall of the Berlin wall and the end of the Cold War. It was the end because liberal democracy and the capitalist system had prevailed. The evolution of state systems had finally come to a point where it could go no further. But Fukuyama was wrong. While the capitalist system, in principal, is universally applied, democracy is not. This is especially true in the developing world.

Democracy has not been as triumphant as expected and twenty years on, from Fukuyama's somewhat impetuous presumption, we know that there are plenty of non-democratic countries in the world. However, although the worldwide spread of democracy has failed to appear, much has changed during these past two decades. It is generally argued that we live in a globalised, or at least in a globalising, world, and that this phenomenon of globalisation permeates many aspects of our lives. Consequently, it also affects us in various ways starting from a personal level all the way to state level.

These two concepts, but also the real phenomena; democracy and globalisation, are today important parts of our world. Democracy has at least won a conceptual victory; it is thought of as the best way to govern a state.<sup>1</sup> Even states that are not considered democratic call themselves democracies. While democracy is preached across the globe, we simultaneously have the process of globalisation and it is indeed interesting to study how these two may or may not affect each other. It was not long ago the established view was that democratisation was domestically driven, and external factors had little to do with it. While this has changed, globalisation tends to be viewed mainly as an economic phenomenon, with the political aspect left behind. This thesis is set out to concentrate on that which has seldom been in focus when it comes to democratisation and globalisation; the linkage between political globalisation and democratisation. The intention is to find out if globalisation in the developing world might have an effect on democratisation, not from an economic, but from a political perspective.

---

<sup>1</sup> Johansson Jonas in Engström, Ole – Hydén, Göran (ed.), 2002. *Development and Democracy. What we have learned and how?*, p.24, London: Routledge  
Chatterjee, Deen K (ed.), 2008. *Democracy in a global world*. p.1, Plymouth: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers



## 2 Purpose and Questions

A lot is already known about domestic factors in developing countries and how they may or may not affect democratisation. For a long time the debates about democratisation revolved around the internal state of the countries and external factors were neglected. However, with the increased awareness of the forces of globalisation questions about the impact of globalisation on democratisation have arisen, at the same time as the term ‘external actors’ has undergone a significant change. It was once used only to refer to states but is now a term for a variety of state and non-state actors. It is also understood that the flows of external influences are diffuse and numerous and democratisation can happen in many different ways.<sup>2</sup> Together these changes have contributed to new ways of looking at democratisation but it still remains unclear how globalisation affects it. Although there are some studies that have tried to investigate the linkage they have been focused on globalisation at large, including economic and political globalisation and occasionally also cultural globalisation. In this study globalisation is narrowed down to just one of its components, political globalisation, in order to study the particular impact of political globalisation on democratisation. In doing so, it will be possible to find out if political globalisation has an important part in democratisation or if it is the other components of globalisation that are of greater interest in trying to determine the linkage between globalisation and democratisation.

The purpose of this thesis is to put focus on the *political* aspect of globalisation and its impact on democratisation. The political aspect is often, if not neglected, at least seen as secondary, to economic globalisation, which is presented as an obvious important factor whereas the political is placed in the background or as a complementary factor. The same was true for external factors for a very long time until, quite recently, it was realised that the external could be just as important as the internal. There is no way to know just how important, or unimportant for that matter, the political aspect of globalisation is until it has been studied on its own, not just lumped together with economic globalisation. Until then, one cannot reduce political globalisation to a negligible or insignificant factor.

This purpose gives rise to the following question:

● *Can a correlation between political globalisation and democratisation in developing countries be observed; if yes, what does this correlation show?*

---

<sup>2</sup> Grugel, Jean (ed.) 1999. *Democracy without borders. Transnationalization and conditionality in new democracies*. p.19-20,159-160 London: Routledge

## 2.1 Thesis Outline

The thesis will begin with three sections that all are theoretical linked together. The key concepts will be defined in section 3, where the emphasis is on the key concepts themselves and literature related to them. Section 4 will present previous studies of importance for the study. Here the emphasis is on the literature in large, selected from different fields of study, all with significance for this study, whether it is the outcome, method contributions or interesting observations. Section 5 will present the analytical frame work, which is entirely focused on the theory that will make up the foundation for the quantitative study. This section is followed by an extensive section 6 on methods and materials. Its length is motivated by the fact that much of the background on material is necessary since the statistical analysis itself will be carried out in databases, not available to the readers. Section 7 is the part where the result and analysis is presented, which is followed by section 8, the conclusion and final note.

## 2.2 Delimitations

Because globalisation and democratisation both are such big topics they must by necessity be delimited. This study does not deal with development in developing countries, merely how political globalisation can affect, or in fact, does affect democratisation in these countries. Although democracy is thought to have positive effects on development that is a whole other study. Whether the outcome of this study shows that globalisation promotes democracy or that it has a negative impact on democratisation, it would be of interest to further investigate the linkage between democratisation, globalisation and development. However, this is something that cannot be done here. It is very important to keep in mind that this thesis is only focusing on *political* globalisation and does not make any claims that political globalisation is the same as globalisation as a whole. It is not concerned with economic nor cultural globalisation for that would demand a much different approach to the topic.

Another delimitation that has been necessary is that domestic factors are not in the centre of attention. This does not mean that they are seen as irrelevant or only dependent on external factors. However, the aim is not to account for the processes within the countries where globalisation is affecting democratisation but to see *if* the external factors and actors in fact have effects on the democratic development. It is important to remember that also a result that shows that there is no connection is of interest. Another delimitation that has been made is that background factors have been excluded from the analysis. This is partly because the theory itself perceives the background factors as secondary but also because background factors such a global or regional economic depression (which is argued to have a negative impact on democratisation) would either have a similar

effect on the developing world (in case of global economic depression) which would mean that it would not show in the analysis or it would have a pronounced effect on one area (in case of regional economic depression) in which case it would be visible in the statistical material anyway without actually including background factors. In addition, background factors can not be included in a statistical comparison like this one, since it demands thorough studies of regional and global happenings that are not relevant for the study of the impact of political globalisation on democratisation in developing countries.

More practical delimitations that have been necessary are the exclusion of some countries. Already from the start, 14 micro-island-states were excluded. After confirming material available on the countries in the KOF Index of globalisation another nine countries had to be removed from the studied. The Global Civil Society Yearbooks included all countries remaining in the study. This means that there are in total 80 countries in the study.

## 3 Key Concepts Defined

None of the key concepts in this study are easily defined. In fact, they are constantly defined and redefined, contested and discussed. Defining key concepts are always important, but it is crucial when dealing with notions that do not have a fixed meaning and can be understood differently from person to person. The following definitions are not in any way superior to other or are the ones to hold the true meaning of the concept. This is merely an elaboration of how they are understood in *this* study.

### 3.1 Globalisation

Globalisation as a concept is used quite arbitrarily to denote most everything and anything. It is a word in fashion which makes it difficult to pin down. The definitions vary a lot depending on where the focus lies. Globalisation incorporates a variety of different processes which indeed are not easy to separate from one another. Studies concerned with economic globalisation are more likely to define globalisation in economic terms, while researchers focusing on cultural globalisation perceive the concept in other terms. It is thus often necessary to define globalisation from the perspective of the study. Globalisation in this thesis is narrowed down to political globalisation and it is the definition of political globalisation that is of greater importance. It is however useful to have a more general definition of globalisation as a starting point. A good first definition of globalisation is made by Feketekuty who defines it as

[...] a phenomenon involving the integration of economies, cultures, governmental policies and political movements around the world.<sup>3</sup>

Moreover, many also feel the need to make a distinction between a globalising world as opposed to a globalised world. The latter is rather an outcome of the former, which is a process, whereas globalised, indicates the end of such a process.<sup>4</sup> Globalisation in this thesis will be understood as a process and not as a fixed occurrence. It is also important to separate the definitions of globalisation from definitions of globalisation outcomes, as many definitions tend to point to

---

<sup>3</sup> Feketekuty, Geza. 2007. *Globalization – Why all the fuss?*  
[www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/1518186/Globalization-Why-All-the-Fuss](http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/1518186/Globalization-Why-All-the-Fuss)

<sup>4</sup> Dicken, Peter, 2007. *Global shift. Mapping the changing contours of the world economy*. p.8, London: SAGE Publications

the outcomes of globalisation rather than globalisation itself. This is the case with the definition from the organisation Global Policy Forum that states that

Globalization creates new markets and wealth, even as it causes widespread suffering, disorder and unrest. It is both a source of repression and a catalyst for global movement of social justice and emancipation.<sup>5</sup>

Although the definition is far from irrelevant for this thesis, it is in fact irrelevant as a definition of globalisation because it does not explain what the processes are, merely their outcomes. This could be one reason why globalisation is such a difficult notion to define; it is a process and an outcome at the same time. However, it is not possible to understand the outcomes if we do not understand the processes and the processes are complicated as it is, without involving the outcomes. Jessop concludes

Globalisation is a [...] supercomplex series of multicentric, multiscalar, multitemporal, multiform and multicausal processes.<sup>6</sup>

It is, in other words, a very intricate work to try to define globalisation and this is why the focus will be on the definition of *political* globalisation. This definition is more relevant for the thesis than the definition of globalisation, since it will exclude economic and cultural processes which both are a part of globalisation as a whole, but not the process of political globalisation.

## 3.2 Political Globalisation

Political globalisation is understood partly as what Mittelman designate as an “emerging worldwide preference for democracy”<sup>7</sup> That might, however, be at the same time, a too wide and too narrow definition, although it could be seen, at least, as a starting point. Axel Dreher, responsible for the KOF Index of Globalisation states that political globalisation is characterised by a diffusion of government policies whereas Global Policy Forum asserts that political activity increasingly takes place at a global level.<sup>8</sup>

Their definition of political globalisation is as follows

Under globalization, politics take place above the state through political integration schemes such as the European Union and through intergovernmental organizations such as International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization. Political activity can also

---

<sup>5</sup> Global Policy Forum: [www.globalpolicy.org/globaliz/index/htm](http://www.globalpolicy.org/globaliz/index/htm)

<sup>6</sup> Jessop in Dicken (2007) p.8

<sup>7</sup> Mittelman quoted in Haynes Jeffrey in McGrew Anthony – Poku Nana K. (ed.), 2007. *Globalization, development and human security*. p.87, Cambridge: Polity Press

<sup>8</sup> Dreher Axel, 2006. “Does globalisation affect growth? Evidence from a new index of globalisation”, *Applied Economics*, vol.38 nr.10:1091-1110, from <http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/cite/> p.4

Global Policy Forum: [www.globalpolicy.org/globaliz/politics/index.htm](http://www.globalpolicy.org/globaliz/politics/index.htm)

transcend national borders through global movements and NGOs. Civil society organizations act globally by forming alliances with organizations in other countries, using global communications systems, and lobbying international organizations and other actors directly, instead of working through their national governments.<sup>9</sup>

The fact that this definition includes organisations that first and foremost are economic organisations point to something important when it comes to political globalisation; where political globalisation ends and economic globalisation starts is not always a clear-cut situation. Nonetheless, these organisations are indeed political organisations as well as economic organisations and they take on the form of intergovernmental organisations, pursuing more than purely economic aims, which is why they also are a part of political globalisation. In reality there is no easy way to completely separate economic and political globalisation, but in general, economic globalisation is more concerned with variables such as economic flows, foreign direct investments, spread of financial markets and spatial reorganisation of production, than with intergovernmental organisations.<sup>10</sup> It is thus not unreasonable to view organisations such as the World Bank and the IMF as a part of political globalisation, perhaps more so than as a part of economic globalisation.

It is the definition by Global Policy Forum combined with the understanding that democracy is considered and promoted as the best regime in the world that will be used in the study to denote political globalisation. The ideational victory of democracy and the real increase in intergovernmental organisations, NGOs and cross-border civil society are thus what constitute political globalisation. Unlike the vague definitions by Dreher and Mittelman, it is an elaborate definition that includes both intergovernmental organisations (which would incorporate Dreher's definition of diffusion of government policies) and nongovernmental organisations, both state actors and non-state actors. This is important for the study as the theoretical framework (see below) points to the importance of both state and non-state actors for political globalisation.

### 3.3 Democracy and Democratisation

In a very simplistic way one could conclude that democratisation is the process and democracy the end of the process. While this certainly is true, it does not tell us what these two concepts stand for. This study focuses on democratisation; however, it is also important to know how its end result – democracy – is understood. Democratisation is a less intricate concept because, unlike democracy which describes a condition, democratisation is the process. This makes the

---

<sup>9</sup> Global Policy Forum: [www.globalpolicy.org/globaliz/politics/index.htm](http://www.globalpolicy.org/globaliz/politics/index.htm)

<sup>10</sup> <http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch>

Haynes in McGrew and Poku (2007) p.86

Johansson in Elgström and Hydén (2002) p.36

concept less contentious. At the very basis, it is used only to describe the transition from an authoritarian rule toward a more democratic one and the development of the institutions necessary for such a democratic regime.<sup>11</sup> It does not necessarily go into what the process would or should lead to. Since the process of democratisation will be understood as the implementations of settings and institutions necessary for democracy it is democracy that needs to be defined. The definition of democratisation is thus partly dependent on the definition of democracy. In other words, if democracy is only understood as universal suffrage, the introduction of such would indicate a democratisation. Although it would still remain an indicator of democratisation in a more complex definition of democracy, it is certainly not enough. In the former case the introduction of election processes would suggest not only that democratisation takes place but also that the end result, democracy, has been reached. In the latter case, democratisation is an ongoing, but not finished process. Because of this the focus in this part will be on democracy and what the concept means in this study.

Trying to define democracy is difficult but as a starting point one could argue that it is only a term used to refer to 'rule by the people', but the debate about democracy goes back to ancient Greece and the meaning of the word has indeed evolved and transformed with time.<sup>12</sup> The concept of democracy can be understood minimally as in the case with Jeffrey Haynes who concludes that democracy

[...] involves the holding of relatively free and fair elections, following which a victorious party or parties take power.<sup>13</sup>

Democracy is here defined as the right to vote in political elections and that these will determine who runs the country. However, this definition is problematic in various ways. As countries in order to gain international democratic legitimacy may hold elections only with the aim to prove its democratic rule, democracy becomes limited to the process of elections alone, which means that democracy remains superficial. In many cases democracy is only rhetorically achieved. Larry Diamond calls these "hollow democracies". They are democracies with political violence, human right violations, corruption and judicial inefficiency, to mention a few characteristics.<sup>14</sup> It is thus very dangerous to equal democracy with elections because it does not tell us anything about civil rights and only very little about political rights. This is why the minimal definition of democracy will not be used in this study.

Robert Pinkney argues that democracy as a concept is very elusive, something many with him would agree on. Lise Storm concludes

Liberal democracy, delegative democracy, industrial democracy, western democracy, Islamic democracy, semi-democracy, façade democracy, and so

---

<sup>11</sup> Sørensen, Georg, 1993. *Democracy and democratization*. p.14, Oxford: Westview Press

<sup>12</sup> Sørensen (1993) p.3-9

<sup>13</sup> Haynes in McGrew and Poku (2007) p.83

<sup>14</sup> Diamond, Larry, 1999. *Developing democracy. Toward consolidation*. p.49, 65, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press

Haynes in McGrew and Poku (2007) p.88

the list goes on. [...] With hundreds of different definitions of democracy in use today, it has become almost impossible to gauge what is meant by the term[...]<sup>15</sup>

Pinkney makes an attempt to present a few of these democratic concepts, based on the studies by Dodd and Sklar, ranging from radical democracy and liberal democracy to socialist democracy and consociational democracy. Pinkney does however fail to define democracy on its own and what he does is solely a comparison between the different concepts. It thus remains unclear what democracy compared to non-democracy stands for.<sup>16</sup>

Overall, there seems to be an unwillingness to define what democracy means. Whether this depends on the complexity of the term or something else remains unsaid. However, someone who has created an elaborate definition of democracy is Robert Dahl and it is his definition that will be used here. Dahl's approach to democracy is quite different from that of Haynes. Although he too states conditions for what is minimally necessary for a country to be called democratic, these conditions are much more extensive.

Firstly, Robert Dahl makes a difference between democracy and what he calls polyarchy. Polyarchy is, in fact, a term to describe democratic countries. However, Dahl has chosen not to call these democracies but polyarchies, in order to make a distinction between, the existing democratic states and what democracy means in theory. He argues that there has never been a perfect democracy, where all its citizens have had, more or less, the same political resources and where the government is completely responsible to all citizens. This discrepancy between democracy in theory and in practice is thus marked by Dahl by the usage of the word polyarchy instead of democracy.<sup>17</sup>

In his book *Democracy and its critics* Dahl establishes seven different institutions necessary for a country to be considered a democracy.<sup>18</sup> The author concludes

[...]polyarchy is a political order distinguished by the presence of seven institutions, *all of which must exist* for a government to be classified as a polyarchy.<sup>19</sup>

The first of the seven institutions is *elected officials*, which means that the people have control over government decisions about policy by electing their officials. These officials should be elected in recurring *free and fair elections*. The third institution is *inclusive suffrage*, meaning that practically all adults have the right to vote in the election. As an extension of this right, the fourth institution, *right to run to office*, gives the right to all adults to run for elective offices in the government. However, the age limit might be higher than for the suffrage. The

---

<sup>15</sup> Storm, Lise, 2008. "An elemental definition of democracy and its advantages for comparing political regime types". p.215, *Democratization*, vol.15, no.2

<sup>16</sup> Pinkney, Robert, 1993. *Democracy in the third world*. p.5-7, Buckingham: Open University Press

<sup>17</sup> Diamond (1999) p.18

<sup>18</sup> Dahl, Robert A, 1989. *Democracy and its critics*. p.221, New Haven: Yale University Press

<sup>19</sup> Dahl (1989) p.221 [emphasis added]



last three institutions are linked to the civil society; *freedom of expression* is the fifth institution necessary for a democracy and simply means that citizens have the right to express themselves, including criticising the government, the regime, the officials, the socioeconomic order and the prevailing ideology, without danger of punishment; *alternative information* means that the citizens must have the right to seek out alternative sources of information and that these should exist in the first place and be protected by law. Finally, the seventh institution should ensure *associational autonomy*, so that citizens have the right to form independent associations or organisation, including political parties.<sup>20</sup>

These seven institutions are thus the preconditions for democracy according to Dahl. The reason why this definition has been chosen is not only the fact that it includes both political and civil rights but also because this definition corresponds to the operationalisation of the concept (see Method and Materials). As a result, democratisation in this study is defined as the process in which these institutions are introduced and established.

### 3.4 Developing Countries

Many would argue that it is not fruitful to lump all countries into one single definition since the variations among the developing countries themselves are very high. However, they do all exhibit some very similar characteristics, which makes it possible to speak of developing countries. These characteristics do not only consist of material indicators such as low per capita income, but also low levels of literacy, low life expectancy, low enrolment rates in school, and high infant mortality. In addition, the countries have often been under colonial rule as well.<sup>21</sup>

Through the years there have been many different terms to denote the same thing; the Third World, underdeveloped countries, emergent countries and developing countries to mention a few. Even though they stand for the same thing some terms are more problematic than other. The term Third World is a remnant of the Cold War and was originally used to refer to poor countries whose political system had not been transformed by membership of the communist bloc.<sup>22</sup> The term underdeveloped does not only indicate a static condition but also that the countries are inferior to other, developed, countries. For this study the term developing countries will be applied. One of the reasons is that the concept suggests an ongoing process, they are developing. They are not locked in a fixed state of development issues. Even though developing countries might not be a great term to denote what it is all about it remains one of the best. The developing countries in this study will be selected partly on economic grounds, partly on social grounds (see Method and Materials) which means that purely economic or

---

<sup>20</sup> Dahl (1989) p.221

<sup>21</sup> Pinkney (1993) p.2

<sup>22</sup> *ibid.* p.1

social definitions of developing countries are avoided. In the end, notions like ‘the Third World’, ‘underdeveloped countries’ and ‘developing countries’ are often used interchangeably, referring to the same thing. With a lack of other, better terms these are the ones at hand. Choosing a definition for developing countries is thus more about choosing the terms than choosing the meaning of it.

## 4 Previous Studies

There is an array of literature on democratisation, developing countries and globalisation as well as various combinations of these, although the one on globalisation is yet to be as voluminous as the other two. It is thus not easy to know where to start when the supply of literature is more than enough for a thesis on its own. This part will present a number of previous studies, mainly the ones that are the most prominent within the field and for the study. Certainly, it does not provide a full overview of the literature available. It is merely a way to place this thesis within the research already carried out.

Starting with the literature on democracy, a quantitative study that deserves to be mentioned is *Democracy and development* by Axel Hadenius. The study goes back to 1988 which makes it slightly outdated. It is, however, interesting to note how the level of democracy in developing countries was almost exclusively explained by domestic factors. Hadenius uses a number of theories as a starting point and after creating an index of democracy of his own, the theories and index are applied to 132 countries in order to explain and evaluate the level of democracy in developing countries.<sup>23</sup> Hadenius divides the theories into three categories; socioeconomic, demographic and cultural, and institutional and the index is used for empirical examination of the theories. An interesting conclusion is that differences in socio-economic development in developing countries are not inconsiderable but “far from crucial for democracy”.<sup>24</sup> That would mean that the level of democracy is not dependent on the level of development to any greater extent, which would also indicate that democratisation is not merely a result of increased development. This is a very important point as socio-economic development often is portrayed as the most central domestic factor for democratisation.

After looking into the following as possible explanations of level of democracy: economic development (GNP/capita, degree of industrialisation and urbanisation), social development (literacy, infant mortality, calorie consumption and school enrolment), trade dependency, distribution of income and poverty, fragmentation (ethnic, linguistic and religious), religion, country size, colonial background (including duration of colonial period), size of the public sector and the role of military, Hadenius concludes that the variables that proved to be significant could only explain about 60 percent of the variation of level of democracy.<sup>25</sup> Assuming that the study does reflect the reality correctly, this would

---

<sup>23</sup> Hadenius, Axel, 1992. *Democracy and development*. p.36, 39-42, 51-28, 75, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

<sup>24</sup> Hadenius (1992) p.147

<sup>25</sup> *ibid.* p.77, 85-88, 95-96, 98, 102, 112-115, 118, 122, 128, 133-134, 137-138, 142, 146

indicate there are many other variables at play than those investigated. One possibility is that these could be constituted by external factors and are to be found in an international context. In other words in 1988, domestic factors could only account for a little more than half of the variation. This could mean that 1) external factors may have an almost equal importance and 2) the importance of external factors is likely higher now than twenty years ago. This is an important observation as this study concentrates on the external factors of democratisation.

Tatu Vanhanen's *Prospects of democracy. A study of 172 countries* is another quantitative study. Vanhanen states that he agrees with those who assume that there are many different factors that affect the chances of establishing and maintaining democracy. He does, however, believe that there is one common underlying factor in the process of democratisation. Vanhanen, inspired by Darwinian theories, calls it "an evolutionary theory of democratisation".<sup>26</sup> Because human nature is similar in all parts of the world, Vanhanen believes it is reasonable to expect that similar factors have been related to the emergence and failures of democracy everywhere in the world. Vanhanen's hypothesis is that the distribution of power relations is crucial and in order to test this, he constructs both an index of democratisation and an index of power resources. The level of democracy is then compared to the degree of resource distribution.<sup>27</sup> Vanhanen concludes that there is indeed one regular and dominant casual factor; the relative distribution of power resources. About 60-65 percent of the variation in the degree of democracy can be explained by the degree of resource distribution and according to himself, his theory is superior to theories of democratisation that concentrate on economic development or physical quality of life. Vanhanen can, unlike those theories, explain why some wealthy countries have remained non-democratic, while other poor countries are democracies. It is all in the distribution of power resources. Like Hadenius, he believes that democracy is not something that is limited to only wealthier, more developed countries.<sup>28</sup>

The main reason why this study is of interest is the focus on distribution of power resources and how changes in this distribution could influence the possibilities of democracy. When taking international nongovernmental organisations and other external non-state actors into account combined with the time and space compression which follows a more globalised world, one could argue that the distribution of power resources is not only limited to a domestic sphere. The possibility to affect and influence could go beyond borders. This is, however, something Vanhanen overlooks.

When discussing democracy and democratisation it is inevitable to mention Samuel Huntington and his *The Third Wave. Democratization in the late twentieth century*. His starting point is that democratisation has happened in three waves and the title, the third wave, refers to the wave of democratisation that begun in

---

<sup>26</sup> Vanhanen, Tatu, 1997. *Prospects of democracy. A study of 172 countries*. p.21-22, London: Routledge

<sup>27</sup> Vanhanen (1997) p.66, 155

<sup>28</sup> *ibid.* p.155-156

1974. In his theory on waves of democratisation, the first two waves were also followed by reverse waves, which again reduced the number of democracies.<sup>29</sup>

The first wave of democratisation that began in 1828 lasted until 1926. During this period, Huntington argues that the USA and New Zealand was democratised along with the majority of the European countries. A few countries in Latin America were also affected. However, in Asia, only Japan was democratised and Africa remained unaffected by this first wave of democratisation.<sup>30</sup>

The first reverse wave started with the fascist rule in Italy, the communist rule in Soviet and the Nazi rule in Germany. It lasted between 1922 and 1942. With the second wave of democratisation (1943-1963) a second reverse wave followed. Before that, West Germany, Turkey and Brazil had been democratised, as well as Lebanon and Israel in the Middle East and Nigeria in Africa. However, a new trend of authoritarian regimes replaced the wave of democratisation in the end of the 1950s. Military rule dominated South America and Asia and in Africa, all independent countries but Botswana turned into authoritarian regimes.<sup>31</sup> The last wave of democratisation then started in 1974, and this is the focus of the book. During the following 15 years democratic regimes replaced authoritarian in thirty countries, and in countries where democratisation did not take place there was still some liberalisation. Huntington calls this wave a global wave of democratisation.<sup>32</sup>

Huntington asks himself why these particular countries and not others were democratised in this time period. He concludes that previous experience of democracy is favourable, even if failed at the time, but overall no single factor is sufficient in explaining the development of democracy, nor is anyone in particular necessary for democratisation.<sup>33</sup>

In *Consolidating the third wave democracies* Yu-han Chu, Fu Hu and Chung-in Moon discuss the international context in which all countries are democratised and their starting point is where Huntington left his study. They argue that the analysis of external influences is an indispensable part of democratisation studies and that it is not reasonable to always view external factors as secondary or of subordinated importance.<sup>34</sup> The most recent transitions to democracy have benefited from a supportive global economic and ideological environment, which, according to the authors, did not exist in the first and second wave of democratisation. Like many others they argue that democracy has triumphed as “the predominant mode of legitimisation in the international ideological community”.<sup>35</sup>

---

<sup>29</sup> Huntington, Samuel P, 1993. *The third wave. Democratization in the late twentieth century*. p. xiv, Norman: University of Oklahoma Press

<sup>30</sup> Huntington (1993) p.16-17

<sup>31</sup> *ibid.* p.16-21

<sup>32</sup> *ibid.* p.25, 41

<sup>33</sup> *ibid.* p.270-275

Vanhanen (1997) p.16-17

<sup>34</sup> Chu et al in Diamond et al (1997) p.267

<sup>35</sup> *ibid.* p.267

Their study focuses on South Korea and Taiwan and although it is very specific they make some interesting points relevant for this study that are worth mentioning. They assert that various transnational actors have played an important role assisting the democratic opening of both South Korea and Taiwan. Democratic forces in South Korea formed diverse transnational networks with international nongovernmental organisations and the church-related groups were the most active. This is also true in Taiwan where material support was given to political dissidents by religious groups.<sup>36</sup> This is an interesting observation and it points to something very important; it is not only the organisations with pronounced democracy promoting aims that are working for democratisation. In other words, a study that focus on non-state actors and democratisation are very limited if it only studies the impact of democracy promoting nongovernmental organisations and actors, since it disregards the fact that other sorts of NGOs may have, and in the case of Taiwan and South Korea in fact did have, an effect on democratisation.

The supply of literature dealing with globalisation and more specifically political globalisation linked with developing countries is, if not scarce, certainly not as frequent as the studies on developing countries and democratisation. When dealing with developing countries and globalisation it is often *economic* globalisation that is in focus. It is remarkable to note how much emphasise is put on globalisation understood as economic globalisation but very little on political globalisation and its impact on democratisation.

Jan Aart Scholte makes some interesting points in the chapter *Globalization and (Un)Democracy* in his book *Globalization*. Although Scholte first and foremost are concerned with the democratisation of globalisation, that is, how to make the processes of globalisation more democratic, he occasionally also focus on the possibility of globalisation to promote democratisation. When it comes to political globalisation he concludes that various connections can be drawn between global relations and the spread of democracy since the 1980s. He argues that human rights campaigns and other transnational civil society associations were involved in pushing for the end of authoritarian regimes, in Central and Eastern Europe as well as in Latin America.<sup>37</sup> There is thus, at least to a certain extent, empirical evidence that civil society organisations can make a difference for democracy.

In addition, Scholte points to the fact that many supranational agencies have supplied different forms of democracy support, anything from EU programmes, UN election monitoring, to 'good governance'<sup>38</sup> promotion by international financial institutions.<sup>39</sup> On the other hand, Scholte remains cautious when it

---

<sup>36</sup> Chu et al in Diamond et al (1997) p.267

<sup>37</sup> Scholte, Jan Aart, 2005. *Globalization – a critical introduction*. p.352, New York: Palgrave Macmillan

<sup>38</sup> 'Good governance' is a term that was introduced in the early 1990s and later adopted by the World Bank as a lending requirement in 1992. At first, the term was used to refer to structural adjustments corresponding to neo-liberalist views on the role of the state. Recently 'good governance' has come to signify state capacity and policy execution. Dormant in the term is also the liberal democratic norms. For more on governance and 'good governance' see Bevir, Mark, 2009. *Key concepts in governance*. p.92-94 London: SAGE Publications

<sup>39</sup> Scholte (2005) p.352

comes to the direct impact of globalisation on democracy. He argues that although globalisation has been a force behind the contemporary wave of democratisation, it has certainly not been the sole influence. Instead it is more likely that global forces have only furthered democratisation where the country from the start has been receptive of these forces.<sup>40</sup>

Jonas Johansson has studied the correlation between globalisation and democratisation. His focus is on both political and economic globalisation, which are brought together in an index. In *Globalisation and democracy – an overlooked connection* Johansson aims at finding out if globalisation makes a systematic difference, and if so, whether it promotes or hinders democracy. However, he points out that the countries studied should not be countries that are already mature democracies. In other words, there is no purpose in studying countries that are consolidated democracies as he assumes that globalisation is not a force that can change the political situation in already solid democratic countries.<sup>41</sup>

Using Freedom House as a source Johansson concludes that “democratisation of domestic politics worldwide is a globalisation process in itself.”<sup>42</sup>

An index of globalisation is constructed based on five indicators; the number of intergovernmental organisations to which a country belongs; the number of international conventions ratified by a country; number of nongovernmental organisations; share of trade in a country’s economy and finally; the level of inflow of foreign direct investment.<sup>43</sup>

With the constructed globalisation index Johansson analyses 124 countries. The findings show that the degree of globalisation has an “unambiguous significance for the degree of democracy.”<sup>44</sup> This is however only true for countries at a relatively high level of socio-economic development (high HDI ranking). The second conclusion is that the degree of globalisation and development are interacting and strengthen their effects on democracy. This means that high level of globalisation combined with high level of development often occurs in countries with high level of democracy.<sup>45</sup> The casual links, however, remain unclear. The weakness with the study is that it does not acknowledge that political globalisation and economic globalisation require quite different preconditions. While economic globalisation often demands openness, high level of transparency, low level of corruption, protected ownership rights and so forth (which often comes with higher level of democracy and socio-economic development), political globalisation does not. Civil society organisations are on the contrary often more active in countries with greater problems, and the level of development does not dictate the possibility of political activity on a global level unlike global economic activity, which indeed is closely linked to development level. As a final note, an interesting remark made by Johansson is that the

---

<sup>40</sup> Scholte (2005) p.352

<sup>41</sup> Johansson in Engström and Hydén (2002) p.23-24

<sup>42</sup> *ibid.* p.29

<sup>43</sup> *ibid.* p.34-37

<sup>44</sup> *ibid.* p.41

<sup>45</sup> *ibid.* p. 41-43

numerical increase and geographical spread of liberal democratic norms can be seen as a global process of *diffusion*. In other words, the diffusion of democracy can be seen as a part of (political) globalisation.<sup>46</sup> This brings us to the literature on democratic diffusion<sup>47</sup> or democracy promotion, which in itself is a large field of study, which is why only one study will be presented here.

*Democracy from the outside-in?* by Daniel Silander focuses on democracy promotion and democratisation in postcommunist Europe, where democracy promotion is understood as “an active prodemocratic pressure towards domestic actors”.<sup>48</sup> The starting point is that there are actors that may promote the democracy norm and that these may use different methods and channel towards domestic actors which may create relations and have an impact on domestic actors.<sup>49</sup> Silander distinguishes four different actors; the *global actor*, which is focused on global issues. Examples given are the UN and the World Bank; the *international actor* which refers to the interaction of states beyond borders. These are often regionally rooted, like EU and NATO; the *state actor* which simply refers to the state and finally; the *sub-state actor* which in this case refers to the transnational actor that operates cross borders and consists of anything from movements and companies to local authorities. According to Silander this link could be called a global society-to-society relation.<sup>50</sup> Three methods for democracy promotion are then presented; political, economic and military methods, followed by the channels which refers to the way in which democracy promotion is channelled into the target state, either top-down or bottom-up or possibly both. The top-down channel is used when democracy promotion is directed toward the regime with its institutions and political elite. This is the prevalent approach for international democracy promotion. However, there could also be a simultaneous bottom-up democracy promotion taking place or if the top-down approach fails this could be an alternative solution. The bottom-up channel is democracy promotion directed towards the society and the population, that is, the civil society.<sup>51</sup> Democratisation from the below involves targeting organisations and movements to become prodemocratic. Silander concludes

If there is space for societal activities beyond state control and regulation that are prodemocratic in nature, democracy promotion through bottom-up may very well lead to democratization.<sup>52</sup>

This thesis includes both the top-down and the bottom-up channels, which in the analytical framework are called state and non-state actors.

---

<sup>46</sup> Johansson in Elgström and Hydén (2002) p.29

<sup>47</sup> Democracy diffusion is used when referring to the spontaneous spread of democratic ideas, whereas democracy promotion refers to active prodemocratic pressure, thus not spontaneous. See Silander (2005) p.83, 192

<sup>48</sup> Silander, Daniel, 2005. *Democracy from the outside-in? The conceptualisation and significance of democracy promotion*. p.83, Gothenburg: Intellecta Docusys

<sup>49</sup> Silander (2005) p.89

<sup>50</sup> *ibid.* p.90

<sup>51</sup> *ibid.* p.95-99

<sup>52</sup> *ibid.* p.99



Finally, it is concluded that there is a domestic dominance in the traditional research on democratisation and international factors are often neglected. The results show that a successful democracy promotion is likely based on a firm interest in democratisation as well as the use of both top-down and bottom-up channels. Democracy promotion is less likely to be successful when the interest is limited and when the promotion process is hindered by the regime, leaving the democracy promotion to a bottom-up approach.<sup>53</sup> There is in other words empirical evidence to support the idea that democracy promotion is the most efficient when it is encourage by both state-actors and non-state actors, working from two different levels.

---

<sup>53</sup> Silander (2005) p.196

## 5 Analytical Framework

According to Jeffrey Haynes the views on globalisation can roughly be divided into two perspectives; globalisation seen as a disperser of democratic values and institutions and; globalisation as a phenomenon that is obstructing or limiting substantive democracy. As a result, depending on the perspective, theories differ considerably in their approach to globalisation and its effects on democracy. As it is the aim of this study to investigate what effects political globalisation might have on democratisation it is not useful to apply a theory that already from the start has chosen side. What is needed is rather a theory that states how globalisation can have importance for democratisation without providing a normative standpoint of its effects.

Haynes starting point is that *every* developing country and its domestic political arrangements are affected by globalisation, though the degree and precise impact naturally varies from country to country. He also states that one needs to take into account a range of domestic and external factors when trying to explain democratisation and democracy in developing countries<sup>54</sup> According to Chatterjee the impact of globalisation on democracy has been especially pronounced and that there has been a worldwide trend toward democratisation in the past few decades. He further argues that the democratic recognition of broader human needs has taken a global dimension and there has been a surge of pluralistically oriented social and political movements in democratic countries as well as non-democratic. This, he assert, is a result of globalisation.<sup>55</sup> He then concludes

Though these two global and domestic trends manifest differently, they share the common democratic ideals of autonomy, equality and political participation, as well as the spur of globalization.<sup>56</sup>

Returning to Haynes, he states that the recent impact of political globalisation on domestic politics in developing countries is bolstered by three key developments. The first is linked to the collapse of European communist governments which gave rise to an increase in both democracy and human rights concerns in the developed world as well as democratic demands from people in developing countries living under authoritarian regimes. Soon enough the pressure to democratise was not only domestic but also international and it has continued to increase. The 1990s also saw the birth of many new states. Haynes argues that under such circumstances it seems plausible that “both international and transnational actors might have a significant impact on the political arrangements

---

<sup>54</sup> Haynes in McGrew and Poku (2007) p.83, 99

<sup>55</sup> Chatterjee (2008) p.1

<sup>56</sup> *ibid.* p.1

of these new states.” This is because many have not completed the formation of the political system. Haynes concludes that countries, which he defines as, small, weak and vulnerable, are especially open to external influences.<sup>57</sup> However, as mentioned above all developing countries are affected, not only the instable and small ones.

[...] political arrangements in virtually all developing countries, almost regardless of their age, size, geographical position, type of political system or level of economic development, are influenced – to some degree – by what international and transnational actors do.<sup>58</sup>

At the same time he is careful not to overemphasise the importance of political globalisation, because he also asserts that few if any developing country has had their domestic political arrangements dictated for a long time.<sup>59</sup> The question that arises is how exactly external actors influence domestic political outcomes in developing countries.

The second key development is described as pressure to democratise from transnational civil society, which refers to the involvement or encouragement from human rights-oriented transnational civil society groups and democracy-promotion organisations for authoritarian governments to reform, mainly through adoption and implementation of international democratic and human rights norms.<sup>60</sup>

Finally, the third key development is the increased international economic integration. Haynes argument is that the increased international economic integration has led to socio-political consequences which have resulted in growing demands in developing countries for democracy. The international economic competition increased with globalisation and as an effect many countries with a weak economic position found themselves worse off. Production systems and labour markets changed and there was a weakening of the labour’s ability to influence or pressurise their governments. In addition, structural adjustment programmes, implemented in a number of developing countries, led to the diminishing or even destruction of inadequate welfare programmes. The increased economic integration thus had effects in the political field that resulted in demands for democracy.<sup>61</sup>

Overall, these three developments mean that there is a demand for democratisation both domestically and internationally, the latter involving both international intergovernmental organisations and international nongovernmental organisations.

Since the 1980s a number of authoritarian regimes in the developing world have collapsed and many times they were replaced by democratically elected governments. Haynes means that although the shift to democratic rule could be a

---

<sup>57</sup> Haynes in McGrew and Poku (2007) p.84-85

<sup>58</sup> *ibid.* p.84

<sup>59</sup> *ibid.* p.84

<sup>60</sup> *ibid.* p.85

<sup>61</sup> *ibid.* p.85

result of solely domestic changes, most of the time external factors were, and still are, an important part of the establishment of democratic principles.<sup>62</sup>

Democratisation requires that no foreign power hostile to this development interfere in the political life of a country with the intention of subverting the political system. This is something Robert Dahl also perceives as an important condition for a democratisation. As one of the unfavourable conditions in which democracy is less likely to thrive Dahl mentions foreign control. Dahl agrees with Haynes that democracy is not only a result of domestic factors. It is concluded that powerful countries often have the capability to direct the development in the direction they wish. However, this foreign control is not necessarily a purely bad thing. The influence from a foreign power, especially if it is democratic, may result in the creation of democratic institutions, although it is maintained that there are no guarantees for democracy as a result of a foreign democratic power exercising its control over the political life in a country.<sup>63</sup>

Samuel Huntington, in his *The third wave*, suggests that external actors can possibly hasten or retard democratic outcomes, though not fundamentally change them. He also points to the fact that encouragement to democratise may actually hinder overall chances for consolidation since it could lead to the process of democratisation before the country is ready.<sup>64</sup>

Sell and Schmitz identify three modes of influence in understanding the globalisation of democracy. These three modes also correlate with competing theoretical concepts. The first one, the neo-realist approach sees the globalisation of democratisation as an issue of pressure as a result of international economic and geo-political conditions. In their view countries have little choice but to adapt. On the other hand, there is the neo-institutionalist approach that believes in voluntary adaptation to international standards. A final mode of influence comes from the constructivist perspective, where norms, values and ideas are viewed to have an independent influence on how actors use the international arena to affect domestic change.<sup>65</sup> Although these are competing perspectives it is likely that they co-exist and interact. In fact, a merge of these theoretical standpoints can be found in Whitehead's approach to the impact of international factors on democratisation which he divides into three different processes called contagion, control and consent. Contagion stands for the process where democracy is spread in waves from neighbouring countries, control refers to the process where democracy is imposed on a country, whereas consent suggests the incorporation of democratic norms, often from the outside, by actors in the state in transition.<sup>66</sup>

As mentioned above Haynes claims that all developing countries and their political arrangements are affected by political globalisation i.e. by what

---

<sup>62</sup> Haynes in McGrew and Poku (2007) p.87

<sup>63</sup> Dahl, Robert A, 2005. *Demokratin och dess antagonister*. p.403, Denmark: Nørhaven Paperback

<sup>64</sup> Haynes in McGrew and Poku (2007) p.88

<sup>65</sup> Schmitz, Hans Peter – Sell, Katrin in Grugel, Jean (ed.) 1999. *Democracy without borders. Transnationalization and conditionality in new democracies*. p.37 London: Routledge

<sup>66</sup> Gruegel, Jean, 2002. *Democratization. A critical introduction*. p.121-122, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan

international and transnational actors do. The impact of political globalisation, however, varies from country to country. Haynes divides the external factors that are of importance in explaining recent shifts to democracy in developing countries into three sets:

- *Background factors*

These factors include favourable and unfavourable geostrategic circumstances, which involves foreign actors exercising their powers over a country. It also refers to circumstances such as economic depressions. It is argued that it is highly unlikely that developing countries would experience democratic progress in a global or regional economic depression.<sup>67</sup> However, as already mentioned, the background factors are of less importance than the following two sets of external factors, given that Haynes maintains that age, size and geographical position of the country is somewhat secondary to the influence of external actors.<sup>68</sup> This is also confirmed by Schmitz and Sell who argue that countries recently democratised do not belong to a certain group of nations in social, economic or cultural terms. The structural background conditions differ considerably and they argue that there are serious doubts on the long-held convictions that democratisation under “structurally unfavourable conditions” is not possible.<sup>69</sup> This is reason why this set of factors is not included in the study.

- *State actors*

State actors is the term used to refer to states, mostly Western governments, that encourage democracy and sometimes even use political or economical conditionalities tied to aid donations. According to Haynes external actors in possession of large financial resources to encourage democracy are often important at the transition stage of democratisation. They are, however, less central in the institutionalisation and sustaining of democracy.<sup>70</sup> State actors are involved in promoting democracy as well as and pressuring countries to democratise via intergovernmental organisations. Larry Diamond maintains that the governments of the leading industrialised democracies remain the most important promoters of democracy although they increasingly share it with a wide variety of nongovernmental organisations. The established democracies are engaged in democracy promotion through diplomatic pressure, conditioning of multilateral policies and also, as Haynes puts forward, through their official overseas development agencies.<sup>71</sup>

- *Non-state actors*

Finally, the non-states actors are used to refer to cross-border, non-state actors that are a part of the transnational civil society. These actors distinguish themselves in three ways; 1) they do not include governmental groups or profit-seeking private entities like transnational corporations; 2) they are transnational, meaning that

---

<sup>67</sup> Haynes in McGrew and Poku (2007) p.100

<sup>68</sup> *ibid.* p.84

<sup>69</sup> Schmitz and Sell in Grugel (1999) p.23

<sup>70</sup> Haynes in McGrew and Poku (2007) p.101-103

<sup>71</sup> Diamond, Larry in Hadenius Axel (ed.) 1997. *Democracy's victory and crisis.* p.312-313, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

they interact across state borders and often beyond the control of governments; and 3) they may take on a variety of forms, everything from international intergovernmental organisations (INGOs) to more ad hoc organisations and associations formed to campaign on a certain issue. Transnational civil society is sometimes argued to be a third force emerging in international politics. The aim of such non-state actors are often based on their perception of public good and they are thus bound together, not by self-interests, but by shared values, which may vary from the belief in animal rights to the conviction that democracy is a global right of all people.<sup>72</sup>

Like Haynes, Chu, Hu and Moon have a similar approach when analysing the international context of democratisation. When looking at the international context it is necessary, they argue, to distinguish, background or situational variables, external actors (such as international organisations, foreign governments and transnational nongovernmental actors) and forms and direction of external influence. The latter is referring to the forms of influence; coercion (military invasion or occupation), persuasion, covert or apparent.<sup>73</sup> Goldmann also uses a similar approach, but excludes background factors. He looks at two kinds of internationalisations; internationalisation of decisions and internationalisation of society.<sup>74</sup> The former can be measured in the extent to which a country is a member of intergovernmental organisations and how many international conventions have been signed whereas the latter, internationalisation of society, in its organised form first and foremost is reflected by nongovernmental organisations. Internationalisation of society is thus indicated by the number of NGOs in a country. Although this approach is slightly dated it too views the process as influenced by two sets of actors; state actors and non-state actors, which also is the focus of this study.

---

<sup>72</sup> Haynes in McGrew and Poku (2007) p.101-102

<sup>73</sup> Chu, Yu-han – Hu, Fu – Moon Chung-in, in Diamond, Larry – Plattner, Marc F. – Chu, Yun-han – Tien, Hung-mao (eds.) 1997. *Consolidating the third wave democracies. Regional challenges*. p.269, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press

<sup>74</sup> Johansson, Jonas in Hydén Göran (ed.) 1998. *Demokratisering i tredje världen*. p.240-241, Lund: Studentlitteratur

## 6 Method and Materials

In this part the method is presented and discussed followed by a thorough presentation of materials employed. This part may be more extensive than normal. However, since the database will not be available for the readers, it is of much importance that the materials used in creating the database and how they were used in the analysis is presented in more detail.

### 6.1 Method

Quantitative studies within the field of political science are less common than qualitative ones. However, the quantitative method is a useful method in cases where one wants to study a phenomenon broadly. It is also a good starting point for further studies that could take on qualitative methods. If the quantitative study indicates that there indeed is a linkage between political globalisation and democratisation in developing countries, whether it is positive or negative, it would be interesting to later on study some countries more profoundly. The quantitative method is thus a way to establish a first correlation that eventually will be studied qualitatively to possibly find out *why* there is a correlation, as oppose to *if* there is one.

One of the reasons why a quantitative method is applied in this case is that it is a topic that has not been studied much. Although there are a few previous studies indicating that globalisation has relevance for democratisation (see Previous Studies) globalisation is understood either as economic globalisation or globalisation encompassing economic globalisation as well as political and cultural globalisation. This study is only concerned with political globalisation. The effects of political globalisation on democratisation in developing countries seem to be minimally studied. Because of that, it would be a good idea to start with a quantitative method to establish if a correlation exists.

Quantitative methods are applied when one wants to find common denominators as oppose to qualitative studies that are often used in studies of the particular. While the qualitative method allows the researcher to study the phenomenon from the inside, the quantitative method means that the researcher takes on the role as an observer rather than a participant. One of the greatest problems with quantitative studies is that variations and statistics can be manipulated by the researcher to fit the expected outcome. However, materials in

qualitative studies do not remain unaffected by the researcher and it is thus not a reason enough why one should not use quantitative studies.<sup>75</sup>

This study will include 80 countries classified as developing countries, how these will be selected is discussed below. Jonas Johansson summarises why globalisation preferably is studied quantitatively rather than qualitatively

[...] taking the geographical dimension of the concept of globalisation seriously requires studies with a broad scope – including large comparison.<sup>76</sup>

Also, in this study of the impact of political globalisation, three political categories of developing countries are of interest; the relatively new democracies, countries in transition and countries in which transition has not begun.<sup>77</sup> The developing countries in the study will be divided into these three main categories. However, three sub-categories will be added to countries in transition, as those countries are more differentiated between themselves than the countries in the other two categories. Because of that they are categorised into the sub-categories; “stable”, “fluctuating” and “recent move to free”. Stable means that the country has remained within the same category during the whole time studied (Freedom House ranking partly free). Countries in the category “fluctuating” are countries that have moved between the different Freedom House rankings, the majority between not free and partly free, but a few have also occasionally been ranked free. Finally, the category “recent move to free” indicates that the country has been continuously ranked as free, though not long enough to be included among the relatively new democracies.

The reason for using the categories is that it allows one to study if the political globalisation has different impacts depending on political system or because these countries are less politically globalised. As a result it is also necessary to study the development over time. If newly democratised countries show a high level of political globalisation throughout the democratisation period this could possibly indicate that external factors may have an effect. Likewise, if newly democratised countries have had a very low political globalisation level throughout its political development, chances are political globalisation is not of great importance.

Because Haynes claim that the external factors are explaining *recent* shifts to democracy the time period that will be studied will not go further back than roughly 15 years, that is the early to mid 1990s. The years selected are 1991, 1992, 1993 and 2001, 2002 and 2003. The reason why these years have been selected are mainly a result of available material (see 6.2.4 on Global Civil Society Yearbooks) but also because analysing every year since 1991 would make the study too extensive.

The statistical material for state actors will be combined with the statistical material for non-state actors and the Freedom House ranking, and the information for the individual developing countries, divided accordingly to the three political

---

<sup>75</sup> Lundquist Lennart, 1993. *Det vetenskapliga studiet av politik*, p.104, Lund: Studentlitteratur

<sup>76</sup> Johansson in Engström and Hydén (2002) p.28

<sup>77</sup> *ibid.* p.27



categories and subcategories will be entered into a database. This database will then be used for the analysis of the study.

## 6.2 Materials

This study is set out to investigate the effects of political globalisation on democratisation in the developing world. The theory by Haynes presented above concludes that it is basically two sets of external factors, or rather actors, that have relevance for democratic outcomes in the developing world; state actors and non-state actors. This means that materials concerning political globalisation, developing countries, state actors and non-state actors are necessary for this study.

### 6.2.1 Globalisation Indices

There are a few globalisations indices available, the most well-known being the A.T. Kearney/Foreign Policy Globalisation Index. Another is the CSGR Globalisation Index, however, for this study the KOF Index of Globalisation has been chosen.<sup>78</sup>

The KOF Index has many advantages compared to the other two. Firstly, it includes 158 countries which is a considerably higher number than the Kearney/Foreign Policy Index. Also, unlike the Kearney/FP index it is possible to access not only the general globalisation index but also the particular indices that make up the general KOF index; the economic globalisation index, the social globalisation index and the political globalisation index. Not to mention that the Kearney/FP is almost purely an index of economic globalisation. Although the CSGR Globalisation Index also allows access to the individual indices, and it does include a political globalisation index, this only includes three variables whereas the KOF index includes four.<sup>79</sup> The political globalisation index of the KOF Globalisation Index is a composite index consisting of four variables; 1) embassies in the country, 2) membership in international organisations (that is international intergovernmental organisations), 3) participation in U.N Security Council missions and 4) international treaties signed, where the first three also are variables in the CSGR political globalisation index. These variables are mainly a measurement of activity on a global level, but they do also tell us how extensive the political interaction with the outside world is compared to other countries, and in this sense it is also a measurement of political globalisation. It should not be forgotten that memberships in international intergovernmental organisations and

---

<sup>78</sup> CSGR Globalisation Index: [www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/csgr/index/](http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/csgr/index/)

A.T. Kearney/Foreign Policy Globalisation Index:

[www.atkearney.com/main.taf?p=5.4.127.2](http://www.atkearney.com/main.taf?p=5.4.127.2)

<sup>79</sup> KOF Index of Globalisation, *Definitions and source*:

[http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/static/pdf/defintions\\_2009](http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/static/pdf/defintions_2009)

signing of treaties are, in a way an acceptance of the underlying values that exist within these organisations which demonstrates a preference for democracy.

Returning to the CSGR Index, another reason why it was not chosen is because the latest accessible data is not as up to date as the KOF Index. In addition, the KOF Index of Globalisation includes data for every year since 1970. In sum, the KOF Index of Globalisation is the best index of political globalisation for this study. Each country in this index, depending on level of political globalisation, has been given a number between 1 and 100, where 100 indicates the highest level of political globalisation. However, this index cannot provide information on non-state actors, which make up an important part of the theory applied. It is thus only used to account for the possible influence of *state* actors.

### 6.2.2 The Centre for the Study of Global Governance – Global Civil Society Yearbooks

The second variable in the theory by Haynes is transnational non-state actors. In order to be able to study non-state actors in developing countries the *Global Civil Society Yearbook* from the Centre for the Study of Global Governance have been used. The centre was established in 1992 and is based at the London School of Economics. It claims that it pioneered research into globalisation and it publishes a Yearbook on global civil society every year, always containing a variety of statistical materials<sup>80</sup>

Both Freedom House (see below) and the KOF Index of Globalisation provide data from the early 1970s to 2006. The GCS Yearbooks however, are more recent and have only been published since 2000. This means that the study is much more limited in time when including the variable of non-state actors. The 2002, 2003 and 2004 editions of the GCS Yearbook provide information on number of international nongovernmental organisations in a country and country participation in INGOs (number of memberships in different INGOs) for 1991 and 2001, 1992 and 2002, and 1993 and 2003 respectively. More recent data is not available since the statistical part of the yearbook has changed over time and the newest changes mean that there is only data available for different regions, not individual countries. Ideally, the countries would have been analysed within more consistent intervals but this is simply not possible because the materials accessible in the GCS Yearbooks are not the same and not available for every year it has been published. However, the chosen years make it possible to observe changes both over a shorter and longer time. Political globalisation are thus analysed both in clusters of three year periods and ten year periods. This should give the study a broader perspective than just one ten year period. Still, it is not the best situation for a study over time, but little can be done about the material available.

Another slight disadvantage is that the latest available material is from 2003 and having a more recent data would indeed benefit the study more. However, the

---

<sup>80</sup> The Centre for the Study of Global Governance: [www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/global/index.htm](http://www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/global/index.htm)

aim is to find out *if* there is a correlation between political globalisation and democratisation. If such a correlation can be observed within the period of time studied, it is not unreasonable to assume that the correlation still exists. If nothing else, the shortage of statistical material on non-state actors is very telling of how this particular phenomenon has been neglected for a long time.

The statistic material from the Global Civil Society Yearbooks includes all kinds of INGOs and networks, which means that it is not only organisations focusing on promoting democracy that are included. This could be problematic as it is not evident how many of the non-state actors that are directly involved in democratic issues. On the other hand it would be wrong to assume that only NGOs working for democracy promoting are the ones to strive for democracy, as was proved in the study by Chu, Hu and Moon.<sup>81</sup> From that point of view, it is in fact an advantage that the non-state actors are not limited.

### 6.2.3 Freedom House – Freedom in the World Ranking

One of the most influential indices of democracy is the *Freedom in the World* ranking that has ranked the countries in the world and their level of democracy every year since 1973. One could almost consider it to monopolistically dominate the quantitative studies of democracy; it occurs again and again in different studies, and the fact is that there is a lack of good alternatives to Freedom House. The advantage of using Freedom in the World ranking is that it is highly considered and accepted worldwide as a measurement of democracy. Freedom House provides data from 193 countries and 15 territories from 1973 to 2008 and they are ranked Free, Partly Free or Not Free as well as given a numerical ranking from 1 to 7, where 1 indicates the highest level of freedom and 7 the lowest level of freedom. The ranking is based on the evaluation of political and civil rights.

The evaluation of political rights include the evaluation of electoral process, political pluralism, participation and functioning of government, whilst the evaluation of civil rights include freedom of expression and belief, associational and organisational rights, rule of law and personal autonomy and individual rights. When the combined average of political rights and civil rights is between 1.0 and 2.5 the country is rated free. The average of 3.0 to 5.0 places a country among the partly free and finally, 5.5 to 7.0 categorises a country as not free.<sup>82</sup>

The Freedom House ranking have been used in this study to determine which developing country belongs to which category (accounted for above); relatively new democracies, countries in transition, with its three sub-categories stable, fluctuating and recent move to free and countries in which transition has not begun. Here it was a great advantage to be able to access the Freedom House ranking over the years, which shows also small political changes. Another reason why Freedom House was chosen in order to select the countries was that its

---

<sup>81</sup> Chu et al in Diamond et al (1997) p.267

<sup>82</sup> Freedom House, *Methodology*:

[www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=351&ana\\_page=341&year=2008](http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=351&ana_page=341&year=2008)

definition of democracy correlates perfectly with the definition of this study, that is, Robert Dahl's definition of democracy.<sup>83</sup>

Figure 6.1<sup>84</sup> Freedom House Numerical Ranking Specified

	<b>Political Rights</b>	<b>Civil Rights</b>
<b>1</b>	Countries receiving a rating of 1 come closest to ensuring the freedoms. The elected rule, there are competitive parties, the opposition is important and has actual power.	Countries rated 1 come closest to ensuring the freedoms, including freedom of expression, assembly, association, education, and religion. They are distinguished by an established and generally equitable system of rule of law.
<b>2</b>	Countries rated 2 are less free. Such factors as political corruption, violence, political discrimination against minorities, and foreign or military influence on politics may be present and weaken the quality of freedom.	States with a rating of 2 have deficiencies in a few aspects of civil liberties, but are still relatively free.
<b>3</b> <b>4</b> <b>5</b>	The same conditions that undermine freedom in rating 2. Other damaging elements can include civil war, heavy military involvement in politics, unfair elections, and one-party dominance. States may still enjoy some elements of political rights, including the freedom to organise quasi-political groups, reasonably free referendums, or other means of popular influence on government.	Countries rated of 3, 4, or 5 range from those that are in at least partial compliance with the standards to those with a combination of scores. The level of oppression increases at each successive rating level, including in the areas of censorship, political terror, and the prevention of free association. In many cases groups opposed to the state engage in political terror that undermines other freedoms.
<b>6</b>	Countries rated 6 have systems ruled by military juntas, one-party dictatorships, religious hierarchies, or autocrats. These regimes may allow only a minimal manifestation of political rights, such as some degree of representation or autonomy for minorities.	People in countries rated 6 experience severely restricted rights of expression and association, and there are almost always political prisoners and other manifestations of political terror. Countries may be characterised by a few partial rights, such as some religious and social freedoms, some highly restricted private business activity, and relatively free private discussion.
<b>7</b>	In countries rated 7, political rights are absent or virtually nonexistent as a result of the extremely oppressive nature of the regime or severe oppression in combination with civil war. May also be marked by extreme violence or warlord rule, dominating political power in the absence of an authoritative, functioning central government.	States with a rating of 7 have virtually no freedom. An overwhelming and justified fear of repression characterises these societies.

## 6.2.4 World Bank Country Classification and Human Development Index

This study focuses on the possible impact of political globalisation on democracy in developing countries. It is thus necessary to select the developing countries to be included in some way.

<sup>83</sup> Linde, Jonas - Ekman Joakim, 2006. *Demokratiseringsprocesser. Teoretiska ansatser och empiriska studier*. p.19-20, 239, Lund: Studentlitteratur

<sup>84</sup> Freedom House, *Methodology*:  
[www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=351&ana\\_page=341&year=2008](http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=351&ana_page=341&year=2008)

The World Bank country classification includes 185 countries and has been used in order to separate developing countries from other countries. Countries classified as middle income countries or below are considered developing countries by the World Bank. However, they are careful to note that “classification by income does not necessarily reflect development status”.<sup>85</sup> Because of this and as the definition is purely economic it has been complemented with the United Nations Development Programme’s index, the Human Development Index, also known as the HDI. Economic measurements of development are insufficient and say very little about the actual development situation. This is why the HDI, a composite index, measure both economic and social development. It consists of three different indices measuring life expectancy, educational attainment and income and it is said to better reflect the development situation in countries. The HDI includes 177 countries ranked and divided into three general categories; High Human Development, Medium Human Development and Low Human Development.<sup>86</sup> The problem with the HDI is that it does not clearly state which countries are developing countries. As a result the World Bank Country Classification has been used as a first step to choose the countries that will be included in this study. However, they have then been compared to the HDI, and if any country has been found in the High Human Development category it has been eliminated from the study. This is because the HDI is better at reflecting the development status and it is thus unwise to include a country that is categorised as a developing country by the World Bank but placed in the High Development category by the UNDP.

## 6.3 The Countries

The countries in this study are all developing countries but the political situation in the countries varies greatly. The three main categories in which every country will be placed are accounted for below as well as what results would indicate relevance of political globalisation.

### 6.3.1 Relatively New Democracies

The relatively new democracies are the countries that have been rated as free countries by Freedom House for at least 7 years in a row, that is, rated free at least from 1996. It is generally thought that if a country has experienced two consecutive elections in a row democracy can said to be somewhat consolidated.

---

<sup>85</sup> World Bank Country Classification: <http://go.worldbank.org/K2CKM78CC0>

<sup>86</sup> UNDP, *Composite indices – HDI and beyond*: <http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/indices>

This is related to Huntington's turnover test.<sup>87</sup> This is obviously a very broad definition, and not sufficient in itself. However, because the definition of democracy, both in this study and for Freedom House, encompasses much more than just elections (see 3.3) it can be used as a criterion for categorising the countries. The seven year period has been chosen partly because it is roughly half of the time studied, partly because the term in which a government is in power may vary, although three or four years are the most common. This means that the chosen time period somewhat corresponds to the period in which two election should have been held. The countries should in other words have been categorised as free by Freedom House for seven consecutive years, no change of category to partly free being allowed. In this study this category includes 10 countries or 12.5% of the countries, making it the smallest category in the study. In the statistical analysis a high level of political globalisation during the whole time would indicate that political globalisation could be significant. Likewise, low level of political globalisation during the whole period would indicate the opposite, that it might not be of any importance. Preferably, the level of globalisation should also be higher for this category than the level for the countries in the other categories.

### 6.3.2 Countries in Transition

Countries in this category are the ones that have begun a transition towards a more democratic rule. These are the countries that show a relative improvement over the years, that is, they have gone from not free to partly free, or even recently from partly free to free, although they remain too new to be classified as relatively new democracies. Although some countries have remained classified as partly free throughout the studied time period, and thus do not show any sign of change during 12 years, the countries have still begun a transition as they do in fact provide some civil and political rights to the people. Democratisation is not one smooth, linear process but includes setbacks and rise of new problems. It also takes time. It would thus be problematic to categorise a country as a country that has not begun transition only because it has not shown any development during the twelve years studied. This category is the biggest in the study with 62.5 % of the countries, that is, 50 countries in total.

For this category high level of political globalisation would also signify that it could have importance for democratisation. Here it is also possible to see if the countries that have fluctuated more between different Freedom House categorisations or the ones that in fact have been ranked as free recently are more politically globalised than the ones that have stayed within the same category between 1991 and 2003. Because of the shifting nature of the countries in this category, they have, as mentioned, been divided into three sub-categories; stable,

---

<sup>87</sup> Burnell, Peter – Randall, Vicky, 2005. *Politics in the developing world*. p.189, Oxford: Oxford University Press

fluctuating and countries that have recently moved to the category free, although not long enough for them to be placed in the relatively new democracy- category. The number of countries that have been fluctuating between categories is 21, 21 have also been stable, while 8 had recently been categorised as free. Among the ones that were changing categories 6 countries were at least once ranked as free. The remaining 16 fluctuated between not free and partly free.

### 6.3.3 Countries Where Transition Has Not Begun

The final category is the one that includes countries that have not begun any transition towards democratic rule. These countries are the ones that have remained within the same Freedom House category of not free during the whole time period (1991-2003). Although the argument above could be applied here as well; democratisation takes time and there are always the possibility for setbacks, it turned out that the majority of the countries in this category have been categorised as not free, not only during the twelve years included here but during the whole time Freedom House has carried out its ranking, which started in 1973. The remaining countries that in fact changed ranking outside the time period between 1991 and 2003 only did so for a very short time, often not more than a year in a row, which could be a result of elections held. The number of countries classified as not to have begun a transition is 20 which is 25 % of the 80 countries in the study.

For this category to confirm that political globalisation has an effect on democratisation it should show low levels of political globalisation throughout the time period. This might be the most interesting category seeing that if it turns out that the political globalisation is about the same as in the countries in the other categories, it would indicate that political globalisation is of minor importance.

Figure 6.2 Countries in the Study Divided Into Categories

<b>Transition Not Begun</b>	<b>Transition Begun</b>	<b>Transition Begun</b>	<b>Transition Begun</b>	<b>Relatively New Democracies</b>
	<i>Stable</i>	<i>Fluctuating</i>	<i>Recent Move to Free</i>	
Algeria	Armenia	Azerbaijan	El Salvador	Belize
Angola	Bangladesh	Bolivia	Ghana	Benin
Burundi	Burkina Faso	Congo Rep.	India	Botswana
Cambodia	Central African Rep.	Côte D'Ivoire	Lesotho	Guyana
Cameroon	Colombia	Dominican Rep.	Peru	Jamaica
Chad	Ethiopia	Gambia	Senegal	Mali
China	Gabon	Haiti	Suriname	Mongolia
Congo Dem. Rep.	Georgia	Honduras	Thailand	Namibia
Egypt	Guatemala	Indonesia		Philippines
Iran	Guinea-Bissau	Kenya		South Africa
Mauritania	Jordan	Kyrgyz Rep.		
Myanmar	Madagascar	Malawi		
Rwanda	Moldova	Niger		
Sudan	Morocco	Nigeria		

Swaziland	Mozambique	Pakistan		
Syria	Nepal	Papua New Guinea		
Tajikistan	Nicaragua	Sierra Leone		
Togo	Paraguay	Tanzania		
Tunisia	Sri Lanka	Yemen		
Vietnam	Uganda	Zambia		
	Ukraine	Zimbabwe		

## 6.4 The Database and SPSS

The statistical material for this quantitative study has been accounted for above. The statistic data have been entered into a database in SPSS, and then analysed. The material from the GCS Yearbook, used to analyse the non-state actor part of the theory, consisted of numbers of international nongovernmental organisations in a country and country participation in INGOs (number of memberships in different INGOs). In order to analyse the state actor part the KOF Index of Globalisation was used, where each country was given a number between 1 and 100, depending on level of political globalisation. Each variable of this statistical material has been entered into the database for every individual country and year. The 80 countries was also, on the basis if the Freedom House ranking, labelled relatively new democracy, country where transition has not begun and country in transition, the latter also divided into its three sub-categories.

Scattergrams, bivariate correlations, means comparisons and regressions are the main techniques used in SPSS for this study. In addition, tables have been created on the basis of frequency charts in SPSS and average scores for the state component of political globalisation have been calculated. The different significance tests, Pearson's  $r$ ,  $\text{Eta}^2$  and ANOVA are presented below (7) as they are introduced to the reader.



## 7 Result and Analysis

In this chapter the outcome of the statistical analysis of the correlation between political globalisation and democratisation will be presented. The result will be accounted for and analysed according to the factors in the theory; state actors and non-state actors, which then are combined into a final part. This is followed by a summary of the result and a conclusion, which will be elaborated in the part that follows.

### 7.1 State Actors

As the statistical result of the analysis is presented below it could be useful to shortly summarise the results for each category, which would indicate a relevance of political globalisation for level of democracy.

For the Relatively New Democracies-category high level of political globalisation during the time studied, 1991-2003, would indicate that political globalisation could be significant. Low level of political globalisation would indicate the opposite; that it might not be of any importance. The same conclusion can be drawn if the level of political globalisation also is about the same as for the other categories.

For the category of countries in transition high level of political globalisation would also signify that it could have importance for democratisation. Preferably the level should be higher for the countries recently ranked free than for the other categories. Overall, the countries should however, if there is a correlation between political globalisation (from a state actor perspective), not have as high scores as the relatively new democracies.

Finally, for the category Countries Where Transition Has No Begun to confirm that there is a link between political globalisation and democratisation it should show low levels of political globalisation throughout the time period. If political globalisation is about the same as among the countries in the other categories, the relevance of political globalisation can be questioned.

The level of political globalisation from state actor perspective is analysed with the KOF Index of Globalisation. The individual years have been combined into indices over the 1990s (years 1991, 1992 and 1993) and the 2000s (years 2001, 2002 and 2003), as well as one index including all years in the study. Since the highest level of political globalisation in the KOF Index is 100 for every year this means that the absolute highest number of political globalisation that can be reached in the index including all six years is 600 and 300 for the two indices including the three years for each decade.

Starting with the statistical analysis on the level of political globalisation within the categories, the ten relatively new democracies show a disperse level of political globalisation. In the 1990s the numbers range from 91.14 to 198.70, in the 2000s, from 117.73 to 245.52.<sup>88</sup> The country with highest average level of political globalisation in this category, all years included, had roughly twice the score as the country with the lowest level. The same is true for the countries where transition has begun. There is a huge dispersion within all three sub-categories both for the years in the 1990s and the 2000. The highest average score for the stable countries in the 1990s is seven times higher than the lowest. Within the same time period, this is also true for the countries where transition has not begun; the lowest average per year for the 1990s is 12.50, the highest is 87.69.<sup>89</sup>

The table below accounts for the political globalisation scores in the 1990s and 2000s according to political category.

*Table 7.1* Political Globalisation Score (State Actor) for the 1990s and 2000s

<b>Category</b>	<b>Range in Score 1990s and 2000s</b>
Relatively New Democracies	<b>1990s:</b> 91.14 -198.70 <b>2000s:</b> 117.73 - 245.52
Country in Transition - Stable	<b>1990s:</b> 34.67- 232.67 <b>2000s:</b> 106.95 - 259 - 54
Country in Transition - Fluctuating	<b>1990s:</b> 53.33 - 243.48 <b>2000s:</b> 120-24 - 267.92
Country in Transition - Free	<b>1990s:</b> 91.37 - 246.56 <b>2000s:</b> 107,14 - 269.07
Country Where Transition Has Not Begun	<b>1990s:</b> 37.49 - 263.06 <b>2000s:</b> 94.40 - 274.99

As seen, there has been an overall increase of political globalisation for all categories. While the countries where transition has not begun have the lowest score in the 2000s and the second lowest, after stable countries in transition, in the 1990s, they also, oddly enough, have the highest scores for both decades. The highest score for the relatively new democracies are in fact the lowest among all categories. There is thus no consistency in the range in scores of political globalisation from a state actor perspective and level of democratisation.

If one instead looks at the average score for all years, the average for all relatively new democracies for all years in the study is 50.55. For the countries in transition that have remained stable, the average for all years is 52.12, for the ones fluctuating the average score is 55.83 and for the ones recently ranked free it is 65.25. Finally, for the countries where transition has not begun the average score for all years is 50.55.<sup>90</sup> This means that the average score for all years is exactly the same for relatively new democracies as for countries where transition has not begun. The highest average score is found among the countries in transition

<sup>88</sup> Appendix p. 56

<sup>89</sup> Appendix p.56-58

<sup>90</sup> Appendix p.58-59

recently ranked free. Again, there seems to be no consistency in the level of political globalisation and level of democratisation. This is also confirmed when looking at the average score for all countries for the 1990s and the 2000s.

Table 7.2 Average Political Globalisation Score (State Actor) for the 1990s and 2000s

Category	Average Score 1990s and 2000s
Relatively New Democracies	<b>1990s:</b> 42.54 <b>2000s:</b> 59.20
Country in Transition - Stable	<b>1990s:</b> 44.86 <b>2000s:</b> 59.38
Country in Transition - Fluctuating	<b>1990s:</b> 48.51 <b>2000s:</b> 63.15
Country in Transition - Free	<b>1990s:</b> 60.08 <b>2000s:</b> 70.41
Country Where Transition Has Not Begun	<b>1990s:</b> 46.71 <b>2000s:</b> 53.94

When running a means test it is confirmed that there is no correlation between political globalisation from a state actor perspective and democratisation.<sup>91</sup> The measure of association, Eta<sup>2</sup>, tells us how much the variation in the y-variable is explained by the x-variable. Eta<sup>2</sup> is between 0 and 1, where 0 is no correlation and 1 perfect correlation. The Eta<sup>2</sup>, when testing the correlation between political globalisation by state actor component and level of democracy, is merely 0.067, thus very far from 1.<sup>92</sup>

Hence, the conclusion that can be drawn from this is that there in this part is no significant correlation between level of political globalisation and level of democracy. The variation of the level of political globalisation from a state actor perspective is very high for all categories. This has been shown both when comparing range in score and average score. The eta<sup>2</sup> square test also came out negative, confirming the lack of correlation since it showed virtually no correlation at all.

## 7.2 Non-State Actors

The non-state perspective of the theory is analysed with the statistics from the Global Civil Society Yearbooks, on the number of INGO secretariats in the countries as well as the number of different INGO memberships held by the people. Unlike the state actor perspective, concentrating on official global state activities, this part focuses on the level of political globalisation of the civil society.

---

<sup>91</sup> Appendix p.60

<sup>92</sup> Appendix p.60

Again the numbers are combined for the years in the 1990s and the 2000s, which then are combined for the total number for all years. The number of INGO secretariats and memberships are first analysed separately, then combined. It is also analysed if the two variables are affecting each other, that is, if a country with high number of INGO secretariats also indicates a high number of INGO memberships held by the people.

Cross tabulations are not recommended when dealing with x-variables and y-variables that are both quantitative, with many values and the chi<sup>2</sup> tests are not usable when more than 20% of the cells have frequencies with less than five, which often is the case with this study. This is why scattergrams have been used instead as the correlation between two quantitative variables is best illustrated with scattergrams. The correlation coefficient (r), Pearson's r, is a measure of the correlation that tells us about the strength of the correlation. The closer to 1 the stronger is the correlation.<sup>93</sup>

The relatively new democracies show a very high level of correlation between number of secretariats and memberships. With all years combined, the scattergrams show that the number of present INGO secretariats in the relatively new democracies can explain 91.7% of the variation in number of memberships in international nongovernmental organisations.<sup>94</sup> The explanation level for countries in transition that have recently been categorised as free is even higher, at 92.9%. Although the explanation level is lower for the remaining categories, it still remains high; 80.4% for countries where transition has not begun, 75.1% for stable countries where transition has begun, and finally, 54.7% for fluctuating countries in transition.<sup>95</sup>

The Pearson's r also confirms the correlation between number of secretariats and memberships for all categories.<sup>96</sup> High level of presence of INGOs seems to lead to a high number of INGO memberships held by the people.

When looking at the range in numbers of secretariats for the different categories (combined for all six years in the study) the dispersion, similar to the state actor perspective, is very high. For the relatively new democracies the number ranges from 6 to 622, for the countries in transition from 2 to 270 (sub-category stable), 0 to 653 (sub-category fluctuating), and from 2 to 934 (sub-category recent move to free). Finally, the range in number of secretariats for all years for the countries where transition has not begun is 0 to 375.<sup>97</sup> There is thus no consistency in the occurrence of number of international nongovernmental organisation secretariats and the level of democratic development. As can be seen in table 7.3 below, when looking at the range in number of memberships in different INGOs, the variation is again high within the different categories, at the same time as the differences between them remain rather small. One can thus

---

<sup>93</sup> Djurfeldt, Göran – Larsson, Rolf – Stjärnhagen, Ola. 2008 *Statistisk verktygslåda – samhällsvetenskaplig oraksanalys med kvantitativa metoder*. p.161-162, 229, Lund: Studentlitteratur

<sup>94</sup> Appendix p.60

<sup>95</sup> Appendix p. 61-62

<sup>96</sup> Appendix p. 63-65

<sup>97</sup> Appendix p. 65-69

conclude that when it comes to the number of INGO secretariats and memberships it says very little about the level of democratic development, although those two variables turned out to be closely linked to one another.

*Table 7.3* Range in Number of INGO Secretariats and Memberships According to Category, All Years Combined

<b>Category</b>	<b>Range in Number of INGO Secretariats</b>	<b>Range in Number of INGO Memberships</b>
Relatively New Democracies	6 – 622	1746 – 13133
Country in Transition – Stable	2 – 270	1184 – 10272
Country in Transition - Fluctuating	0 – 653	868 – 9573
Country in Transition – Free	2 – 934	1876 – 16055
Country Where Transition Has Not Begun	0 – 375	626 – 12704

The Eta<sup>2</sup> test on the correlation between democratic level and number of INGO secretariats as well as INGO memberships confirm that there are no correlations. This is also true when the two different variables for the non-state perspective are combined. There is still no correlation with level of democracy. None of the three Eta<sup>2</sup> tests are even above 0.1.<sup>98</sup> Thus, the result for this part, the non-state actor part, is to a great extent a duplication of the state actor part. No correlations between level of political globalisation and level of democracy can be observed.

### 7.3 State Actors and Non-State Actors Combined

So far the results have not confirmed any correlation between political globalisation, whether it is from a state or non-state perspective, and level of democracy. Combining the two is now what is remaining. This final part will thus bring together the state and non-state components of political globalisation, as they so far only been analysed separately.


As a first step, the correlation between the two different components of political globalisation, all years combined, is analysed through scattergrams. The explanation level is fairly high. The state actor component can explain 43.7% of the variation in the non-state component for the relatively new democracies and 69.7% for the countries where transition has not begun. For countries where transition has begun the state actor component can explain 52.6% of the variation in stable countries, 79.5% in the fluctuating countries and 60.5% in the countries recently ranked as free. When combining all countries the state actor component

---

<sup>98</sup> Appendix p.70-72

can explain 59.3% of the variation in the non-state actor component as can be seen in the figure below. This means that there is at least a co-variation between the two components which constitutes political globalisation both *within* the categories and *between* them.<sup>99</sup>

Figure 7.1 Scattergram on State Actor and Non-State Actor Component of Political Globalisation



The result is the same when running scattergrams for the 1990s and the 2000s. The co-variation is slightly higher in the 1990s than for all years combined; 59.7% and lower for the 2000s alone; 55.1%. The Pearson's r tests confirm that there is a correlation. For all countries and all years combined the Pearson's r for the correlation between the state actor component and the non-state component is 0.770 which is significant and it remains significant also when Pearson's r is tested for all categories all years combined and for all countries in the 1990s and in the 2000s respectively.<sup>100</sup>

When combining the two components of political globalisation and running a means test with democratic category as independent variable the Eta<sup>2</sup> test is only 0.087, which is very low and the correlation is more or less nonexistent. A regression with democratisation level as dependent on political globalisation level shows no correlation. The ANOVA test is 0.113, while the level of significance is 0.05 or below. The result is the same for a regression with political globalisation

<sup>99</sup> Appendix p.73- 78

<sup>100</sup> Appendix 78- 80

as dependent on level of democracy. Regressions for both the 1990s and the 2000s produce the same result. The ANOVA tests are far higher than the significance level with 0.103 for the 1990s and 0.115 for the 2000s. Finally, compare means tests are run for both decades, which show no sign of significance with the Eta<sup>2</sup> being 0.101 for the 1990s and 0.063 for the 2000s.<sup>101</sup>

In sum, while it has been confirmed that the two components of Haynes's theory, state actor and non-state actor are correlated, the level of political globalisation can not be explained by the level of democracy and nor can the level of democracy be explained by the level of political globalisation.

## 7.4 Discussion on Outcome

The question to be answered in this study was if a correlation between political globalisation and democratisation in developing countries could be observed. The statistical analysis above has shown unambiguous results that point to the fact that level of political globalisation and level of democracy have very little to do with each other. A correlation can not be observed. However, results that show no correlation are also of interest. It is not only a positive result that tells us something about the correlation between democratisation and political globalisation.

The study by Jonas Johansson confirmed that there was a correlation between globalisation and level of democracy, when including factors of economic globalisation. This study has shown that there is not any correlation between political globalisation alone and level of democracy. This is interesting as it indicates that there is something about economic globalisation that in fact is linked to level of democracy (or just as plausible, something about the level of democracy that is linked to the level of economic globalisation). As discussed, political globalisation does not require the same preconditions as economic globalisation; regardless of level of development a country can engage in global political activities. This may be the explanation to why there seemingly is no correlation between political globalisation and level of democracy, yet a correlation when a few economic variables are added. The ideational victory of democracy in organisation, both governmental and non-governmental, seems to have had little impact on the real political situation. What happens on global level appears to stay on global level. That is, high engagement and interaction in political activities on a global level does not have any significant effects on democratisation in a domestic sphere. The other way around is also true; level of democracy does not seem to dictate the possibility for a country to interact globally through organisations and other arrangements, which also may be an

---

<sup>101</sup> Appendix p.80-83

explanation to why there is not a correlation. The countries simply do not need to have a high level of democracy in order to take part. This is true both for the state and non-state actor components. The presence of international nongovernmental organisations and number of memberships, as a measure of a dynamic civil society, could be expected to be lower in developing countries with less developed democratic institutions. That is however not what the outcome of this study shows. The civil society seems to be little affected by the democratic situation in developing countries; at least it is as active, if measured by those two components, in countries where transition has not begun as in countries that are considered democracies.

Another outcome of interest is the fact that a correlation between the state and the non-state component of political globalisation can be observed. Although it is not possible to further investigate what this correlation consists of in this study it indicates that activities in civil society (measured by number on INGO memberships and secretariats) are correlated with activities on global intergovernmental level. Since the level of democracy has already been ruled out, this must depend on something else.

A correlation between the two components of political globalisation from a non-state actor perspective was also observed. This correlation indicates that a higher presence of international nongovernmental organisations leads to a higher number of different INGO memberships held by the people. A possible explanation to this is that the presence of NGOs could make the people more aware of the possibilities to organise themselves and affect their situation, which could lead to an increase in the number of INGO memberships.



## 8 Conclusion and Final Note

With Haynes's theory as an analytical framework political globalisation has been studied from the two different perspectives; the state actor perspective and the non-state actor perspective. These have been combined as well. Although correlations were observed between the two components constituting the non-state actor component and between the two components of political globalisation, the general outcome of the statistical analysis has shown that no correlation between political globalisation and democratisation in developing countries can be observed. One possible explanation to this is the fact that political globalisation does not require the same preconditions as economic globalisation. The fact is that regardless of level of development a country can engage in global political activities.

Silander's study on democracy promotion maintains that state actors are more active in democracy promoting but that there could be simultaneous bottom-up channel trying to promote democracy from below. The outcome of this study shows that the two components of political globalisation, state actor and non-state actor, in fact are correlated. The level of political globalisation from a state actor perspective has a significant correlation with the level of political globalisation from a non-state actor perspective. This means that the theory used as an analytical framework is confirmed in that sense that state and non-state actors are working interdependently. It is, however, not confirmed in that sense that a correlation is lacking between the different actors and level of democracy.

This is also one of the most interesting outcomes in this study; the correlation between the state actor and non-state actor component. It indicates that high level of political activities on state level, in intergovernmental organisations is somehow connected to a higher level of activities in civil society (higher number of memberships in international nongovernmental organisations and higher presence of INGO secretariats). One can only speculate as to why these are correlated, as the level of democracy has already been excluded as a possible explanation. The correlation could be spurious but more research is needed before anything can be concluded on the correlation between the two.

It should also be kept in mind that the result is much dependent on the material available. The Freedom House categorisation has determined the categorisation of the countries in this study. It is indeed possible that a different categorisation would lead to a different result. In addition, it is a fact that the third factor, background factors, in the theory by Haynes was not included in the study. More in-depth analysis on background could reveal something that has not been possible to observe in this statistical analysis. As possible future research it would be of interest to compare different political categorisations of countries in order to further investigate the linkage between political globalisation and

democratisation. It would also be fruitful to carry out a study which includes all different components of globalisation, but deals with them individually before combining them. As of now, the majority of studies on globalisation tend to lump all different components together without more thought of the importance or unimportance of them.

Although it could be argued that a smaller sample with more thorough analyses would have been more productive, the size of the sample in this study has also been an advantage. The more deviant cases are less likely to distort the result and the fact that almost all developing countries in the world could be included gives the study the advantage of being able to generalise on the basis of the results. Another thing to keep in mind is that the analysis has been carried out on an aggregated level, which means that different international nongovernmental organisations for example have been grouped together. Although the study by Chu *et al* showed that NGOs without overt democracy promoting aims can and do have relevance for the promoting of democracy, it is still reasonable to assume that organisations mainly concerned with topics such as HIV/AIDS or environmental protection have less significance than organisation working for democracy. It would thus be of interest to further study the impact of different international nongovernmental organisations and to produce more material on non-state actors in general, as the material available now is rather limited.

Furthermore a correlation between number of INGO memberships and number of INGO secretariats present could be observed. A given possible explanation is that the presence of NGOs could make the people more aware of the possibilities to organise themselves and affect their situation. This is however only speculations and further studies could investigate this linkage better.

The theory by Haynes assumed that state actors are involved in promoting democracy as well as and pressuring countries to democratise via intergovernmental organisations. However, this seems to have had little effect on the countries partaking in political activities in intergovernmental organisations. Assumably the pressure for democratisation would increase the more involved a country is which assumingly would lead to higher level of democracy, but this is not something that can be seen in this study. In fact, a few of the countries where transition has not begun are the ones to have the highest level of political globalisation both from a state and non-state perspective. From this point of view the ideational victory of democracy might not be much more than just an ideational victory. The overall preference for democracy within different intergovernmental organisations does not seem to have had a major influence on the developing countries considered non-democratic. This also means that Haynes might have overrated the influence exercised by democracy promoting countries and organisations from a political perspective.

In conclusion, much has happened since the fall of the Berlin wall twenty years ago and Fukuyama's statement that the end of history had come. It might be true what Jimmy Carter claims; that if you are totally illiterate and living on one dollar a day, the benefits of globalisation never come to you. However, from a political globalisation perspective it seems like globalisation has little to do with the level of democracy. In the end, the world has changed significantly and much

remains before one can fully understand the processes and their impact on the world that now take place beyond the end of history.

## 9 Executive Summary

The starting point of this study was the statement by Francis Fukuyama that democracy and capitalism had prevailed with the fall of the Berlin wall in the end of the Cold War. Although democracy won an ideational victory, the assumption has been proven wrong as there are many countries in today's world that cannot be considered democratic. These non-democratic countries are mostly found in the developing world. At the same time, major changes have taken place during the past twenty years that followed the fall of the Berlin wall. The processes of globalisation and their effects have become more and more in the centre of attention. The aim of this thesis was to put these two phenomena; globalisation and democratisation, together in order to study how they might affect each other and to put focus on political globalisation, which too often been neglected for economic globalisation. A few previous studies have shown that there is a link between globalisation and democratisation. Jonas Johansson confirmed in his study that high level of globalisation combined with high level of development often occurred in countries with high level of democracy. However, his study combined both economic and political globalisation and could thus not draw any conclusion on which of the factors that were the most important. This is one of the reasons why globalisation has not been studied in its whole. Since globalisation includes political, economic and cultural processes it is very difficult to know which processes have significance for democratisation if they are not first studied on their own. This is also linked to the fact that the different processes of globalisation require different preconditions. For countries to be highly economically globalised, openness, high level of transparency, low level of corruption and protected ownership rights are often required. However, this is something that comes with higher level of democracy and socio-economic development. Political globalisation does not require this. Level of development does not dictate the possibilities for countries to be politically globalised.

The theory of Jeffrey Haynes was used as an analytical framework. The theory was divided into three sets of factors and actors considered important for political globalisation; state actors, non-state actors and background factors. This study did not deal with the latter, as Haynes himself and other previous studies reinforced the fact that countries recently democratised do not belong to a certain group of nations in social, economic or cultural terms and that the structural background conditions differ considerably.

State actors referred to the pressure from other countries and organisations on non-democratic countries to develop, which often occur via intergovernmental organisations. Non-state actors referred to nongovernmental organisations part of the transnational civil society which were thought to work for democracy through

a different channel than state actors. Together the two components made up political globalisation in this study.

A quantitative method was applied in this study, which was motivated by the fact that this study was set to establish if there is a correlation between level of political globalisation and level of democracy. A qualitative method would have been more of use if the study was to find why there is a correlation.

The statistical analysis of the level of democracy and level of political globalisation required a fair amount of material. In order to select the countries qualifying as developing countries both the World Bank Country Classification and the Human Development Index were used. If the countries categorised as developing countries by the World Bank but ranked as having high human development they were excluded. In the end 80 developing countries could be included in the study. Nine countries were excluded as a result of a lack of material, 14 as they were micro-island states.

The countries were then categorised, with the usage of the Freedom House ranking, in three political main categories for the analysis; relatively new democracies, countries where transition has begun and countries where transition has not begun. The countries in the second category were also divided into sub-categories due to variation of political nature. These sub-categories were “stable”, “fluctuating” and “recent move to free”. Stable meaning that a country has not changed Freedom House ranking during the years included in the study, fluctuating meaning that the country has been moving between different Freedom House rankings and finally, recent move to free meaning that the country has been ranked free consecutively but not long enough to be considered a democracy.

The years included in the study were 1991, 1992, 1993, 2001, 2002 and 2003. The reasons why these years have been chosen are due to the material available. Unfortunately, there were not more, nor more recent data available.

The material used for the state actor component of political globalisation was taken from the KOF Index of Globalisation which ranked the countries from 1 to 100 depending on level of political globalisation. Because the materials making up the index were only dealing with state activities on a global level, other material was necessary for the non-state actor component. This was taken from the Global Civil Society Yearbooks, which in three editions included statistics over number of international nongovernmental secretariats in countries as well as number of different international nongovernmental memberships held by the people. This data for both the state actor and non-state actor were then entered into a database in SPSS for every individual year and country together with the political categorisations of the countries.

The statistical analysis was divided into three parts. The two different components of political globalisation were analysed on their own before they were brought together as one, as political globalisation in its whole.

The analysis of the state actor component showed no correlation between political globalisation and level of democracy and there were major variation in political globalisation within the different categories. The result was duplicated in the part analysing the non-state actor component. No correlation could be observed and again major differences were seen within the categories, while they

remained rather small between them. A correlation between number of INGO secretariats and number of INGO memberships could however be observed in the part on non-state actor component of political globalisation. It seems like the presence of international nongovernmental organisation secretariats affects the number of memberships. That is, higher number of secretariats means higher number of memberships.

In the final part, where the two components were brought together another correlation could be observed. The state actor component was correlated with the non-state actor component. This was true for also within every category and sub-category. However, it was confirmed that level of political globalisation and level of democracy were not correlated. This result was the same in all three parts of the analysis and the significance showed that any possible correlation was practically non-existent. The conclusion is thus that there is not a correlation between political globalisation and level of democracy and that political globalisation does not affect democratisation.

One possible explanation this has already been brought up; the fact that political globalisation does not require the same preconditions as economic globalisation. The fact is that regardless of level of development a country can engage in global political activities.

This result has led to the suggestions that future research within this topic should aim to determine the impact of different international nongovernmental organisations as well as to produce more material on non-state actors, as the material available now is rather limited. Furthermore, in-depth analysis on background could reveal something that has not been possible to observe in this study as it only included state and non-state actors. It would also be of interest to compare different political categorisations of countries in order to further investigate the linkage between political globalisation and democratisation. It would also be fruitful to carry out a study which includes all different components of globalisation, but deals with them individually before combining them. As of now, the majority of studies on globalisation tend to lump all different components together. Finally, more research on the correlation between the state and non-state component of political globalisation is suggested as this result is very interesting, but cannot be further developed in the study.

# 10 References

## Literature

- Bevir, Mark, 2009. *Key concepts in governance*. London: SAGE Publications
- Burnell, Peter – Randall, Vicky, 2005. *Politics in the developing world*. Oxford: Oxford University Press
- Chatterjee, Deen K (ed.), 2008. *Democracy in a global world*. Plymouth: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers
- Dahl, Robert A, 1989. *Democracy and its critics*. New Haven: Yale University Press
- Dahl, Robert A, 2005. *Demokratin och dess antagonister*. Denamrk: Nørhaven Paperback
- Diamond, Larry – Plattner, Marc F. – Chu, Yun-han – Tien, Hung-mao (eds.) 1997. *Consolidating the third wave democracies. Regional challenges*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press
- Diamond, Larry, 1999. *Developing democracy. Toward consolidation*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press
- Dicken, Peter, 2007. *Global shift. Mapping the changing contours of the world economy*. London: SAGE Publications
- Djurfeldt, Göran – Larsson, Rolf – Stjärnhagen, Ola. 2008 *Statistisk verktygslåda – samhällsvetenskaplig oraksanalys med kvantitativa metoder*. Lund: Studentlitteratur
- Dreher, Axel, 2006. “Does globalisation affect growth? Evidence from a new index of globalisation”, *Applied Economics*, vol.38 nr.10, from <http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/cite/>
- Engström, Ole – Hydén, Göran (ed.), 2002. *Development and Democracy. What we have learned and how?* London: Routledge
- Feketekuty, Geza. 2007. *Globalization – Why all the fuss?* [www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/1518186/Globalization-Why-All-the-Fuss](http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/1518186/Globalization-Why-All-the-Fuss)

- Grugel, Jean (ed.) 1999. *Democracy without borders. Transnationalization and conditionality in new democracies*. London: Routledge
- Gruegel, Jean, 2002. *Democratization. A critical introduction*. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan
- Hadenius, Axel, 1992. *Democracy and development*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
- Hadenius Axel (ed.) 1997. *Democracy's victory and crisis*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
- Hydén Göran (ed.) 1998. *Demokratisering i tredje världen*. Lund: Studentlitteratur
- Huntington, Samuel P, 1993. *The third wave. Democratization in the late twentieth century*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press
- Linde, Jonas – Ekman, Joakim, 2006. *Demokratiseringsprocesser. Teoretiska ansatser och empiriska studier*. Lund: Studentlitteratur
- Lundquist Lennart, 1993. *Det vetenskapliga studiet av politik*. Lund: Studentlitteratur
- McGrew, Anthony – Poku, Nana K. (ed.), 2007. *Globalization, development and human security*. Cambridge: Polity Press
- Pinkney, Robert, 1993. *Democracy in the third world*. Buckingham: Open University Press
- Scholte, Jan Aart, 2005. *Globalization – a critical introduction*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan
- Silander, Daniel, 2005. *Democracy from the outside-in? The conceptualisation and significance of democracy promotion*. Gothenburg: Intellecta Docusys
- Storm, Lise, 2008. "An elemental definition of democracy and its advantages for comparing political regime types", *Democratization*, vol.15, no.2
- Sørensen, Georg, 1993. *Democracy and democratization*. Oxford: Westview Press
- Vanhanen, Tatu, 1997. *Prospects of democracy. A study of 172 countries*. London: Routledge



## Internet Sources

A.T. Kearney/Foreign Policy Globalisation Index:

[www.atkearney.com/main.taf?p=5,4,127,2](http://www.atkearney.com/main.taf?p=5,4,127,2)

CSGR Globalisation Index: [www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/esgr/index/](http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/esgr/index/)

Freedom House. *Methodology*:

[www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=351&ana\\_page=341&year=2008](http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=351&ana_page=341&year=2008)

Global Policy Forum: [www.globalpolicy.org/globaliz/politics/index.htm](http://www.globalpolicy.org/globaliz/politics/index.htm)

KOF Index of Globalisation. *Definitions and sources*:

[http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/static/pdf/defintions\\_2009](http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/static/pdf/defintions_2009)

The Centre for the Study of Global Governance:

[www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/global/index.htm](http://www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/global/index.htm)

UNDP. *Composite indices – HDI and beyond*:

<http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/indices>

World Bank Country Classification:

<http://go.worldbank.org/K2CKM78CC0>

# Appendix

## 7.1 State Actors

*Combined KOF Index of Globalisation Score for the 1990s and the 2000s for Relatively New Democracies*

<b>Political Globalisation Score 1990s</b>	<b>Country</b>	<b>Average Score/Year</b>	<b>Political Globalisation Score 2000s</b>	<b>Country</b>	<b>Average Score/Year</b>
91,14	Belize	30,38	117,73	Botswana	39,24
94,22	South Africa	31,41	120,77	Belize	40,26
100,60	Mongolia	33,53	138,43	Guyana	46,14
106,54	Namibia	35,51	155,64	Jamaica	51,88
114,14	Botswana	38,05	159,75	Mongolia	53,25
114,73	Benin	38,24	175,32	Namibia	58,44
148,17	Mali	49,39	203,52	Benin	67,84
152,38	Jamaica	50,79	215,64	Mali	71,88
155,57	Guyana	51,86	243,78	Philippines	81,26
198,70	Philippines	66,23	245,52	South Africa	81,84

*Combined KOF Index of Globalisation Score for the 1990s and the 2000s for Countries in Transition, Sub-Category Stable*

<b>Political Globalisation Score 1990s</b>	<b>Country</b>	<b>Average Score/Year</b>	<b>Political Globalisation Score 2000s</b>	<b>Country</b>	<b>Average Score/Year</b>
34,67	Moldova	11,56	106,95	Moldova	35,65
37,53	Armenia	12,51	112,93	Armenia	37,64
37,78	Georgia	12,60	113,61	Georgia	37,87
97,93	Gabon	32,64	126,12	Central African Rep	42,04
106,24	Mozambique	35,41	134,16	Madagascar	44,72
108,39	Burkina Faso	36,13	145,49	Guinea-Bissau	48,50
115,44	Central African Rep	38,48	149,21	Uganda	49,74
116,85	Ukraine	38,95	152,64	Gabon	50,88
120,17	Madagascar	40,07	169,89	Nicaragua	56,63
126,16	Sri Lanka	42,05	176,65	Guatemala	58,83
127,34	Uganda	42,45	189,31	Ethiopia	63,10
135,49	Paraguay	45,16	189,74	Mozambique	63,25
148,74	Ethiopia	49,58	191,28	Colombia	63,76
157,54	Nicaragua	52,51	195,43	Nepal	65,14
159,06	Nepal	53,02	201,89	Burkina Faso	67,30
164,86	Guinea-Bissau	54,95	205,92	Sri Lanka	68,64
178,78	Guatemala	59,59	214,10	Paraguay	71,36
183,77	Bangladesh	61,26	219,86	Bangladesh	73,29
215,75	Colombia	71,92	236,03	Ukraine	78,68
220,86	Jordan	73,62	250,43	Jordan	83,48
232,67	Morocco	77,56	259,54	Morocco	86,51

*Combined KOF Index of Globalisation Score for the 1990s and the 2000s for Countries in Transition, Sub-Category Fluctuating*

<b>Political Globalisation Score 1990s</b>	<b>Country</b>	<b>Average Score/Year</b>
53.33	Kyrgyz Rep	17.78
62.43	Azerbaijan	20.81
97.93	Gambia	32.64
99.13	Yemen	33.04
100.53	Papua New Guinea	33.51
102.21	Malawi	34.07
102.73	Tanzania	34.24
124.68	Haiti	41.56
126.16	Sierra Leone	42.05
135.40	Niger	45.13
140.17	Côte D'Ivoire	46.72
142.11	Dominican Rep	47.37
145.43	Bolivia	48.48
166.55	Honduras	55.52
167.18	Congo Rep	55.73
180.66	Zambia	60.22
186.33	Zimbabwe	62.11
220.47	Kenya	73.49
222.49	Indonesia	74.16
236.96	Pakistan	78.99
243.48	Nigeria	81.16

<b>Political Globalisation Score 2000s</b>	<b>Country</b>	<b>Average Score/Year</b>
120.24	Congo Rep	40.08
129.36	Papua New Guinea	43.12
129.90	Sierra Leone	43.30
132.52	Haiti	44.17
137.57	Yemen	45.86
144.82	Azerbaijan	48.27
166.51	Tanzania	55.50
174.08	Malawi	58.03
175.43	Dominican Rep	58.48
178.08	Kyrgyz Rep	59.36
188.08	Gambia	62.69
203.69	Niger	67.90
206.92	Honduras	68.97
207.68	Zimbabwe	69.25
211.53	Côte D'Ivoire	70.51
221.20	Bolivia	73.73
222.25	Zambia	74.08
246.12	Indonesia	82.04
251.39	Kenya	83.80
263.33	Pakistan	87.78
267.92	Nigeria	89.31

*Combined KOF Index of Globalisation Score for the 1990s and the 2000s for Countries in Transition, Sub-Category Recent Move To Free*

<b>Political Globalisation Score 1990s</b>	<b>Country</b>	<b>Average Score/Year</b>
91.37	Lesotho	30.46
94.30	Suriname	31.43
138.52	El Salvador	46.17
198.42	Thailand	66.14
216.87	Peru	72.29
225.27	Ghana	75.09
230.64	Senegal	76.88
246.56	India	82.19

<b>Political Globalisation Score 2000s</b>	<b>Country</b>	<b>Average Score/Year</b>
107.14	Suriname	35.71
110.75	Lesotho	36.92
214.97	El Salvador	71.66
242.32	Thailand	80.77
242.67	Peru	80.89
250.55	Ghana	83.52
252.39	Senegal	84.13
269.07	India	89.69

*Combined KOF Index of Globalisation Score for the 1990s and the 2000s for Countries Where Transition Has Not Begun*

<b>Political Globalisation Score 1990s</b>	<b>Country</b>	<b>Average Score/Year</b>	<b>Political Globalisation Score 2000s</b>	<b>Country</b>	<b>Average Score/Year</b>
37.49	Tajikistan	12.50	94.40	Myanmar	31.47
63.44	Myanmar	21.15	109.47	Swaziland	36.49
80.44	Cambodia	26.81	109.97	Tajikistan	36.66
98.38	Burundi	32.79	110.42	Burundi	36.81
99.76	Swaziland	33.25	113.07	Cambodia	37.69
106.82	Chad	35.61	123.69	Chad	41.23
108.83	Vietnam	36.28	125.70	Rwanda	41.90
114.71	Rwanda	38.24	137.90	Angola	45.97
117.63	Angola	39.21	138.64	Congo Dem. Rep	46.21
125.38	Mauritania	41.79	142.96	Mauritania	47.65
128.99	Congo Dem. Rep	43.00	143.26	Vietnam	47.75
136.29	Iran	45.43	160.45	Sudan	53.48
146.26	Togo	48.75	162.66	Syria	54.22
148.28	Sudan	49.43	166.11	Togo	55.37
156.07	Syria	52.02	186.62	Iran	62.21
178.24	Cameroon	59.33	207.61	Cameroon	69.20
203.51	China	67.84	243.36	China	81.12
243.03	Tunisia	81.01	253.04	Algeria	84.35
246.34	Algeria	82.11	259.11	Tunisia	86.37
263.06	Egypt	87.69	274.99	Egypt	82.66

Combined KOF Index of Globalisation for All Years

*Relatively New Democracies*

<b>Political Globalisation Score - All Years</b>	<b>Country</b>	<b>Average Score/Year</b>
211,91	Belize	35,32
232,14	Botswana	38,69
260,35	Mongolia	43,40
281,86	Namibia	47,00
294,00	Guyana	49,00
303,81	Jamaica	50,64
318,25	Benin	53,04
339,74	South Africa	56,62
368,02	Mali	61,34
422,48	Philippines	70,41

*Countries in Transition, Recent Move to Free*

<b>Political Globalisation Score All Years</b>	<b>Country</b>	<b>Average Score/Year</b>
201.44	Suriname	33.57
202.12	Lesotho	33.69
353.49	El Salvador	58.92
440.74	Thailand	73.46
459.54	Peru	76.59
475.82	Ghana	79.30
483.03	Senegal	80.51
515.63	India	85.94

*Countries in Transition, Stable*

<b>Political Globalisation Score - All Years</b>	<b>Country</b>	<b>Average Score/Year</b>
141,62	Moldova	23,60
150,46	Armenia	25,08
151,39	Georgia	25,23
241,56	Central African Rep	40,26
250,57	Gabon	41,76
254,33	Madagascar	42,39
276,55	Uganda	46,09
295,98	Mozambique	49,33
310,28	Burkina Faso	51,71
310,35	Guinea-Bissau	51,73
327,43	Nicaragua	54,57
332,08	Sri Lanka	55,35
338,05	Ethiopia	56,34
349,59	Paraguay	58,25
352,88	Ukraine	58,81
354,49	Nepal	59,08
355,43	Guatemala	59,24
403,63	Bangladesh	67,27
407,03	Colombia	67,84
471,29	Jordan	78,55
492,21	Morocco	82,04

*Countries in Transition, Fluctuating*

<b>Political Globalisation Score - All Years</b>	<b>Country</b>	<b>Average Score/Year</b>
207,25	Azerbaijan	34,54
229,89	Papua New Guinea	38,32
231,41	Kyrgyz Rep	38,57
236,70	Yemen	39,45
256,06	Sierra Leone	42,68
257,20	Haiti	42,87
269,24	Tanzania	44,87
276,29	Malawi	46,05
286,01	Gambia	47,67
287,42	Congo Rep	47,90
317,54	Dominican Rep	52,92
339,09	Niger	56,52
351,70	Côte D'Ivoire	58,62
366,63	Bolivia	61,11
373,47	Honduras	62,25
394,01	Zimbabwe	65,67
402,91	Zambia	67,15
468,61	Indonesia	78,10
471,86	Kenya	78,64
500,29	Pakistan	83,38
511,40	Nigeria	85,23

*Countries Where Transition Has Not Begun*

<b>Political Globalisation Score - All Years</b>	<b>Country</b>	<b>Average Score/Year</b>
147,46	Tajikistan	24,58
157,84	Myanmar	26,31
193,51	Cambodia	32,25
208,80	Burundi	34,80
209,23	Swaziland	34,87
230,51	Chad	38,42
240,41	Rwanda	40,07
252,09	Vietnam	42,02
255,53	Angola	42,59
267,63	Congo Dem. Rep	44,61
268,34	Mauritania	44,72
308,73	Sudan	51,46
312,37	Togo	52,06
318,73	Syria	53,12
322,91	Iran	53,82
385,85	Cameroon	64,31
446,87	China	74,48
499,38	Algeria	83,23
502,14	Tunisia	83,69
538,05	Egypt	89,68

*Compared Means and Eta test of significance for State Actor component of political globalisation and level of democracy*

**Report**

Combined KOF all years all countries


Democratisation level	Mean	N	Std. Deviation
Transition not begun	303,3190	20	115,43602
Transition begun stable	312,7238	21	94,30290
Transition begun fluctuating	334,9990	21	94,51886
transition begun recent move to free	391,4763	8	126,14177
Relatively new democracies	303,2560	10	63,02637
Total	322,9116	80	101,33612



**Measures of Association**



	Eta	Eta Squared
Combined KOF all years all countries * Democratisation level	,259	,067

**7.2 Non-State Actors**

*Scattergrams on Correlations between Number of INGO secretariats and Number of INGO Memberships held by the people*









*Pearson's r correlation coefficient on Number of INGO secretariats and Number of INGO Memberships held by the people*

**Correlations**

		# of INGO sec for All year Relatively New democracies	# of INGO mem.ship All years Relatively New Democracies
# of INGO sec for All year Relatively New democracies	Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N	1  10	,958**  10
# of INGO mem.ship All years Relatively New Democracies	Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N	,958**  10	1  10

\*\* . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

**Correlations**

		# of Sec all year Trans. Begun Stable	# of mem.ship all years Trans. Begun Stable
# of Sec all year Trans. Begun Stable	Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N	1  21	,866**  21
# of mem.ship all years Trans. Begun Stable	Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N	,866**  21	1  21

\*\* . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

**Correlations**

		# of Sec all years Trans. Begun Fluctuating	# of mem.ship all years Trans. Begun Fluctuating
# of Sec all years Trans. Begun Fluctuating	Pearson Correlation	1	,739**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		,000
	N	21	21
# of mem.ship all years Trans. Begun Fluctuating	Pearson Correlation	,739**	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,000	
	N	21	21

\*\* . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

**Correlations**

		# of Sec all years Trans Begun Recent Move to Free	# of mem.ship all years Trans Begun Recent Move to Free
# of Sec all years Trans Begun Recent Move to Free	Pearson Correlation	1	,964**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		,000
	N	8	8
# of mem.ship all years Trans Begun Recent Move to Free	Pearson Correlation	,964**	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,000	
	N	8	8

\*\* . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

**Correlations**

		# of sec all years Trans Not Begun	# of mem.ship all years Trans Not Begun
# of sec all years Trans Not Begun	Pearson Correlation	1	,896**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		,000
	N	20	20
# of mem.ship all years Trans Not Begun	Pearson Correlation	,896**	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,000	
	N	20	20

\*\* . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

*Number of INGO secretariats and memberships from 1990s, 2000s and All Years Combined for Relatively New Democracies*

<b>Country</b>	<b>Number of INGO secretariats</b>	<b>Number of INGO memberships</b>
Belize	<b>1990s:</b> 2 <b>2000s:</b> 4 <b>All Years:</b> 6	<b>1990s:</b> 849 <b>2000s:</b> 1175 <b>All Years:</b> 2024
Benin	<b>1990s:</b> 31 <b>2000s:</b> 62 <b>All Years:</b> 93	<b>1990s:</b> 1370 <b>2000s:</b> 2200 <b>All Years:</b> 3570
Botswana	<b>1990s:</b> 12 <b>2000s:</b> 30 <b>All Years:</b> 42	<b>1990s:</b> 1279 <b>2000s:</b> 2024 <b>All Years:</b> 3303
Guyana	<b>1990s:</b> 13 <b>2000s:</b> 30 <b>All Years:</b> 43	<b>1990s:</b> 1241 <b>2000s:</b> 1484 <b>All Years:</b> 2725
Jamaica	<b>1990s:</b> 51 <b>2000s:</b> 51 <b>All Years:</b> 102	<b>1990s:</b> 2264 <b>2000s:</b> 2696 <b>All Years:</b> 4960
Mali	<b>1990s:</b> 18 <b>2000s:</b> 21 <b>All Years:</b> 39	<b>1990s:</b> 1285 <b>2000s:</b> 1896 <b>All Years:</b> 3181
Mongolia	<b>1990s:</b> 6 <b>2000s:</b> 11 <b>All Years:</b> 17	<b>1990s:</b> 434 <b>2000s:</b> 1312 <b>All Years:</b> 1746
Namibia	<b>1990s:</b> 1 <b>2000s:</b> 7 <b>All Years:</b> 8	<b>1990s:</b> 782 <b>2000s:</b> 1954 <b>All Years:</b> 2736
Philippines	<b>1990s:</b> 296 <b>2000s:</b> 326 <b>All Years:</b> 622	<b>1990s:</b> 4334 <b>2000s:</b> 6210 <b>All Years:</b> 10544
South Africa	<b>1990s:</b> 98 <b>2000s:</b> 425 <b>All Years:</b> 523	<b>1990s:</b> 4555 <b>2000s:</b> 8578 <b>All Years:</b> 13133

*Number of INGO secretariats and memberships from 1990s, 2000s and All Years Combined for Countries in Transition, Sub-Category Stable*

<b>Country</b>	<b>Number of INGO secretariats</b>	<b>Number of INGO memberships</b>
Armenia	1990s: 0 2000s: 3 All Years: 3	1990s:83 2000s: 1609 All Years: 1692
Bangladesh	1990s: 41 2000s: 64 All Years: 105	1990s: 2315 2000s: 3508 All Years: 5823
Burkina Faso	1990s: 39 2000s: 59 All Years: 98	1990s: 1375 2000s: 2095 All Years: 3470
Central African Rep	1990s: 9 2000s: 0 All Years:9	1990s: 890 2000s: 1199 All Years: 2089
Colombia	1990s: 131 2000s: 139 All Years: 270	1990s: 4251 2000s: 6021 All Years: 10272
Ethiopia	1990s: 59 2000s: 51 All Years: 110	1990s: 1647 2000s: 2320 All Years: 3967
Gabon	1990s: 9 2000s: 10 All Years: 19	1990s: 1128 2000s: 1476 All Years: 2604
Georgia	1990s 0: 2000s: 10 All Years: 10	1990s: 125 2000s: 1698 All Years: 1823
Guatemala	1990s: 39 2000s: 46 All Years: 85	1990s: 2409 2000s: 3229 All Years: 5638
Guinea-Bissau	1990s: 2 2000s: 0 All Years: 2	1990s: 45 2000s: 734 All Years: 1184
Jordan	1990s: 54 2000s: 79 All Years: 133	1990s:1933 2000s: 2861 All Years: 4794
Madagascar	1990s: 5 2000s: 6 All Years: 11	1990s: 1617 2000s: 2097 All Years: 3714
Moldova	1990s: 0 2000s: 5 All Years: 5	1990s: 61 2000s: 1550 All Years: 1611
Morocco	1990s: 49 2000s: 52 All Years: 101	1990s: 3029 2000s: 4124 All Years: 7153
Mozambique	1990s: 4 2000s: 6 All Years: 10	1990s: 1053 2000s: 1895 All Years: 2948
Nepal	1990s: 20 2000s: 59 All Years: 79	1990s: 1428 2000s: 2531 All Years: 3959
Nicaragua	1990s: 35 2000s: 41 All Years: 76	1990s: 1699 2000s: 2365 All Years: 4064
Paraguay	1990s: 18 2000s: 16 All Years: 34	1990s: 2069 2000s: 2888 All Years: 4957
Sri Lanka	1990s: 48	1990s :3044

	2000s: 59 All Years: 107	2000s: 3999 All Years: 7043
Uganda	1990s: 18 2000s: 56 All Years: 74	1990s: 1926 2000s: 3036 All Years: 4962
Ukraine	1990s: 3 2000s: 51 All Years: 54	1990s: 262 2000s: 4926 All Years: 5188

*Number of INGO secretariats and memberships from 1990s, 2000s and All Years Combined for Countries in Transition, Sub-Category Fluctuating*

<b>Country</b>	<b>Number of INGO secretariats</b>	<b>Number of INGO memberships</b>
Azerbaijan	1990s: 0 2000s: 5 All Years: 5	1990s: 49 2000s: 1236 All Years: 1285
Bolivia	1990s: 7 2000s: 33 All Years: 40	1990s: 2611 2000s: 3610 All Years: 6221
Congo Rep	1990s: 35 2000s: 5 All Years: 40	1990s: 1295 2000s: 1987 All Years: 3282
Côte D'Ivoire	1990s: 94 2000s: 84 All Years: 178	1990s: 2217 2000s: 2986 All Years: 5203
Dominican Rep	1990s: 19 2000s: 17 All Years: 36	1990s: 2188 2000s: 2856 All Years: 5044
Gambia	1990s: 7 2000s: 12 All Years: 19	1990s: 1090 2000s: 1451 All Years: 2541
Haiti	1990s: 5 2000s: 0 All Years: 5	1990s: 1421 2000s: 1823 All Years: 3244
Honduras	1990s: 5 2000s: 39 All Years: 44	1990s: 1816 2000s: 2460 All Years: 4276
Indonesia	1990s: 99 2000s: 114 All Years: 213	1990s: 3828 2000s: 5745 All Years: 9573
Kenya	1990s: 311 2000s: 342 All Years: 653	1990s: 3504 2000s: 4868 All Years: 8372
Kyrgyz Rep	1990s: 1 2000s: 7 All Years: 8	1990s: 27 2000s: 841 All Years: 868
Malawi	1990s: 10 2000s: 9 All Years: 19	1990s: 1357 2000s: 1951 All Years: 3308
Niger	1990s: 14 2000s: 6 All Years: 20	1990s: 1032 2000s: 1480 All Years: 2512
Nigeria	1990s: 174 2000s: 162 All Years: 336	1990s: 383 2000s: 4927 All Years: 8810
Pakistan	1990s: 84 2000s: 82 All Years: 166	1990s: 3175 2000s: 4712 All Years: 7887

Papua New Guinea	1990s: 7 2000s: 16 All Years: 23	1990s: 1617 2000s: 2102 All Years: 3719
Sierra Leone	1990s: 15 2000s: 9 All Years: 24	1990s: 1553 2000s: 1838 All Years: 3391
Tanzania	1990s: 42 2000s: 53 All Years: 95	1990s: 2321 2000s: 3292 All Years: 5613
Yemen	1990s: 0 2000s: 0 All Years: 0	1990s: 707 2000s: 1017 All Years: 1724
Zambia	1990s: 34 2000s: 31 All Years: 65	1990s: 2166 2000s: 2812 All Years: 4978
Zimbabwe	1990s: 72 2000s: 118 All Years: 190	1990s: 2820 2000s: 3983 All Years: 6803

*Number of INGO secretariats and memberships from 1990s, 2000s and All Years Combined for Countries in Transition, Sub-Category Recent Move to Free*

<b>Country</b>	<b>Number of INGO secretariats</b>	<b>Number of INGO memberships</b>
El Salvador	1990s: 27 2000s: 30 All Years: 57	1990s: 1805 2000s: 2609 All Years: 4414
Ghana	1990s: 85 2000s: 109 All Years: 194	1990s: 2699 2000s: 3685 All Years: 6384
India	1990s: 403 2000s: 531 All Years: 934	1990s: 6591 2000s: 9464 All Years: 16055
Lesotho	1990s: 10 2000s: 9 All Years: 19	1990s: 1120 2000s: 1491 All Years: 3611
Peru	1990s: 160 2000s: 145 All Years: 305	1990s: 3932 2000s: 5382 All Years: 9314
Senegal	1990s: 170 2000s: 177 All Years: 347	1990s: 2609 2000s: 3303 All Years: 5912
Suriname	1990s: 1 2000s: 1 All Years: 12	1990s: 843 2000s: 1033 All Years: 1876
Thailand	1990s: 157 2000s: 301 All Years: 458	1990s: 3797 2000s: 5811 All Years: 9608

*Number of INGO secretariats and memberships from 1990s, 2000s and All Years Combined for Countries Where Transition Has Not Begun*

<b>Country</b>	<b>Number of INGO secretariats</b>	<b>Number of INGO memberships</b>
Algeria	1990s: 37 2000s: 32 All Years: 69	1990s: 2391 2000s: 3205 All Years: 5596
Angola	1990s: 3 2000s: 6 All Years: 9	1990s: 912 2000s: 1379 All Years: 2291

Burundi	1990s: 0 2000s: 2 All Years: 2	1990s: 987 2000s: 1453 All Years: 2440
Cambodia	1990s: 0 2000s: 19 All Years: 19	1990s: 279 2000s: 1120 All Years: 1399
Cameroon	1990s: 50 2000s: 66 All Years: 116	1990s: 2128 2000s: 3194 All Years: 5322
Chad	1990s: 1 2000s: 0 All Years: 1	1990s: 777 2000s: 1210 All Years: 1987
China	1990s: 90 2000s: 173 All Years: 263	1990s: 3737 2000s: 8967 All Years: 12704
Congo Dem Rep	1990s: 41 2000s: 14 All Years: 55	1990s: 2182 2000s: 2308 All Years: 4490
Egypt	1990s: 172 2000s: 203 All Years: 375	1990s: 4214 2000s: 5948 All Years: 10162
Iran	1990s: 4 2000s: 21 All Years: 25	1990s: 2047 2000s: 2913 All Years: 4960
Mauritania	1990s: 6 2000s: 7 All Years: 13	1990s: 869 2000s: 1276 All Years: 2145
Myanmar	1990s: 0 2000s: 3 All Years: 3	1990s: 842 2000s: 1231 All Years: 2073
Rwanda	1990s: 7 2000s: 6 All Years: 13	1990s: 1115 2000s: 1560 All Years: 2675
Sudan	1990s: 28 2000s: 26 All Years: 54	1990s: 1896 2000s: 2228 All Years: 4124
Swaziland	1990s: 9 2000s: 6 All Years: 15	1990s: 1018 2000s: 1401 All Years: 2419
Syria	1990s: 58 2000s: 30 All Years: 88	1990s: 1425 2000s: 1814 All Years: 3239
Tajikistan	1990s: 0 2000s: 0 All Years: 0	1990s: 24 2000s: 602 All Years: 626
Togo	1990s: 24 2000s: 58 All Years: 82	1990s: 1515 2000s: 2036 All Years: 3551
Tunisia	1990s: 88 2000s: 90 All Years: 178	1990s: 2754 2000s: 3732 All Years: 6486
Vietnam	1990s: 2 2000s: 11 All Years: 13	1990s: 1007 2000s: 2659 All Years: 3666

*Compared Means and Eta test of significance for Non-State Actor component (secretariats) of political globalisation and Level of democracy*

**Report**

Secretariats GCS All Years

Democratisation level	Mean	N	Std. Deviation
Transition not begun	69,65	20	98,647
transition begun stable	419,14	21	1289,272
transition begun fluctuating	103,76	21	154,263
transition begun recent move to free	290,75	8	307,213
relatively new democracies	149,50	10	226,443
Total	202,44	80	681,223

**Measures of Association**

	Eta	Eta Squared
Secretariats GCS All Years * Democratisation level	,211	,045

*Compared Means and Eta test of significance for Non-State Actor component (memberships) of political globalisation and Level of democracy*

**Report**

Membership GCS All Years

Democratisation level	Mean	N	Std. Deviation
Transition not begun	4117,75	20	2946,560
transition begun stable	3883,24	21	2463,936
transition begun fluctuating	4697,81	21	2508,710
transition begun recent move to free	7146,75	8	4471,630
relatively new democracies	4792,20	10	3864,817
Total	4595,66	80	3090,512



**Measures of Association**

	Eta	Eta Squared
Membership GCS All Years * Democratisation level	,300	,090

*Compared Means and Eta test of significance for Non-State Actor components of political globalisation and Level of democracy*

**Report**

Combined GCS All Years All Countries

Democratisation level	Mean	N	Std. Deviation
Transition not begun	4187,40	20	3035,303
transition begun stable	4302,38	21	2269,708
transition begun fluctuating	4801,57	21	2624,811
transition begun recent move to free	7437,50	8	4767,761
relatively new democracies	4941,70	10	4082,227
Total	4798,10	80	3169,339

**Measures of Association**

	Eta	Eta Squared
Combined GCS All Years All Countries * Democratisation level	,294	,086

*Compared Means and Eta test of significance for Number of Secretariats and Level of democracy*

**Report**

Secretariats GCS All Years

Democratisation level	Mean	N	Std. Deviation
Transition not begun	69,65	20	98,647
transition begun stable	419,14	21	1289,272
transition begun fluctuating	103,76	21	154,263
transition begun recent move to free	290,75	8	307,213
relatively new democracies	149,50	10	226,443
Total	202,44	80	681,223

**Measures of Association**

	Eta	Eta Squared
Secretariats GCS All Years * Democratisation level	,211	,045

*Compared Means and Eta test of significance for Number of Memberships and Level of democracy*

**Report**

Membership GCS All Years

Democratisation level	Mean	N	Std. Deviation
Transition not begun	4117,75	20	2946,560
transition begun stable	3883,24	21	2463,936
transition begun fluctuating	4697,81	21	2508,710
transition begun recent move to free	7146,75	8	4471,630
relatively new democracies	4792,20	10	3864,817
Total	4595,66	80	3090,512

**Measures of Association**

	Eta	Eta Squared
Membership GCS All Years * Democratisation level	,300	,090


### 7.3 State and Non-State Actors Combined

*Pearson's r correlation coefficient on State Actor and Non State Actor Component of Political Globalisation All Years All Countries*

		Combined KOF all years all countries	Combined GCS All Years All Countries
Combined KOF all years all countries	Pearson Correlation	1	,770**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		,000
	N	80	80
Combined GCS All Years All Countries	Pearson Correlation	,770**	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,000	
	N	80	80

\*\* . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

*Scattergram on Correlations between State Actor Component and Non-State Component of Political Globalisation All Years Relatively New Democracies*




*Pearson's r correlation coefficient on State Actor and Non State Actor Component of Political Globalisation All Years Relatively New Democracies*

**Correlations**

		Total Non state actor all years from Relatively New Democracies	Combined KOF score for all years for Relatively New Democracies
Total Non state actor all years from Relatively New Democracies	Pearson Correlation	1	,661*
	Sig. (2-tailed)		,037
	N	10	10
Combined KOF score for all years for Relatively New Democracies	Pearson Correlation	,661*	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,037	
	N	10	10

\*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

*Scattergram on Correlations between State Actor Component and Non-State Component of Political Globalisation All Years Countries in Transition; Stable*




*Pearson's r correlation coefficient on State Actor and Non State Actor Component of Political Globalisation All Years Countries in Transition; Stable*

		Combined KOF score for all years Transition begun (stable)	Total nonstate actor all years Trans Begun Stable
Combined KOF score for all years Transition begun (stable)	Pearson Correlation	1	,726**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		,000
	N	21	21
Total nonstate actor all years Trans Begun Stable	Pearson Correlation	,726**	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,000	
	N	21	21

\*\* . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

*Scattergram on Correlations between State Actor Component and Non-State Component of Political Globalisation All Years Countries in Transition; Fluctuating*




*Pearson's r correlation coefficient on State Actor and Non State Actor Component of Political Globalisation All Years Countries in Transition; Fluctuating*

		Combined KOF Score for all years Transition begun (fluctuating)	Total nonstate actor all years Trans. Begun Fluctuating
Combined KOF Score for all years Transition begun (fluctuating)	Pearson Correlation	1	,891**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		,000
	N	21	21
Total nonstate actor all years Trans. Begun Fluctuating	Pearson Correlation	,891**	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,000	
	N	21	21

\*\* . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

*Scattergram on Correlations between State Actor Component and Non-State Component of Political Globalisation All Years Countries in Transition; Recent Move to Free*




*Pearson's r correlation coefficient on State Actor and Non State Actor Component of Political Globalisation All Years Countries in Transition; Recent Move to Free*

		Combined KOF score for all years Transition begun (recent move to free)	Total nonstate actor all years Trans Begun Recent Move to Free
Combined KOF score for all years Transition begun (recent move to free)	Pearson Correlation	1	,778*
	Sig. (2-tailed)		,023
	N	8	8
Total nonstate actor all years Trans Begun Recent Move to Free	Pearson Correlation	,778*	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,023	
	N	8	8

\*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

*Scattergram on Correlations between State Actor Component and Non-State Component of Political Globalisation All Years Countries Where Transition Has Not Begun*




*Pearson's r correlation coefficient on State Actor and Non State Actor Component of Political Globalisation All Years Countries Where Transition Has Not Begun*

**Correlations**

		Combined KOF Score for all years Transition Not Begun	Total Nonstate actor All Years Trans No Begun
Combined KOF Score for all years Transition Not Begun	Pearson Correlation	1	,835**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		,000
	N	20	20
Total Nonstate actor All Years Trans No Begun	Pearson Correlation	,835**	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,000	
	N	20	20

\*\* . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

*Scattergram on Correlations between State Actor Component and Non-State Component of Political Globalisation, All Countries, 1990s*






*Pearson's r correlation coefficient on State Actor and Non State Actor Component of Political Globalisation, All Countries, 1990s*

		Combined KOF 1990s all countries	Total GCS All Countries 90s
Combined KOF 1990s all countries	Pearson Correlation	1	,773**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		,000
	N	80	80
Total GCS All Countries 90s	Pearson Correlation	,773**	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,000	
	N	80	80

\*\* . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

*Scattergram on Correlations between State Actor Component and Non-State Component of Political Globalisation, All Countries, 2000s*



*Pearson's r correlation coefficient on State Actor and Non State Actor Component of Political Globalisation, All Countries, 2000s*

**Correlations**

		Combined KOF 2000s all countries	Total GCS All Countries 00s
Combined KOF 2000s all countries	Pearson Correlation	1	,742**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		,000
	N	80	80
Total GCS All Countries 00s	Pearson Correlation	,742**	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,000	
	N	80	80

\*\* . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

*Compared Means and Eta test of significance for Political Globalisation and Level of Democracy, All Years*

**Report**

State and Nonstate Actor combined All Years

Democratisation level	Mean	N	Std. Deviation
Transition not begun	4490,7190	20	3132,33203
transition begun stable	4615,1048	21	2339,03304
transition begun fluctuating	5136,5705	21	2709,40721
transition begun recent move to free	7828,9763	8	4863,50292
relatively new democracies	5244,9560	10	4123,66931
Total	5121,0116	80	3248,01543

**Measures of Association**

	Eta	Eta Squared
State and Nonstate actor combined * Democratisation level	,294	,087

*Compared Means and Eta test of significance for Political Globalisation and Level of Democracy, 1990s*

**Report**

State and Nonstate Actor Combined 1990s

Democratisation level	Mean	N	Std. Deviation
Transition not begun	1777,0975	20	1171,70918
transition begun stable	1726,5452	21	1159,43630
transition begun fluctuating	2131,4052	21	1209,68754
transition begun recent move to free	3231,3688	8	2037,83671
relatively new democracies	2019,7460	10	1544,69341
Total	2032,5915	80	1367,60787

**Measures of Association**

	Eta	Eta Squared
State and Nonstate Actor Combined 1990s * Democratisation level	,318	,101

*Compared Means and Eta test of significance for Political Globalisation and Level of Democracy, 2000s*

**Report**

State and Nonstate Actor Combined 2000s

Democratisation level	Mean	N	Std. Deviation
Transition not begun	2713,6215	20	2041,42017
transition begun stable	2891,1514	21	1354,25492
transition begun fluctuating	3004,7438	21	1517,67932
transition begun recent move to free	4471,3575	8	2961,76311
relatively new democracies	3227,2100	10	2631,06876
Total	3076,6149	80	1964,52717

**Measures of Association**

	Eta	Eta Squared
State and Nonstate Actor Combined 2000s * Democratisation level	,251	,063

*Regressions on Political Globalisation and Level of Democracy, 1990s*

**ANOVA<sup>b</sup>**

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	4985411,891	1	4985411,891	2,724	,103 <sup>a</sup>
	Residual	1,428E8	78	1830414,601		
	Total	1,478E8	79			

a. Predictors: (Constant), Democratisation level

b. Dependent Variable: State and Nonstate Actor Combined 1990s

*Regressions on Political Globalisation and Level of Democracy, 2000s*

**ANOVA<sup>b</sup>**

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	7842210,804	1	7842210,804	2,059	,155 <sup>a</sup>
	Residual	2,970E8	78	3808304,884		
	Total	3,049E8	79			

a. Predictors: (Constant), Democratisation level

b. Dependent Variable: State and Nonstate Actor Combined 2000s

*Regressions on Political Globalisation and Level of Democracy, All Years*

**ANOVA<sup>b</sup>**

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	2,657E7	1	2,657E7	2,569	,113 <sup>a</sup>
	Residual	8,068E8	78	1,034E7		
	Total	8,334E8	79			

a. Predictors: (Constant), Democratisation level

b. Dependent Variable: State and nonstate actor combined

*Regressions on Political Globalisation and Level of Democracy, All Years (Democratisation as Dependent Variable)*

**ANOVA<sup>b</sup>**

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	4,316	1	4,316	2,569	,113 <sup>a</sup>
	Residual	131,071	78	1,680		
	Total	135,388	79			

a. Predictors: (Constant), State and nonstate actor combined

b. Dependent Variable: Democratisation level