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An Application of Monroe C. Beardsley's  
Controversion Theory of Metaphor  
– On Examples of Synaesthetic Metaphor from Proust's *À la  
recherche du temps perdu*

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# 1. Introduction and Aim

This thesis takes as its point of departure the metaphor and theory concerning the same. As the accumulated theories of metaphor constitute a virtual maze to navigate, they form a rather fragile ground stone to build a thesis upon. This is information that is probably better to disclose willingly at this early state rather than being forced to later.

Because of the different views on what metaphor really is, when working with it, one has to surround it with rigorous definitions that might seem rather dull. However, making an effort beyond the superficial examination of such theoretical texts, many will sooner or later find themselves intrigued by the metaphor and its functions, by how it is so hard to understand the mechanisms of it while the reading and interpretation of it comes so natural to the human psyche. It is an initial simple wish of the writer to share this fascinating world of metaphor theory with others, however the scientific purposes of the thesis at hand can be reduced to a number of questions that might not easily be answered without it becoming somewhat a “heavy read”.

On another starting note; though the writer of this thesis is orientated towards one theory of metaphor the reader must keep in mind that there is nothing definite about metaphor and that claiming to have found an all encompassing theory of it would be a stroke of hubris. Indeed philosophical theologian Janet Soskice refers to a scholar that upon looking into the matter counted 125 different theories of metaphor in her book *Metaphor and Religious Language* (1985), and this one person cannot possibly have been able to find more than a fraction of them.<sup>1</sup> Thus the theory chosen for the thesis at hand is merely one through which it seems particularly advantageous to look upon the questions raised in this thesis alone.

As metaphor has been looked upon from so many angles and since so many great thinkers has lost sleep over it, the subject as such seems rather hard to approach from a fresh point of view. Instead this thesis is to find a preexisting theory fitting for the metaphorical situation presented here and subsequently try it against a little touched upon, special case, of metaphor.

Synaesthesia is to begin with a psychological affliction that causes experiences by one sense to manifest in another, meaning for example that one who has synaesthesia might experience a sound to have a color.<sup>2</sup> Psychologist Monica Vester has collected many accounts of how synaesthesia might appear to one that is afflicted by it. She recounts for example how one patient, explaining her feelings

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<sup>1</sup> Janet Soskice, *Metaphor and Religious Language*, Oxford 1985, p. 15

<sup>2</sup> Monica Vester, *En värld av nyanser – Om synestesi*, Lund 2008, p. 7, comp. Vester, p. 25f

on meeting different people, says: "If people have the right color so that it blends it can be awesome. It is like being hugged (a bodily, physical feeling) and then the dancing tones enter, sometimes with short pieces of fine lines and beautiful colors of blue and some nice looking reds."<sup>3</sup> This example goes to show how *attempts*, such as this one, to explain synaesthetic phenomena turn the psychological affliction into something of interest to the literary scholar.

The term synaesthetic metaphor applies to a type of figural language that, in a way, strives to achieve a synaesthetic effect with the reader. A simple variation might be the "dancing tones" from the quote above. It is difficult to say from an author's text if she truly has synaesthesia and wishes to describe her experiences by using synaesthetic metaphor or if she merely uses said metaphor in an attempt to encourage synaesthesia with the reader. It is however clear that the use of synaesthetic metaphor varies with literary trends while the ratio of persons that have synaesthesia seems to rest steadily at about one in two-thousand.<sup>4</sup> The special case of metaphor, as described above, is what this thesis will ultimately come to examine and this will be done by means of example. By looking upon examples of synaesthetic metaphor from Marcel Proust's *Swann's Way* (*Du côté de chez Swann*, 1913) and *Within a Budding Grove* (*À l'ombre des jeunes filles en fleurs*, 1918) some hopefully interesting perspectives, on this somewhat obscure sibling of the metaphor, should present themselves.<sup>5</sup>

To summarize; this thesis is to go head to head with metaphor theory and to humbly try to wrestle from the enormous structure of facts and hypotheses that such theories form collectively, one theory that might favorably be used to study another interesting phenomenon. This phenomenon is the variety of metaphor that is encouraging of synaesthesia, called simply synaesthetic metaphor.

## 1.1 Research Questions

As promised in the introduction there are certain questions that must be asked, and preferably answered, to divulge how metaphor is theorized, how it functions and how it appears in its synaesthetic mode. In short these questions, for this thesis, are as follows:

What is metaphor, or rather what does it do, how can it be identified and explicated? The answers here could be many and diverging but one should be inspired rather than deterred by that.

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<sup>3</sup> Vester, p. 23, "Om personer har rätt färg så att det liksom går ihop kan det vara oerhört. Det är som att bli omkramad (en kroppslig, fysisk känsla) och så kommer de dansande tonerna, ibland så kommer det snuttar med fina linjer och vackra blå färger och några snygga röda."

<sup>4</sup> Vester, p. 69, p. 7

<sup>5</sup> Marcel Proust, *Swanns värld*, Stockholm 1993, Marcel Proust, *I skuggan av unga flickor i blom*, Stockholm 1993

Can one distill an essence of metaphor by considering, or comparing, a couple of leading theories and what kind of meanings they propose that metaphor actually produces? It would be a practical impossibility to try to explain or even locate all theories of metaphor for a complete study, so in this case theories that seem exhaustive and have been used by others, is the mode for selection.

Is there a theory that better fits the studying of synaesthetic metaphor than others? If so, then why is that? Since there is such a multitude of theories concerning metaphor one must indeed argue the reason for choosing one before another.

How are some of the synaesthetic metaphors of Proust's *Swann's Way* and *Within a Budding Grove* spelled out and how might they be explicated using the chosen theory?

## 1.2 Disposition

For the first part of this thesis general metaphor theory has been studied in an endeavor to grasp the broader strokes of what metaphor is and what it has been considered to be through history. The reading process was then, more or less automatically, honed in towards more and more specialized cases of metaphor theory and also critique of metaphor theories which indeed have turned out to be even more educational than many of the theories themselves. As part of the purpose of this thesis is to look upon synaesthetic metaphor, one theory, after considering many, stood out as being the most suitable to do so.

For studying synaesthetic metaphor philosopher Monroe C Beardsley's theory as he presents it in his book *Aesthetics – Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism* (1958) was found to be the most suitable, but to be able to apply it to examples, it had to be rigorously presented in the text. Throughout this presentation effort was made to problematize Beardsley's concepts and ideas which indeed led to further insights on what metaphor might be.

To find examples to apply the selected theory on, or put simply to find test subjects, a literary work that is acclaimed for its richness in figural language was turned to. After reading the first two volumes of Proust's epic *In Search of Lost Time (À la recherche du temps perdu, 1913 – 1927)*, synaesthetic metaphors were chosen under no rule but that there should be examples from all five senses to ensure some breadth.

For the next part of the thesis the functions and mechanisms of the theory of metaphor chosen was simply tested on the synaesthetic metaphors from Proust in an attempt to explicate them.

From these explications some concluding answers to the research questions were drawn and somewhat further problematized in the finishing discussion.

### 1.3 Material and limitations

For this thesis, material from several different literary theorists, language philosophers and even a philosophical theologian have been studied in an attempt to understand the metaphor. Some works however have contributed more than others.

As an introduction to the history of the metaphor and to metaphor theory Gerhard Kurz' book *Metapher, Allegorie, Symbol* (1982) has been particularly helpful. Furthermore Janet Soskice's *Metaphor and Religious Language* has, as it takes a panoramic view on metaphor theory in its first half, helped to reinforce the understanding that Kurz' book initiated. Thirdly Beardsley's book *Aesthetics* has of course been of great value for this thesis. One might even say that the bulk of the thesis has been derived from said book in one way or another.

On the area of linguistics Roland Barthes' study of Honoré de Balzac's short story *Sarrasine* (1831) named *S/Z* (1970) has been very helpful, particularly when it comes to the problematizing of connotation and culture.

On a final note Proust's *Swann's Way* and *Within a Budding Grove* have been very inspirational to read parallel to the studying of metaphor theory since Proust's examples of metaphor are indeed some of the finest one will ever come across. It must however be made clear that Proust's text is *not* the focus of this thesis and that no attempt to analyze his works have been made beyond the short passages chosen to test Beardsley's theory against. In other words, this thesis is meant to be purely theoretical and nothing else, however fascinating the examples presented might be.

## 2. Terms

As the terminology of Beardsley's theory of metaphor has been considered unconventional and somewhat unclear, by Soskice among others, definitions of how his terms and others' have been interpreted and used for this thesis follows here.

*Attribution* is, by Beardsley, held to be any two signs or more that holds within them one sign that “denotes a class and also characterizes it in some way” and another that modifies the first.<sup>6</sup> The easiest way to illustrate an attribution would be a noun and paired with an adjective but an attribution could however have other grammatical structures. Since it is Beardsley’s term it will be used throughout this thesis where it applies.

*Catachresis* has, as it is an extensive subject, been bestowed its own chapter. Look to chapter 3.4.

*Connotation* has, as it is an extensive subject, been bestowed its own chapter. Look to chapter 4.2.

*Dead metaphor* is for this thesis to be considered a metaphor in which the connotations of the modifier’s signifieds, due to prolonged use, have taken the place of its denotation in a particular textual context, thus obliterating the contradiction that once made it metaphorical. A dead metaphor might be for example “leg of a table” or “leaf of a book”.

*Denotation* as a linguistic term originates from what linguist Ferdinand de Saussure referred to as signification of the first order. In short, denotation is that which binds a signifier to its signified on its most obvious level, and at the same time it is that which tries to bridge the chasm between the sign and the qualities of an object, person or state of affairs that it wishes to communicate.<sup>7</sup> Roland Barthes has further developed the concept and describes denotation as that part of the signified of a sign that displays itself to the reader and is obvious.<sup>8</sup> The sign “house”, for example, simply denotes a building of some sort. However, buildings can have different structures, different colors and so forth but this is instead part of the connotations of the sign. Connotations will be discussed further in the chapters 4.2, 4.2.1, 4.2.2 and 4.2.3 of this thesis.

*Emotive* theories of metaphor are those which do not accept metaphor to hold a cognitive content and claims rather that metaphorical sign usage in a text might inspire an emotional response with the reader beyond the level of cognition. As the functions of language have been further mapped it has become difficult to explain how an emotional response to a text of any kind could take place

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<sup>6</sup> Monroe C. Beardsley, *Aesthetics – Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism*, Second edition, Indianapolis 1988 (1958), p. 138f

<sup>7</sup> Saussure according to John Fiske, *Kommunikationsteorier – En introduction*, second revised edition, Stockholm 2001 (1990) p. 117

<sup>8</sup> Roland Barthes, *S/Z*, Lund 1975, p. 16. It will be noted here that Barthes definition of denotation is the one that has been used throughout this thesis.



without it being grounded in a cognitive process. Or basically, that meaning is a condition for emotional response to texts.<sup>9</sup>

*Explication* has, as it is an extensive subject, been bestowed its own chapters. Look to chapter 4.1 and 4.3.

*Meaning* is that which allows a text to refer to something in the world but even texts that do not refer can have meanings as long as they are not nonsense to the reader. This means that reference is bound to the event of uttering, is made while the text is uttered, while meaning remains with said utterance even if its reference is no longer active. It must be stressed here that meaning is extracted from a textual context, not from single signs.<sup>10</sup>

*Reference* is bound to an utterance and is that, in the world, which said utterance refers to. It is illustrative to imagine that in the particular event of an utterance, the meaning of the signs that constitute the utterance creates a reference to something in the world. “A green house” means, in short, a house that is painted with a certain color while it might refer to a certain “green house” as it is uttered. However one must recall that this is just a way of understanding reference and that reference might as well be something fictional that refers to something in a world other than the physical one, a constructed world. It might however be helpful to look upon reference as something extra-linguistic and is thus differentiated from meaning, which lies within the linguistic structures of language.<sup>11</sup>

*Sense* is for this thesis to quite simply be considered, that which is the dictionary definition of a sign. Not to be confused with a sign's denotation which should rather be considered that which binds a signifier to its signified or a sign to the qualities of an object, person or state of affairs that it wishes to communicate.<sup>12</sup>

*Sign* as defined by Saussure is a phenomenon of language. How signs look varies to a great degree between different languages. Waving one's hand to signal hello constitutes a sign as do a photography but for this thesis sign will be taken to be the same as word if other distinctions are not made. All signs are bisect containing a *signifier*, which is the physical appearance of the sign that is arbitrarily connected to a *signified*, which is the mental idea or process that is instigated upon reading the sign. Saussure's model of signs focuses on the linguistic parts of language which makes his model preferable for dealing with formal theories of metaphor, as this thesis does. However, without claiming

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<sup>9</sup> Soskice, p. 26, Beardsley, p. 134

<sup>10</sup> Umberto Eco, *A Theory of Semiotics*, First midland book edition, Indianapolis 1979 (1976), p. 66, Soskice, p. 52f

<sup>11</sup> Soskice, p. 52f, 130

<sup>12</sup> Soskice, p. 52, Fiske, p. 117

that all forms of signification is extra-linguistic, the French structuralists have developed Saussure's model to include signification of different types.<sup>13</sup> For this thesis denotation and connotation is used in connection with signs to quite an extent. To clear any confusion, mental processes like that of connotation is confined within the signified of the sign, and is spoken of in such a fashion throughout this thesis, but for such processes to occur, the signifier is of course a prerequisite. There can be no signified without a signifier and the sign is the totality of these two fractions. Furthermore whole books are written on the subject of the sign but for the humble purposes of this thesis the definition above should suffice.

*Utterance* is distinct from attribution since it seems to treat the event of producing a text rather than a text as something that is definite after it has been produced. It is also different as it does not require a subject and modifier. Utterance has been used here for the definition of reference since it is necessary to speak of the particular event of text production while explaining how extra-textual context is essential to reference. Since reference has not been made an issue to any great extent for this thesis, attribution will be used hereafter and where that does not apply, text will be used.

### 3. The Metaphor

To clarify earlier rudimentary explanations of metaphor Quintilian, Roman rhetorician of the first century, divided it into four distinct groups. The tradition of considering metaphor as a quadrisection phenomenon has then lived on and entered modern theories and schools of thought. This in itself may not be very interesting but it speaks something of metaphor theory and how a long tradition has limited the scope of scholars and theoreticians when it comes to said phenomenon.<sup>14</sup> Kurz starts his book on figural language *Metapher, Allegorie, Symbol* with an explanation of the substitution theory of metaphor, which is considered to derive from Aristotle's theories of figural language in rhetoric. This, the most basic of theories of metaphor, explains how metaphORIZATION is the creation of a linguistic disturbance by means of changing a proper sign in a text to one improper and by doing so articulating accordance between the substituted signs.<sup>15</sup> An example of this might be using the improper word "green" instead of the proper "beginner". This, in turn, means that metaphor would create no meaning of its own, that one could either use a literal (proper) alternative to express an intended meaning or use

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<sup>13</sup> Fiske, p. 66f

<sup>14</sup> Soskice, p. 7

<sup>15</sup> Gerhard Kurz, *Metapher, Allegorie, Symbol*, fourth revised edition, Göttingen 1997 (1982), p. 7, p. 11

a metaphorical (improper) alternative to express the same. In short it reduces metaphor to an ornamental function of language. However, according to Soskice, reducing the Aristotelian view on metaphor to simple substitution, something that is done by routine, is reading too little into his remarks on the subject. Soskice then illustrates by example from Aristotle's texts how he allows for metaphor as being able to name that which has no name, to fill "lexical gaps" by means of catachresis, which is something that will be discussed more thoroughly later.<sup>16</sup> This is something that clearly, according to Kurz' explanation, lies beyond the reach of substitution theory, since no sign is substituted where catachresis occurs, and it goes to illustrate how theories of substitution was obsolete to their purpose from the beginning and indeed are so still.

As Kurz speaks collectively of theories that claim metaphor to be merely ornamentalist and isolated to the single sign, he speaks collectively of theories that acknowledge textual context as necessary for the production of meaning of metaphor as well and he calls these interaction theories. Communal for these theories are also that they consider metaphor to produce its own meanings, thus not merely as being a linguistic ornament contained within a single sign that is used instead of a literal or proper other. That substituting a hypothetical proper sign in a text for another, improper, could not be done without loss and differentiation of meaning of the text.<sup>17</sup> This means that a figural sentence such as "he is green" actually means something else than the literal "he is a beginner". Interaction theory supports the thesis that, in metaphor, incongruence exists between a sign and its textual context and that this activates an interactive interpretation between the two resulting in new meanings being produced.<sup>18</sup> With Soskice, theories that are characterized by this belief in the production of new meaning by metaphor are referred to as incremental theories.<sup>19</sup> By introducing textual context to the metaphorical scheme Kurz adds another piece to the puzzle of metaphor and its mechanisms.

### 3.1 Black's Interaction View of Metaphor

As they share names, one might think that Kurz has derived his idea of interaction theory from philosopher Max Black. But the similarities between Kurz' and Black's theories turns out to be superficial at best. Black's interaction view of metaphor, as presented in *Models and Metaphor – Studies in Language and Philosophy* (1962), is instead inspired by earlier theories of rhetorician I. A.

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<sup>16</sup> Soskice, p. 8f, p. 61

<sup>17</sup> Kurz, p. 8

<sup>18</sup> Kurz, p. 8

<sup>19</sup> Soskice, p. 31

Richards. Where Kurz speaks of the interaction between a sign and its textual context Black considers how a metaphor has two elements within an attribution, the principal subject and the subsidiary subject, that because of their unconventional contextualization of each other interacts to create a new extended meaning that can not be created by any one sign. Black suggests that the “system of associated commonplaces”, which he describes as those things that an individual holds to be true about the subject in question, of the subsidiary subject actually organizes ones view of the principal subject and by this the two signs together gives meaning to the attribution. Black further states the condition that the reader has identified this extension of meaning for the metaphor to work at all.<sup>20</sup> Considering the metaphor “he is green” again, the primary subject is “he” and the subsidiary subject is “green”. According to Black’s theory that which the reader knows, “the system of associated commonplaces”, of green remolds the readers understanding of the primary subject “he” thus produces the meaning of the metaphor.

Criticizing Black’s and a number of other theories Soskice speaks of the “hegemony of the word” as concerning the problems with definitions of metaphor that do not take textual context into consideration and doing this she seems to be in agreement with Kurz who claims that metaphor can not even be identified without appreciation of textual context and situation.<sup>21</sup> Theories that do not consider extra-textual context, intention, reference and presupposition as being necessary for metaphorical construal and instead relies completely on linguistics for the understanding of the mechanisms of metaphor, constitutes what Soskice calls formal theories of metaphor.<sup>22</sup> Soskice does not promote this view on metaphor but one can not help to ask if influx of the loose variables mentioned above would not ruin the possibilities for formulating a theory of metaphor at all. Imagine all the cases where the intention of the speaker cannot be known, and regard the fluctuating nature of presuppositions depending on the situation of the reading. No, for the thesis at hand the vague concept of connotation bound within the linguistic nature of the formal metaphor (something that will be further discussed later) is simply enough of a problem to cope with. However, as far as Kurz go on extra-linguistic phenomena being variables when it comes to *identifying* a metaphor, his theory plays rather well.

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<sup>20</sup> Max Black, *Models and Metaphor – Studies in Language and Philosophy*, New York 1962, p. 38ff

<sup>21</sup> Soskice, p. 21, Kurz, p. 13

<sup>22</sup> Soskice, p. 32

## 3.2 Davidson's Nudge

Philosopher Donald Davidson has, in his article "What Metaphors Mean" (1978), constructed a theory of metaphor that, like theories of substitution, holds that metaphorization does not create new meanings, however he does not refuse that metaphor often holds meanings of an exotic or artful kind, he then complements this idea with an emotive concept.<sup>23</sup>

Davidson's theory states that while the metaphor is used according to the same rules as any other form of language and while the metaphor displays its meaning like any other text, it "nudges" its reader into noting similarities between the signifieds of the signs of the metaphor.<sup>24</sup> He goes so far in this idea of metaphor as promoting comparison, that he considers metaphor to "nudge" its reader to note the same types of meanings (literal meanings) that simile *tells* one to note.<sup>25</sup> Thus the metaphor "he is green" would "nudge" its reader into noting similarities between the "he" and the "green" which, in the readers mind, would turn the metaphor into the simile "he is like green".

Davidson furthermore states that "implication is not meaning", that the "nudge" he assigns to the metaphorical texts lies outside of the meaning production of language.<sup>26</sup> Consider for a moment that such a thing as an extra-linguistic "nudge" guiding the production of meaning by a reader was possible and consider also, for this argument that language evolves for practical purposes of good communication. Would such a "nudge" not constitute a rather powerful means for controlling the meaning production of language? Would such "nudges", if they were possible, not then govern or at least be a part of all language? And if they by some sophisticated mode of reasoning could be explained to only be possible in metaphorical language, would speakers then not choose to speak solely by metaphor since they would then have powers of control that they would not have by use of literal language?

A second critique of Davidson's theory goes to the simple practice of turning metaphor into simile as a way to explicate it. Beardsley discusses the branch of theories of metaphor that indeed claims metaphors to be nothing but elliptical similes, meaning that metaphors would always be best explicated by simply adding the comparison word that is prerequisite for similes, making the metaphor literal by turning it into a simile.<sup>27</sup> With theories such as these, as with substitution theory before them,

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<sup>23</sup> Donald Davidson, "Metaforers mening", *Språk, tanke och handling*, Stockholm 2004, p. 193

<sup>24</sup> Davidson, p. 199

<sup>25</sup> Davidson, p. 202

<sup>26</sup> Davidson, p. 203, "antydning är inte mening"

<sup>27</sup> Beardsley, p. 137

claiming metaphor to be simply ornamental, to be only figural ways of expressing something that might as well be said literally, this introduction to the world of metaphor theory has reached full circle and a new springing point.

### 3.3 The Essence of Metaphor

It has been shown in chapter 3. how the substitution theory, ascribed to Aristotle by misreading, claims metaphor to be an ornamental trope of the rhetoric that is a result of the substitution of a proper sign by an improper. Yet, by performing this substitution no change appears to the meaning of the text. The substitution theorists thus states that the essence of metaphor is its aesthetic value but one cannot help wondering how a text can change the reader's aesthetic evaluation of it without changing its meaning.

Interaction theory instead claims that the signifieds of a sign in a metaphor interacts with its textual context and that this is how metaphor indeed can apply to its own meanings. This meaning that there is not a more proper way to refer to the meaning of the metaphor than the metaphor itself. This holds that what the metaphor does is filling previously empty lexical slots thus complementing the language with signifiers for signifieds previously unspoken. The term for this is catachresis and it will be further looked upon later.

Black's interaction view of metaphor ascribes two subjects to the metaphor where one has its system of commonplaces organized by the other resulting in a shift of meaning in the attribution. This, he claims, results in a dangerous concoction where the reader might not interpret into the metaphor what she is supposed to.<sup>28</sup> The view that metaphor is a hazardous component of language is one shared by many.

“[D]eplaced, dishonest and, because it is no longer considered univocal, inexact and ambiguous.”<sup>29</sup> Thus Kurz summarizes the critique of substitution theories of metaphor during the twentieth century.<sup>30</sup> Can these obstacles then be overcome by other theories of metaphor? Since Black's theory is non-substitutive and he still considers metaphorical language a danger to communication it may be difficult to remain hopeful.

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<sup>28</sup> Black, p. 46f

<sup>29</sup> Kurz, p. 9, “[D]e-plaziert, unernst und, weil nicht mehr eindeutig, ungenau und zweideutig.”

<sup>30</sup> It will be noted here that Black's interaction view of metaphor is not included among the substitution-theories. Kurz merely have the same ideas regarding the essence of substitution-theory that Black has concerning his own. Namely that metaphor is a danger to the language situation.

However Davidson seems to be of a completely different view when he talks of metaphor as being a necessary and positive element in language, “not only in fiction but also in science, philosophy and law” furthermore he concludes that metaphor is indeed a sufficient means for communicating and that it is not dubious in nature.<sup>31</sup>

After examining such alternate versions of metaphor theory as done above, one might conclude from the diversity of the answers given as to metaphor’s essence, that it cannot be separated from its mechanisms. That is, if metaphor at all has an essence separate from that of language at large. It is thus to the mechanisms of metaphor one has to look to find an answer to what kind of meanings metaphor produces and if those are differentiated in any way from meanings that literal language holds.

### 3.4 Catachresis

There is, before leaving the subject of what metaphor does, another aspect that deserves looking further into. Soskice defines catachresis as “the supplying of a term where one is lacking in the vocabulary” and she further explains how metaphorization is one way that catachresis can be performed.<sup>32</sup> Typical results of catachresis are for example “leg of a table” or “leaf of a book”, which are also examples of dead metaphors.

There are two basic fractions among theories of metaphor. The first claims metaphorization to be an unconventional use of signs in a text that leaves the meaning of it unaltered (ornamentalists). And the second claims metaphorization to be a way to express meanings that cannot be expressed in any other way by using standard language (catachrecists). To further explain, a metaphor is either a way of using signs unconventionally to express a conventional meaning or using signs conventionally to express an unconventional meaning. What is puzzling with both these variations is how the normally quite rigid bonds, between the physical appearance of a text and the meaning that the text holds, suddenly become flexible when the text is a metaphor. Usually such bonds are considered to be the result of a slow process of establishing conventions of language which makes them quite difficult to corrupt.<sup>33</sup>

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<sup>31</sup> Davidson, p. 193, p. 195f, “inte bara i skönlitteraturen utan också inom vetenskap, filosofi och juridik”

<sup>32</sup> Soskice, p. 61

<sup>33</sup> Fiske, p. 107f, It will be noted here that this might not apply in the same way when extra-textual circumstances are considered as components in the construction of meaning. Different situations may very well allow for an attribution to mean completely different things. For this thesis however, such circumstances have, as said before, not been taken into account.

Consider now the single sign, and how well a definition of it in a lexicon from the eighties usually still applies today. This must mean that the bulk of the stock of signs has senses that are still intact after decades of use, and as a sign's senses are a result of its denotation, the signified must remain rather unaffected.

If the answer to what catachresis by metaphor is cannot be found in the single sign it must lie in the textual contextualization that constitutes a text. Indirectly this gives that the meaning of a metaphor is not the sum of its signs, that the signifieds of the signs of a metaphor are not simply stacked on top of each other for the meaning of the text to be extracted.<sup>34</sup>

Allowing the line of thought pursued above, what is then catachresis by metaphor? It must concern the modification of the meaning of a text, done by *manipulating* the reader's utilization of the signifieds of the single signs when extracting the meaning of said text. This might simply be considered a change focus when reading, allowing the meaning of a text to change without a complete change of signifieds within the single signs. This change of focus within the sign would let the metaphor say new things without allowing for the whole sign to be rapidly reconstructed simply by being used in metaphor. There is furthermore a theory that supports this.

## 4. Beardsley's Controversion theory of Metaphor

Beardsley has in his *Aesthetics* constructed a theory of metaphor that allows for the metaphor to say something new without its signs having to change their signifieds. Instead he considers the metaphor to instigate a change of focus within the structure of a sign.<sup>35</sup>

Like Black Beardsley works with two signs that he calls the subject, and the modifier. Beardsley holds that the pair of subject and modifier constitutes an *attribution*, metaphorical or not, and that an attribution can have more signs than the two but never less thus implying that textual context is a prerogative for the production of meaning.<sup>36</sup>

To explain his theory Beardsley initially presents a literal language situation generally referred to as self-contradictory attribution. When such an attribution holds within its modifier some connotations that can be accepted by the subject the self-contradiction becomes significant and among significant

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<sup>34</sup> It will be noted here that even though the reasoning here concerns only metaphor, it is not meant to say that the meaning of a text is the sum of its signs when the text is not metaphorical.

<sup>35</sup> Beardsley, p. 138

<sup>36</sup> Beardsley, p. 139, Comp. Beardsley, p. 143



self-contradiction there is a subcategory called significant and indirect self-contradiction, or more plainly metaphor. To use Beardsley's own examples; A self-contradictory attribution where one might not be able to find connotations of the modifier that applies to the subject might be "circles are square".<sup>37</sup> If the self-contradiction is significant it might be an oxymoron such as "these my feet go slowly fast" from Lovelace.<sup>38</sup> Finally, if the significant self-contradiction is indirect it might be "female uncle" as opposed to the direct "female male".<sup>39</sup> Accordingly "[t]he man is a fox" is a self-contradiction since its impossible to be both "man" and "fox", its indirect because modifier and subject are not direct opposites and it is significant since some of the characteristics connoted by "fox" indeed might apply to "man".<sup>40</sup>

Beardsley continues to speak of the need for the connotations of a modifier to be accepted by a subject as a requirement for the significant and indirect self-contradiction to work and this says much on what constitutes Beardsley's theory of metaphor as a whole.

Taking self-contradiction as a basis for all metaphors is Beardsley's way to explain how the reading of a metaphor results in a change of focus within the structure of the modifier and ultimately in a new meaning of the attribution. When a reader comes upon a subject and modifier that are self-contradictory she directly identifies them as either trying to say something, as being significant, or as an obvious mistake from the speaker resulting only in nonsense.<sup>41</sup> Beardsley thus acknowledges that the identification of a metaphor depends on the reader's ability to grasp textual context.<sup>42</sup> If the attribution is identified as significant the reader realizes that its meaning must be hidden behind the incompatibility of the denotations of the subject and modifier. This incompatibility thus forces the reader to instantly shift focus within the signified of the modifier, from its nonsense rendering denotation, to its connotations, because if the indirectly self-contradictory attribution is significant, some of its connotations can produce a logical textual context when accepted by the subject, where denotation could not. From this, previously obscured textual context, new meaning is negotiated by the connotations of the modifier that has been accepted by the subject, connotation thus taking up the role that was denotation's just before. The connotations of the modifier simply enters the void left when its denotation were canceled out by controversy. Subsequently when the reconstructed modifier is applied

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<sup>37</sup> Beardsley, p. 140

<sup>38</sup> Beardsley, p. 141

<sup>39</sup> Beardsley, p. 141

<sup>40</sup> Beardsley, p. 140f

<sup>41</sup> Comp. Beardsley, p. 140f

<sup>42</sup> Beardsley, p. 143

to the subject and starts to interact with its textual context, it gives rise to previously obscured potential meanings of the attribution.<sup>43</sup> Beyond significant and indirect self-contradiction Beardsley considers obvious falsity between subject and modifier to be able to instigate a reconstruction according to the same pattern as above and thus to constitute a metaphor as well.<sup>44</sup>

Beardsley differentiates between individual reading and explication of a metaphor. He claims that even though individual readings might differ, there exists a *correct* explication of any metaphor.<sup>45</sup> This is difficult to get ones head around and that has, partly, to do with how Beardsley uses two concepts. The first is the concept of explication itself and how it differs from an individual reading. The second is connotation, the subjectivity of which, if connotation indeed is a subjective part of the sign, must be stayed for a definite explication of a metaphor in line with Beardsley's theory to be possible. However, before discussing the two problems of explication and connotation, one more aspect of Beardsley's theory must be mentioned.

Multiple metaphors are a problem when it comes to explication since the many controversies that arise within them cannot be dealt with at once. Beardsley suggests that one must, when explicating a multiple metaphor, primarily consider the order of the signs in the metaphor. Then one must let the connotations selected by the principles of congruence and plenitude of the first sign be applied to the second, those of the second to the third and so forth, until the last connotations can be applied to the final subject.<sup>46</sup> This however concerns metaphors within metaphors but something that seems to be more common are metaphors with several modifiers. The distinction is made here since Beardsley does not expand upon what multiple metaphor really is and since his example is dissimilar to those metaphors that will be encountered here.

## 4.1 Explication

In several passages Beardsley agrees that any number of readings can result from a metaphor and he claims this to result in relativism when it comes to the reading of metaphor. However he suggests that there is a way of escaping relativism and in doing so he speaks of explication, or explication-statements as apart from readings.<sup>47</sup> Per his own definition, an explication is, instead of an individual

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<sup>43</sup> Comp. Beardsley, p. 138, p. 140f

<sup>44</sup> Beardsley, p. 142

<sup>45</sup> Beardsley, p. 146

<sup>46</sup> Comp. Beardsley, p. 144

<sup>47</sup> Beardsley, p. 143, p. 145f

reading, an *instruction* on how to read the metaphor and by means of the mechanisms of explication he claims that a *correct* explication can be deduced.<sup>48</sup> Beardsley calls these mechanisms the principles of congruence and plenitude and their functions are to show the reader what to read into the metaphor for it to mean the *correct* thing. The principle of congruence means to find the connotations of the modifier that logically and physically *fits* the subject. Secondly the principle of plenitude attributes all of the fitting connotations discovered to the metaphor so that it “means all that it can mean”. Thirdly, by taking into account the connotations’ applicability to the larger textual context of the attribution, more connotations of the modifier are eliminated.<sup>49</sup>

For Beardsley’s wish to escape relativism to be granted, all connotations of modifiers that are kept, after the use of the principles of congruence and plenitude and after the elimination by textual context, must be complementary upon one another and not opposing. This is because Beardsley suggests that individual explications must be able to add on to each other. Adding said explications together, Beardsley claims, would finally result in an explication holding a quantity of data that no other explication can topple, which makes it as the *correct* one. This is held to be true by Beardsley with the exception of ambiguous metaphors but such, he holds, must own “a limited number of equally *correct*” explications and thus are still not subject to relativism.<sup>50</sup>

Is Beardsley’s effort to circumvent relativism then reasonable, considering that the explicator tests the acceptability of her *personal* connotations of the modifier on the subject by means of the principles of congruence and plenitude? If connotations are personal and individually ascribed to the particular sign, there must be the possibility of opposing individual connotations that are both acceptable by the subject and this constitutes a problem with Beardsley’s theory of explication. This is because opposing connotations to a modifier that are both acceptable to the subject would not allow for the explications that said connotations gives rise to, to complement each other into forming a superior *correct* explication. They would be degenerative instead of constructive of explication except in the cases of ambiguous metaphors that Beardsley speaks of.

Before moving on to a discussion on connotations, to find out more precisely what Beardsley means by ambiguity, one is directed to his example of it which goes; “[h]e rents the house”.<sup>51</sup> Beardsley holds this text to be ambiguous basically because the sign “rents” has two denotations. One

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<sup>48</sup> Beardsley, p. 146

<sup>49</sup> Beardsley, p. 144

<sup>50</sup> Beardsley, p. 145

<sup>51</sup> Beardsley, p. 145

that is, approximately, *acquiring* accommodation in exchange of currency and another that is, approximately, *supplying* accommodation in exchange for currency. It seems thus that ambiguity according to Beardsley rather concerns signs that have two denotations than the problem of individual connotation.

## 4.2 Connotation

Ironically one of the major weaknesses of Beardsley's theory, according to Soskice, is indeed his at best vague definitions of the connotation that he focuses his whole theory on.<sup>52</sup> The problem of connotation becomes two headed for this thesis, since it is both a matter of answering what connotation is and at the same time how Beardsley uses the concept.

Connotation according to professor of communication John Fiske is that which takes place when the sign meets the reader's "notions or feelings and the values of the culture" furthermore he states that it is in the case of connotation where "the signified approaches the subjective, or at least the inter-subjective".<sup>53</sup> This explanation is hardly enough to leave the issue of connotation behind since it really only leaves more questions to be answered. How does Fiske intend for the reader to interpret "culture" and subject and furthermore, is it not rather important to specify if connotation is "subjective" or "inter-subjective"?

### 4.2.1 Subjectivity

Consider for a moment that connotation is individually negotiated by the subject upon reading a sign, then one must continue to ask from where or what the subject itself is derived. Imagining the subject as a hub of information and judgement, that independently negotiates connotation to the signs it encounters while remaining unaffected by said signs is the same as claiming that language has nothing to do with communication and that interpretation, instead of having practical grounds, is nothing but a hobby of hermits. No, the subject must, partially at least, be a result of the language situation surrounding it and this is something that Beardsley explicitly agrees to.<sup>54</sup>

Barthes has in *S/Z* spoken of subjectivity and of how one is to treat the phenomenon. He speaks of subjectivity as something that might seem to be "an independent, saturated world of ideas" that the

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<sup>52</sup> Soskice, p. 33f

<sup>53</sup> Fiske, p. 118, "uppfattningar eller känslor och de värderingar som gäller i kulturen", "betydelsen närmar sig det subjektiva, eller åtminstone det intersubjektiva"

<sup>54</sup> Beardsley, p. 25

writer or reader brings to her text.<sup>55</sup> However Barthes decidedly speaks against such a view on subjectivity, indeed he completely disbands such ideas, by considering the subject itself as a result of the codes surrounding it.<sup>56</sup> Thus any subject would only write herself into the group of codes that she is constructed by and subjectivity would no longer be an issue of connotation within said group. If one considers Fiske's inter-subjectivity as meaning subjectivity between such groups of codes, that might be called cultures, instead of singular subjects his reasoning seems to be in line with Barthes' explanation, and one is inclined to interpret Fiske's inter-subjectivity just so because one could not possibly imagine something to be half-subjective, which would be the other way to interpret his words. This makes further sense as he later explains that "[c]onnotation is, in all, arbitrary and specific for a culture" which affirms his view on connotation as something specific to a culture rather than to an individual.<sup>57</sup>

## 4.2.2 Culture

To fully understand connotation, it was found above that one must endeavor just a bit further by asking how culture would be defined for it to be the stuff of connotation. One might say that a culture as far as language goes is the result of accumulated experience of a group of people. This, at least, seem to play into the semiotician idea of how cultural belonging affects communication.<sup>58</sup> Claiming that a sign gets its connotations by the cultural setting in which it is used, read and written, is according to the definition of culture above to say that understanding is a result of mutual experience between users of the sign. However, if it is so, the problem becomes one of how to separate one culture from another and to do that one has to find out what it is that separates cultures from each other. This is because if one wants to eliminate subjectivity of connotation, by claiming that the subject is spawned by its experience in a certain cultural context, cultures have to be distinguishable from each other without overlapping. This because overlapping cultural fields would reestablish subjectivity of the connotations of a sign, or at least what would seem to be subjectivity between the users of said sign, within said fields. Is it then defensible to claim that a clear distinction between cultures can be made, keeping in mind how one navigates through a virtual jungle of cultures and subcultures, on ones way from the maternity ward to the funeral parlor? No, instead one would have to

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<sup>55</sup> Barthes, p. 17, "en självständig, mättad föreställningsvärld"

<sup>56</sup> Barthes, p. 17

<sup>57</sup> Fiske, p. 119, "[k]onnotation är på det hela taget godtycklig och specific för en kultur"

<sup>58</sup> Fiske, p. 12f

look upon the situation from the opposite perspective to find an explanation as to how one culture is separated from another.

From this opposite end of the discussion one might claim, not that culture produces shared connotations, but that shared connotations is that which separates one culture from another. Sadly such a conclusion does not help much when one considers the textual context of signs that is essential to meaning production and the reasoning becomes particularly unhelpful when applied to the meaning production of Beardsley's metaphor, of which textual contextualization of connotation holds the lion's share.<sup>59</sup> Certain signs would then activate different cultural structures upon negotiating their connotations, since each sign would have been experienced in different cultural settings. Would this not make the reading of texts a positively schizophrenic experience?

Extraction of metaphorical meaning by means of Beardsley's theory and Fiske's semiotic view on connotation does not seem to allow any escape from the relativism that Beardsley strives to circumvent. Trying to deduct what Beardsley means by connotation through further reverse engineering of his theory seems bound to be inaccurate and in the end maybe such a maneuver would be pointless.

### 4.2.3 Barthes' connotation

Since Beardsley does not define connotation properly and since the reasoning on the subject made earlier in this thesis only defines connotation as something that lends a stroke of relativism to language, a set definition regarding other circumstances of connotation must be chosen. Barthes has previously been mentioned on the case of subjectivity, however he also has a theory of connotation that supplements Beardsley's theory of metaphor rather well and at the same time makes some allowance for the relativism of language as embraced above.

Put simply, Barthes considers connotation to perform a wide spectra of tasks in language. It is how a sign connects with its previous applications, "an intrinsic correlation of the text itself".<sup>60</sup> It seems to be something less graspable, less apparent than denotation. Connotations partake in the production of meaning in a text, by interlocking and interacting to spread said meaning about the surface of the text.<sup>61</sup> It is a "static" between users of a sign, "an anti-message".<sup>62</sup> But furthermore and

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<sup>59</sup> It will be noted here that the contextualization spoken of here is the applying of connotations of a modifier to a subject.

<sup>60</sup> Barthes, p. 15, inneboende korrelation hos själva texten

<sup>61</sup> Comp. Barthes, p. 15

most importantly Barthes refers to denotation and connotation as part of the same process within the signified of the sign within which the denotation is not primary, but only the more visible of the two. He even explains how denotation is to be looked upon, not as a particular kind of signified, but as the final connotation in a row of them overshadowing the rest.<sup>63</sup> Deducing from this that denotation and connotation is active at the same time in the signified of the sign, whilst denotation only *seem* to be more present than connotation. Beardsley sometimes refer to denotation and connotation as central and marginal meanings, words that would be rather illustrative of denotation and connotation according to Barthes had they only been more thoroughly explained in Beardsley's text.<sup>64</sup> This furthermore underlines that Barthes' theory of connotation will be fruitful to use in conjunction with Beardsley's theory of metaphor.

On a final note on connotation, Barthes wishes to distinguish between connotations and "associative ideas" of a reader.<sup>65</sup> In doing this he speaks of associative ideas of the reader as "a system of the 'I' that reads the text" and of connotation as "an association of ideas that the I-text independently performs within its own system".<sup>66</sup> Barthes is however well known for his personification of language, indeed for his inauguration speech when he became professor at Collège de France in 1977 he insistently referred to language as "fascist" because it forces its users to speak. Beardsley furthermore, from his scarce remarks on the subject and his examples, does not seem to make any distinction between a readers ideas of a sign and the texts own ideas.<sup>67</sup> One might ask; if there would indeed exist "associative ideas" of an "I-text", as separate from "associative ideas" of an "I", would these ideas not intermingle, or rather try to force themselves upon one another and thus become one, while reading?

### 4.3 Explication II

What has been said on the subject of connotation above might seem to constitute a rather depressing take on the possibilities of understanding at all what meaning a metaphor holds. However, the fact that the meaning of a metaphor according to Beardsley's theory relies on, not only the connotations of the

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<sup>62</sup> Barthes, p. 15, "brus", "ett motmeddelande"

<sup>63</sup> Barthes, p. 16

<sup>64</sup> Beardsley, p. 125

<sup>65</sup> Barthes, p. 15, "idéassociationer"

<sup>66</sup> Barthes, p. 15, "ett system hos ett 'jag' som läser texten", "en idéassociation som jag-texten självständigt utför inom sitt eget system"

<sup>67</sup> Louis-Jean Calvet, *Roland Barthes – En biografi*, Stockholm/Stehag 1994, p. 281, "fascistiskt"

modifier but also whether or not the subject will accept them, radically impedes the possibilities for connotations that are degenerative of explication to slip through the virtual net that the principles of congruence and plenitude constitute. A situation where one produces a connotation of a modifier that opposes another connotation of the same would indeed be degenerative of the explication, but this is under the condition that both connotations are applicable to the subject. This however must be a quite rare event. A more normal situation would probably be that if a person's connotation to a modifier goes against the grain, so to speak, they will simply not be accepted by the subject. This, in turn, will render the metaphor to appear nonsensical to the aberrant reader since significance is a condition for the indirect self-contradiction to be a metaphor at all. The probability of degenerative explications thus must be considered proportional to the willingness of the denotation of the subject to accept connotation. Even if one can never rule out the risk of degenerative explication, by choosing subjects with less allowing denotation, the risks might be considerably reduced.

Recalling that textual context is to be taken in consideration for which explications are to be kept and which are to be left behind further infringes on the possibilities of degenerative explication. However one must consider textual context, beyond the metaphor itself, to be a luxury that one cannot always count on having.

Supported by the argument above, one might deduce that the principles of congruence and plenitude can help refining the meaning extracted from metaphors that comes the reader's way and all this goes to show how the language situation, though not perfect, is indeed functional on most accounts and that communication, as everyone knew already, is possible.

#### 4.4 Controversion theory and Synaesthetic Metaphor

Beardsley's theory of metaphor, as all others, has its weaknesses and strengths. What is it then that makes it so applicable to the particular case of synaesthetic metaphor that it has been chosen for this thesis?

While reading one comes across metaphors ever so often and as said before, when doing so, a seemingly natural process of interpretation takes place that produces meaning to the reader. To explain this process the controversion theory of metaphor is as good as any. However, when looking upon the particular case of synaesthetic metaphor the controversion theory becomes especially suitable since it carries within it a certain fondness for absurd language situations as those created by the inter-sensoric



claims of the synaesthetic metaphor. Indeed such absurdity is, according to Beardsley a prerequisite for attributions to become metaphors in the first place.

The synaesthetic metaphor has a subject that denotes something that is normally used in connection to one of the five senses of man while its modifier denotes something that is normally used in connection with another sense. This is what creates the absurd controversy that is Beardsley's metaphor requirement and that by which a reader identifies a metaphor.

On a final note, the five sense of man are the visible, tactile, gustative, olfactive and auditive.

## 4.5 Potential Criticism of Beardsley's Theory

Beardsley's theory of metaphor has been criticized in many ways, something that seems to be commonplace when it comes to theories of metaphor. It is not the purpose of this thesis to defend Beardsley's theory, since it has simply been chosen for its particular applicability to the synaesthetic metaphor, but there is a great upside to studying criticism and that is the way it lets one see things from another perspective. This in turn, might give access to a lot of understanding that was previously hidden to the reader.

Comments on Soskice's critique here are not meant to be taken as a negative judgement on her book, which is indeed very knowledgeable and impressingly enlightening. The comments are instead to be taken as illustrative of how problematic it is to really grasp what a metaphor is and how important it is to challenge what one reads about them. Even if ones observations turn out to be wrong in the end, they will indeed always turn out to be constructive.

Since Beardsley's theory of metaphor is driven by controversy there is a natural problem when it comes to negating metaphors. For example in "he is green", contradiction can easily be identified between the denotations of subject and modifier. But what then of "he is not green"?<sup>68</sup> In this criticism, brought forth by Soskice, it seems like she neglects to take into account that Beardsley seems to claim explication of metaphor to be a process. For example he sees the principles of congruence and plenitude as being applied *prior* to the elimination of connotations by means of textual context in the explication of a metaphor. Considering this is it not unreasonable to claim that the negation in cases like "he is not green" is applied in the end of the explication process.

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<sup>68</sup> Soskice, p. 36

Soskice also criticizes how Beardsley's theory allows for any subject paired in controversy with any modifier to be identified as a metaphor. This she means is preposterous, which it might be, however in saying so she fails to take into account how Beardsley ascribes the final element of the explication process of metaphor, which must include identification, to its textual context. By this Beardsley does not allow for any attribution to be metaphorical if it is not compatible with the text within which it is located.<sup>69</sup>

Soskice considers Beardsley to be ignorant of extra-textual context when he seems to reduce the metaphor to only two signs.<sup>70</sup> Indeed, as his is a formal theory, Beardsley does not speak much of extra-textual context but could it not be so that he refrains from speaking of such matters to be able to formulate a theory that is functional when considering metaphors' linguistic circumstances and nothing more. And might not the principles of congruence and plenitude and furthermore an appreciation of textual context that goes far beyond the subject and modifier, be a way to compensate for his lack of regard to extra-textual context.

## 5. Explication – The Metaphors

To test Beardsley's theory six passages from Proust in which synaesthetic metaphors are found, three from *Swann's Way* and three from *Within a Budding Grove*, have been chosen. The passages have, for practical reasons, been chosen from the Swedish translations by Gunnel Vallquist and have subsequently been translated into English by the author of this thesis. Since the metaphor, not Proust's oeuvre, is the primary concern for this study, this should not constitute a problem.

Each passage will be treated according to the following scheme. First the subject and modifier/-s of a metaphor will be identified and then the opposition of their denotations will be presented. The next step will be to establish between which senses synaesthesia is encouraged by the metaphor. This will be followed by a plotting of connotations of the modifier from which a selection will be made according to the principles of congruence and plenitude. Further elimination of unfitting connotations will be made by considering the rest of the passage, the nearest textual context. This process will hopefully result in explications of the chosen synaesthetic metaphors.

For this thesis it has not been possible to eliminate relativism and it therefore still considered a factor in explications of metaphor, synaesthetic or not. The explication of the metaphors here is thus

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<sup>69</sup> Comp. Soskice, p. 36f

<sup>70</sup> Soskice, p. 35

not to be considered superior to any individual readings. However, this part of the thesis will strive to show how Beardsley's principles of congruence and plenitude might reduce aberration when used in the explication of synaesthetic metaphor. Thus, hopefully, the explications here will be more universal than readings done without the application of the principles of congruence and plenitude. This not saying that the connotations mentioned here, though an effort have been made to be exhaustive, are more than a few of, and hardly more proper than, those that any other reader might find. Hopefully the individual readers' adages to the humble efforts to explicate made in this chapter, will be constructive and not degenerative of the ultimate explication of the metaphors chosen here. And hopefully the explications made here will turn out to be constructive to explications made by others, prior to this attempt.

They belonged to the type of rural rooms which allures us by the thousands of scents that fills them /.../ scents that breathes the virtues, the wisdom, the habits, the secrecy, invisible, over flowingly rich and modest life that in some way lingers in the air; scents that were still conditioned by nature and colored by the weather as was the scents of the surrounding meadows<sup>71</sup>

This passage has several metaphors but only one that is synaesthetic and it uses the sign "scents" as subject and "colored" as modifier. This gives the simplified metaphor "colored scents" that encourage synaesthesia between the reader's sense of olfaction and her sense of vision. In the metaphor "colored scents", there exists an opposition between denotations, since "scents" denotes stimuli of the sense of olfaction they have no intrinsical coloration, or rather have not the visible qualities that "colored" denotes. Now, considering the modifier, which connotations might it be said to have after its denotations have been cancelled out by self-contradiction? Some connotations of "colored" might be "rainbow-like", "apparent", "equivocal", "not Caucasian", "filled in" and "tainted" and surely one can imagine "scents" that are very "apparent", stronger than "scents" are normally, "scents" that are "tainted" as in polluted and maybe even "equivocal" that might apply to such decadence as champagne, vanilla and chocolate.

In some cases, like for example "rainbow-like scents" it seems that the application of connotations of the modifier on the subject only creates a new metaphor. It will be noted that

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<sup>71</sup> Proust, *Swanns värld*, p. 59, "De hörde till de lantliga rum vilka tjsar oss genom de tusen dofter som fyller dem /.../ dofter som utandas de dygder, den visdom, de vanor, det hemlighetsfulla, osynliga, överflödande rika och sedesamma liv som på något sätt ligger kvar i luften; dofter som ännu var präglade av naturen och färgade av väderleken liksom de kringliggande ängarnas doft"

Beardsley does not speak of the possibility of metaphors as explications. However, considering that self-contradiction or obvious falsity is prerequisite for metaphor, connotations that would only create a new metaphor when applied to the subject would be eliminated by the principle of congruence. The problem thus becomes one of where to draw a line between dead and living metaphor, if a metaphor is lexicalized or not. This seems to be a matter of judgement and, though an interesting problem it is, no further effort has been made to define at which point a metaphor is to be considered dead.<sup>72</sup> To exclude certain connotations and include others by assessment of logical and physical circumstance, as done above, is practicing the principles of congruence and plenitude.

The next step is to test the explications made by their textual context. Marcel, the main character of *Swann's Way* and *Within a Budding Grove*, speaks of "thousands of scents" mingling, might they not be "tainted" from being blended.

Speaking of a certain "type" of room Marcel must find the "scents" it has familiar, however if one considers the connotation "apparent" to fit "scents" it would mean that they are not the "scents" of his home but are connected with something else. Maybe regular stays in the country side while growing up.

The two explications "tainted scents" and "apparent scents" does not seem to be degenerative upon one another which mean that they collectively would form an explication stronger than the singular explication since it would contain a higher amount of data.

on the bed in my room, that in shivering anticipation shielded its transparent and fragile cold against the afternoon sun behind the shutters of the windows all but closed<sup>73</sup>

This passage, like the first one, holds more than one metaphor, however only one is synaesthetic. It has several modifiers but reducing it to its synaesthetic elements makes the metaphor simply "transparent cold" where "transparent" is the modifier of the subject "cold". This metaphor encourages synaesthesia between the tactile sense and the sense of vision. Already at this early stage of the explication of this metaphor one finds that something is amiss. "Cold" is by default "transparent" since it has no mass, thus no real contradiction exists here. Recalling that a metaphor is primarily a

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<sup>72</sup> It will be noted here that according to Beardsley's theory of metaphor one might deduct that he would claim a metaphor to be dead when it is no longer significant and indirectly self-contradictory, or logically absurd which again seems to reduce the issue to a matter of judgement.

<sup>73</sup> Proust, *Swanns värld*, p. 97, "på sängen inne i mitt rum, som bävande värnade sin genomskinliga och ömtåliga svalka mot eftermiddagssolen bakom de nästan helt stängda fönsterluckorna"

significant and indirect self-contradictory attribution, how can this attribution be metaphorical without being self-contradictory? It must be that this is metaphorical because of the absurdity, the obvious falsity, which Beardsley speaks of as a secondary way for attributions to be metaphorical. Claiming that “cold” is “transparent”, in this particular case, implies that it is not always so and this lends obvious falsity to the attribution. Thus the denotation of “transparent” which would be something like a quality of an object that lets one see through the same, is not applicable to the denotation of “cold” which might be a temperature lower than practice. This, in turn, lets the reader bring the connotations of the modifier to the foreground of her reading of the sign to make the attribution meaningful. The connotations of “transparent” might be “window-like”, “water-like”, “light”, “honest”, “invisible”, “exoteric”, “accessible”, “illusion” and “fleeting”. By considering logical and physical circumstances some of these connotations can be found to apply to the subject. Considering a “light cold” or a “fleeting cold” the problem of dead or living metaphor is encountered again, but is it not safe to say that calling a temperature that is lower than practice, only not considerably lower, a “light cold”, without speaking in metaphor. And does the same not go for calling a rising temperature a “fleeting cold”. For the author of this thesis at least, “light cold” and “fleeting cold” seem neither self-contradictory nor absurd.

When testing the reconstructed attributions towards their nearest textual context, they both seem easily applicable. According to Beardsley’s theory of explication of metaphor, this would mean that this metaphor is either ambiguous or that these two explications complement each other according to the principle of plenitude and interact constructively to form a singular explication with a higher content of data than only the one has. But just writing the explications in succession, “light, fleeting cold” will not suffice since that would mean that the textual length of explications increase with the amount of data they hold. The difficulty of merging two explications that are constructive of each other seems to be a problem of formulating the collective mental idea that “light cold” and “fleeting cold” form, to merge the two into one explication. Leaving with only a mental idea of what the attribution explicates into is not the ultimate explication that Beardsley speaks of, it is rather a de-metaphorization. This problem does not seem to have been met by Beardsley and it can perhaps be taken as underlining the relativism of language that has been argued extensively in parts of this thesis.

how the purling flow of the pianos part strove to surpass the violins tender, rigid, dense and dominant melody, as if it was a shifting nevertheless undivided, even and still fractured mass of water in the enchanted and morose light of the moon.<sup>74</sup>

There are several metaphors in this passage but looking exclusively upon synaesthetic metaphor the scope can be reduced to a single one that has several modifiers. Of this metaphor with several modifiers two can be considered encouraging of synaesthesia and are subsequently both kept which results in the simplified metaphor “tender, rigid melody”. Both the modifiers in this case are from the tactile sphere of senses, while the subject belongs to the auditive and in this lies the controversy of this metaphor. Since the tactile is reserved for physical experiences, an instant controversy arises when modifiers from it meet subjects from the auditive sense. Thus, the denotations of “tender”, which might be textural softness and “rigid”, which might be the inflexibility of an object, is cancelled out by the denotation of “melody”, which might be a succession of tones. This leaves a void for the, previously hidden connotations of the modifiers, to enter. Connotations of “tender” could be “delightful”, “smooth”, “penetrable”, “lenient”, “chewable” and “porous” while “rigid” might connote “strict”, “hard”, “unaffected”, “thorough”, “correct”, “durable” and “intact”. However, those that can be found to fit the subject are radically fewer. Of the connotations found for “tender” two seem to fit, if but just so, without forming new metaphors. A “lenient melody” and a “delightful melody” seem appropriate all the while the difference between the metaphor, which was perhaps boarder line dead from the beginning, and the explications are not that overwhelming. Again it comes down to a matter of judgement. Allowing for this the principles of congruence and plenitude have produced two viable explications and they seem to be constructive, rather than degenerative, of each other. This, however, is not all since one more modifier has to be taken into account. An “unaffected melody” is possible, as is a “correct melody” but are these connotations constructive of the final explication?

A “melody” can be both “delightful” and “correct”. Indeed to some, correctness might even be a prerequisite for the delightfulness of a “melody”. Unaffectedness might also, for some, be a prerequisite for a “melody” to be “delightful” but “unaffected” mixes badly with “lenient”. Since lenience denotes certain proneness towards change where “unaffected” denotes a changelessness the two, in fact, seem to cancel each other out, in this textual context. It will be noted that the canceling

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<sup>74</sup> Proust, *Swanns värld*, p. 243, “hur pianostämmans porlande ström sökte höja sig upp över violinens spröda, fasta, täta och dominanta melodilinje, som en mångskiftande och likväl odelad, jämn och ändå bruten vattenmassa I månens trolska och vemodiga sken.”

out of connotations is only possible in the metaphor with several modifiers here since it occurs between the connotations of different modifiers. If cancellation like this was possible with connotations within the same modifier, ambiguous metaphor would be impossible.

The connotation “correct” might also seem to oppose “lenient” but a “melody” can be “lenient” towards its score and thus towards correctness. Keeping “delightful melody” and “correct melody” the scope must be expanded to include the nearest textual context for potential, further decimation. Doing so, nothing apparent in the passage is found to eliminate any of these explications. Thus the two must, according to Beardsley, be constructive of each other if the metaphor is not to be considered ambiguous. Maybe one might dare to wager that these explications of “tender, rigid melody”, that is “delightful melody” and “correct melody”, are indeed constructive of each other, speaking something of what Marcel considers to be good music. Whether this is true or not the ultimate explication, formed by several explications supportive of each other, is again lacking.

my heart jumped at the thought that I would finally get to see them bathing in the sun-saturated atmosphere of the golden voice.<sup>75</sup>

This metaphor is multiple, however reducing it to its synaesthetic elements leave simply “golden voice” which uses “golden” as a modifier of “voice”. The metaphor thus encourages synaesthesia between the visual and auditive senses and since auditive phenomena have no mass they can not have visual properties and this, in turn, creates the controversy essential to metaphor. The denotation of voice, which might be oral instrument of communication, cancels out the denotation of “golden”, which might be metallic deep yellow (where deep yellow is to be considered a dead metaphor). Its denotation cancelled out, “golden” brings to the foreground its connotations and they might be “good”, “expensive”, “shiny”, “winning”, “silence”, “sun”, “royal”, “rich”, “soft” and “noble”. By means of the principles of congruence and plenitude the connotations that fit in combination with the subject are chosen. These might be “good voice”, “winning voice” and “soft voice” but these have to be reduced further by examining how they fit their nearest textual context.

The anticipation of Marcel’s “finally” gives that it is probably a “good voice” that he is about to hear but the passage does not speak of a competition which means “winning voice” does not seem to be feasible. The “voice” being “soft” however might very well be in line with the positive tone of

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<sup>75</sup> Proust, *I skuggan av unga flickor i blom*, p. 18, ”mitt hjärta klappade vid tanken att jag äntligen skulle få se dem badande i den gyllene röstens solmättade atmosfär.”

the passage. “Good voice” and “soft voice” cannot possibly claim the metaphor as ambiguous, instead, as before, the two must be considered constructive of each other and again the problem of merging the two into one stronger explication is at hand. The mental idea of a “voice” that is both “good” and “soft” is quite apparent but to merge these into a single explication one would have to find a sign that holds the signifieds of both “good” and “soft” and nothing more. This, in turn, seems improbable at best.

One can really feel the point where the darkness thickens between the trees and the *arpeggio* of the violin initiates the cooling.<sup>76</sup>

The synaesthetic metaphor of this passage might be simplified into “cooling *arpeggio*”. A “cooling *arpeggio*” encourages synaesthesia between the tactile and the auditive sense. When applying the modifier “cooling” to the subject “*arpeggio*” the reader finds that the denotation of “cooling”, something like the lowering of temperature, and the denotation of “*arpeggio*”, which denotes approximately a rapid succession of tones that constitute a chord, results in controversy. A chord, dissected or otherwise, does not have a temperature to lower and this lets the reader look beyond the denotation of “cooling” to try to find connotations that might be applicable in denotations place. Connotations of “cooling” might be “easing”, “slowing”, “calming”, “scary” and “soothing”. The principles of congruence and plenitude can now help to find out which of these connotations are fitting to use in the explication of “cooling *arpeggio*”. An “*arpeggio*” can be found to ease the distinction of which tones are part of a chord. Its inherent rapidness however discards “slowing” as a possibility for explication but despite this rapidness it is not, however, unreasonable to claim that an “*arpeggio*” can be “calming” to some listeners. Finally “scary” and “soothing” are both possible natures of the “*arpeggio*”. Considering the textual context of the metaphor “easing *arpeggio*” does not play well with thickening darkness while “calming *arpeggio*”, “scary *arpeggio*” and “soothing *arpeggio*” might all apply better to the same circumstance. Night brings calm, brings a “soothing” sleep while for some the darkness of night is “scary”. It is apparent that the first two explications are constructive of each other, indeed used in the same textual context they are almost synonyms. But considering “scary *arpeggio*”, is it perhaps so that the first ambiguous metaphor of this thesis has been found? According to Beardsley’s definition, ambiguity seems to be reserved for metaphors using signs that have more

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<sup>76</sup> Proust, *I skuggan av unga flickor i blom*, p. 120, ”Man riktig känner den stund då mörkret tätnar mellan träden och violinens *arpeggio* framkallar svalkan.”



than one denotation. “Cooling” however, has only the denotation the lowering of temperature, which indicates that the two explications that are constructive of each other “calming *arpeggio*” and “soothing *arpeggio*” are degenerated by the third explication “scary *arpeggio*”. This further complicates the formulating of a single explication that carries the whole cognitive content of the three.

This room /.../ like a beehive where all the sweetness of the coming day lay taken apart, scattered, intoxicating and visible; or like an Eden of hope that was dissolved in trembling silver beams and rose leaves.<sup>77</sup>

Initially it will be noted that within the synaesthetic metaphor of this passage “sweetness” seems to be a metonymy for honey. This metonymy has however not been explicated prior to the explication of the synaesthetic metaphor since doing so would eliminate the encouragement of synaesthesia, indeed “visible” and honey would not even constitute a metaphor. This goes to show an apparent problem when applying Beardsley’s theory of metaphor to a textual situation where different types of figural language are mixed.

Reducing the first metaphor of this passage to its synaesthetic content leaves “visible sweetness” to be explicated, which means that it encourages synaesthesia between the visible and the gustatory sense by applying the modifier “visible” to the subject “sweetness”. As “visible” denotes that which is present to the sense of vision and “sweetness” denotes the taste of sugar, there exists the contradiction between modifier and subject that is necessary for an attribution to be metaphorical. An object manifesting itself to the sense of vision simply does not make one experience any taste. The next step is to find connotations of the modifier, connotations that might be “present”, “clear”, “obvious”, “in range”, “contrasting”, “bright” and concrete. But all of these can not possibly be brought along, they have to be reduced by means of the principles of congruence and plenitude. Doing this “present sweetness” that is just there when one experience taste, “clear sweetness” that is not obscured by other tastes, “obvious sweetness” that cannot be confused with something else when one tastes it and “contrasting sweetness” that in some way balances a sourness seem appropriate. This while “in range sweetness” and “bright sweetness” must be cast out, since the first is, at best, a new metaphor and the second a new synaesthetic metaphor which makes them both impossible by the

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<sup>77</sup> Proust, *I skuggan av unga flickor i blom*, p. 311, ”Detta rum /.../ som en bikupa där hela den stundande dagens sötma låg sönderdelad, spridd, berusande och synlig; eller som en hoppets lustgård vilken upplöstes i skälvande silverstrålar och rosenblad.”

principle of congruence. After this one must also take heed of the textual context of the metaphor for further elimination of alternative explications. The textual context allows for “present sweetness” since Marcel is indeed experiencing it. Even though it is “taken apart” and “scattered” it still intoxicates him. If the “sweetness” that intoxicates him is “clear” or “obvious” is more difficult to say but since it is “taken apart” and “scattered”, it is hard to imagine how it could be “clear” *or* “obvious” to him. Finally when it comes to “contrasting sweetness” there is really nothing in this passage for the “sweetness” to contrast against.

## 6. Conclusion

Recalling the questions made in the beginning of this thesis, which answers have been found, what knowledge have they allowed to surface that was previously obscured or inaccessible?

What is metaphor, or rather what does it do, how can it be identified and explicated?

The metaphor was for this question first put in historical perspective by the mentioning of the rhetoric of Aristotle and Quintilian. It was then loosely divided into two general variants, where substitution theory, which claims metaphor to be merely an ornament that is derived from improper sign use, was decided as the older. Secondly interaction theory as suggested by Kurz claims the metaphor to concern a sign which, interacting with its surrounding textual context can make the attribution mean something that no other attribution can mean. These theories were in shorter words defined as ornamentalist and catachrecist for this thesis.

This was followed by short presentations of several theories of metaphor to give a basic perspective on what metaphor might mean. Black’s theory was presented to exemplify the formal theories of metaphor, Davidson’s as his is one of the emotive theories and literalist theory presented another type of ornamentalist theory that has its grounds in an idea of the elliptical simile claiming metaphor to be nothing but a more complicated way to speak what a simile speaks.

The accounts on different theories of metaphor were used to show that such have usually been either ornamental or catachrecist but in chapter 3.4 both schools were argumentatively rejected. Since a text’s physical appearance and its meaning are bonded together and do not easily change, why would the relationship between them suddenly then become flexible when used in a metaphor?

As an answer to this, a functional compromise was subsequently presented called Beardsley’s controversion theory, which does not claim metaphor to be inactive on the level of meaning and still

do not claim it to speak *new* meanings. Instead Beardsley's theory allows for one of the signs of the metaphor to reconstruct its content in such a way that it, together with its textual context, applies to *seemingly* new meanings. These meanings have however been latent in the attribution from the beginning, hidden among the connotations of the single signs which interact to form its meaning. Beardsley's metaphor allows for this to happen by means of contradicting signs or, more precisely, by significant and indirect self-contradiction, which is indeed what he considers metaphor to be.

Beardsley was found to distinguish between readings of metaphors and explications of them, where he accepts individual readings as being relativistic but claims that if one follows certain principles to make an explication, one can circumvent the relativism of the metaphor. He calls these principles congruence and plenitude and considers them to be a way to select the correct connotations of the modifier of a metaphor in its textual context, resulting in a correct explication. Challenging this, a definition of connotation had to be made to establish whether connotation is a subjective element of language that might give rise to relativism in explications, or not. Because of Beardsley's negligence when it comes to defining connotation, an external definition that could be seen to fit controversion theory had to be brought in. Fiske makes a basic definition of connotation that seemed to be applicable to the circumstances presented in this thesis, but it, in turn, gave rise to further questions.

Initially a discussion on the nature of subjectivity was needed, since Fiske made use of the concept for his definition. By using some of what Barthes has written on the matter of subjectivity the discussion was again brought onward to an attempt to define what culture is, since culture constitutes a vital part of the explanation of subjectivity.

In the end relativism was embraced as a variable of language but it was agreed that the principles of congruence and plenitude might be effective in reducing aberration in the explication of metaphor even if they are not able to fully stay said aberration.

Can one distill an essence of metaphor by considering, or comparing, a couple of leading theories and what kind of meanings they propose that metaphor actually produces?

Substitution theory, since it basically does not allow for metaphor to do anything but acting as a decoration of language was found to claim the essence of metaphor to be its aesthetic value. Interaction theories however ascribe to metaphor one of the most important functions of language, the power of supplying a new sign where one is lacking or catachresis. Black has a somber view on metaphor as a dangerous element of language that might corrupt a texts relation to its meaning and be inspiring of faulty readings while Davidson claims metaphor to be sufficient for use in any situation of

language and thus has a positive take as to the essence of metaphor. All this went to show that the essence of metaphor differs completely depending on which mechanisms one ascribes to it.

Is there a theory that better fits the studying of synaesthetic metaphor than others? If so, then why is that?

Beardsley's theory of metaphor was chosen for the examination of synaesthetic metaphor for one main reason. That reason is its inherent appreciation of the absurd which springs from its demand for controversy, something that is highly compatible with many synaesthetic metaphors. The reason that absurdity is so explicit in synaesthetic metaphor is the inter-sensory nature such metaphors hold.

How are some of the synaesthetic metaphors of Proust's *Swann's Way* and *Within a Budding Grove* spelled out and how might they be explicated using the chosen theory?

The first of the explicated synaesthetic metaphors encouraged synaesthesia between the sense of olfaction and the sense of vision by the signs "scents" and "colors" being applied to one another. As a clear case of contradiction it was found to be in line with the idea of synaesthetic metaphor as being almost intrinsically self-contradictory.

This first explication furthermore illustrated two problems. The first was that when one finds a connotation from the modifier that creates a new metaphor together with the subject, it can never be accepted. This is because the principle of congruence forbids the keeping of any connotation that is not in line with the subject when one makes an explication and since controversy is prerequisite for metaphor to exist, an explication that is a metaphor is automatically discarded.

The second problem was one that subsequently was to be encountered throughout the explications and it concerned so called dead metaphors. Because explications that are in themselves metaphors are impossible, sometimes deciding if a connotation of a modifier is to be kept or not for explication becomes a question of whether or not it constitutes a metaphor or a dead metaphor together with the subject. To decide if a metaphor is dead or not seemed to come down to personal judgement, which underlined further how relativism is an issue in explication according to the principles of congruence and plenitude.

Next passage held a synaesthetic metaphor that encouraged synaesthesia between the tactile sense and the sense of vision. It was different from the previous metaphor since its subject, "cold" and modifier, "transparent", were not metaphorical due to self-contradiction but by Beardsley's secondary metaphor definition, by obvious falsity. It was furthermore problematized at this point how ending up with two separate explications that seem to be constructive upon each other was not an ideal situation.

How would one add the explications to form a superior one without constructing a, possibly, very long chain of signs? One would have to find one sign that held neither more nor less than the signifieds of all the explications found to fit.

The third passage was found to hold a synaesthetic metaphor with two modifiers to its subject. Both of the modifiers belonged to the tactile sense while the subject belonged to the auditive being respectively “tender”, “rigid” and “melody”. The Explication process here was rather straightforward, except for problems already discussed in the two earlier explications, however it held one particularity. Due to it having two modifiers, opposing connotations *between* the two seemed to be able to cancel each other out in a way that opposing connotations could not do if they were from a single modifier. This is held to be so because that would rule out the possibility for ambiguous metaphor to exist.

Following this a passage containing a synaesthetic metaphor in the simplest of fashion were chosen to illustrate an ideal situation. Encouraging synaesthesia between the auditive and visual sense “golden voice” was explicated. However, even in this, the simplest of cases, the problem with constructing a superior explication by adding several explications that acted constructively upon each other was encountered.

The fifth passage holds within it “cooling *arpeggio*”, which constitutes a synaesthetic metaphor between the auditive and tactile senses. The particularity of this metaphor was indeed not noticeable on its surface and it followed the same pattern of explication as the other metaphors presented here. But as the final explications were to be made two opposing explications were among the ones attributed to the metaphor by the principle of plenitude without it being an ambiguous metaphor. The discovery of degenerative explications can only underline further the relativism of language, embraced in this thesis and in opposition to Beardsley.

Finally a synaesthetic metaphor reading “visible sweetness”, in which the subject “sweetness” seems to be a metonymy for honey, was explicated. This did not really affect the explication but it illustrated the point that when other types of figural language become involved using Beardsley’s theory of metaphor, problems might be afoot. If “sweetness” would have been explicated before the explication of the metaphor took place, this metaphor would have ceased to exist since “visible honey” is not metaphorical.

## 7. Finishing discussion

When applying Beardsley's theory of metaphor upon synaesthetic metaphors, several problems seem to have arisen. Of those the most apparent was the problem of finding a single sign to speak the collective idea made up of several explications that are supportive of one another. When a reader has found only a few explications of a metaphor, which from the explications in this thesis seems to be the typical result, there might be a possibility of simply writing the connotations of the modifier that are found to apply to the subject in succession in front of the subject. Thus for example the explications "good voice" and "soft voice" might be collectively explicated by "good, soft voice". But in the long run, considering Beardsley's idea of the supreme and unbeatable explication generated by all the individual ones, it becomes imperative to find another solution to this problem. A simple answer to the problem however fails to register. One might try, as suggested in the beginning of this chapter, to find a singular sign that carries the collective mental idea that all separate explications form together. But the likeliness of finding such a sign, without it at the same time encompassing any further features, must be considered so low it borders on impossibility.

In a way, such a solution as presented above might be one that Beardsley would suggest, since such a solution would harmonize with the general problem with Beardsley's theory. In several cases, from the beginning of the explication process and throughout it, it seems as if the explications become results of personal judgement in the evaluation of certain situations. This might not be so surprising considering the argument on the subjectivity of connotations in chapters 4.2, 4.2.1, 4.2.2 and 4.2.3 of this thesis. But even when problematic situations that derive exclusively from connotation are disregarded, problems with explication remain. These problems are the result of situations where choices have to be made by the explicator without guidance of any theory, where personal judgement rather than regulation decides what is correct.

The first of said problematic situations is the definition that has to be made of the denotations of the subject and modifier. For the purpose of establishing controversy between the two, simple indications of what the signs denote seem to be enough. But for the use of the principle of congruence, where connotations of the modifier are tested against the denotation of the subject, the precision of the definition of the subject's denotation becomes vital. It seems indeed as if vagueness in the definition of the subject's denotation, might allow for connotations from the modifier to be accepted that would not have been, had the definition of the denotation read otherwise. This means that no matter how precise

the principles of congruence and plenitude are, the explications might still vary depending on how the explicator defines the denotation of the subject.

How to counter this problem is very difficult to see. Is it a matter of being concise in ones definition of denotation or will that result in too little information diminishing the chances of explication? Or should one rather expand generously in ones definitions of denotation or would that result in too many textual elements that might multiply the number of explications?

The second problematic situation also seems to come down to a matter of personal judgement. It concerns how one might distinguish a dead metaphor from one that is not. When a metaphor that *might* be considered dead is derived from trying a connotation of a modifier on the denotation of a subject, this problem presents itself. This problem becomes one of determining if there is still controversy between the two signs of this new, possibly dead, metaphor since if there is still controversy, the connotation will not be accepted for explication on account of the principle of congruence. It is then up to the explicator to determine whether the connotations of the modifier is not only temporarily taking the place of its denotation but indeed has *become* its denotation (remembering that denotation according to Barthes is not different in nature from connotation but only the last in a line of connotations), if only in combination with that particular subject.

Adding the previous discussion on the problems of connotation to those presented in this chapter it seems that Beardsley's theory, though ample for helping the reader to make her own understanding of a metaphor, cannot help relapsing into personal judgement, relativism, subjectivity or whatever one chooses to call it. Again embracing the idea of language as being subject to such particularities, one is left with a final choice of how to answer a lingering question. Is it not fantastic how a text can mean and communicate while it still paints a slightly different, personal picture to everyone?

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