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The Evolution of ESDP:

Recent Political Developments and Social Constructivism

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To

my mother

who had the privilege to stand next to when

my back was against the wall

Abstract

The formation of ESDP (European Security and Defense Policy) is one of the most important building blocks shaping the European security structure and the European integration process since the beginning of the 21st century. Even though the integration engine was injured by the rejection of the European Constitutional Treaty in France and the Netherlands, the ESDP can be seen as currently one of the most dynamic areas in European integration. This dynamism takes the attention of theorists attempting to explain the security and defence integration from their own point of view. Social Constructivism, Realism and Realist version of Liberalism, namely Liberal Intergovernmentalism (LI) are three theories having different emphasis on not only the security integration of the European Union (EU) but also the definition of the security concept.

Key Words: European Security and Defence Policy, Social Constructivism, Liberal Intergovernmentalism, European Security Strategy, European Union Minister for Foreign Affairs, Structured Cooperation, Solidarity Clause, Realism, Neo-Realism

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1. INTRODUCTION

The formation of ESDP (European Security and Defense Policy) is one of the most mainstream developments shaping the European security structure and the European integration process since the beginning of the 21st century. Despite the fact that the integration engine was injured by the rejection of the European Constitutional Treaty in France and the Netherlands, the ESDP can be seen as currently one of the most dynamic areas in European integration.

After the failure of the European Defense Community in 1954 and other attempts to create a European security policy, by the spring of 1998, the UK began to give a serious importance to defense issues. It was a turning point led to rapid developments in the formation of the ESDP.

In the development of the ESDP, the Saint-Malo declaration was the one of the most important steps. *No longer content with the quest for a security and defense identity from inside NATO, and no longer prepared to use the WEU as a proxy, the EU itself sought to generate ESDP, which, as it arose from the Saint-Malo declaration of December 1998, explicitly called for the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces* (Hill 2005 p.183).

St Malo raised a number of challenges. Despite these challenges, the institutional implications were rapidly resolved and the EU in Brussels created new bodies, the High Representative for the CFSP (HR-CFSP—Javier Solana) and advisory Policy Unit (PU) of HR-CFSP; the Political and Security Committee; the European Union Military Committee (EUMC); and the EU military staff (EUMS) (Hill 2005).

Trend towards military power is now to be found in the ESDP agreed at the June 1999 Cologne European Council, which committed the EU to having a 60.000 person rapid reaction force (RRF) ready by the end of 2003 (Manners 2002 p. 237).

In December 1999, in the Helsinki Headline Goal (HHG), appropriate resources for European missions, including the Petersberg Tasks, set out in the Petersberg Declaration, adopted at the Ministerial Council of the Western European Union (WEU) in June 1992, was determined. Resources and deficiencies were identified in Capabilities Commitments Conference (November 2000) and Capabilities Improvements Conference (November 2001). At third

conference, in May 2003, they achieved some results and Member States agreed on some contributions. When we came to the year 2003, the EU has started become the military actor, and ongoing political developments demonstrated that the EU attempted further security and defence integration.

1.1 Purpose and Research Questions

In general, the specific purpose of this thesis is to form a theoretical approach that could provide a better understanding of the European Security and Defence Policy, and could demonstrate its necessity.

This study emphasizes on the evolution of the ESDP, its background, political developments behind the evolution of the ESDP, and the application of three theories on the ESDP. As a result of the study, I will try to demonstrate that Social Constructivism can explain the evolution of the ESDP whereas the Liberal Intergovernmentalism and Realism are not sufficient enough to explain it. I attempt to compare these three theories since I believe that this will make easier to understand the contribution of the Social Constructivism.

Finally, this study tries to answer the following questions:

- What are the political developments behind the evolution of the ESDP?
- Could we say that these political developments provide an applicability of Constructivist theory on the security and defence cooperation in the EU?
- Why does Liberal Intergovernmentalism and Realism, relatively to the Social Constructivism, fail in explaining the security and defence cooperation in the EU?

1.2 Methodology

This paper takes the European Security and Defence Policy, which is one aspect of European Integration, as a case. Then, three theories, which are Social Constructivism, Realism (and Neo-Realism), and Liberal Intergovernmentalism, are applied on this case. Consequently, this paper can be regarded as a theory testing case study; however, this paper is not only theory-confirming but also theory-infirming case study since the paper claims that the Liberal

Intergovernmentalism and Realism are not adequate, relatively to the Social Constructivism, to explain the evolution of the ESDP whereas the Social Constructivism is almost adequate. In other words, after defining three theories, I demonstrate that the evolution of the ESDP can be almost explained by Social Constructivism.

1.3 Material

The material I used in this study is divided into two groups: theoretical and empirical. In the theoretical part of my thesis, I use Andrew Moravcsik, Antje Wiener, Thomas Diez, Ben Rosamond, Thomas Christiansen, and Kenneth Waltz as my secondary sources. Then, as empirical materials, I used official papers of the EU such as declarations and treaties (especially EU's drafted constitutional treaty). These are primary resources I used. Moreover, secondary sources I used in my thesis are academic journals and books of Christopher Hill, Maria Strömvik, Brian White and Nelson and Stubb.

1.4 Organization of the Thesis

The first part is the introduction mentioning the purpose, research questions, methodology and materials of the thesis. The second part explains the theoretical framework, and thus gives a general idea about Liberal Intergovernmentalism and Social Constructivism. The next part briefly mentions the evolution of the European Security and Defence Policy including its background and the political developments behind it. Fourth part is the application of Realism (and Neo-Realism), Liberal Intergovernmentalism and Social Constructivism on the ESDP. Finally, last chapter will give a brief conclusion on the findings of the thesis in accordance with the answers of research questions.

2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Since the theoretical framework of the ESDP is the combination of Realism, Liberal Intergovernmentalism and Social Constructivism in this paper, this chapter will attempt to explain these three theories briefly.

2.1. REALISM

Realism is a state-centric approach. Realists give an importance to the national interests and power in international life. States decide to determine their interests and how to pursue them. The most important thing is the survival for the states. Stanley Hoffman (1966) defines this by saying that member states are not obsolete at all. Realists claim that also everything existing in the world is measurable, material and observable. That is why; there is no place for ideas, norms and culture in realism (Tonra 2000 p. 8). Besides, according to Realism, interests are exogenously given (Fierke and Wiener 1999 p. 724).

Realism is said to be based on three main assumptions. 'First, the state is the dominant actor on the international scene, and is capable acting as a coherent, unitary and rational unit.

Second, states recognize no authority above them so in international relations, there is a state of anarchy, or lack of hierarchy, which forces states to self help. Third, in anarchy, politics is dominated by military considerations and by the fragility of trust and cooperation. War is therefore always a possibility (Hill, 2005).

Neo-realism takes the world as anarchy, a field having no sovereign. In that field, states must survive. Since there is no sovereign, there is no mechanism preventing states from threats in international politics. Thus, the war is possible, and military power is necessary to survive in war. Power of states is also important to survive. They try to increase their power relatively to each other. One power's domestic or foreign success can decrease the one of other. Neo-realism claims that powers do not behave the same all the time; however, if they do not behave like this, they probably disappear from history (Waltz, 1979

pp.102-28; Mearsheimer 2001, pp. 29-54). About the anarchical condition of international politics, he claims:

“A self-help system is one in which those who do not help themselves, or who do so less effectively than others, will fail to prosper, will lay themselves open to dangers, will suffer. Fear of such unwanted consequences stimulates state to behave in ways that tend toward the creation of balances of power” (Waltz).

As mentioned above, realists and neo-realists claim that international system is anarchic and in the state of anarchy, sovereign nation states behave conflictually. As Weber says that individual war may be stopped from time to time but war cannot be finished completely (Weber, 2005 pp.13-35).

Besides, for Realists and Neo-realists, the ultimate goal in this environment is to survive for the states. Weber says: ‘This is their overriding interest. The only way that states can reasonably ensure their survival is to increase their power and therefore be less likely to attack them’ (*ibid.*).

Realists and neo-realists also agree that there is no exit from international anarchy. It is not realistic to assume a formation of a world government could since states will never feel in secure enough. That is why they will never trust enough each other in order to give up their autonomy to a world government.

In contrast to common thoughts of realists and neo-realists, there are issues they disagree. First, they disagree about the human nature. Hans Morgenthau, who is a realist, claims that the nature of man is fundamentally detected. He argues that even though man is not purely evil, he certainly has the original sin. Thus, he means thinking pessimist about man’s behaving is the only realistic way in international politics. That is why; international politics will be anarchical and conflictual due to the nature of man.

Besides, neo-realists claim that instead of finding natural causes of conflict, social causes of the conflict should be found. Waltz, who is a neo-realist thinker, claims that the organization of social relations demonstrates the existence of the war. The nature of man is not too important. The reason of this result is that good man behaves badly in bad social organizations, and bad man could be prevented from behaving badly in good social organizations. The war takes place if the states are in a bad social organization. According to Waltz, bad social

organization is international anarchy. Waltz says: 'International anarchy is the permissive cause of war'. That is why; realists and neo-realists think different in the conceptualization of international anarchy. *Realists argue that it is just the environment in which sovereign nation-state act whereas neo-realists claim that international anarchy describes the social relations among sovereign nation states that causally explain why wars occur* (Weber, 2005 pp. 13-35).

2.1.1 Liberal Intergovernmentalism

Some EU scholars explain Liberal Intergovernmentalism (LI) as a theoretical school with no disciples and a single teacher: Andrew Moravcsik; however, LI is an application of rationalist Institutionalism to the field of European Integration (Schimmelfening 2004 p.75 in Diez and Wiener). In other words, as Nelsen and Stubb point out that Moravcsik and the rest of the field do not say completely different things. Moravcsik is a rationalist and an institutionalist. He says that actors generally behave rationally to reach their material interests, and institutions created by these actors affect the behavior deeply. According to his view of international relations, sovereign states can accept the cooperation if this is in their interest. That is why; they can reject the integration when their interests change (Stubbs and Nelson, 2003 pp. 239-254).

To begin with, Liberal intergovernmentalism has the two-level game understanding which means that governments bargain with other governments and with their domestic electoral district (Putnam 1993; Moravcsik 1998 in Merand 2006). Furthermore, Moravcsik utilizes Robert Putnam's two-level bargaining model (1988) since Moravcsik argues that international institutions are created to represent domestic interests in an intergovernmental bargaining arena. Integration can occur if preferences of domestic interest groups of the negotiating states can converge. Moreover, for the integration, negotiators which are likely to win should be compliance with the creation of institutions.

The main idea of LI is that the integration is related with the interests of the states themselves. In other words, governments' preferences have the supremacy in this theory; however, it is also close to the neo-realism since governments look for a common ground in intergovernmental negotiations after

determining their interests. Nevertheless, finally, all states do not prefer to give up more sovereignty and power than necessary.

In contrast to neo-realists, Liberal intergovernmentalists do not believe that state preferences are naturally conflictual and convergent, including a collective action problem. Intergovernmentalism is close to the Neo-liberalism thought which targets catching the complex interdependence of states in the international system and thus *departing from those who treat states as billiard balls or black boxes with fixed preferences for wealth, security or power* (Keohane and Nye 1977; Moravcsik 1993: 481).

In LI theory, Moravcsik argues that governments determine their national preferences in intergovernmental bargaining under the influence of domestic and international forces. National preferences are explained as an ‘ordered and weighted set of values placed on future substantive outcomes ... that might result from international political interaction’ (Moravcsik 1998 p.24 cited in Merand 2006).

Moravcsik divides his theory into six core assumptions (Moravcsik, 1993 p. 481). The first one is the rational state behaviour (*ibid.*). Second, he claims that groups express preferences, governments bring them together and governments’ preferences are determined (*ibid.* p. 483). These groups are producers since their economic interests shape national preferences (*ibid.* p. 517).

Third, it is argued that there are three factors shaping governments’ policy preferences. First of all, there should be important benefits of the cooperation. Moreover, costs and benefits should be clear. Last, influence of producers on policy formation is important. These factors affect also the flexibility of governments in negotiations.

The fourth assumption argues that governments are less flexible about giving concessions from their interests. They try to reach on an agreement in the lowest common denominator (*ibid.* p. 501). According to Moravcsik, the lowest common denominator bargaining is not the result of actions of supranational leaders, but domestic interest groups (*ibid.* p. 491).

Fifth, LI theory argues that issue areas are separate. They become connected if there is no solution. The connection involves some financial and

symbolic concessions not real issues. Finally, the nature of the issue brings important constraints to a government, and this creates predictable patterns of bargaining (*ibid.* p. 488).

Moravcsik argues the difference between preferences and strategies. On one hand, he points out preferences of states are autonomous from other actors in the international arena, and thus come before the interstate bargaining. On the other hand, strategies are policy options which can be changed to protect national interests (Moravcsik 1997 p. 519). Moravcsik claims that to guarantee the security of national interests and to become a part of the European integration are not contradictory to each other. Even, he asserts that European integration 'can best be explained as a series of rational choices made by state leaders' (Moravcsik 1998 pp.18-21). He demonstrates this, Moravcsik presents three stages. First, state leaders form 'a consistent set of national preferences'. These preferences are based on permanent national interests. Second, the states develop strategies based on these preferences. The strategies aim to provide the states to encounter domestic and international demands and pressures (*ibid.*). Finally, states decide whether they fit their agreements in institutional frameworks. For instance, if states decide to pool their sovereignties, they give their right to veto decisions up.

According to Moravcsik, states can pool their sovereignty if they are persuaded that cooperation will be more useful in order to keep their national preferences (*ibid.* pp. 20, 67). This means that institutions do not have the capability to change interests and preferences of states. In this point, Moravcsik claims that states pool their sovereignty in the realm of 'low politics' like economy and trade than 'high politics' like security and defence. In other words, Moravcsik points out economic interests drive the European integration (1998 p. 473). Rational preferences are mostly economic issues since the nature of European integration is economic. Governments decide the integration for their economic advantages.

Furthermore, Moravcsik mentions the importance of geopolitical preferences. Not only economic preferences but also geopolitical preferences are important for the explanation of the creation of the Union and the extensive policies of the EU integration (Moravcsik 1998. p. 476, Schimmelfennig 2001 p. 79).

The theory of formation of national preference, the theory of interstate bargaining and functional theory of institutional choice are useful to explain liberal intergovernmentalism.

First, the theory of formation of national preference attempts to explain national preferences. According to Moravcsik, economic interests determine national preferences in the European integration process. Moravcsik says:

The central prediction of this approach is that when economic integration is perceived to generate positive geopolitical externalities, governments tend to favor integration; whereas when integration is perceived to generate negative geopolitical consequences, they are more likely to oppose it (Moravcsik 2005).

Moravcsik also asserts that state preferences are determined by the distributional conflict and bargaining power at the domestic and the international level (Schimmelfennig 2001 p. 49).

Furthermore, Moravcsik argues that the theory of interstate bargaining tries to explain the efficiency and distributional outcomes of EC negotiations (Moravcsik 2005). According to Moravcsik, efficiency is unproblematic relatively since negotiators, first, give an importance to the distribution of benefits, shaped by the relative power of national governments regarded as asymmetrical policy interdependence:

Patterns of interdependence underlie credible threats to veto, exit and exclude other governments, as well as, though secondarily, linkages between issues and offers of side payments (Moravcsik, 2005 p.11).

According to Schimmelfennig, Bargaining theory argues that the outcome of international negotiations, that is, whether and on which terms cooperation comes about depends on the relative bargaining power of the actors. Bargaining power is a result of the asymmetrical distribution of information, and the benefits of a specific agreement (Schimmelfennig 2004 p. 77 in Diez and Wiener,). This means that actors having much and better information will have more bargaining power. They also gain their outcomes they demand by threatening them with non-cooperation (*ibid.*).

Number of scholars, who support reflectivist, constructivist or sociological institutionalist approaches in general, have criticized Moravcsik's formation of national preferences model. For example, Wendt and Ruggie claim that membership is important to change preferences and identities of national elites who are part of the EU integration process (Sandholtz 1993, Risse 1996, Lewis 1998 cited in Pollack). They also claim that preference formation model of Liberal Intergovernmentalism ignores the endogenous effects of EU membership even though those effects are one of the fundamental features of the integration process.

Finally, as an explanation of functional theory, states establish international institutions to remove the first and second- order problems in international cooperation. Non- cooperative behaviour is a rational choice; however, it leaves all states inferior in the end (Schimmelfening 2004 p. 78 in Diez and Wiener).

In conclusion, Liberal Intergovernmentalism basically argues that in the international arena, governments behave regarding their purposes and goals set domestically. Liberal Intergovernmentalists claim that since 1955, there are three factors convincing the governments for further integration in the EU: their economic interests, their bargaining power; and their credible commitments to transfer national sovereignty.

2.2 SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIVISM

A more radical view sees the international system itself, and its characteristic anarchical condition, as a social construction which can be altered or transformed by finding an alternative lens through which to conceptualize international relations (Wendt 1992).

Constructivist approaches to the study of Europe are trendy since the early 1990s. The ontology of the Social Constructivism is open to both material and social facts. As Checkel points out Social Constructivism focuses on the interaction of structures and agents since they are mutually constitutive rather than the causal explanations (Checkel 2006).

Recently, many scholars has utilized the constructivist approach; however, there is not a unique "social constructivist theory" about European integration

even international relations in general. Due to this problem, many scholars writing in constructivist approach contrasts it to the prominent theories of European integration such as neo-functionalism, liberal intergovernmentalism and multi-level governance, which are firmly committed to a rationalist ontology instead of making a direct comparison (*ibid.*).

Constructivist view sees that decisions of political actors such as nation states are not always the result of calculations of material benefit. In contrast, opinions and actions of decision makers come from the relationships with other people. That is why; Constructivism claims that norms, ideas, identities and interests can change. Nelsen and Stubb agree that *the EU, with its levels of government and many formal and informal institutions, provides an ideal arena for constructivist exploration*. They also add that the Constructivist view of Checkel gives an importance to institutions too much since Checkel argues that via interaction, institutions help to shape the identities and interests of member states within them; and learning is one of the components of this process. In sum, Checkel tries to understand that effects of new social relations at the European level upon the perception of interests of EU's member states (Stubbs and Nelson, 2003 pp. 351-360).

Risse (2004 p.160 in Diez and Wiener) defines Social Constructivism as 'a truism that social reality does not fall from heaven, but that human agents construct and reproduce it through their daily practices. Since defining the Constructivism as a truism would not be a clear definition, he explains constructivism as 'based on a social ontology which insists that human agents do not exist independently from their social environment and its collectively shared systems of meanings'. (Risse 2004 in Diez and Wiener). This means that agents and structures interact each other; identities, preferences and interests are the result of this interaction. They are not exogenously given. Constructivists assert that interests are socially constructed as a result of social interaction (Checkel 1998; Wendt 1992, 1994; Wind 1997 in Rosamond 2000).

This helps to understand why Social constructivism views the multilateral cooperation and political integration as the result of social interaction and collective identity formation. It does not accept that the states' interests are fixed. Knutsen (1997 pp. 281-2 in Rosamond 2000) also has a similar argument:

‘the structures of international politics are outcomes of social interactions, that states are not static subjects, but dynamic agents, that state identities are not given, but reconstituted through complex, historical overlapping practices and therefore variable, unstable, constantly changing; that the distinction between domestic politics and international relations are tenuous.’

Wendt (1999) argues that this view provides to understand international cooperation. In the same way, according to the Social Construction of Europe (Christiansen et al. 2001), the Constructivist approach on the European integration process demonstrates that integration is the result of a common things such as common institutions, common rules, norms and standards (Wendt 1999 ch. 7; Checkel 2001a in Diez and Wiener 2004). Institutions and norms are the part of the international environment and states give an importance them. The EU as an institution has certain principles such as democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and free market. These principles are important to constitute a European identity; and states become socialized with institutional aims (Hill, 2005).

The Constructivist approach on the European integration process can be detailed with the Europeanization, which includes the political, economical and social changes on the member states as a result of the EU membership (Wong 2005 p. 135). Europeanization has three components which are national adaptation, national projection, and identity reconstruction. First, the EU is regarded as a part of national politics of member states. Second, domestic policies are sent to the EU. Third, since identity is transferred to the EU gradually, European identity gives a direct to national identities (*ibid.* p. 137).

As mentioned above, Risse says that social constructivists define institutions as social structures so institutions have an impact on agents and their behavior. Thus, social constructivism follows the ‘logic of appropriateness’ and differs from rationalism in this sense:

‘Human actors are imagined to follow rules that associate particular identities to particular situations, approaching individual opportunities for action by assessing similarities between current identities and choice dilemmas and more general concepts of self and situations’ (March and Olsen 1998 p. 951 in Diez and Wiener 2004 p.163).

According to Risse, the logic of appropriateness claims that actors attempt to choose the appropriate rule in a given social situation. This means that social

institutions such as the EU are not external to actors. Instead, actors are affected by the social institutions.

This is contrast to the Rationalism since it claims that social institutions such as the EU constrain the actors' behaviors through identities and preferences they give. In other words, Rationalism follows the 'logic of consequentialism' (March and Olsen 1989, 1998 *ibid.*). This logic of action aims to maximize interests and preferences of one side.

Risse (2004 in Diez and Wiener) mentions the communicative and discursive practices as a final characteristic feature of social constructivist approaches. He argues that to explain social behavior, the words, language and communicative expression should be taken into account seriously.

Risse points out the contribution of the application of Habermasian theory of communicative action to the communicative practices in the European integration. Habermas (1981, 1992), Müller (1994), and Risse (2000) concentrate on arguing and reason-giving which prove that not only strategic calculations but also the principles and norms are important (Risse 2004 in Diez and Wiener).

In addition, Risse mentions that interests, preferences, and the perceptions are not fixed. They are under the rule of discursive challenges. Due to this reason, if argumentative rationality overcomes, actors will not try to maximize their interests and preferences. Instead, they will be ready to change their interests via better argument. Risse argues that this view will provide to study European institutions as bargaining arenas open for a reasoned consensus to solve common problems. (Diez and Wiener 2004).

Finally, according to Rosamond, constructivism can be used to criticize the notions of intergovernmentalism. He mentions that Christiansen and Jorgensen (1999) criticize liberal intergovernmentalist view on the processes of treaty reform. They point out liberal intergovernmentalism views treaty reforms as the product of bargains and the result of the negotiations of actor's interests (Rosamond 2000).

3. THE EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY (ESDP)

3.1 A Background

This chapter will explain the evolution of the ESDP; give a background and mentioning political developments affecting its evolution.

3.1.1 The Amsterdam Treaty and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)

The 1996-1997 Intergovernmental Conference had discussed many issues about the defense dimension in the EU. Some member states supported that the EU should integrate the WEU, while others supported that security and defence issues should remain intergovernmental. Due to different views between the EU member states, the conference continued until June 1997. The Amsterdam treaty brought amendments to CFSP part in the Maastricht treaty. For instance, the treaty emphasized a High Representative of the CFSP. It would increase the coordination and effectiveness and create the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit (PPEWU), which would help the creation of a ground for joint actions and common positions (Ojanen 1999 p.6). Besides joint actions and common positions, common strategies were introduced in the Amsterdam treaty. The inclusion of the Petersberg tasks, which are humanitarian and rescue, peace-keeping, and even peace-making tasks, can be regarded as the most important novelty in the Amsterdam treaty (*ibid.*) since France, Germany and UK had different views. France and Germany proposed that the Western European Union (WEU) should merge with the EU while UK suggested that defence issues should stay outside the EU (Gourlay and Remacle 1998 p.88 in Romsloe No.04/22).

Despite these novelties, it is considered that the Amsterdam Treaty just kept the status quo since real progress aimed in the EU foreign and security policy could not be realized (Ojanen 1999 p.6).

3.1.2 St. Malo Initiative

The European Union needs to be in a position to play its full role on the international stage. This means making a reality of the Treaty of Amsterdam, which will provide the essential basis for action by the Union. It will be important to achieve full and rapid implementation of the Amsterdam provisions on CFSP. This includes the responsibility of the European Council to decide on the progressive framing of a common defence policy in the framework of CFSP. The Council must be able to take decisions on an intergovernmental basis, covering the whole range of activity set out in Title V of the Treaty of European Union (Joint declaration art. 1).

Before the creation of the ESDP, European countries were primarily relying on NATO for defence cooperation, even though some efforts were spent to improve EU's external activities and defence responsibilities; however, at the Franco-British summit in St-Malo, 3-4 December 1998, the European defence project gained a new and rapid dimension. Many declarations and proposals followed the St Malo Conference.

Even though the UK insisted that defence issues should stay outside the EU, interestingly the newly elected Blair government in the UK demonstrated that they are not happy due to the European lack of power in defence issues. UK suggested that the EU should have responsibility in its military operations, and should have autonomous forces which could take part of the operations which the US did not want to take part (Howorth cited in Hill, 2005 p.185).

Blair gave up traditional British policy for two reasons. First, diplomatic efforts to bring peace to Kosovo became unsuccessful. Blair claimed that the EU needed to reinforce Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and WEU was not enough to create an impact in the disputes of the world.

Second, Blair wanted to make the UK a more influential member in the EU. Defence was the best choice since Britain was one of two EU members having the military capacity to act its power outside NATO (Grant 1999). Finally, The UK got together with France and the two countries issued a "Joint Declaration on European Defence" in St. Malo on December 4, 1998. The declaration was radical since it raised "the issues of European autonomous action, credible military forces, and a European defence industry (Haine 2004):

To this end, the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises (Joint Declaration art. 2).

3.1.3 The Helsinki Headline Goals

The Helsinki Headline Goal (HHG) was created at the European Council in Helsinki in December 1999. It was like a “force catalogue” which determined necessary resources for European missions. The goal was to make member states voluntarily take part in EU-led operations, deploying by 2003, up to 60 000 persons for 60 days and sustaining them for at least one year (*ibid.*).

The sixty-day limit concerned the deployment of full-size forces, whilst rapid reaction forces would have to be ready on shorter notice. An ad hoc Committee of Contributors was set in place, which would serve as a mechanism for dialogue, consultation and cooperation with partner states such as NATO member states and its non-EU European states, EU applicant states, and other potential partners. Were NATO assets to be used, non-EU European NATO states could join the operations if they so wished, whereas other states would have to be invited to join by the Council (Salmon and Shepherd 2003 pp. 71-72). This policy, however, caused problems in the working relationship between the EU and NATO.

The Feira European Council in June 2000 established a Headline Task Force (HTF) mechanism, which would identify the capabilities the EU required to implement the Petersberg Tasks. The meeting also established four working groups between the EU and NATO on security, defining capability goals, EU access to NATO assets and capabilities, and permanent arrangements for relations between the two organisations.

Via a series of “Pledging Conferences” – *Capabilities Commitments Conference* (November 2000) and *Capabilities Improvements Conference* (November 2001) – this pool of resources was refined and deficiencies identified. Capabilities Commitment Conference gives the basic materials such as troops, planes, ships for the creation of an EU Rapid Reaction Force (RRF), which was the Helsinki European Council’s “Headline Goal” (Howorth 2002).

In November 2001, EU defence ministers met for the second time to discuss the progress achieved in meeting the Helsinki Headline Goals at the Capabilities Improvement Conference. New offers of capability inputs had been received but forty shortfalls still remained, of which many were critical to the military effectiveness of the ESDP. The conference agreed to remedy the capabilities shortfalls by nationalizing defense efforts and improving compatibility between the national and multinational projects through a European Capability Action Plan (ECAP). The CIC Conclusions were then adopted by the European Council at Laeken on 15 December 2001 (*ibid.*). The European Council meeting in Laeken (December 2001) boldly declared that the EU “should be able to carry out the whole range of Petersberg tasks by 2003” (*ibid.*).

In spite of the identified shortfalls, the ERRF was declared partly operational at the Leaken European Council in December 2001. The Seville European Council the following spring announced that the EU would be in a position to undertake its first crisis management operation in January 2003, by overtaking the UN police mission in Bosnia, and thus renamed the EU Police Mission (EUPM) (Salmon and Shepherd 2003 pp.79-80).

3.1.4 The Nice Treaty and ESDP

The Nice Treaty was signed on March 10, 2001 (European Communities 1991). It revised some of the parts of CFSP and ESDP in the Amsterdam treaty. thus, the role of the EU in security and defence was changed under the same three pillars structure. In other words, there are some fundamental differences between 1997 Amsterdam treaty and 2001 Nice treaty.

First, the defence issues of the EU will directly be related with not WEU but the EU itself (EU Council 2000). As a result of this decision, many functions of the WEU were moved to the EU. A new military and political structure was created within the EU. This new military structure included the European Union Military Committee (EUMC) and the European Union Military Staff (EUMS), and the new political structure is the Political Security Committee (PSC) (Presidency Report on ESDP 2000).

Second, the EU would develop an EU military force consisting of approximately 60,000 troops. This military force would have a ability to receive responsibility for a task from peace-keeping to peace-making (*ibid*).

Nevertheless, some arrangements of ESDP have created a tension between members since some EU member states supported that the EU should act autonomously from NATO in terms of the military capabilities while other member states supported that the EU could use tools and capabilities of NATO.

Moreover, it was decided that the EU should take full responsibility in the conflict prevention areas and increase its capabilities for civilian crisis management.

Besides these novelties, the Nice Treaty brought a number of changes which will affect the ESDP indirectly. One of these changes is the Enhanced Co-operation clause in certain areas.

‘Enhanced Cooperation’ (French Presidency Report on ESDP 2000) allows group of members to act in a specific policy area without consulting all Member States. The Nice Treaty brought Enhanced Co-operation clause to CFSP; however, this clause is not applied to the military co-operation.

There are two arguments upon the changes made in the Nice treaty in terms of ESDP. One argument claims that the Nice treaty did not bring any progress on defence issues²⁴ while other argument says that the Nice Treaty provided ‘Brusselisation’ of EU Member States’ Foreign and Security and Defence policies.

3.1.5. “Headline Goal 2010”

The European Council adopted the Headline Goal 2010 on 17 June 2004. The document can be regarded as the continuation of the Helsinki Headline Goals. Since it left some issues unresolved, Member States decided “themselves to be able by 2010 to respond with rapid and decisive action applying a fully coherent approach to the whole spectrum of crisis management operations covered in the Treaty of the European Union (Schmitt 2004 p.98). The Headline Goal 2010 aims to improve European armed forces’ availability, interoperability, deployability and sustainability. Headline Goal 2010 was to shift the objective from quantity to quality (Howorth 2002). In fact, The Headline Goal has been created to fill the

lack of mobile forces, which should be ready in a very short notice if they become necessary. France, the UK and Germany presented this initiative in February 2004. The forces are primarily used as a request of the UN. They could also be used without the request of the UN. On 16 May 2006, The Council on General Affairs and External Relations stated:

“It is ensured that from January 2007 on, the EU will have the full operational capability to undertake two battle group size operations of rapid response ,including the ability to launch two such operations nearly simultaneously”(Council of European Union 2006).

Moreover, the Headline Goal document established a civil-military cell within the EUMS that would act as an operation centre for rapid civil-military responses (Schmitt 2004 p.99).

It also resolved the contradiction between a Kosovo-style capability and the requirements of the “war on terrorism” partially. Yet the war on terrorism requires different instruments from those involved in driving the Serbian army out of Kosovo. The newly created battle-groups, of which from seven to nine are projected for 2007, can be used for both types of operation. (Howorth 2002) Furthermore, with the Headline Goal document, the European Defence Agency (EDA)was established. The European Security Strategy gave an importance to the establishment of the EDA, officially established by a Council Joint Action in July 2004, for European military resources. Moreover, it was established to support the Member States in issues related with the ESDP. Javier Solana, the High Representative for the CFSP, is the Head of the EDA.

3.1.6. 2003: EU became a Military Actor

On 31 March 2003, the EU’s first military operation, a peace-keeping mission in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) was achieved, by taking over from a NATO force. The operation Concordia was a great political success even though it was modest military. Although people living in northern villages challenged the operation in September 2003, the EU established order again. When the operation finished, there was criminality problem in Macedonia so an EU police operation, Proxima succeeded Concordia on 15 December 2003. Concordia was important for the EU since it allowed the EU to test its new

procedures which cover every aspect of the mounting of a military operation from command and control, through use of force policy, to issues such as logistics, financing and legal arrangements and memoranda of understanding with host nations (Howorth 2002).

In June 2003, the EU's first autonomous operation, Operation Artemis, in the Democratic Republic of Congo, took place. The operation Artemis was a success, exemplifying rapid deployment, utilizing a single chain of command and well-trained troops along the lines of NATO procedures (Howorth 2005). France was the framework nation of the operation (Howorth 2002). With Operation Artemis the EU saw it can be successful in a peacekeeping operation even if it is far from Europe.

The transfer of responsibility for the Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH), in December 2004, Operation Althea, became the EU's most ambitious military mission.

Since the launch of the EU Police Mission in Bosnia (EUPM), the EU has launched sixteen missions under the Petersberg tasks. Twelve missions are still ongoing, of which four are civilian, five are policing missions, two are military missions, and one is mixed military-civilian (*ibid.*).

Through these missions, the EU has demonstrated its ability to break out of its self-imposed conceptual paralysis concerning military operations. Despite the weaknesses and deficiencies discussed earlier, the EU is clearly not without considerable potential in relation to the use of force. In addition to the ground forces which have been – and will increasingly be – deployed in overseas missions, the EU could with no difficulty take on naval or air-combat missions against any conceivable adversary. Officially, the EU's agreed strategy involves the ability to intervene – essentially on humanitarian grounds and at the invitation of the UN – anywhere in the world. But before that can happen, the EU needs to resolve a range of political dilemmas.

3.2 Main Political Developments behind the evolution of the ESDP

Since 2003, the EU has started the military operations. These missions demonstrated the EU's ability involving in military operations. *Officially, the EU's agreed strategy involves the ability to intervene –essentially on humanitarian grounds and at the invitation of the UN – anywhere in the world* (Hill 2005 p.194). To realize this aim, EU began to initiatives to determine the real political objectives behind ESDP. The European Security Strategy, the 'European Union Minister for Foreign Affairs' (EUMFA), 'Structured Cooperation' and the 'Solidarity Clause' formed in the Convention/IGC in 2004. This section will mention these political developments briefly.

3.2.1 European Security Strategy

European Security Strategy was drafted by Javier Solana and approved by the European Council on 12 December 2003. It is an important building block to understand the real political objectives behind ESDP. *It aimed to harmonize the different views of the current and future member states without falling into lowest common denominator rhetoric* (Hill 2003 p.195). The Strategy was entitled as 'A Secure Europe in a Better World'. Besides Solana, UK diplomat Robert Cooper has important contributions to the document with the humanitarian intervention theses (Cooper, 2003 in Hill).

This initiative was especially important in the aftermath of the Iraq crisis which had increased internal divisions within the EU. The strategy paper is based on three central issues, 1) strengthening and extending the security zone around Europe, 2) establishing an effective multilateralism based on the framework of the UN, and 3) responding to the threats of terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and organized crime (Haine 2004 pp.8-9)

The strategy begins with the recognition that Europe has never been 'so prosperous, so secure nor so free'. It identifies new five threats: terrorism,

Weapons of Mass Destruction, failed states, organized crime and regional conflicts (Hill 2005 p.195).

The second section includes strategic objectives of the EU. The strategic objectives are divided into two parts which are to construct security in the European region, and to contribute for a new international order. Emphasizing the use of trade and development policies in a conditional way is the most innovative feature in this section.

The final section asserts that the policy implications of the EU should be more active, more capable and more coherent. Moreover, the document mentions the need for a greater capability for the EU to have the capacity to sustain several operations simultaneously. The document also remembers that EU military operations will be carried out hand in hand with humanitarian and civilian missions, so there should be coordination between the European civilian and military instruments:

In contrast to the massive visible threat in the Cold War, none of the new threats is purely military; nor can any be tackled by purely military means. Each requires a mixture of instruments . . . In failed states; military instruments may be needed to restore order, humanitarian means to tackle the immediate crisis. Regional conflicts need political solutions but military assets and effective policing may be needed in the post conflict phase. Economic instruments serve reconstruction, and civilian crisis management helps restore civil government. The European Union is particularly well equipped to respond to such multi-faceted situations (See Wider Europe 2003).

The document, finally includes a will of partnership first with the US and NATO, second with Russia, and then with other regional partners. The US and NATO are the first since ESS says that many of the EU force's missions will be undertaken in cooperation with NATO:

The EU-NATO permanent agreements, in particular Berlin Plus, enhance the operational capability of the EU and provide the framework for the strategic partnership between the two organisations in crisis management. This reflects our common determination to tackle the challenges of the new century (*ibid.*)

This document is already an important step in the way towards a coherent security and defense policy for the EU. Haine points out several significant characteristics of this document. First, Haine calls this document as a threat-driven for the first time in the EU. Second, the strategy was gradually added to the EU's *acquis communautaire* and identity in security policy. Two key concepts, 'preventive engagement' and 'effective multilateralism' are important in the document:

‘Preventive engagement’ means the Union’s approach to stability and nation-building, which is far more comprehensive than the military method favoured by Washington. ‘Effective multilateralism’ captures the essence of the Union’s rule-based security culture. The European Security Strategy stresses that ‘the fundamental framework for international relations is the United Nations Charter. Strengthening the United Nations, equipping it to fulfill its responsibilities and to act effectively, is a European priority’(Haine 2004 p.52).

3.2.2 The ‘European Union Minister for Foreign Affairs’ (EUMFA)

The EUMC is the highest military body established within the Council. The EUMFA is the result of the Convention in 2004. As an institution, EUMFA can be regarded as the most important innovation of the European Convention. The aim of greater political coordination of the EU created the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs.

The holder of this post, elected for a five-year term, will replace the rotating presidency. Like the High Representative, it is important to choose the holder of this post in terms of background, style and personality and it is also crucial the role of the ‘Foreign Minister’. The European Council appoints the Minister with qualified majority. Moreover, the Minister will be one of the Vice-Presidents of the European Commission and a member of the college under the examination of the European Parliament.

He or she will have the responsibilities of the HR-CFSP and of the Commissioner for External Relations. This means that he or she will have relations with the Council and the Commission. This dual function is good for consistency and unity of representation. Under the authority of the Council and in cooperation with the PSC, the EUMFA will also help the coordination of the civilian and military aspects of EU crisis management operations (Constitutional Treaty, article III-309(2)). The EUMC will give military advice and make recommendations to the PSC over the EU’s military issues which are the development of crisis management in its military aspects, the risk assessment of potential crisis, and the elaboration, assessment and review of capability goals. In crisis management, if the PSC demands, the EUMC will take ideas from the European Union Military Staff (EUMS) for developing strategic military options. With a decision of the Council, it will permit the Operation Commander to

employ in initial operational planning. During an operation, the EUMC will monitor the proper execution of military operations (Missiroli 2004). He or she will also chair the new Foreign Affairs Council (FAC). Moreover, he or she will have the right to coordinate the security and aid policies of the EU. The EUMFA will also have the responsibility in the preparation and the implementation of CFSP/ESDP. In addition, The EUMFA will be common voice of the Union in international organizations and at international conferences.

Moreover, the EUMFA will lead an EU Diplomatic Corps, the European External Action Service, which is intended to be introduced within one year after entry into force of the Treaty (Duke 2000 in Hill 2005). The 'European External Action Service' is in Art. III-197 of the Constitutional Treaty. The 'European External Action Service' will involve officials of the Council, the Commission and seconded national diplomats (Missiroli 2004).

This central pillar is intended to enhance the coordination, and thus increase the integration. The EUMFA can be regarded as the first clear form of supranational intergovernmentalism (Hill, 2005). Hill defines supranational intergovernmentalism as the phenomenon whereby a profusion of agencies of intergovernmentalism take root in Brussels and, through dialogue and socialization process, reaction to events, and a host of other dynamics, gradually create a tendency for policy to be influenced, formulated even driven from within that city (Hill 2005 p.182).

3.2.3 'Structured Cooperation' and the 'Solidarity Clause'

In the Convention and IGC, besides the formation of the EUMFA, two more issues were discussed. The first one was the way of increasing the political coordination of military capacity, and the second was the question of going further in the European collective defense (Hill 2003). Thus, 'structured cooperation' has emerged as a new instrument. It was attempted by France and Germany to move 'enhanced cooperation' of the TEU into one step further. 'Structured cooperation' will give a right to small but militarily strong states to give a direct to the ESDP in the name of the EU. *Those Member States whose military capabilities fulfill higher criteria and which have made more binding commitments to one another in this area with a view to the most demanding*

missions shall establish permanent structured cooperation within the Union framework (article I-41(6)). This cooperation is governed by Article III-312 and by the Protocol on permanent structured cooperation established by Article I-41(6) and Article III-312 of the Constitution (Naert, 2005). The reason why this cooperation was governed by a specific ‘Protocol’ is that ‘the intrinsically exclusive character of the scheme and the parallel controversies over the Tervuren initiative triggered a negative reaction by some member states – from both the ‘Atlanticist’ and the non-allied camps – that translated into a partial rewriting of Art. III-213 in the IGC’ (Missiroli 2004 p.150).

Moreover, this Protocol points out the basic criteria for participation. The basic criteria includes the achievement of high military operational readiness with national and/or multinational force packages, and with pooling and/or specializing of means and capabilities; participation in the development of ‘major joint or European equipment programs’ and in the activities of the Defence Agency; and increased cooperation with a view to meeting agreed objectives concerning ‘the level of investment expenditure on defence equipment’ (*ibid.* p.151).

It is necessary to mention that the final version of Art. III-213 points out QMV is used to form ‘permanent structured cooperation’; however, unanimity will be used for decisions and recommendations related with ‘permanent structured cooperation’.

Furthermore, ‘permanent structured cooperation’ can be regarded as different from other attempts realized in the ESDP since those attempts were more voluntarily and less pressure. In addition, it is interesting the acceptance of the QMV in military and defence issues.

However, structured cooperation can be regarded as a danger by many member states in two ways. First, member states chosen for ‘structured cooperation’ can lead discrimination problem between other member states. Second, ‘structured cooperation’ can be regarded as an alternative to NATO (Hill 2005). Even though the UK supported to work in harmony with NATO, it did not reject structured cooperation. The reason behind this decision was to repair the relations, got worse after Iraq, with France and Germany. With the ‘structured cooperation’ attempt, member states having powerful combat units for

intervention in crisis areas will have a rapid response chance with the request of the UN.

Another and arguably more fundamental innovation is the mutual assistance clause in article I-41(7):

If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defense policy of certain Member States. Commitments and cooperation in this area shall be consistent with commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which, for those States which are members of it, remains the foundation of their collective defense and the forum for its implementation.

The mutual assistance clause is a sensitive issue. While the Atlanticist states fear it may lead to a downgrading of the Alliance, the 'neutral' states fear there may be a possibility to give a decision they do not agree (Hill 2005). According to Naert (2005 p. 6), the stipulation that this obligation of aid and assistance "shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defense policy of certain Member States" raises questions as to the precise scope of this obligation. This is so because the said mutual assistance obligation is clearly incompatible with the neutrality of neutral Member States. However, the mutual assistance clause is a step to have common interests, rights and responsibilities. It seems necessary for the formation of a robust system.

Finally, it is necessary to mention the Solidarity clause in article I-43. The solidarity clause in the EU Constitution is:

1. The Union and its Member States shall act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if a Member State is the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-made disaster. The Union shall mobilize all the instruments at its disposal, including the military resources made available by the Member States, to:
 - (a) – prevent the terrorist threat in the territory of the Member States;
– protect democratic institutions and the civilian population from any terrorist attack;
– assist a Member State in its territory, at the request of its political authorities, in the event of a Terrorist attack;
 - (b) assist a Member State in its territory, at the request of its political authorities, in the event of a natural or man-made disaster.

According to Arts. I-42 and III-231, this new solidarity clause would be implemented by the Council of Ministers and the Political and Security Committee. The solidarity clause did not lead to major challenges of member

states since it was limited to the ‘territory’ of the related member state (Missiroli 2004).

Nevertheless, Naert (2005 p. 10) argues that different obligations under the mutual defense clause and under the solidarity clause may lead to discussions over the respective scope of application of both provisions. In this respect, it appears that there is some overlap, in particular in the case of a terrorist attack that equally amounts to an act of aggression.

4. APPLICATION OF THEORIES ON THE ESDP

The European Union as a security and defence actor could not find a good place in mainstream international relations theories (Hill, 2005). Nevertheless, since 1999, EU has taken a long way in the security and defence cooperation. Thus, international relations theorists have tried to explain the development of security and defence cooperation, even integration.

In this chapter, I will try to explain the evolution of the ESDP through the Realism (and Neo-realism), theory of Liberal Intergovernmentalism (LI) and the theory of Social Constructivism.

4.1 ESDP and Realism

Realists do not believe the international cooperation due to the anarchy. As mentioned above, Realism claims that survival and sovereignty are the basic for the states (Mearsheimer 1994/5, 10 in Hill); however, the rapid development in the formation of the ESDP demonstrated that realists should have found an explanation from the perspective of their theories.

During the Cold War, since Neo-realists assumed that states are interested in survival and protection from threats, they thought that multilateral institutions may be established to work as an alliance towards a common threat. That is why; it was easy to explain the existence of the multilateral cooperation during the Cold War period. Nevertheless, this cooperation and political integration in Europe

continued after the Cold War even though the threats were altered. They had problems to explain this development.

Along with Waltz, realists and other neo-realists claim that security policy is not concerned in the integration process of the EU. The anarchic structure of the international system does not let the systematic pressure of international institutions on nation states. Instead, John Mearsheimer (1994, 1995) asserts that, due to the fact that realists accept the formation of international institutions, they claim that states will always want to make pressure over these institutions in order to redefine and reform the ideas, binding effects and interests of these institutions.

Realism assumes that member states transfer limited powers to institutions of the EU. That is why; member states govern the EU. According to Glarbo (2001), since member states want to maintain their sovereignties, they do not want further integration in high politics such as the security and defence policy. In other words, realism could not explain EU members' transfer their sovereignty in military matters, and it does not believe that they could act coherently in the EU (Howorth in Hill, 2005).

According to neo-realism, states prefer to decide alone in security and defence issues; and other military activities. Bull says that the European Union is inappropriate and incapable for this conception (Bull, 1983 in Howorth in Hill 2005). However, Barry Posen (2004; 2006) claims that there is an explanation of the emergence of the ESDP from the neo-realist perspective, which is that the ESDP is the weak version of balance of power. Moreover, he assumes that in the formation of the ESDP, one more factor which is European identity is important. However, it is hard to derive this factor from the neo-realist perspective. Constructivist theory makes a contribution to the formation of the ESDP in this factor.

Balance of power explanation is accepted by other realists; however, they claim that in the current unipolar world order this is irrational. They claim that ESDP is not for a balance of power but a reaction to the US, which did not spend an effort to solve the problem in the Balkans, and did not behave to Europe like its allies anymore (Brooks – Wohlforth 2005: 91 cited in Forsberg). In other words, Neo-realists argue that member states can use the EU's security and defence policy as an instrument to balance of its power with the US. In other words, Realism claims that if the ESDP is developed, this will be the result of the

interests of member states. This perspective defines the EU's security and defence policy as a bargaining between actors thinking about their interests; however, this view underestimates longer-term changes. In this point, Social Constructivist can be used to understand the process and dimensions which are ignored by Realists.

Since Neo-realists see the military threats as the primary issue in the security, to be secure, it is needed a military capacity alone or together with the allies. *Security policy is then a policy of the build-up and use of military force.* Basically, Neo-realism gives an importance to military threats, military instruments to stop these threats, and the military capacity to be effective in the world order (Waltz 1979; Walt 1991; Mearsheimer 2001, cited in Rieker).

Neo-Realists assume that states are concerned with security because the survival comes first, then the pursuit of other goals become important (Waltz, N. Kenneth 1979: 126). Classical Realism rejects this and argues that states want to maximize their power as an end. *The assumption of security seeking says nothing about the states' relationships towards each other as they think about their security, however, and as such is logically compatible with a collective rather than a competitive security system* (Weber, 2005 pp. 13-35). Waltz claims that the states are egoistic and "self-regarding" (Waltz 1979: 91). Waltz says: "states [will] not enjoy even an imperfect guarantee of their own security unless they set out to provide it for themselves" (Waltz 1979: 201). Weber assumes that this definition means that the international system is a "self-help" system (Weber, 2005 pp. 13-35).

In general, Rationalists can explain the reasons of the EU's ineffectiveness and incoherency in world politics; however, they cannot explain the changeable character of the EU. They also have difficulties in explaining the reason why member states are willing to establish common institutions in spite of the fact that they could not get any material gains. Constructivism argues that the reason of this is not material since states do follow not only material objectives, but also ideological motivations.

Since Neo-realism, based on classical realism, claims that the international system is anarchic, and there is no authority to determine common rules, economic and military power is necessary to protect national interests of the state. The balance of power is achieved with an order in international system. Thus, multilateral cooperation is demanded if it is in the interests of the great powers.

International institutions have limited autonomy coming from the nation states. If national interests conflict with each other, multilateral cooperations disintegrate.

4.1.1 ESDP and Liberal Intergovernmentalism

When mentioning the EU integration theory, liberal intergovernmentalism and supranational institutionalism prefer to use the territory concept as a dominant or explanatory factor for European cooperation and integration. According to Howorth, first, the sovereign state as a unitary actor is involved in political bargaining. Then, supranational institutions as diverse actors at multiple levels involved in functional integration (Howorth in Hill 2005).

Moravcsik (1998) argues that external and internal factors change states' strategies; however, national identities, interests, and preferences of states are not affected by those factors. Social Constructivists are against this argument and assert that interests, especially national security interests and national identities are affected by external and internal factors (Jefferson et al. 1996 p.53; Risse and Sikking 1999 p.11; Wendt 1999 p.170)

Number of the Liberal Intergovernmentalists argues that states might accept to pool their sovereignty for security and defence policy; however, they would claim that this can happen if the most powerful states in the EU use their powers in order to shape the EU policy, and if their interests are consistent with it. This explanation is consistent with St. Malo initiative of the UK; however, they add that EU security policy disintegrate when the interests of the powerful states differ.

Alan Milward, who has searched the historical background of the EU integration, asserts that European integration did not decrease national sovereignty but helped the reconstruction of European states. According to Milward, when we look at the origins of the EC, we see that nation states played the most important role in its formation (Milward, 1992, 12). However, like other liberal intergovernmentalists, he asserts that in foreign policy issues, this integration has taken place less than other areas such as monetary or agricultural affairs since governments have had a great autonomy in that field. *However, this position leads a so-called democratic deficit, according to which decisions at the*

European level are not subject to the same controls as decisions at the national level (Kaiser 1971, Sharpf 1999, Koenig- Archibugi 2002 in Hill). To remove this problem, it is necessary to support integration in foreign policy issues.

Moravcsik claims that ESDP is the result of bargains between EU Member States whose interests are driven by domestic politics. Even though, institutions of the EU have an influence, Moravcsik also argues that the decision which develops ESDP is the result of the national preferences formed in domestic politics of member states (Moravcsik 1991). In fact, Liberal intergovernmentalism claims that certain policies can be given to a supranational institutions since governments can increase their power via extra resources remaining from those policies against their domestic rivals (Hill, 2005). However, this can be in low politics because governments give up their control if it is in their interest, and foreign policy affairs such as ESDP are regarded as high politics. Thus, these issues are rigidly separated from integration in general. However, the rapid development in the evolution of ESDP since 1998 has demonstrated that high politics can be a part of the integration machine even though interests of governments are too important.

Liberal Intergovernmentalism does not concern about military threats and military capacities. This means that it is not much interested in security issues. Instead, LI gives much importance to economic interests. Nevertheless, Moravcsik explains that geopolitical threats and security concerns were included in the formation of the EU.

On the other hand, according to Smith and School (2004), liberal intergovernmentalism faces two challenges while explaining security and defense integration. First of all, since most foreign policy decisions are given in accordance with the decision of elites, this policy area does not involve domestic interest groups thus, two-level bargaining model may not work here. Smith and School assert that domestic interest groups generally do not form strong opinions on security and defense policy. If liberal intergovernmentalism worked, domestic actors should have had the capacity to influence their governments during negotiations in forming a security and defense policy. According to Smith and School, this is a problem in liberal intergovernmentalism's applicability.

Second, according to Smith and School (*ibid*), liberal intergovernmentalism claims that domestic constituents form preferences for or

against defense and security policy integration; however, in contrast to economic policy, to form preferences in the defence and security issues with their gains and losses is too difficult. Moreover, they give an example that domestic actors could determine whether or not an economic policy would increase prosperity; however, such a rationale in defense and security issues could be difficult (*ibid*). Finally, Smith and School, claims that these two objections make liberal intergovernmentalism not well adapted to explain defense and security integration (*ibid*).

Smith and School also assert that there is a way to continue to use the liberal intergovernmentalism. The development of the ESDP was the result of a side payment or issue-linkage in order to come to an agreement on different sets of issues since the ESDP have come from a bilateral agreement between British Prime Minister Tony Blair and French President Jacques Chirac at a 1998 summit in St. Malo. Even, Smith and School claim that Liberal intergovernmentalism is particularly unsuited to explain the defense and security integration since its model is based on rationally calculating domestic constituents (*ibid*).

Finally, Liberal Intergovernmentalism is not open for changes in national security interests and preferences and sees them static rather than dynamic. Moreover, it depends on the traditional concept of the security, which concentrates on material rather than societal values. Finally, identity concept is not involved in the theory since LI, like Rationalism ignores the concept of identity and sees it as given. This analysis demonstrates that we need a second approach which involves these factors. This approach is Social Constructivism.

4.2 ESDP and Social Constructivism

Howorth finds the EU security integration *theoretically unproblematic* from the Constructivist perspective, which suggests that *international relations can be "socially constructed" in more value-based or normative terms and may not be a clash of interests* (Howorth in Hill, 2005).

Constructivism has significant contributions in explaining EU's external strategy. Constructivism claims that the material position of the EU such as its role, interest and strategy gains a meaning in the world gradually. Moreover,

perceptions of different actors are also effective in giving an international identity and some capabilities to Europe (Bretherton and Vogler 1999, 28-32 cited in Hill 2005). Robert Cooper points out this identity concept and says that the thing the EU did is to remove the distinctions between internal and external affairs (Cooper 2003 in Hill 2005). The EU's external policy which is produced under the multi-level structure of the EU is the result of this effort. In addition, Cooper claims that the EU should use the multilateralism to define itself and *more of the traditional kind of hard, or military power* (ibid., 164-72). Smith and Steffenson argues that even though the EU do not reach the military power the US has, member states should cooperate more in military issues in order to have equal rights with the US in this sense. (Hill, 2005)

The classical security complex theory gives an importance to the region (Buzan *et al.* 1998 p. 15); and it points out security is related with power politics and survival. This theory is a part of Realist school of thought. However, new approaches in security studies which challenge traditional realist theory. It was believed that a broadened security agenda should be examined. One of the most prominent of these new approaches is developed by Barry Buzan and Ole Waever (Weaver *et al.* 1993, Weaver 1995, Buzan, Weaver and Wilde 1998). Their study is known as the Copenhagen School.

This new approach of the Copenhagen School is more than the classical security complex theory, which focuses on military and power. This approach has a social constructivist perspective in order to demonstrate the issues which should be securitized. In other words, this approach claims that the security does not only include the use of force but also human beings which has impacts on security.

The concept of security is more flexible for the Social Constructivists so there are changes in threat perception and security instruments. Social Constructivism has contributed to the concept of security through a broader definition of the security concept. Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde (Buzan *et al.* 1998) agree with the Realism, which argues that security is directly connected with survival; however, they disagree with the Realism in terms of securing survival. They argue that security and threats are not fixed. They are socially constructed, and in order to become a threat or a security issue, an issue should be presented by an actor which calls for a process of securitization.

As mentioned above, security does not have a fixed meaning. it is *speech act* (*ibid.* p. 39). As a speech act, security is *an emergency condition and the right to use any means* (Wæver cited in *ibid.*). If a security issue is presented as critical, it should be resolved. This issue is a security issue since it is labeled as a threat. It is not related with being a real existential threat (Buzan *et al.* 1998 p. 24). The Copenhagen School claims that the issues which will be securitized are ‘*speech acts*’. Thus, they point out that it is not important what security is in reality, but what is recognized as a threat.

The Copenhagen School has a ‘constructivist/realist’ perspective in terms of the meaning of security. They divide the security into five sectors which are military, environment, economic, societal, and political security. This division has not only traditional but also non-traditional issues. In other words, security is the result of a social process. This process is the securitisation. In contrast, there is a desecuritisation which is the shift of issues from an emergency condition to normal.

Whereas some Constructivists follow a broader definition of the security concept, some scholars concentrate on the cultural factors affecting the security concept (Katzenstein 1996). Katzenstein argues that states’ interests are not stable, and thus can be shaped by external and internal factors (1996 p.3 in Rosamond 2000). In the same way, strategies, identities and interests could change over time through internal and external factors in their environment (*ibid.*). This means that interests and preferences are ‘constructed through a process of social interaction’ (Katzenstein 1996 p.2 in Rosamond 2000).

Constructivism is an approach, which claims that cognitive factors in determining the foreign policy are important. These factors are ignored by realist and liberal theorists. These theorists defend the rationality of actors while constructivists defend the bounded rationality meaning that cognitive factors constrain decision-makers, and decisions are given under the less than full rationality. The constructivism also tries to observe social events objectively, based on a more reflective approach (Andreatta cited in Hill 2005).

The Social Constructivists disagree with the Rationalists in terms of security policy of EU. Rieker (2004) explains this in three arguments. First, she argues that even though EU has not been a unitary actor yet, it has some

autonomy which was formed by the gradual establishment of common rules, norms and institutions. She asserts that gradually, the EU will be able to influence the agendas of the member states in terms of the security policy. According to the constructivists, in the EU, member states have a common identity, norms and values such as rule of law, human rights, democracy, tolerance etc. (Manners 2002; Risse 2004 p. 172). These norms constrain behavior of actors, shape their preferences and redefine their interests (*ibid.* p. 163; Sjusen 2002 p. 501).

The Europeanisation theory (Checkel 2001; Hill and Wallace 1996; Manners 2002; Tonra 2003) deals with this process of reconstruction. According to Wong, Europeanization asserts that the EU institutions are important in the reconstruction process (2005 p. 138). This means that the fundamental building bricks of the EU will gradually be reconstructed. In terms of the security discourse, Rieker argues that states adapt to their environments by changing the security policies at the national level, and by attempting to change the security policies at the European level. Even, the concept of the sovereignty has been changed and modified in the EU, and state monopoly will be constrained through common institutions in the Foreign and Security Policy field like the High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy. She adds that this does not mean full power over the member states; however, it will affect the agenda and the policy of the member states in this area.

Second, Rieker agrees with the Copenhagen School and points out the constructivists argue that the EU's security policy is not just related with military instruments. Social Constructivists have a broader approach to security including all security policy instruments of the EU, threats in EU documents, and policies to counter these threats. There are empirical results demonstrating that the EU has taken measures against internal and external threats. As an internal measure, in the area of Justice and Home Affairs, especially after September 11, the EU enforced the domestic police cooperation to counter international crime and terrorism. As an external measure, the EU has improved its capacity for civilian and military crisis management operations (Rieker 2003).

Nevertheless, some Social Constructivists argues that without a broader definition of security, the EU is a security actor since the EU has a significant military capacity with a different military power. Cooper agrees with this argument: "it is not true that Europeans have no military capability – after the

United States and Russia there is no country that is on par with the European Union's collective force. Nor is it true that the Europeans are unwilling to use force" (Cooper 2003 p.156). He adds: "the Anglo-French artillery rather than American bombing that made the difference in Bosnia; and it was the British-French artillery that were willing to send in troops when the air campaign in Kosovo seemed to go nowhere. And Germany – in spite of its long-standing reservations about the use of military force – has been active in Kosovo and Afghanistan" (*ibid.*). Moreover, Constructivists point out EU's crisis management operations in Macedonia, Congo and Bosnia prove the military power of the EU.

Besides the EU crisis management operations, Constructivists mention political developments since 2003 to demonstrate the development in the EU's security policy. First one is the formation of a European armament agency, which will improve the defence capabilities of the member states, develop the European defence capabilities and increase the European armaments cooperation. Second is the creation of the European security strategy, which presents main threats, main strategic objectives and the policy implications of the EU and demonstrates that the EU's efforts for a coherent foreign policy and effective crisis management. It points out the EU should get together its instruments and capabilities to counter the identified threats. According to Rieker, the approach in the ESS is consistent with the Constructivist approach in the security. Third, the creations of the EUMFA, the possibility to create structured cooperation in security and defence, and a solidarity clause in the constitutional treaty demonstrate that the EU has developed a security policy even though major member states try to take different positions related with hot issues in international politics (Rieker, 2004).

Jeffrey Checkel, James Caporaso, and Joseph Jupille (2003 in Smith and School 2004) connect constructivism with preference formation and institutions. They argue that joining to an institution affect the preferences. Regarding the ESDP, Smith and School claim that even though having different preferences for the ESDP, France and Britain negotiated for further institutionalization (Smith and School 2004). Rosamond agrees with this argument: institutions such as the EU could change not only the strategic choices of states but also most basic preferences and very identity of them (2003 p.117 *ibid.*).

The Constructivism takes the EU more than a simple set of rules, and gives an importance to the social origins of behavior, and to the power of ideas

(Bretherton and Vogler 1999, 28-36 in Hill). Like LI, Constructivism claims that states are willing to transfer their sovereignty to supranational institutions. Nevertheless, in contrast to LI, Constructivism argues that the reason of this transfer is not material since states do follow not only material objectives, but also ideological motivations. Moreover, Constructivists assert that states may not seem willing to transfer sovereignty to institutions and may demand an ultimate control over their policies; however, the reason of this is not being unwilling to follow institutional rules, but being considered untrustworthy or inappropriate (March and Olsen 1998). Thus, Constructivism supports the integration in the security policy of the EU since institutions influence the foreign policy decisions and there is an institutionalization process in the security policy of the EU.

Finally, the difference between Rationalism and Social Constructivism comes from the strategic adaptation and identity change. On one hand, Morgenthau, Keohane, and Moravcsik claim that national interests are exogenously given. On the other hand, Social Constructivists argue that national interests could change, and norms form identities and influence behaviour (Katzenstein 1996 p.5). Wendt (1999 p.113-4) argues that Social Constructivism accepts that states behave in accordance with their domestic interests; however, it points out these interests could be changed through norms and ideas. Shortly, identities and interests are not constant, and change through external and internal factors. In the same way, national security and national identity are related so national security interests could change when the national identity was changed.

5. CONCLUSION

I have throughout the previous chapters analyzed the political developments behind the evolution of the ESDP, and the process of security and defence integration. To sum up, ESDP has become one of the most prominent policies of the EU to shape its external relations and the European integration process. In 1998, the EU realized the seriousness of the security and defense issues. Since 2003, security and defense issues gained momentum with the effect of political developments and started to move towards a true (European) Common Security and Defense Policy. The EU has started the military operations. These missions demonstrated the EU's ability involving in military operations. The drafted Constitution's provisions on security and defense such as common defense as a future objective, the mutual defense clause, and the broader definition of the EU's crisis management missions, the possibility of enhanced cooperation on defense, the permanent structured cooperation and the creation of the function of the EUMFA have important contributions in this progress.

I also tried to argue why Social Constructivism can explain this integration relatively to Realism and Liberal Intergovernmentalism. If I conclude my findings in terms of the theoretical framework of my thesis, I will try to answer my research questions briefly.

First, as mentioned above, Realists do not believe the international cooperation due to the anarchy. Realism claims that survival and sovereignty are the basic for the states; however, the rapid development of the ESDP demonstrated that realists should have found an explanation from the perspective of their theories.

In general, Rationalists can explain the reasons of the EU's ineffectiveness and incoherency in world politics; however, they cannot explain the changeable character of the EU. They also have difficulties in explaining the reason why member states are willing to establish common institutions despite the fact that they could not get any material gains. Constructivism argues that the reason of this is not material since states do follow not only material objectives, but also ideological motivations.

Liberal Intergovernmentalism is not open for changes in security interests and preferences and sees them static rather than dynamic. It depends on the traditional concept of the security, which concentrates on material rather than societal values. Identity concept is not involved in the theory and LI ignores the concept of identity and sees it as given. This analysis demonstrates that we need a second approach which involves these factors since in this point LI cannot explain the gradual evolution of the ESDP. The political developments affecting the evolution of the ESDP have taken place gradually. This demonstrates us state identities could change overtime. Even though the draft constitution of the EU has not been ratified yet, this attempt explains that member states can be willing to delegate their sovereignties to the institutions.

Second, the approach which could explain the security and defence integration is Social Constructivism. As Rieker points out the constructivists argue that the EU's security policy is not just related with military instruments. Social Constructivists have a broader approach to security including all security policy instruments of the EU, threats in EU documents, and policies to counter these threats. European Security Strategy is the result of these attempts. Similarly, the creations of the EUMFA, the possibility to create structured cooperation in security and defence, and a solidarity clause in the constitutional treaty are the efforts that show the EU has developed a security policy even though major member states try to take different positions related with hot issues in international politics.

Moreover, even though EU has not been a unitary actor yet, it has some autonomy which was formed by the gradual establishment of common rules, norms and institutions. The EU will be able to influence the agendas of the member states in terms of the security policy gradually. This argument is consistent with the Constructivist approach.

In conclusion, although there are some limits, political developments I mentioned above in the evolution of the EU demonstrate that Social Constructivism can explain further security and defence integration better than the Liberal Intergovernmentalism and Realism do.

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