

Lund University

Center for East and South-East Asian Studies

Master Programme in Asian Studies

East and Southeast Asian Track

Spring Semester, 2008

**Resolving and Transforming Conflicts: An Empirical Study of Track II/III
Diplomacy and Its Interplay with Track I Diplomacy in Sino-Japanese Relations
Since the End of WWII**

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Abstract

The purpose of this thesis is to shed light on the role of Track II and Track III diplomacy as a means to shape Sino-Japanese relations. It studies the Track II and Track III diplomacy and its interplay and interrelations with Track I diplomacy in Sino-Japanese relations since the end of the WWII. It analyzes the function of Track II and Track III (or non-governmental) diplomacy and their interrelations with Track I diplomacy in resolving and transforming conflicts both empirically and theoretically. The non-governmental relations between China and Japan since the end of the WWII have been chosen as empirical studies. Liberalism and critical theory have been applied and studied theoretically.

Keywords: Track I, Track II and Track III Diplomacy; Sino-Japanese Relations; Liberalism; Critical Theory; Civil Society; NGOs; Institutions

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1.0 INTRODUCTION

The resolution of disputes in a peaceful way and the search for new strategies dealing with nontraditional security threats in managing and transforming conflicts have been given rise to the emergence of new actors and characters during the last two decades due to the changing global order influenced by “globalization, economic liberalization and the concomitant growing interdependencies” (Rüland 2002: 84). International institutions in form such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs), multinational corporations (MNCs) and regional forums etc, provide an increasingly significant role in diplomatic world, epistemic communities, and think tank in international politics. These international organizations are considered as Track II/III diplomacy institutions in using common ground approach¹, away from adversarial approaches² and towards collaborative problem solving³.

Realism school, mainly represented by Thomas Hobbes, Hans J. Morgenthau, and Kenneth Waltz etc, argue that, first, the principal actors in the international system are national states. The non-government organizations, multinational corporations, international institutions and other sub-state actors are having little independent influence. Second, the international relations are anarchic and there is no superior authority regulating states behaviour and interactions. Third, sovereign states act rationally according to national interests, thus there is general distrust of long-term cooperation. And finally, the overriding states interests are national security and survival. Relations among states are determined by comparative level of power. Realism school have greatly framed international relations, however, an abundance of academic works have

¹ According to the Search for Common Ground (SFCG), the “Common Ground Approach” is a means of navigating through conflict and identifying possibilities that are not apparent from an adversarial mind set. It is a set of principles and practices that, when utilized, causes a fundamental shift in people's relationship with conflict - away from adversarial approaches toward cooperative solutions.

² “Adversarial approaches are seen to involve sides as being hostile and in opposition to one another. The general principle is that one side is right and the other is wrong and this results in winners and losers according to who is determined to be in the right”. This definition is from The Indigenous Facilitation and Mediation Project (IFaMP). Access: http://ntru.aiatsis.gov.au/ifamp/terms/terms_content.html.

³ In collaborative problem solving, parties work together to solve the problem instead of negotiating from opposing positions, besides, problems are identified in terms of interests.

distributed themselves in institutional studies concerning the states' security and collaboration in International Relations. Representatives' authors including Alastair Iain Johnston, Charles E. Morrison, Sheldon W. Simon, and Michael Leifer not only examine states relations and international activities but also analyze institutional behaviors. They argue that sub-states actors including non-governmental organizations, multinational corporations and other international institutions are performing increasingly independently and significantly. They could carry out various activities to promote long-term cooperation among sovereign states. Such a trend suggests that realism seems insufficient in taking various actors in international community into consideration in explaining the complexity of international relations and new phenomenon such as the function of NGOs, MNCs and institutional development.

Liberalism and critical theory are the two main alternative strands within the field of international relations that address this shortcoming. Liberalism introduces new actors and focuses more on non-security issues such as institution, society development, democracy, peace and human rights, etc. Critical theory uses a different perspective by challenging the notion of "knowledge of each other" and emphasizes culture and ideology are important and powerful means to challenge the existing social and economic order. Track II and Track III diplomacy, supported by liberalism and critical theory, emphasize various actors in citizen movement and civil society, become increasingly significant for academic studies. In doing my fieldwork research in Tokyo, after observations and interviews with several Japanese NGOs, I argue that the significance of non-states actors from civil society, business or social communities cannot be underestimated and neglected in the non-governmental relations between China and Japan since the end of WWII. Chinese and Japanese civil society and the mutual interests from the economic, political and cultural fields make the interaction even possible.

1.1 Background and Research Problem

1.1.1 Overview

International community is represented and principally formed by actors of national states.

This community has to deal with conflicts and disputes aroused by different national interests. Traditional diplomacy, mainly carried out by states leaders, formal government officials and instructed representatives of sovereign states, which defined as Track I diplomacy, is far from efficient and sufficient to manage states relations and intractable conflicts intertwined with other regional and global conflicts. According to scholars and practitioners in study of conflict management and transformation, several reasons have been listed to explain the possibility and necessity of multi-track diplomacy⁴ whose actors are made of a majority of informal intermediaries: professional mediators, arbitrators, judges, or other officials that try to intervene and resolve the conflicts (Chigas 2003: http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/track2_diplomacy/). First, the conflicts issues involved may be too complicated and sensitive entangled with whether historical, ethnical or inter-societal questions and the experience of “threat” is so powerful that it pervades all aspects of a community's life” to deal with in the absence of multi-track diplomacy (ibid. and Dugan 2003: <http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/threats/>); Secondly, the conflicts may involve human needs and values which require rebuilding of identity, but traditional diplomacy (Track I diplomacy) only used to deal with lack-of-resource problems, such as poverty, power entitlement or distribution to provide economic opportunity, and is not efficient to address mutual understanding and “identity” acknowledgement (Kriesberg 2003: http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/identity_issues/); Thirdly, some conflicts like border disputes are not “ripe” (Zartman 2003: <http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/ripeness/>) enough to manage and transform conflicts immediately but should wait until the trust and communication-confidence

⁴ Scholars represented by John W. McDonald, Louise Diamond, Joseph Montville are the founders that put forward the concepts of “Multi-track diplomacy”, and some of their works have expanded the multi-track diplomacy into many newly analyzed perspectives, such as from two-track diplomacy (Montville 1982), five-track diplomacy (McDonald 1991) to nine-track diplomacy (McDonald 2003). However, in this thesis the concept of “multi-track diplomacy” is defined, according to the Search for Common Ground (SFCG), as Track II diplomacy (unofficial-to-unofficial diplomacy) and Track III diplomacy (unofficial-to-grass roots diplomacy). Those concepts will be further defined in the thesis.

mechanism is built through non-traditional diplomatic channel⁵.

Thus, in keeping the insufficiency of traditional Track I diplomacy in mind, it is necessary to introduce other channels, and in this thesis, I refer to Track II diplomacy and Track III diplomacy, to deal with various conflicts covering much more complicated and sophisticated issues that cannot yet be resolved by formal actors in Track I. Besides, the interrelations between Track II/III and Track I diplomacy are also studied.

1.1.2 The Definition of Track I, Track II and Track III Diplomacy

Track I diplomacy involves official governmental or intergovernmental representatives, who may use good offices, mediation, and sticks and carrots to seek or force an outcome (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall 2005: 20,21). This diplomacy involves governmental negotiation and collaboration. Participants in this track are on the official level, represent their respective governments and reflect the official decisions of the states .

Track II diplomacy could be described as interaction between epistemic communities and their high-level officials. This diplomacy is generally considered as supplement of Track I diplomacy. In theory, groups from Track II diplomacy were "created to influence their government counterparts by providing studies on issues that officials had neither the time nor the expertise to address, or that were too sensitive to be raised in official meetings" (Simon 2002:172). The idea was that non-official specialists would influence the deliberations of government policy (ibid.). It could work through working group, dialogue mechanism and meeting that include representatives from both official and non-official levels. In this thesis it is defined as work of epistemic community and communication among unofficial figures (businessmen, religious staff and experts) to official figures (local leaders, politicians etc.).

⁵ For more details of the reasons explaining the insufficiency of traditional diplomacy dealing with conflicts and disputes, see Diana Chigas'(2003) work of Track II (Citizen) Diplomacy, and other studies including Peter Coleman (2000), I. William Zartman (2003) and others in the field of conflicts management.

On the other hand, ““people to people” diplomacy is defined as Track III diplomacy. This type of diplomacy is unofficial or people of grass roots diplomacy. Its actors are generally individuals and groups marginalized from central political power. They are from public or civil society. In this diplomacy, activities concerning economic, social and cultural exchanges are organized, media exposure is generated. People could be provided with political and legal advocacy. The aim is to promote specific courses or enacting systemic changes linked with Track I channel.

1.1.3 Track II and Track III Diplomacy in Sino-Japanese Relations

The Track II and Track III (or the non-governmental) diplomacy between China and Japan, as a unique multi-faceted feature, have imbedded in the history of Sino-Japanese relations. The development of Sino-Japanese non-governmental relations since the end of the World War Second can be traced back to the establishment of several unofficial institutions including the Sino-Japanese Trade Promotion Association, Dietmen League for Promoting Trade between China and Japan before the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (P.R.C.) in 1949 and later the bookkeeping barter trade in 1951 and the “LT trade”⁶ (Sino-Japanese Long Term Integrated Trade Memorandum). Then a variety of cooperation in economics, culture and politics has sprung up. It moderates the history of conflict between China and Japan via people-to-people exchanges. However, to date, few academic works has analyzed the Track II and Track III diplomacy shaping International Relations study theoretically and the Sino-Japanese non-governmental relations since the end of the WWII empirically.

Based on secondary materials, this thesis analyses previous works from academic books and articles on the theoretical claim of sub-states actors including international institutions, non-governmental organizations and multinational corporations shaping

⁶ The LT Trade is named based on the abbreviation of the two representatives signing up the treaty from the agency of the Sino-Japanese Long Term Integrated Trade Memorandum. Chinese representative was Liao (L), and Japanese representative was Takasaki (T).

international relations studies. As supplements of the documentary studies, the thesis also includes secondary sources empirical materials that analyzing on the role of Track II/III diplomacy as means to shape Sino-Japanese relations since the end of the WWII.

1.2 Research Question and Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this thesis is to shed light on the role of Track II/III diplomacy as a means to shape Sino-Japanese relations. The study will employ liberalism and critical theory to analyze the role of Track II/III diplomacy in managing and transforming conflicts in the context of the non-governmental relations between China and Japan since the end of the WWII.

The main research questions are two-fold:

How did Track II/III diplomacy between China and Japan develop after the second world war?

How is Track II/III diplomacy linked to Track I diplomacy?

1.3 Methodology

The main approach of this thesis is based on documentary studies including academic books and articles on institution and states behaviour. Emphasis goes to their previous work and analysis on the theoretical basis of states relations and institutional research. The secondary data also includes lectures, personal helps from staffs of Lund and Waseda University, overseas students from China and Japanese NGOs and grassroots organizations.

In addition, I also conducted interviews with specialists and scholars from Japanese NGOs. Use of interviews is good to explore subjective information, such as the institutions' motivations, function, working procedure to find out how Japanese and Chinese NGOs and grassroots organizations working out some conflicts and reaching

new understandings about each other and how they are able to set aside conflicts and differences that the states cannot. I adopt these sources from interviews as reference of my research.

1.4 Disposition

The thesis is divided into three sections. The first section is a theoretical framework of Track II and Track III diplomacy. This section will specifically outline liberalism and critical theory as an analytical framework for analyzing the topic of this thesis. This section also analyzes the theoretical working mechanism of Track II and Track III diplomacy and its interplay with Track I diplomacy. The second section will principally provide more substance for the theoretical claims and introduce the empirical study of how Track II and Track III diplomacy between China and Japan looks like and how it developed after the Second World War. The concluding section will summarize the major findings of this thesis.

2.0 TRACK II AND TRACK III DIPLOMACY

Traditional IR theory has been mainly concerned with interests of sovereign states, such traditional approaches proved to be very useful to explain realpolitik, hegemony or power in a state of anarchy. More recently, however, political scientists maintained that these approaches are insufficient to address newly emerging phenomena such as NGOs and MNCs and their role in shaping international relations. Liberalism and critical theory are the two main strands within the field of international relations studies that address this shortcoming. Liberalism focuses on non-security issues and a range role of new actors such as institution, peace, human rights, interdependence of states and the structural

international system. Thus liberalism supplements traditional approaches by advocating cooperative relations of states. Critical theory uses a different perspective by challenging the notion of "knowledge about each other" and emphasizes that culture and ideology are important and powerful means to support or challenge the existing social and economic order. Liberalism and critical theory have in common that both of them minimize the interests of sovereign states as only core element analyzing international community and consider new actors possible to take place of power competition and conflicts. The most significant differences between liberalism and critical theory are that the former emphasizes substantial non-governmental factors as institutions, non-governmental organizations, and multinational corporations and non-security issues such as democracy and human rights while the latter focuses on knowledge about each other that culture and ideology are important for supporting or challenging the existing social and economic order.

The nontraditional approaches to IR studies provide a useful framework for analyzing Sino-Japanese relations comprehensively as the mainstream literature has been focusing almost exclusively on the interests of sovereign states and security issues in a state of anarchy. In my thesis I am applying liberalism in order to show how new non-governmental actors shape the relations between China and Japan. In addition, I will employ critical theory as a means to elaborate on the role of "knowledge about each other" that influences the politics between these two nations.

2.1 Liberalism

In IR, liberalism seems to be rather optimistic about promoting cooperative relations for states. First, liberalism has been innovated by a number of thoughts originating from institutionalism, which objects the view of realism that the international system is anarchic without world government and international orderer and believes that implicit or explicit structure exists to determine states' behaviour within the international system. International relations, in this context are characterized as interdependent, e.g. they are

reliant on one another economically, socially or politically; International relations are also increasingly shaped by transnationalism, which implies the free flow of people, idea, goods transcending the boundaries limits of states communicating globally. One form of transnationalism is the multinational corporation. Liberalism points also to the growing significance of non-governmental organizations, multinational corporations and other actors in international community. Those liberal pluralists believe that power and influence were “exercised by a range of actors” and “cooperation in pursuit of mutual interests” is the major process, thus study could go to areas of institution, society development, democracy, peace and human rights instead of giving too much emphasis on conflicts due to power unbalance and hegemonic competition in realism’s belief (Steans, Pettiford and Diez 2005: 22). And finally, liberalism believes that international community where cooperations among nation states take place is an alternative to international anarchy. Liberalism goes against Kenneth Waltz realism's myth "anarchy is the permissive cause of war" suggests that so long as anarchy prevails, conflicts are inevitable aspects of international affairs, and supports the myth "there is an international society" that offers hopes that the conflictual aspects of international anarchy could be somewhat overcome by transforming international politics from conflictual to cooperative (Weber 2005: 38).

Liberalists believe that the emergence and existence of Track II and Track III diplomacy helps to deal with or supplement the inefficiency of direct government-to-government interaction on the official level. Track II and Track III diplomacy are organized and exercised by a great range of individuals, private groups and organizations from public, local communities and civil society. This, however, does not go against the idea of governmental interaction, which to some extent still follow the interests of a domestic hierarchy or international anarchy and reflects national interests and centralization of power. The main function of Track II/III diplomacy, in the eye of liberalists, is to provide suggestions and propose policy for Track I channel how to promote mutual trust among states and establish confidence-building measurements and security-protecting mechanism. By doing that individual and collective mutual interests and potential

harmonious relations could be pursued.

2.2 Critical Theory

Generally speaking, critical theorists challenge the idea that “IR is necessarily about the pursuit of power and strategic interest by states”, and the concept of knowledge has been particularly emphasized saying that “all knowledge is ideological – it is reflection of the values, ideas and, crucially, interests of particular social groups”. On the contrary, critical theorists believe that culture and ideology are “in themselves, an important and powerful force working to support or challenge the existing economic and social order” (Steans and Pettiford 2005: 107). The emphasis in this thesis goes to one of the variants of critical theory from Habermas’ understanding of public sphere in relation to diplomatic negotiation and conflict resolution. Habermas believes that there are two types of political deliberation: “(a) among citizens within the informal public sphere and (b) among politicians or representatives within formal settings”, that respectively refer to “dialogic” and “instrumental” deliberation (Habermas 2005: 388). But precede formal and instrumental deliberation, together with Habermas, scholars including Barber (1984) believe that informal, casual and unconstrained course and conversation could be carried out without being restrained by predetermined rules or regulated agenda, and during a process of political everyday talk the mutuality can be explored, the notion of citizen is given life and private self-interests can be reconceptualized making civility and common political action possible (Barber 1984: 184-85, 190). The concept of communication theory brought about by Habermas (1984) believes that citizens in social interaction construct and create communicative reasons and achieve mutual understanding in making rational decisions.

Further, Habermas ask that where political communication and deliberation take place and how they influence decision-making process. According to Habermas’ communication theory, the places where actors socialize and interact are public sphere - “an intermediary system of communication between formally organized and informal

face-to-face deliberations in arenas at both the top and the bottom of the political system” (Habermas 2006: 415). Conceptually, the political communication and deliberation are located somewhere between the public (political system) and the private (life world) realms. Between the political system (state) and the civil society (the life world) is “the unruly life of the public sphere” (Habermas 2006: 417). In doing so, the process of communication in the public sphere or formal settings is to establish shared values, ideas and necessary condition to transform conflicts over Track II/III diplomacy.

2.3 Conclusions

Track II and III diplomacy, in international politics, tries to establish a new framework of institutional architecture where various actors, whether in a form of unofficial-to-official interaction (Track II) or unofficial-to-grass roots interaction (Track III), interact with each other for dialogue and mutual understanding. The purpose is to seek for common ground through socialization for disputes and conflicts management.

As a counterforce against or supplement realism, Track II and Track III diplomacy supported by liberalism and critical theory, theoretically, in general focuses on various actors in contributing to resolve and transform conflicts. In theory, it shapes the IR study by aiming on transforming, managing conflicts, socializing states, institutionalizing relations and maintaining regional security.

As for the relationship between Track II/III diplomacy and Track I diplomacy, firstly, Track II and III diplomacy always work with its counterpart of Track I policy networks, guided by its principle and working procedure. Secondly, Track II and III diplomacy, guided by the principle and the aim of Track I concerned with conflictual issue, has its own working mechanism and selected personnel involving in and working along with Track I diplomacy. At the community level, Track II and III diplomacy provides network of personnel including expertise, figures from business, politics, religious community, media and social society to socialize with each other aiming at dealing with and

moderating a conflict on a middle or lower level before any formal official negotiation; at the local leader and ministerial level, Track II and III diplomacy helps to form think tank for Track I channel to generate innovated ideas for policy making and further flesh out, legitimize and repackage those initial policies for politicians on the Track I level; at the states level, Track II and III diplomacy provides institutional framework for representative states at the Track I level to interact and communicate with each other where the generated ideas could be exchanged, as for some countries that are not familiar with and used to international working mechanism and procedure, they will be socialized, more transparent and participatory toward conflicts management. Finally, at the supranational level, Track II and III policy network enable and facilitate committees and working groups from Track I channel and international institutions to collaborate and share experience for further informative work. In short, the Track II and III diplomacy have significantly cooperation with intergovernmental officials on the Track I diplomacy, and this interrelation according to Morrison has been deepened and strengthened through the interaction between the Track II/III and Track I diplomacy with each other (Morrison 2004: 550).

3.0 THE NON-GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS BETWEEN CHINA AND JAPAN SINCE THE END OF WWII

This is an empirical study section. In this section I will use much more my theoretical framework to outline the nature of Track II and III diplomacy and its interaction with Track I diplomacy, and provide more substance how Track II and III diplomacy between China and Japan looks like and how it developed. I arrange this section, by having a first part describing the historical phases, as second part analyzing historical events based on liberalism and a third part, that analyzes historical events based on critical theory.

3.1 Overview

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3.1.1 Track II/III Diplomacy in Sino-Japanese Relations During 1950s and 1960s

The non-governmental diplomacy, as unofficial relations between China and Japan possesses special feature and is seen as of significance in the history of Sino-Japanese relations during the post WWII period, in 1950s in particular.

China and Japan established formal official diplomatic relations in 1972, but before 1972 the exchanges between two countries were principally carried out in form of unofficial interchanges in Track II and III diplomacy. China adopted a softer line, initiated of “people diplomacy” in dealing with Japan during the period between 1953 and 1957. This “people diplomacy” aimed to create and persuade a large body of public civic Japanese groups to put pressure on Japanese government so as to achieve the ultimate goal of normalization. In reality, it designed to promote friendly relations between Chinese and Japanese people through the exchanges of cultural delegations, such as “friendship” groups, women’s and youth civic groups, social labor unions and semi-political dietmembers (Rose 1998: 43-44). For the part of Japan, many were enthusiastic to welcome the “cumulative diplomacy” (*tsumiage hōshiki* or *tsumikasano hōshiki*) with the reason of whether intending to resume the “old” friendship since ancient period back to the first trend of cultural communication of Han China (206BC – 220AD) to Yayoi Japan (400BC – 250AD) or expressing the feeling of guilty for war launching by Japan. Businessmen in Japan also thought the resumption of commercial interests with China (ibid.). Regardless of the major incident of Nagasaki Flag in 1958, four of the private agreements on trade have been made between China and Japan during this period⁷. In the 1960s, the relationship between China and Japan has undertaken a developmental stage although political relations became fraught due to Eisaku Satō’s (1964 - 1972)

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⁷ The Nagasaki Flag Incident principally concerned a Japanese youth who pulled down the Chinese national flag at an exhibition in Nagasaki on May 2nd, 1958. Unfortunately, Japanese government failed to make any legal action against it which triggered anger from China.

“anti-PRC” policies⁸ and China’s hard-line policy during the Cultural Revolution period. The communication and unofficial affairs moderates this trend when Track II and III diplomacy in Sino-Japanese relations moved towards the direction of bilateral economic trade in terms of “Friendly Trade”⁹ and “L-T Trade”¹⁰. In 1964, China and Japan began to send journalists to stay in each other’s correspondent stations and reported events on spots, showing a friendly sign from general public.

3.1.2 During 1970s Track II/III Diplomacy Helps to Realize the Normalization

During 1970s, the diplomatic normalization was achieved. Besides of two principal agreements, the Joint Statement in 1972 and the Treaty for Peace and Friendship in 1978, Chinese and Japanese governments concluded twelve agreements ranging from aviation and maritime transport agreements to meteorological communication agreements. The trade volume increased to around 6653 \$US millions in total for Japan’s export to and import from China till 1979, avoiding relations deterioration caused by Shenkaku/Diaoyu Island Incident¹¹. Following the primary goal of China’s Japan policy of diplomatic normalization, in the early 1970s, extensive contact from Chinese general public and mediated groups with Japanese political elites carried out, among which were Xiaoyun Wang led Pingpang delegation to Japan in March, 1971 and Guoquan Wang led the delegation to Japan to condole with Mr. Kenzo Matsumura in August, 1971¹². Sports

⁸ When Eisaku Satō was in power, his political policies towards PRC were generally hard. In 1965, he signed the Treaty between Tokyo and Seoul which was considered by China as an attempt to seek for military alliance in Northeast Asia. In 1967, he visited Taiwan.

⁹ Japanese companies that attempted to join the “Friendly Trade” with PRC should first join in a friendship organization where they were vetted.

¹⁰ “L-T Trade” is trade with fixed trade annual volume of five years agreement in two-way trades between PRC and Japan. Representatives from Liao’s office and Japanese companies consulted on the detailed items (Rose 1998). Both China and Japan address the economic interests to each other. Japan is the second largest economic partner with China and China is the second largest investment destination of Japan after the United States recently.

¹¹ In 1978, Chinese fishing boats appeared in the territorial water of Shenkaku/Diaoyu Islands, and were asked to leave by Japanese government with the claim of territorial invasion. But China insisted on the belonging of Diaoyu Islands to herself. (Rose 1998)

¹² One of which was the deputy President of China-Japan Association Guoquan Wang led the delegation to Japan to condole with Mr. Kenzo Matsumura (1883 - 1971) who was a politician and advisor in Japanese Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) since 1960s has dedicated in Sino – Japanese relations. On August, 1971, at the funeral ceremony attended by four thousands of people, according to report from PRC, the President of LDP Satō Eisaku shook hands with Wang initiatively and expressed his gratitude. Later, Japanese press described Wang’s visit as tornado (xuanfeng). Source from People Liberal Army Newspaper (PLAN) website: <http://www.pladaily.com.cn/gb/pladaily/2002/09/23/20020923001214.html>

matches and competition are facilitating more positive Sino-Japanese relations. First, sports competition tests players' physical qualification and mental preparation which reflects nations' characters and culture. Good quality exemplifies good nature. Thanks to sports matches and competitions, Chinese and Japanese people better understand each other's cultures and traditions. Second, sports events bring the opportunity for Chinese and Japanese players and persons involved communicate with each other and promote the mutual understanding. Japan's policy towards China was assistant-oriented although passive when an economic development and modernization ambition were made by PRC after 1978 and as the compensation of the claim of renunciation of war reparation from Japan.

3.1.3 Track II/III Diplomacy Were More Institutionalized During 1980s

During 1980s, the non-governmental relations between China and Japan scored considerable achievements. The bilateral trade volume broke ten billion US dollars. The number of Japanese visitors increased from nine thousand since normalization in 1972 to one hundred and thirty thousand in 1980s (Xu 2002: 134). Due to the establishment of the formal relations, the non-governmental exchanges have developed further and a number of institutionalized mechanisms were set up, including the Conference of Unofficial Public Figures between China and Japan in 1982¹³, the Sino-Japan Friendship Exchanges Conference in 1983¹⁴ and the Sino-Japan Friendship Twenty-first Century Committee in 1984. According to the researcher from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Yisu Zhang, the exchanges in Track II and III channel between China and Japan have developed into mechanisms that are more regulated and institutionalized. Firstly, the Sino-Japanese economic relations leap forward from unofficial level to governmental

¹³ The first conference was set up in Tokyo, 1982 and the second was in Beijing, 1984. The above Source is from the Sino-Japan Forum in the website of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS): http://www.cass.net.cn/zhuanti/chn_jpn/show_News.asp?id=19457

¹⁴ Since the first meeting of the Sino-Japan Friendship Exchanges Conference in 1983, the latest one – the 10th conference was held on 23rd of May, 2007 with the topic of “the strategic reciprocal relations and people-to-people exchanges between China and Japan”. In reality, each time the conference was held with a specific topic concerning intractable and significant issues between China and Japan. Source from People Daily: “The 11th Sino-Japan Friendship Exchanges Conference is open” (di shiyici zhongri youhao jiaoliu huiyi kaimu) <http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrb/images/2007-05/24/11799544970628526222096911299.pdf>.

level, which promoted the new style of economic bilateral relations with both popular and official characteristics. Secondly, as for cultural exchanges, a cultural agreement has been signed during this period, which formally regulated several primary cultural exchanges programs such as "the special plan of Japanese education" and "donation for the Sino-Japanese friendship hospital". Thirdly, the newly established mechanism during this period promoted the friendship of Chinese and Japanese youth¹⁵. These mechanisms have facilitated the mutual communication and eliminated the misunderstandings; and besides, they have particularly promoted the non-governmental relations (Zhang 2002: 45).

3.1.4 Track II/III Diplomacy During 1990s and 2000s

In 1990s, a spontaneous, concerned group of citizens independently of government defined as civil society (Yamamoto 1999: 14) in Japan experienced rapid growth¹⁶. As a result, a number of Japanese social active citizens' movements in non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and non-profit organizations (NPOs) dealing with environmental issues, development issues, human rights issues, security issues and gender issues both locally and internationally sprung up. Till 2000s the number of NPOs in Japan reaches up to around 21,000 (Dobson 2002: 139)¹⁷. As for China, the civic organizations principally emerged under the encouragement of China's opening-up policy since 1978, and insofar there was a rapid growth in number and type. The phenomenon is ascribed to and "found

¹⁵ For instance, three thousand of Chinese and Japanese youth made up of six Sino-Japanese friendship groups and thirty five youth groups were invited to attend the speech delivered by former president of Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, Yaobang Hu, in 1982. According to Xu, such a large number of youth in Japan welcoming President Hu was rather rare historically (Xu 2002: 144).

¹⁶ According to Yamamoto (1999), the civil society is defined as "a spontaneous, concerned group of citizens who interact independently of government, while collaborating with it at certain times and opposing it at others." This relatively late emergency of civil society in Japan is ascribed to, according to Caroline Rose, the public-private split in Japanese governance and society (Rose 2005: 28). The 'public' refers to "officialdom which took on the task of providing the people with what they needed and acted in the public interest"; while the 'private' is defined as "people or the masses that were permitted the pursuit of private gain, personal welfare, and individual happiness insofar as these things like within the legal and political frameworks dictated by government". And the principle function of civil society is to "trespass the boundaries of their status in society and intervene in the realm of activity deemed to belong to the government" (ibid: 52) and at worst, opposing the state (Rose 2005: 28).

¹⁷ As Wakahara Yasuyuki from Company of Asahi Mutual Life Insurance summarized, "[g]lobalization brings to Japan, as anywhere else, a revolution in attitudes against the social codes of the past. Over the next century, Japanese society will be formed by citizens, for their needs. That recognition has started to penetrate government sectors" (Chanin 1998: <http://www.us-japan.org/dc/civil/cspaper.chanin>).

the expression in an official strategy of political liberalization which decreased the degree of direct politicization of society and provided greater space for intellectual debate, cultural creativity, professional expertise, and economic entrepreneurship” (White *et al.*1996: 26). The main difference between China’s non-governmental groups with Japanese NGOs is their ambiguous character¹⁸. These associations are normally informal, non-incorporated and can be participated by women, artists, journalists, musicians, professionals, religious persons.

On 31 March 2006, Japanese seven friendship groups, Japan-China Cultural Exchange Association, the Association for the Promotion of International Trade, Japan; Japan-China Economic Association, Japan-China Friendship Association, the Japan-China Society, Japan-China Friendship Centre and the Association of Dietmen League for Japan-China Friendship, visited China and were received by Chinese president Hu Jintao. This event has drawn great attention from public. Hu considered these seven Japanese friendship groups as backbone (*gugan*) for Sino-Japanese friendship relations and suggested of further strengthening this exchanges (China News 2006: <http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2006-03-31/15529496835.shtml>).

3.2 Track II/III Diplomacy in Light of Liberalism

In theory, I believe that liberalism is the right framework to start with as it brings the perspective of institution, cooperation, societal development and the role of new actors in international affairs. Generally speaking, during 1950s principle actors were influential unofficial figures and delegations from China and businessmen and official political figures from Japan. Track II/III diplomacy in this period was concerned with issue of

¹⁸ According to White (1996), most of these Chinese non-governmental groups are not only “ideal-type ‘civil society’ organizations that fully embody the principles of voluntary participation and self-regulation”, but also “autonomy and separation from the state”(p.29). Several types of China’s civic organizations, no matter in what form, are coincidentally corresponding to the above explained characters. The first type is the traditional mass organizations such as the All-China Women’s Federation. Another type goes beyond mass organizations arranging in extensive range from national to local groups including “associations” (*xiehui*) and friendship societies (*lianyihui*), professional associations, trade groups, and issue-oriented groups (Rose 2005: 29), but restricted to government guidance (White 1996: 31). The Sino-Japanese reconciliation group belongs to the last type of China’s civic organizations or spontaneous (*zifa de*) grass-roots organizations which seem no aim to seek official status or funding (Rose 2005: 29-30).

resuming friendship and achieving the ultimate goal of normalization. Both of the means of Track II diplomacy and Track III diplomacy were carried out, and the latter - people diplomacy - was more dominant. The establishment of "Friendly Trade" and "L-T Trade" institutions plus a number of cultural exchanges delegations between China and Japan are the first few institutions that aim at promoting peace and human rights, and transforming Sino-Japanese relations from conflictual to cooperative.

Institutionalism advocated that rule determines decision-making process is a primary innovated thought of liberalism. During 1970s, a great number of treaties including statement, agreements have been signed which framed greatly Sino-Japanese relations in various areas. In order to fix the friendship after diplomatic normalization, China and Japan principally concerned of formally concluding a treaty of friendship - the Treaty for Peace and Friendship. The bilateral political dialogue has moved towards governmental or official to people (*guanmin*) or Track II diplomacy from people to people (*minjian*) or Track III diplomacy (Xu 2002: 73). Track II diplomacy was more in use and dominant in reality during this period.

During 1980s, from liberalism's perspective, this is the period when Track II and Track III diplomacy were more institutionalized and mechanized. Institutions are more regulated, operation is more mature and skilled. The main actors from Track III diplomacy were individuals and private groups from non-governmental international organizations (NGOs) that are dedicated to promoting Sino-Japanese friendship. Track III diplomacy was more dominant during this period as in the case of the establishment of the Conference of Unofficial Public Figures, the Sino-Japan Friendship Exchanges Conference and the Sino-Japan Friendship Twenty-first Century Committee. The issues were a matter of common interests and principally involve organizing meetings and conferences, generating media exposure, and political and legal advocacy for cultural exchanges, business negotiation and communication of unresolved social and economic problems. The prosperous development of some non-governmental organizations and their institutionalization in Track II/III diplomacy during this period were principally

thanks to the success of normalization in 1972 and the signature of the Treaty for Peace and Friendship in 1978 in the form of law between the two countries.

The newly emergence of civic groups in 1990s and the prosperity of civic activities in 2000s between China and Japan facilitate their non-governmental relations. From liberalism perspectives, groups or individuals in international organizations, NGOs, MNCs and various institutions in economics, arts, professions, cultures and even in politics transcend boundary limitation interacting and communicating with each other. Cooperations are promoted. Conflictual aspects between China and Japan could be somewhat overcome by transforming the bilateral interactions from conflictual to cooperative (Weber 2005: 38).

3.3 Track II/III Diplomacy in Light of Critical Theory

Critical theory is enlightening as the “people diplomacy” aimed to create and persuade a large body of public civic Japanese groups to put pressure on Japanese government to demonstrate how public opinion dictates the two countries' policies toward each other. During 1960s, the main actors were some influential unofficial figures from China and businessmen from Japan. Track II/III diplomacy in this period was concerned with issue of resuming bilateral economic relations; the normalization was still the ultimate goal both for China and Japan. Yet, compared with 1950s, the pattern of trade was much more institutionalized and regulated thanks to both the Track II and Track III diplomacy. The institutional perspective was applied. In reality, the means of Track II diplomacy were more in use where informal interactions between Chinese politicians and Japanese business community were carried out.

As for critical theory during 1970s, actors were still various and generally from Japanese and Chinese political circle before the signature of the Treaty for Peace and Friendship in 1978 and Chinese and Japanese unofficial figures from business, religious communities and civil society after 1978. In particular, the bilateral economic activities have boomed

and the bilateral economic relations are steady further thanks to the normalization of Sino-Japanese relations. Thus businessmen have gradually become the main source of personal exchanges.

During 1980s, political deliberation are carried out among citizens within the informal public sphere and among politicians or representatives within formal settings. During this period, thanks to the establishment of several institutionalized mechanism, formal settings or informal public sphere were provided for regular governmental and non-governmental exchanges. Citizens in social interaction in those institutions construct and create communicative reasons and achieve mutual understanding in making rational decisions. During the process of political everyday talk the mutuality can be explored, the notion of citizen is given life and private self-interests can be reconceptualized making civility and common political action possible (Barber 1984: 184-85, 190).

In 1990s and 2000s, the model of civic activities in Track II/III diplomacy carried out between China and Japan corresponding with critical theory in theoretical claims. Theoretical understanding of public sphere in relation to diplomatic negotiation, conflict resolution, political deliberation and other variants studying new actors from civil society or the role of "knowledge about each other" are substantiated in the non-governmental diplomacy during this period. Track II/III diplomacy still have the new actors from civil society, such as non-governmental organizations and multinational corporations. Substance tells that those NGOs, MNCs and various institutions were more and more significant in bridging Sino-Japanese relations so as to get contact with Track I network in reality. During this period, the issues involved in Track II/III diplomacy were various that have covered almost every aspect of civic life, such as culture, arts, education, professions, economics, etc., Activities from international non-governmental organizations and institutions were especially prosperous that have attracted attention from Track I such as the development of civil society in China. Thus the Track III diplomacy were more in use and dominant compared with Track II diplomacy during this period.

Critical theory has acclaimed a framework of "knowledge about each other" or ideological and cultural differences and commons shapes international relations between two countries. It believes that culture and ideology are "in themselves, an important and powerful force working to support or challenge the existing economic and social order" (Steans and Pettiford 2005: 107). Track II diplomacy and Track III diplomacy in Sino-Japanese relations after the second world war have provided a new framework moderating states relation, besides bringing in liberalism's new actors as NGOs, MNCs and institutional perspectives shaping opinion, they also revealed the significance of civic groups and public opinion. They advocate that public opinion dictates very much how the two countries' policies toward each other look like¹⁹. Public opinion stands for the power of civilian. It is the opinion from people. When the public opinion is powerful enough such as the case of 21st century China when a series of activities from academics and a spate of invective assembled to force national government to take a tough line on Japan, the national government had to take the pressure from public opinion into consideration and accordingly made its policy. As a result, the public opinion dictates the two countries policies toward each other.

3.4 Linking Track II/III Diplomacy to Track I Diplomacy

¹⁹ This statement seems particularly true in Peter Hays Gries' "China's "New Thinking" on Japan" (2005). At the beginning of the 21st century China saw various of activities in form of public debate, internet petition and street protest spring up spreading different opinions on Japan policy. In 2002, the final issue of the influential journal Zhanlue yu Guanli (Strategy and Management) publicized Ma Licheng's article "Dui Ri Guanxi Xin Siwei" ("New thinking on relation with Japan"). This article was proactive enough that it triggered a remarkable public debate on Japan policy from academics. Some considered Ma as a "traitor" for being too soft on Japan while others advocated his argument as rapprochement in China's interest. In the same year, a Chinese actress Zhaowei took a picture wearing imperial Japanese flag in New York City featured on *Shizhuang (Fashion)* magazine ignited widespread condemnation and national coverage. Also as an actor, Jiang Wen was exposed that he had been to Yasukuni Shrine many times where war criminals of WWII were honoured and memorized. This event appeared going against with his national heroic image in films thus was taken offence by some Chinese. In 2003, a series of events including the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands incident, the 4th August mustard gas incident, the sex party in Zhuhai incident and a rescue skit incident in Xi'an with web-based petition and demonstration sparked another spate of anti-Japanese invective. More details please refer to Gries (2005). In reality, the power of citizen (*minjian*) from China could not be neglected when talking about Chinese policy on Japan. For instance, the citizen legal prosecution and claim have become the principle channel for Chinese public dealing with historical conflicts with Japanese government (Zhu 2003: Japan. <http://www.southcn.com/NEWS/HKTWMA/zhuanti/baodiao/review/200310290746.htm>).

When it comes to the question how Track II/III diplomacy is linked with Track I diplomacy, in the case of Track II/III diplomacy in Sino-Japanese relations since the end of WWII, I believe that first the actors from non-governmental organizations interact with each other for opinions and perspectives, through media exposure, civic activities, academic debate or even street protest, those opinion could be transformed into public pressure on national governments to react to the other country. In reality, the Track II/III diplomacy has been used consciously by China and Japan to pursue policies on Track I diplomacy. Track II/III diplomacy, especially Track II diplomacy was used to bridge network with Track I channel or facilitate Track I work. Track III diplomacy was used to organize meetings, conferences for topic discussion and dedicate to promoting bilateral causes, ideas and norms. Furthermore, the Track II/III diplomacy was also used strategically. Before the establishment of Sino-Japanese relations in 1972, the function of Track II/III diplomacy was to realize the diplomatic normalization, especially Track II diplomacy was much in use and dominant by the two states during this period. After 1972 and with the signature of the Treaty for Peace and Friendship in 1978, Track III diplomacy developed in area of arts, culture, professions, economics, and politics and was more in use to further promote Sino-Japanese relations.

3.5 Conclusions

The empirical study of Track II/III diplomacy in the non-governmental relations between China and Japan since the end of WWII in actualities exams the theory's utility and function. The non-governmental diplomacy between China and Japan since the end of the WWII provide a typical example of Track II and Track III diplomacy in managing and transforming conflicts in the two countries' normalization process. It also mentioned the states interests and to some extend it was driven by the process of civil exchanges. As analyzed, when the conflicts issues involved are too complicated and sensitive entangled with whether historical, ethnical or inter-societal questions and the experience of "threat" is so powerful that it pervades all aspects of a community's life" to deal with in the absence of multi-track diplomacy (Dugan 2003:

<http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/threats/>); or the conflicts may involve human needs and values which require rebuilding of identity and shared values, but traditional diplomacy (Track I diplomacy) only used to deal with lack-of-resource problems, such as poverty, power entitlement or distribution to provide economic opportunity, and cannot be efficient or sufficient to address in the process of mutual understanding and people's "identity" acknowledgement concern (Kriesberg 2003: http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/identity_issues/); or some conflicts like border disputes are not "ripe" (Zartman 2003: <http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/ripeness/>) enough to manage and transform the conflicts right now but wait for the trust and communication-confidence mechanism building through non-traditional diplomatic channel²⁰, the approach of multi-track diplomacy should be applied to driving its interplay with Track I diplomacy. During the WWII period, since the Sino-Japanese war in 1937, many conflicts issues that were complicated and sensitive entangled with whether historical, ethnical or inter-societal questions such as the labor issue, comfort women issue and the issue of usage and remain of biological and chemical weapons have been triggered out. After the WWII, hatred and negative emotion have hindered the normal relations of two countries. Then it was the age of the Cold War, unfavorable international environment embedded with different ideologies required the rebuild of identity for China and Japan. But one of the most conflictual issues of border disputes went to Taiwan question and Shenkaku/Diaoyu Islands, which were not "ripe" enough to manage and transform but should wait for the right moment of trust and the establishment of confidence building. Besides, since the normalization of the bilateral relations, both the economic and social situation in China and Japan were favorable for the non-governmental exchanges and interactions. Under such circumstance, in order to seek for common ground and manage and transform conflicts, China and Japan utilized the Track II and Track III diplomacy further. This diplomacy believes that institutions are independent to provide social mechanism and institutional "environment" for "representatives" states where various actors, such as

²⁰ For more details of the reasons explaining the insufficiency of traditional diplomacy dealing with conflicts and disputes, see Diana Chigas' (2003) work of Track II (Citizen) Diplomacy, and other studies including Peter Coleman (2000), I. William Zartman (2003) and others in the field of conflicts management.

business personnel, civilians, civic groups and NGOs from civil society carry out social interchanges for communicating, information sharing or common cause of human being. Centering on the various actors and behavior of agents, actors' perception and interests could be influenced or shaped in civic movement in China and Japan.

4.0 CONCLUSIONS

In conclusion, this thesis has raised questions concerning:

How did Track II/III diplomacy between China and Japan develop since the end of second world war? And

How is Track II/III diplomacy linked to Track I diplomacy?

Track II and III diplomacy, in international politics, tries to establish a new framework of institutional architecture where various actors, whether in a form of unofficial-to-unofficial interaction (Track II) or unofficial-to-grass roots interaction (Track III), interact with each other for dialogue and mutual understanding.

As a counterforce against or supplement realism, Track II and Track III diplomacy supported by liberalism and critical theory, theoretically, in general, focuses on various actors in contributing to resolve and transform conflicts. In theory, it shapes the IR study by aiming on transforming, managing conflicts, socializing states, institutionalizing relations and maintaining regional security. It is a basic tenet from liberalists and critical theory that support Track II and Track III diplomacy involving in a great range of non-states actors from civil society, business or social communities to carry out institutional work and interaction. Specifically, first, liberalism has been more optimistic

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Kommentar: In case you make changes in your thesis as suggested you need to adjust your conclusions accordingly.

about promoting cooperative relations for states. Second, liberalism points to the growing significance of non-governmental organizations, multinational corporations and other actors in international institutions. Third, liberalism believes that international community is an alternative to international anarchy where international politics could be transformed from conflictual to cooperative. And finally liberalism believes that emergence and existence of Track II and Track III diplomacy initially is to deal with or supplement the inefficiency of direct government-to-government interaction on the official level. As for critical theory, first, critical theorists believe that culture and ideology are “in themselves, an important and powerful force working to support or challenge the existing economic and social order” and emphasize the concept of knowledge saying that “all knowledge is ideological – it is reflection of the values, ideas and, crucially, interests of particular social groups”(Steans and Pettiford 2005: 107). Second, critical theorists believe that political deliberation could happen among citizens within the informal public sphere or among politicians or representatives within formal settings”(Habermas 2005: 388). Third, critical theorists argue that informal, casual and unconstrained course and conversation could be carried out without being restrained and during a process of political everyday talk the mutuality can be explored making civility and common political action possible (Barber 1984: 184-85, 190). And finally, actors get socialized and interacted during political communication and deliberation, in public sphere values are shared , ideas and necessary condition are provided to transform conflicts over Track II/III diplomacy.

As for the relationship between Track II/III diplomacy and Track I diplomacy, the general purpose of Track II/III diplomacy is to seek for common ground for disputes and provide sources of idea, expertise, historical memory and testbeds for Track I diplomacy in conflicts management (Morrison 2004: 561). Specifically speaking, firstly, Track II and Track III diplomacy always work with its counterpart of Track I policy networks, guided by its principle and working procedure. Secondly, Track II and III diplomacy, guided by the principle and the aim of Track I concerned with conflictual issue, has its own working mechanism and selected personnel involving in and working along with

Track I diplomacy. At the community level, Track II and Track III diplomacy provides network of personnel including expertise, figures from business, politics, religious community, media and social society to socialize with each other aiming at dealing with and moderating a conflict on a middle or lower level before any formal official negotiation; at the local leader and ministerial level, Track II and III diplomacy helps to form think tank for Track I channel to generate innovated ideas for policy making and further flesh out, legitimize and repackage those initial policies for politicians on the Track I level; at the states level, Track II and Track III diplomacy provides institutional framework for representative states at the Track I level to interact and communicate with each other where the generated ideas could be exchanged, as for some countries that are not familiar with and used to international working mechanism and procedure, they will be socialized, more transparent and participatory toward conflicts management. Finally, at the supranational level, Track II and III policy network enable and facilitate committees and working groups from Track I channel and international institutions to collaborate and share experience for further informative work. In short, the Track II and Track III diplomacy have significantly cooperation with intergovernmental officials on the Track I diplomacy, and this interrelation has been deepened and strengthened through the interaction between the Track II/III and Track I diplomacy with each other (Morrison 2004: 550).

Empirically, this thesis has studied how the Track II and Track III (or non-governmental) diplomacy developed between China and Japan since the end of WWII. In short, the main findings of the empirical studies in this thesis suggest that there are several reasons for China and Japan utilizing the non-governmental diplomacy towards each other. Firstly, since the Sino-Japanese war in 1937, many conflicts issues between China and Japan were rather complicated and sensitive entangled with whether historical, ethnical or inter-societal questions that Track I diplomacy is insufficient to handle with. Thus multi-track diplomacy is required so as to drive its interplay with Track I diplomacy. Secondly, the unfavorable international environment during the Cold War period where Communists and Capitalists confronted with each other and since 1980s China's

changing grand strategy towards Japan from a hard realpolitik approach to a diversity of diplomatic approaches and Japanese more assertive foreign policies made the diplomacy in Track II and Track III diplomacy possible. Thirdly, some conflicts between China and Japan, like border disputes (Taiwan question), are not “ripe” enough to manage and transform the conflicts right now but wait for the trust and build of communication-confidence mechanism through non-traditional diplomatic channel. The very different domestic public perception with Chinese and Japanese central government is the main reason of two governments utilizes Track II and Track III diplomacy to deal with either current or historical disputes. Fourthly, China and Japan signify economic interests in their overall development, thus they applied Track II/III diplomacy to avoid direct conflicts. And finally, China and Japan utilizing Track II/III diplomacy is because of the newly emergence of civil society in 1990s. In reality, as the empirical studies shows that by interacting with economic circle, political network, friendly cultural groups that are interested in history and culture (These groups include civilians, friendly old friends and civil servant sent to Japan) towards each other, the theory of Track II/III diplomacy has been substantiated to support Track I diplomacy. As a result, the institutions advocating friendly relations between China and Japan have been established or further strengthened; sensitive issues could be discussed and moderated through personal persuasion or consultation during group visits. Moreover, different ideologies, cultural and historical perspectives have received attention and respect in order to achieve mutual understanding.

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APPENDIX 1. QUESTIONS FOR THE INTERVIEWEES (ENGLISH)

1. What kind of activities has your organization carried out with China as a partner? How do you view your organization's role during the partnership?
2. What were the reasons for your organization having relations with China? And how did/does your organization implement those activities?
3. Because of some historical and political factors, Sino-Japanese relations have faced and are facing conflicts, some of which are quite difficult to resolve, especially at the official and governmental level. Do you think the work done by your organization could somewhat smooth over Sino-Japanese ties? If your answer is yes, how have you done and what are some examples?
4. Do you think that there are any problems that cannot be solved by your exchanges with China?
5. With regards to the Japanese representatives' visit to China in March 2006, what are your feelings about it and what were your initial reason(s) to participate it? Do you think that it was a successful trip and why?
6. Do you think that Shinzo Abe's term in power will see changes between Japan and China? How will the domestic changes in politics in Japan influence your decision and the organization's activities? And how will your organization adapt to that change?
7. Do you have any idea about how your organization through non-governmental activities could develop in the future concerning relations with China?
8. Do you think it's necessary to build up institutional frameworks among non-governmental organizations in China and Japan? Do you think those activities will or should be institutionalized? Do you think that regulations governing the activities of NGOs will have an effect on Sino-Japan relations? How can China and Japan integrate themselves into these institutions?
9. What role do you see Track II and Track III playing in the diplomatic, bilateral relations of China and Japan? Do you feel that these will help the citizens of each country to learn more about each other in the aspect of culture, history and so on? What do you see in the future with respect to Sino-Japan Track II and Track III diplomacy?
10. Please give some final remarks about your organization carrying out activities with China counterpart and its relations to non-governmental activities.

Thank you!

APPENDIX 2. QUESTIONS FOR THE INTERVIEWEES (JAPANESE)

- 1.中国と緊密な関係のある日本のNGOとして、中国とどのような活動を催して、どのような成果を収めたでしょうか？何の役割を果たしたでしょうか？
- 2.中国と交流及び訪問活動を展開する契機は何でしょうか？ どう推進されているでしょうか？
- 3.歴史と政治問題の関係で、日中国交正常化以来ずっと相違と争論が特に政府のトップ及び正式外交に存在しています。歴史問題を解決するために、双方の政府とも努力をしていますが、日中関係はやはり民間的な交流に依存しているようです。貴組織の努力を通して、中国側との交流はどのような成果を収めたでしょうか、政府筋の外交活動の補充になりましたでしょうか？例を出していただけませんか？
- 4.中国との交流を計る際、どのような問題が存在していますか？
- 5.日中友好七つの団体のひとつとして、06年3月に中国を訪問したことについて、どう思われますか？成功でしたか？
- 6.安倍内閣発足以後、日中関係は変わりましたか？日本国内の政治情勢は貴組織の活動に影響を与えましたか？もしそうであれば、その変化にどのように対応されていますか。
- 7.今後、どのような方向性や目標を持って中国と交流して行こうとお考えですか？

8. 日中関係の発展につれて、中国NGOとの活動を制度化する可能性がありますか？貴組織のように枠組みを立てる必要がありますか？制度と規則は中国側のNGOと交流にどのような役に立ちますか？

9. 日中関係においてこれらはどのような役割を果たしていると思われますか。これら活動は、お互いの国の人々がそれぞれの文化や歴史などについて理解を深めることに貢献していると思われますか。Track II およびTrack IIIの将来はどのようなと思われるか。

10. 中国側との民間外交活動をどう思いますか？

ご協力ありがとうございました。

APPENDIX 3. QUESTIONS FOR THE INTERVIEWEES (CHINESE)

1. 作为与中方来往密切的日本非政府组织,请问贵机构与中国方面开展了哪些活动取得了什么成果,您怎样看待本组织的角色?
2. 基于何种原因使您的组织愿意与中国开展交流与互访活动?那么具体是怎么实施的?
3. 由于一些历史和政治的原因,中日自建交来始终存在着分歧与争端,特别是在政府高层和正式官方外交中,虽然为解决历史争端和分歧双方高层均做出过努力,但中日两国关系发展很大程度收益于非官方组织间的交流。您认为通过贵组织与中国方面的交流在非官方外交领域取得了哪些重要成果?是否弥补了双方官方外交活动领域的一些空白,以解决在日中正式外交中不能解决的问题。请简单举例。
4. 另外即使通过贵组织与中国方面的努力,您认为哪些问题仍无法解决?
5. 作为中日友好七团体之一您如何看待2006年3月出访中国的行程,是什么原因使贵组织接受了中方的邀请。您认为这次行程是否成功?
6. 2006年Sinzo Abe执政后,您认为中日关系是否会有所改变。日本国内政治的变化是否影响了贵组织的相关活动?贵组织会怎样调整这样的变化?
7. 在今后与中国方面的交往中,贵组织作为日本与中国交流的非政府机构将会采取或朝着怎样的目标和方向发展下去?
8. 随着中日关系的不断发展,您认为是否可能将这些在同中国的非政府机构中开展的有关活动制度化,是否有必要在像您一样的贵组织中建立所谓的框架体系以支持中日两国间的非政府间交流。您认为制度和规则在同中国方面的非政府组织中是否会起到作用?如果是,会起到什么样的作用?
9. 在学术层面上,贵组织与中国方面开展的活动事实上属于第二/三轨道外交范畴之内。请问,作为第二/三轨道外交的日方非政府组织,您如何看待与中国开展的活动。您如何看待贵组织在二/三轨道领域中的作用?您认为通过活动是否增进了两国人民的相互理解?您如何看待未来中日两国间开展的第二/三轨道的活动。
10. 最后请您就与中国方面开展的非官方外交活动给予最后的评论。

非常感谢!