

The MAGIC MORAL SURVEY
Choice Blindness in the Moral Domain
Lund University Cognitive Science

Thomas Strandberg
thomas.strandberg.004@student.lu.se

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In collaboration with:
Lars Hall &
Petter Johansson

Examiner:
Christian Balkenius

Abstract

It has been argued that the choice blindness effect is only present in quick and intuitive tasks such as preference decisions for faces or shapes, and not when it comes to more important and deliberative decisions involving issues like moral, political or religious beliefs. To answer this criticism, using a method inspired by close up magic, we investigated whether participants would notice changes made to previously evaluated moral dilemmas, and also if these manipulations would in any way affect the participants' explanations of their previous evaluations. Few participants detected the changes, and many also gave confabulatory answers when asked to explain their choices. These results show that the choice blindness effect persists also for more important tasks like moral choices, and it suggests that the choice blindness paradigm is a viable research tool for many other forms of decision making.

Keywords

Choice Blindness Consciousness Confabulation
Decision Making Experimental Psychology
Introspection Magic Moral X-Phi

Video clips

Below are two Youtube links that will give you a brief demonstration of how our two experimental methods work in action. The first shows the clipboard binder utilised in this study, and the second shows the clipboard that is currently being used in the main study.

<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WBO03PngZPU>

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R9_G2Lb9xsE

Index

1.	Introduction
1.1	Choice blindness
1.2	Choice blindness for moral decisions
2.	Material and method
2.1	The design problem
2.2	Procedure
2.2.1	The pilot study
2.2.2	The main study
3.	Experiment 1
3.1	Abstraction
3.2	Concretion
3.3	Hybrid
3.4	Summary
4.	Experiment 2
4.1	Scenarios 1
4.2	Scenarios 2
4.3	Hybrid
4.4	Summary
5.	Discussion
5.1	Possible determinants of detection
5.2	Confabulation
5.3	Moral theory
5.4	Conclusion
6.	References
7.	Appendixes

1. Introduction

French poet Arthur Rimbaud once wrote: *Morality is the weakness of the brain*¹. A rather bold statement even in the philosophical sense.

The work presented in this study is an empirical and theoretical exploration of the moral domain, and the use of choice blindness as a new experimental tool in this domain. Its purpose needs to be seen from different angles. The initial main focus is to challenge the critique the choice blindness paradigm has received by

applying it to morality, a field thought of as being too deliberative and "cognitive" to fall for simple post-choice manipulations. Two equally important foci is to learn more about introspection, self-knowledge, verbal reasoning and confabulation, and finally to invent and design new, smart methods to use the choice blindness paradigm for different purposes concerning e.g. manipulation techniques, survey formats, and various kind of materials.

To do this, we set out to investigate whether participants would notice changes made in questions about moral when they are confronted with them after the choice is made. The next step is to determine what will happen to the participants justification of their choices if the manipulation remains undetected. A third addressee is the current theories regarding moral philosophy and psychology: if the choice blindness paradigm turns out to be applicable in moral context, what does it then say about our notion of morality?

Thus, we propose to use choice blindness to study introspection and self-knowledge in the domain of moral decision making where decisions are of great importance, and where deliberation and introspection are seen as crucial ingredients of the process (Moore & Haggard, 2006 commenting on Johansson et al., 2006, see also the response by Hall et al., 2006).

This study involves embedding critical manipulations in a simple but challenging decision task where the participants are to choose which one of a variety of different moral dilemmas or rankings they find to suit their own moral values the best. The question is, will the participants fail to notice changes even for stimuli they have intentionally chosen?

The effect is demonstrated in a series of experiments, using different moral attributes and different questionnaires, but with the same experimental method. As for choice alternatives, the main instrument has been classic text-based scenarios from moral philosophy that captures and distils distinctions that are deemed to be of

1. A Season in Hell, 1873

either theoretical or intuitive interest, such as those between doing and allowing harm, intentional and unintentional actions, and obligations and prohibitions. To get larger differences and variations between dilemmas, we combined hypothetical ones used in moral philosophy with ones that we made up using both theoretical problems, and real-life experiences taken from current news. We also made sure to distinguish between different type of choice alternatives by sometimes using classic scales, and sometimes deciding on a particular dilemma instead of another.

We chose to divide the six experiments in to two categories called experiment 1 and experiment 2.

In experiment 1, we wanted to compare the differences and similarities between classic, abstract moral dilemmas, and more context based, concrete ones. In experiment 2, we presented the participants with longer paired dilemmas, to explore the effects of more details and pairwise comparison.

Throughout the whole study, we solved different problems and continuously improved our material and method, added features if they were thought of to have a positive effect, and removed ones that had a negative effect. This rendered our six experiments to be divided in to different generations, where one generation is meant to be an improvement of the previous. Many of these gradual changes will not be included in the thesis, and the different generations will be categorised as belonging to experiment 1 and 2.

Each of our six conditions is presented with a description of the experiments, the results, and the conclusions, and are later on discussed and further analysed in the discussion.

The experimental methodology we use in this study can be seen as a finding of its own, where we show how to use the choice blindness paradigm for paper based choice tasks like surveys. It can be used for any kind of topic, and easily distributed to a large number of

participants. The method should thus be considered equally important as the results.

Finally, this thesis should be considered the first phase of a larger study, with the six experiments (hereby called conditions) serving as a thorough pre-study.

1.1 Choice blindness

Progression within the fields of change- and inattention blindness has formed many new ways of thinking regarding perceptual accuracy, detailed memory and introspection. From this, choice blindness emerged. It is a tool used to study attention, change detection, and introspection, but also a variety of other related cognitive phenomena (Johansson et al., 2005, Johansson et al., 2006, Hall & Johansson, 2008).

The term originates from a variety of experimental findings that show peoples' inability to notice even dramatic mismatches between what they want and what they get. Until recently, many experiments concerned with these issues mostly focused on uncovering perceptual flaws (Rensink, 2002). But the choice blindness paradigm allows us to expand our interests to many different areas of the human mind.

As the name foretells, choice blindness has the primary focus of trying to induce an effect by letting participants deal with a matter of different choices. This effect is reached through manipulation of the relationship between intentional choice and outcome. The results of the choice blindness effect are best understood within the framework of the *Intentional Stance* (Dennet, 1987), in which beliefs and desires are seen as predictive tools we use in our attempts to make sense of ourselves, others, and the world surrounding us.

One of the most (in)famous choice blindness experiments was conducted by Johansson, Hall, Sikström and Olsson (2005) in an attempt to measure peoples relation to attractiveness. In the experiment, participants were shown a number of pairs of black and white photographs of human faces for a few seconds

and their task was to point at the one that they considered most attractive. They were then slid the photography that they had decided on, and able to get a second look at it in order to verbally justify the decision and describe what features they fell for. Unbeknownst to the participants, in some occasions the faces had switched positions, making the photography shown the second time the opposite. The results came back very interesting. Even when participants had unlimited time to evaluate their choices, only 30 % managed to detect manipulation. At the same time, 84 % answered yes to the questions of whether they thought that they would be able to detect such a change if it occurred, a sub-phenomenon called *choice blindness blindness*, where you fail to detect the change but think that you would notice it if it occurred.

1.2 Choice blindness for moral decisions

It has been questioned whether the choice blindness paradigm has anything to say about "real" and important choices - even if people miss changes and then confabulate reasons why they prefer one face over another, this may not say anything about how people make and explain, for example, moral, religious, or political choices.

This seems like a valid scepticism since it would be rather absurd to assume that the cognitive aspects of processing a photography, would equate to the inner opinion of right and wrong. A moral opinion should be a lot stronger than the relation to a picture of a human face. It is an important cog in our lives; it is information about something we really care about and that will guide us through life. But does this entail that it is immune to manipulation? Well, the criticism against previous studies has rendered us challenged to prove that it is, in fact, not.

2. Material and method

In this study we used a total number of 73 participants (50 female), age 23.7 years (std 3.30), with 8 participants removed due to various technical problems.

2.1 The design problem

Initially we stood in front of practical problem that deviated from the theoretical. It was how to get choice blindness on to paper; on to a physical questionnaire to pass around amongst a large number of participants. We wanted to be able to capture participants "in their natural environment", e.g. out on the streets, in the university library, or in the park. A lot of times was spent on this problem, and we worked with many different methods and materials.

We tried various models of clipboards before we settled for two specific kinds that suited our requirements and that resembled surveys given out on the street.

Initially the design work was a slow-moving process, but for experiments presented in this thesis we finally chose to use a regular plastic clipboard binder. To this, two additional, removable binder clips were added so that the questionnaires could be attached both at the top and at the bottom to add extra support. At first, we used a plastic poster hanger frame, but soon changed this since the binder clips were much easier to remove and reattach. We used a repositionable mounting spray adhesive (*Ghiant Re-Tac Repositionable Mounting Spray*, hereby merely referred to as adhesive) that was invisible, easy to apply, did not smudge, and allowed a large amount of re-usage. Finding the right adhesive was also a long process, but we finally found a paper adhesive that suited our needs perfectly. An even longer process was to determine how much adhesive to apply on each surface, a technique that we to this day practice to perfect (an important part of the solution was the creation of a plastic frame to lay on top of

each area that we wanted to spray in order to get the right amount on the right spot). On the front of the clipboard, a small notebook was attached using blue-tack, it had the purpose of serving as an alibi when the test leader wanted to retrieve the clipboard from the participants after they were done filling out the questionnaire.

The next step was to design suitable questionnaires. We wanted a designed that allowed quick, unnoticeable manipulations, and the content had to be relevant to philosophical theories regarding morality. Each experiment used a specially designed questionnaire with unique properties. There were a number of problems to be solved regarding the content as well. After a thorough research of current moral surveys, as well as other relatable surveys (e.g. political, psychological), moral testing methods et cetera, we reached the conclusion that although many moral surveys has been designed over the years, none of them were ideal for our purposes. This included what questions or dilemmas to use, what kind-, and how long the scales should be, and other potentially crucial features. It all depends of the purpose, but even if a moral survey is context based and depend on different variables, few permanent ground rules exist.

What we did throughout the whole study was to design every experiment to its extreme by using dilemmas that were as emotionally charged as possible. The initial idea was to start at one end and then digress towards the "middle", i.e. finding more neutral moral situations for every generation. We did not stick entirely to this idea, but chose to keep the manipulated dilemmas as extreme as possible throughout the whole study.

But maybe the most difficult issue to solve was how to conduct the manipulation; how we would be able to make information disappear or change right in front of our participants.

We tried out several different methods, e.g. invisible ink that disappeared via friction, bleed-through ink that transcended from one paper to another that is placed under it, various kind of paper materials, e.g. magnetic paper in relation

with magnetic tape, as well as various other more or less obscure methods. But in the end we found regular paper, in cahoots with paper adhesive, to be the best combination.

In order to use these materials in front of participants we needed to apply a special method with it. We got inspired with a trick that magicians call the *out-to-lunch principle*, which is a classic paper magic routine where a piece of paper pose as the property of an item and then, via a convoluted *sleight-of-hand movement* (a covert manipulation used in close up magic routines), disappears and instead gets replaced with the information of a different property (e.g. a "out for lunch" sign).

2.2 Procedure

2.2.1 The pilot study

For the study described in this thesis we used the clipboard binder that could perform the manipulation via the sleight-of-hand movement by the test leader. It works like this: the opened left part contains a paper with a descriptive text of the survey. There is also a square showing how to correctly fill out the questionnaire. This square plays an important role in the whole procedure, since it is where the original dilemmas will end up after manipulation. To the right, a questionnaire is attached with the clips, aligning the preferred dilemmas perfectly with the recently mentioned square. The third and most important part is the manipulation square, a rectangular piece of paper that on one side contains the *altered* dilemmas, and on the other side, has the square showing how to fill in the questionnaire. This manipulation square allows for changes in the questionnaire to be made. Surrounding the dilemmas on both the questionnaire and the manipulation square is a thick, black frame that causes the eyes not to notice that the manipulation square lies on top of the questionnaire. To further prevent distinct irregularities, the edges of the manipulation square were painted black using a regular black marker. On both sides of this, a brief dust of

adhesive is sprayed, and it is then placed on top of the questionnaire.

We chose to equip all participants with a colourful felt pen to add a slightly more distinct touch to their handwriting, hence creating a stronger case that nothing could have been tampered with.

The participants were asked if they could spare a few minutes to do a moral survey. They were instructed to answer the questions according to their own moral beliefs. At the end of the survey page they were asked to write how hard they thought the questions had been, as well as put down gender and age. This last part had the purpose to make participants leave their own handwriting on the questionnaire so that they would recognise it when they looked at it the second time.

When done, they were asked to close the binder and hand it to the test leader who claimed to "need" the notebook that was attached on the front of the binder. When given it, the test leader removed the notebook, and gently pressed on the front of the binder in order for the manipulated square on the questionnaire to securely attach itself on the left side, thus altering some of the questions. The procedure only takes a brief moment, during which the test leader asks the participants how it felt and if they thought that the test was hard. The notebook routine was only used in the first four conditions since we noticed that participants were not suspicious to the handling of the binder, which meant that we could close it and open it without rousing any suspicions. Afterwards, participants were given back the binder and asked to take out their questionnaires in order to reason and justify their choices.

A final step was to debrief the participants to see whether they suspected anything, and to see how they reacted when they found out about the manipulation.




Figure 1. A snapshot sequence of the choice procedure during a manipulation trial for the pilot study. **1.** Participants make their choices on the questionnaire attached to the right part of the clipboard. On the left part is a square that has been sprayed with adhesive. **2.** After filling out the questionnaire the test leader takes the survey from the participants and gently presses on the front making the manipulation square, that is placed on top of the lower section of dilemmas, attach itself on the square sprayed with adhesive. **3.** Unbeknownst to the participants, this changes the properties in some of the dilemmas (shown here as coloured stripes), and they are then asked to justify their choices. **4.** Afterwards, the test leader removes the manipulation square from the left side of the clipboard and asks whether they had suspected anything.

2.2.2 The main study

The clipboard that is currently being used in the main study has a different agenda. We want to see if it is possible for the participants to have the full responsibility over the clipboard, i.e. cause the questionnaire to change by themselves.

The properties for the clipboard are much simpler. It contains nothing but a two-paged questionnaire, the manipulation square and a piece of paper sprayed with adhesive. When the participant turns the page, that goes over the top of the clipboard, to fill in the second page, the manipulation square attaches itself on to the piece of paper that is placed on the back of it. When participants are done with the survey, and then flips back the first page, the dilemmas have changed.

To make sure that the manipulation square connected with the piece of paper on the back,

we had to carefully measure the procedure several times. We also made sure to place the dilemmas on the second page farther up, to provoke the participants to move their hand up, thus adding weight to the manipulation square. We also added a slight crest to the lower part of the first page so that it would bend outwards, making it more accessible to the participants whenever they are done with the questionnaire and want to flip it back again.

In order for this procedure to work perfectly, good weather conditions are essential. Rain or strong winds could easily tamper with both the paper and the adhesive. We must also hand both the clipboard and the pen to the participants in a synchronised fashion. The pen needs to be given the left hand, after which the clipboard is given the right. Since it is important for the participants to not place their hand on the sticky piece of paper attached to the back, we used a routine that magicians call *equivocation*, or *forcing* (containing an *information gap*, i.e. what the magician knows and what the participant think he knows), which in our case implies that the test leader controls some of the participants acts, e.g. grabbing for the clipboard, by moving it towards of away from her, so that she, for example, do not place her hand on the sticky piece of paper. It is also important that the test leader stands on the left side of the participants, in order to get a closer look at the participants choices.




Figure 2. A snapshot sequence for the clipboard that is currently being used in the main study. **1.** The participants make their choices on the two paged survey that is attached to a clipboard. On the back of it, a piece of paper sprayed with adhesive is attached. **2.** When participants turns the page to answer the second one, the manipulation square that

is placed on top of the dilemmas on the first page attaches itself on to the sticky piece of paper on the back. The dilemmas on page two are deliberately placed far up on the page so that they will prime participants to put their hands over the manipulation square, adding weight to it. **3.** When participants turn the pages back, the manipulation square is attached on the back of the clipboard, thus altering some of the dilemmas on the first page (shown here as coloured stripes). They are then asked to justify their choices.

3. Experiment 1

In the first experiment, we wanted to compare the similarities and differences between abstract and concrete dilemmas by using a classic survey format.

3.1 Abstraction

Condition 1:1 was designed in order to locate how people would react to classic, abstract moral dilemmas; many that addresses moral principles found in the literature of moral-philosophy and psychology of today, and what would happen if negating manipulations occurred within the dilemmas.

The abstract dilemmas lacks in specific information, which implies that participants can either apply them to real-life situations and experiences, invent hypothetical scenarios, or just process them intuitively. These kind of moral dilemmas are the most commonly used both in philosophy and psychology, and are often considered the standard tool in moral testing since they are universal and somewhat generic.

There are plenty of moral testing tools, methods and literature to inspire from, for example *The Big 5* (Haidt et al, 2006), which is a classification of five moral universals, and the foundations for our intuitive ethics. These five universals are: (1) harm/care, (2) fairness/reciprocity, (3) authority/respect, (4) purity/sanctity, and (5) ingroup/outgroup loyalty. The problem with *The Big Five*, as well as other moral classifications, is that few fits into a general context. Though *The Big 5* rest on a solid theoretical ground, its content is not really

applicable to Swedish context where moral values are mismatched with many that are found in the theoretical framework of Haidt, that are more aligned with the moral code of U.S. citizens.

We decided to use a tool named the *Ethics Position Questionnaire (EPQ)* (Forsyth, 1980), which we in part translated to Swedish. We found its content applicable to a general notion of morality; as little effect-ridden as possible by demographic or cultural status. We also found it easy to convert into real-life situations, and to apply to a variation of moral principles.

Participants. Twelve randomly chosen participants (seven female) in Lund were asked to partake in a moral dilemma study by taking a brief moral survey. The experiment was described as a pilot for the development of a new moral dilemma survey format. All participants were naïve about the actual purpose of the study.

Material. The material that we used were the clipboard binder, adhesive, questionnaires containing eight abstract moral dilemmas, the manipulated dilemmas, and a green felt pen. The questionnaires had a scale ranging from one (do not agree at all) to nine (do absolutely agree).

Procedure. The clipboard binder interacted with the questionnaires by negating dilemmas five and seven (changing them to their opposite meaning). The participants were then encouraged to justify their choices for dilemmas one (control), five and seven (manipulated).




Figure 3. The English translation of the two dilemmas that were being manipulated (negated) for this condition.

Results

- **Participants: 12**
- **Manipulated trials: 24**
- **Immediate detections: 4**
- **Confabulations: 19**

16,5 % (4/24) of the manipulated dilemmas got detected. None of the participants, however, detected or even suspected the test format, but blamed their own attention by giving excuses that they had read wrong or even thought wrong. Three of the detections were for question five, and only one for question seven. None of the participants detected both of the manipulated questions, thus excluding a *cascade effect*². Three out of the detections were for participants that had answered a nine, which was the highest rating, and the fourth had answered a two, i.e. the second lowest.

3.2 Concretion

Condition 1:2 intended to be a valid comparison to the first. The abstract dilemmas were converted into authentic situations and current events likely to be well known to our participants. The dilemmas ranged from the, at the time chaotic, Gaza conflict, to global warming; some having profound emotional status, and others being more politically charged. The dilemmas were extracted from the previous weeks most popular news or debated topics in Sweden.

We chose to manipulate two dilemmas, concerning (1) the Gaza conflict, and (2) internet file sharing - two matters likely to have strong emotional status to our participants.

2. By detecting discrepancy in the first manipulation the chances for detection in the second increases (Johansson & Hall, 2006).

Participants. Twelve randomly chosen participants (five female) in Lund were asked to partake in a moral dilemma study by taking a brief moral survey. The experiment was described as a pilot for the development of a new moral dilemma survey format. All participants were naïve about the actual purpose of the study.

Material. The material that we used were the clipboard binder, adhesive, questionnaires containing eight concrete moral dilemmas, the manipulated dilemmas, a voice recorder, a stop watch, and a green felt pen.

Procedure. Condition 1:2 was conducted in almost the exact manner as condition 1:1. The clipboard binder interacted with the questionnaires by negating dilemmas five and seven. The participants were then encouraged to justify their answers for dilemmas one (control), five and seven (manipulated). New for this condition was that we used a voice recorder to collect the verbal reports, and a stop watch to keep track of the time it took for participants to finish the test. The voice recorder and the stop watch were used for the remaining part of the study.




Figure 4. The English translation of the two dilemmas that were being manipulated (negated) for this condition.

Results

- **Participants: 12**
- **Manipulated trials: 24**
- **Immediate detections: 9**
- **Confabulations: 11**

37,5 % (9/24) of the manipulated dilemmas got detected. The detections took the same form here as in condition 1:1, i.e. none of the participants suspected the test, but rather mistook their failed attention and our mischief for bad reading skills. Six out of these detections were for question five, and three for questions seven. In two cases participants detected both of the manipulated questions, rendering a plausible cascade effect. One of these detections was for a participant that had answered a nine and the remaining eight ranged from lower ratings like one and two.

3.3 Hybrid

Condition 1:3 was a mixture of 1:1 and 1:2, where we used four abstract and four concrete dilemmas. The purpose of this condition was to find out if the participants would react and respond differently to the concrete dilemmas if they first had formed opinions of some abstract statements. This condition was merely a test condition and we did not proceed to gather as much data as for the other conditions.

Participants. Five randomly chosen participants (one female) in Lund were asked to partake in a moral dilemma study by taking a brief moral survey. The experiment was described as a pilot for the development of a new moral dilemma survey format. All participants were naïve about the actual purpose of the study.

Material. The material that we used were the clipboard binder, adhesive, questionnaires containing four abstract and four concrete moral dilemmas, the manipulated dilemmas, a voice recorder, a stop watch, and a green felt pen.

Procedure. Experiment 1:3 was conducted in the same manner as the previous. The clipboard binder interacted with the questionnaires by negating dilemmas five and seven (two abstract dilemmas). The participants were then encouraged to justify their answers for dilemmas one (control), five and seven (manipulated). The dilemmas that were being manipulated for this condition were the same as for 1:2.

Results

- **Participants: 5**
- **Manipulated trials: 10**
- **Immediate detections: 8**
- **Confabulations: 1**

80 % (2/10) of the manipulated dilemmas got detected. Two had answered a neutral five on dilemma five which rendered their choice redundant for our purpose. One participant gave confabulatory reasons for dilemma seven, even though she had rated it very low. For all the other cases the participants notice a mismatch and blamed their own attention, except for one, who clearly stated that it was not what he had answered. That particular participant had put down a one for both dilemma five and seven. There were too few participants for us to be able to draw any real conclusions regarding the outcome of this condition.

3.4 Summary

The analysed result for experiment 1 indicates that certain type of dilemmas are easier to form solid opinions about than others. The concrete had a strong emotional attachment to most of the participants that partook in this study, alas they were easier both to remember, and to have honest, well-harboured opinions about. The abstract had the opposite attributes, making them tougher to conceptualise. But even though we chose to manipulate two of the most emotionally charged questions (the Gaza conflict, and file sharing), we still found the choice blindness effect prevalent within almost a third of the cases. A problem that we found in the first experiment was that some participants had trouble understanding the scale in relation to the dilemmas when confronted with the questionnaire the second time. Some chose to re-map the scale, i.e. regarding one as being the highest (do absolutely agree) and nine being the lowest (do not agree at all). Others ignored that the change had occurred, and when asked to re-read the dilemmas, they gave reasons for the initial choice. These participants, i.e. the ones that had trouble understanding the scale and ones that ignored the changes were categorised as detections. We wanted to get the same effect like when confronted with a photography, i.e. it is clearly there in front, which lead us to alter the questionnaires for the next experiment.




Figure 5. Table showing the frequency for detection (left) and confabulation (right) for the three conditions in experiment 1.

4. Experiment 2

After trying a classic survey format we wanted to really prime participants to more confrontation with the dilemmas to see whether they would still hold on to their opinions, or if this would cause them to more easily detect the manipulations. We more or less wanted our dilemmas to resemble pictures. So we came up with a number of elaborate, morally challenging scenarios, and took inspiration from the attractiveness study mentioned earlier, were participants had to decide between two options, and then verbally justify their choice.

After a futile search through the moral literature and the web for scenarios that suited our requirements, we ended up writing our own, with consideration of both the concrete and abstract questionnaires, but also Haidts moral principles.

4.1 Scenarios 1

In condition 2:1 we used a different type of questionnaire relative to the ones used in experiment 1. It contained four questions, each with a set of two elaborate moral scenarios that we had constructed via inspiration of Haidt's (2007) moral principles like doing harm, allowing harm, stealing, et cetera. Instead of grading them on a one to nine scale, the instruction here was to chose one of the displayed scenarios, the one that the participants found to be most reprehensible. This prevented participants to re-map the scale, or ignore the post-manipulation. Afterwards, participants were encouraged to read the scenarios aloud, in order for us to record it, but mainly to make sure that they really read and understood it a second time, and then give reasons for their decisions. The two scenarios that we used for manipulation concerned (1) a man that cheats on his CV in order to get a job to support his sick wife, and (2) a young boy that steals money from an old lady in order to be able to go on a class trip.

Participants. Fifteen randomly chosen participants (seven female) in Lund were asked to partake in a moral dilemma study by taking a brief moral survey. The experiment was described as a pilot for the development of a new moral dilemma survey format. All participants were naïve about the actual purpose of the study.

Material. The material that we used was the clipboard binder, adhesive, questionnaires containing four set of moral scenarios, the manipulated scenarios, a voice recorder and a red felt pen. The colour of the pen was changed from the previous experiments (green) to a more distinct one in order to further prevent ignorance.

Procedure. The participants were confronted with two morally challenging scenarios and were then asked to chose which of them was most morally reprehensible. The clipboard binder interacted with the questionnaires by switching the position of the scenarios in question three. The participants were then encouraged to justify their choices for scenarios one (control), and three (manipulated) by reading them out loud and then reason for why one was to prefer in front of the other.

Bengt's wife is ill, and he has been unemployed for several years. Finally, he finds a job at the that he considers suitable for him. Before he submits his resume he finds out that a friend of his is also applying for the same job. Bengt knows that his friends has better merits than him. Bengt decides to cheat on his resume, and choses to add experience that he does not have, which makes him he get the job.



Stefan's class is going on a trip to Paris. The trip cost four thousand Swedish crowns, and stefan cannot afford to go. On his way home from school, he sees and old woman in the midst of extracting money from an ATM. Her vision is bad, and she asks Stefan to help her type in the code. With Stefan's help, she is able to take out money, but forgets his card as she leaves. There are twenty thousand Swedish crowns at her account, Stefan takes out four thousand to himself, and thereafter break the card.

Figure 6. The English translation of the two scenarios that were being switched for this condition.

Results

- **Participants: 15**
- **Manipulated trials: 15**
- **Immediate detections: 14**
- **Confabulations: 2**

93,5 % (14/15) of the manipulated scenarios got detected. One participant failed to notice the change, thus giving confabulatory justifications for the opposite dilemma. One participant clearly suspected that there was something wrong with the outcome of his choice, and solved this discrepancy by giving reasons for both scenarios, thus rendering the data for this experiment to have one failed detection but with two confabulations. In all other thirteen cases, participants noticed that something was wrong. Two of these suspected the questionnaire, the other eleven participants blamed their own attention.

4.2 Scenarios 2

For condition 2:2 we got inspired by 2:1. We chose to investigate the verbal reports to find solutions for a more elaborate version. We concluded that too much distinct information was separating the two scenarios in 2:1.

First we colour coded the dilemmas. The areas to the left was given a blue tone, and the areas to the right a red. This would hopefully have effect on the memory, provoking participants to remember, for example, "the blue scenario". A second alteration was to use similar scenarios, but with different outcomes, i.e. like in the *footbridge problem* (Cushman et al., 2006), where the initial circumstances are the same, but the moral act critically differs. So while the context remained intact, details like names, locations, numbers, and other distinctions, along with the moral act, was different. To induce an

extra effect, we deliberately misspelled a word in the opening line of the second scenario, a trick that caused a facial reaction to almost all participants. Also, to avoid the *primacy-recency effect*³, we added another question, i.e. a fifth, and placed the manipulated in the middle (third).

The condition contained two generations. In 2:2:2, we had altered some features from 2:2:1 that seemed to play a big difference to the participants chance of memorising particular details separating them. The most prominent was gender. In 2:2:1 the two agents were female, which we changed to one female and one male.

Participants. Fifteen randomly chosen participants (eleven female) in Lund were asked to partake in a moral dilemma study by taking a brief moral survey. The experiment was described as a pilot for the development of a new moral dilemma survey format. All participants were naïve about the actual purpose of the study.

Material. The material that we used was the clipboard binder, adhesive, questionnaires containing five set of moral scenarios, the manipulated scenarios, a voice recorder and a red felt pen and the. The test leader was also equipped with a participant sheet, unique to every participant, to keep track of pre-reasoning information during the taking of the survey. This sheet was found very valuable since it gave us opportunity to take notes concerning reactions, facial expressions, verbal statements given off the record, time spent on scenarios, et cetera, that occurred before the verbal reasoning session was taken.

Procedure. The participants were confronted with two morally challenging scenarios and were then asked to chose which of them was most morally

3. The primacy effect is due to the long-term memory, and typically attributed to additional rehearsal of items or events in the earlier stages. In contrast, the recency effect is due to the short-term-, or echoic memory, and typically attributed to recently staged items or events.

reprehensible. The clipboard binder interacted with the questionnaires by switching the position of the scenarios in question three. They were then encouraged to justify their choices for all questions.

Anna is driving 45 km/h on a narrow one-way street. She is approaching a pedestrian crossing, and has green light. An old woman with a walking frame is standing waiting on the right side. Just as Anna reaches the crossing, two women stumbles out in the middle of the road - they are conversing and ignores the approaching car. Anna realises that it is particular impossible to stop the car in time. Anna decides to yield to the right and hit the old woman. She gets severely injured, while Anna just suffers a few bruises.

↑ ↓

Kenneth is driving on a narrow one-vey [sic] street. He has green light as he approaches a pedestrian crossing in 50 km/h. There is an old woman with a walking frame waiting on the right side. Just as Kenneth approaches the crossing, two women stumbles out in the middle of the road, they are conversing and fail to notice the Kenneth. He realises that it is practically impossible to stop the car in time. Kenneth still decides to try to break but hit the women. They are severely injured, while Kenneth fractures and arm and suffers a minor concussion.

Figure 7. The English translation of the two scenarios that were being switched for this condition.

Results

- **Participants: 15**
- **Manipulated trials: 15**
- **Immediate detections: 11**
- **Confabulations: 4**

73 % (11/15) of the manipulated dilemmas got detected. Most of these blamed their own attention, where the four participants that failed to notice the changed tried to justify their choices with confabulatory reasons. Three participants had to be removed (out of a number of initially 18) due to problems with the questionnaires.

4.3 Hybrid

Condition 2:3 was sort of a mixture between all the previous conditions were we wanted to combine a flexible scale with the comparison of two different dilemmas (or scenarios). This would let us focus both on how sure the participants were on their grading of a moral dilemma, as well as let them give reasons for why a certain dilemma is more reprehensible than another.

Initially we confronted three problems that caused us to test three different generations. The first was how to design the scale so that it would differ as much as possible between the dilemmas. This problem rose when we noticed that participants chose the same rating on both of the intended manipulated dilemmas, rendering them redundant to confrontation. We solved this in 2:3:2 by designing a continuous scale, and the participants got instructed to simply mark their choice on a straight line (that ranged from 0 to 100, 0 being shop-lifting, and 100 being genocide). This scale would in most cases result in some degree of difference, thus making it possible for us to have participants confronted with their choice. The second problem was how to polarise the scale. We found this difficult in both 2:3:1 and 2:3:2, and solved this by giving 2:3:3 a solely negative scale were one end represented "minimum reprehensible" and the opposite represented "maximum reprehensible". The third problem was to figure out what type of dilemmas to manipulate. In 2:3:1 they were so emotionally strong that they caused participants to put their mark at "maximum reprehensible" for in most cases both the dilemmas, leaving no space for confrontation. We solved this for 2:3:2 by switching both of the dilemmas for ones that had less emotional charge. We also separated the dilemmas even further by adding two more to the survey as well as placing the two most emotionally charged dilemmas first and last. By doing this, we had participants making tough choices right from the start, thus stretching the scale, making other, less critical dilemmas drawn more to the middle. Also, a general rule

concerning memory is that you remember the *first* and *last* thing that you are confronted with, and by having two critical dilemmas first and last we hoped that they would consume much of the participants' memory resources.

A final alteration was that we in this condition used a new and more elaborate generation of the unique participant sheets. These included attributes such as gender, age, occupation, time and date, if the had any previous "moral experience" (i.e. political affiliation et cetera), plus notes about reaction during the taking of the survey. To this, a verbal manuscript was given the test leader in order to control the feedback during the verbal reports.

Participants. Fifteen randomly chosen participants (10 female) in Lund and Luleå were asked to partake in a moral dilemma study by taking a brief moral survey. The experiment was described as a pilot for the development of a new moral dilemma survey format. All participants were naïve about the actual purpose of the study.

Material. The material that we used was the clipboard binder, adhesive, questionnaires containing ten moral scenarios, the manipulated scenarios, a voice recorder, a red felt pen, participant sheets and the manuscript.

Procedure. The participants were confronted with a survey format resembling the one used in experiments 1:1 and 1:2, but with scenario-like dilemmas from 2:1 and 2:2. On a continuous scale, ranging from "minimum reprehensible" to "maximum reprehensible", they were asked to mark their choice based on their own moral beliefs. The clipboard binder interacted with the questionnaires by switching the position of the fifth and seventh dilemma. The participants were then encouraged to give reasons for why one dilemma was more reprehensible than the other, as well as asked if they were satisfied with their choice.

Bengt's wife is ill, and he has been unemployed for several years. Finally, he finds a job at the that he considers suitable for him. Before he submits his resume he finds out that one of his best friends is applying for the same position. Bengt knows that his friends has better merits than him. Bengt decides to cheat on his resume, and to add experience that he does not have.



Jonny and his friends are sitting at the outdoor terrace of a restaurant. At another table sits a family with three children, and a pregnant wife. The father of the family points out to Jonny that the smoke could harm the fetus. Since there are no other vacant tables at the moment, the family are considering leaving the restaurant of the do not stop smoking. Jonny tells them that it is allowed to smoke at the terrace, and that the family should leave if it does not suit them.

Figure 8. The English translation of the two scenarios that were being switched for this condition.

Results

- **Participants: 14**
- **Manipulated trials: 14**
- **Immediate detections: 2**
- **Confabulations: 11**

13, 5 % (2/15) of the manipulated dilemmas (including all three generations) got detected. Eleven of the participants gave confabulatory reasons for why a certain dilemma was to prefer before the other. Six of these indirectly reacted on a mismatch, but instead of blaming the survey format, the gave reasons resembling regret; that if they could take the survey again they might have choose differently. A sub-group of these stood out at a very interesting level. These stated that they would have changed their decisions into something entirely different, i.e. either only changing one of the two dilemmas, or putting the mark somewhere else on the scale.

4.6 Summary

The result of experiment 2 shows that more elaborate scenarios, and fewer options, will render the detection frequency to increase. In the experiment 2:1 the differences are too many as almost everyone detects the change. In experiment 2:2 we removed a lot of these differences and instead used critical details to our advantages, as well as added various memory cues such as names, gender, colour, et cetera. Which resulted in a lowered detection rate. When we then in experiment 2:3 added another feature, the continuous scale, the detection rate dropped drastically, resulting in the lowest detection rate of this study. Further, it seems like when the detection frequency drops, the nature of the verbal reports and confabulations becomes a lot more complex and elaborated. For example, the verbal reports give in 2:3 was so complex that we had some difficulties analysing the result. Not only did the participants confabulate, but they sometimes wanted to change their opinions entirely. For example, sometimes the participants wanted to change their opinions not only for the manipulated dilemmas, but for several of the non-manipulated items as well. These results will be further analysed in the main study, and are expected to further add valuable information regarding introspection, self-knowledge and reasoning.




Figure 9. Table showing the frequency for detection (left) and confabulation (right) for the three conditions in experiment 2.

5. Discussion

We have described two experiments involving moral decision tasks with covert manipulations. If we look at the overall result we can see that only a third (36 %) noticed the manipulations in experiment 1, and just over half (61 %) in experiment 2. Complementary to this, over half (53 %) of the participants gave confabulatory verbal reports in experiment 1, and over a third (39 %) in experiment 2. These numbers clearly answers the questions whether it is possible or not to perform choice blindness manipulations in the moral domain, and also that some form of confabulation will occur when the manipulations remain undetected.

5.1 Possible determinants of detection

It is of course difficult to determine exactly what causes detection, but considering the results it seem as if the actual act performed by the agent in the moral situation plays a slightly more significant role than do details surrounding it. In condition 2:2, the verbal reports indicated that the added colours, names, genders, and numbers had lesser effect compared to the (lack of) moral act that was performed by the agent. When we debriefed the participants afterwards a majority stated that they did not choose "the left scenario", or "Anna that is driving 45 km/h", but what the consequences of the two options would be. This is of course promising, and the verbal reports of condition 2:1 and 2:3 also seem to indicate this, especially since the compared scenarios in those two conditions differed a lot more than in 2:2. But besides just being the moral act or what your memory allows you to remember, another important variable might be how well you are able to conceptualise the situation.

The abstract dilemmas in condition 1:1 resulted in a lower detection rate than for the the concrete dilemmas that had been on the tabloids the past weeks. We still think that the participants had proper opinions about the abstract dilemmas, but they were less memorable

than then concrete. There were also differences within the dilemmas, since matters like internet file sharing and the Gaza conflict manifested in stronger emotions (high and low ratings) within our focus group than many of the other matters that we used.

The way participants get confronted with the dilemmas, and what type of decisions they have to make, will also be an important determinant. When making your choice on a scale, low and high ratings (1 and 9), i.e. strong opinions, will result in a high detection frequency, whereas numbers close to the middle, i.e. moderate opinions, but still valid opinions, will lower the detection rate drastically.

A problem that we confronted was that some participants rated the dilemmas opt for manipulation as a five, i.e. right in the middle of the scale, making it redundant for us to ask about that dilemmas since their opinions had not been reversed. We could have designed our way out of that problem by having an even scale (e.g. eight or ten steps), but theorised about the possibilities that moral thinkers wish for the participants to be allowed a middle path, i.e. a "I do not have an opinion" function. Also, we wanted our participants to have the option to withdraw if they actually did not prefer one outcome to the other.

Rating	Detected trials	Non-detected trials
9	4	1
8	0	2
7	0	5
6	0	3
5	0	2
4	0	7
3	2	5
2	5	6
1	2	4
Sum	13	35

Figure 10. A table over the detected and non-detected trials in relation to rating. I shows that it is only the high and low ratings that render detection, but also that it is not necessarily that a high or low will get detected.

5.2 Confabulation

The criterion we used for confabulation in this study is when participants fail to detect discrepancies between their choice and the actual outcome, and still tries to reason for the non-preferred choice. In addition to this, the reports that were given for manipulated choices seem to be just as elaborate as the ones give for non-manipulated questions.

The confabulations in this study seemed to deviate in some aspects compared to previous choice blindness studies. They were longer and more elaborate, and a reason for this could be that the participants cared a lot about the topics and were willing to do their best to explain their opinions. In the experiment 1, it was sometimes difficult to distinguish whether they were addressing the manipulated or the original version of the dilemma.

For this pilot study we chose not to put any advanced linguistic analyses in to the verbal reports since we mostly wanted to distinguish between confabulation and non-confabulation. But it is obvious that even though the participants had strong opinions about the dilemmas that we gave them, it was still possible not only to change their opinion, but also how they reasoned for it.

The participants that failed to detect the change gave different kind of responses. Many gave naturally sounding arguments for the new outcome, while others seemed to ignore the change and stay with the initial choice, and some avoided the conflict by giving a comparative justification between more than one alternative. Another group gave reasons for how they must have thought, rather than how they did think, and a few even stated that they did not really know what they were thinking when they made their choice.

Below we will mention a few interesting cases, showing the diversity of the verbal reports.

In condition 2:2, some participants initially thought that cheating on your CV was more reproachable than smoking in the presence of a

pregnant woman, but when presented with the manipulated alternative they argued that "smoking is worse...". Many justified the manipulated alternative by stating that "smoking is worse because it can harm the foetus, while pretty much everyone is cheating on their CV so it is not such a big deal". Condition 2:2 was interesting since the two most prominent reasons were the very simple *health before money argument* on one end, but instead of *money before health* on the other, we got more elaborate responses that it is still allowed to smoke outside, and that by cheating on your CV you will ruin the chance for someone more qualified than you, which ultimately, if for example the job is in medicine, can cause patients do die. Alas, it was quicker to find a reason why smoking is worse, while the other way around required more thinking and a longer response.

In condition 1:1 one participant told us that it was sometimes OK to sacrifice the welfare of others, "...like for self-defence. But in general it is wrong", which indicates that she sticks to her principles about violence, but need to come up with a quick reason for her choice that is displayed in front of her.

5.3 Moral theory

The result presented in this study is interesting in relation to many aspects of current moral theory.

As an example, deontological (i.e. quick and intuitive) moral decisions about right and wrong might be easier to manipulate than more calculated utilitarian, since moral decisions based on utilitarian reasoning takes more cognitive resources and therefore might lead to a higher detection rate (Greene, 2001 and Bartels, 2008). Also, matters regarding something we really care about and that happens in a context in which we can place ourselves (situations with so called affective underpinnings (Haidt (2001)) should be harder to manipulate than matters with no emotional status. It is suggested that these "gut feelings" might have a stronger inner attachment

than moral values without personal emotions (Haidt & Bjorklund, 2007). In contrast to this, it is suggested that moral emotions are separated from moral values, and is thus not necessarily correlated with expressed moral opinion (Heubner, Dwyer & Hauser, 2008).

Our result indicates that emotions might play a big part in moral decisions, and that both deontological and utilitarian decisions are less resistant to confrontation without emotional attachment. Future choice blindness research could use this as an interesting target.

Regarding introspection, Cushman (in Cushman, Young & Hauser, 2006) suggests that intuitive choices may be accompanied by incomplete justification, and that moral decision form differently based on whether they are intuitive, allows conscious reflection, and so forth.

5.4 Conclusion

During this study we examined a variety of philosophical and psychological surveys that can be of interest for future choice blindness studies. As mentioned before, religious, or political values appear to be good candidates since they are of great importance for us, and have already seen potential in some of our conditions that had dilemmas that resembled political matters.

This study makes clear that choice blindness can occur in moral and political decisions and judgements, and that non-detected manipulations may lead to elaborate confabulatory reports even in domains of such high personal importance. These findings further establish the choice blindness paradigm as an important instrument in the study of complex decision making, self-knowledge and introspection.

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MORAL COMPASS

LUND UNIVERSITY COGNITIVE SCIENCE

HÅLLER EJ MED

HÅLLER MED

1. Vad som är etiskt riktigt varierar från situation till situation och ett samhälle till ett annat

2. En moralisk standard är endast personlig, och kan inte användas för att döma och dra slutsatser om andra

3. Den viktigaste uppgiften för ett samhälle är att garantera välfärden för medborgarna

4. Att vara moralisk innebär endast att väga positiva och negativa konsekvenser av handlingar innan man utför dem

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

5. Det är ibland tillåtet att offra andras välfärd för egen vinning

6. Om en lögn ska anses som moraliskt eller omoraliskt beror på omständigheterna

7. Frågor kring vad som är moraliskt eller omoraliskt bestäms av individen

8. Det är aldrig tillåtet att avsiktligt fysiskt eller psykiskt skada en annan person

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Hur svåra tyckte du att frågorna var?

Ålder:

Kön:

HÅLLER EJ MED

HÅLLER MED

1. Det är moraliskt berömvärt att gömma flyktingar trots utvisningsbeslut från svenska myndigheter

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Håller ej med							Håller med	

2. Det är moraliskt tillåtet att kalla en fiktiv berättelse för en sann historia för att uppmärksamma allvarliga oföretter som riktas mot en individ eller folkgrupp

<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Håller ej med							Håller med	

3. Det är moraliskt klandervärt att inte avstå från internationella flygresor för att minska utsläppen av växthusgaser i miljön

<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Håller ej med							Håller med	

4. Det bör inte vara kriminellt att inneha och nyttja cannabis för eget behov, så länge det utförs av myndiga individer

<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Håller ej med							Håller med	

5. Det våld som Israel använder i sin kamp mot Hamas är moraliskt förkastligt på grund av de civila dödsoffren

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Håller ej med							Håller med	

6. Det är moraliskt försvarbart att stödja banker och storbolag med stora summor av skattemedel trots att de till stor del har orsakat finanskrisen

<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Håller ej med							Håller med	

7. Det bör vara tillåtet att ladda ner upphovsskyddat material från nätet utan att man ska behöva betala för det

<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Håller ej med							Håller med	

8. Storskalig elektronisk övervakning av e-post och internettrafik bör vara ett tillåtet myndighetsmedel i kampen mot internationell brottslighet och terrorism

<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Håller ej med							Håller med	

Hur svåra tyckte du att frågorna var?

Ålder:

Kön:

1.

Olle är påväg hem från krogen. Han är berusad och väldigt trött. När han genar genom en park så bevittnar han när en av hans bästa vänner förgriper sig på en tjej. Hon kämpar, skriker och försöker förgäves komma loss.

Olle väljer att varken ingripa eller ringa polisen utan går bara hem och lägger sig och låtsas som om inget hade hänt.

Anders är påväg hem efter en stressig dag på jobbet. Han kör längs en landsväg och är i sina egna tankar. Helt plötsligt kör han på någonting, som visar sig vara en cyklist. Han stannar upp, och ser att personen åtminstone rör på sig, även om han verkar ha ont.

Anders tar ett snabbt beslut, och väljer att köra vidare och låtsas som om inget hade hänt eftersom ingen såg honom.



2.

Jonny och hans kompisar sitter på en uteserveringen till en restaurang och dricker varsin öl. Alla röker dessutom. Ett bord bort sitter en trebarnsfamilj, vars mamma dessutom är gravid. Pappan i familjen påpekar för Jonny att hans fru är gravid, och att cigarettroken kan vara skadlig för fostret. Eftersom det inte finns några andra platser skulle familjen tvingas att lämna restaurangen.

Jonny svarar att det är tillåtet att röka på uteserveringen, och att familjen får gå om det inte passar.

Lisa köper smink på Åhléns. Väl hemma märker hon att hon fått 200 kronor för lite i växel. Hon går dit för att få tillbaks pengarna, men ingen i personalen kan göra något med hänvisning till att det inte går att bevisa.

Månaden efter är Lisa på Åhléns igen. Hon väljer då att stjäla en parfym till ett värde av 400 kronor, eftersom hon anser att hon inte bara är berättigad till sina 200 kronor, men även bör kompenseras lite för butikens orättvisa behandling.



3.

Bengts fru är sjukskriven och själv har han varit arbetslös i flera år. Han hittar till slut ett jobb på arbetsförmedlingen som han tycker skulle passa perfekt, men innan han skall skicka in sin ansökan får han reda på att en man han känner också skall söka jobbet. Bengt vet att den andre mannen har bättre meriter än vad han själv har.

Bengt bestämmer sig för att fuska med sitt CV och lägger till arbetslivserfarenhet han egentligen inte har, vilket leder till att han också får jobbet.

Stefans klass skall åka på klassresa till Paris. Resan kostar fyra tusen kronor, men Stefan har inte råd att åka med. På väg hem från skolan ser han en gammal kvinna som håller på att ta ut pengar från en bankomat. Hon ser dåligt och ber Stefan om hjälp att slå in sin kod. Med Stefans hjälp lyckas hon ta ut pengar, men när hon går därifrån glömmar hon sitt kort.

Det finns tjugotusen kronor kvar på kontot, han tar ut fyratusen till sig själv och gör därefter sönder kortet.



4.

Efter ett par månader i första klass står det klar att David har ADHD. Han har stora koncentrationsproblem, han stör resten av klassen och tar väldigt mycket av lärarens tid.

Det är en liten skola på landet med mycket begränsade resurser. Skolledningen väljer att ställa in all musikundervisning i grundskolan och avskeda musikläraren för att kunna anställa en specialpedagog till David.

Eva är 64 år, hon är sjukpensionär och står efter fyra år först i kön för en hjärtransplantation. Under den sista månaden har hon blivit allt sämre och ligger nu på sjukhus i väntan på en möjlig donator. Efter en trafikolycka i samma stad blir ett hjärta tillgängligt för transplantation. På sjukhuset ligger också 16-åriga Johanna, hennes hjärta har slutat fungera efter en hjärtmuskelinflammation.

Trots att Eva står först i kön väljer den ansvarige läkaren att ge det tillgängliga hjärtat till Johanna.



Hur svår tyckte du att enkäten var?

Ålder:

Kön:

1.

Eva är 64 år, hon är sjukpensionär och står efter fyra år först i kön för en hjärttransplantation. Under sista månaden har hon blivit allt sämre och är nu inlagd i väntan på en möjlig donator. Efter en olycka blir ett hjärta tillgängligt för transplantation. På sjukhuset ligger även 16-åriga Johanna, hennes hjärta har slutat fungera efter en hjärtmuskelinflammation. Trots att Eva står först i kön väljer den ansvarige läkaren att ge det tillgängliga hjärtat till Johanna.

Johanna är 16 år, hennes hjärta har helt plötsligt slutat fungera efter en hjärtmuskelinflammation. Efter en olycka blir ett hjärta tillgängligt för transplantation. På sjukhuset ligger även 64-åriga Eva, hon är sjukpensionär och står efter fyra år först i kön för en hjärttransplantation. Under sista månaden har hon blivit allt sämre och är nu inlagd i väntan på en möjlig donator. Trots att Johanna är så pass ung så väljer den ansvarige läkaren att ge det tillgängliga hjärtat till Eva.

2.

Davids klass skall åka på klassresa till Prag. David har inte råd att åka med på resan, men han har ännu inte berättat det för sina klasskamrater. På väg hem från skolan ser han en äldre man som håller på att ta ut pengar från en bankomat. Han ser dåligt och ber David om hjälp att slå in sin kod för att ta ut 4 000 kr. När mannen gått runt hörnet springer David i kapp honom och rycker åt sig hans väska. David behåller pengarna, men känner dåligt samvete hela resan för pengarna han har tagit.

Stefans klass skall åka på klassresa till Paris. Resan kostar 4000 kr, och Stefan har inte råd att åka med. På väg hem från skolan ser han en äldre man som håller på att ta ut pengar från en bankomat. Han ser dåligt och ber Stefan om hjälp att slå in sin kod. Med Stefans hjälp lyckas han ta ut pengar, men när mannen går därifrån glömmer han sitt kort. Stefan tar ut 4000 kr till sig själv, han känner sig nöjd och glad med att han nu har råd att åka på klassresan.

3.

Anna kör i 45 km/h på en smal enkelriktad väg. Hon närmar sig ett övergångsställe, hon har grönt ljus. På höger sida står en gammal kvinna med rullator och väntar. Precis när Anna kommer fram till övergångsstället går två kvinnor rakt ut i vägen – de pratar med varandra och ser inte att bilen kommer. Anna inser att det är nästan omöjligt att stanna bilen i tid. Anna väljer att styra över till höger och kör på den gamla kvinnan. Hon skadas allvarligt, medan Anna undkommer med några få blåmärken.

Kenneth kör på en smal änkeliiktad väg. Han har grönt ljus när han närmar sig ett övergångsställe i 50km/h. På höger sida står en gammal kvinna med rullator och väntar. Precis när Kenneth kommer fram till övergångsstället går två kvinnor rakt ut i vägen, dom pratar och ser inte Kenneth. Han inser att det är nästan omöjligt att stanna bilen i tid. Kenneth väljer ändå att försöka bromsa men kör på kvinnorna. De skadas allvarligt, medan Kenneth bryter armen och får en lindrig hjärnskakning.

4.

Bengts fru är sjukskriven, och själv har han varit arbetslös i flera år. Han hittar till slut ett jobb på arbetsförmedlingen som han tycker skulle passa perfekt, men innan han skall skicka in sin ansökan får han reda på att en man han känner också skall söka jobbet. Bengt vet att den andre mannen har bättre meriter än vad han själv har. Bengt bestämmer sig för att fuska med sitt CV och lägger till arbetslivserfarenhet han egentligen inte har för att öka sina chanser att få jobbet.

Klara har ett bra jobb hon egentligen trivs med, men när hon bläddrar i platsannonserna ser hon ett jobb som hon tror hon skulle trivas ännu bättre med. Klara har alltid haft jobb och har väldigt bra meriter, men hon läste nyligen att nästan alla fuskar med sina CVn. Klara lägger till arbetslivserfarenhet hon egentligen inte har för att vara på den säkra sidan.

5.

Olle är på väg hem från krogen. Han är berusad och väldigt trött. När han genar genom en park så bevittnar han en våldtäkt som äger rum lite längre bort. Han går dit för att hjälpa tjejen, men när han kommer närmre ser han att mannen är en av hans bästa kompisar. Olle väljer att inte ingripa, i stället går han direkt hem och ignorerar hela händelsen.

Erik är ute och går en kvällspromenad med sin hund. När han går genom en park får han bevittna vad som till synes verkar vara en våldtäkt. I stället för att ingripa väljer Erik att ringa ett anonymt samtal till polisen när han kommit hem en dryg halvtimme senare. Där han berättar om vad han bevittnat. Man vill ju inte bli inblandad i saker man inte har med att göra, tänker Erik.

Hur svår tyckte du att enkäten var?


Ålder:

Kön:


1. Stefans klass ska åka på klassresa till Paris. Resan kostar 4000 kr, och Stefan har inte råd att åka med. På väg hem från skolan ser han en äldre man som håller på att ta ut pengar från en bankomat. Han ser dåligt och ber Stefan om hjälp med koden. När mannen går därifrån glömmer han sitt kort. Stefan tar ut 4000 kr till sig själv och slänger sedan kortet i en soptunna. Stefan känner sig nöjd över att han nu kan åka på klassresan.




2. Lisa köper smink på Åhléns. Väl hemma märker hon att hon fått 200 kr för lite i växel. Hon går dit för att få tillbaks pengarna, men ingen i personalen kan göra något med hänvisning att det inte går att bevisa. Månaden efter är Lisa på Åhléns igen. Hon väljer då att stjäla en parfym till ett värde av 400 kr, eftersom hon anser att hon inte bara är berättigad sina 200 kr, men även bör kompenseras lite för butikens orättvisa behandling.




3. Bengts fru är sjukskriven, och själv har han varit arbetslös i flera år. Han hittar till slut ett jobb i en annons som han tycker skulle passa honom perfekt, men innan han ska skicka in sin ansökan får han nys om att en av hans bästa vänner också ska söka jobbet. Denna vän har mycket bättre meriter än Bengt, som då bestämmer sig för att fuska med sitt CV och lägga till erfarenhet han egentligen inte har.




4. Jonny och hans kompisar sitter på en uteservering och dricker öl. Alla röker. Ett bord bort sitter en trebarnsfamilj, vars mamma dessutom är gravid. Pappan i familjen påpekar för Jonny att röken kan skada fostret. Eftersom det inte finns några lediga platser skulle familjen tvingas lämna restaurangen. Jonny svarar att det är tillåtet att röka på uteservering, och att familjen får gå om det inte passar.




5. Olle är på väg hem från krogen. Han är berusad och väldigt trött. När han genar genom en park så bevittnar han en våldtäkt som äger rum lite längre bort. Han går dit för att hjälpa tjejen, men när kommer närmare ser han att mannen är en av hans bästa kompisar. Olle väljer att inte ingripa, istället går han raskt hem och ignorerar hela händelsen.




6. Anna kör på en smal enkelriktad väg. Hon närmar sig ett övergångsställe. Hon har grönt ljus. På höger sida står en gammal kvinna med rullator och väntar på grön gubbe. Precis när Anna kommer fram till övergångsstället går två kvinnor rakt ut i vägen - de pratar med varandra och ser inte bilen. Anna inser att det är nästintill omöjligt att få stopp på bilen i tid. Hon väljer att veja åt höger och kör då på den gamla kvinnan. Hon skadas allvarligt.



7. Anders är på väg hem efter en stressig dag på jobbet. Han kör längs en landsväg och är i sina egna tankar. Helt plötsligt kör han på nåt, som visar sig vara en cyklist. Han stannar bilen, och ser att personen är skadad men rör på sig. Anders tar en snabbt beslut och väljer att köra vidare efter som att ingen såg honom.



8. Eva är 64 år gammal, hon är sjukpensionär och står efter fyra år först i kön för en hjärttransplantation. Under sista månaden har hon blivit allt sämre och är nu inlagd i väntan på möjlig donator. Efter en bilolycka blir ett hjärta tillgängligt. På sjukhuset ligger även 16-åriga Johanna. Hon har plötsligt blivit svårt sjuk och är även hon i akut behov av ett nytt hjärta. Trots att Eva står först i kön sedan fyra år så väljer ansvarig läkare att ge det tillgängliga hjärtat till Johanna.



Hur svåra tyckte du att frågorna var?

Ålder:

Kön: