

Lund University  
Department of Sociology

# Muslims as a counter-image of the German majority?

An analysis of mechanisms of symbolic exclusion by the German majority  
population

Author: Romina Müller  
Master Thesis SOCM02  
30hp  
Spring 2010  
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Ann-Mari Sallerberg

## **ABSTRACT**

**Author:** Romina Müller

**Title:** Muslims as a counter-image of the German majority?

**Master Thesis SOCM02**

**30 hp**

**Supervisor:** Prof. Dr. Ann-Mari Sallerberg

**Department of Sociology, Spring 2010**

**Problem/Background:** During the last decades, Germany has been experiencing an ongoing religious and cultural diversification. But despite this process, other groups are still excluded from dominant discourses of the German society. Especially the Muslim population is often presented as being different and oppositional in comparison to the German majority. Since Islam is of rising interest in the integration debate as a result of the growing Muslim population, it is considered important to find out about these assumed differences.

**Purpose:** The aim of this thesis is to uncover the ways in which the German majority population differentiates itself from the Muslim population and which pictures of Muslims are reflected in these processes of differentiation.

**Brief description of the study's points of departure and approach:** Within this thesis, to analyze the processes of differentiation, the theoretical concepts of the boundary literature are used. Symbolic boundaries reflect normative distinctions, cultural practices and attitudes or examples of likes and dislikes and reflect the mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion of individuals into a community. The hypothesis of this thesis is that the processes of exclusion are not independent, but interrelated with the generation one grew up in, with the national identity and with the personal experiences with Islam. To research these assumptions, a dominant, sequential mixed method design where qualitative methods dominate over quantitative methods is applied. Survey analysis is used as an insight into possible boundaries and unstructured interviews to uncover the process of boundary drawing in more detail.

**Conclusion/Results:** Boundaries towards the Muslim population were drawn because of their religion that appeared to the respondents as more violent, radical and intolerant than Christianity. But not only having a different belief made Muslims appear to be different but also their different normative systems, lifestyles, customs and traditions. Further a generation affect was displayed with younger generations being less likely to draw symbolic boundaries. But on the contrary having a strong national identity and no contacts with Muslims increased the likelihood of symbolic exclusion.

**Keywords:** Religion; symbolic boundaries; social exclusion; social identity; national identity

**Content**

- 1. Introduction..... 5
  - 1.1 Research objective ..... 6
  - 1.2 Methodology..... 8
  - 1.3 Outline of the thesis ..... 8
- 2. Defining the research problem..... 8
  - 2.1 Relevance of the study ..... 8
    - 2.1.1 The importance of the attitude of the majority population ..... 9
    - 2.1.2 The specific case of Islam..... 10
    - 2.1.3 The current importance of the Islam debate in Germany ..... 13
  - 2.2 Theoretical point of departure: symbolic boundaries as a tool of exclusion ..... 14
    - 2.2.1 Possible boundaries..... 15
  - 2.3 Moderating variables ..... 17
    - 2.3.1 The role of national identity in the process of boundary drawing ..... 17
    - 2.3.2 Age/ Generation ..... 21
    - 2.3.3 Contact ..... 23
- 3. Methodology ..... 24
  - 3.1 Quantitative part ..... 25
  - 3.2 Qualitative part ..... 26
  - 3.3 Limitations..... 28
- 4. Quantitative part: An overview of possible boundaries that can be drawn towards immigrants and Muslims ..... 30
  - 4.1 Bright and blurred boundaries towards immigrants ..... 30
  - 4.2 Stereotypical beliefs as an indicator for possible boundaries..... 33
- 5. Qualitative part: An analysis of symbolic boundaries in their making..... 35
  - 5.1 What renders someone German? ..... 37
  - 5.2 Differences as a tool of symbolic boundary drawing ..... 39
  - 5.3 The influence of national identity..... 46

5.4 Contact as a moderating factor .....	50
6. Conclusion and Discussion .....	51
Literature .....	55
Appendix .....	61
Table 1: Muslims in Germany according to their country of origin.....	61
Table 2: Muslims in Germany according to their persuasion.....	61
Table 3: Characteristics that are considered important for awarding citizenship.....	62
Table 4: Cross tabulation Generation * Inflexible characteristics.....	63
Table 5: Cross tabulation National Pride * Inflexible characteristics .....	64
Table 6: Perceptions about Muslims in Germany .....	65
Table 7: The influence of age/generation on the perceptions about Muslims.....	66
Table 8: Overview over the interviewees .....	67

## 1. Introduction

*“The image of the other is not static; it is in a constant flux, depending on constellations of relations and power. This became most obvious in connection with Islam which was more and more perceived as an antagonist of the West and therewith turned into a prototype of the stranger and more and more into an enemy. With the fall of the Soviet Union, there was a redefinition of the images of the self and the other according to the new political situation. Within that redefinition of the Western world, Islam was constructed as the new opposite who tries to gain hegemony over the West” (translated from Rommelsbacher, 2002:99).*

Until the end of World War II, immigration to Germany played a minor role and migration mostly took place within the borders of Germany leading to little ethnical pluralization. This changed drastically in the 1960s with the labor recruitment that called for workers to fill the vacant positions resulting from Germany’s fast economic growth. The first requests were satisfied by refugees of German origin (Borkert and Bosswick, 2007:3) but after the closure of the Berlin Wall in 1961 more workers were needed to satisfy the demand of labor. West Germany then signed recruitment agreements with seven non-European Community countries – Greece, Morocco, Portugal, Spain, Tunisia, Turkey and Yugoslavia (see Martin, 2004). From then on the number of employed guest workers started rising: In 1964 there were 1 million guest workers in Germany and in 1973 2.6 million (Martin, 2004: 227) who later on gained the possibility of family re-unification which increased the number of foreign born. This number was then additionally increased by immigration from the former USSR countries and developing countries (Borkert and Bosswick, 2007). The result was an ongoing diversity in the Federal Republic in the areas of ethnicity, culture and religion. Germany was turned into a country of immigration with the result of 15.1 million people with a migration background living in Germany (18.4 percent of the total population) of which 7.3 million are foreigners (German Statistical Office, 2008).

One new group is quite big in relation to the other minorities – the group of Muslims. According to a recent study of the German Ministry of Foreigners and Refugees (BAMF, 2009), nowadays there are 3.8 to 4.3 million Muslims living in Germany. Before the migration process started, Germany was characterized by a majority of Catholics and Protestants whereas other religious groups played a minor role. Although Germany is not a deeply religious country, religion is of increasing interest in the actual discourse and especially people coming from countries belonging to the Muslim faith are increasingly defined through their religious identity (Spielhaus, 2006). Islam is seen as a “stranger”, as “an enemy”, as Rommelsbacher (2002) points out, and not fitting with the German society.

According to Naumann (2009: 19) in 1997 47 percent of the Germans were afraid of Islam and in 2006 80 percent were expressing the opinion that Islam is a fanatic and violent religion<sup>1</sup>. Schneiders (2009: 12) is pointing out that this Islamophobia is a mainstream phenomena and is especially expressed against the buildings of mosques – for example observable in December 2008 during the protests against the building of a mosque at the center of the DIBIT (the Turkish-Muslim Union for Religion) in Cologne: *”Against Turkishness and Islamisation. Cologne may not be turned into Istanbul”* (Schneiders, 2009: 5). Further issues are the veil debate, Islamic school lessons as well as the honor killings that show a picture of Islam in the media as not fitting. Islam seems to function as a counter-image of the majority with a different lifestyle, culture and religion than the German majority population.

### **1.1 Research objective**

My theoretical standpoint to research processes of differentiation is originated in the boundary work. Boundary work differs from traditional theories of prejudice and xenophobia in the sense that it recognizes the multidimensionality and alterability of boundaries between groups (Bail, 2007: 6). The traditional theories of prejudice assume that there is only one boundary, for example race, that is separating the groups whereas the boundary-work approach assumes that there are also other boundaries (language, culture, religion etc.) and stresses the relationship between these boundaries and their flexibility in different contexts (Bail, 2007). As Cohen (1985) points out, boundaries can be perceived by everyone but are interpreted by each individual in a different way. Boundaries therefore help to design a multidimensional picture of perceptions for each individual that reflects their interpretations and social realities. One can differentiate between symbolic and social boundaries but here I focus on symbolic boundaries because only when it is agreed upon symbolic boundaries, they can limit and form social relations and can lead to the drawing of social boundaries (Lamont and Molnar 2002:168). Symbolic boundaries are “conceptualized distinctions made by social actors to categorize objects, people, practices, and even time and space” (Lamont and Molnar, 2002: 168). They mark the beginning and the end of a community<sup>2</sup> and seclude one community

---

<sup>1</sup> The percentage from 1997 is based on a survey by the TV-Channel ”Arte” and the survey from 2006 by the Allensbach Institute (see Noelle and Petersen, 2006)

<sup>2</sup> For the meaning of community in general it is here referred to Cohen (1985: 12) who interprets community in the way that the members of a certain group ”have something in common with each other which distinguishes them in a significant way from the members of other putative groups”. For the Muslim community though we follow the definition of community by Baumann (1996) (see section 2) who redefined the concept of community

from the other (Cohen, 1985: 12). This process is moderated by feelings of similarity and group membership within the community and feelings of difference towards other communities. The boundaries reflect expressed dissimilarities in the form of normative interdictions (such as taboos), cultural practices and attitudes or examples of likes and dislikes (Lamont, 2008). These boundaries of dissimilarity can either be bright or blurred, meaning that either it is clear to which group one belongs (bright boundaries) or not, meaning there are ambiguous locations with respect to the boundaries (blurred boundaries) (Bail, 2007; Alba, 2005). Yet there is only little research to be found that uncovers the processes of symbolic boundary drawing by the German majority population to exclude the Muslim population (see for example Honolka and Götz, 1999 and Schneiders (ed.), 2009). Therefore this thesis is of explorative nature and wants to find out

***How the symbolic boundaries towards the Muslim population are drawn and what images of Muslims are reflected in these boundaries?***

When researching such boundary mechanisms, Germany is an interesting case both because of the fact that it for a long time claimed not to be a country of immigration and because of its national concept of being an ethnic exclusive society based on Christian values<sup>3</sup>. Here it is assumed that this has an influence on the perception of the other, the inclusion of migrants in the existing national concepts and the process of group categorization which is a prerequisite for identity formation (Lamont and Molnar, 2005). However, the previous national concepts have been challenged in the last decades by ongoing immigration and therefore national identity and attitudes towards foreigners could be expected to differ from generation to generation. Furthermore every generation in Germany has a different experience with the fascist past which is expected to lead to differences in the processes of symbolic exclusion. Therefore in this thesis the generation one belongs to is assumed to be influential. As a last moderating variable contact with Muslims is added since it is assumed that contact with Muslims makes the symbolic boundary drawing less likely since it reduces prejudices (in line with Allport, 1954).

---

for the specific case of immigrant communities. For the German majority population it is preferred here to use the term majority population since we cannot be sure at this point of this thesis that the German majority population views itself as a community.

<sup>3</sup> Islam is still not recognized as a “cooperation of public law” like Christianity and Judaism. By not recognizing Islam, it is possible to limit the religious freedoms of Muslims and it appears as a way to preserve the Christian heritage (Joppke, 2009). Further, when talking in public debates about issues concerning the religious practice of Islam in Germany, politicians and others often mention that the German society is based on Christianity. And historically, Christianity served as a unificator when building the German nation state (Joppke, 2009). Therefore it appears to me that Germany is a society based on Christian values.

## **1.2 Methodology**

One method is here seen as inadequate to fully grasp the phenomena under research. Normally it is distinguished between quantitative research methods – “a research designed to address questions that hypothesize relationships among variables that are measured frequently in numerical and objective ways” – and qualitative methods – “a research paradigm designed to address questions of meaning, interpretation, and socially constructed realities” (Newman et al., 2003:170). I decided to use both methods to first of all outbalance the weaknesses of each method but also to get a broader picture (see Flick, 2006; Bryman, 2008): an analysis of surveys is used to get an overall picture about possible boundaries and how these are influenced by the moderating variables and unstructured interviews are used to become an in-depth and more individual picture about the symbolic boundaries drawn towards Muslims and the ways in which they are constructed.

## **1.3 Outline of the thesis**

In the following section ”Defining the research problem” the phenomena under research is defined in more detail. First of all it is discussed what makes it so relevant to study majority attitudes in general and in specific the German case by pointing to the actuality of the Islam debate and the specific case of Islam. One of the main causes for this thesis was that, despite an ongoing diversity within Germany, Muslims tend to be excluded from the majority population with their different culture, religion and lifestyles. As pointed out before, the theoretical framework to research this process is the boundary literature which will be discussed in subchapter two of the second section. In the third subsection the moderating factors national identity, age and contact are discussed since it is assumed within this thesis that they have a major influence on the differentiation process. In the fourth section, the methodology of this thesis is discussed in more detail and is followed by the empirical analysis. With the help of survey analysis and unstructured interviews, it is analyzed how symbolic boundaries are drawn and which images of Muslims they reflect. The last section includes a summarization of the findings as well as a discussion about the limitations of this study and the need for further research within this area.

## **2. Defining the research problem**

### **2.1 Relevance of the study**

The relevance of this study is seen as rooted in the fact that immigrants depend on the majority attitude since those are the prerequisites for the establishment of harmonious group



relations with the receiving society. In Germany however this topic is very complicated because of the fact that Germany's national identity was for a long time based on the imagination of an ethnic exclusive society built upon Christian values. Only recently, through changing citizenship regulations and a growing Muslim population seeking for ways to exercise their religious rights, these concepts were macerated. Islam especially displayed a threat for previous concepts of nationality in Germany and has only recently tried to be included into the national debates and politics.

### **2.1.1 The importance of the attitude of the majority population**

Although previous studies (for an overview see Van de Vijver, 2008) showed that migrants depend on the attitude of the majority when it comes to the establishment of harmonious group relations, research on this topic is rather scarce<sup>4</sup>. Previous research showed that there is a relation between support of multiculturalism and minority acculturation (see for example Berry, 2001 or Kagitcibasi, 2001). Support of an ideology of multiculturalism is seen as a prerequisite for establishing harmonious intergroup relations in a multicultural society (van de Vijver, 2008: 95). People supporting an ideology of multiculturalism respect other cultures and religions as well as their different practices and do not require immigrants to assimilate. Especially in nowadays European societies where racism is rising more and more (Even Foundation, 2002), openness towards other cultures is a necessary precondition to establish harmonious intergroup relations.

The majority attitude is a crucial factor in establishing such relations because they are influencing the acculturation strategies of immigrants. Acculturation is “primarily a process of change in identity” (Friedman, 1994: 28) and “is a process by which individuals change, both by being influenced by contact with another culture and by being participants in the general acculturative changes underway in their own culture” (Berry, 1990: 235). When settling down in a new society, immigrants are confronted with the decisions whether or not they should retain their own culture and if they should establish intergroup contact with the host society or not. But according to Bourhis et al. (1997:380) these decisions and their success depend on the attitudes of the majority – do they find it acceptable that immigrants maintain their cultural identity? Does the majority want/accept that immigrants adapt to the

---

<sup>4</sup> Of course research about racism in Germany has been conducted by various authors but the process of symbolic boundary drawing has only been researched by a few for the German case (for an overview see Bail 2007).

cultural identity of the host community? The answers to these questions are leading to different acculturation strategies for the immigrants that will be discussed now in more detail. The *integration orientation* of the majority allows for the perpetuation of the immigrant culture but also the adaptation of important features of the majority host culture. Majority members preferring integration support a cultural pluralism in the long run of their own society. The *assimilation orientation* of the majority on the contrary expects the immigrants to adapt to the host culture by giving up their own culture. The *segregation orientation* of the majority allows immigrants to maintain their own culture but not adopting to the host culture therewith favoring no cultural contacts with immigrants. The *exclusion orientation* of the majority allows for neither maintaining the immigrant culture nor for adapting to the new culture and therewith prefer immigration to stop. These different orientation possibilities of the host community in interplay with the immigrants preferred acculturation strategies can lead to consensual, conflictual or problematic outcomes (Bourhis et al., 1997).

Therefore it is assumed important to learn out about the perceptions of the German majority population since this has an impact on the establishment of harmonious group relations, the possibility for Muslims to practice their religion and their overall integration into the German society.

### **2.1.2 The specific case of Islam**

The process of differentiation between the Muslim and Western world is not only a result of the increasing threat of Islam felt since the Iranian revolution in the 1970s and 9/11 but of a dispute between Islam and Christianity since many centuries. The self-perception of Europe and therewith also Germany is according to Malik (2004: 283) an opposite distinctive cultural identity and is only to be understood in interdependency with others such as “Asia” or “Orient”. Islam especially served as a distinctive “other” for the European self-perception since the first contacts with the new religion in the seventh century. Here Islamic images focused on the slave descent of Muslims which made them illegitimate for god’s heritage (Naumann, 2009: 22). After that period, until the 11<sup>th</sup> century, there was nearly no contact with Islam but with the crusades, in times of high cultural-political rivalry, the image of Muslims was re-edited into one of a fanatic, threatening, aggressive and sainted warrior. The own expansionism was justified with the abjectness of the other who is violent and lascivious whereas the self was brave, fair and a believing Christian (Rommelsbacher, 2002: 101). In the beginning of the 15<sup>th</sup> century when Europe recaptured Spain and the sea travel from Portugal

began, heralding the European expansionism, the picture of Islam as backward was even more emphasized – Europe saw itself as culturally, politically and morally more developed than Islam and other cultures. Islam was turned into a reason for poverty and underdevelopment whereas Christianity meant progress (Naumann, 2009). The other was here pictured as being on a pre-modern stage and was according to Said (1978) needed by Europe to define itself as a place of freedom and enlightenment.

Until the 20<sup>th</sup> century images of Islam reflected an aggressive Islam that wanted to spread the new religion with sword and compulsion. These images experienced a revival in the 1970s when Islam re-entered world politics and with the increasing presence of Muslims in Europe and Islamic terrorism (Naumann, 2009: 34). Muslims are excluded nowadays from the dominant discourse of many Western societies not only because of having a different religion but because of belonging to a different world civilization (Huntington, 2002).

### *Discourses of Islam in Germany*

In public discussions Islam is often presented as not fitting with the Christian coinage of Germany. This is reflected in issues such as ritual slaughtering, Islamic burials, guidelines of the curriculum in schools such as swimming lessons, the wearing of veils and Islamic school lessons (Muckel, 2009). Especially the veil is a highly debated topic and is seen as a threat to the emancipator achievements such as equality and freedom (Bielefeldt, 2007). This was especially observable in the issue whether or not a Muslim teacher is allowed to wear a veil during school lessons in the Bundesland<sup>5</sup> Baden-Württemberg. The headscarf was forbidden in this issue, because of its being a political symbol that rejects liberal-democratic concepts, and was seen as an infringement of neutrality (Joppke, 2009). “*The headscarf/.../ also stands for cultural segregation and thus it is a political symbol [that puts at risk] social peace*” (Baden Württemberg’s Minister of Education Annette Schavan in *ibid*: 53).

According to Bielefeldt (2007:5) resentments against Islam arise from conservative fears about the growing Muslim identity and its threats on security up to fears of destruction of emancipator achievements. This is done by drawing a symbolic boundary between the Christian-occidental coined Germany and the Orient with Islam as a threat to enlightenment and liberalism with its pre-modern culture and lifestyle (Bielefeldt, 2007). In contrast to this “other”, the German society is characterized by freedom, liberalism, modernity and equality. Islamophobia, the overall denegation of people of Muslim origin, is not only a minority phenomenon anymore but is to be found in the general German population (Bielefeldt, 2007).

---

<sup>5</sup> Term for a province/state within Germany.

### ***Excursus: background information on the Muslim population in Germany***

However these pictures of Islam ignore the diversity of the Muslim population in Germany and present them as one community. When thinking about the concept of community one is easily coming along Tönnies (2005) who defined communities as characterized by emotional boundaries as well as a sense of community feeling that lead to common goals and actions that are taking place within the community context. This former concept of communities that was for Tönnies best reflected in villages (“Dörfer”) as communities has now been replaced by ethnic minorities as communities. As Baumann (1996) points out, community is not any longer a positive concept but a polite term for ethnic minority. Still the word is often used, even by the minorities itself, because it acknowledges people as members of special collectives and therefore it is assumed they also share the same culture:

*“In this dominant discourse, ‘community’ can function as the conceptual bridge that connects culture with ethnos. It can lead to a spurious plausibility that ethnic minorities must share the same culture by necessity of their ethnic bond itself. [...] Culture appears as a reified entity already”. (Baumann, 1996: 16)*

The two key terms – ethnic minority and community – often reinforce each other. Ethnic minorities are supposed to form a community based on their reified culture and this culture has to appear in a reified form because they are identified as culture (Baumann, 1996: 17). With this assumption everything can, according to Baumann, be reduced to the simple equation: culture = community = ethnic identity = nature = culture. This, though, is ignoring the diversity of this group which is portrayed in the following.

*The ethnical and cultural diversity:* The majority of the 3.8 to 4.3 million Muslims living in Germany, between 2.5 and 2.7 million, is from Turkey. But there are also people believing in the Islamic faith who hail from other nations, leading to a high ethnic diversity within the group of people believing in the Muslim faith (see Table 1). Muslims are likewise coming from countries in South-East Europe like Albania, Bosnia and Bulgaria, and the countries of the Near East and North Africa, mostly Morocco. Smaller populations come from Central Asia, Iran, South and South East Asia as well as other parts of Africa (BAMF, 2009<sup>6</sup>). Further on is the world’s Muslim population culturally heterogeneous as a result of the global expansion of Islam to different parts of the world. The result is a global community of

---

<sup>6</sup> The cited study interviewed 6.004 persons having a migration background steaming from fifty Islam minted countries and collected, additional to the information of the respondent himself, also data about other house members leading to information about 17.000 people. Official data for the Muslim population is unfortunately not available since such data is not collected in Germany. But this study, by not only focusing on the Turkish Muslim population, is characterized by a high reliability and validity of the research design (BAMF, 2009).

believers without boundaries between them (Baumann, 1996) as it is to be found in Germany: most Muslims belong to the Sunnite faith (around 74 percent) but this is not the only Muslim persuasion, there are also Shiites, Levites, Ahmadis, Sufis and Ibadits (see Table 2).

*The lack of a common bond:* The Muslim population in Germany is characterized by a cultural heterogeneity and a lack of a “common bond” (Baumann, 1996: 124f) that is supposed to connect the Muslim community. This is observable when looking on the degree of organization: it is rather low and more and more Muslims are becoming members of German associations. There are however some Muslim associations to be found in Germany but they are only to be known by few Muslims and only a little percentage feels represented by these associations<sup>7</sup>.

This shows that Muslims in Germany are not a homogenous community; Muslims stem from different countries and different denominations and have different interests. Additionally, the degree of religiousness varies: the Muslim population is religious in total with 36 percent being very religious and 50 percent being rather religious. The most religious Muslims are of Turkish and African origin and the least religious Muslims are of Iranian origin – only around 10 percent of this group consider themselves as religious and 30 percent as not religious at all. In addition, when it comes to everyday religious practices such as religious celebrations or dietary requirements, there are huge differences between denomination and country or origin although these practices are performed by most of the Muslims. In comparison to other religions is only a small number of Muslims (20 percent) a member of a religious association or church. Furthermore is there no connection between religiousness and the wearing of a veil: only a minority, every second strong religious Muslim women, is wearing a veil (BAMF, 2009). This picture is a counter-image to the uniform Muslim population that is presented in the public debate.

### **2.1.3 The current importance of the Islam debate in Germany**

One reason why the diversity of the Muslim population is ignored can be rooted in the fact that the Islam debate is a rather young phenomenon in Germany. This can be seen as a result of the long position of Germany not being a country of immigration and the relatively late, in 2005, establishment of an integration policy on a national level. On the Länder-level, as a

---

<sup>7</sup> For example the Turkish Islamic Union of the Institution for Religion (DITIB): this association is only to be known by 44 percent of the total Muslim population and 59 percent of the Turkish Muslim population. Further, only 16 percent of the total Muslim population and 23 percent of the Turkish Muslim population feel represented by the DITIB. Such a picture of low publicity and low representativeness also applies to other associations such as the Central Council of the Muslims in Germany (ZMD), the Association of Islamic Cultural Centers (VIKZ) and the Levite Community in Germany (AABF) (BAMF, 2009).

result of the requests of local Muslim communities for more religious freedoms, Islam has been a topic for a much longer period of time. Still this did not result in a systematic addressing of this issue (Halm, 2008).

With the attacks of 9/11 the discourse about the integration of Islam changed. Islam was also beforehand rejected because of its cultural and terrorist threat, but the attacks of 9/11 led to an accentuation of the religious category within the already intensified integration discourse (ibid). Before, religion which had lost in importance in post-World War Germany, was not seen as a factor that would lead to societal disintegration. But with the establishment of the German Islam conference in 2006 and the explicit reference to an establishment of dialogue with Islam, religion now seems to be a major component of integration politics (ibid: 11). The debates about the fitness of Islam into the secularized Europe, the “clash of cultures” as well as the establishment of parallel societies in the German debates are another reason why it seems relevant to research the majority perceptions. With this growing importance of an “other” religion but the synchronic process of devaluation of this religion, a process of differentiation between Muslims and the receiving society seems to start; a process that needs to be researched.

## **2.2 Theoretical point of departure: symbolic boundaries as a tool of exclusion**

As pointed out before the theoretical point of departure is the boundary literature. Boundary work differs from traditional theories of prejudice and xenophobia in the sense that it recognizes the multidimensionality and alterability of boundaries between groups (Bail, 2007: 6). The multiple boundaries that can be drawn towards the “other” are reflected in the typology of boundary configurations developed by Bail (2007: 5). The “cultural-assimilationist” configuration emphasizes differences of language and culture whereas the “ascriptive-pragmatic” configuration emphasizes differences of race, religion and human capital. The third type, the “Christian-accommodationist” configuration emphasizes only religious boundaries. Whereas traditional theories of prejudice assume that there is only one boundary that is separating the groups, the boundary-work approach assumes that there are also other boundaries, therewith leaving space for a multidimensional analysis of perceptions. In the 1960s with the junction of research of indirect forms of power and symbolic systems, the research of symbolic boundaries became more and more important. Very influential within this area have been the writings by Emile Durkheim, Max Weber, Thorstein Veblen, Norbert Elias, Mary Douglas, Pierre Bourdieu, Erving Goffman and Michel Foucault (see

Lamont, 2008 for an overview). But only little research has yet been conducted to investigate the boundary drawing process of the majority population to keep their dominant position (see Bail, 2007 for an overview). But the topic is very important since immigrants do not only blur the territorial borders of the nation state and the political boundaries of citizenship, but also the cultural (and therewith symbolic) boundaries of the national community (Lamont and Molnar 2002: 185). For the Muslim population in Germany this means that they blur the cultural, religious and ethnical boundaries of the German majority population through their different lifestyles, religion and ethnicity. To maintain their dominant position, the host community tries to establish different symbolic boundaries to construct notions of “us” and “them” (Bail, 2007). Former concepts of exclusion such as citizenship which differentiates the receiving society from the immigrant community by a different access to fundamental rights, is not any longer a useful tool of exclusion (Alba, 2005). Citizenship is now also possible to be acquired by foreigners and other mechanisms need to be used to differentiate oneself from the other. Symbolic boundaries are seen within this thesis as a tool to construct such notions of “us” and “them”.

### **2.2.1 Possible boundaries**

One can differentiate between symbolic and social boundaries: “Symbolic boundaries are conceptualized distinctions made by social actors to categorize objects, people, practices, and even time and space” (Lamont and Molnar 2002: 168). Through these symbolic boundaries people are separated into ingroups and outgroups, a process which is moderated by feelings of similarity and group membership and these boundaries are reflections of social relations between groups. “Social boundaries are objectified forms of social differences manifested in unequal access to and unequal distribution of resources (material and nonmaterial) and social opportunities” (ibid: 168). But, as Lamont and Molnar (2002) point out, only when it is agreed upon symbolic boundaries, can they limit and form social relations. Therefore symbolic boundaries are here regarded as more important for structuring group relations and therefore the analysis focuses on the symbolic boundaries.

Previous studies, such as the ones by Alba (2005) and Zolberg and Woon (1999) are pointing out that religion is more and more used in Europe to draw symbolic boundaries between the “self” and the “other”. This is according to Zolberg and Woon (1999) a result of the fact that European identity, despite being characterized by national variations, is still deeply embedded in the Christian tradition and the Muslim population here constitutes the visible “other”. In

Europe religion is not only a matter of faith but is also embedded in the institutions. Therefore, despite the incorporation of human rights and religious freedom into national legislations, when it comes to public education, the building of religious schools and mosques or the wearing of the veil, complex negotiations follow as a result of the more support of historically established religions (ibid).

Especially in Germany this is most obvious where the established religions receive financial support through the obligatory “church tax”; Islam is not included into this system because of its non-hierarchical, polyphonic nature that does not provide a legally recognizable authority that can collect taxes and leaves Islam therewith out of the state-supported system (Alba 2005: 32). According to my state of knowledge previous studies failed to look for other boundaries and mostly only looked on the conflict Christianity – Islam, neglecting cultural and ethnical differences that come with Islam. In the German society, ethnicity, religion and culture are the new principles of vertical social differentiation and substitute classical forms of social inequality such as class (see Eder et al., 2004). They are leading to social exclusion – “the unequal participation on different assets and the coexistent capitulation of the idea of an equal inclusion within the society” (ibid: 17) – which implies a symbolic power that means not only anymore the exclusion from the cultural, social and capital properties but also from the discourses of the society through symbolic exclusion, symbolic degradation or the symbolic non-existence (“*Totschweigen*”) (ibid: 18). Here is the individual not only positioned in a system of social inequality but also excluded as a member of a certain group. The individual is classified as the “other”, as a member of a group who does not belong to the society (ibid: 42). Within this thesis it is not only looked at the religious differences between Muslims and the German majority population but also on lifestyle and racial differences as well as the impact of Muslims being raised by another language than only German. In line with the boundary literature, this is done to become a multidimensional picture of the boundary drawing process.

As Lamont (2008) points out, research about identity formation processes is another area where symbolic boundaries have gained in importance since boundaries are seen as central to the process of defining oneself. Especially in Germany where the identification of the border between the self and the other seems to be contained in the self-concept of the ethnic exclusive German society, such a study is of great interest (Eder et al., 2004:11). But before taking an actual look on this process, I am going to discuss now in more detail why group categorization is such an influential part for the process of identity formation.



## 2.3 Moderating variables

### 2.3.1 The role of national identity in the process of boundary drawing

According to Castells (1997:6), identity is “the process of construction of meaning on the basis of a cultural attribute, or related set of cultural attributes, that is/are given priority over other sources of meaning”. This definition implies the multiple possibilities of identity – for example, I could define myself as daughter, student, native of Baden, German, European, World citizen but not every category is equally important for me. Roles and identities can correspond but identities are according to Castells a stronger source of meaning than roles, as a result of the process of self-construction and the meaning that they express.

Which powerful influence identity can have on the exclusion of the “other” was first shown by the classical summer camp study by Sheriff et al. (1961) – during a summer camp students were sorted towards different groups by chance which lead in the following to ingroup favoritism. This ingroup favoritism was later researched in detail by Tajfel (1969; 1972) within the “minimal group paradigm”<sup>8</sup>. During the experiment subjects should give money with the help of matrixes towards the ingroup and outgroup. The result was that the ingroup was always favored. This lead to the emergence of the social identity theory which is characterized by the core assumption that individuals categorize their social worlds according to groups and identity formation is following a process of social comparison (Tajfel and Turner, 1986). Social identity can be defined as:

*“that part of an individual’s self concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership” (Tajfel, 1978: 63)*

and is achieved through defining ourselves according to a group we are socially attracted to. As pointed out with me as an example, everyone has a range of social identities one can choose from and this is always happening in recognition of the differences towards others (in my example the opposite would be: male, brother, worker, French etc.). But whether we define ourselves through a personal (daughter) or a collective identity (German) is depending upon the degree to which they can provide us with a positive self-image and the “others” surrounding us (Smith et al., 2006). This positive self-image is achieved through the construction of an ingroup (which the “self” is a member of) and an outgroup (which the “other” is a member of) by maintaining and accomplishing a positive group distinctiveness of the ingroup. It is assumed that the outgroup is seen as having mostly negative characteristics

---

<sup>8</sup> There was no contact between the ingroup and the outgroup and in between the groups themselves; the groups were sorted by chance and there was no possibility of personal advantage if giving money to the ingroup.

and being a uniform unity and the ingroup having mostly positive and diverse characteristics (this was proven in various experiments. For an overview, see Wigboldus and Douglas, 2007). This effect is strongest, as previous research showed, when there is a threat of the ingroup identity observable. When the outgroup is perceived as a threat, this leads to a miniaturization of the perceived differences between the individual and the other ingroup members and a maximization of the perceived differences between the ingroup and the outgroup. The result is a positive distinctiveness of the ingroup that is enhancing one's self-esteem. The more the individual identifies with the ingroup the more this leads to depreciation of the outgroup (Wigboldus and Douglas, 2007).

But with which social group is one likely to identify himself with? Although globalization is challenging the nation state and some talk about the losing importance of the nation (Benhabib, 2002), others such as Kaldor (2004) claim that despite new ideologies such as market fundamentalism, global Islam, cosmopolitanism and Europeanism, nationalism will persist. Nationalism, besides religion, is linked to chosen traumas and chosen glories and turns them into powerful identity signifiers in times of uncertainty and globalization (Kinnvall, 2004). Kinnvall even claims that this power will rise, since the nation state due to its long history is stabilizing and gives the impression that the world is as it appears. The nation helps to build political unities that lead to images of a self and an other (Rommelsbacher, 2002), therewith giving a base or starting point for the drawing of symbolic boundaries. When someone is born, he or she is sorted towards a nation therewith turning nation into one of the main mechanisms for social categorization. Poole (2003: 275) is pointing out that

*“we begin to acquire our national identity on our mother's knee. We discover our nation – as we discover ourselves – in the bedtime stories we are told, the songs which put us to sleep, the games we play as children, the heroes we are taught to admire and the enemies we come to fear and detest”.*

Nation is not only to be found in the language we speak but also in the culture we identify ourselves with and the political responsibilities we have and, by being an essential part of our identity, our national imprint is difficult to abandon (Poole, 2003).

### ***The uniqueness of the German national identity***

The uniqueness of the German national identity has been neglected in previous studies about boundary drawing in Germany (see for example Alba, 2005 or Bail, 2007). As just pointed out, national identity is still one of the main identity signifiers for self-categorization and here it is assumed that the national identity is moderating the perceptions towards foreigners. This

effect should even be stronger for Germany as a result of its unique national concept (see for example Eder et al., 2004; Honolka and Götz, 1999; Rätzzel, 1997).

*A national identity that is based on ethnicity and Christian values:* The specificity of the German national identity is rooted in the history of the German nation state where cultural identity is the base for political identity. This is a result of German romanticism which in contrast to the French revolution and its universal values, dreamed of a national identity that was constituted of cultural unity, unity of language and shared German ancestors as the base for the national collective identity with Christianity as “unificator” (Kastoryano, 2002: 43). In contrast to the French revolution, the Prussian reformers understood themselves in religious terms and the aim of state-building was based on a religious rebirth (Joppke, 2009: 63). The idea of building a nation, however, was not one implemented by the Prussian reformers but preceded the German state – already in the beginning of the 19<sup>th</sup> century and onwards there were movements all over the “Reich” calling for the creation of a nation state. The cultural definition of the collective identity also went on after 1870 and the principle of the ethnic exclusive society is reflected in the citizenship regulations which follow the principle of *ius sanguinis* – a type of citizenship that is based on descent from a citizen of the given country. During the Nazi-regime, in 1935, the German citizenship was for the first time ethnicized by a law introducing the term “Reichsbürger” (citizen of the Reich) and considered as a German citizen who was of German origin (Hansen, 2004). This principle is also to be found in the history of the FRG with the “Bundesvertriebenengesetz” (Law of displaced persons) from 1953 that considered someone as a German citizen when he confessed himself to the German nationality and when this could be proven through characteristics like descent, language, education and culture (ibid). But the ongoing labor migration to Germany in the 1960s made it necessary for foreigners to come to Germany for a fixed time period and in the following decades there was also a change observable away from *ius sanguinis* to a mixture of *ius sanguinis* and *ius soli* (this kind of citizenship is based on the fact that someone is born within the territory of the country). First guest workers were not given any possibility to stay in Germany and only their temporary stay was supported. After some decades, under the Kohl administration in 1990, when already four million foreigners lived in Germany, a major change in German citizenship law was enacted: the law introduced the possibility of naturalization after living in Germany legally for fifteen years. This qualification period was eased in the following years as well as the possibility for children being of German descent to acquire German citizenship (Borkert and Bosswick, 2007).

*The revival of the image of the ethnic exclusive community after 1989:* Before reunification, German national identity was based on work ethic and the building up after the end of the Second World War. To distance oneself from the Nazi-past, foreign politics concentrated on peace and European integration and domestic politics concentrated on economic development. Collective identity during that time should be built in contrast to the Nazi-past and the German Democratic Republic, with democracy and social market economy as identity signifiers<sup>9</sup> (Eder, 2004: 167). Developments in the 1980s, such as the deployment of intermediate-range missiles as a result of the NATO's double track decision and the "historian issue" (*Historikerstreit*) where conservative historians tried to disprove the historical uniqueness of the Holocaust, led to a request for German interests (Honolka and Götz, 1999: 12). Then a self-recognition of the Federal Republic and its moderate patriotism took place and even the Left, who before had distanced themselves a lot from having a national identity, found a way to find their identity, a patriotism rooted in the constitution ("*Verfassungspatriotismus*": Habermas, 1996) (Räthzel, 1997). The result of these debates was before the reunification a national identity that included the fascist past and was based on the constitution. This was seen as a perfect prerequisite for living together with immigrants since they should exclude differences between natives and immigrants (Honolka and Götz, 1999: 13).

But after the re-unification the constitution patriotism lost in importance to the idealization of the past and a cultural homogenization. This was a result of the end of the Soviet Union and the German reunification that drastically changed the framework in which identities were to be formed. There was no revival of German national feelings after the re-unification but a revival of folkish ("Völkischer") identifications in the new provinces and ethnic-nationalistic identifications in Eastern Europe (ibid: 13). Neither political-universalistic nor economic principles formed national identity and relations with migrants but the historical thinking that Germany is an ethnic homogenous society (Eder, 2004: 166). Germany's reunification worked through cultural homogenization of the nation by neglecting East-West-differences and thereby leaving the other with only one possibility: to adopt the German "Leitkultur" by assimilation (ibid: 169). According to Kastoryano (2002: 43) in Germany there is

*"an ethnic affiliation that excludes all the cultural differences, the cultural unity and the organic character of the national community [...] in the definition of the nation. Whereas the French nation is invented in terms of a historic process deriving from the will of the kings and from an emotional bond, the German nation is imagined in terms of organic*

---

<sup>9</sup> A reference point for identity construction (see Kinnvall, 2004).

*bounds between individuals sharing the same origins, in terms of membership in the German people even though people were scattered into two kingdoms with no communication network between them.”*

At least on the political level it came to changes of this image of a homogenous German nation: in 2001, finally by acknowledging that Germany is a country of immigration, the possibility of getting a German citizenship was increased drastically. The last years have been characterized by a change from the German policy of assimilation to more of a recognition of the rights of immigrants and their ethnical and cultural specificity, and this has led to some people even talking about a multicultural policy.

### **2.3.2 Age/ Generation**

The ongoing diversification of Germany since the 1960s and the renunciation from a policy of assimilation to a policy of recognition of diversity and the changing citizenship regulations should lead to the effect that younger Germans should include migrants in general and Muslims in specific into their national concepts. Therefore symbolic exclusion should be less likely for the second and third generations in Germany since they grew up in a diverse Germany. Especially the third generation is expected to be very open towards migrants since they grew up in a multicultural country where the concept of an ethnic exclusive society was not tangible anymore. This though was tangible for the older generations who experienced the diversification of Germany step by step. Such an influx of migrants can be an activator for processes of group differentiation (Reicher, 2004). Especially in times of globalization – “the intensification of world-wide social relations, which links distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa” (Giddens, 1990: 64) – threats occur on an everyday basis. The change of traditional concepts leads to a rising feeling of insecurity within persons who experience powerlessness towards the results of a global cosmopolitan society (Giddens, 2002). Kinnvall (2004) and Rantanen (2005) point out that constructing a self identity that is connected to a collective identity is a way of dealing with these insecurities. When ontological insecurity<sup>10</sup> increases, individuals try to securitize subjectivity which results in an intensified search for one stable identity (regardless of its actual existence) (Kinnvall, 2004). This is done by drawing boundaries towards an

---

<sup>10</sup> This connotation goes back to Giddens (1991) who defined the opposite, ontological security, as the trust that the world is as it appears to be. This trust helps to create a sense of “being” and is a sort of “emotional inoculation” against existential anxieties (Giddens, 1991: 39).

“other” who is constructed as an abject<sup>11</sup>. Recognizing the other as a threat and turning him into an enemy are ways of increasing the ontological security.

*“In this process of securitizing subjectivity, hate becomes the link among the present, the future, and a re-created past. In this sense it serves as a social chain for successive generations as a particular event or trauma becomes mythologized and intertwined with a group’s sense of self” (Kinnvall, 2004:754).*

Such a process should be especially likely for the older generations since they experienced themselves the changes that happened as a result of globalization whereas younger generations were born into an already changed structure.

But not only growing up in a multicultural and international vs. a homogenous and national society should lead to generation effects but also the Nazi-past and its experience. During the Second World War Germany was responsible for the killing of millions of people in concentration camps, a memory that made it for a long time not acceptable to be proud to be German. Until the 1980s expressing a national identity was a taboo, it was anathematized, and started to become “legitimate” with the German re-unification (Honolka and Götz, 1999). The Nazi-past influenced people of different ages and generations in different ways, leading to a different attitude of every generation when it comes to national pride:

*“The first generation wanted to be silent about Auschwitz because Auschwitz had hurt their pride. The second generation wanted to talk about Auschwitz because it explained their shame of being Germans. The third generation does not accept Auschwitz as the centre of a moral code, and insists that they are proud to be Germans. Each new generation has a clear distinction about the taboos of the preceding ones – and digs them out” (Mörshäuser, 1992: 114 translated by Castles, 2000).*

As Mörshäuser points out, every generation in Germany is characterized by a different relationship with the Nazi-past which results in different relations to the question whether or not one is proud to be German. But according to my observations especially the developments of the last two decades made it more and more acceptable to be proud to be German and to express it. This was best reflected during the 2006 Soccer World Cup where for the first time German flags were hanging all around. But the tournament and its end did not lead to an end of the starting celebrations of the nation. In May 2009, at the 60<sup>th</sup> anniversary party of the FRG, Berlin again was covered in flags being another sign of renewed pride (Rosenberg, 2009).

---

<sup>11</sup> Abjection goes back to Julia Kristeva (1998) which she developed during her clinical work where she used it for symptoms where the distinction between subject and object is not clear.

But the fascist past and “the experience of the destruction of the cultural other /.../ has an impact on the Germany collective memory since it implies difficulties to handle the other” (Eder, 1993: 384). Therefore, although beforehand I expected older Germans to be less open, an opposite trend is possible to occur: amplified by the German past, people should be more open and positive towards immigrants because of the memory of what can happen when racism is getting too much power; the experience of prosecution, displacement and the killing of a religious other should lead to more open attitudes and less symbolic boundary drawing. This should be the most likely for older generations since for them the Nazi-past is the most tangible. This differs from the assumptions of the globalization theorists, therefore making it necessary to research this effect.

### **2.3.3 Contact**

The contact hypothesis by Allport (1954) assumes that contact between members of different groups leads to a dismantling of stereotypes/prejudices. The more one is dealing with a stereotyped group, the more likely it is that he or she senses stereotype-inconsistent information, thereby also making a positive and less stereotypical view of the outgroup more likely. But the success of this process is depending on the status of the group members, the contact situation, if the individuals work together cooperatively to pursue common goals and if the contact is supported by norms (Allport, 1954). Further research in this area has also pointed out the importance of personal and intimate interactions and friendship: this was proven for example by Levin et al. (2003). Their study showed that students, who expressed more outgroup bias and intergroup anxiety, had fewer outgroup friends and more ingroup friends. These results again proved that having outgroup friends is strongly correlated with lower intergroup prejudice.

Contact is leading to less prejudices and makes it less likely that differences between the ingroup and outgroup are coming to the fore. On the contrary, no contact increases the chance of common characteristics being ignored. The more these differences are coming to the fore, the more the other is perceived as strange and different. By not knowing the other “strangeness is turning into one of the basic experiences of modern life” (Rommelsbacher, 2002: 11) where the “other” is turned into an enemy who is incapable of the self. To make someone strange means to distance the other cognitively, emotionally, and socially and keeping an image of the other being totally different. Social distance is here the prerequisite which reproduces the symbolic line between the self and the other every day. This

identification of the other is helping the self to maintain the self's pursuit for belonging and to understand and structure the world (ibid: 16). To make the "other" strange or to capture him in the strangeness, symbolic boundaries are applied by the self. When following this argumentation, the more contact an individual has with Muslims and the more this contact is of friendly nature, the less likely the process of symbolic exclusion should be.

### **3. Methodology**

As pointed out before, one method is seen as inadequate to fully grasp the phenomena under research. That is why in the following two methods are combined. The use of both qualitative and quantitative methods is becoming more and more frequent with many contemporary researchers moving towards a combination of these two research areas by viewing the two methods as complementary rather than as competing (Flick, 2006: 37). An advantage of combining these two research strategies is that the limitations, weaknesses and imperfections of one method can be outbalanced by the use of other methods (Brymann, 2008; Flick, 2006). According to Tashakorri and Teddlie (1996: 43) four different types of mixed method designs can be distinguished<sup>12</sup>. I decided on, what is called by Tashakorri and Teddlie (1996), a dominant, sequential mixed method design where qualitative methods dominate over quantitative methods. The dominant, sequential mixed-method design is seen as the most suitable method since survey analysis was used to get a first insight in possible boundaries and the way in which the assumed moderating variables influence the process. These findings I tried to deepen with unstructured interviews that were here seen as a tool to get a broader insight into the findings of the survey analysis but also allowed for the mere expression of the social realities of the respondents. It would have been ideal if the interviewees from the quantitative part would also have taken part in the qualitative study. My first idea though was to conduct my own quantitative survey but I realized during designing a questionnaire, that I will have to use similar connotations and stereotypes that have been used in previous studies, leading me to the decision to use open interviewing for the qualitative part. Further on, because of practical reasons such as time and financial restrictions it would have been very difficult for me to conduct my own survey that would not only replicate previous findings but also give some fresh insights. But since the survey analysis serves more as a first stance to gather more general insights, I do not consider that a problem.

---

<sup>12</sup> The equivalent status mixed method design, the dominant - less dominant mixed method design, the parallel/simultaneous mixed method design and the method triangulation can be distinguished. These mixed method designs can either be conducted sequential or parallel (Tashakorri und Teddlie, 1996: 44-49).



### 3.1 Quantitative part

Survey analysis is a widely used quantitative method and gives the possibility to provide information about the attitudes or behaviors of a sample of a given population. Through the use of surveys it is possible to conduct the answers of a wide range of research questions where every respondent gets the exact same questions. If the sample is drawn correctly, one can say that results from the sample can be generalized towards the total population (Gomm, 2008). With the help of statistics it is then possible to calculate estimates of the frequency distributions of population. I calculated such frequency distributions with the data sets of ALLBUS 2006 and PEW Global attitudes Project (2006) for questions such as “What is the percentage of Germans thinking Muslims are intolerant”? Additionally cross tabulation which allow for the displaying of two or more variables were calculated with the selected datasets. This allows controlling for the hypothesis whether or not age, national identity and contact have an influence on the boundary drawing process. By calculating the Chi-square test, which measures if the null hypothesis (meaning that there is no correlation between the two variables) can be rejected, we can make comments about the quality of the correlation between two variables. The significance of the Chi-value is the level of significance when one is rejecting the null hypothesis. So when there is a correlation between the two variables, the significance value  $p$  must be lower than 0.05. By further calculating Cramer’s  $V$ , which measures the strength of the association of the cross tabulations, it is possible to make comments about the relationship between the two variables.

#### *Used Surveys*

For my analysis I used two freely available surveys: the long-ranging, multidimensional survey ALLBUS 2006<sup>13</sup> and a smaller and less representative public opinion survey of the Pew Global Attitudes Project (2006)<sup>14</sup>. Unfortunately only little research and few surveys are yet to be found that analyze the attitudes of Germans towards Muslims<sup>15</sup>. In 2006, ALLBUS

---

<sup>13</sup> The general population survey of the social sciences (ALLBUS) is a long-ranging, multidimensional survey that asks a representative cross-section of the German population about their attitudes, behaviors and their social structure. Since 1980 every two years a new survey is conducted with the help of personal interviews. The universe that can be interviewed are since 1991 all adults living in Germany (Germans as well as foreigners) (selected with the help of the register of residents). The number of cases is 2400 in the old and 1100 interviews in the new Bundesländer (GESIS 2010). In 2006 3038 respondents between 18 and 89 were interviewed of which 48.1 percent were men and 51.9 were women.

<sup>14</sup> The Pew Global Attitudes Project is a worldwide public opinion survey that conducts data about a wide range of subjects such as the evaluation of peoples own live and their views of the world. Until now over 200.000 interviews in 57 countries have been conducted (PEW Global Attitude Project 2010). In 2006 there were a total number of 472 respondents between 18 and 89, with 52.2 percent male and 47.1 female respondents.

<sup>15</sup> Previous surveys focused on all immigrants, see for example ISSP National Identity Survey 2003, or on Turkish immigrants, see for example ALLBUS 2006.

conducted information about characteristics that are important for Germans in order for them to consider someone as German and this helps to get a first insight into possible boundaries. Since there is a lack of questions about perceptions of Muslims in the ALLBUS, we are further on going to include the survey by the Pew Global Attitude Project where data about these perceptions was conducted. For our analysis all people not having a German citizenship and not being born in Germany were excluded to ensure that the analysis includes only the German majority population.

### **3.2 Qualitative part**

Interviews are probably one of the most used qualitative methods in the social sciences to study the phenomena under research but there is a variety of interview forms one can choose from – structured interviews, unstructured interviews, group interviews etc. (Fontana and Frey, 1994). I decided on unstructured interviews and the way I conducted the interviews was largely influenced by the book “Creative Interviewing” by Douglas (1985). The creative interview is a way of collecting oral reports from the members of the society and by not following a guide line strictly, the interviewees are free to express themselves, therewith giving them a greater voice within the research process and the research report (Fontana and Frey 1994: 368).

Before choosing a method I spent a lot of time talking with family and friends about my topic of interest. I would describe myself as very open towards other cultures and therefore never saw Islam as a threat. But during the talks I had with friends and family on my research topic, I realized the sensitivity of these questions as people behaved in an for me unusual way, expressing fear of an Islamization of Germany and the destruction of the German culture and, despite their usual moderated attitudes, used arguments of nationalism and Christianity to justify their opinion. To ensure that the interviewees would find enough space to express their perceptions with only little influence of my previous assumptions, I followed the advices of Douglas (1985). I adapted to the situation by changing my own communication processes during the interview to increase the discovery of the truth. Since I asked the respondents about rather delicate topics I tried to establish an interview situation of understanding, friendly feelings and intimacy that should support the process of disclosure and mutual understanding (ibid: 25). Since I am not free of any previous assumptions, I tried to be more a listener to devote to the experience and soul of the other person and to be as open as possible to discovery. Further on, all the interviews were conducted in the kitchens of the respondents, a very intimate place (in contrast to the dining room or living room) where everyday life takes

place. My impression was that this made the respondents feel very comfortable and the whole interview situation very casual. To exclude factors of social desirability and familiar conflicts, I interviewed every respondent individually, leading to an even more intimate situation. I taped all the interviews but I put the recorder on the table in a way that turned it into something marginal in order not to destroy the intimate atmosphere.

### *Themes of the interview*

But of course I had some guidelines in my head but more in a form of themes than in the form of stock phrases. Every interview was started with small talk and questions about the demographics of the respondents but the other themes, when to ask for them and in which way, was controlled by the situation. These were the themes during my interview:

- **Demographic questions** to become an insight in the living situation of the respondent
- Questions about collective identity and the main **identity signifier** of the respondents (such as family, town, occupation, religion etc.)
- Questions about the attitude towards the **German national identity**, the importance of certain characteristics for one's identification with Germany and important characteristics that made the respondents consider someone as German
- Questions about the **perceptions** of Muslims and **assumed differences** by the respondents between themselves as members of the German majority population and the Muslim population
- **Contacts** with Muslims and how the respondents experienced these contacts

For some respondents it took many questions and different stories to answer the questions such as for example for Heinrich B. It took him many justifications why one can be proud of Germany despite its shameful past and a total of forty minutes to admit that he is proud to be German. These stories could be seen as not important but are here included into the analysis. As Kohler Riessman (2000) points out, respondents are well aware of the rules of conversational storytelling but when respondents get lost, these answers should not be ignored but seen as an insight into how respondents structure the meaning of their lives. The storytelling is important when analyzing qualitative interviews because it is part of everyday conversations and connects the everyday life with the scientific research interviewing and reflects social processes and structures in which the respondents form and express their attitudes (ibid).

I decided, after the transcription of the recorded interviews, to evaluate the interviews with a “thematic analysis”. Thematic analysis is a version of content analysis and, by detecting themes, creates a framework of themes which allows for comparisons and contrasts between the different interviewees (Gomm, 2008: 189). All the interviews, which lasted between ten and forty-five minutes, were conducted in German. I translated them myself and analyzed them according to the interview themes: demographic questions/identity signifiers/German national identity/perceptions about Muslims/Contacts with Muslims.

### Ethics

The respondents were informed beforehand about the aim of the study and for which purposes their information will be used. All respondents agreed, on the prerequisite to make the data anonymous, that their answers are allowed to be used for this thesis. Every interviewee had the possibility to end the interview or to refuse to answer a question. Further on, when respondents explicitly stated that they did not want some responses to be included in the analysis, this wish was satisfied. As the British Sociological Association (2002) states “although sociologists, like other researchers are committed to the advancement of knowledge, that goal does not, of itself, provide an entitlement to override the rights of others”. Within this thesis I tried to ensure the well-being of the respondents as well as to make sure that the conditions that they expressed for the usage of the data are adhered.

### Selection of the interviewees

With the selection of the interviewees I did not try to find a representative group of the German population but rather a small group of interviewees that were selected because of their age and contacts with Muslims. Detailed information about the interviewees will be given in section five.

## **3.3 Limitations**

The most prominent criteria for evaluation are reliability, replication and validity. Reliability is concerning the question whether or not a study is repeatable and if the use of the concepts are consistent; replication implies the question whether or not a study is replicable and validity if the conclusions are of integrity (Brymann, 2008: 30-32). For the quantitative part we can say that problems of the reliability, the repeatability of the study, and the validity of the results are outbalanced by standardized questionnaires and objective data collection and calculation (Brymann, 2008). But quantitative methods also have weaknesses (Bryman 2008:159f for the following) such as the fact that people and social institutions are not

distinguished from “the world of nature”, meaning different interpretations of the questions made by the respondents are ignored. To outbalance this criticism qualitative methods are added in this investigation that leave space in the interview for explanation and different interpretations. Another criticism is that the questionnaires reflect a given concept and interpretation and answering of the questions can only take place within this context. Quantitative methods may hinder reflections of connections between research and everyday life. What happens if respondents do not have sufficient knowledge? Are they aware of what their responses imply? This is also a problem of interviews but here, by using open interviews, at least respondents have the possibility to explain their situation and their everyday life within an observable context. Often it is also criticized that statistics and calculations create a view of social life that is independent of the respondent’s lives; a criticism that I have tried to outbalanced by the mixed-method design.

Reliability, repeatability and validity are however major problems in interviewing, because of the fact that interviews and their interpretations are highly subjective. These criteria though are less applicable for evaluating qualitative research. Here, to evaluate the results, the criterion of trustworthiness by Lincoln and Gaba (1985: 290) is used. To compare the two methods “trustworthiness” seems to be an adequate concept since every of the above discussed criteria have a parallel to the aspects of trustworthiness. Trustworthiness is achieved by *credibility* which equals internal validity and represents the truth value of a study; *transferability* which equals external validity and represents applicability of a study; *dependability* which equals reliability and represents the consistency of the results and *confirmability* which equals objectivity and represents the neutrality of the results.

It is assumed our results are trustworthy in the sense that credibility was achieved by using creative interviews allowing the respondents to express their social reality and by conducting the interviews in the natural environment of the respondents. The degree of transferability as well as the degree of dependability is rather low since a very flexible form of interviewing was applied and questions were depending on contexts and situations. This was outbalanced by quantitative methods. In addition, the degree of confirmability is rather low for the qualitative part since interviews are no neutral method. I tried to outbalance also this by using surveys with structured questionnaires but also these questionnaires reflect ideas and concepts of the designing researchers therewith leading to a low confirmability of the study.

#### **4. Quantitative part: An overview of possible boundaries that can be drawn towards immigrants and Muslims**

As pointed out before, the aim of the survey analysis was to get an insight into the boundary drawing process. The dataset of the ALLBUS (2006) is used to get a general overview over characteristics considered as being important for awarding German citizenship therewith giving an indication where boundaries are bright or blurred. The dataset of the Pew Global Attitudes project (2006) is used to get a first impression about stereotypical assumptions about Muslims that can help to understand in the first place how symbolic boundaries can be drawn towards Muslims. Further, by calculating cross tabulations I have tried to get an insight into the influence of the assumed moderating variables. Unfortunately, not all moderating variables were to be found in the data sets, therefore cross tabulations were only calculated for the available data<sup>16</sup>.

##### **4.1 Bright and blurred boundaries towards immigrants**

In the ALLBUS 2006 respondents were asked how important the following characteristics are, in their opinion, for awarding German citizenship<sup>17</sup>. The importance was measured on a scale from 1 (= not important) to 7 (= important). For my analysis everyone rating the characteristics 5 or higher was categorized as perceiving these characteristic as important for awarding citizenship and was included in the percentage (see Table 3).

Interestingly the concept of an ethnic exclusive society based on Christian values seems to be important for only a few respondents: being a Christian and being of German descent are the least important characteristics for the respondents; the same also applies to the prerequisite “being born in Germany”. Exclusion processes because of ethnical and religious differences therefore should be less likely, meaning that differences within these categories should not be crucial for the German majority population to socially exclude the “other”.

The most important characteristic is the German language (91.6 percent), therewith leading to the assumption that language constitutes the brightest boundary. This is not surprising since it

---

<sup>16</sup> Cross tabulations with contact as a variable were not possible to calculate since no sufficient data was conducted by the ALLBUS (2006) (respondents were only asked if they had migrants in their environment but not asking directly if they had personal contact). Additional no information was conducted about contact and national identity by the Pew Global Attitudes Project (2006).

<sup>17</sup> The question was the following: “I am now going to mention different things that can have an influence on awarding German citizenship. Please tell me on the basis of the scale how important these things are to you (1 = not important at all to 7 = very important). If the person was born in Germany/ If the person is of German descent/ If the person is able to speak German/ If the Person lived here for a long time/ If the person is willing to adapt to German life styles/ If the person belongs to a Christian church/ If the person is a criminal/ If the person is making his own living” (ALLBUS, 2006).

is often criticized about the German integration policies that they failed to convey proper language skills. Still nowadays it is not surprising when children of foreigners go their first day to kindergarten or school and speak no or very bad German<sup>18</sup>. The characteristics that are nearly as important as language are the respect for the constitution (91.5 percent) and not being a criminal (91.4 percent). To follow the German laws is of great importance and can be explained by the fact that the migrants' criminality is often criticized in the media. Then it seems like the constitution patriotism by Habermas (1996) as a base for national identity is highly influential whereas former concepts of national identity in Germany lose in importance. Another characteristic that is considered as important for the respondents when awarding German citizenship is that one is making his own living (86.9 percent). This can be explained by the spread opinion that immigrants are a threat to the welfare system (Stephan and Stephan, 2000).

When looking at this picture, it seems the boundaries between immigrants and the dominant population can be crossed by such things like proper language skills, the respect of the German laws and by making one's own living; the concept of an ethnic exclusive society seems to be irrelevant. But the importance of life style adaptation (80.1 percent consider it as important) pinpoints other obstacles; the importance of adaptation implies that boundaries because of a different lifestyle are rather bright. This seems to be of great importance when it comes to the inclusion of the Muslim population. The ALLBUS (2006) asked the respondents, how different they think the lifestyles of Italians/"Aussiedler" (Ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe)/asylum seekers/Turks and Jews are in comparison to their lifestyles. The lifestyle differences towards Turks are seen as rather high by most respondents (69.5 percent)<sup>19</sup>, only the group of asylum seekers seems to be more different. The Turkish Muslim often works as a stereotype for the German Muslim (Kastoryano, 2007) and responses to this question can serve as an indicator for a symbolic exclusion of Muslims.

Now we are taking a closer look at how our moderating variables age/generation and national identity are influencing the symbolic boundary drawing process. By considering the following characteristics as important - being of German descent, lifestyle adaptation and being

---

<sup>18</sup> Information based on an internship at the European Forum for Migration Studies in Bamberg where I analyzed data about kindergarten or preschool children with migration background and their language skills.

<sup>19</sup> The question was: "How strong do you think differ the here living Italians/Aussiedler/asylum seekers/Turks/Jews from the Germans?" (ALLBUS, 2006). Responses were measured on a scale from 1(= not at all) to 7 (very strongly) and respondents rating the difference as 5 or higher were categorized as seeing the group under interest as different in their life styles.

Christian<sup>20</sup> - individuals are able to draw bright boundaries that are difficult to cross. These differences reflect ethnicity, religion and culture which are the new principles of vertical social differentiation in Germany (Eder et al., 2004) and reflect the image of Germany being an ethnic and cultural homogenous society. In the following we are interested in how the importance of these characteristics is connected to one's own age and national identity. Therefore an additive index that allows for the combination of the three "inflexible" characteristics was computed.

To test the generation effect, age was recoded and everyone born before 1933 was sorted into the category of the first generation, everyone born before 1968 into the second generation and everyone born after 1968 into the third generation<sup>21</sup>. The first generation should be more likely to rate those characteristics as high since they are the most tangible for them and should be followed by the second generation whereas for the third generation, as a result of growing up in a multicultural society, previous national concepts should be less tangible. The cross tabulation (see Table 4) displayed that the first generation rated the characteristics more often as important compared to the second and third generation. This is reflected by the fact that members of the second (16 percent) and third generation (22 percent) were more likely to name none of the characteristics as important for awarding citizenship (in contrast to 7 percent of the respondents belonging to the first generation). Further, the percentage of the respondents considering two or more of these characteristics as important is the lowest for the respondents belonging to the third generation (24.2 percent) (for the second generation the percentage is 30.9 percent and for the first generation 45.6 percent). This clearly displays a generation effect where older respondents are more likely to consider the chosen "inflexible" characteristics as important. The results are statistically significant ( $p = .000$ ) but the strength of the association is rather weak (Cramer's  $V = .112$ ).

The national identity concept of Germany is rooted in the image of an ethnic exclusive society based on Christian values and a specific German culture. Therefore people having a strong

---

<sup>20</sup> I excluded the category "being born in Germany" since it is not such a powerful category of symbolic exclusion than the other ones.

<sup>21</sup> People born before 1933 were sorted into the category of the first generation because it is assumed that they have a high likelihood of knowing how Nazi-Germany looked like. People born before 1968 were sorted into the category of the second generation because they were born in the times of the so-called economic miracle, the times of the refurbishment of the NS-past where their parents have been a part of and in times where the process of the diversification of Germany started. People born after 1968 were sorted into the category of the third generation because they grew up in a multicultural Germany and know the NS-past mostly from history books.



national identity<sup>22</sup> should be more likely to consider the chosen characteristics as important. When looking at the cross tabulations (see Table 5) these assumptions are confirmed. People being proud are more likely to agree to two or all of the characteristics (34.7 percent in comparison to 23.2 percent) (the percentage of respondents agreeing to one of the characteristics is nearly equal) whereas people not being proud to be German are much more likely to agree to none of the characteristics (24.1 percent in comparison to 12.3 percent). The results, that a strong national identity makes it more likely to agree to “inflexible” concepts, are statistically significant ( $p=.000$ ) but the strength of association is rather weak (Cramer’s  $V=.165$ ).

This data analysis implies that concepts of nationality seem to change in Germany. With the decreasing importance of Christianity and German descent when awarding German citizenship, there is a shift of previous drawn symbolic boundaries observable. But characteristics such as lifestyle adaption and therewith having a German culture is still important, showing the difficulty immigrants have to be included into the dominant discourse. But the importance of these “inflexible” characteristics is strongly moderated by age and national identity and therefore will be examined in more detail in the qualitative section. However, these characteristics lose in importance towards more flexible characteristics such as speaking the German language or respecting the constitution, implying a maceration of previous symbolic boundaries. Still this is no sufficient answer to our research objective since the questions did not target the Muslim population. This is why in the next step we are taking a closer look at the stereotypical beliefs about Muslims.

#### **4.2 Stereotypical beliefs as an indicator for possible boundaries**

The PEW Global Attitude Project asked Germans which characteristics they associate with Muslims<sup>23</sup> (see Table 6) as well as general questions about the Muslim population and Islam. I analyzed the data myself and looked for structures that can give an insight into differences that can be used to draw boundaries to the Muslim population.

Most respondents characterized Muslims as “devoted” (82.4 percent) and “fanatical” (68.6 percent). These stereotypical beliefs imply that symbolic boundaries towards the Muslim

---

<sup>22</sup> The question was: “Would you say that you are very proud/fairly proud/not very proud/not proud at all to be German?”. Everyone answering with “very proud” or “fairly proud” was categorized as proud and everyone answering “not very proud” or “not proud at all” as not proud.

<sup>23</sup> The question was: “Which of these characteristics do you associate with Muslims? The first is (...). Do you associate this with Muslims?” Possible answers were yes or no (PEW Global Attitude Project, 2006)

population are often drawn because of their religion and the different lifestyles it entails. Two further characteristics are interesting when it comes to the Muslim population: only 17.6 percent associated “tolerance” and only 15.7 percent “respectful of women” with Muslims. Contrariwise this means that 84.7 percent of the respondents’ associate lack of respect for women with Muslims and 82.2 percent associate intolerance with Muslims. These stereotypical beliefs reflect cultural boundaries that are rooted in a different world view and a normative system that seems incomparable with the own views. “Violence” though is only for 44.7 percent of the respondents characterizing for Muslims and can be explained by the fact that only a little number of respondents think (16.7 percent) that many or most of the Muslims support Al Qaeda.

These stereotypical beliefs imply that Muslims are excluded from dominant concepts because of having a different religion that is more devoted. Islam as a religion is also perceived as backward, violent and old-fashioned – two thirds of the respondents think that Islam is standing in conflict with modernity whereas for Christianity only one third of the respondents assume such a conflict. The strong religiousness is also the assumed reason by the majority of the respondents for the lack of prosperity in the Muslim countries. Further, most respondents think that Islam prevents the integration of Muslims into the German society. Religion therefore seems to be a major tool for drawing symbolic boundaries.

One of the main interests of this thesis is to find out how age/generation is influencing the boundary drawing process. Symbolic boundaries can reflect dislikes such as the above discussed ones. To control the influence of age on these dislikes, age was recoded into three generations as in the case of the ALLBUS (2006) survey and an additive index was computed with the stereotypes reflecting the most prominent stereotypical beliefs about Muslims – devoted, fanatical, violent, intolerant and not respectful towards women. Surprisingly the first generation had the highest percentage of the respondents agreeing to none of the stereotypes (8.7 percent as opposed to the second generation with 3.7 percent and the third generation with 0.6 percent) (see Table 7). The reason for such a result can be social desirability (older respondents are afraid to be characterized as Nazis and therewith do not agree) or the experience of the destruction of a religious other during the Nazi-time (which makes them more open towards other religions). In contrast, the first generation (39.1 percent) was more likely to associate all of the named stereotypes with Muslims (in comparison to the second generation with 34 percent and the third generation with 31.3 percent) which can be a result of the fact that older Germans grew up in a Germany that was more homogenous than today,

leading to less contact with foreigners and therewith to more stereotypical beliefs. This clearly reflects the assumed opposite trends for the older generations and shows that the process of boundary drawing is necessary to be researched in more detail.

The results, which are not statistically significant ( $p > 0.05$ ), show some trends but not without ambiguity. This though is not leading to a rejection of the hypothesis that age has an influence on the boundary drawing process – the sample was not representative for my research question because the second generation was significantly overrepresented (with 325 of the 489 respondents) and the survey constituted of a much smaller sample of the German population than the ALLBUS survey. Therefore it seems necessary, also because of the fact that the calculations of the ALLBUS (2006) showed a clear trend, to look at the generation effect in more detail with the help of qualitative methods.

## **5. Qualitative part: An analysis of symbolic boundaries in their making**

With the help of qualitative methods, namely unstructured interviews, I tried to uncover the construction of symbolic boundaries in more depth. I conducted six interviews with two families that lasted between ten and forty-five minutes each. With the selection of the families I tried to vary in age, gender, contact to Muslim as well as my personal relationship with the respondents to ensure, although having a small sample, reliable answers.

### Interviewees

With the selection of the interviewees I did not try to find a representative group of the German population but rather a small group of interviewees that were selected because of their personal narratives. First of all, all the interviewees hailed from the suburbs of a small town in Baden-Württemberg called Rastatt. The city was chosen because of its high amount of immigrants: of the 47.589 inhabitants 17.491 inhabitants are either foreigners or have a migration background, meaning that Rastatt has a total migrant population of 36.6 percent (City of Rastatt, 2008). As interviewees two families were selected (see Table 8).

Families were selected as a research unit because it is assumed within this thesis that age and the generation one was raised in, influence the boundary drawing process. Of each family, three generations were interviewed – grandparents, parents, and children – to control the assumed generation effect. Heinrich B. (82) and Hilde K. (81) belong to the first generation since they were born before 1933, experienced the Second World War and saw what Nazi-Germany looked like. Johann B. (46) and Michaela K. (50) belong to the second generation because of being born in the end of the 1950s/the beginning of the 1960s and therewith

actually experiencing the turn of Germany from a homogenous to a multicultural society as well as the refurbishment of the NS-past. Annika B. (14) and Laura K. (27) belong to the third generation, the events of the NS-past are mostly known for them from history books and they were growing up or are still growing up in a very culturally diverse Germany.

Moreover, the two families were selected because of their different contact with Islam since strangeness is assumed to have an influence on the boundary drawing process. Social distance is here the prerequisite which reproduces the symbolic line between the self and the other every day. Therefore I expect people having contacts with Muslims to perceive them as less strange and different, therewith being less vulnerable for the group categorization process and ingroup favoritism because of sensing common characteristics. Within family K. everyone had contact with Muslims, abroad as well as in Germany. The granddaughter, Laura K.<sub>3</sub><sup>24</sup>, worked from August 2008 to July 2009 in Cairo, Egypt as a kindergarten teacher in a multilingual kindergarten. Both through her work in Cairo and her work in Germany as a kindergarten teacher she is characterized by professional experiences with Islam in Germany and in a Muslim country, therewith making her an interesting case. Both Hilde K.<sub>1</sub> and Michaela K.<sub>2</sub> went to visit Laura K.<sub>3</sub> in Cairo and were not only introduced by Laura to tourist places but also the everyday life in Cairo and the lifestyles of Muslim families there. In my opinion this family serves as an interesting case since all three experienced, besides Muslim living in Germany, Muslim living in a Muslim country where stereotypes of Muslim living in Germany were far away.

Family B. however had less or no contact with Islam. Both Heinrich B.<sub>1</sub> and Johann B.<sub>2</sub> never had contact with Muslims, neither in Germany nor abroad, therewith giving an insight into how perceptions of Muslims look for people not being exposed to Islam. Annika B.<sub>3</sub>, however, has contact with Muslims every day. She is attending the gymnasium and in her class there are three Muslims of Turkish origin. Her answers were seen as giving a deep insight into how young Germans may handle and experience Islam and how Muslims may become integrated in the everyday (school) life.

Furthermore, my personal relationship with the families differed – family K. are relatives of mine and I have a rather personal relationship with them whereas I never had personal contact with any of the family members of family B. Honolka and Götz (1999) point out that interview acquaintances and relatives are not only of advantage regarding financial and temporal issues but also have a positive impact on the interview situation; it reduces the fear

---

<sup>24</sup> The number behind each respondent implies to which generation one is belonging to: (1) = first generation etc.

of the researcher about the unknown situation and makes the respondent feel more comfortable. Additionally background information about the interviewees can support the evaluation. But I was afraid that having background information on family K. would lead to an all too high subjectivity. Therefore I decided to interview a family I did not know because I was conscious about the fact that personal relationships can also make it more difficult to get reliable answers. The respondents I know could be afraid to express negative attitudes because it is very likely that we see each other again and I keep their thoughts in mind.

The interview results are presented in four thematic sections to make the answers to the research objectives more comprehensible. First of all, images of what makes someone considered as a German are discussed since it gives an insight into possible symbolic boundaries. This is followed by an analysis of the actual boundary drawing process towards the Muslim population. Onwards it was assumed that one's identity has an influence on this process which will be discussed in the third subsection and is followed by a review of the influence of contacts on the boundary drawing process.

### **5.1 What renders someone German?**

When asking the respondents what is typical German and which characteristics are important for them to consider someone as a German, they had great difficulties in answering the questions. For Hilde K.<sup>1</sup> Germany changed a lot in the last decade, because *“there are so many foreigners, so many different foreigners. When you come to Rastatt, all the grocery shops are owned by Turks”*. Germany is not an ethnic exclusive society anymore, something that is important for her. Although she is not expressing negative attitudes towards foreigners, she still would have preferred it to have stayed that way. But I guess her reasoning is not really related in racism but more in the fact that foreigners are not Germans to her. This becomes clear when she tells the story of a relative of her who is married to an African:

*“The husband of my relative wanted to go back to Africa but because of the riots he didn't go back, he didn't have the courage anymore. [...] I am not really sure. He is comfortable in Germany but if he ever wanted to become a real German, I don't know. But because of the riots in Africa he stayed.”*

His living in Germany is more a coincidence to her, something that makes her question if he is a real German. The way she talks about the son of her relative who is travelling around the world, implies that she thinks foreigners and their children are more guests than citizens of Germany. I think here one can see that she is imprinted by the time of the labor recruitment and therefore immigrants are not really Germans for her. She also complains about the

declining religiousness in Germany and for her Islam is not such a problem since Muslims believe in God and she prefers them before non-believers.

Hilde K.<sub>1</sub> sees herself confronted with a Germany that changed. Therefore deciding what makes someone German is hard for her since all the typical German values and characteristics she believed in, changed.

Heinrich B.<sub>1</sub> is also imprinted by the guest worker period. The coming of the guest workers is for him not related to their interest of rebuilding Germany but more in making money. These guest workers as well as their children are not Germans for him but their grandchildren will be since they have been raised in Germany; *“there is no doubt, that they are German. But the old ones, that is the same as if I would have moved to Alsace, I would never have been French. I would always have stayed German, deep inside. Because I am born here and I am raised here”*. Also that someone is Christian is not important to him. Someone is German for him when he is imprinted by the German culture more than by any other culture.

For Johann B.<sub>2</sub> and Michaela K.<sub>2</sub> being born in Germany, being of German descent or being a Christian is not important. For Johann B.<sub>2</sub> the only deciding factor is that *“someone follows the rule of the game”*, meaning that someone is respecting the constitution and is not criminal. Michaela K.<sub>2</sub> cannot find anything typically German, everything changed and therefore she cannot really say that foreigners or persons with migration background are not German. But still around migrants she feels more German which triggers an ingroup/outgroup thinking.

For Laura K.<sub>3</sub> Germany being an ethnic exclusive society based on Christian values is not important.

*“For me it is important that someone is coming along with the society and the culture, that he restores himself within this society. He doesn’t have to live like a full-blooded German. But when he is living here, it is not about assimilation, when he is coming along, then that is more important than a German citizenship”*.

For Annika B.<sub>3</sub> previous national concepts are not tangible and migrants are as much German to her as she herself, making it difficult for her to define typical German.

For the first and second generation concepts of Germany being an ethnic exclusive society based on Christian values are still tangible but they lose in importance in a multicultural Germany. Similar to the results of the ALLBUS (2006), being a Christian, being born in Germany or being of German descent is of little importance, more important is that someone is respecting the constitution, is able to speak German and has lived here for a long time. But still although acknowledging that, the respondents still feel distinct from the migrants; this

also applies to Laura K.<sub>3</sub>. Only Annika B.<sub>3</sub> cannot name differences between herself and foreigners or persons with migration background.

## **5.2 Differences as a tool of symbolic boundary drawing**

When looking at these answers, it seems that boundaries towards migrants nowadays are rather blurred and one would expect symbolic boundaries drawn towards the Muslim population to be rather blurred as well. Since lifestyle adaptation as well as someone being a Christian or being of German origin was not important for the respondents to consider someone German, one would expect that there should be no symbolic boundary drawing towards the Muslim population because of cultural, religious or ethnical differences. But if this is the case or not, will be discussed in the following. To make the analysis more clear, four categories were distinguished that allow for differentiation processes from the Muslim population: religion, lifestyle, race and language (similar to Alba, 2005 or Bail, 2007).

*Religion* as a symbolic boundary does not only reflect one's own personal belief but also the history of a country in which religion is embedded into institutions (Zolberg and Long, 1999). Both religion and culture are reflected in institutions, normative systems, rituals, traditions, customs and beliefs and especially in Islamic societies religion plays an important role in determining the life of people; making a separation difficult (Pohlong, 2004). Therefore in the religious subsection it is only focused on differentiation processes that are correlated to Islam being a different belief. But Islam also entails a different lifestyle and a normative system that for some of my respondents seemed to stand in conflict with the dominant discourse and its institutions. The role of these differences for drawing symbolic boundaries will be discussed in the subsection *lifestyles*. This said, the following refers often to culture since this term was used by the respondents themselves. Further *race* is added, a factor for exclusion that is of great importance when researching boundary in comparable contexts (Alba, 2005). Muslims are of a different ethnicity and therewith not of German descent. This could also lead to symbolic exclusion because of the previous national concepts existing in Germany. Further was the lack of language skills often mentioned by the respondents, therefore making it interesting to research the role of *language* as a tool of exclusion. I will start discussing boundaries that were drawn towards the Muslim population because of them having a different religion.

### ***Religion***

Heinrich B.<sub>1</sub> draws symbolic boundaries towards Muslims because of their religion:

*“Islam is a danger for our Christian, occidental world. Because Islam is too violent. If you take a look, every day or every second day, an attack on the own people. Islam needs to interfere /.../ and not train them and say: ‘You are going to heaven when you are doing that’. And that is why I oppose Islam because it is not taking any consequences out of that. [Islam] does not fit in our Christian embracing”.*

Islam as a religion appears as a threat for him because of its violence:

*“Take a look at this: when Islam sees a Christian person and thinks, he can kill him. That cannot be. That is what disturbs me about Islam. Because Islam believes, when he is killing differently thinking people, then this doesn’t matter. /.../ I have nothing against persons, if there is walking a Turkish woman, I will not kill anyone. But the differences are there”.*

The violence and intolerance of Muslims is for him a direct result of the religion and therefore makes them not suitable for the Christian-occidental Germany. Interestingly, in the case of Heinrich B.<sub>1</sub> it seems the pictures of the Middle Ages appear again where Islam was seen as a violent and backward religion in comparison to Christianity which served as a justification to combat Islam. For him, this also serves as a justification to exclude the Muslim population, even to discriminate against them. But on the other hand he does not want to discriminate someone because of their belief:

*“When he is an honest person, he can be Jew or something else. There was enough killing of the Jews which you still don’t understand as a normal person today. How can someone bring humans, just because of having a different religion, into a gas chamber? That is not right. This is for a normal person not understandable.”*

The memories and experiences of the Second World War were engraved in him deeply and nowadays he thinks about these things much more. The destruction of a religious other is something he has not been able to understand until today and that is what makes him angry about Islam as a religion. The terrorism is often presented in the media as a war in the name of religion and Heinrich B.<sub>1</sub> cannot understand why Islam as a religion is not going against these movements. This is for him a device of the intolerance of Islam which is also reflected for him in the fact that it is forbidden in Muslim countries to build Christian churches. *“That is why I am against minarets”*. But talking about Islam in Germany is rather difficult for him since he is caught between his experiences of the NS-past that made him realize everyone should be able to practice his religion, and the confrontation with a belief of intolerance and violence that makes it difficult for him to acknowledge that Muslims should have the same religious rights as everyone else in this country - *“it is stupid that you think about it but it happens every morning when you open the newspaper”*. Heinrich B.<sub>1</sub> is drawing a boundary between Germany with its Christian-occidental coinage and Islam by picturing Islam as violent and intolerant which legitimates, in his opinion, the (social) exclusion of Muslims



from dominant concepts of the German society. A similar mechanism of symbolic exclusion is also to be observed in the case of his son Johann B.<sub>2</sub>. For him the Christian belief should keep a higher significance to conserve “our” cultural order. Important characteristics of the cultural order that need to be preserved are women rights and freedom of speech which “cannot be guaranteed by Islam, according to my state of knowledge”. In principle he thinks Islam is not different,

*“in general Islam tells the same as Christianity but Islam interprets it different (...) Islam is as violent as Christianity. The Christians penetrated also very violent centuries ago. But this has all changed now, this though was also an effect of our industrialization, our livable values, where we do not put so much emphasize anymore on religion.”*

But Islam seems to be for him on a pre-modern stage compared to Christianity and this serves for him as a justification to exclude the Muslim population from dominant concepts.

Similar to Heinrich B.<sub>1</sub>, in the case of Michaela K.<sub>2</sub> the violence of Islam also serves as an apology for the exclusion of Muslims: “what fears me are not the mosques but the boarding schools where no one knows what is happening.” Still she acknowledges that “everyone should have the possibility to live according to his faith and should not be directed by any institution”. Like Heinrich B.<sub>1</sub>, Michaela K.<sub>2</sub> also resides between knowing that it should be the right of everyone to have religious freedom but also her own fear of the violence and intolerance of the unknown.

Laura K.<sub>3</sub> also realizes the symbolic boundary between herself and Muslims but perceives not Islam itself as a problem but more the Islam that is practiced in Germany which appears to her more radical and devoted than the Islam she experienced in Egypt:

*“Muslims that live here in Germany have a problem with the way religion is lived in their original homeland. Because these states open themselves and they do not come along with this openness and establish here a parallel society [...] I have the impression that the Muslims I meet here are more radical when it comes to their point of view. The Islam that I experienced over there [in Egypt] I experienced as more open but at the same time religious, in a healthy way. They practice their religion totally differently. I mean, we are catholic, but we do not live accordingly to Christianity, they live accordingly to Islam but do not try to convince you. Of course you have to arrange yourself, especially during Ramadan. You have to accommodate yourself over there. Not to eat something on the street or eat during day time.”*

She was never afraid of Islam there and when she talks about Islam in Egypt she gives the impression of being very fascinated, surprised over how little Islam was a problem. Problems of integration of Muslims in Germany are for Laura K.<sub>3</sub> a result of the devoutness of the Muslim immigrants but also a result of the state’s failure to stop the establishment of parallel societies. But the good experiences she had with Islam in Egypt are for her not applicable to

Germany, therewith leading to a stronger drawing of symbolic boundaries to Muslims living in Germany than the ones living in Egypt.

Heinrich B.<sub>1</sub>, Johann B.<sub>2</sub>, Michaela K.<sub>2</sub> and Laura K.<sub>3</sub> differentiate themselves from the Muslim population by picturing Muslims as “devoted”, “radical”, “violent” and “intolerant”. For Heinrich B.<sub>1</sub> and Johann B.<sub>2</sub> this is a direct result of Islam as a religion whereas Michaela K.<sub>2</sub> is caught between her experiences of an Islam in Egypt that was open as well as her common sense that no one should be discriminated because of their religion and her own fear of Islam. Laura K.<sub>3</sub> again, as a result of her own experiences in Egypt, does not see Islam itself as a problem but the way people live in Germany according to Islam and the way the state allows Islam to be lived. Religion is here a powerful tool for drawing boundaries and therewith excluding the Muslim population from the dominant group. The boundaries appear quite bright and boundary shifting, the reallocation of boundaries between the two groups, or boundary blurring, meaning that the importance of a boundary becomes less distinct (Zolberg and Woon, 1999), seems unlikely.

Hilde K.<sub>1</sub> has no problem at all with Islam in Germany; it is just a different religion for her. *“All believe in the same God. That is why I do not understand that because of religion there is war and killing of people”*. She accepts everyone no matter what they believe in and never had a problem with people of different beliefs. Hilde K.<sub>1</sub> realizes the symbolic boundaries, meaning that Muslims are different from her, but here one can see the interesting part about boundaries: they can be of different meaning and different importance for different individuals. She also has no problems with them practicing their religion here: *“they have already built mosques. There are already many religions in Germany. And you need to accept them. [...] That is their religion and when that is their religion, you are not allowed to forbid that”*. As a teenager she got to know that Jews were killed because of their faith, an instance she still cannot understand and what moderates her open feelings towards Islam and other religions.

### ***Lifestyle***

For Annika B.<sub>3</sub> not Islam as a religion leads her to perceive boundaries but more the different lifestyles Islam entails. In her class are three Muslims, two girls and one boy – one of the girls is wearing a veil and Annika B.<sub>3</sub> looks at her differently:

*“But when you look at [the Turkish girl wearing a veil], then you realize immediately that she is coming from another country. Then there is a certain distance. But the other, [the Turkish girl not wearing a veil], there you do not think that immediately. You realize the difference. [...] During the school trip she had to pray five times a day. This was then of course weird.”*

When asking if there are also other moments when she feels the distance to the girl wearing the veil, for example regarding her leisure activities, she answers that *“If she prefers to remain distant, it is her choice.”* Other kids in the class having a migration background do not give her this feeling. For example the other Muslim girl is a good friend of hers, is class representative and seems not different to her since she has the same lifestyle as Annika B.<sup>3</sup> although being a Muslim. The girl wearing the veil though, with her strong religiousness and her different lifestyle that her way of living Islam entails, seems to have a major impact on Annika’s feelings of difference. The different lifestyles Muslims have, are also to be noticed by Laura K.<sup>3</sup> but for herself this is no reason to exclude Muslims from the dominant concepts of the Germany society:

*“It starts with the meat of the pork. Of course in Islam pork meat is not clean. /.../ But I also met Muslims, that don’t practice their religion but do not eat pork meat. Those are often cultural things that are not seen as clear here. Immediately one is saying, of course, that is because of the religion.”*

Michaela K.’s<sup>2</sup> comments are in line with the comments of her daughter but she perceives the different lifestyles more as a symbolic boundary. This for her related to the fact, that *“it is foreign, intangible, you don’t know the background, why they are doing that like that, for what reasons, because you never were concerned with that and no one was ever enlightened about it”*. She is not of the opinion that Islam does not fit in to Germany because then no foreigner would be allowed to come to Germany. Such incidents as when the government of Baden-Württemberg forbid a teacher to wear a veil, are in her eyes ridiculous:

*“That is a cultural thing; they have their reasons for wearing their veil. /.../ But they have their culture, their world view and according to that they are living. And I think that no one should stick his nose into that”*.

But she admits that before going to Cairo she had mostly negative perceptions about Islam *“but there the whole picture changed. And I started to see the Muslims living here in a new light”*. During her time in Egypt she had a lot of talks about religion and direct contacts with Islam. For example they visited a typical Egyptian family where the women were only among themselves, a totally new experience for her. Then the father of the girl they visited came in and said “hi”, but did not shake hands. The brother did but wore a glove. *“The girl we visited told us then that this is deduced from Koran and that you can interpret the Koran so and so, that is a matter of interpretation as well as here”*. For Michaela K.<sup>2</sup> this changed her handling of the different lifestyles that come with Islam and made her more open to understand the

Muslims living here. Still Islam is something strange and foreign for her, making it difficult to include Islam into her dominant concepts of what is German.

The different lifestyles are an important characteristic when it comes to the exclusion of the Muslim population. Muslims with their different lifestyles that include praying five times per day, not eating pork, the wearing of veils or the separate meetings of women and men seem so different from the typical German lifestyle. But these different lifestyles are also a direct result of their different religion, again pointing out how difficult it is to separate religion and lifestyles/culture. These differences are even more amplified by a normative system that seems to allow for intolerance and the repression of women. This was most observable in the case of Johann B.<sub>2</sub>: *“the machismo of these men that you can also observe in the way the lock their women in their flat, these little things...”* are characteristics of Muslim that make them in his opinion not compatible with the German culture. Because of being such powerful tools of symbolic exclusion, the named differences then easily lead to an “us” and “them” thinking and a separation into groups.

### ***Race***

Race as a basis of a symbolic boundary was no major tool of exclusion of the respondents. Of course people talked sometimes about Turks but during all my interviews I never had the impression that the race is an important tool to exclude the Muslim population. As most of the respondents expressed, Germany is not an ethnic exclusive society anymore and being of German descent is not of great importance in order for them to consider someone as German. So one’s origin is only of minor importance as a mechanism of exclusion and loses importance against religion and lifestyle as indicators of difference.

### ***Language***

Language can also be used as a tool of symbolic exclusion but was only of minor importance for the respondents. Although all respondents, except for Annika B.<sub>3</sub>, complained about the lack of language skills of the foreigners it was not seen as a specific Muslim characteristic. Only Annika B.<sub>3</sub> emphasized the difference of language when it comes to the Muslim population *“because they have been raised bilingual and go every year on vacation to Turkey. I think that that is different”*. She sees them as Germans but herself in contrast to them as German in a different way: *“I think that they see Germany differently than I do. That they have considered, for example [the girl wearing the veil], that she is going back to Turkey. They have for sure two homes.”* Speaking another language since birth is a reason for her why she sees herself as a different kind of German. This is in line with Zolberg and Woon (1999:

21) who claim, that the logic of a language, similar to religion, is also embedded in social and cultural institutions and determines the formation of “bounded and mutually exclusive national groups, thereby paralleling the institutionalization of religion”. This is similar to the experience of Annika B.<sub>3</sub> who perceives migrants because of preferring to speak another language than German as an exclusive national group in which she cannot be a member. She also expresses such mechanism for a Russian girl in her class but the expressed difference is much smaller when talking about the Russian girl than when talking about the Turkish girl. In my opinion this is a result of the fact that when the Turkish girl with the veil speaks Turkish, in combination with her foreign lifestyle and religion, she appears as much more different. As pointed out before, boundary work was chosen because of its multidimensional approach in comparison to previous racism approaches – such an example as the one of Annika B.<sub>3</sub> shows that not only one difference decides about an “us” and “them” thinking but the interplay of many differences which is influenced by different experiences and different individual backgrounds and characteristics.

Every respondent differed in reasoning why Muslims are different and therewith using different symbolic boundaries to exclude the Muslim population. For Michaela K.<sub>2</sub> and Laura K.<sub>3</sub> the devoutness of Muslims in Germany and the different lifestyles were deciding; for Heinrich B.<sub>1</sub> the violent and intolerant religion; for Johann B.<sub>2</sub> the different normative system of Islam; for Annika B.<sub>3</sub> the different lifestyles, traditions, customs and language and Hilde K.<sub>1</sub> noticed differences because of the religion but this was not leading to an exclusion of Muslims from the dominant discourse, therewith showing that boundaries are interpreted differently by everyone.

Interestingly, when talking about migrants in general, being a Christian and lifestyle adaption was not important but when talking about the Muslim population these two characteristics turned into powerful tools for symbolic exclusion. In both the cases of Heinrich B.<sub>1</sub> and Johann B.<sub>2</sub> it seems previous national concepts are not important anymore but when it comes to the Muslim population, these concepts are easily activated and an ingroup/outgroup-categorization starts where Germany being based on Christian values seems to serve as a justification and religion as a major tool of symbolic exclusion. This pinpoints that those characteristics considered important for being German, depend on the reference category of one’s own identity. This implies that group categorization that is required to form one’s own identity, has a great influence on the boundary drawing process; the topic of the next section.

### **5.3 The influence of national identity**

Social identity theory assumes that the process of identity formation is following a process of group categorization into an ingroup, of which the self is a member, and an outgroup, of which the other is a member. Beforehand it was said that boundaries mark the beginning and the end of a community, therewith, using the expressions of the social identity theory, the beginning and the end of the ingroup. But the boundaries that were drawn to separate the ingroup (the German majority population) from the outgroup (the Muslim population) differed immensely in their brightness as well as in the way Muslims were excluded from the own concepts of Germanness from individual to individual. Some respondents, namely Johann B.<sub>2</sub>, Michaela K.<sub>2</sub> and Heinrich B.<sub>1</sub>, pictured Muslims in Germany as a homogenous unity having mostly negative characteristics and being different from the ingroup. The way Muslims were described is reflected in the definition of community by Baumann (1996) where community equals ethnic minority. Ethnic minorities are supposed to form a community based on their reified culture and this culture has to appear in a reified form because they are identified as culture (Baumann, 1996: 17). As pointed out before such an image of the Muslim population as a community ignores the diversity of this group. This also happened in the interviews: the named respondents assumed every Muslim had the same culture and therefore also the same interests and thoughts – every Muslim believes in a normative system that is intolerant and oppressing and every Muslim is deeply religious and practices his religion in a very devoted way, keeping him away from integrating into a society that, unlike Islam, is so open, tolerant, democratic and highly developed. Only Michaela K.<sub>2</sub> sometimes macerated this image of a Muslim community when she talked about her experiences in Egypt where she learned that the Koran can be interpreted differently but she could not really transfer this experience to Muslims in Germany.

Although Germany being a very diverse society, not only since re-unification, these differences were ignored when comparing the German majority population to the Muslim population. For the German majority population the definition of Cohen (1985: 12) is very suitable since he defines a community as members of a certain group who "have something in common with each other which distinguishes them in a significant way from the members of other putative groups". But what is the common thing? The concept "oldness" that was used by Elias and Scotson (1994) to categorize the established when researching the mechanisms of exclusion of the new working class community in Winston Parva, reflects most adequate this common thing. It was very hard for the outsiders to become a member of the group of the

insiders because of their lifestyles that appeared so different to the insiders. The established were despite their diversity connected by a specific emotional bond because of living there for a longer time. The same is also observable for our case: Germans constitute a unity because of living here for a longer time, because of being more imprinted by typical German values such as punctuality or thoroughness. Muslims in comparison are not considered German because of them not living that long here - first generation respondents even perceived them more as guests and their different behaviors, standards and beliefs. But such a categorization was only the case for members of the first and second generation, for the third generation these values were not tangible anymore and they did not perceive themselves as the established and the Muslims as the outsiders. As said before, the process of group categorization did not happen for every respondent in the same way.

Beforehand we said that national identity can have an influence on this process - the national identity of the respondents though did not reflect a one-dimensional but a multidimensional picture. In the cases of Heinrich K.<sub>1</sub>, Johann B.<sub>2</sub> and Michaela K.<sub>2</sub> their strong national identity had an influence on the group categorization. National identity however was for Heinrich K.<sub>1</sub> a rather delicate topic. He feels connected to Germany but it seems in the beginning, it is not an important identity signifier to him: *“You cannot be proud anymore to be German. But you are German, you stay German”*; implying being German is for him more a social role. But during the interview, he was slowly moving into the direction of expressing national pride but was caught between two narratives: the shame of Germany’s past and the actual feeling of national pride. It seems he wants to defend his national pride by pointing out that also other countries have a shameful past. He is naming for example the French colonialization or the Polish murdering of Germans during the Second World War, which he observed with his own eyes. Additionally, talking about the times of the economic miracle and all the achievements during the reconstruction, gave him, as it seemed to me, a justification for German national pride. At the end of the forty minutes long interview he finally acknowledges *“but when you take it close, everyone has a certain degree of pride towards his country. /.../ I am German”*.

As pointed out before, for a long time German national identity was a taboo; this can be seen in the case of Heinrich B.<sub>1</sub>. But it was also pointed out before that during the last years a change was observable towards a social acceptance of national pride; especially for younger generations. This can be seen in the cases of Johann B.<sub>2</sub> and Michaela K.<sub>2</sub>; it was very easy for them to express national pride. Johann B.<sub>2</sub> feels connected to Germany and identifies a lot

with the German traditions, the German culture, the literature or the German tidiness, a characteristic with which he would describe himself. *“There are many things one can be proud of: the social market economy and the way democracy is adhered”*. Michaela K. expresses pride even more unrestrictedly and feels strongly connected to Germany: *“First of all you have been growing up in that society and it is not possible to deny that some values that are typical German are engraved into you. [...] I always say, I am German and no one will ever change me”*, implying a strong national pride. In these three cases Muslims were excluded from the dominant discourse because of not being typically German and because of not being imprinted by the same things as the established. In the case of Michaela K. <sup>2</sup> though, this thinking was not so strong as in the cases of Heinrich B.<sub>1</sub> and Johann B.<sub>2</sub>. When she was differentiating Muslims from Germans, she overrode the comments by saying *“but Germany is not Germany anymore”* and *“but in Egypt I experienced an Islam that was different. /.../ In Germany all this is the fault of the state”*, therewith making the drawn boundaries to appear less bright. This implies that contact seems to have an influence on the boundary drawing process and that it can change. But this is depending on the type of contact – Michaela’s good experiences are limited for her to Egypt, making it difficult for her to transfer them to the German case.

In the cases of Johann B.<sub>2</sub> and Heinrich B.<sub>1</sub> however national identity was – which was based in the case of Johann B.<sub>2</sub> on the German values, culture, democracy and Christianity and in the case of Heinrich B.<sub>1</sub> on the German culture, lifestyles, traditions and Christianity – an influencing variable. For them, it was not possible to include Muslims into their image of Germanness because of them having different values, lifestyles and traditions that seem incapable with the established German culture, democracy and institutions. This though also points out that national identity alone is not a deciding factor but also what one identifies with the most. This is also shown in the example of Hilde K.<sub>1</sub>: not only does she feel connected to Germany but she is also very proud to be German. In her case, however, her strong national identity did not lead to an ingroup/outgroup thinking. This though should not lead to an all too easy disavowal of the identity hypothesis since this thinking can be explained when looking at where her national identity is rooted: in the welfare state; a concept with which Islam does not really interfere. Another explanation is also coming from her own experiences: because of being affected by the NS-past, excluding Muslims from the German dominant culture does not seem right to her. In her opinion everyone should be able to live the way they want; a result of the fact that the killing of the Jews is still not traceable for her.



For Kinnvall (2004) nationalism, besides religion, is linked to chosen traumas and chosen glories and this turns them into powerful identity signifier in times of uncertainty and globalization. The nation state, due to its long history, is stabilizing and gives the impression that the world is as it appears. This can be seen in the cases of Johann B.<sub>2</sub> and Heinrich B.<sub>1</sub> where Germany is idealized. For example Heinrich B.<sub>1</sub> admits that Germany did “*bad things*” during the NS-time, but on the other hand other countries also let bad things happen, leading him to the conclusion at the end of the interview that one can be proud. By thinking about other historical events, German architecture as well as the rebuilding of the country after the Second World War, he is idealizing the past and turns German national identity into an important identity signifier. The same is also happening in the case of Johann B.<sub>2</sub> who finds a lot to be proud of – the rebuilding and what was achieved in those times, the social market economy and the democracy; he is only looking on positive things, ignoring the NS-past and is therewith idealizing the past. Germany is idealized as something positive whereas Islam appears to be something negative. These examples point out how important one’s identity and especially one’s own national identifications are for the boundary drawing process.

But when someone is lacking a strong national identity this can have the opposite effect, as the examples of Annika B.<sub>3</sub> and Laura K.<sub>3</sub> display. For them discussing German identity and identity in general was a rather hard topic because to them it seemed less important to differentiate themselves from others through categories. This can be seen as a result of them being raised in a cultural and religious diverse Germany and times of globalization. For Annika B.<sub>3</sub> German national identity seemed very intangible. This of course can be related to the fact that she is very young in comparison to the other respondents; meaning her life centers mostly around school and her friends. Having people around her stemming from different cultures and countries is very normal for her. She is not feeling more German than the migrants or the people having a migration background therewith being German seemed to her more like a social role than an identity. The same also applied for Laura K.<sub>3</sub> who does not feel German but more like a cosmopolitan:

*“As soon as I enter the plane and go off in Cairo, I have a different feeling. This is like looking beyond one’s own nose. You feel more cosmopolitan, you feel like you are a different person”.*

Not everything that for Laura K.<sub>3</sub> is related to German national identity – the German punctuality, the German cleanliness, the German accurateness, the typical Prussian values – is of great importance to her since it reflects a Germany existing before she was born.

Laura K.<sub>3</sub> and Annika B.<sub>3</sub> express no pride in being German, this being a totally intangible phenomenon for them. Their identities were mostly based on local identity signifiers such as the hometown or the school, an identity where immigrants can be easily included since these identities do not give rise to categories that differentiate one group from the other. Laura K.<sub>3</sub> even expressed a cosmopolitan identity, an identity that is characterized by openness to other cultures and a lesser importance of nationality as an identity signifier.

Interestingly though, although considering Muslims as Germans, they differentiate them as a subcategory. For Annika B.<sub>3</sub> the girl in her class wearing the veil is German for her, but German in a different way because of her different religion, culture and the different way she was raised. The other Muslim girl seems much more similar to her because of her not wearing the veil, being class representative, going out with the other girls and obviously not acting out her religion. Also Laura K.<sub>3</sub>, although being very open to Islam and accepting it, draws symbolic boundaries towards Muslims because of their religion and their culture. It seems the boundaries are more blurred for them; it is not that easy for them to put all Muslims into one group, they are aware of the diversity of the group and therefore do not see Muslims as a community. This displays that group categorization seems to be more difficult when lacking a strong national identity. Through their own intimate contacts with Muslims they are further on, in contrast to their parents and grandparents, aware of the diversity of the Muslim population which is pointing out the importance of contacts; the subject of the next section.

#### **5.4 Contact as a moderating factor**

In line with the contact hypothesis by Allport (1954) contact with Muslims should lead to less stereotypical beliefs about them, therewith making the process of boundary drawing less likely. In the case of Michaela K.<sub>2</sub> though one could see that her stereotypical beliefs are slowly macerating as a result of her experiences in Egypt but they are difficult to transfer for her to the German case. This is pointing to the importance of intimate contact (Levine et al., 2003): Michaela's contacts are limited to vacations abroad and formal contacts with Muslims during her work at a retirement insurance. Further on, she grew up in a society where Muslims constituted the "new" lower class and she was not surrounded by norms that supported the integration of Muslims into the German society, a result of the guest worker period.

According to the contact hypothesis is the equal status of the group members as well as a supportive normative system of great importance for the success of the reduction of stereotypes. This is the case for Laura K.<sub>3</sub> and especially for Annika B.<sub>3</sub>. Muslims are now

also more and more attending the gymnasium, therewith giving them the same status as Laura K.<sub>3</sub> and Annika B.<sub>3</sub> themselves have. Both grew up in a multicultural Germany that recognizes itself as a country of immigration and is moving towards an integration of this diversity in the dominant concepts, therewith they are surrounded by a supportive normative system. Both experienced much more intimate contact with Muslims than their parents and grandparents and both have close friends who are Muslims.

Positive and intimate contacts with Islam reduced the likelihood of excluding Muslims from the dominant concepts of the society but still both Annika B.<sub>3</sub> and Laura K.<sub>3</sub> saw Muslims as different types of Germans, therewith showing, despite being more open towards other cultures and having friends with migration background, that they are not freed from the social structure that constituted Germany before.

Having no contacts at all with Muslims though, as in the case of Heinrich B.<sub>1</sub> and Johann B.<sub>2</sub>, led to social strangeness and social distance towards Muslims. Making someone strange implies distancing oneself from the other cognitively, by ignoring common characteristics and drawing symbolic boundaries. This was the case for both Heinrich B. and Johann B.<sub>2</sub> and it was easy for them since they did not have any antithetic pictures; therewith, for them, the Muslim population served as a counter-image.

Family K. was in total, moderated by their contacts with Islam, much less characterized by negative attitudes towards Muslims. Boundaries were here less often drawn towards the Muslim population than by family B.; although here Annika B.<sub>3</sub> was an exception. When not having contacts with Muslims, more the differences with Muslims were coming to the fore and more common characteristics were ignored, leading to a symbolic exclusion of Muslims.

## **6. Conclusion and Discussion**

As a theoretical point of departure the boundary work was used to get a multidimensional picture of the ways in which the German majority populations is excluding the Muslim population. Boundary work allows for more flexibility than previous racism or prejudice measures by assuming that there is more than one boundary secluding one community from the other. The empirical part revealed the flexibility of the exclusion process and pointed out that the boundary work was an adequate measurement for exclusion mechanisms since the boundaries drawn towards Muslims were multifaceted. Further, the way they were interpreted, differed from individual to individual – some individuals did not notice the boundaries whereas other did. Also the interpretations and exclusion mechanisms that were

deduced from these boundaries differed from person to person depending on one's national identity, previous experiences with Islam and the social structure and time period one grew up in. This showed the advantage of the boundary concepts in contrast to previous racism or prejudice measurements, namely that even when boundaries are perceived, this must not lead to ingroup favoritism or outgroup discrimination.

By analyzing the data from ALLBUS (2006) which gathered information about characteristics considered important for awarding German citizenship, I got a first insight into possible boundaries. The result was that previous concepts such as being Christian, being of German origin or being born in Germany were losing in importance against much more flexible concepts such as German language skills, respecting the constitution and not being a criminal. This led to the impression that attitudes towards Muslims must be more open than one would expect when looking at actual public debates. But the survey analysis also revealed that most respondents preferred a lifestyle adaptation and that Turks and their lifestyles were perceived as very different. The ALLBUS survey also displayed that the process of differentiation is significantly moderated by age and national identity. When analyzing the result of the PEW Global Attitudes Survey (2006), I discovered that Muslims, by most respondents, were perceived as different because of their religiousness, which appeared as devoted and fanatical as well as their normative beliefs which appeared as intolerant and oppressing.

But the survey results did not reveal the boundary drawing process in the making besides agreeing to stereotypical connotations or certain characteristics. I therefore conducted interviews to uncover the construction of boundaries and the way they intervene with the social reality of the respondents. The unstructured interviews revealed that Muslims are seen as incompatible with the German society because of their different religion that appeared to some of the respondents as more violent, intolerant and devoted than Christianity. Interesting here is that respondents having problems with Islam as a religion previously mentioned that someone does not have to be Christian to be considered German, but when talking about the Muslim population, this view changed drastically. This showed that one's national identity and the involved process of group categorization has a major influence on the boundary drawing process. This view was more likely for those respondents who never had contact with Islam, pointing out the importance of contact when it comes to prejudices.

Other symbolic boundaries reflected distinctions rooted in the fact that Muslims have different culture and lifestyles such as wearing a veil, a different normative system and different every day practices and customs. Here again national identity was a major

influencing factor and Islam entailing a different normative system than the existing one, served as a justification to exclude the Muslim population. However, not all of our respondents excluded the Muslim population from dominant concepts. The younger generations were aware of some symbolic boundaries, that they declared as not important to them, but they did not exclude Muslims from their concepts of Germanness. These results displayed the multidimensionality of the boundary drawing process and that this process is depending on different factors such as age, one's national identity and contact with Muslims, therewith showing that the exclusion process of Muslims from the dominant concepts of the German society is much more comprehensive than one would expect when looking at the public debates nowadays that mostly center around the building of minarets or the wearing of veils. This makes further research within this area necessary. Since the quantitative and the qualitative findings to a large extent are the same, they hint towards trends. But still, generalizations for a whole population are not possible because of the limitation of the qualitative part which is the result of having a rather small sample and the fact that the study was conducted in only one city (Wunderlich, 2005). With the selection of the families I tried to vary age, gender, contact to Muslims as well as my personal relationship with the respondents to ensure, although having a small sample, reliable answers.

Despite these limitations, this thesis showed interesting results that give interesting starting points for further research such as the generation effect. Young Germans in my interviews were more open and differentiated themselves much less from the Muslim population than their parents and grandparents. Similar results were also observable within the survey analysis of the PEW Global Attitudes Project (2006) with younger Germans being less likely to agree to all stereotypes about Muslim. The third generation differed from the other generations not only when looking at perceptions of Muslims but also when looking at national identity. Further, for younger respondents the national concept of Germany being an ethnic exclusive society was less tangible and the calculations of the ALLBUS (2006) revealed that the third generation was less likely to consider characteristics that are connected to this image as important. Therefore it would be interesting to research the generation effect in more detail and with more respondents.

Contact with Muslims also moderated the perceptions and further research should elaborate the types of contact and relationships with Muslims in more detail. Additionally, when researching processes of symbolic exclusion and processes of group categorization, it would be of great advantage, before conducting interviews, to develop a theoretical framework that

allows for the differentiation between culture and religion and the ways of life they entail something that was not possible within this thesis regarding space and time limits. Culture and religion are difficult to separate and I found the work of Pohlson (2004) for such a separation very inspiring. Although I am aware that this is rather difficult, I consider it, regarding the fact that public debates mostly reflect symbolic boundaries that are drawn towards the Muslim population because of religious reasons, as important to research in more detail if cultural or religious boundaries are the determining factors when it comes to the exclusion of the Muslim population.

The empirical data of this thesis revealed interesting insights into the process of boundary drawing towards the Muslim population and the images of Muslims that are reflected in these boundaries. Images of Muslims still reflect stereotypes of old times such as being intolerant and violent. Further on, Islam as a belief is still perceived as not fitting to the Christian coinage of Germany. But the perceptions differ from person to person and depend on factors such as national identity, age and contact with Islam. But the fact that younger Germans were less likely to express negative perceptions, which is moderated by their higher likelihood of having contact with Muslims and their different opinions of what is German, is pointing in an interesting direction, namely that the perceptions towards Muslims will change a lot in the next decades. Despite the mere spread of negative perceptions and of differentiation processes, it is possible that one day Islam is not a counter-image anymore but an accepted subcategory of Germanness. This can also change the preferred integration strategies of the majority, shifting from an assimilation orientation to more of an integration orientation. Therewith, also the acculturation strategies of immigrants might be influenced, making harmonious intergroup relations more likely.

## Literature

- Alba, Richard (2005) Bright vs. blurred boundaries: Second-generation assimilation and exclusion in France, Germany, and the United States. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 28 (1), pp. 20-49.
- Allport, G. W. (1954). *The nature of prejudice*. Reading: Addison-Wesley.
- Bail, Christopher (2007). *Diverse Diversities: The Configuration of Boundaries against Immigrants in Twenty-One European Countries*. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association, TBA, New York, New York City, on the 11<sup>th</sup> of August 2007.
- Baumann (1996). *Contesting Culture – Discourses of Identity in Multi-Ethnic London*. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.
- Benhabib, S. (2002). *The Claims of Culture. Equality and Diversity in the Global Area*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Berry, John W. (2001). A Psychology of Immigration. *Journal of Social Issues* 57, 615–631.
- Berry, John W. (1990). Psychology of Acculturation: Understanding Individuals Moving Between Cultures. In: Richard W. Brislin (Ed.), *Applied Cross-Cultural Psychology*. Newbury Park: Sage.
- Bielefeldt, Heiner (2007). Das Islambild in Deutschland. Zum öffentlichen Umgang mit der Angst vor dem Islam. *Deutsches Institut für Menschenrechte Essay No. 7*.
- Borkert, Maren and Bosswick, Wolfgang (2007). Migration Policy-Making in Germany – between national reluctance and local pragmatism? *IMISCOE Working Paper No. 20*.
- Bourhis, Richard Y., Moise, Léna C., Perreault, Stéphane, and Senécal, Sacha (1997). Towards an Interactive Acculturation Model: A Social Psychological Approach. *International Journal of Psychology* 32 (6), 369-386.
- British Sociological Association (2002) (Updated in 2004). Statement of Ethical Practice for the British Sociological Association. Accessed on the 28<sup>th</sup> of February 2010 on [www.britisoc.co.uk/equality/](http://www.britisoc.co.uk/equality/)
- Bundesamt fuer Migration und Fluechtlinge (2009). *Muslimisches Leben in Deutschland*. Accessed on the 6th of October 2009 on [www.bmi.bund.de/cae/servlet/contentblob/566008/publicationFile/31720/vollversion\\_studie\\_muslim\\_leben\\_deutschland\\_.pdf;jsessionid=6CBCF5BB1605F757E0A0A5335A916E53](http://www.bmi.bund.de/cae/servlet/contentblob/566008/publicationFile/31720/vollversion_studie_muslim_leben_deutschland_.pdf;jsessionid=6CBCF5BB1605F757E0A0A5335A916E53)
- Bryman, Alan (2008). *Social Science Research Methods*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- Castells, Manuel (1997). *The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture. Volume II. The Power of Identity*. Oxford and Malden: Blackwell Publishers, pp. 6-12.
- Castles, Stephen (2000). *Ethnicity and Globalization: From Migrant Worker to Transnational Citizen*. London: Sage, pp. 155-163.
- Cohen, Anthony P. (1985). *The Symbolic Construction of Community*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Douglas, Jack (1985). *Creative Interviewing*. Beverly Hills: Sage.
- Eder, Klaus, Rauer, Valentin and Schmidtke, Oliver (2004). *Die Einhegung des Anderen. Türkische, polnische und russlanddeutsche Einwanderer in Deutschland*. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.
- Eder, Klaus (1993). Identität und multikulturelle Gesellschaft in Deutschland. Ein neuer deutscher Sonderweg in der Modernisierung Europas? In: Werner, Weidenfeld (ed.), *Deutschland: Eine Nation – zwei Gesellschaften – doppelte Geschichte. Materialien zum Selbstverständnis*. Köln: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, pp. 381-391.
- Elias, Norbert and Scotson, John L. (1994). *The Established and the Outsiders. A Sociological Enquiry into Community Problems*. London: SAGE Publications.
- The Evens Foundation (2002). *Europe's New Racism? Causes, Manifestations, and Solutions*. New York, Oxford: Berhahn Books.
- Flick, Uwe (2006). *An Introduction to Qualitative Research*. London: Sage Publishing.
- Fontana, Andrea and Frey, James H. (1994). Interviewing: The Art of Science. In: Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln (eds.), *Handbook of Qualitative Research*. Thousand Oaks: Sage.
- Friedman, Jonathan (1994). *Cultural identity and global process*. Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications.
- German Statistical Office (2008). *Leichter Anstieg der Bevölkerung mit Migrationshintergrund*. Accessed on the 4th of January 2009 on [www.destatis.de/jetspeed/portal/cms/Sites/destatis/Internet/DE/Presse/pm/2008/03/PD08\\_\\_105\\_\\_12521,templateId=renderPrint.psml](http://www.destatis.de/jetspeed/portal/cms/Sites/destatis/Internet/DE/Presse/pm/2008/03/PD08__105__12521,templateId=renderPrint.psml)
- GESIS (2010). *Allgemeine Informationen zum ALLBUS*. Accessed on the 18th of February 2010 on [www.gesis.org/dienstleistungen/daten/umfragedaten/allbus/allgemeineinformationen/](http://www.gesis.org/dienstleistungen/daten/umfragedaten/allbus/allgemeineinformationen/)
- Giddens, Anthony (2002). *Runaway World: How Globalization is Reshaping Our Lives*. London: Profile Books.
- Giddens, Anthony (1990). *Modernity and Self-Identity. Self and Society in Late Modern Age*. Cambridge: Polity Press.



- Gomm, Roger (2008). *Social Research Methodology: A Critical Introduction*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Habermas, Jürgen (1996). *Die Einbeziehung des Anderen: Studien zur politischen Theorie*. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.
- Halm, Dirk (2008). *Der Islam als Diskursfeld. Bilder des Islams in Deutschland*. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.
- Hansen, Georg (2004). *Die Ethnisierung des deutschen Staatsbürgerrechts und seine Tauglichkeit in der EU*. Accessed on the 3rd of January 2009 on [www.fernuni-hagen.de/KSW/forschung/pdf/fk2\\_ksw\\_hansen.pdf](http://www.fernuni-hagen.de/KSW/forschung/pdf/fk2_ksw_hansen.pdf)
- Honolka, Harro and Götz, Irene (1999). *Deutsche Identität und das Zusammenleben mit Fremden*. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag.
- Huntington, Samuel P. (2002) (5th ed.). *Kampf der Kulturen*. München: Goldmann.
- Joppke, Christian (2009). *The Veil: Mirror of identity*. Cambridge: Polity Press, pp. 53-80.
- Kaldor, Mary (2004). Nationalism and Globalisation. *Nations and Nationalism* 10, pp. 161-177.
- Kagitcibasi, Cigdem (1997). Whither multiculturalism? *Applied Psychology: An International Review* 46, 44–49.
- Kastoryano, Riva (2007). Religion and Incorporation: Islam in France and Germany. In: Alejandro Portes and Josh DeWind (eds.), *Rethinking Migration. New Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives*. New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books, pp. 419-440.
- Kastoryano, Riva (2002). *Negotiating Identities. State and Immigrants in France and Germany*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Kinnvall, C. (2004). Globalization and Religious Nationalism: Self, Identity, and the Search for Ontological Security. *Political Psychology*. 25 (5), pp. 741-767.
- Kohler Riemann, Caterine (2000). Analysis of Personal Narratives. Draft, to appear in: J. F. Gubrium, and J.A. Holstein (2001) (ed.), *Handbook of Interviewing*. Sage.
- Kristeva, Julia (1999). Europhilia, Europhobia. *Constellations: An International Journal of Critical and Democratic Theory* 5 (3), pp. 321-333.
- Lamont, Michele (2008). Symbolic Boundaries (General). Accessed on the 4<sup>th</sup> of March 2010 on [www.peregrin.jmu.edu/~brysonbp/336/readings/LamontEncyclo.html](http://www.peregrin.jmu.edu/~brysonbp/336/readings/LamontEncyclo.html)
- Lamont, Michele, and Molnar, Virag (2002). The Study of Social Boundaries in the Social Sciences. *Annual Review of Sociology* 28, pp. 167-95.

- Levin, Shana, van Laar, Colette and Sidanius, Jim (2003). The Effects of Ingroup and Outgroup Friendships on Ethnic Attitudes: A Longitudinal Study. *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations* 6 (1), pp. 76-92.
- Lincoln, Yvonna S. and Guba, Egon G. (1985). *Naturalistic Inquiry*. Beverly Hills: Sage.
- Malik, Jamal (2004). Nationale und religiöse Fremd- und Selbstbilder. Muslime in Deutschland. In: Heinz G. Haput and Dieter Langewiesche (Eds.), *Nation und Religion in Europa. Mehrkonfessionelle Gesellschaften im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert*. Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, pp.283-302.
- Martin, Philip L. (2004). Germany: Managing Migration in the Twenty-First Century. In: Wayne A. Cornelius, Takeyuki Tsuda, Philipp L. Martin and James F. Hollifield (eds.), *Controlling Immigration: a Global Perspective*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, pp. 220-253.
- Muckel, Stefan (2009). Zur christlich-abendländischen Tradition als für den Islam in deutschen Verfassungen und Gesetzen. In: Thorsten G. Schneiders (Ed.), *Islamfeindlichkeit. Wenn die Grenzen der Kritik verschwimmen*. Wiesbaden: Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, pp. 239-258.
- Naumann, Thomas (2009). Feindbild Islam – Historische und theologische Gründe einer europäischen Angst. In: Thorsten G. Schneiders (Ed.), *Islamfeindlichkeit. Wenn die Grenzen der Kritik verschwimmen*. Wiesbaden: Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, pp. 19-36.
- Newman, Isadore, Ridenour, Carolyn S., Newman, Carole and De Marco Jr., Giorgio M. P. (2003 ). A Typology of Research Purposes and Its Relationship to Mixed Methods. In: Abbas Tashakkori and Charles Teddlie (eds.), *Handbook of Mixed Methods in Social and Behavioral Research*. Thousand Oaks: Sage, pp. 167-189.
- Nökel, Sigrid (2002). *Die Töchter der Gastarbeiter und der Islam. Zur Soziologie alltagsweltlicher Anerkennungspolitik. Eine Fallstudie*. Bielefeld: Transcript.
- Pew Global Attitude Project (2010). *About*. Accessed on the 18th of February on [www.pewglobal.org/about/](http://www.pewglobal.org/about/)
- Pew Global Attitude Project (2007). *The Great Divide: How Westerners and Muslims View Each Other*. Accessed on the 7<sup>th</sup> of March 2010 on [www.pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?PageID=835](http://www.pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?PageID=835)
- Pohlong, Basil (2004). *Culture and Religion. A Conceptual Study*. New Delhi: Mittal Publications.
- Poole, Ross (2003). National Identity and Citizenship. In: Linda Martin Alcoff and Eduardo Medieta (eds.), *Identities. Race, Class, Gender and Nationality*. Malden, Oxford, Melbourne, Berlin: Blackwell Publishing, pp. 271-280.
- Rantanen, Terhi (2005). *The Media and Globalization*. London: Sage.

- Reicher, S. (2004). The Context of Social Identity: Domination, Resistance, and Change. *Political Psychology* 25 (6), pp. 921-945.
- Rommelspacher, Birgit (2002). *Anerkennung und Ausgrenzung. Deutschland als multikulturelle Gesellschaft*. Frankfurt am Main: Campus Fachverlag.
- Räthzel, Nora (1997). *Gegenbilder. Nationale Identität durch Konstruktion des Anderen*. Opladen: Leske + Budrich.
- Schiffauer, Werner (2000). *Die Gottesmänner - Türkische Islamisten in Deutschland*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
- Schneiders, Thorsten G. (Ed.) (2009). Einleitung. In: *Islamfeindlichkeit. Wenn die Grenzen der Kritik verschwimmen*. Wiesbaden: Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, pp. 9-18.
- Said, Edward (1978). *Orientalism*. New York: Pantheon
- Sherif, Muzafer, Harvey, O. J., White, B. Jack, Hood, William R., & Sherif, Carolyn W. (1961). *Intergroup Conflict and Cooperation: the Robbers Cave Experiment*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Book Exchange.
- Smith, Peter B., Band, Michael H. and Kagitcibasi, Cigdem (2006). Cultural Aspects of Intergroup Relations. In: Ibid (Eds.), *Understanding Social Psychology Across Cultures*. London: Sage.
- Spielhaus, Riem (2006). *Religion und Identität. Vom deutschen Versuch, „Ausländer“ zu „Muslimen“ zu machen*. Migration und Sicherheit März 2006. Accessed on the 6th of January 2009 on [www.internationalepolitik.de/ip/archiv/2006/maerz2006/religion-und-identitaet--vom-deutschen-versuch-----auslander----zu----muslimen----zu-machen.html](http://www.internationalepolitik.de/ip/archiv/2006/maerz2006/religion-und-identitaet--vom-deutschen-versuch-----auslander----zu----muslimen----zu-machen.html)
- Stadt Rastatt (2008). Sportentwicklungsplan. Accessed on the 2nd of March 2010 [www.rastatt.de/servlet/PB/show/1276558/081124%20TOP%2011%20Anlage%201.pdf](http://www.rastatt.de/servlet/PB/show/1276558/081124%20TOP%2011%20Anlage%201.pdf)
- Stephan, Walter G. and Stephan, Cookie W. (2000). An Integrated Threat Theory of Prejudice. In: Stuart Oskamp (Ed), *Reducing Prejudice and Discrimination*. Malden: Blackwell, pp. 23-46.
- Tajfel, Henri (1978). *Differentiation between Social Groups: Studies in the Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations*. London: Academic Press.
- Tajfel, Henri (1970). Experiments in intergroup discrimination. *Scientific American* 223 (5), pp. 96-102.
- Tajfel, Henri (1972). Experiments in a vacuum. In: Joachim Israel and Henry Tajfel (eds), *The Context of Social Psychology: A critical assessment*. London: Academic Press, pp. 69-121.

- Tajfel, Henri and Turner, John C. (1986). The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behavior. In: Stephen Wochel and William G. Austin (eds.), *Psychology of Intergroup Relations*. Chicago: Nelson-Hall, pp.7-24.
- Tashakkori, Abbas and Teddlie, Charles (1996). *Mixed Methodology: Combining Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches*. Thousand Oaks: Sage.
- Tietze, Nikola (2001). *Islamische Identitäten. Formen muslimischer Religiosität junger Männer in Deutschland und Frankreich*. Hamburg: Hamburger Edition.
- Tönnies, Ferdinand (2005). *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft. Grundbegriffe der reinen Soziologie*. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.
- van de Vijver, Fons J.R., Breugelmans, Seger M., and Schalk-Soekar, Saskia R.G. (2008). Multiculturalism: Construct Validity and Stability. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations* 32, 93-104.
- Wigboldus, D.H.J. und Douglas, K. (2007). Language, stereotypes und intergroup relations. In: Fiedler, Klaus (Ed.), *Social Communication*. New York and Have: Psychology Press, pp. 79-106.
- Wunderlich, Tanja (2005). *Die neuen Deutschen. Subjektive Dimensionen des Einbürgerungsprozesses*. Stuttgart: Lucius & Lucius.
- Zolberg, Ariside Z. and Woon, Long L. (1999). Why Islam Is Like Spanish: Cultural Incorporation in Europe and the United States. *Politics and Society* 27 (1), pp. 5-38.

#### Newspaper articles:


- Noelle, Elisabeth and Petersen, Thomas (2006). Eine fremde bedrohliche Welt. *FAZ* 114, pp.5.
- Rosenberg, Steve (2009). *Renewed pride at Germany's birthday party*. BBC News Online. Accessed on the 9<sup>th</sup> of January on <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8065504.stm>.

#### Data Sets:

- ALLBUS (2006). Accessed on the 1<sup>st</sup> of February 2010 on [www.gesis.org/dienstleistungen/daten/umfragedaten/allbus/datenzugang/](http://www.gesis.org/dienstleistungen/daten/umfragedaten/allbus/datenzugang/)
- ISSP (2003). National Identity Survey. Accessed on the 1<sup>st</sup> of February 2010 on [www.gesis.zacat.org](http://www.gesis.zacat.org)
- Pew Global Attitudes Project (2006). The Great Divide: How Westerners and Muslims View Each Other. Accessed on the 1<sup>st</sup> of February 2010 on [www.pewglobal.org/datasets/](http://www.pewglobal.org/datasets/)


## Appendix

**Table 1: Muslims in Germany according to their country of origin**




Source: BAMF (2009)

**Table 2: Muslims in Germany according to their persuasion**




Source: BAMF (2009)

**Table 3: Characteristics that are considered important for awarding citizenship**



Source: own calculations with ALLBUS (2006)

**Table 4: Cross tabulation Generation \* Inflexible characteristics**



Source: own calculations with ALLBUS (2006)

**Chi-Square Tests**


	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	83,604 <sup>a</sup>	6	,000
Likelihood Ratio	84,863	6	,000
Linear-by-Linear Association	76,664	1	,000
N of Valid Cases	3322		

a. 0 cells (,0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 25,02.

**Symmetric Measures**

	Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal Phi	,159	,000
Cramer's V	,112	,000
N of Valid Cases	3322	

**Table 5: Cross tabulation National Pride \* Inflexible characteristics**



Source: own calculations with ALLBUS (2006)

**Chi-Square Tests**

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	81,729 <sup>a</sup>	3	,000
Likelihood Ratio	79,979	3	,000
Linear-by-Linear Association	72,400	1	,000
N of Valid Cases	3005		


a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 61,49.

**Symmetric Measures**

	Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal Phi	,165	,000
Cramer's V	,165	,000
N of Valid Cases	3005	




**Table 6: Perceptions about Muslims in Germany**



Source: own calculations with the survey from the Pew Global Attitudes Project (2006)

**Table 7: The influence of age/generation on the perceptions about Muslims**



Source: own calculations with the survey from the Pew Global Attitudes Project (2006)

**Chi-Square Tests**

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	9,844 <sup>a</sup>	10	,454
Likelihood Ratio	11,736	10	,303
Linear-by-Linear Association	,221	1	,638
N of Valid Cases	464		

a. 5 cells (27,8%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,69.

**Symmetric Measures**

	Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal Phi	,146	,454
Cramer's V	,103	,454
N of Valid Cases	464	

**Table 8: Overview over the interviewees**

<b>Name (Pseudonym)</b>	<b>Age</b>	<b>Sex</b>	<b>Marital Status</b>	<b>Level of Education</b>	<b>Employment Status</b>	<b>Contact with Muslims</b>
<b><u>Family 1</u></b>						
<b>Hilde K.*</b>	81	female	Widow	Volksschulabschluss (something similar to CSE)	House wife	Yes
<b>Michaela K.*</b>	50	female	married	Realschulabschluss (General certificate of secondary education) and vocational education	Secretary	Yes
<b>Laura K.*</b>	27	female	single	Vocational diploma and vocational education	Nursery nurse	Yes
<b><u>Family 2</u></b>						
<b>Heinrich B.*</b>	82	male	Widower	Volksschulabschluss (something similar to CSE) and vocational education as plasterer	Retiree	No
<b>Johann B.*</b>	46	Male	married	Hauptschulabschluss (something similar to CSE) and vocational education	Employed as orthopedic shoe maker	No
<b>Annika B.*</b>	14	female	single	Is attending the "Gymnasium" (grammar school)	Student	Yes

\* = all names changed