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Behind Allocation of EU Funding

A Quantitative Study of the Relation between Internal
Factors of Municipalities and Allocation of EU Funding in
the Municipalities of Skåne

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Abstract

The aim of this thesis is to study allocation of EU funding to the municipalities of Skåne between 2007 and 2009 in order to determine if there are internal factors which are of importance to the allocation of EU funding for the municipalities in Skåne. The objective is to study if a relation between internal factors of the municipalities and the amount of EU funding allocated can be observed and what such a potential relation shows.

The analytical framework encompasses three different kinds of internal factors which are studied in turn; resource factors, structural factors and political factors. These factors form the basis for eight hypotheses which are tested by the means of statistical data analysis. The statistical material consists of material collected first hand from the municipalities, and already existing statistical data gathered from Statistics Sweden, *kommundatabas.se* and *Kfakta06*. Out of the 33 municipalities in Skåne 18 are included in the study. Furthermore, only EU funding from the two structural funds, the European Social Fund and the European Regional Development fund, are being studied.

The result shows that there is no relation between internal factors and the amount of allocated EU funding. Only when lowering the certainty level to 90 per cent the variables *political majority* and *population density* show statistically significant correlations with the amount of allocated EU funding.

Key words: EU funding, structural funds, internal factors, municipality, quantitative study

Words: 17.853

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1 Introduction

The original Lisbon Strategy, launched 2000, set as its objective for the European Union ‘to become the most dynamic and competitive knowledge-based economy in the world by 2010.’¹ With emphasis on social cohesion and knowledge-based communities, the goal is to increase growth within the area of the European Union, and to achieve this goal, EU’s regional policy has become a key instrument.²

For the period of 2007-2013, EU has three overriding objectives encompassing *convergence*, *regional competitiveness and employment*, and *European territorial cooperation*. The means to achieve these objectives are three funds - the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), the European Social Fund (ESF), and the Cohesion Fund. They aspire to promote growth-enhancing conditions, strengthen the competitiveness and employment, and strengthen European cross-border cooperation. The focus of this study is on the objective of *regional competitiveness and employment*, which is to be realised by the structural funds consisting of the European Regional Development Fund and the European Social Fund.³

During the period of 2007-2013 a total of more than SEK30 billion will be distributed from the structural funds to Sweden, whereof SEK3 billion will be allocated to the region of Skåne-Blekinge.⁴ A share of that sum will be further allocated to the municipalities of Skåne. However, to receive funding active participation from the municipalities are required and some municipalities are undoubtedly more successful than others in their endeavour to receive EU funding. Why this is the case can surely be found in the extent of the municipalities’ activity, but however interesting activity is in itself as an occurrence, this study goes deeper. Activity for the purpose of receiving EU funding is not an isolated event unaffected by the characteristics of municipalities. Consequently there must be something internal to the municipalities which affect the allocation of EU funding. This study’s question of interest is on that which so far has gained little or no academic attention: the linkage between internal factors of the municipalities and allocation of EU funding. The intention is to find out if internal factors have any relation to the allocation of EU funding, and if so to what extent.

¹ Lisbon Strategy evaluation document,

http://ec.europa.eu/growthandjobs/pdf/lisbon_strategy_evaluation_en.pdf, 2010-02-09

² Boschini, A.D., Eriksson, R, (2005), *Den europeiska tillväxtdebatten*, s. 12

³ European Commission’s homepage: Regional Policy – Inforegio:

http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/policy/object/index_en.htm, 2010-02-09

⁴ Region Skåne’s homepage: <http://www.skane.se/templates/Page.aspx?id=200245>, 2010-02-16

2 Purpose and Questions

Much attention has been directed towards the Europeanisation process of local authorities and how it affects activity towards EU. Academic debates have been concentrated on whether the European Union's Regional Policy has had any real effect and whether the allocated funds help achieve the objectives.⁵ However, municipal activity in form of pooling EU funding to the municipalities has been left in the dark. There are, of course, many factors in play when EU funding are being allocated, both external and internal ones. The focus in this study is on factors internal to the municipality and how they are involved in municipal activity in form of resource pooling.

The purpose of this thesis is to study if there are internal factors which are of importance to the allocation of EU funding to the municipalities of Skåne. The purpose gives rise to the following question:

- Can a relation between internal factors of the municipalities and the amount of EU funding allocated be observed; and if yes, what does this relation show?

2.1 Thesis Outline

The thesis will begin with a short but necessary introduction to the municipalities of Skåne and the structural funds. This is mainly to help orient the reader and give background information on elements central to the study. In the section to follow, previous research is presented. Literature from different fields of study with importance to the thesis, be it the outcome or simply interesting observations, are discussed. Section 5 presents the analytical framework, which forms the basis for the quantitative study. Thereafter, in section 6, follows an extensive presentation of the method employed and the material used. The fact that much of the study is in form of statistical analyses carried out in a database not available to the reader motivates the length of this section.

The last two sections, section 7 and 8, feature the parts where the result and analysis, and conclusion are presented.

⁵ Baldersheim H., H. Wollman (eds.) (2006), *The Comparative Study of Local Government and Politics: Overview and Synthesis*, p. 21

2.2 Delimitations

The study will only include municipalities in Skåne. This is motivated by the fact that the study requires data collections from each and every municipality. The outset to include a number of 33 municipalities is therefore reasonable both considering time and resources available. However, based on availability of the material needed, 15 municipalities have been excluded and thus leaving 18 to be included in the final study.

As for EU funds and programmes, it has been necessary to delimit which to include. There are a large variety of EU programmes and funds and all of them cannot be covered. This study focus on the structural funds of ESF and ERDF, which are the funds most commonly applied for by Swedish municipalities. Though these funds are funding two of the objectives, *regional competitiveness and employment*, and *European territorial cooperation*, the latter will not be dealt with. It is concerned with interregional cooperation, meaning the involvement of and cooperation with other regions. Since other partners beside the municipality are involve in these co-operations, the effect on allocation of EU funding is difficult to control. The exclusion itself of interregional co-operations is fairly simple as they constitute an independent sub-category to ERDF.

Regarding the time aspect, the new programme period is well on its way and therefore EU funding allocated to the municipalities during the years of 2007, 2008 and 2009 will be covered.

3 Municipalities of Skåne and the Structural Funds

Below follows a short presentation of the municipalities of Skåne and the European Structural Funds. This is just a short overview to help orient the reader in the sections to follow.

3.1 Municipalities of Skåne

The municipalities of Skåne have a total population of 1.2 million, which is divided between 33 municipalities. The municipalities exercise self-government and are responsible for areas of a typical local nature, such as schooling, childcare, care of the elderly and technical services (water, recreational facilities and roads). Out of the 33 municipalities 18 are part of this study (marked with red dots on the map).⁶




Figure 3.1. The municipalities of Skåne⁷

⁶ Region Skåne homepage: Swedish administrative system <http://www.skane.se/templates/Page.aspx?id=257111>, 2010-02-16

⁷ Region Skåne homepage: <http://www.skane.se/templates/Page.aspx?id=2466>, 2010-02-16

3.2 The European Structural Funds

The European structural funds consist of the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and the European Social Fund (ESF). These funds are the instrument to achieve the objective of *regional competitiveness and employment*. As stated earlier, the programme period of 2007-2013 has three overriding objectives - *convergence, competitiveness and employment* and *European territorial cooperation*. Sweden is eligible to seek funding for the two latter objectives. The objective of convergence only applies to regions which have a GNP below 75 per cent of the EU average. Interregional cooperation, referring to the objective of *European territorial cooperation*, is not covered in this study and will hence not be dealt with here.⁸

The two structural funds will be presented separately and in more detail below. There are, however, no major differences between them and the separation of the two is mainly to enable better overview. They are managed by different authorities and have different national objectives but apart from that they share a lot of characteristics. Both are concerned with the *competitiveness and employment* objective and common for all projects financed by the structural funds are the requirement for matching funds. This means that projects which have been granted EU funding must also have national funding. In most cases, half of a project's budget is granted by the structural funds while the other half comes from national sources. The required matched funding does not necessarily have to be in the form of pure financial means. Funds can also be matched in form of labour, time, venues and/or supplies.⁹

Below is a table illustrating the objectives of the European Union's regional policy and the means to achieve these objectives.

Table 3.1: Objective and instruments of the European Union's Regional Policy

Objective	Instrument		
Convergence	ERDF	ESF	Cohesion Fund
Regional Competitiveness and Employment	ERDF	ESF	
European Territorial Cooperation	ERDF		

⁸ EU-upplysningen Sveriges Riksdag, *Din Guide Till EU-stöd*, 2007, p. 77

⁹ *ibid.*, p. 77ff

3.2.1 European Regional Development Fund

In Sweden ERDF funds eight programmes, divided between the regions of North Sweden, North Mid-Sweden, Mid North-Sweden, East Mid-Sweden, Stockholm, West Sweden, Småland and the Islands, and Skåne-Blekinge. The principal objective of the ERDF is to promote economic and social cohesion within the European Union, aiming at reducing the imbalances between regions and social groups. The managing authority in Sweden is the Swedish Agency for Economic and Regional Growth (Tillväxtverket).¹⁰

Out of four national strategic priorities, *innovation and renewal*, *skills supply and improved workforce supply*, *accessibility* and *strategic cross-border cooperation*, focus of the ERDF is on *innovation and renewal* and *accessibility*. The national objective *skills supply and improved workforce supply* is the responsibility of the ESF (see 3.2.2).

As the programmes funded by the ERDF are divided between eight regions, special measures are adopted to suit the specific regions. For example, the sparsely populated regions in the north of Sweden and the three metropolitan regions (Stockholm, Göteborg and Malmö) have been given special guidelines.¹¹

3.2.2 European Social Fund

The European Social Fund has, as oppose to ERDF, only one national programme encompassing the whole of Sweden. ESF is considered to be the main financial instrument allowing the European Union to realise its objective concerning the European employment policy. In Sweden, ESF is managed by the Swedish ESF Council (Svenska ESF-rådet), which is responsible for the implementation of the European Social Fund in Sweden.¹² The aim of the Swedish Social Fund is to contribute to change and renewal within working life and by doing so promoting employment and growth. Projects which can be financed by the Social Fund are projects that, for example:

- a) Gives increasing opportunities to development and renewal within working life through competence development; and
- b) Gives increasing job-opportunities for individuals that are far from the labour market.

¹⁰ Swedish Agency for Economic and Regional Growth's homepage, <http://www.tillvaxtverket.se/huvudmeny/englishpages/structuralfunds.4.3c4088c81204cca906180008263.html>, 2010-03-11

¹¹ Swedish Agency for Economic and Regional Growth's homepage, <http://www.tillvaxtverket.se/huvudmeny/englishpages/structuralfunds.4.3c4088c81204cca906180008263.html>, 2010-03-11

¹² ESF's homepage, <http://www.esf.se/sv/Rotsida-for-topmeny/In-english/>, 2010-03-11

The whole of the labour market i.e. not just public sector and organisations but also companies and single entrepreneurs are eligible for funding from ESF, though only the public sector on the municipal level is included in this study.¹³

¹³ ESF's homepage, <http://www.esf.se/sv/Rotsida-for-topmeny/In-english/> , 2010-03-11

4 Previous Research

Previous research for this particular field is not preceded by voluminous or vast studies dating back for decades. It is, however, somewhat in the nature of the field as Sweden has only been a member of the European Union for fifteen years and only for the last ten years has there been enough of empirical material to actually study allocation of EU funding to Swedish municipalities and regions. In terms of other research fields found within political science, this is still a relatively young and unexplored field. However, studies on municipalities in general as well as studies on municipalities and the EU dimension have been conducted to a larger extent and they too will be relevant for this study. Additionally, studies within the fields of economics and public economy are also to be considered.

What is presented here is an overview, which will make it possible to place this study on allocation of EU funds to municipalities in Skåne among already existing research. First, the research within the field of political science will be presented, followed by research more closely tied to the fields of economics and specifically public economy.

Studies on municipalities and the EU dimension are to a large extent found within research on regionalism and Europeanisation, though few of these studies devote much attention to the sub-national or local level. One exception is the study on Europeanisation and EU funding in Italy and England by Stefania Zerbinati. Not only does this study consider Europeanisation of the local government level, but also the role of EU funding in this process. Zerbinati studies five local authorities in England and five local authorities in Italy. The regions chosen for her study are all ex-industrial areas with high unemployment and low economic growth. She examines the funding process within local government organisations and the process behind the competition for EU funding. Focus is on the occurrence or non-occurrence of changes derived by the competition for EU funding. Zerbinati argues that the presence or absence of these changes is a measure of Europeanisation. The study arrives to an interesting conclusion, namely that there is a relationship between EU funds and Europeanisation. In the local authorities observed in her study, those which are more Europeanised also acquire a higher amount of funds. The non-Europeanised, as termed by Zerbinati, took no part in competition over EU funding and thus received no funding.¹⁴ Though an interesting conclusion, the study does not control for other factors possibly affecting the relationship between Europeanisation and EU funds. It is difficult to know whether Europeanisation or

¹⁴ Zerbinati, S. (2004), *Europeanization and EU funding in Italy and England – A Comparative Local Perspective*, p. 1001; 1014ff

the granting of EU funds come first, but nonetheless the study assumes that the level of Europeanisation is decisive for the amount of funds allocated.

A more general study on regionalisation and Europeanisation is Peter John's study on local governance in Western Europe. John divides Europeanisation into two perspectives, *the new pluralism* and *multi-level governance*. The new pluralism believes that Europeanisation of local authorities is more than just a short-term strategy to obtain extra public funding. This perspective sees Europeanisation as a creation of a form of governance which is based on interlocking spheres of influence. However, John is critical of this and what he argues is a simplistic view. Instead, he provides another complementing perspective on Europeanisation. According to John, the process of Europeanisation is sub-national and regional authorities gradually ascending a ladder. The greater interplay the local authority has with European ideas, the higher it ascends. Some activities are minimal, such as mandatory responses to directives or regulations, while activities such as advising EU on implementation issues are considered to be a step towards a fully Europeanised local authority. Financially oriented activities, including maximising EU grants, are one step above minimal activities and thus it is not considered to be a crucial sign of Europeanisation, which is an interesting contrast to Zerbinati's argumentation.¹⁵ In connection to this John also argues:

*The main aspect of the EU that preoccupies local and regional governments is the disbursement of funds. Any public authority becomes alert if it can access pots of money, and for many this incentive is the main reason for engaging with European affairs.*¹⁶

In other words, what is guiding local authorities towards a higher level of Europeanisation is the perspective of pooling money and not so much the interplay with European affairs. On the other hand, those moving above the financially oriented steps on the ladder might be genuinely concerned with the European ideas and the incorporation of those into local policies.¹⁷ In connection to the just mentioned Zerbinati study, this also proves the complexity surrounding the concept of Europeanisation, and whether it is a prerequisite for active funding competition or whether it is merely a product of it.

The perspective of multi-level governance is probably the one perspective that has been most concerned with local government levels. It is however not a pure Europeanisation perspective, as it is also frequently found within theories on European integration and public organisation. The focus of multi-level governance is to a great extent on power struggle and influence between different levels and, in an EU context the emerging third level, i.e. the local government level. Dealing with the European regional policy and EU funding, multi-level governance does not believe that sub-national actors can affect EU programmes as

¹⁵ John, P. (2001), *Local Governance in Western Europe*, p. 71f

¹⁶ *ibid.*, p. 67

¹⁷ *ibid.*, p. 72

they are controlled by the nation-state which has the final say over who gets what. Rather unfortunate and in the very nature of the perspective, multi-level governance seldom study the local level separate from other levels, which may also be its weakness, in this context.¹⁸

When leaving these general theories and perspectives on municipalities and the European dimension, and moving on to specific studies on municipalities and allocation of EU funding, it is quite apparent that it has been subjected to little academic attention. Pure academic studies focusing on allocation of EU funds to municipalities are rare to find. There are, however, plenty of non-academic evaluation reports on EU funds and EU projects available. Often such reports are carried out by the municipalities themselves or external revision companies. Though, non-academic as they are, they still provide useful empirical insight as can be demonstrated by the revision of EU work in the municipalities of Klippan and Eslöv. The revision work has been conducted by an external company and is focused on the municipalities' EU work during 2005-2007 and 2006-2009 respectively. What makes these reports specifically interesting, in relation to this study, is the focus on the European structural funds and the municipal organisation surrounding allocation of these EU funds.¹⁹

Three different factors are mentioned in relation to the allocation of EU funds. Firstly, there is the role of the EU coordinator in the municipality. It is concluded that the fairly new employment of an EU coordinator in the municipality of Klippan has had a positive effect on the EU work and it is believed that this coordinator will help support the development of EU work in the future. However, as the EU coordinator is not working full-time in the municipality of Klippan, there is a risk that this will in fact impede the EU work in the municipality. The EU work in the municipality will be dependent on the EU coordinator and during the time she is not present, her work will not be carried out and hence will risk stagnating.²⁰ As for the municipality of Eslöv, an EU coordinator was employed for six months during 2009. During this period the municipality experienced increased development in the EU work. However, it was emphasised that the role of the coordinator should be informative and supportive, and the EU coordinator was not to be someone who could be used for application writing.²¹

It is interesting to note that the revision reports to a large extent put emphasis on the role of the EU coordinator. According to the reports the municipalities are highly dependent on them when it comes to EU work. This might however be connected to the second factor. Knowledge and interest are very important factors in the EU work of a municipality and an EU coordinator often contributes to both. If they are lacking, EU work in the municipality will likely suffer. This is also what the revision report for Klippan concludes. The municipality is not relishing all opportunities given to it to apply for EU funding and one contributing factor is

¹⁸ John, P. (2001), *Local Governance in Western Europe* , p. 73f

¹⁹ Radovanovic, D. (2008), *Granskning av EU arbete inom Klippans kommun* , p. 5

²⁰ *ibid.* , p. 10

²¹ Göransson A., A. Eriksson (2009), *Granskning av Eslövs kommuns EU-arbete* , p. 4

suggested to be the lack of knowledge and/or interest. Another factor, and the third one dealt with in the reports, is strategies for EU work. The municipalities of Klippan and Eslöv have not adopted an EU strategy and the reports are critical of this.²² EU coordinators, knowledge/interest and EU strategies are interlocking factors, and considering the revision reports they are also a crucial part when successfully allocating EU funding to the municipality. These factors occur in this study as well, where it will be tested just how important they are.

Leaving the revision reports behind and once again turning to academic studies, Linda Berg, occasionally together with Rutger Lindahl, is the one researcher that undoubtedly has contributed the most to research on European or international dimensions in Swedish municipalities. One of the studies conducted by Linda Berg and Rutger Lindahl is on internationalisation processes in west-Swedish municipalities, which has an extensive discussion on the subject of strategies. In this particular study, Berg and Lindahl have chosen to focus on all kinds of international work, and not just that related to EU. However, when studying west-Swedish municipalities, two main reasons for not having adopted a strategy can be distinguished. Either the municipalities lack the interest for international work or they lack resources. In general, resource allocation seems to be a strong deterrent regarding all kind of international work in the studied west-Swedish municipalities. It is asserted that if resources are available, the municipalities will also engage in the process of internationalisation to a greater extent.²³ Surprisingly enough, the aspect of resources are never mentioned in the revision reports. Either resources do not matter when engaging in pooling of EU funding or this is simply an aspect that has not been considered in the revision reports. That it should be the former is unlikely. Unfortunately, Berg and Lindahl do not study how allocation of municipality resources affects the specific action of pooling external funding from e.g. the European Union.²⁴ Seemingly, the importance of available resources in a municipality and its effect on allocation of EU funding has up until now been little explored.

Another study, also by Berg and Lindahl, concentrates on Swedish municipalities and regions and their channels to Brussels. It is an extensive study encompassing nine years, from 1999 to 2007. The study mainly focuses on policy processes but it makes some interesting observations regarding EU work. Berg and Lindahl conclude in their study that the municipalities have increased their activity towards EU but also that they over time have become less prone to focus solely on project financing. On the local level it is also evident that the bigger cities have markedly more activities directed towards EU. In the light of this they conclude that the parts of Sweden that do have a lower degree of activity towards EU, primarily should try *not* to increase their share of projects but rather focus on what added value a European dimension can have on the regular work in

²² Radovanovic, D. (2008), *Granskning av EU arbete inom Klippans kommun*, p. 5, 9f; Göransson A, A. Eriksson (2009), *Granskning av Eslövs kommuns EU-arbete*, p. 10

²³ Berg L., R. Lindahl (2003), *Kommunal internationalisering. Internationaliseringsprocesser i Västra Götalands kommuner*, p. 50

²⁴ *ibid.*, p. 34ff

municipality or region. Consequently, this would mean that municipalities with an overall low activity towards EU should first become more active before they try to increase the share of EU funded projects in the municipality. Unfortunately, the study does not offer any closer explanations to this suggestion. Whether it is because municipalities with low EU activity lack experience of international work or whether such municipalities do not have the means to benefit from EU funded projects are unclear.²⁵ In connection to this, a report on municipal activity by Linda Berg is well worth mentioning.

The purpose of the report is to study which municipalities are most actively engage in EU work and why. Activity is defined as measures the municipalities do in order to improve its position, both among other municipalities and on the European arena. Berg's theoretical point of departure is that political actions are explained by individual actors and their actions and wishes. The actions of politicians and officials often depend on the opportunities that arise for these people to act. The hypothesis is that individual actors matter and affect municipal activity in the sense that they increase activity. Confirming this hypothesis, the report shows higher activity levels in municipalities where individual actors have a great say, i.e. individuals with a great interest in EU will lead to higher EU activity.²⁶

As stated earlier, few academic studies are concerned with allocation of EU funding to municipalities. One exception is a study on regionalism by Lars-Inge Ström. The study has been conducted over two decades and it includes all Swedish municipalities. The part of the study covering the structural funds only includes the years from the beginning of the Swedish EU membership in 1995 to 1999, when Ström's study ends. Though it is arguably somewhat outdated today, the study still contributes with some interesting reflections on EU and the structural funds. During this time the funding was modest and the resources the municipalities had to put in was not in relation to the amount of money that could be allocated to the municipality. Many municipalities had little or no information on the available EU funding and more often than not, they had stumbled across the EU funds. The municipalities also commonly stated that they applied for EU funding mostly on chance and that little coordination preceded the initiatives. Furthermore, the process of application was seen as unnecessarily difficult and did little to encourage more active efforts in the pooling of EU funds. From the municipalities, which had applied for and been granted EU funding, the statements were uniform: receiving EU funding meant little money, a lot of work and very strict control from the European Union.²⁷

The study of Ström did also reveal some interesting attitudes towards EU funding amongst the municipalities. In many cases it was not the opportunity to develop the municipality, which would arise from additional funding, which was

²⁵ Berg, L., R. Lindahl (2007), *Svenska kommuners och regioners kanaler till Bryssel – subnationella nivåers försök att påverka EU:s policyprocesser*, p. 6f

²⁶ Berg, L. (1999), *Aktiva kommuner? En studie av de svenska kommunernas aktivitet i EU-frågor*, p. 5f; 9

²⁷ Ström, L-I. (1999), *Den kommunala revolutionen – Svenska kommuners förändring under två decennier*, p. 134ff

the reason behind the applications but rather the want for political legitimacy. In other words, the EU funding tended to become a goal in itself and not a means by which the municipality could develop the region.²⁸ This conclusion is very much a point of contact with what is known as *tactical allocation* within the field of public economy.

Tactical allocation occurs when a central government allocate state subsidies to local levels with a high number of volatile voters with the purpose of ‘buying’ their future votes. Eva Johansson has studied different aspects of tactical allocation between Swedish regions and Swedish municipalities, with focus on state subsidies.²⁹ With her quantitative study she is trying to show that the central government will allocate a larger share of states subsidies to local authorities where they recognise a high number of what is termed ‘swing voters’.³⁰ Though this is a study concerned with the macro level, it makes some points potentially valid also for the micro level. If this phenomenon is true for the central government, it may also be true for the municipality and allocation of EU funding. If the municipality has a large base of volatile voters or swing voters, the municipality might be more prone to work actively in order to pool EU funds to the municipality area. As a connection to the Ström study, such allocations could give the municipality politicians political legitimacy while also buying voters in order to secure a future. Unfortunately, Johansson does little to explain how these swing voters are recognised, and to what extent ‘vote buying’ is actually determining or steering the work of central governments, as one cannot disregard the effect of other factors.

Mikael Granberg’s research on climate cooperation in Swedish municipalities is another relevant study from the field of public economy. It is mainly concerned with climate issues but its discussion on municipal funding regarding climate cooperation makes some valid points. When studying two state-supported programmes funding climate cooperation, KLIMP and LIP³¹, it was evident that municipalities which had received funding from these programmes were more active. In addition, this type of funding seemed to produce path dependency. Municipalities, receiving funds from the LIP-programme, were more likely to continue their climate engagement and also receiving funds from the following KLIMP-programme. Generally, those municipalities which received funding from any of the programmes were more positive towards monetary state-support.³² Though Granberg’s study deals with climate cooperation and state-supported programmes, it does have some parallels to EU funding. It is not unreasonable to assume that EU funding could have the same effect on municipalities’

²⁸ Ström, L-I. (1999), *Den kommunala revolutionen – Svenska kommuners förändring under två decennier*, p. 136

²⁹ see also Hanes (2003) and Jordahl (2002)

³⁰ Johansson, E. (2003), *Intergovernmental Grants as a Tactical Instrument - Empirical Evidence from Swedish Municipalities*, p. 1

³¹ Abbreviations for klimatinvesteringsprogram - KLIMP (climate investment programme) and lokalt investeringsprogram - LIP (local investment programme).

³² Granberg, M (2006), *Alla talar om vädret – Svenska kommuner, klimatförändring och samverkan*, p. 24, 27f

engagement in EU work and pooling of EU funding. It seems as if funding can trigger a circular behaviour. Municipalities which have once received funding will be more positive towards engaging in activities which will generate even more funding. This is an aspect which has not been explored in the context of EU funding, but it is well worth to be considered further.

5 Analytical Framework

The thesis has an ambition to explore internal factors of municipalities and to study whether the presence or absence of these factors display a relation with the amount of EU funding allocated to the municipalities of Skåne. This shall be separated from the study of factors affecting municipalities to apply for EU funding in the first place. This distinction is imperative and therefore, before taking on the task of developing and presenting the analytical framework of this study, a short but essential discussion on these factors will follow below.

A lion's share of existing research has devoted a lot of attention to external factors affecting municipal EU activity. Figure 1 is graphically illustrating the case of the relation between external factors, municipal activity and competition for EU funding.



Figure 5.1: Relationship between external factors affecting municipal EU activity in competition for EU funding.

It is of crucial importance that the external factors illustrated above are not confused with internal municipal factors, which are the focus of this study. A typical external factor in this context is the organisation surrounding and actions of the managing authorities, which allocates EU funding. As shown graphically in figure 2, internal factors are a part of the municipality, attracting (or preventing) EU funding from within, rather than externally affecting pooling of funds, as in the case of external factors. Studying internal factors requires opening of what could be called the black box of the municipality, which is of quite a different nature from studying input of factors external to the municipality.

The *factor* box in figure 2 is not independent from, but an integral part of the municipality. The two-way arrow illustrates the relationship between the municipality (factors included) and EU funding. Allocation of EU funding is dependent on municipal fund-pooling activity, which hypothetically is connected to internal municipal factors. The EU, in turn, responds to the activity of the municipality, hence the two-way arrow. The dash-lined box is merely to illustrate where external factors are placed in relation to internal factors.




Figure 5.2: Relationship between allocation of EU funding to a municipality and internal factors pooling such funding.

As already stated, focus of this study will be on internal factors and their potential involvement in the pooling of EU funding. However, internal factors in municipalities are numerous and to be able to pin-point factors explaining differences in allocation of EU funding, an analytical framework needs to be developed.

5.1 Internal Municipal Factors

According to Gary Marks *et al.* factors can either push or pull resources.³³ In the case of this study, it would mean that internal municipal factors push or pull EU funding into the municipalities. Both pushing and pulling assumes that funding is being allocated to the municipalities, though the nature of allocation differs. *Resource push* concerns factors pushing resources into the municipality and it assumes some kind of factor activity, as in the case of, for example, an EU coordinator. The sole existence of an EU coordinator in a municipality does not attract EU funding. Rather, it is the activity or work of the EU coordinator which is moving or pushing funding into the municipality. This can be contrasted to *resource pull* which concerns factors pulling resources into the municipalities.

³³ Marks, G. *et al.* (1996), *Competencies, Cracks, And Conflicts. Regional Mobilization in the European Union*, p. 168f

Factors typical of pulling resources are large populations and geographical centrality. Such factors are believed to positively correlate with allocation of resources, but as they do not exert activity they fall within the category of resource pulling.

Common for both kinds of resource allocation is the assumption that the more factors pushing or pulling resources, i.e. EU funding, the greater the likelihood is of the municipality allocating funds of this type.³⁴

Allocation of EU funding is seen as a function of the capacity of a municipality to pool resources. This capacity is dependent on internal municipal factors. However, these factors need to be more closely defined. For this purpose internal municipal factors will be divided into three sub-categories: *resource factors*, *structural factors*, and *political factors*.

The dimension of resource pulling and resource pushing will be added to these factors. Studying the effect of these processes can be valuable. If resource pushing is facilitating the pooling of EU funding, it would mean that municipalities themselves actively can affect allocation of funding. On the other hand, it would be somewhat more difficult to affect, for example, the population size in a municipality, which would be the case of factors pulling resources.

5.1.1 Resource Factors

Resource factors include not only pure financial resources, but also other forms of resources such as labour and knowledge. It cannot be disregarded that availability of labour and knowledge resources to some extent are dependent on financial resources. It is not unreasonable, though, to assume that a municipality prioritising allocation of EU funding, however poor, will invest in relevant labour and knowledge resources, and vice versa. It is thus argued that labour and knowledge resources are not solely dependent on available financial resources.

Previous studies dealing with financial resources and allocation of funding to municipalities have been able to show if not an unambiguous result at least a strong tendency on how financial resources affect pooling of funds. Not surprisingly, financially strong municipalities are receiving more funds than financially weak municipalities. In general, financially strong municipalities have more resources to mobilise and they have the possibility of spending money on factors pushing and pulling funds into the municipality.³⁵ Based on this, a first hypothesis concerning financial strength can be formulated; *financially strong municipalities can invest in factors pooling funds and thus increase the amount of allocated EU funds.*

³⁴ Marks, G. *et al.* (1996), *Competencies, Cracks, And Conflicts. Regional Mobilization in the European Union*, p. 169

³⁵ Berg, L; Lindahl, R (2007), p. 6f; Granberg, M. (2005), *Alla talar om vädret – Svenska kommuner, klimatförändring och samverkan*, p. 22

Labour resources or personnel resources constitute a second resource factor. Receiving funds from the EU requires active work from the municipalities' side, meaning that the municipalities need to have people employed for the task of pooling funds. This task is often given to EU coordinators. It can easily be hypothesised that an EU coordinator in a municipality inevitably should raise the amount of EU funds allocated to the municipality. Simply put, if the municipality has a person employed to carry out EU work this should also be reflected in the amount of funds allocated to the area, at least compared to those municipalities which do not have a person employed for this kind of work. An interesting aspect here is that not only is it believed to matter whether the municipality has an EU coordinator employed, but also the amount of time the coordinator is working. Undoubtedly, if all EU work rests on the shoulder of one person working only 20 or 30 percent in the municipality, the amount of work possible to carry out will be limited and slow. The optimal scenario would be to have an EU coordinator working fulltime.³⁶ The second hypothesis is therefore as follows: *municipalities employing person(s) working with EU related tasks, including pooling of EU funds, are receiving more EU funding than municipalities which have not. The more work hours a municipality dedicate to EU related tasks, the more funding are pooled.*

However, not all municipalities employ EU coordinators and it is not unusual for municipal employees to have EU work as an additional work task. The question is then, does it matters if it is an EU coordinator dedicating 20 or 30 percent to EU work or an employee having other work tasks in between EU work?

The answer could potentially be connected to the third factor of resources, namely knowledge. A person with specific knowledge of EU and experience from EU work should, by logic, be able to pool EU funding to a larger extent than a person lacking such knowledge. Therefore, it is not only the amount of time dedicated to EU work in a municipality that is of relevance but also the knowledgebase found there. How to practically handle an EU application, and on a later stage realising the project itself is of course a crucial element in the EU work of a municipality. Without such competence being present in the municipality, the possibility to successfully compose an application, receive EU funding and implement a project is small. The third hypothesis is thus: *previous experience of receiving EU funding results in knowledge on how to pool resources and thus the likelihood of receiving EU funding will increase. Likewise, valuing the municipalities' knowledge of EU and EU funding as good will increase amount of EU funding.*

One indicator of knowledge is past experience of receiving EU funding. If it has been done once, it should be easy or at least easier to do it again, and the knowledge gained on the way should be there to be used for future EU projects.³⁷

An interesting aspect, relevant to all resource factors mentioned here, is the requirement of matching funds. As previously mentioned, the municipalities are

³⁶ Radovanovic, D. (2008), *Granskning av EU arbete inom Klippans kommun*, p. 10

³⁷ *ibid.*, p. 10

expected to match the EU funding they receive. This means that the municipalities must be able to set aside working hours, personnel and/or financial means in order to be eligible for EU funding. For a municipality with little resources this requirement can potentially act as a deterrent.

5.1.2 Structural Factors

Municipalities can be divided along a centre-periphery spectrum. On one end is the centre, characterised by big cities and large populations. The centre is densely populated and has a small share of people employed within the agricultural sector and a high share of people employed within the service sector. On the other end is the periphery, characterised by rural areas and small populations. Low population density, high share of people employed within the agricultural sector and a small share of people employed within the service sector are other characteristics found in peripheral municipalities.³⁸

The pattern of centre-periphery constitutes by itself a structural factor, though it is argued here that the centre-periphery factor is an insufficient factor in so far as it tells us very little of what it is in this pattern that affects allocation of EU funding. It is thus necessary to separate this factor into the very factors determining whether a municipality is placed on the centre or periphery end of the spectrum. Not only does this make it possible to test which of the factors that might be the stronger ones in affecting allocation of EU funding, but it also allows for a more in-depth understanding of the overriding pattern of centre-periphery.

The first of the structural factors to be dealt with is *population*. EU funding is assumed to be a positive function of number of people in a municipality. In other words, more people mean more money. Of course, it is not the large population in itself that affect allocation, but rather what it brings in terms of resources and pressure. Municipalities with large populations are presumed to have more internal as well as external pressure on them to pool funding of different kinds, and often but not necessarily large municipalities have more resources to invest in pooling of EU funding. Furthermore, large populations are frequently accompanied by a high population density, which in turn also is assumed to positively affect allocation of funding. *Population density* is the second structural factor and shall be separated from pure population numbers. Measured as inhabitants per square kilometres, population density can tell how high or low population concentration is in a municipality. Normally large populations also mean high population density. However, it is fully possible for a small municipality (population-wise) to have a high population density (the population of the municipality being concentrated to a small area). Municipalities with a high population density have displayed strong activities towards pulling funding into the organisations and an ability to mobilise internally. Contrary, municipalities with low population density have shown a tendency of weak EU work and also an

³⁸ Berg, L. (1999), *Aktiva kommuner? En studie av de svenska kommunernas aktivitet i EU-frågor*, p. 9

overall lack of ability to pool EU funding.³⁹ This leads to the fourth and fifth hypothesis. The fourth one reads: *municipalities with large populations are receiving more EU funding than municipalities with small populations*. Closely connected to this hypothesis is hypothesis five, which in turn reads: *municipalities with high population density are receiving more EU funding than municipalities with low population density*.

The third and fourth factor are related and will therefore be dealt with together. The factors are *high share of service sector employees* and *high share of agricultural sector employees*. In his study on international activity in Swedish municipalities, Lars-Inge Ström displays a strong positive relation between municipalities with a high share of service sector employees and high international activity in the municipality. According to Ström, a high level of employees within the service sector is an indication of municipal capacity. This is based on the fact that a high share of people with academic education is employed within civil services, which in turn would positively affect international engagement. On the opposite side are municipalities with a high share of employees within the agricultural sector. Municipalities with low population density and a large share of people in the agricultural sector are the ones displaying lowest activity when it comes to international/EU activity in municipalities. Though this study is not concerned with municipal activity, these factors constitute background variables relevant also to allocation of EU funding.⁴⁰

The factors of high share service sector employees and high share of agricultural sector employees are combined into one hypothesis: *municipalities with a high share of service sector employees are receiving more EU funding compared to other municipalities*. Likewise, *municipalities with a high share of employees within the agricultural sector are receiving less EU funding compared to other municipalities*.

5.1.3 Political Factors

Unlike the factors dealt with above, political factors are quite few in numbers. The most obvious of these factors, and one of the two dealt with in this study, is political majority. The composition of political parties in a municipality is assumed to affect allocation of EU funding. Political party or parties in majority, which have a positive attitude towards EU and EU funding should by logic also pool more funding of this type. Liberal and conservative parties have in previous municipal studies displayed a more positive attitude, as well as higher levels of activity towards EU than their socialistic counterparts. This may or may not be held true for the municipalities of Skåne. However, what political majority

³⁹ Ström, L-I. (1999), *Den kommunala revolutionen – Svenska kommuners förändring under två decennier*, p. 129f

⁴⁰ *ibid.*, p. 130ff

correlates with EU funding might not be as interesting as whether there actually is a correlation between political majority and allocation of EU funding.⁴¹ This is especially so, since not everyone shares the belief that political majority is a factor to be counted on. Ström asserts that other factors are of greater importance as the differences found within, as well as between the municipal parties are too big to actually account for any correlation. This does not necessarily mean that political majority does not affect allocation of EU funding, but rather that it does not affect it to the same extent other factors do. Nonetheless, however doubtful one might be of the effect of political majorities on allocation of EU funding, it cannot be disregarded that this factor constitute one of the mostly used explanatory factors in municipal studies. It would therefore be wrong to exclude it on the basis that it, in this context and according to Ström, might be a weak factor and lack the impact on allocation of EU funding other factors might have.⁴² As this is a quantitative study, it will be possible to determine just how strong of a factor this is. The hypothesis thus formulated is: *municipalities' political majority will affect allocation of EU funding.*

International and/or EU strategies constitute the second and last factor presented here. It might not be an obvious political factor, but as this kind of strategies express a political will, it will be dealt with here.

The importance of strategies is a subject reoccurring in many academic studies on municipalities and international work. The fact that a municipality has an international strategy is not enough in itself. Rather, what is important is how the strategy is used. Undeniably, a strategy that is not put to use by the municipalities is just as useless as one that does not exist.⁴³ In order for international/EU work to be successful as well as purposeful, the municipalities need to adopt a strategy outlining means and objectives. The reason for this is quite simple. If the municipalities do not know their own needs and priorities, they cannot possibly be expected to be able to identify EU projects they could potentially benefit from.⁴⁴ This motivates the eighth and last hypothesis: *municipalities with international/EU strategy in use are receiving more EU funding than municipalities not using or without such a strategy.*

⁴¹ Berg, L. & Lindahl, R. (2003), *Kommunal internationalisering. Internationaliseringsprocesser i Västra Götalands kommuner*, p. 31; Berg, L. (1999), *Aktiva kommuner? En studie av de svenska kommunernas aktivitet i EU-frågor*, p. 8; 10

⁴² Ström, L-I. (1999), *Den kommunala revolutionen – Svenska kommuners förändring under två decennier*, p. 30; Granberg, M. (2006), *Alla talar om vädret – Svenska kommuner, klimatförändring och samverkan*, p. 26

⁴³ Berg, L. & Lindahl, R. (2003), *Kommunal internationalisering. Internationaliseringsprocesser i Västra Götalands kommuner*, p. 34ff

⁴⁴ Radovanovic, D. (2008), *Granskning av EU arbete inom Klippans kommun*, p. 5; 9f

5.1.4 Hypotheses and Operationalisation

Throughout the theoretical discussion above, eight hypotheses have been formulated. Each of them will once again be presented here, together with a short discussion on how they will be operationalised.

Hypothesis 1: *Financially strong municipalities can invest in factors pooling funds and thus increase the amount of allocated EU funds.*

Financial strength will be measured in tax paying power (kr/inhabitant). Taxpaying power is based on the municipality's taxable income divided by number of inhabitants. Taxpaying power indicates financial strength in the sense that the net cost will be affected by the municipality's tax revenue. Consequently, the stronger the taxpaying power in a municipality is, the stronger the municipality should be financially.

Hypothesis 2: *Municipalities employing person(s) working with EU related tasks, including pooling of EU funds, are receiving more EU funding than municipalities which have not. The more work hours a municipality dedicate to EU-related tasks, the more funding are pooled.*

It is not fruitful to simply study whether a municipality has an EU coordinator employed or not. Often municipalities do have one or several persons employed for EU-related tasks though the organisation surrounding the position might differ. For this purpose three categories have been created.

1) The municipality has a person employed with special responsibility for international/EU work.

2) The municipality has delegated the responsibility for international/EU work to one of their employees, though this person is mainly working with other tasks.

3) No one is responsible for international/EU work.

Since the effectiveness of a person working with EU-related work tasks might be related to number of hours spent on this particular work, this too will be considered. In this case it is measured in number of hours per week, where 40 hours indicate fulltime.

Hypothesis 3: *Previous experience of receiving EU funding results in knowledge on how to pool resources and thus the likelihood of receiving EU funding will increase. Likewise, valuing the municipalitie's knowledge of EU and EU funding as good will increase amount of EU funding.*

Operationalisation of knowledge is not easy. It is however argued here that experience from the previous programme period will result in knowledge on how

to pool EU funding. Consequently, the amount of allocated EU funding from the previous programme period is used as an indicator of knowledge.

However, knowledge measured in amount of previously allocated funds does not give the whole picture. Knowledge in this form is therefore complemented with the municipalities' perceived knowledge of EU and EU funding, which is based on the answers given in the questionnaire. The question concerning both general EU knowledge and knowledge of EU funding in particular has four alternative answers (very poor; poor; good; very good) but as each of these categories by themselves have too few observations they have been combined accordingly: *very poor* and *poor* constitute the category *poor*; *good* and *very good* constitute the category *good*. The categories on perceived knowledge concerning general EU knowledge and specific knowledge of EU funding are therefore simply:

1) Poor; or

2) Good

Hypothesis 4: *Municipalities with large populations are receiving more EU funding than municipalities with small populations.*

Population is measured in number of inhabitants. Categorisations are not used; instead every municipality is tested separately. Since this study is dealing with relatively few municipalities there is no real need of categorisation for this variable. Furthermore, the problematic and potentially subjective process of deciding what is large and what is small is left aside.

Hypothesis 5: *Municipalities with high population density are receiving more EU funding than municipalities with low population density.*

Population density is measured in number of inhabitants per km². For the same reason as given for hypothesis 4, categories are not used.

Hypothesis 6: *Municipalities with a high share of service sector employees are receiving more EU funding compared to other municipalities. Likewise, municipalities with a high share of employees within the agricultural sector are receiving less EU funding compared to other municipalities.*

According to this hypothesis municipalities with a majority of service sector employees will receive more EU funding than municipalities with a majority of people employed in the agricultural sector. The municipalities will not be divided between those with a high share and those with a low share of employees in respective sector. Rather, it will be tested if a high percentage of service sector employees correlate positively with EU funding and conversely if a high share of agricultural sector employees correlate negatively with EU funding.

Hypothesis 7: *Municipalities' political majority will affect allocation of EU funding.*

It should be noted that hypothesis 7 on political majority does not make any assumption as to which party majority is believed to best affect pooling of EU funding. It is left to the analysis itself to detect any such pattern.

There have not been any elections since 2006 which means that the political majority between 2007 and 2009 has been constant. Categorisation is used and the three categories are:

- 1) Left-wing majority
- 2) Right-wing majority
- 3) Other majority

Left-wing majority refers to political majority made up by the Social Democratic Party, the Left Party and/or the Green Party. In turn, right-wing majority refers to political majority of the Moderate Party, Centre Party, Liberal Party and/or the Christian Democrats. Other majority refers in this case to mixed majority, where the parties collaborate across the political blocks.

Hypothesis 8: *Municipalities with international/EU strategy in use are receiving more EU funding than municipalities not using or without such a strategy.*

First, municipalities are divided between those who have an international/EU strategy and those who do not. Thereafter the extent of strategy-usage is categorised as follows:

- 1) High extent of usage
- 2) Low extent of usage

These categories are based on the responses given in the questionnaire. The questionnaire has five alternative answers (not at all; to a very low extent; to a low extent; to a high extent; and to a very high extent) but due to too few observations in each of the five categories they have been combined into the two categories presented above. Categories *to a very low extent* and *to a low extent* make up the category *low extent of usage*. Conversely, categories *to a very high extent* and *to a high extent* are combined into the category *high extent of usage*. No one municipality placed itself in the category *not at all*.

Table 5.1.4.1 below gives an overview of the internal municipal factors, the specified factors or the sub-factors and the hypotheses formulated and derived from the theoretical assumptions regarding these factors.

Table 5.1.4.1: Factors and hypotheses

FACTORS	FACTORS Specified	HYPOTHESIS
Resource	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Financial (<i>pushing</i>) - Personnel (<i>pushing</i>) - Knowledge (<i>pushing</i>) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>Financially strong municipalities will receive more EU funding</i> - <i>Municipalities with EU coordinators will receive more EU funding. The more work hours dedicated to EU work, the more EU funding.</i> - <i>Knowledge will increase likelihood of receiving EU funding</i>
Structural	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Population (<i>pulling</i>) - Population density (<i>pulling</i>) - Number of employees in service sector (<i>pulling</i>) - Number of employees in agricultural sector (<i>pulling</i>) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>Large populations will receive more EU funding than small ones</i> - <i>High population density will receive more EU funding than low population density</i> - <i>High share of service sector employees will receive more EU funding</i> - <i>High share of agricultural sector employees will receive less EU funding</i>
Political	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Political majority (<i>pushing</i>) - Int./EU strategy (<i>pushing</i>) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>Political majority will affect allocation of EU funding</i> - <i>Municipalities with int./EU strategy will receive more EU funding</i>

6 Method and Materials

In this section the method will be presented and discussed. The materials employed for the analysis will also be given an in-depth presentation as the material in form of a database will not be available to the readers. How the database was constructed and how the material was used in the analysis must therefore be accounted for.

As with most quantitative studies, much of the work of collecting data, constructing databases and statistically testing the collected material is in risk of being beyond the scope of the presented study and consequently left in the dark without further discussion. For the exact reason of the work being, to a large extent, external to the study it is imperative to make a thorough presentation of the quantitative method applied, as well as the material and databases used. As a consequence, this section on methods and material might be more extensive than normal.

6.1 Method

The relation between internal municipal factors and allocation of EU funding to the municipalities of Skåne will be studied quantitatively. To be able to test the presumed relations between internal municipal factors and amount of allocated EU funding, the method known as quantitative data analysis or statistical analysis will be applied.⁴⁵

6.1.1 Quantitative Data Analysis

Compared to qualitative methods, the quantitative ones have been less frequently used within the field of political science. This should however not be attributed to quantitative methods being insufficient in or less suitable for explaining phenomena of the discipline. To a large extent qualitative methods have become the norm, but when dealing with studies trying to establish correlations such methods are not fruitful, nor useful. It makes little sense to qualitatively study the ‘whys’ of a phenomenon without first quantitatively establishing the ‘ifs’.

⁴⁵ Bryman, A (2008), *Social Reserach Methods*, p. 220

Since the purpose of the study is to explain allocation of EU funding to municipalities of Skåne, the statistical analysis will aim at testing correlations. Measuring correlations is employed when trying to explain a phenomenon, as opposed to just trying to describe it, and as there are no previous studies on correlation between internal municipal factors and allocation of EU funding it will be necessary to establish if a correlation *de facto* exists. Taking on the task of studying why there is a correlation cannot be done without previously having established an actual correlation.⁴⁶

When looking for common denominators, as in the case of this study, quantitative methods are normally applied, while qualitative ones are used to study the particular. On a more practical level, quantitative studies are to a large extent concerned with testing of hypotheses. Consequently, to study whether there is a correlation between internal municipal factors and allocation of EU funding to municipalities of Skåne, method of choice needs to be quantitative, and more specifically that of statistical analysis or quantitative data analysis.⁴⁷

Quantitative methods, as well as qualitative ones, have their limitations and imperfections. Intentional or unintentional manipulation of statistics by the researcher to fit the expected outcome is always at risk when working quantitatively. It would, however, be naive to believe that qualitative methods are being spared from such problems. No matter how a researcher chooses to work with the material there is a risk of manipulation. However, one aspect of the statistical analysis method one cannot escape is the fact that it does not allow for in-depth understanding of the studied phenomenon. Nonetheless, statistical analysis is useful when one wants to study phenomena not previously studied as it can give an overall picture at the same time as it can pinpoint areas of significance, which later on can be studied qualitatively. This is exactly what quantitative data analysis/statistical analysis does and why it is the method applied in this study.

However, methods of statistical analysis require material which can be quantitatively analysed, as well as means to do the actual analysis. In this case, the means is SPSS and material has been collected from a number of different sources (see section 6.2). Here it is important to make a distinction between data collected and compiled by the author and data already compiled by someone else, as in the case of material collected from, for example Statistics Sweden (SCB). Therefore, in the section to follow the methods employed when collecting data which was not already available will be presented.

6.1.2 Collecting Data

In the case of the amount of allocated EU funding to the municipalities of Skåne there was no previous material available that could be used for the

⁴⁶ Lundahl, U., Skärvad, P-H. (2000), *Utredningsmetodik för samhällsvetare och eknomer*, p. 94

⁴⁷ Lundquist, L. (1993), *Det vetenskapliga studiet av politik*, p. 104

database. A request was sent by e-mail to each of the 33 municipalities of Skåne, asking them to submit statistics on EU funding received from the European structural funds during the current programme period between the year of 2007 and 2009. In most cases the head accountant in the municipalities has submitted figures valid for the municipality as a whole. However, in some cases the decentralised municipal organisation has made it necessary to contact each of the municipal sub-administrations (*förvaltningar*). This means that the administrations responsible for health care, education and so on individually have submitted figures on the EU funding they have received, which then have been compiled for the municipality as a whole and entered into the database.

As it is the municipalities themselves which have been providing the data on received EU funding, it has been difficult to control the accuracy of the data submitted. This is obviously problematic and steps have been taken to try to make sure that the data submitted by the municipalities are uniform. The municipalities have been asked to specify EU funding received from the ESF and ERDF during the new programme period between 2007 and 2009, which clearly defines what material is wanted. However, it has been proved that many of the municipalities do not separate EU funding allocated to the municipality from other sources of income. This means that the material has not been readily available and some of the municipalities have thus been forced to find requested information through other means. How this has been done, if they have been fully informed, and whether the information they have been given is correct can only be subjected to guesses. Nonetheless, many of the municipalities have made it known if they are uncertain of the material submitted. If they were, further research has been conducted to make certain that all EU funding has been included.

When collecting data on the municipal organisation regarding EU work a questionnaire was used (for questionnaire see Appendix II). The municipalities were contacted by e-mail where a short questionnaire of mere five questions was attached. It was an active choice to keep the number of questions small as it would probably increase the likelihood of the municipalities answering it. The needed information on municipal organisation of EU work did not require an extensive questionnaire. Important information was thus not sacrificed for the point of keeping down the number of questions.⁴⁸

The purpose of the questionnaire was to capture the organisation surrounding EU work in the municipalities, as well as measure the municipalities' perceived knowledge of EU and EU funding. For this purpose the use of a questionnaire was optimal.

The questionnaire was sent to the person in the municipalities which are responsible for international or EU work. Some municipalities have several persons responsible for this area and the questionnaire was then sent to the one with main responsibility. Moreover, the questionnaire was only sent to the 18 municipalities which had been able to submit the needed information on EU

⁴⁸ Esaiasson, P. *et al.* (2005), *Metodpraktikan – Konsten att studera samhälle, individ och marknad*, p. 268

funding. 13 of the municipalities submitted the questionnaire as requested, while the other five received a reminding e-mail a week later.

The fact that the questionnaire left little room for the municipalities to go into detail about their organisation of EU work turned out to be problematic. As well understood, organisation of municipality work is not always black or white and a few responders felt that the questionnaire could not accurately reflect their organisation. However, as the data received from the questionnaire was given numeric values and entered into a database, it has not been possible to give a nuanced or detailed picture of the organisation of EU work. This is not the purpose of the study but admittedly it is one of the major drawbacks using quantitative data analysis.

6.2 Material

Out of the 33 municipalities in Skåne, 18 are included in the study. The ambition was to cover all the municipalities in Skåne but as 15 of them were lacking or unable to submit the material needed for the construction of the database, they had to be excluded from the study. It would have been ideal if all the municipalities of Skåne were a part of the study but having included 55 per cent of the municipalities is still to be considered a fairly good outcome. Furthermore, the 18 municipalities constitute a heterogeneous group without bias towards a certain type of municipality, i.e. both big and small, densely populated and not so densely populated etc., are represented. The risk of systematic errors in the analysis result should thus be small.⁴⁹

The two managing authorities, the Swedish ESF Council and the Swedish Agency for Economic and Regional Growth, do have project databases for programme period 2007-2013, but as these databases are organised after projects it is not possible to accurately determine whether funding for the projects has been allocated to a municipality or not. Consequently it has been necessary to contact each and every one of the municipalities in Skåne to acquire the needed material.

The data entered into the SPSS database are mainly based on material from three different sources: the material submitted by the 18 municipalities in Skåne, statistics from Statistics Sweden (SCB) and data from an already existing SPSS database constructed by Leif Johansson. This database includes a vast number of variables covering all the Swedish municipalities and it has been very useful in providing data which otherwise would have been impossible to collect solely for being used in this study.

The database constructed for this study consists of material collected first-hand by the author, as discussed in section 6.1.2, and already existing data. Below follows a discussion on the statistical material used.

⁴⁹ Eljertsson, G. (1992), *Grundläggande statistik – med tillämpningar inom sjukvården*, p. 21

6.2.1 Statistical Material

Data collected from the municipalities on received EU funding constitute the dependent variable. The independent variables, which the dependent variable will be tested against, come from two main sources: Statistics Sweden (SCB) and the SPSS database Kfakta06 constructed by Leif Johansson at Lund University, with the addition of *kommundatabas.se*.

The database Kfakta06 is a compilation of statistical material gathered from nearly forty different statistical sources, and consists of near thousand variables encompassing all Swedish municipalities. Its latest updates are from 2007 but the updates do not cover all the variables. Some have been updated 2007 while others go back to 2003 or even further. Where necessary and possible the variables entered into the database constructed for this study have been updated to 2009. However, when it has not been possible to update the variables to 2009, the variable from 2007 has been used without any moderation. This means that the variables used are either from 2007 or 2009, with one exception. The exception is the variables measuring the share of employees in the service- and agricultural sector. These variables date back to 1996. Leif Johansson has regularly updated the database Kfakta06 and it is therefore odd that these variables have not been updated. After a thorough search it can be concluded that the major Swedish statistical databases do not either have material which could be used for updates of the variables. A possible explanation could be that the share of employees in the service sector and agricultural sector is no longer measured. Consequently the choice has been between excluding share of service sector and agricultural sector employees as a factor or use dated variables. The choice fell on using the existing variables from 1996. The motivation behind this is that even though the data is relatively old, the tendency is clear. It is argued that the likelihood of this tendency being reversed during the years past is very small.

Furthermore, it might be a slight disadvantage that all variables do not cover the same year but little can be done about the material available. The fact that the variables cover different years should have little effect on the outcome, especially when considering that a majority of the variables cover year 2007 or 2009. Both years fit well within the studied timeframe and what is important here is that each separate variable cover the same year, i.e. no one variable has data from different years.⁵⁰

Kfakta06 includes most areas concerning municipalities but it is not exhaustive. It has therefore been necessary to complement this database with statistics gathered from Statistics Sweden and *kommundatabas.se*. Statistics Sweden has been the main complementary source, as most of the material needed has been found here. However, Statistics Sweden did not provide any information on tax paying power and *kommundatabas.se* was therefore consulted.

⁵⁰ Esaiasson, P. *et al.* (2005), *Metodpraktikan – Konsten att studera samhälle, individ och marknad*, p. 268

All three sources are well recognised and reoccurring in academic studies. They are in general considered to be reliable statistic sources and they will be considered to be reliable also for this study.

6.3 SPSS

The statistical material used for the quantitative study has been accounted for above. A database in SPSS has been constructed using the collected statistic data, which has been entered into the database and then analysed. The variables chosen have been dependent on the hypotheses presented in section 5.1.4, as these variables function as the operationalisation of the hypotheses.

The main techniques used in SPSS for this study are bivariate correlations, means comparison and regressions. The choice of technique is wholly dependent on the scale of the variable and whether the x-variable is quantitative or qualitative and whether the y-variable is quantitative or qualitative and the combinations between them.

The significance tests, Pearson's r , Eta/Eta² and analysis of variance (ANOVA) are presented as they occur in the analysis and result part.

With the testing of significance it is attempted to tell something about the population based on the sample. In this case the sample is the 18 municipalities. The population is the municipalities in Skåne. In other words, based on statistical analyses of the sample we would like to tell if a correlation is significant and thus also generalisable to the population.

Testing significance is a way of testing hypotheses and correlations. It is necessary to test hypotheses and confirm correlations between variables before being able to say anything about causation. A correlation test is not in itself enough to establish causation, but a necessary step. In connection to this it is of importance to emphasise the difference between correlation and causation. Correlation does not equal causation. There is an important difference between, for example, big populations causing more EU funding and big population size correlating with the amount of allocated EU funding. This should be kept in mind.

6.3.1 Sample Size and Errors

The ambition was to include all municipalities in Skåne. As 15 of them were unable to submit the data needed for the study, it has been necessary to excluded them. As argued earlier, the material does not display bias towards a certain type of municipality and the risk of systematic errors in the result from the statistical analyses should therefore be small.

However, with a relatively small sample size, as is the case here, other problems arise. With few cases standard deviation increases which in turn increases the statistical uncertainty. The tests for significance are affected by the sample size. A larger sample reduces the risk of an observed correlation being

produced by chance. Also, a larger sample improves the possibility to detect small differences and weak significant correlations in the statistical analyses. In other words, what is at risk here is that weak significant correlations go by undetected. There is, furthermore, also the risk of rejecting a hypothesis which in fact is true. Hypothesis-testing is affected by sample size and dispersion of the variables. Large samples and small dispersions, *ceteris paribus*, increase the likelihood of a measured correlation or difference being significant.⁵¹

In the case of this study, there is little that can be done to come to terms with the size of the sample. It is nonetheless important for the reader to be aware of the impact the sample size can have on the result of the statistical analysis.

⁵¹ Djurfeldt, G *et al.* (2003), *Statistisk verktyglåda – samhällsvetenskaplig orsaksanalys med kvantitativa metoder*, p. 202ff

7 Result and Analysis

In this section the outcome of the statistical analysis of the relation between internal municipal factors and allocated EU funding will be presented. The result will be presented and analysed according to the hypotheses formulated in the theory discussion. This is followed by a summary of the findings.

7.1 Resource Factors and Allocation of EU Funding

The result and analysis concerning resource factors and allocation of EU funding is presented in this section. Since the database and material used for the analysis is not available to the reader, tables and graphic illustrations is employed to facilitate overview.

7.1.1 Financial Strength

The first hypothesis assumes that municipalities which are financially strong will receive more EU funding than municipalities which are not. According to this hypothesis EU funding should increase with financial strength, measured by taxpaying power (kr/inhabitant). However, looking at table 7.1.1.1 which is ranking municipality after amount of allocated EU funding, there seem to be no consistency in amount of EU funding and taxpaying power. The numbers within the brackets in the third column is the municipalities' ranking after tax paying power.

Table 7.1.1.1 EU Funding 2007-2009 - Tax Paying Power

Municipality	EU funding 2007-2009 (tkr)	Taxpaying power kr/inh.
1. Malmö	279975	144 245 (14)
2. Hässleholm	30342	144 621 (12)
3. Helsingborg	17100	162 445 (4)
4. Burlöv	12268	145 135 (11)
5. Hörby	12000	139 509 (16)
6. Kävlinge	4676	172 500 (2)
7. Bromölla	4653	152 808 (5)
8. Skurup	4239	146 540 (9)
9. Landskrona	3262	142 222 (15)

10. Östra Göinge	1783	147 880 (8)
11. Kristianstad	1596	152 506 (6)
12. Örkelljunga	1162	138 002 (18)
13. Simrishamn	640	146 476 (10)
14. Höör	0	147 997 (7)
14. Lomma	0	204 775 (1)
14. Perstorp	0	142 572 (13)
14. Sjöbo	0	138 576 (17)
14. Svedala	0	163 405 (3)

When running a test on correlation and measuring the correlation coefficient, it is confirmed that there is no correlation between the amount of allocated EU funding and taxpaying power.⁵² The measure of correlation, Pearson's r , is telling us the strength of the co-variation between the x-variable and the y-variable. The stronger the correlation is, the closer the coefficient is to +1 (positive correlation) or -1 (negative correlation) If there is no correlation between x and y, $r = 0$. When $r = \pm 1$ this indicates perfect correlation. However, when testing amount of allocated EU funding and taxpaying power, r is no more than -0.13 and thus far from indicating correlation of significance. For the correlation to be strong enough for it to be ascribed significance, the correlation coefficient needs to be above 0.5 for positive correlations or below -0.5 for negative correlations. The p-value, the number telling us if the test in itself is statistically significant, is above the critical 0.05 limit and thus the correlation, however weak, cannot be deemed statistically significant.⁵³

It can be noted that Malmö has received, in absolute terms, far more EU funding than any other municipality. When dividing the amount of allocated EU funding by number of inhabitants, this still holds true though the gap between Malmö and the rest of the municipalities is reduced (see table 7.2 below). Measuring EU funding in relative terms instead of absolute terms does strengthen the correlation with taxpaying power and although the strength of the correlation is increased, it is still not strong with $r = -0.30$.⁵⁴ Nonetheless, it is interesting to note that the variables are negatively related. Minus indicates a negative relation and in this case it means that when taxpaying power increases, EU funding decreases.⁵⁵ This relationship is contrary to what is expected from the hypothesis formulated. According to what is hypothesised, EU funding should be positively correlated with municipal taxpaying power. However, this is not the case. Though there is only room for speculations, it is not unreasonable to assume that financially strong municipalities do not have the same need or motivation to pool EU funding as those who are financially weak. In connection to this it can also be

⁵² Appendix I, 11.1.1. *Bivariate analysis: taxpaying power – total EU funding 2007-2009* p. 58

⁵³ Djurfeldt, G *et al.* (2003), *Statistisk verktygslåda – samhällsvetenskaplig orsaksanalys med kvantitativa metoder*, p. 162; 196

⁵⁴ Appendix I, 11.1.2. *Bivariate analysis: taxpaying power – EU funding/inh. 2007-2009*, p. 58

⁵⁵ Marsh C., Elliott, J. (2008), *Exploring Data – An introduction To Data Analysis for Social Scientists*, p. 193

noted that requirements for matching funds most likely do not act as a deterrent for financially weak municipalities. However, the p-value of the test is not denoting statistical significance and the test is therefore not generalisable to the population of the municipalities in Skåne. The hypothesis on financial strength and EU funding cannot be confirmed.

Table 7.1.1.2: EU funding 2007-2009 kr/inh. – Tax paying power

Municipality	EU funding 2007-2009 kr/inh.	Taxpaying power kr/inh.
1. Malmö	997	144 245 (14)
2. Hörby	832	139 509 (16)
3. Burlöv	767	145 135 (11)
4. Hässleholm	609	144 621 (12)
5. Bromölla	382	152 808 (5)
6. Skurup	287	146 540 (9)
7. Kävlinge	168	172 500 (2)
8. Helsingborg	137	162 445 (4)
9. Örkelljunga	129	138 002 (18)
10. Östra Göinge	121	147 880 (8)
11. Landskrona	81	142 222 (15)
12. Simrishamn	33	146 476 (10)
13. Kristianstad	21	152 506 (6)
14. Höör	0	147 997 (7)
14. Lomma	0	204 775 (1)
14. Perstorp	0	142 572 (13)
14. Sjöbo	0	138 576 (17)
14. Svedala	0	163 405 (3)

7.1.2 Municipal Organisation of EU work

The second hypothesis states that municipalities which employ people for the specific purpose of working with EU related tasks will receive more EU funding than municipalities which have not. Also, the amount of hours dedicated to EU related work tasks is hypothesised to correlate positively with the amount of allocated EU funding.

To begin with, it is interesting to note how the municipalities have solved the organisation of international/EU work. As illustrated by the pie chart below, a majority of the municipalities have employed a person with special responsibility for this kind of work. The second largest category is municipalities which have delegated the responsibility of international/EU work to someone working in the municipality, though this person is mainly concerned with other work tasks. However, the municipality does in fact have a person to turn to with questions

concerning EU. Only one of the municipalities included in the study does not have someone responsible for international/EU work.




Figure 7.1.1.1: Share of EU coordinators

Comment: the numbers are based on the responses given in the questionnaire. *Yes:* municipality has a person employed with special responsibility for international/EU work. *Other:* municipality has delegated the responsibility for international/EU work to one of their employees, though this person is mainly working with other tasks. *No:* municipality with no one responsible for international/EU work.

No clear pattern can be distinguished between organisation of EU work and the municipalities' size. Big as well as small municipalities have EU coordinators employed, even though it would be expected of the smaller municipalities to fall in the *no-* or *other-*category, as it is assumed that bigger municipalities have more resources (or a greater need) for employment of an EU coordinator or the equivalent.

As argued earlier, amount of time dedicated to EU work by the municipalities should matter as well. When first studying the population size and time spent on EU work, it is apparent that it is the biggest municipalities which also dedicate most time. The municipalities of Malmö, Helsingborg and Hässleholm (largest, second largest and fourth largest municipality respectively) all have EU coordinators employed full-time. Kristianstad, third largest of the municipalities studied, is an exception. It falls in the category *other* and dedicates only 5 hours per week to EU related tasks. In connection to this it is also interesting to note that the municipality of Skurup does not dedicate any hours at all to EU work though the municipality has delegated the responsibility to one of its employees.⁵⁶

Statistically testing the correlation between EU coordinators and EU funding is done by employing the Eta and Eta² tests. Since we are no longer dealing with two quantitative variables, but with one qualitative x-variable and one quantitative

⁵⁶ Appendix I, 11.1.6. Table: population size – EU coordinator – hours dedicated to EU work, p. 59

y-variable, Pearson's r cannot be used as the measure of correlation. Instead, comparison of means and Eta and Eta² tests will be used. The Eta-test takes on values ranging from 0 to 1, where 0 denotes no correlation and values around 1 denotes strong correlation. If we also want to know to what extent the x-variable explains the variation of the y-variable, the Eta²- test is used. Like the measure of Eta, Eta² takes on values between 0 and 1.

Comparison of means is a fairly uncomplicated measurement though it has some drawbacks. It is very sensitive to extreme values and such values have to be removed, otherwise there is the risk of distorting the result. In the case of Malmö, it has an extreme value and it is therefore necessary to exclude it from this particular test.⁵⁷

When studying comparison of means for allocated EU funding it seems as if municipalities with EU coordinators are allocating more EU funding than the other two categories. One should be somewhat careful though as the *no*-category only contains one observation. As the p -value is not indicating statistical significance, it is not meaningful to further analyse the Eta and Eta² tests (0.3 and 0.1 respectively). It can, however, be concluded that no correlation between EU coordinators and EU funding can be established.⁵⁸

Part of the second hypothesis is that the amount of hours dedicated to EU work will correlate positively with the amount of EU funding. Taking the test above into account, having an EU coordinator or not might not be what is important but rather how much time is dedicated to EU related work tasks. A bivariate correlation test on hours spent on EU work and EU funding produces a Pearson's r of 0.61, showing a fairly strong correlation. The p -value is confirming a statistically significant test as well, which means that it is generalisable to the population.⁵⁹ Based on this result, there is reason to also study the *coefficient of determination*, the R^2 . R^2 is a measure used for prediction, which assumes causality rather than correlation. The share of the total variation that can be explained by the x-variable is denoted by the coefficient of determination. R^2 takes on values ranging from 0 to 1. However, when R^2 is based on a small sample as in this case, it has a tendency to denote values that might be too high. To avoid this problem, the measure of *adjusted* R^2 is used instead.⁶⁰

When testing the coefficient of determination for the two variables the adjusted R^2 comes out at 0.32, meaning that 32 per cent of the variation in EU funding can be explained by time spent on EU work in the municipalities. In other

⁵⁷ Djurfeldt, G *et al.* (2003), *Statistisk verktygslåda – samhällsvetenskaplig orsaksanalys med kvantitativa metoder*, p. 158

⁵⁸ Appendix I, 11.1.4. *Comparison of means: EU coordinator – total EU funding 2007-2009*; 11.1.5. *Eta and Eta²: EU coordinator – total EU funding 2007-2009* p. 59

⁵⁹ Appendix I, 11.1.7. *Bivariate analysis: hours/week dedicated to EU work – total EU funding 2007-2009*; 11.1.8. *R² and adj. R²: hours/week dedicated to EU work – total EU funding 2007-2009*, p.60

⁶⁰ Djurfeldt, G *et al.* (2003), *Statistisk verktygslåda – samhällsvetenskaplig orsaksanalys med kvantitativa metoder*, p. 168f

words, time spent on EU work explains a rather small share of allocated EU funding.⁶¹

Though the second part of the analysis does confirm a correlation between number of hours dedicated to EU work and amount of allocated EU funding, the overall outcome is an interesting contrast to the revision reports from Klippan and Eslöv, where the role of the EU coordinator and the time spent on EU work was strongly emphasised in connection to allocation of EU funding.

Apparently, employing EU coordinators does not seem to be correlated to the amount of received EU funding. Could it be that knowledge about the European Union in general and EU funding in particular could be displaying a relation to the amount of allocated EU funding?

7.1.3 Knowledge

According to the third hypothesis, knowledge of how to pool funds to the municipality should also increase the amount of received EU funding. Knowledge is here measured by the amount of EU funding allocated to the municipality during the period of 2000-2006. If a municipality has been successful in the previous programme period it should, following the logic of the hypothesis, also be successful in this round.

First of all, the *p*-value is 0.000 and thus the test is statistically significant. When furthermore studying the test of the correlation coefficient it is indicating a very strong correlation (Pearson's $r = 0.91$) between funds allocated in the previous programme period and funds being allocated during the current one.⁶² Since we are dealing with two quantitative variables, it is not meaningful to do cross tabulations or compare means. Instead, the correlation occurring when testing allocated EU funding from the previous and current period is best illustrated with a scatter plot.⁶³

As the correlation between the two tested factors has been proved to be strong, it is also possible to do an R^2 test, testing the *coefficient of determination*. As already mentioned, R^2 is a measure used for prediction and is related to assumptions of causality. The share of the total variation that can be explained by the x-variable is denoted by the coefficient of determination, and the closer the dots in the scatter plot are to the line, the better is the prediction. In scatter plot 7.1.3.1 $R^2 = 0.83$. This would mean that 83 per cent of the variation in *y* can be explained by *x*. However, as discussed above R^2 shall not be used when dealing with a small number of cases but rather the *adjusted* R^2 . When applying it to these two factors *adj. R*² = 0.82, which means that 82 per cent of the variation of *y* is


⁶¹ Appendix I, 11.1.7. *Bivariate analysis: hours/week dedicated to EU work – total EU funding 2007-2009; 11.1.8. R^2 and adj. R^2 : hours/week dedicated to EU work – total EU funding 2007-2009*, p.60

⁶² Appendix I, 11.1.9: *Bivariate analysis: total EU funding 2000-2006 – total EU funding 2007-2009*, p. 60

⁶³ Djurfeldt, G *et al.* (2003), *Statistisk verktygslåda – samhällsvetenskaplig orsaksanalys med kvantitativa metoder*, p. 161

still explained by x .⁶⁴ It should be noted that the scatter plot is featuring one extreme value and that this case could have affected the strong R^2 value to some extent.⁶⁵

Figure 7.1.3.1 Scatter plot on correlation total EU funding 2000-06 - total EU funding 2007-09



As seen in the scatter plot above, the x-variable encompasses 8 years, while the y-variable only encompasses 3 years. All years from the current programme period are included and though it would have been optimal to have more years to make comparison to the previous programme period, this is obviously not possible. However, a tendency can be discerned. The municipalities which allocated EU funding between year 2000 and 2006 are continuously allocating EU funding during the current programme period. As of now there is a strong correlation and if the tendency continues this would mean that there is a definite correlation between knowledge measured as previously allocated EU funding and EU funding currently being allocated. Nonetheless, one cannot overlook the fact that this also could be an expression of path dependency. As evident from Mikael Granberg's study on state-funded climate cooperation, municipalities which had once received funding were more likely to also allocate funding from following programmes. Here it is argued, though, that this type of path dependency

⁶⁴ Appendix I, 11.1.10. R^2 and adj. R^2 : total EU funding 2000-2006 – total EU funding 2007-2009, p. 61

⁶⁵ Djurfeldt, G *et al.* (2003), *Statistisk verktygslåda – samhällsvetenskaplig orsaksanalys med kvantitativa metoder*, p. 168 -169

nonetheless reflects competence of the municipalities to allocated EU funding, which in turn relates back to knowledge.

In contrast to measuring knowledge on an aggregated level, it is also of interest to study how knowledge of EU and EU funding in the municipalities is perceived by the people working there. Perceived knowledge should be related to municipal activity in form of fund pooling and consequently it is of interest to study the correlation between perceived knowledge and received EU funding. However, before doing that, it is worth seeing how the resource factor *EU coordinator* varies with perceived knowledge. Logically, those municipalities which have an extra resource available with special knowledge of EU should also value their knowledge higher. Looking at how general knowledge varies with EU coordinator this is also confirmed. Out of the municipalities with an EU coordinator employed, 73 per cent consider themselves having very good or good knowledge of the EU. As for the category *other*, all of them are considering their general EU knowledge being very poor or poor. Only one of the municipalities falls in the category of no one responsible for EU work. This municipality consider itself having good knowledge of EU but the observations are too few to be reliable.⁶⁶

The variation between knowledge of EU funding and EU coordinator is less unambiguous. Out of the municipalities with an EU coordinator employed, 55 per cent value their knowledge as very good or good. 75 percent of the municipalities falling in the *other* category consider their knowledge of EU funding being very poor or poor. The one municipality falling in the *no* category now values its knowledge as poor, but again the observations are too few to be of importance.⁶⁷ Judging from this, EU coordinators seem to display some kind of relation to at least EU knowledge and knowledge of EU funding. The question that remains is if this kind of knowledge also is correlated to the amount of allocated EU funding.

Once again comparison of means and Eta and Eta² is used. Beginning with general knowledge of EU and allocation of EU funding, comparison of means shows that municipalities which value their EU knowledge as being good also allocates more EU funding. However, the measures of correlation and variance, Eta and Eta² are very low; 0.14 and 0.02 respectively, denoting no correlation.⁶⁸ The result is reproduced when testing knowledge of EU funding and amount of EU funding received. Measure of association is 0.25 for Eta and 0.06 for Eta². Neither of the *p*-values is below the critical limit for statistical significance.⁶⁹

The result for the different measures of knowledge is quite diverse. It cannot be denied that perceived knowledge might not reflect the actual knowledgebase correctly. It is a highly subjective measure of knowledge and people working in

⁶⁶ Appendix I, 11.1.11. Crosstabulation: EU knowledge – total EU funding 2007-2009, p. 61

⁶⁷ Appendix I, 11.1.12. Crosstabulation: knowledge of EU funding – total EU funding 2007-2009, p. 61

⁶⁸ Appendix I, 11.1.13. Comparison of means: EU knowledge – total EU funding 2007-2009; Eta and Eta²: EU knowledge – total EU funding 2007-2009, p. 61

⁶⁹ Appendix I, 11.1.14: ANOVA: EU knowledge – total EU funding 2007-2009; 11.1.16. ANOVA: Knowledge of EU funding – total EU funding 2007-2009; 11.1.17. Eta and Eta²: Knowledge EU funding – total EU funding 2007-2009, p. 62

the municipalities are possibly not fully aware or informed of the knowledge or the lack thereof. On the other hand, it is also fully possible that perceived knowledge is not correlated with allocation of EU funding. The perception in a municipality of it lacking knowledge of EU funding might not have any actual correlation with fund-pooling activities.

7.2 Structural Factors and Allocation of EU Funding

Leaving resource factors behind and continuing on to the hypotheses for structural factors, the hypotheses concerning population size and population density are dealt with together. The hypothesis on service sector and agricultural sector employees, and EU funding is also discussed in this section.

7.2.1 Population Size and Population Density

It has been hypothesised that EU funding is positively related to population size, meaning that EU funding will increase with the increase of the size of the population. When running a test on correlation between population and EU funding, Pearson's $r = 0.91$ and is thus indicating a very strong correlation. The p -value is below 0.05 and is denoting a statistically significant correlation test. As a correlation is established, the coefficient of determination, adjusted R^2 , is measured and also coming out strong at 0.83. Again, 83 per cent of the variation in EU funding can be explained by population size.⁷⁰

However, big populations may also mean more resources in form of personnel. The question is if municipal organisations, in terms of number of employees, have an impact on the analysis. To find out, a multiple regression analysis (MRA) is used. An MRA resembles a simple regression analysis. The one difference is that while simple regression analysis only analyses one independent variable, multiple regression analysis can test several independent variables against a dependent variable at the same time. This is done in order to isolate correlations and to test the variance within and between groups. The greater the variance is between groups the stronger is the correlation, which in turn increases the likelihood of a statistically significant correlation. The ANOVA, which is part of the regression analysis, is the test determining whether the variance is statistically significant or not. For the test to be significant, we want it to be as close to 0 as possible. In connection to this, it should also be noted that regression analyses are preferably used when dealing with a large number of

⁷⁰ Appendix I, 11.2.1. *Bivariate analysis: Population – total EU funding 2007-2009*; 11.2.2. *R² and adj. R²: Population – total EU funding 2007-2009*, p. 63

cases. This study only encompasses 18 cases and the statistical uncertainty might therefore be increased. This should, however, not be decisive for the final result.⁷¹

In addition to number of employees, the variable for financial strength, *taxpaying power*, is also included in the MRA. Together with municipal employees/1000 inhabitants, it can help explain why population size correlates with EU funding.

To start with, the *p*-value in the ANOVA test is statistically significant, which means that the test has captured a statistically significant part of the variance. It is therefore meaningful to also study the adjusted R^2 , which tells us that 81 per cent of the variance in EU funding can be explained by population size, number of municipal employees/1000 inhabitants and taxpaying power. However, when studying whether the *b*-coefficients (independent variables) are statistically significant or not, the test for population size is the only one significant. From this it can be concluded that only population size as an isolated variable is positively correlated with allocation of EU funding. In other words, number of municipal employees and taxpaying power do not show any independent correlation with EU funding.⁷²

Neither taxpaying power, nor municipal employees can account for the observed correlation between population size and EU funding. It can be confirmed that population size correlates with the amount of EU funding but as for possible causation it is, by logic, not the population size in itself that affect allocation, but rather what it brings with it. This leads on to the fifth hypothesis.

Hypothesis 5 states that high population density will correlate positively with the allocation of EU funding and indeed, a bivariate correlation test shows a significant correlation between population density and EU funding. According to the *p*-value the test is statistically significant. Pearson's *r* measures 0.89 and is denoting a very strong correlation with allocated EU funding.⁷³

When adding population density to the MRA tested above, 88 per cent of the variation in EU funding can be explained by population size, number of municipal employees/1000 inhabitants, taxpaying power and population density. The analysis of variance tells us that the likelihood of the result being produced by chance is less than 1 in 1000. When studying the statistical significance of the *b*-coefficients the result from above is once again reproduced, but with the difference that both population size and population density are now statistically significant and correlates positively with the amount of EU funding.⁷⁴

⁷¹ Djurfeldt, G *et al.* (2003), *Statistisk verktygslåda – samhällsvetenskaplig orsaksanalys med kvantitativa metoder*, p. 334

⁷² Appendix I, 11.2.3. R^2 and adj. R^2 : Population; municipal employees 1000/inh; taxpaying power – total EU funding 2007-2009; 11.2.4. ANOVA: Population; municipal employees 1000/inh; taxpaying power – total EU funding 2007-2009; 11.2.5. MRA: Population; municipal employees 1000/inh; taxpaying power – total EU funding 2007-2009 .p. 63

⁷³ Appendix I, 11.2.6. Bivariate analysis: Population density – total EU funding 2007-2009 p.64

⁷⁴ Appendix I, 11.2.8. ANOVA: Population; municipal employees 1000/inh; taxpaying power; population density – total EU funding 2007-2009; 11.2.7. R^2 and adj. R^2 : Population; municipal employees 1000/inh; taxpaying power; population density – total EU funding 2007-2009; 11.2.9. MRA: Population; municipal employees 1000/inh; taxpaying power; population density – total EU funding 2007-2009, p.64f

It is obvious that size of the population and population density correlates with the amount of allocated EU funding. What it is cannot be detected here but it is not unlikely that external factors have a role in this. As argued earlier, municipalities with large populations are believed to have higher pressure on them to allocated funds of different kinds. Pressure is unfortunately not a factor accounted for here.

7.2.2 Service Sector and Agricultural Sector

The sixth hypothesis assumes that municipalities with a high share of service sector employees will receive more EU funding compared to other municipalities. Likewise, it is assumed that municipalities with a high share of employees within the agricultural sector will receive less EU funding.

When testing the correlation between percentage of employees in the service sector and EU funding, Pearson's r equals 0.32 and is thus denoting a weak and positive correlation. However, the p -value tells us that the test is not significant. The correlation test between percentage of employees in the agricultural sector and EU funding comes out even lower. Though Pearson's r is only -0.27, the direction of the correlation is confirmed; when the percentage of agricultural employees increases, the amount of EU funding decreases. Though, as in the case of service sector employees the p -value is not below the 0.05 limit. Consequently, neither of the tests is statistically significant and is therefore not of any importance.⁷⁵

7.3 Political Factors and Allocation of EU Funding

The two last hypothesis concerning political factors will be dealt with and presented here.

7.3.1 Political Majority

Hypothesis 7 on political majority does not make any assumption whether it is left-wing majority, right-wing majority or other mixed majority in the municipalities which correlates with allocated EU funding. It is up to the statistical analysis to detect any such pattern.

However, before doing that, it is worth noting what the division of political majority between the municipalities looks like. As illustrated below, a majority of

⁷⁵ Appendix I, 11.2.10. *Bivariate analysis: Service sector employees – total EU funding 2007-2009*; 11.2.11. *Bivariate analysis; agricultural sector employees – total EU funding 2007-2009*, p.65

the municipalities included in the study have a right-wing majority, followed by left-wing majority and other majority.




Figure 7.3.2.1: Pie chart on political majority

Again, we are dealing with one qualitative and one quantitative variable, which means Pearson's r cannot be used as a measure of correlation. Instead, comparison of means and Eta and Eta² is once more employed.

For this hypothesis we are interested in knowing how political majorities correlates with EU funding. When running a means test it seems as if municipalities with parties collaborating across the political blocks and left-wing majorities are allocating slightly less funding from the structural funds than municipalities with right-wing majorities.⁷⁶ However, when applying the two measures of correlation, no correlation between political majority and EU funding can be detected. Rather, the running of the two variables, *political majority* and *EU funding*, reveals a very weak correlation without statistical significance. Eta = 0.21 and Eta² is even lower showing 0.04. As a result, no correlation between political majority and amount of EU funding can be established using a bivariate analysis.⁷⁷

⁷⁶ Appendix I, 11.3.1. Comparison of means: Political majority – total EU funding 2007-2009, p. 66

⁷⁷ Appendix I, 11.3.2. ANOVA: Political majority – total EU funding 2007-2009; 11.3.3. Eta and Eta²: Political majority – total EU funding 2007-2009, p. 66

7.3.2 EU Strategy

The eighth hypothesis states that municipalities which have an international/EU strategy in use are receiving more EU funding than municipalities not using or without such a strategy.

The comparison of means between those who have an EU strategy and those who do not shows a result in line with what is argued here; those which have an EU strategy are receiving more EU funding compared to municipalities not having one. Unfortunately when looking at the p -value it is revealed that the test is not statistically significant.⁷⁸ However, what is argued is that not only does it matter if the municipalities have an EU strategy but also to what extent it is employed in their EU work. Consequently, the existence of an EU strategy in the municipalities and the extent of usage should be positively correlated with the amount of allocated EU funding. Checking the correlation for those municipalities which have an EU strategy, the extent of the usage of the strategy and EU funding does however not give rise to any major changes to the outcome of the correlation test. Surprisingly though, out of the municipalities having an EU strategy, the means comparison shows that the municipalities which claim that they are using their strategy to a high extent receives *less* EU funding than those which claim a low extent of usage. The Eta test is however not statistically significant. As in the case of political majority, a correlation between international/EU strategy and usage of strategy cannot be established with the amount of EU funding in a bivariate analysis.⁷⁹

7.4 All Independent Variables and EU Funding

The statistical data analysis has provided that hours dedicated to EU funding, population size, population density and knowledge measured as previously allocated EU funding correlates with amount of allocated EU funding in bivariate analyses. It is therefore meaningful to do a multivariate regression analysis (MRA) on all independent variables in order to see if the observed correlations also hold when isolating correlation and controlling for correlations with other independent variables. It is also possible to detect correlations in a multivariate analysis which have not been shown in bivariate analyses. Thus there are strong reasons for employing an MRA.

⁷⁸ Appendix I, 11.3.4. Comparison of means: Int./EU strategy – total EU funding 2007-2009; 11.3.5. ANOVA: Int./EU strategy – total EU funding 2007-2009; 11.3.6. Eta and Eta²: Int./EU strategy – total EU funding 2007-2009, p.67

⁷⁹ Appendix I, 11.3.7. Comparison of means: Usage int./EU strategy – total EU funding 2007-2009; 11.3.8. ANOVA: Usage int./EU strategy – total EU funding 2007-2009; 11.3.9. Eta and Eta²: Usage int./EU strategy – total EU funding 2007-2009, p. 67f

To begin with it can be established that the p -value is statistically significant and thus also the multivariate regression analysis. However, when looking at the b -coefficients none of them are statistically significant when employing a security level of 95 percent, meaning that out of 100 cases 5 will be accepted as statistically significant on false grounds.⁸⁰ This is the certainty level normally employed within social sciences.⁸¹ The conclusion that can be drawn from this outcome is that the variables showing strong correlations which also were statistically significant in the bivariate analyses are not unaffected by other variables. They do not individually display a correlation with the amount of EU funding. Neither do any previously undetected correlations surface in the MRA.

Considering that some of the bivariate correlations were very strong the result might be surprising. The MRA result can be ascribed to one of two explanations. First, the reason for the variables not being statistically significant when running them in a MRA is because the bivariate correlations were spurious. This means that the correlation was false and when the variables are tested against other variables the statistical significance no longer holds true.⁸²

Second, one can suspect that the MRA might not be telling the whole truth. As already discussed, this study is dealing with relatively few cases which might mean that only very strong correlations can be proved as the statistical uncertainty is increased. An MRA on all the independent variables and the one dependent variable, EU funding, is potentially not producing a correlation strong enough to be detected and deemed statistically significant. It is, however, customary to ascribe MRA greater significance than bivariate analyses. Based on this the first explanation of spurious correlations are most likely in this case.

As already mentioned, a certainty level of 95 per cent was employed to determine statistically significant correlations in this MRA but it is possible to lower the level of security to 90 per cent. This would mean that out of 100 cases 10 would be accepted on false grounds. In other words correlations produced by chance are more likely to be accepted and it is in statistical terms bordering to risky business. It is, though, not uncommon to lower the level of certainty when dealing with a small number of cases.⁸³ As this study do have a small number of cases, it could be beneficial to at least study what happens if the level of certainty is lowered.

Much remains unchanged, but for two variables the b -coefficient is now statistically significant. The variables are population density and political majority. When studying the political majority it is revealed that left-wing majority is allocating more EU funding than right-wing majority and other majority. This is an unexpected outcome, both when considering previous studies

⁸⁰ Appendix I, 11.4.1. MRA: all independent variables – total EU funding 2007-2009; 11.4.2.ANOVA: all independent variables – total EU funding 2007-2009, p.68

⁸¹ Marsh C., Elliott, J. (2008), *Exploring Data – An introduction To Data Analysis for Social Scientists*, p. 151

⁸² Djurfeldt, G *et al.* (2003), *Statistisk verktygslåda – samhällsvetenskaplig orsaksanalys med kvantitativa metoder*, p. 350

⁸³ Djurfeldt, G *et al.* (2003), *Statistisk verktygslåda – samhällsvetenskaplig orsaksanalys med kvantitativa metoder*, p. 366

on the relation between political majority and EU funding, and Ström's assertion that political majority is a weak factor in this context.⁸⁴

7.5 Discussion on Outcome

The question to be answered is if a relation between internal factors and the amount of allocated EU funding can be observed. In order to answer this question, eight hypotheses covering resource factors, structural factors and political factors have been tested. The result from the statistical data analysis is unambiguous. Simply put, no relation between internal municipal factors and the amount of allocated EU funding can be observed. However, a non-existent relation can be just as interesting as an actual established relation. If nothing else, it tells us that internal factors might just not be as important as first believed.

A somewhat worrying outcome is the one concerning EU coordinators and EU funding. A statistically significant correlation between the variables has not been established. Considering both the revision reports emphasis on the role of EU coordinators and the resources some municipalities invest in EU coordinators, the result is discouraging. If an EU coordinator does not add value to the municipality it would, in harsh words, mean that he or she is a waste of resources. However, when studying the municipalities and their perceived knowledge of EU there seem to be a connection between valuing EU knowledge as very good or good and EU coordinators. This tendency is reoccurring for knowledge of EU funding and EU coordinators, though it is not as unambiguous as the previous one. In other words, in some aspects EU coordinators add value to the municipality, but just not in financial terms, at least not according to this study and in the case of the municipalities of Skåne.

It is also interesting to note that financial strength does not correlate with the amount of allocated EU funding. According to the study carried out by Berg and Lindahl on west-Swedish municipalities, availability of resources is of great importance to all kinds of international work, pooling of EU funding included. However, this study cannot even establish a correlation between financial strength and allocated EU funding. Over all, factors which have been ascribed great importance for allocation of EU funding do not, in the case of the municipalities of Skåne, display any relation of importance to the amount of allocated EU funding.

However, if we accept a lowering of the level of certainty to 90 per cent, some variables are statistically significant. As already mentioned, it is somewhat risky to lower the level of certainty as the correlations occurring might be false. Nonetheless, it is interesting to note that population density is strongly correlated to the amount of EU funding in a bivariate analysis. This correlation still holds

⁸⁴ Appendix I, 11.4.3.MRA: *all independent variables – total EU funding 2007-2009*, p. 69

true in the MRA. There might just be something in the argument about municipalities with high population density and their ability to mobilise internally and pull funding into the municipal organisation.

The variable of political majority which has not displayed any correlations with the amount of allocated EU funding in bivariate analyses, was also statistically significant in the MRA when employing a certainty level of 90 per cent. Furthermore, it also tells us that left-wing majorities are associated with higher levels of EU funding. This is both interesting and surprising as studies on political majority in general have concluded that municipalities with right-wing majorities have a more positive attitude and higher levels of activity towards EU. Ström's argument that the political factor in the context of allocation of funding is a weak factor is also not correct in the case of municipalities in Skåne. It is advisable to be careful with conclusions based on a certainty level of 90 per cent, but left-wing majorities pushing EU funding into the municipalities could be the case for the municipalities of Skåne.

As discussed earlier, the dimension of resource pulling and resource pushing were to be added to the different factors. However, as the result from the statistical analysis has not been able to establish any relation between internal factors and allocation of EU funding, it is also difficult to tell if it is factors pushing resources or factors pulling resources into the municipalities which are of greater importance when it comes to allocation EU funding.

8 Conclusion and Final Note

The purpose of the study has been to study if there are any internal factors which are of importance to the allocation of EU funding to the municipalities of Skåne. By the means of statistical data analysis it has been attempted to find an answer to the question: *can a relation between internal factors of the municipalities and the amount of EU funding allocated be observed; and if yes, what does this relation show?*

Though some correlations have been observed when employing bivariate analyses the general outcome is that there is no relation between the studied internal factors of the municipalities and the amount of EU funding allocated in the case of municipalities in Skåne. One possible explanation to this outcome is the fact that internal factors, here divided between resource factors, structural factors and political factors do not matter to the extent commonly believed. This study has been focused on internal factors. To get a broader picture of allocation of EU funding to municipalities, these factors should be complemented with other factors which have not been covered here, such as external factors and possibly also other internal factors. Arguably such factors could as well play a role in allocation of EU funding to municipalities.

In the table below, the result from the statistical data analysis is presented. As can be noted in the case of political majority and population density, they do display correlation of statistical significance, though only with a certainty level of 90 per cent. If accepting the lowered certainty, it is interesting to note that in the case of political majority a tendency of left-wing majorities allocating more EU funding can be discerned. This is contrary to the result of previous studies. Population density is also showing a strong correlation with amount of allocated EU funding, both in the bivariate analysis and the MRA if a certainty level of 90 per cent is employed. It is possible that there is some truth to the argument that municipalities with high population density have a greater ability to mobilise internally and pull funding into the municipal organisation.

Table 8.1: Factors, hypotheses and results

FACTORS	FACTORS Specified	HYPOTHESIS	RESULT
Resource	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Financial (<i>pushing</i>) - Personnel (<i>pushing</i>) - Knowledge (<i>pushing</i>) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>Financially strong municipalities will receive more EU funding</i> - <i>Municipalities with EU coordinators will receive more EU funding. The more work hours dedicated to EU work, the more EU funding.</i> - <i>Knowledge will increase likelihood of receiving EU funding</i> 	<p>Not confirmed.</p> <p>Not confirmed, though number of hours dedicated to EU work/week displayed a correlation in bivariate analysis.</p> <p>Not confirmed, though knowledge measured as previous allocated EU funding displayed a strong correlation in bivariate analysis.</p>
Structural	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Population (<i>pulling</i>) - Population density (<i>pulling</i>) - Number of employees in service sector (<i>pulling</i>) - Number of employees in agricultural sector (<i>pulling</i>) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>Large populations will receive more EU funding than small ones</i> - <i>High population density will receive more EU funding than low population density</i> - <i>High share of service sector employees will receive more EU funding</i> - <i>High share of agricultural sector employees will receive less EU funding</i> 	<p>Not confirmed, though displaying a strong correlation in bivariate analysis.</p> <p>Confirmed only on a certainty level of 90 percent. Displaying strong correlation in bivariate analysis.</p> <p>Not confirmed.</p> <p>Not confirmed.</p>
Political	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Political majority (<i>pushing</i>) - Int./EU strategy (<i>pushing</i>) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>Political majority will affect allocation of EU funding</i> - <i>Municipalities with int./EU strategy will receive more EU funding</i> 	<p>Confirmed only on a certainty level of 90 percent. Not displaying correlation in bivariate analysis.</p> <p>Not confirmed.</p>

For future research, further studying of the possible correlation between left-wing majority and allocation of EU funding, and population density and EU funding could be of interest. Another potential way to explore the result of the study could be the use of other methods. As discussed earlier statistical data analysis has its drawbacks. This has been evident in this study as well. There is only so much quantitative methods can explain. However, the purpose of using statistical data analysis was to establish if there *de facto* is a relation between internal factors and allocation of EU funding. It has been established that there is no relation between these factors and when the question of *if* has been answered,

the question of *why* might be next in line. To bring further clarity to the result, the study could very well benefit from other methods, preferably qualitative methods such as interviews.

It can furthermore not be denied that the result of the study is much dependent on the material available. With the addition of more municipalities the outcome might have been different. This is of course true for all kind of studies and not just quantitative ones, though they arguably are more sensitive when it comes to availability and use of material. To bring down the level of uncertainty, the number of cases could be increased. Nonetheless, in the case of Skåne the maximum number of cases is 33, which might still be too small.

In conclusion, what is behind the allocation of EU funding to the municipalities of Skåne has escaped this study. One thing is quite evident though; it is not the internal municipal factors studied.

9 Executive Summary

The starting point of this study was the Lisbon strategy statement that the European Union is to become the most dynamic and competitive knowledge-based economy in the world by 2010. To achieve this goal the European Union has the regional policy and the structural funds as one of its key instrument.

During the period of 2007-2013, a total of SEK3 billion will be allocated to the region of Skåne-Blekinge. A share of that sum will be further allocated to the municipalities of Skåne. To receive funding the municipalities need to actively engage in fund-pooling activities and some municipalities are more successful than others in doing so. In this context it is thus interesting to study the relation between internal factors and the amount of allocated EU funding. The aim of this thesis was to study if there are any internal factors which are of importance to the allocation of EU funding to the municipalities of Skåne.

The theoretical framework encompasses three types of internal factors which are believed to be of importance to the allocation of funding; resource factors, structural factors and political factors. Based on theoretical assumptions surrounding these factors, eight hypotheses were formulated. In the case of resource factors three hypotheses concerning financial strength, the organization of EU work and knowledge were developed. Three hypotheses were also formulated in connection to structural factors. These hypotheses concerned population size, population density, number of service sector employees and number of agricultural sector employees. Finally, two hypotheses were formulated based on the theoretical assumptions on political factors. The hypotheses concerned political majority and the existence and usage of international/EU strategy in the municipalities.

A quantitative method was applied in this study, motivated by the fact that the study wanted to establish a relation between internal factors and the amount of allocated EU funding. As it was attempted to study *if* there is a relation rather than *why* it necessitates a quantitative study. The quantitative method employed was statistical data analysis.

Though it would have been preferable to have included all the municipalities in Skåne, 15 of them did not have or was unable to submit the material needed for this study. Covering 55 per cent of the population is fairly good, but as the population is small to start with the small sample size could have potential effect on the result. This is mainly the case when trying to detect weak correlations of statistical significance. However, in general the small sample size should not have a decisive impact on the result outcome. Nevertheless it cannot be denied that larger sample would also increase the level of certainty.

The study was concentrated on the amount of EU funding allocated to the 18 municipalities during the current programme period, i.e. year 2007 to 2009. Only

EU funding from the structural funds, the European Social Fund and the European Regional Development Fund, covering the objective of regional competitiveness and employment has been included.

The material on the amount of allocated EU funding has been collected first hand from the municipalities. This has been complemented with material gathered from already existing databases found at Statistics Sweden, *kommundatabas.se* and the SPSS database *Kfakta06*, constructed by Leif Johansson at Lund University. All the material has then been entered into an SPSS database constructed for this study.

The statistical data analysis was divided into four parts, three of them were each in turn dealing with resource factors, structural factors and political factors. The last part combined all the independent variables which had previously been individually tested and ran them in a multivariate regression analysis. The analysis of the internal factors and the amount of allocated EU funding did not show any relation between them. Statistically significant correlations occurring in bivariate analyses disappeared when the variables were isolated and controlled for in the multivariate analysis. Only when lowering the level of certainty in the MRA, a statistically significant outcome could be produced for two of the variables, *political majority* and *population density*. Especially interesting in this context is that according to the MRA, left-wing majorities are allocating more EU funding than right-wing majority or other majority. Though it is argued that the lowering of the certainty level is risky, it is not uncommon in studies dealing with a small amount of cases. In either case, it is interesting to at least note that some variables might potentially have a relation to the amount of allocated EU funding.

However, not only established relations are of interest but also the lack thereof. A worrying outcome in this context was the one concerning EU coordinators and EU funding. A statistically significant correlation between the variables could not be established. Revision reports emphasise on the role of EU coordinators and municipalities invest large sums of money on EU coordinators. If an EU coordinator does not add value to the municipality it could mean a waste of resources. When studying the municipalities and their perceived knowledge of EU there seem to be a connection between valuing EU knowledge as very good or good and EU coordinators and this tendency was reoccurring for knowledge of EU funding and EU coordinators. It could mean that in some aspects EU coordinators add value to the municipality, however not in financial terms.

It is also interesting that financial strength does not correlate with the amount of allocated EU funding. According to previous studies availability of resources is of great importance to all kinds of international work. Nonetheless, this study has not been able to establish any type of correlation between financial strength and allocated EU funding. Reoccurring in this study is that factors which have been ascribed great importance for allocation of EU funding did not, in the case of the municipalities of Skåne, display any relation of importance to the amount of allocated EU funding.

The result has led to the suggestions that future research could benefit from studying the importance of external factors. As they are not included in this study

it cannot be overlooked that they also could be related to the allocation of EU funding. Furthermore, if accepting the low certainty level it could also be interesting to further study the tendency of left-wing majorities allocating more EU funding, as this is contrary to the result of previous studies. Likewise, it could be fruitful to study the correlation of population density and allocation of EU funding.

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11 Appendix I

11.1 Resource Factors

		total EU funding 2007-09 (tkr)	Tax paying power kr/inh.
total EU funding 2007-09 (tkr)	Pearson Correlation	1	-,132
	Sig. (2-tailed)		,602
	N	18	18
Tax paying power kr/inh.	Pearson Correlation	-,132	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,602	
	N	18	18

11.1.1. Bivariate analysis: total EU funding 2007-09 – Tax paying power

Correlations

		Tax paying power kr/inh.	Funding/inhab 07-09
Tax paying power kr/inh.	Pearson Correlation	1	-,297
	Sig. (2-tailed)		,232
	N	18	18
Funding/inhab 07-09	Pearson Correlation	-,297	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,232	
	N	18	18

11.1.2 Bivariate analysis: funding/inh. 2007-09 – Tax paying power

EU coordinator	Mean	N	Std. Deviation
yes	7083,40	10	10038,309
no	3262,00	1	
other	1904,50	4	1749,947
Total	5447,60	15	8442,432

11.1.3 Comparison of means: EU coordinator – total EU funding 2007-2009

		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
total EU funding 2007-09 (tkr) * EU coordinator	Between Groups	8,175E7	2	4,087E7	,535	,599
	Within Groups	9,161E8	12	7,634E7		
	Total	9,978E8	14			

11.1.4 ANOVA: EU coordinator – total EU funding 2007-2009

	Eta	Eta Squared
total EU funding 2007-09 (tkr) * EU coordinator	,286	,082

11.1.5 Measure of association: EU coordinator – total EU funding 2007-2009

Municipality after falling population size	EU coordinator	Time spent on EU related work (h/week)
1. Malmö	Yes	40
2. Helsingborg	Yes	40
3. Kristianstad	Other	5
4. Hässleholm	Yes	40
5. Landskrona	No	-
6. Kävlinge	Yes	1
7. Lomma	Other	2
8. Simrishamn	Yes	5
9. Svedala	Yes	8
10. Sjöbo	Other	
11. Burlöv	Yes	2

12. Höör	Other	2
13. Skurup	Other	0
14. Hörby		
15. Örkelljunga	Yes	10
16. Bromölla	Yes	5
17. Östra Göinge	Yes	5
18. Perstorp	Yes	4

11.1.6. Table Population size – EU coordinator – Time spent on EU related work

		total EU funding 2007-09 (tkr)	hours spent on EU work/week
total EU funding 2007-09 (tkr)	Pearson Correlation	1	,606*
	Sig. (2-tailed)		,017
	N	18	15
hours spent on EU work/week	Pearson Correlation	,606*	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,017	
	N	15	15

11.1.7. Bivariate analysis: total EU funding 2007-09 – Hours spent on EU work/week

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	,606 ^a	,367	,318	58904,172

11.1.8. R^2 and adjusted R^2 : total EU funding 2007-09 – Hours spent on EU work/week

		total EU funding 2000-06 (tkr)	total EU funding 2007-09 (tkr)
total EU funding 2000-06 (tkr)	Pearson Correlation	1	,913**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		,000
	N	18	18
total EU funding 2007-09 (tkr)	Pearson Correlation	,913**	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,000	
	N	18	18

11. 1.9 Bivariate analysis: total EU funding 2000-06 – total EU funding 2007-2009

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	,913 ^a	,834	,823	27411,602

11. 1.10 R^2 and adjusted R^2 : total EU funding 2000-06 – total EU funding 2007-09.

		EU coordinator			Total	
		yes	no	other		
EU knowledge 2cat	Poor	Count	3	0	4	7
		% within EU coordinator	27,3%	,0%	100,0%	43,8%
	Good	Count	8	1	0	9
		% within EU coordinator	72,7%	100,0%	,0%	56,3%
Total		Count	11	1	4	16
		% within EU coordinator	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

11.1.11. Crosstabulation: EU knowledge – EU coordinator

		EU coordinator			Total	
		yes	no	other		
Knowledge EU funding cat. 2	Poor	Count	5	1	3	9
		% within EU coordinator	45,5%	100,0%	75,0%	56,3%
	Good	Count	6	0	1	7
		% within EU coordinator	54,5%	,0%	25,0%	43,8%
Total		Count	11	1	4	16
		% within EU coordinator	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

11.1.12. Crosstabulation: Knowledge EU funding – EU coordinator

EU knowledge 2cat	Mean	N	Std. Deviation
Poor	4199,14	7	5979,699
Good	6540,00	8	10439,261
Total	5447,60	15	8442,432

11.1.13. Mean: EU knowledge – total EU funding 2007-09

			Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
total EU funding 2007-09 (tkr) * EU knowledge 2cat	Between Groups	(Combined)	2,046E7	1	2,046E7	,272	,611
	Within Groups		9,774E8	13	7,518E7		
	Total		9,978E8	14			

11.1.14. ANOVA: EU knowledge – total EU funding 2007-09

	Eta	Eta Squared
total EU funding 2007-09 (tkr) * EU knowledge 2cat	,143	,021

11.1.15. Eta and Eta²: EU knowledge – total EU funding 2007-09

			Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
total EU funding 2007-09 (tkr) * Knowledge EU funding cat. 2	Between Groups	(Combined)	6,360E7	1	6,360E7	,885	,364
	Within Groups		9,342E8	13	7,186E7		
	Total		9,978E8	14			

11.1.16. ANOVA: Knowledge of EU funding – total EU funding 2007-09

	Eta	Eta Squared
total EU funding 2007-09 (tkr) * Knowledge EU funding cat. 2	,252	,064

11.1.17. Eta and Eta²: Knowledge of EU funding – total EU funding 2007-09

11.2 Structural Factors

Population	Pearson Correlation	1	,914**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		,000
	N	18	18
total EU funding 2007-09 (tkr)	Pearson Correlation	,914**	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,000	
	N	18	18

11.2.1. Bivariate analysis: Population – total EU funding 2007-09

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	,914 ^a	,836	,826	27223,558

11.2.2. R^2 and adj. R^2 : Population – total EU funding 2007-09

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	,920 ^a	,846	,813	28158,022

11.2.3. R^2 and adj. R^2 : Population; Municipal employees 1000/inh.; tax paying power – total EU funding 2007-09

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	6,111E10	3	2,037E10	25,693	,000 ^a
	Residual	1,110E10	14	7,929E8		
	Total	7,222E10	17			

11.2.4. ANOVA: Population; Municipal employees/1000 inh.; tax paying power – total EU funding 2007-09 (dependent)

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	51236,409	78159,791		,656	,523
	Population	,897	,103	,910	8,679	,000
	Number of municipal employees/1000 inh.	-99,965	582,134	-,018	-,172	,866
	Tax paying power kr/inh.	-,408	,424	-,101	-,962	,352

11.2.5. MRA: Population; Municipal employees/1000 inh.; tax paying power – total EU funding 2007-09 (dependent)

		total EU funding 2007-09 (tkr)	Population density inh/km2
total EU funding 2007-09 (tkr)	Pearson Correlation	1	,891**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		,000
	N	18	18
Population density inh/km2	Pearson Correlation	,891**	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,000	
	N	18	18

11.2.6. Bivariate analysis: Population density – total EU funding 2007-09

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	,953 ^a	,907	,879	22682,851

11.2.7. R^2 and adj. R^2 : Population; Municipal employees 1000/inh.; tax paying power; population density – total EU funding 2007-09

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	6,553E10	4	1,638E10	31,839	,000 ^a
	Residual	6,689E9	13	5,145E8		
	Total	7,222E10	17			

11.2.8. ANOVA: Population; Municipal employees 1000/inh.; tax paying power; population density – total EU funding 2007-09

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	48967,987	62966,820		,778	,451
	Population	,527	,151	,535	3,482	,004
	Number of municipal employed/1000 inh.	118,070	474,816	,021	,249	,808
	Tax paying power kr/inh.	-,503	,343	-,124	-1,466	,166
	Population density inh/km2	65,707	22,439	,452	2,928	,012

11.2.9. MRA: Population; Municipal employees 1000/inh.; tax paying power; population density – total EU funding 2007-09 (dependent)

		total EU funding 2007-09 (tkr)	% servicesysselsatta (inkl off sektor) 1996
total EU funding 2007-09 (tkr)	Pearson Correlation	1	,318
	Sig. (2-tailed)		,198
	N	18	18
% servicesysselsatta (inkl off sektor) 1996	Pearson Correlation	,318	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,198	
	N	18	18

11.2.10. Bivariate analysis: service sector employees – total EU funding 2007-09

		% jordbrukssysselsatta 1996	total EU funding 2007-09 (tkr)
% jordbrukssysselsatta 1996	Pearson Correlation	1	-,271
	Sig. (2-tailed)		,276
	N	18	18
total EU funding 2007-09 (tkr)	Pearson Correlation	-,271	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,276	
	N	18	18

11.2.11. Bivariate analysis: agricultural sector employees – total EU funding 2007-09

11.3 Political Factors

Political majority	Mean	N	Std. Deviation
other majority	6130,50	2	8669,836
left-wing majority	1938,33	3	2421,698
right-wing majority	6303,17	12	9228,901
Total	5512,59	17	8179,180

11.3.1. Comparison of means: Political majority – total EU-funding 2007-09

			Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
total EU funding 2007-09 (tkr) * Political majority	Between Groups	(Combined)	4,659E7	2	2,329E7	,319	,732
	Within Groups		1,024E9	14	7,313E7		
	Total		1,070E9	16			

11.3.2. ANOVA: Political majority - total EU funding 2007-09

	Eta	Eta Squared
total EU funding 2007-09 (tkr) * Political majority	,209	,044

11.3.3. Eta- and Eta²-tests: Political majority - total EU funding 2007-09

International/EU strategy	Mean	N	Std. Deviation
yes	7102,00	10	9984,582
no	2138,80	5	2150,991
Total	5447,60	15	8442,432

11.3.4. Comparison of means: Int./EU strategy – total EU-funding 2007-09

			Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
total EU funding 2007-09 (tkr) *	Between Groups	(Combined)	8,211E7	1	8,211E7	1,166	,300
International/EU strategy	Within Groups		9,157E8	13	7,044E7		
	Total		9,978E8	14			

11.3.5. ANOVA: Int./ EU strategy - total EU funding 2007-09

	Eta	Eta Squared
total EU funding 2007-09 (tkr) * International/EU strategy	,287	,082

11.3.6. Eta- and Eta²-tests: Int./EU strategy - total EU funding 2007-09

Usage EU strategy cat.	Mean	N	Std. Deviation
Low usage	11395,20	5	12235,674
High usage	3511,00	4	5893,576
Total	7891,11	9	10254,172

11.3.7. Comparison of means: usage EU strategy – total EU-funding 2007-09

			Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
total EU funding 2007-09 (tkr) * Usage EU strategy cat.	Between Groups	(Combined)	1,381E8	1	1,381E8	1,375	,279
	Within Groups		7,030E8	7	1,004E8		
	Total		8,412E8	8			

11.3.8. ANOVA: Usage - total EU funding 2007-09

	Eta	Eta Squared
total EU funding 2007-09 (tkr) * Usage EU strategy cat.	,405	,164

11.3.9. Eta- and Eta²-tests: usage EU strategy - total EU funding 2007-09

11.4 All Independent Variables and EU Funding

Model	Variables Entered	Variables Removed	Method
1	EU strategy_yes dummy, Knowledge EU funding dummy, total EU funding 2000-07, Tax paying power kr/inh., % jordbrukssysselsatta 1996, Political majority other dummy, hours spent on EU work/week, % servicesysselsatta (inkl off sektor) 1996, Population density inh/km2, Political Majority right dummy, Population ^a	.	Enter

11.4.1. MRA: all independent variables - total EU funding 2007-09

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	7,017E10	11	6,379E9	17,672	,019 ^a
	Residual	1,083E9	3	3,610E8		
	Total	7,125E10	14			

11.4.2. ANOVA: all independent variables - total EU funding 2007-09

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	-90933,315	116782,368		-,779	,493
	hours spent on EU work/week	28,099	640,257	,006	,044	,968
	Population	,992	,520	1,002	1,908	,152
	total EU funding 2000-07	-,002	,001	-,951	-1,823	,166
	Tax paying power kr/inh.	,093	,564	,022	,165	,880
	Population density inh/km2	78,996	31,977	,539	2,470	,090
	% jordbrukssysselsatta 1996	3675,623	2368,646	,232	1,552	,219

% servicesysselsatta (inkl off sektor) 1996	2124,250	1342,005	,411	1,583	,212
Political Majority right dummy	-128760,466	42333,019	-,915	-3,042	,056
Political majority other dummy	-123247,221	39238,047	-,608	-3,141	,052
Knowledge EU funding dummy	11099,813	15249,835	,080	,728	,519
EU strategy_yes dummy	22472,417	34674,907	,154	,648	,563

11.4.3. MRA: all independent variables - total EU funding 2007-09

12 Appendix II

FRÅGEFORMULÄR

Kommunens organisation angående EU-frågor

1. Har kommunen anställt personal med särskilt EU-kunnande, t.ex. EU-samordnare eller EU-koordinator?

Ja Nej

• Om **ja**, hur många timmar per vecka använder denna person/dessa personer på EU-frågor?
..... timmar.

• Om **nej**, har annan personal ansvar för EU-frågorna i kommunen?

Ja timmar/vecka Nej

2. Har en eller flera personer inom den kommunala förvaltningen utsetts att ha ansvar för EU-frågor?

Ja Nej

• Om **ja**, hur många timmar per vecka använder denna person/dessa personer på EU-frågor?
..... timmar

3. Enligt Dig, hur är den generella kunskapen om EU i kommunen? Markera med X.

Mycket dålig

Dålig

God

Mycket god

4. Enligt Dig, hur är kunskapen om att ansöka om EU-medel i kommunen? Markera med X.

Mycket dålig

Dålig

God

Mycket god

5. Har kommunen antagit en särskild EU strategi alt. internationell strategi?

Ja Nej

• Om **ja**, i vilken utsträckning används strategin i kommunens EU/internationella arbete?
Markera med X.

Inte alls

I mycket låg utsträckning

I låg utsträckning

I hög utsträckning

I mycket hög utsträckning