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Do non-alignment, geography and size matter?

**The motives and effects behind participation in EU
security and defence missions – the cases of Finland,
Sweden and Ireland.**

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I would like to thank my family, and especially my parents, for their never ending support and understanding that enables me to pursue my dreams.

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Abstract

This master's thesis examines the motives of non-aligned, geographically peripheral and smaller European Union (EU) Member States (MS) Finland, Sweden and Ireland to participate in EU military crisis management operations. It also studies the effects that these MS have had in the development of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Theoretically this thesis is based on a typology that Alyson J.K. Bailes has created to explain states' motives to send military troops to overseas missions since the end of the Cold War. The rapid development of CSDP has forced MS to adjust their own security and defence strategies. Pernille Rieker's outlook on Europeanization is used in analysing the roles of the case states in the CSDP development.

The data used consists of governmental and parliamentary documents. By looking at an EU military operation EUFOR Althea, where all three MS had a sizeable role to play, there are national but also shared motives for participating. Sweden and Finland have actively participated in the development of the CSDP. Ireland has had its own tools to guarantee its own interests. Non-alignment, geography or size has not limited their successful participation in the CSDP.

Key words: European Union, EU Common Security and Defence Policy, military crisis management, strategy, Operation Althea.

Words: 18774

List of Acronyms

AU	African Union
BiH	Bosnia and Herzegovina
CCMS	Comprehensive Crisis Management Strategy
CESDP	Common European Security and Defence Policy
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CM	Crisis Management
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
ECAP	European Capabilities Action Plan
EDA	European Defence Agency
EEAS	European External Action Service
EEC	European Economic Community
EES	European Security Strategy
ENP	European Neighbourhood Policy
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
EU	European Union
EUFOR	European Union Force
FYROM	Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
MC	Military Committee
MP	Member of Parliament
MS	Member State(s)
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PfP	Partnership for Peace
PSC	Political and Security Committee
SFOR	Stabilisation Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina
UN	United Nations
WEU	Western European Union

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1. Introduction

1.1 Background of the study

The European Union (EU) has been a progressively active participator in managing crisis situations both close and far away from its borders. Since the introduction of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) a decade ago, the EU has also started its own military operations of which it is now fully in command of. At present many nations and states (both citizens and politicians) are very critical about sending troops to any place necessary, whether it is under the umbrella of the UN, NATO or the EU. In spite of this, most of the EU states are participating in these operations. Regardless of the fact that the Member States (MS), in theory, should have a common understanding of why the EU, with all its members, has decided to develop its CSDP and execute its own military crisis management operations, there are many national perceptions of it. As there are differences between the national perceptions of security and defence policies in general, there are different motives why MS choose to participate in EU crisis management operations.

Perhaps surprisingly, states, that are militarily non-aligned as well as, have limited military capabilities due to their size, are the Member States that are actively participating in EU military operations. Other variable than non-alignment, that MS, Finland, Sweden and Ireland share is, that all three are located to the borders of the EU. This study is looking at these Northern European MS and their motives to join to the EUFOR Althea military operation, which began in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) in December 2004. Operation Althea is interesting to look at because it was the first major EU military mission in which participants, including Finland, Sweden and Ireland participated with a greater number of troops. The operational co-operation of Althea with NATO, which is still a delicate subject within the three non-aligned MS, presents another interesting aspect to choose Althea as the case to study and, why these states regardless decided to participate.

The changes that have occurred in the international order since the end of Cold War have had a profound effect on the way states plan their contemporary security strategies and to which organisations they choose to be associated with. Globalised threats are putting more emphasis on multilateral co-operation, where it is inevitable to be influenced by each other. The limitations of non-alignment as an integral part of foreign policy, puts Finland, Sweden and Ireland as EU MS in a position where it is crucial for them to prove that they are in charge of or at least partly influencing the development of the CFSP, as well as the military aspect of the CSDP.

Katsumi Ishizuka points out that: “The post-Cold War era has witnessed a more equal distribution of opportunities for states to contribute to peacekeeping operations, but it has also reduced the status of middle and neutral powers like Sweden, Finland and Ireland. Middle and neutral powers have also been faced with a situation that has forced them to reconsider the maintenance of their military status of neutrality in the current unipolar system of international politics. Meanwhile, the European continent still has a security crisis in the former Yugoslavia, while the demand for peacekeeping operations in this region has increased” (Ishizuka, 1999: 185). It may be that, it is even more challenging in the peacetime rather than war, for militarily neutral states to justify their security policy. This is a major reason why these three states were chosen to be analysed. In addition, it is especially interesting to look at the operation that is actually still taking place in the European continent.

1.2 Aims of the study

The national strategies of the states are a natural starting point in understanding what kind of approach states have in defending their sovereignty and citizens. They also tell what kinds of threats and challenges the states are prioritizing and preparing for in their national foreign policies. The aim of the study is to go deeper into military crisis management and observe what kind of motivations member states have in participating in the implementation of EU’s security and defence strategies and operations. The CSDP is a young policy, but it is also an interesting area of academic study.

As Grevi, Helly and Keohane (2009: 14) recount: “Much has already been written over the last decade on different national positions towards ESDP, and various divisions at

various times between ‘Europeanists’ and ‘Atlanticists’, ‘peacekeepers’ and ‘war fighters’, and the inherent tension between ESDP as a policy and ESDP as a political project”. Contrary to their book, the aim of this study is to provide political analysis, rather than explain a comprehensive policy of the CSDP. This thesis analyses the strategic positions and approaches of three individual EU Member States and their motives for sending troops to an EU military mission.

The novelty of this research is that it examines the military component of the EU crisis management and explores the ways in which national debates consider sending troops abroad. The selection of the cases spreading outside the Nordic countries, including a periphery state, gives an extra dimension for finding possible differences between the various approaches to military crisis management. This is of value in the context of existing literature which focuses on the ways in which Nordic countries are renowned for promoting solidarity in their attitudes and approaches to international concerns. It is worth mentioning that albeit Austria’s position of a non-aligned EU member state, it does not meet all the criteria due to its closer proximity with the Balkans and therefore it has been left out of the study.

With the help of two theories, the aim of the study is also to demonstrate that non-aligned EU member states have developed their military security strategy together with the EU’s strategy “in terms of the wider society and/or historically” (Gomm and Hammersley, 2007: 4). The motives and possible differences are categorised with the help of a typology of the tripartite division of motives.

1.3 Research question and hypothesis

This thesis draws upon three MS case studies in order to assess the motives the MS present in their national political debate, when sending peacekeeping military troops to different destinations of the world to represent the EU. To concentrate more on the military perspective of the comprehensive European security approach, the study analyses national government documents and discussions that were occurring prior to the EU-led Operation Althea, which began in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 2004. To begin with the thesis will look more generally at the national strategies and defence and security

policies that the three states have and also how the EU policies and especially the European Security Strategy (ESS) have influenced their approaches.

The research questions which will be addressed are:

‘What motives do non-aligned EU member states have in order to send troops to EU military operations?’

‘Are there common variables and reasons as well as differences, as to why the non-aligned MS choose to send troops to EU overseas missions?’

‘Can a difference be seen between the level of ‘Europeanization’ in the foreign, defence and security policies of traditionally non-aligned Member States?’

The study begins with the hypothesis that the EU is an international actor and that the development of the CFSP and especially the CSDP has had an influence on the three states, i.e. all three states have gone through more or less direct Europeanization process in the fields of security and defence. The Europeanization theory suits the framework to help explain the changes that have occurred in the three MS defence and security strategies after the Cold War ended. Also, the assumption that while the states look very similar on paper when looking at the variables, there is the possibility for having different motives between the member states when they are in the process of discussing the decision to send military troops overseas into EU operations.

1.4 Limitations of the study

There are limitations that have an effect to the generalization of the study. First the study is limited to only three non-aligned MS out of 27 which makes it possible to evaluate only their motives and does not comment on the other MS’ motives. The data only looks at government and parliamentary documents which are available online for citizens and leaves out the news media and public opinion as such.

The study is also limited to the military perspective even though these MS are known especially for their active role in the civilian crisis management. In addition, the study is analysing the motives that these states had in order to send troops to the operation in BiH. It does not look the reasons why Finland and Sweden decided to call their troops

home before the official end of the mission. There are nine EU military operations from which the EUFOR Althea in BiH was selected to be studied in this thesis.

The method of use in analysing data is limited to looking at texts. To confirm the motives or getting more information, it might be beneficial to interview government representatives. Due to the limited size of the thesis these limitations are made consciously.

The role of the media and public opinion are also excluded from this study. It is a conscious decision, because the aim is to study the particular motives of these states. As in all democratic countries, the national parliaments are the representatives of the people. In this case, the national parliaments also represent the state.

Naturally there are several external factors that have impacted in the development of a common European approach to issues concerning security and defence. 9/11, Iraq and Afghanistan wars have provoked a lot of discussion on all levels of European societies. This is an important point that affects the national security strategies and should be considered in the analysis. The scope of this study limits the data that is analysed.

1.5 Structure of the thesis

The theoretical framework (chapter 2), which follows the introductory chapter, discusses some previous research that has been done on the topic. It is important to explain and define all the appropriate terms that are being used in the analysis and throughout the study. The theory in this thesis will be mostly supporting the hypothesis that is being laid out in the beginning rather than explaining the results. The second chapter of the theoretical framework will explain more about this. Methods and data chosen for the study are explained in the third chapter.

The analysis part (chapter 4) will be divided in four sub-parts. First, the study will introduce the development of the CSDP with a special emphasis on the changes that affect the military crisis management. The second part of the chapter is analyzing the European Security Strategy (ESS) that was composed in 2003 and revised in 2008.

The second, third and fourth sub-part introduce and analyse the Finnish, Swedish and Irish governments' relationship with the CSDP. First, the approaches of the three MS to

the CSDP are being examined. Secondly, the national positions of the defence and security strategies of these states are studied. Third part is analyzing the debates that were going on in the national governments and parliaments of Finland, Sweden and Ireland before the beginning of the Operation Althea. In the concluding chapter (chapter 5) the research questions are answered and future research is suggested. The Executive Summary will sum up the study.

2. Theoretical framework

2.1 Previous research

From the early days of the EU, the main goal of the member states has been to keep Europe secure and peaceful. During the last fifty years, many attempts have been made to create a common policy that would make this goal more realistic. The last ten years have been most successful, so far, in creating a common European strategy for security and defence. Defence is not a taboo subject in the European context anymore. Today it is possible to talk about a comprehensive European policy framework that together tackles security issues in Europe and in the wider world. The EU has become an international actor that works together with NATO, the UN, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the African Union (AU) and other organisations and states. During the last ten years there has been a lot of research in this particular area. A more recent Europeanization theory and globalisation theory have helped the international relations theory researchers to approach the topic from different angles. Many articles, papers and books have been published about the development, participation and influence of the CFSP and the EU as a global security actor.

To continue, a limited representation of some academics that this paper also uses to analyse and find answers to the research question and problems;

Jolyon Howorth is a reference in the field of CFSP development and security issues. In 2000 he was analysing where the (then) CESDP had its roots, where it was at the time and where it was going to (Howorth 2000). More recently he has continued among other things, the discussion about the future of the European military capacity and how it needs to be developed to become a serious 'military muscle' (Hill & Smith, 2005).¹

¹ More: Jolyon Howorth, *Security and Defence Policy in the European Union* (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).

Geographical or territorial location and regional cooperation is one main variable used in this study. Sweden and Finland together with the Nordic countries are known for their innovative ways of working together. Even more recently, the former Prime Minister of Norway, Thorvald Stoltenberg, published a paper that is encouraging the Nordic countries to strengthen their foreign and security policy cooperation and introduced a special Nordic solidarity clause as a result of discussions with representatives from all the Nordic countries (Stoltenberg Report, 2009).

Hanna Ojanen is a researcher who has also written about the Finnish and Swedish participation and influence in the CFSP after the Amsterdam Treaty (Ojanen, 2000). She brings to light the problems of being a smaller and borderline member state with military non-alignment as one of the main security strategies of these countries. She tries to explain the starting points of both countries and not only explain how they perceive their non-alignment strategy but also how other states may perceive it as a very limiting approach and even as a lack of solidarity. She puts forward another interesting point about how these two states differentiate the term 'crisis management' from 'defense'. For both countries it is a very important point and makes a difference in their national strategies vs. EU strategies. Ojanen discusses the strict descriptions of the states' defense and security policies as non-aligned. Daniel Keohane follows the same line of thought by introducing the explanation of why the Irish are moving away from military neutrality to non-alignment in order to meet new types of conflicts and global challenges where they need the help of the CSDP (Keohane, 2001).

Pernille Rieker (2004) wrote in her doctoral thesis in 2003, about the Nordic Europeanization. She studied the discourse that Norway, Denmark, Sweden and Finland were facing post Cold War and how this was linked to the national Europeanization processes. She found that the instrumental adaptation or learning of the Nordic countries were results from the degrees of participation rather than the type of the relationship that the countries had to the EU. In addition, the differences, that the countries had with their security policy traditions and historical experiences played a role in the Europeanization processes. She also found that the Europeanization was in some cases more direct than in others. This was in relation to the timing of the changes at a national level whether it was a change in the discourse or a specific decision.

While looking at the research question and trying to find a suitable framework to attempt to uncover possible motivations for MS' to participate in overseas military missions,

Alyson J.K. Bailes provides a very useful categorization. She has defined the category in order to be better suited to the post Cold War era and Western countries' motives for overseas missions (Eskola eds., 2008). Below is a table that illustrates the main points of her modern typology.

(Direct) National	Strategic	Altruistic
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Good training of troops, testing national forces, advertise for sale or acquiring new equipment • The 'quid pro quo' • Territorial security concerns, threat of migration • Pairs/groups of countries setting up joint peacekeeping units a way to regional reconciliation, e.g. Hungary/Italy/Slovenia 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Response to 'new threats', e.g. trade-off between UK and US in the Iraq attack • Non-UN institutions, e.g. EU member states has a chance to establish their place in the Union; Weakness and limitations of the institutions, e.g. the development of the CSDP • Economic, e.g. Middle East and oil 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The advance of globalisation and multipolar world power system make countries more dependent on global order, mutual responsibility, etc. • A more popular concern and demand for humanitarian action, 'clean hands', more institutions capable to do something for the good of mankind • Demonstration of vigilance and strength, e.g. sending help to the Caribbean hurricane areas send a message to Cuba of their incompetence compared to the western states

Table 2.1. Alison J.K. Bailes: Motivations to send troops to overseas missions post Cold War era.

In the latter part of the study, with the help of this table, these types are used in order to categorize the states and whether it is possible to find similarities and differences in the motives of each state. Generally, the table is of course very simplified and there are a lot of factors that need to be taken into account, but this will be discussed more closely in the analysis sections. To add to this, previous studies mentioned above, have helped to frame the research question for this study and will help to answer the questions which have arisen.

2.2 Theory and definitions

In order to analyze the outcomes of a study, it is beneficial to use theories, which can provide a framework for the results. The nature of the study prompted the use of

previous studies on the subject and the theories which could be linked to this particular study. With the help of a theory it is easier to analyze research, produce clear and concise results, and put these into a broader context.

From a traditional realist point of view, the national security and defence issues have been and still are, a matter of national politics and politicians but this is not the way that the EU is trying to develop its policies. In general the smaller states are often said to be forced to adapt to the changes in the world. The assumption that the smaller EU MS, such as Finland, Sweden and Ireland, as being the states, that Europeanize their national foreign policy compared to large states such as France and the UK, cannot be fully accepted but this is more likely (Hill and Smith, 2005). Maria Strömviik argues that one natural reason for smaller states being the influenced partner is simply the size and resources of the state's ministry. This argument affects Finland, Sweden and Ireland (Bailes et al., 2006: 209).

Thus it is more appropriate for this paper to take an approach that fits well within the meaning of the Europeanization theory. There are many ways to explain Europeanization. Reuben Wong uses (Hill & Smith, 2005: 135-142) Alistair Cole and Helen Drake's identification of four different usages of the concept. They believe that it is an independent variable, an emulative policy transfer, a smokescreen, and an imaginary constraint. In other words, whether the EU is the imposer of policies for national governments, whether the states are taking policy models from other member states, or whether the governments use the EU as a smokescreen to introduce new policies and blame the EU for them. To go further, Reuben Wong identified three dimensions that Europeanization can have within national foreign policies. The first is adaptation and policy convergence, the second, national projection, and the third, identity reconstruction (Hill & Smith, 2005: 142).

For this study it is important to use the pattern that Rieker created for her thesis. She showed that the Nordic countries have had an instrumental adaptation and learning process in their security identity discourse. This is also the assumption that is made for the Irish case. Rieker argued that: "national security approaches are adapted to the norms defined by a community to which they are closely linked" (Rieker 2003: 5). According to Rieker this happens over time and goes through a socialisation process and might lead to changes in the identities of national security. Rieker challenged two common assumptions that prevail in IR theories; the first being that nation states defend national

territory against military threats where military means are the main tool of the national security and national security policy. Second, the rational thought excludes the possibility that independent factors like international norms can have an effect on national identities and interests. She used a wider security approach where the security identity of the EU affects national identities and interests. By using the same approach as Rieker, this thesis attempts to show that even non-aligned states, with the general assumption that they are not likely to be willing to become militarily allied, have been influenced by the EU and have gone through a process of Europeanization in the field of security and defence.

Other definitions that need more explanation are evidently what the states and the EU understand when they discuss crisis management, security and defence. The lines that even these three case states draw are different, and therefore they are explained in their own analysis chapters. Non-alignment is another term that all three countries have a unique understanding of and will be explained in their respective chapters.

Strategy today is fashionable in many other areas than just on military issues. Nevertheless this thesis goes back to look at the importance that a strategy has in defending state's territory and region. One of the oldest and original western definitions about strategy was Carl von Clausewitz's (2002) strategy as an art of warfare. In today's military vocabulary strategy has many meanings. According to Pekka Visuri in a political security environment it means certain knowledge that a state or alliance uses in order to accomplish its security efforts. In today's political-military setting which this thesis concentrates strategy to secure security includes resources that are not only military but also political, economic, technical and informative (Kerttunen, 2007).

3. Methods and data

The analytical approach to the study is to ask ‘why and how preferences come to be formed and how these preferences and choices relate to the strategic aims of powerful interests in society’ (Marsh & Stoker, 2002: 39-40). Marsh and Furlong (2002) argue that ontologically from a social constructivist point of view, if there is a problem where the decision-making process has become ever more complex, like in the case of the EU with 27 MS building up a common defence and security policy, the complexity has to be understood as political projections that are linked to the external and internal limitations that originate as responses to these views (Marsh & Stoker, 2002: 39). Regarding the generalisation and validity, the constructivist approach acknowledges that there are limitations but that it is possible. In epistemological terms the study is using a qualitative method that is approved in the field of social constructivism (Marsh & Stoker, 2002: 27).

3.1 Text analysis

In order to address the research questions the method of choice is analysing texts. This part of the research is carried out by analysing selected texts and documents that describe the states’ contributions in crisis management and among other things, attitudes towards the EU operations. By analysing the texts it is possible to find whether there are any similar patterns in the texts and whether there are differences e.g. within the semantics that the EU and the MS use.

Choosing which method to use in a study certainly depends on what is being studied, but most importantly on the research question. Wilson (1982) states that qualitative and quantitative methods are complementary rather than competitive techniques and the use

of a particular method must be based on the research question at hand². Interviews would probably enrich the findings by providing individual responses but they would not necessarily bring much new information to the table. Therefore this study will initially only concentrate on written data of the EU and national security and defence strategies from the last ten years and secondly analyse the debates that were in process in the national parliaments and governments prior to the start of the Operation Althea.

According to Uwe Flick (2006: 295) in qualitative research the interpretation of data is at the core. Flick writes that in discourse analysis ‘a special emphasis is on the constructions of versions of the events in the reports and presentations’ (2006: 324). The discourse analysis method is appropriate and is best suited to help answer the research questions. Additionally there are also elements of qualitative content analysis where one essential attribute is the use of categories. These categories are evolved from theoretical models, such as Bailes’ typology. According to Flick, the categories can actually be brought to the empirical material and are not necessarily always developed from it (Flick, 2006: 312-315).

The hypotheses which are tested were derived from previous studies that were explaining the Europeanization that had occurred and could endorse the ways the member states were developing their security strategies. The analysis in the following chapters follows the approach to research, which was based on the deductive method as outlined in Babbie et al. (2007: 9): theory; deduce hypotheses to test theory; collection of data; analyse data; and evaluate hypotheses.

As previously noted, there might be limitations due to only choosing one method of study. However, using the same method for three different cases and also looking at two different dimensions will help to answer the research question.

3.2 Case study method

Robert E. Stake, in Hammersley and Gomm (2007), states that the target of a social inquiry is seldom individual. Nevertheless it is usually these single targets that are

² T.P. Wilson, (1982) “Quantitative ‘oder’ qualitative Methoden in der Sozialforschung”, *Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie*, 34: 487-508. in U. Flick (2006), *An Introduction to Qualitative Research*. London: SAGE.

thought of as cases. And a case is thought to represent a target population. Furthermore, because single individuals or targets are seen as poorly representing a whole population, Stake writes that a case study is not a good method to generalize. It is likely that by studying the progress in three case states, the results will support the hypotheses and theory. Although the fact that the number of cases (N) is three, and, small, there is no reason that the method of study cannot work with the other 24 Member States. If it fails to do this it does not mean that the study does not have any general relevance. One possible solution is to make the same study with the rest 24 MS. All studies aim to discover or validate laws. But Stake believes that “the aim of the practical arts is to get things done” (Hammersley & Gomm, 2007: 23).

According to Hammersley and Gomm (2007) there is a variation in how to use a case study. Either, one can test a hypothesis or a theory or one can develop a new theory or one can describe and explain a situation for its own sake. Although this study is mostly explorative, a theory can put the results into a broader perspective. In this case, the study will deal with the case “as an instance of type, describing it in terms of a particular theoretical framework (explicit or implicit)”³.

3.3 Data

To investigate the subject further, it is important to look how the states have participated in the EU crisis management. In the initial phase of looking at all the nine EU military operations that have been conducted to this date there was no significant difference between the three states. All of them have participated in most of the operations whether it has been with actual troop deployment or personnel to the operational headquarters⁴. Therefore, it was clear that the direction of the research needed to be steered towards government and parliamentary texts and debates to see the motivations of the states to send troops to these crisis areas. The fact that all three states have sent their military personnel to a number of operations, also gives a lot of positives to the construction of the study, including more data to access (or texts and statements).

³ R. Gomm, Hammersley, M. and Foster, P. (eds) (2007), *Case Study Method*. London: SAGE.

⁴ Information found from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute: SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations Database. Available at: <http://www.sipri.org/databases/pko/pko>.

The research was initiated by reading EU documents and choosing specific operation in which all three member states have had a significant military input. The basis for the data is constituted from the national security and defence strategy documents and communications, as well as crisis management strategies and parliamentary discussions. There is a natural limitation to the dataset; the CSDP is ten years old, thus the time frame is ten years for the documents. The analysis concerning the CSDP and national defence and security strategies and crisis management are the newest publications that the states have produced. When it comes to the Operation Althea, the dates of the parliamentary documents are naturally dated prior to the beginning of the operation in 2004. The documents are mostly found from the websites of the national governments, national parliaments, Foreign or Defence Ministries and official EU websites.

4. Analysis

4.1 EU and CSDP

4.1.1 Background

After the EU's ineffectiveness in the Balkans in the 1990s there was significant pressure to create a common policy with legitimate power that would strengthen the EU's position as an international actor in crisis situations. The EU has many policies, including enlargement, trade, and development, which it can effectively use in its comprehensive approach towards crisis situations. The Maastricht Treaty opened the discussion for framing a common defence policy. The Saint Malo Declaration was another important step that marked a change in the course of the European common security and defence. Now France with Britain were declaring together with other MS that they had the political will to break the taboo that the common defence and security had been before as 'a touchstones of national sovereignty' (Keukeleire & MacNaughtan, 2008: 174-5). The CSDP is divided into four sections: military, civilian, industrial and technological, and political. In this study the main focus is on the military section which will be introduced chronologically below (GS of the Council of the EU, 2009: 6-7).

In May 1999, The Amsterdam Treaty came into force. This treaty incorporated the Petersberg Tasks (humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking) as well as the creation of the position of secretary –General/High Representative. The 'Joint Declaration on European Defence' which was the result of the Franco-British summit in Saint Malo in December 1998 was formally adopted to establish the (then) ESDP by the European Council in Cologne in June 1999. In December in Helsinki the European Council decided to develop an autonomous defence capability by 2003 using the rapid reaction force model.

The Nice European Council in December 2000, adopted the texts that defined the EU political and military bodies and structures (including the Political Security Committee, the Military Committee and the Military Staff). The transfer of WEU's operational role to the EU was also decided to ensure that any shortfalls of the capabilities to carry out EU tasks European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP) was also created.

At Laeken in December 2001 the European Council made the declaration on the operational capability of the ESDP.

The WEU subsidiary bodies Satellite Centre and Institute for Security Studies were transferred to the EU in January 2002. Eight months after 9/11 the scope of the ESDP was broadened, at the Seville European Council, to include fighting against terrorism. In December the Berlin Plus strategic partnership agreement with the EU and NATO was adopted.

In March 2003 FYROM Concordia, the first EU military operation was launched in Macedonia. In September the Joint Declaration on UN-EU Cooperation in Crisis Management was made. In December the ESS was adopted.

In May 2004 the 2010 Headline Goal which looks at the objectives of the ESS and emphasized the development of capabilities to react more rapidly was approved. In July the Council agreed on the Joint Action to establish the European Defence Agency (EDA). In November in the Military Capability Commitment Conference the EU Battlegroups were created. In December the EU military operation began in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In June 2005 the European Security and Defence College was decided to be established by the Council.

In Autumn 2006 the future development of European military capabilities was discussed by the EDA and Military Committee.

Two years later this was adopted in the Ministerial Commitment to the Development of Military Capabilities while a statement on the European young officers exchange scheme was adopted. In December 2008 the declaration on the strengthening of capabilities was made. The report on the implementation of the ESS was also published at the end of the year.

The institutional changes which were agreed upon in the new Lisbon Treaty, which was adopted in the end of 2009, saw the replacement of Javier Solana with the newly named position of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy who has the support of a new European External Action Service (EEAS). The ESDP was upgraded to now be known as the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The Petersberg Tasks were extended to cover: “joint disarmament operations; military advice and assistance task, peace-making and post-conflict stabilization; conflict prevention and post-conflict stabilization missions” and also to contribute to combating terrorism “in supporting third countries in their territories” (ISIS Europe, 2007: 4). The mutual defence clause together with the solidarity clause allowing for the possibility of enhanced co-operation between willing MS in defence matters, are important innovations that the Lisbon Treaty introduced (ISIS Europe, 2007).

As can be seen, the development of the common European security and defence policy into a capable and operational tool has been very robust within the EU and MS. These introduced military changes in addition to civilian development and trade tools make a comprehensive EU approach that has operated in the 22 missions launched is remarkable proof of EU’s capabilities.

Crisis management

The European Commission states that: “Since its foundation, the European Community is involved in all phases of the crisis cycle; from preventive strategies, to post-crisis rehabilitation and reconstruction. She manages substantial resources devoted to countries in political crisis through its country programmes and specific instruments such as the Instrument for stability. The Commission attaches great importance to a coherent EU approach to crisis situations, assuring that EC instruments and ESDP actions are complementary. Both local delegations and local partners are closely involved” (European Commission, *Crisis Management*, 2009).

The EU has created a number of instruments that are all helpful in bringing about peace and stability within Europe. Development and globalization have led to the situation that it may be argued that the EU has become an important global player. It has the possibility, but also the responsibility to promote common goals and interests worldwide

together with other actors such as the United States. The EU is carrying out these responsibilities using all available tools including political, economic, diplomatic, developmental and humanitarian as well as tools associated with trade co-operation and crisis response (civilian and military crisis management). This list of instruments is so extensive as to demonstrate how comprehensive the approach of the EU is towards a secure and peaceful world. This part of the study focuses on the last instrument and attempts to expose the motives behind the EU military crisis management.

The EU crisis management missions begin with supporting the police, encouraging judiciary and customs reforms as well as assisting capacity-building. According to the European Commission agreements are made to end hostilities and ensuring compliance, and to assure the security of civilians, refugees, humanitarian workers and UN personnel. The CSDP missions can also be helpful in specific fields such as border-monitoring and the latest mission involved fighting against piracy off the coast of Somalia (Commission, 2009).

To this date, CSDP missions have been operated in the following regions: FYROM (Former Republic of Macedonia), Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Occupied Palestinian Territories, Guinea-Bissau, Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan/Darfur, Chad, the Central African Republic, Somalia, Afghanistan, Moldova, Ukraine, Iraq, Georgia and Aceh, a province of Indonesia. Military missions have been carried out in FYROM, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Guinea-Bissau, Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan/Darfur, Chad, the Central African Republic and Somalia (Council of the EU, 2010).

4.1.2 ESS

A Secure Europe in a Better World – The European Security Strategy (ESS) was the creation of Javier Solana who was at the time the EU High Representative. Due to external and internal occurrences a strategy was drafted in 2003 to tackle new security threats and challenges. It was adopted by the European Council in December 2003. This part of the study analyses the content of the ESS and compares it to the more recent Report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy – Providing Security in

a Changing World that was approved by the European Council in December 2008. A special emphasis of this analysis is put on the military aspects of the strategy.

Due to certain external events and specifically the division of the opinions regarding the conflict in Iraq it was important to create a common European strategy that could bring the different parties within the MS back together and help planning a future foreign policy in the EU. The strategy has three objectives. First, it addressed the global challenges and key threats that the EU was facing in the global security environment. The second strategic objective was to build security in the EU's neighbourhood particularly with the new European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). Thirdly, it emphasizes the importance of effective multilateralism that is the base of an international order. The last part of the strategy assessed the threats and attempted to put them in policy priority order. It was also suggested that in achieving goals, the role of multilateral co-operation with key actors as partners was significant. The strategy encouraged the EU to be 'more active, more coherent and more capable' (Council of the EU, 2003: 11). It also directed the EU 'to develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention' (Council of the EU, 2003: 11).

Certain words that are used in the paper are new to the European rhetoric. The obvious tensions connected with the US during the time the strategy was gathered are apparent. For example: "The United States has played a critical role in European integration and European security, in particular through NATO. [...], no single country is able to tackle today's complex problems on its own". There is a clear criticism of the decision of the Bush Doctrine to invade Iraq regardless of the UN Security Council decision. The decision to list threats gives in a way less positive image of the EU. Listing them such as terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as 'potentially the greatest threat to our security', regional conflicts, state failures and organized crime as the key threats, might make the EU more vulnerable to act in certain parts of the world (Council of the EU, 2003: 3-5).

When looking at Alyson J.K. Bailes' typology of motivations that she had created, equal determinants can be found. It is extremely difficult to make a distinction between the actual motives of a single member state from the group of 27 members; therefore this thesis examines three member states in particular in order to uncover more empirical evidence and motives behind their participation. As the name of the Security Strategy

suggests, it is obvious to turn first to the second Bailes' typology of the strategic motivations. Similarly the first strategic objective of the ESS is to address the threats.

Bailes' first form of strategic motivations is actions in response to new threats. According to the ESS, the EU has been active in responding to threats such as terrorism, policies against proliferation, regional conflicts, failing states and organized crime (Council of the EU, 2003: 6).

The second form of strategic motivations 'missions undertaken through non-UN institutions' also concerns the EU. It can be argued that some smaller range EU operations - even though they included humanitarian targets - may have also been undertaken to build up the competences and self-profiling of both the EU and its MS. In the Balkans and Caucasus, strategic self-interest of the EU also played a role in the decision-making process in order to limit the possible damages and prevent any spillovers by managing the spread of crisis to the west by sending troops. Additionally, building security in the neighbourhood was also an objective of the ESS: 'Even in the era of globalization, geography is still important' (Council of the EU, 2003: 7); 'Resolution of Arab/Israeli conflict is a strategic priority for Europe' (Council of the EU, 2003: 8).

Third form of Bailes' typology of strategic motivations is linked to the operational participation for economic motives. There is also a connection between the ESS with this third form of strategic motivations: 'The European Union's interests require a continued engagement with Mediterranean partners, through more effective economic, security and cultural cooperation in the framework of the Barcelona Process'. Although this is mostly connected to the strategic instruments that the EU is using, it may be sufficient to say that economics play a big part in the global security. For example, recently the unrest in Europe and especially in Greece has shown how important it is to maintain economic stability in order to prevent conflict - both internal and external.

The first division of Bailes' model of typology of motivations is to do with direct national motives. Nowadays, though it may not be as obvious as before, post-colonial connections may continue to steer the decisions to launch or join a mission. Nevertheless, the EU's emphasis on multilateralism is an attempt to evade this history. An example of this is the stress that the EU still puts on the UN Charter as a fundamental framework (Council of the EU, 2003: 9). Guaranteeing territorial security

has been a major concern and the EU has been quite successful in it with many different tools.

The last typology of motivations - the altruistic motives - sounds more familiar EU rhetorics. Promoting peace and security, the spread of the rule of law and democracy are just some of the main characteristic traits that the EU promotes. Due to the globalization countries are more dependent on global order and mutual responsibility that the EU favors. In certain parts of the world the EU is seen to have 'cleaner hands' than for example the UN.

Bailes recognizes the limitations of her typology. It is difficult to separate national, strategic and altruistic motives. Due to the nature of the security and defence policy, which is not a policy where states may wish to share everything openly, it may be impossible to get a clear reason for the real motives a country has to join or leave a mission (Eskola, 2008: 78-9). This is something that needs further explanation in respective chapters of Finnish, Swedish and Irish defence and security strategies.

The 2008 report followed the mark of five years since the ESS was approved by the European Council. It continues to address the same objectives and also describes the EU's identity and performance as a global actor. It is a more detailed and up-to-date report of the progress and it is meant to reinforce the ESS. Key threats have stayed similar. Proliferation by states and terrorists as the 'potentially greatest threat to EU security' is indicated as presenting an even greater risk (Council of the EU, 2008: 3). The emphasis on multilateral work is described as essential while working with Libya, North Korea and Iran. Terrorism and organized crime - homegrown and coming from outside - remain major threats (Council of the EU, 2008: 4). More emphasis throughout the report is given to cyber security, energy security and climate change (Council of the EU, 2008: 5-6). Iran and Afghanistan also receive additional attention in the report. Lastly, pandemics, tensions over water and raw materials and piracy with small arms and light weapons are some other threats that need co-operation to resolve.

The report gives more tangible suggestions for the future, emphasizing the importance of the combination of the civilian and military crisis management. The EU assistance in crisis situations is in demand and it is a proof of success of the operations. Strengthening the military capabilities, mutual collaboration and burden-sharing arrangements, as well

as rapid reaction to crisis are major factors taken into consideration, while engagement with the neighbourhood continues as an important part of the report.

The tone of the report changes in its final section. It states that ‘the key partner for Europe in this [a more effective multilateral order] and other areas is the US’ (Council of the EU, 2008: 11). The more critical tone is now turned towards NATO: ‘formal relations have not advanced’. The problem lies with the decision-making autonomy that both organisations should have, but also in providing better operational co-operation and work on military capabilities (Council of the EU, 2008: 11). The main argument is that more still needs to be done.

To conclude, as discussed above, the European Security Strategy is very comprehensive and the 2008 report introduces many instruments and arrangements that have been set up in order to challenge present threats. The typology of motivations that Alison J.K. Bailes provides can be very well adapted to the 27 MS. Considering the large variation of policy tools that form the European Security Strategy this is not a surprising result. According to the EU’s strategy, military crisis management is only one part of the great system that provides security. Nevertheless, it plays a major role and is visible during the times when a soldier is lost in battle in the name of securing peace in Europe, and, thus, makes news headlines and forces someone to take the responsibility, whether it may be the government, national parliament or the EU.

4.1.3 Operation Althea

The EU launched an EU-led military operation in Bosnia Herzegovina (BiH) on the second of December in 2004. Operation was named as EUFOR Althea (Althea) as part of the CSDP in support to BiH. It was the first larger scale crisis management operation that the EU had conducted. Althea was authorized by the UN Security Council as a legal successor to NATO-led mission SFOR. Recently the UN Security Council extended the mandate of Althea until November 2010. The Althea Operation began within the frames of the Berlin Plus arrangement, where the EU and NATO are working together⁵.

⁵ See more: e.g. Keukeleire & MacNaughtan, 2008.

According to the EU Commission the mission of Althea is: “[...] to provide a military presence in order to contribute to the safe and secure environment, deny conditions for a resumption of violence, to manage any residual aspect of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in BiH (Dayton Agreement). Therefore, all EU and International Community actors can carry out their responsibilities regarding further peaceful development of BiH. Additionally, EUFOR is tasked to support the Armed Forces of BiH in the areas of capacity-building and training” (EUFOR, 2010).

In 2004, the beginning of the operation, the EU deployed military force that was partially the same force as NATO SFOR troops with approximately 7000 troops. Althea is part of the comprehensive EU approach to support BiH’s move towards European integration. It ‘provides support to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and relevant BiH authorities, regarding the detention of Persons Indicted for War Crimes’ (EUFOR, 2010).

Finland, Sweden and Ireland contributed to the operation from the beginning of the operation in December 2004. During the first year of the operation Finland sent 172, Sweden 68 and Ireland 64 members of their Defence Forces⁶. In 2010 there were four Finns left in BiH (Puolustusvoimat, 2010), while Sweden withdrew its troops from the area in April 2008 (Försvarsmakten, 2008). Ireland has maintained its position, with a commitment of 40 soldiers (The Defence Forces, 2010).

4.2 Finland

4.2.1 Finland and CSDP

Since the end of the Cold War Finland has been in a better position to refine its foreign policy concerning security and defence issues to a more international western direction. Non-alignment and military neutrality is still something that, due to the past, especially its position in the World War II and also presently is an important factor for the Finns to maintain in their foreign policy. Hanna Ojanen writes that the Finns separate crisis management and defence. It is more natural to participate in crisis management

⁶ Information found: SIPRI Multilateral Peace Missions Database, http://conflict.sipri.org/SIPRI_Internet/add.php4

operations and still maintain the position of a non-aligned state. To Finns, collective defence does not seem correct. The shadow of the east, i.e. Russia, has always strongly shaped the Finnish security and defence strategies, even more than some want to admit. Whether it is culturally built into the Finnish mentality that they are able to independently defend themselves, they nonetheless have a strong history with the UN peacekeeping missions. These are seen as two different entities. Thus, in the EU context defence actually means crisis management.

The development of the CSDP, nevertheless, has made this separation more problematic. Ojanen agrees with Pernille Rieker that all in all Finland has been affected more by the EU than the other way around. However, to Finland's 'defence', it has played a role in the CSDP development especially during its first Presidency when it proposed in conjunction with Sweden an initiative that resulted to including the Petersberg Tasks into the Amsterdam Treaty. Maria Strömviik believes that even though this example is used very often to justify the fact that the motivation of Finland and Sweden, traditionally non-aligned states, to do this was only to make them look more accepting towards the ESDP. She believes that the Petersberg solution would have been regardless realised without Finnish-Swedish initiative (Bailes et al., 2006: 209). Finland, together with Sweden has also been very active in arguing on behalf of the comprehensive approach that the EU has accepted where military forces are used when necessary, as the last resort. Whether this originated from the Nordic approach is of course debatable, but it fits well together with the traditional European soft power ideology.

The Finnish Government made another contribution in the development of the CFSP when it proposed the Northern Dimension Initiative in 1997. The somewhat selfish aim was to promote integration of Russia with the West and thus also contribute to regional security with the neighbouring countries including Finland (Bailes et al., 2006: 210). The fact that Finland has participated in most of the EU military operations excluding ARTEMIS Congo, EUSEC Congo and SSR Guinea Bissau⁷, strengthens Nina Graeger's characterisation of 'troops for influence'- strategy, that Finland also seems to be using to gain more influence in the broader EU agenda (Rieker, 2003: 233). Finally, Strömviik finds an explicit motivation for Finnish active participation in the CSDP where 'in contrast to Sweden, Finland appears to see a collective defence aspect to the ESDP:

⁷ Look for SIPRI Multilateral Peace Missions Database found at: http://conflict.sipri.org/SIPRI_Internet/index.php4

indeed, this motivation may just be as important for Finland as the opportunity to actively influence the EU's policies on distant conflicts and wars' (Bailes et al., 2006: 213).

The EU Battle Group concept is also a novel area in which Finland has taken part. Finland will participate in the first half of the 2011 Battlegroup standby period. There is of course a national twist with national motives in the development that will contribute to the general global changes that have happened where crisis are still unpredictable, but where the reaction needs to be rapid. The Defence Forces has to be prepared for this (PM's Office, 2009: 97).

It seems that, with respect to the size and political non-alignment attitude, which suggests that the Europeanization of Finnish security and defence policies have been EU-based. Surely in terms of the history Finland has also been the receiving party. The actions and initiations that Finland has done during the last decade towards the CSDP might imply that the Europeanization process is not that straight forward after all.

4.2.2 Finnish national security and defence strategy

To discover further evidence to this claim, more research is required. More information on this question may be found from the Government Reports on Finnish Security and Defence Policy. The Government of Finland has published three reports on its Security and Defence Policy in the 21st century. This thesis is looking at the most recent one, which was published in February 2009.

Finland promotes multilateralism, as does the EU, and has been working with the UN for decades. The public negative attitude towards NATO has not weakened the many forms of military cooperation with NATO as Partnership for Peace (PfP) country. According to the 2009 Report: "The most important functions of Finland's foreign, security and defence policy are safeguarding Finland's independence, territorial integrity and society's basic values, advancing the security and well-being of its citizens and sustaining the functioning of society." (PM's Office, 2009: 70)

It continues: "The security and defence policy guidelines take into account changes in the global operating environment in accordance with the comprehensive concept of

security. Globalisation requires goal-oriented, consistent and proactive action as well as the capability to swiftly react to changes in the environment. National interests are best advanced through international cooperation.” (PM’s Office, 2009: 70)

The report states that the non-alignment is not as negative towards common security as the word may imply: “Finland, a militarily non-allied country, cannot build its defence planning on military assistance from abroad. Nonetheless, Finland must be prepared to provide and receive international assistance.” (PM’s Office, 2009: 70)

The relationship with the EU is seen top priority:”Membership of the Union is a fundamental security policy choice for Finland. As a Member State of the Union Finland belongs to a close-knit political grouping, the members of which share a strong sense of unity and the will to act in unison. Finland is strongly committed to this union. The European Union affects Finland’s security policy on many levels. On the one hand, the Union steadfastly develops its security-related activities (CFSP, crisis management, materiel cooperation, internal security). Yet, the Union is also a key actor in several other fields which directly affect security, such as energy, transport and infectious diseases.” (PM’s Office, 2009: 71)

This last quote may imply that Finland is influenced by the EU very strongly. The report nonetheless continues: “Finland aims to develop the European Union into an increasingly efficient and coherent actor”(PM’s Office, 2009: 71). Going further: “A credible Common Foreign and Security Policy advances Finland’s security policy goals. Finland is firmly committed to the common goals of the Union and seeks to ensure that its security policy interests are observed in EU decision-making” (PM’s Office, 2009: 71). The report brings out the EU’s solidarity clause and its importance to Finland. The report also accepts the importance of the ESS and its contents.

Threats facing Finland

The main threats that the report mentions due to the globalization, are in line with the threats that the ESS lists. Cyber attacks, raw material and energy supply, nuclear safety, terrorism and organized crime, infectious diseases and climate change all cross borders and are substantial threats that may affect Finland at some point. In addition keeping the Baltic Sea clean and safe is a significant goal. The report states that ‘Finland does not

expect to face the prospect of military pressure or armed aggression outside the context of a wider international conflict' (PM's Office, 2009: 110). Even though the immediate eastern neighbour, Russia is not only due to the historic events in the Second World War - a threat that can be categorized as key: "Finland follows developments in Russia, which is the most important factor in Finland's security environment". (PM's Office, 2009: 74)

Crisis management

Crisis management is the key foreign policy instrument that Finland uses to promote the stability in crisis around the world. It is used 'to control wide-ranging security threats' (PM's Office, 2009: 112). In 2008 a working group was set up by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to draw *Finland's Comprehensive Crisis Management Strategy* (CCMS).

Main motives for international crisis management according to the Government report are 'to promote peace and security as well as development and respect for human rights. Participation in crisis management is part of Finland's security and international burden sharing. It also bolsters the national defence capability' (Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2009: 78). The first reasons are altruistic when referring to Bailes' typology. The last motive to bolster the national capability is seemingly national and direct.

According to the CCMS: "Finland participates in international crisis management operations in which it can provide added value and contribute to effectiveness. [...] consideration is given, on the one hand, to the need to increase stability in the crisis areas and, on the other, to Finland's own security and other national interests" (Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2009: 6). Implementing Bailes' typology to this case, there is an altruistic motive, but naturally, also a national motive behind it.

Concerning the role that Finland has in the development of the CSDP strategies, the CCMS states that Finland 'actively participates' in the development of the EU's military and civilian crisis management strategies, structures, concepts and capabilities and that Finland 'contributes to the comprehensive development' (Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2009: 6). One of the key measures that the Strategy proposes is to actively promote a comprehensive approach in the EU, international cooperation and multinational crisis management operations. These all favour the assumption that Finland wants to be an active player in developing the CSDP. The same rhetoric continues in the Strategy.

The Strategy explains that Finland wants to continue its 'active participation in military crisis management to advance international peace and security, to support humanitarian assistance and to protect civilian populations' (Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2009: 18). All these are very altruistic motivations. The aim to preserve the current level of participation also explains that Finland wants to keep its reputation and the power that it might attain by doing so. By taking into account themes such as protecting civilians, especially the status of women, child protection and sexual violence, the motives to influence internationally seem very altruistic. Another object is to 'strengthen well-functioning international institutions and a rules-based multilateral international order' (Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2009: 23). This seems more like a strategic motive to boost a role in the international organisations.

Focus areas of Finnish crisis management activities in the near future, according to the Strategy, are Afghanistan and Africa. The crises in Africa have 'knock-on effects on the security of Europe' (Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2009: 32) and therefore an important place to help the poor, but also a great place to send troops from a country that has no colonial ties, and therefore improve their 'clean' reputation.

Another interesting national characteristic that the Strategy points out is that, while Finland has been a participant in ever more challenging operations the willingness of military personnel in the tasks has 'waned' (Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2009: 56). There may be many reasons for this, but it is safe to say that the motivation to leave family to take part in a war-like situation has to be very high and people need different means, whether financial or ideological to be motivated.

To conclude, the government report states that in the Finnish foreign, security and defence policy, the main concerns are to protect its independence, territories, security of citizens and functions of the society. The internal position comes naturally before the external position where multilateralism and working with the EU, UN and NATO has a significant role. The comprehensive concept of security gives the possibility to be actively participating in securing the national safety via the international co-operation. Non-alignment according to the government is not contradicted with the international help or co-operation. Relationship with the EU is the top priority and the EU has a strong influence in Finland. By looking at the report it is very tempting to draw the conclusion that Finland has been Europeanized more strongly than it maybe wants to

admit or it actually understands. In addition, the global threats to Finland are in line with the threats the EU states. One specific threat that gets a lot of attention is Russia.

Crisis management is the key foreign policy instrument of Finland in the international setting. The motives are very altruistic in nature, which are similar to the EU's. There are some national motives behind the participation such as the clean reputation it gets in areas, such as Africa without any past colonialist burden. Also, to bolster the national defence capabilities as part of the international framework aids the internal defence mechanism if needed. This can be mirror-imaged to strategic motivation where Finland is maintaining its place in the EU's core within the crisis management issues regarding its size or political alignment.

4.2.3 Process towards participation in the Althea operation

The national political decision-making process

In accordance with the law, on the 20th of August 2004, the President of the Republic of Finland, consulted the Parliament's State Council for foreign affairs and security policy about Operation Althea. This was done quickly as it came about less than a month after the EU's official decision to overtake NATO's mission. On the 6th of September 2004, the government presented Parliament with a report on Finland's participation in the Althea mission. On the 22nd of September 2004, the Finnish Parliament (Eduskunta) took a formal vote in favour of the country taking part in Operation Althea (Crema & Gülçicek, 2005: 7).

National debates

Government report

The political debate and decision to participate in Althea operation by the Finns was made in the course of September 2004. It went through the process detailed above. The discussion that the operation raised was quite straight forward. There were some main themes that directed it. From the report that the Government submitted to the Parliament, the primary motive to participate in Althea was that Finland had participated

in the area in the operation whilst still under NATO command and therefore, there was previous knowledge of the situation the troops would be sent back into. Additionally, it was the first large scale operation in the history of the EU military crisis management. Finland would be part of making European history. Moreover what made it even more appealing was that the Finns had been offered to be the framework country and lead the battalion of the Multinational Task Force North (including Swedish and Irish troops). The Government saw that accepting this responsibility would be a visible and politically appreciated effort in international crisis management (Ulkoasiainministeriö, 2004).

The motives that the Government presented are mostly strategic with some altruistic notions. National indirect territorial threats or any migration flows were not seen problematic at all and did not deserve any mention.

Parliamentary debate

The parliamentary discussion also expressed the historical aspect of the mission as well as the fact that with two EU civilian missions already in place in BiH the European approach was to work in a comprehensive way to secure the situation and development towards peace. The operation was still seen as a European rehearsal for future missions and that it could only be a good experience for the EU to work together with NATO. Finnish participation would also be a natural continuity for the work that Finland had done in order to promote peace and stability in the Balkans. It was imperative that the operation be successful to demonstrate that the EU now had the military means to operate in the Western Balkans, which it did not have in the 1990s.

The debate also initiated some national open questions about military crisis management. Especially parliamentarians that were representing the leftist views were very critical towards the cooperation with NATO and the Berlin Plus Agreement. It was unclear how the work and responsibilities were divided between the two. There were also concerns that the role and national interest of Finland would and should be in the development of the military dimension of the EU crisis management. In the interest of the financial input, a comment was made that Finland should be bolder, and say 'no' with respect of the international pressure to participate. This also resonated with the voices of concern that were raised in the form of attainable casualties.

The decision to send troops to the ever more demanding and dangerous missions was not seen positively by all and it was questioned where the line should be drawn. The differences with the rules of engagement between NATO and the EU, as well as between EU MS were also an issue. The parliamentarians wanted more reassurance that the Finnish troops would be allowed to defend themselves with appropriate force. The role of the parliament, as the voice of the people, was also a significant motive. The opinion of the parliament in the decision-making process is to be heard in order for the parliament to be able to take responsibility when faced with a difficult situation, such as the case of troop casualties.

Conclusions

To summarize, the main political motives that Finland had, on the basis of the discussions that were taking place in the government and parliament at the time, were the historical EU input in the Althea operation and thus make Finland a part of this history. The political respect that Finland would receive by being in a visible role from the beginning of the operation was another major motive. With respect to Bailes' typology the most important motives that Finland had would fall in the category of strategic motivations. The comprehensive approach also reveals the altruistic motivation where the goals are to help BiH to establish among other things, long-range communication and economic relationships. It was also important to assure the EU citizens, including the Finns, that the EU is now capable to add its effective military tools to the long list of instruments it had been able to use to promote peace and security in its immediate neighbourhood.

4.3 Sweden

4.3.1 Sweden and CSDP

At the end of the 1990s the Swedish Defence Minister, at the time, Björn von Sydow wrote in a report about Sweden's Security in the 21st Century (1999) how it was the non-aligned position that made it possible for Sweden 'to avoid involvement in the first and

second world wars' (von Sydow, 1999: 14). This of course dates even further back, to almost 200 years of peace in Sweden that according to von Sydow: "Owing to a fortunate mix of politics, defence and geography, Sweden has been at peace [...]" (von Sydow, 1999: 5). He added that non-alignment was a key factor to Swedish democracy. Due to Sweden's support for collective security structures in Europe and non-participation in alliances Swedish democracy had the public support. He stated that the non-alignment policy is a good match with solidarity and an active security policy. The Nordic co-operation continues to ensure the freedom for innovation. As von Sydow puts the question of size to gain more power in CSDP, he sees that the smaller size of Sweden is not a limiting factor. Nonetheless national sovereignty - even for him - cannot be lost when facing the decision to choose collective security (von Sydow, 1999: 10).

Non-alignment as a security strategy as referred to in the part explaining the Finnish stance, might be problematic at an international level. The non-alignment supports the fact that Sweden has been arguing for the comprehensive approach where military and civilian capabilities are used together. This definitely excludes the possibility of any kind of common European army, where Sweden would be forced to join and leave the military neutrality or non-alliance in the past.

Rieker proposes that where Europeanized Finland had institutionally adapted all the changes, Europeanized Sweden had gone through a learning process and actually 'undergone a more stable and enduring change in security policy' (Rieker, 2004: 385). The contributions that Sweden has made to the CSDP such as initiating the Petersberg Tasks together with Finland tell a slightly different story. The first Swedish Presidency in 2001 resulted in the development of conflict prevention and peace-building policy⁸ (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, 2008: 215). Sweden also proposed the creation of the EU Committee for Civilian Crisis Management. Sweden also partly initiated the Civilian Headline Goal. Furthermore, Sweden proposed a better EU peace-building activities' coordination with the OSCE and the UN. It initiated the EU strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (Bailes et al., 2006: 210-211).

Sweden's Programme, during its 2009 Presidency, included a part which stressed the continuing development of the crisis management capability of the EU (Regeringen,

⁸ More in the Commission's *Communication on Conflict Prevention and the Council's EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts*. Available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/misc/09537-r1.en1.html.

2009). Sweden's participation in every EU military operation (Försvarmakten, 2007)⁹ to this date is also proof that it has the commitment to send its troops wherever the EU Member States agree to participate. Sweden supported the changes that the Lisbon Treaty introduced for the EU to become a more effective actor with political power. The Swedish input into the Nordic Battlegroup, as the leader, is also an important factor that Sweden wanted to be developing the CSDP.

To conclude, it seems that the size and non-alignment in the Swedish case has not restricted it to participate in the development of the CSDP. This does not mean, however, that the Swedish security and defence policy would not have been Europeanized in an ever changing global world.

4.3.2 Swedish national security and defence strategy

The Government, on its security policy Government's Statements of Foreign Policy 2010 states that: "Sweden's security policy is based on a broad perception of security. The security is built in solidarity together with others. Threats to peace and security are deterred collectively and in cooperation with other countries and organisations."(Regeringskansliet, 2010)

Globally the support for the UN is the 'primary expression in creating stability and security'. It supports multilateralism by: "[...] developing and deepening the broad participation that [they] already have in regional security efforts in the EU, including its international crisis management within the framework of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the NATO Partnerships for Peace (PfP). Sweden is also active in the Council of Europe which is tasked with safeguarding human rights, democracy and the rule of law, thus contributing to conflict prevention". (Regeringskansliet, 2010)

The Swedish Government sees the EU membership as being allied politically, 'where the Member States do not have defence obligations in relation to each other but take collective responsibility for Europe's security'. Regarding the Lisbon Treaty, the Swedish Government sees it positively strengthening 'the collective responsibility of EU Member

⁹ Look also: SIPRI Database

States for Europe's security'. Nonetheless regional/Nordic security and cooperation is 'of particular importance'. (Regeringskansliet, 2010)

It is clear that, like Finland, Sweden has made a great number of adaptations to their security and defence strategies that can be found in the European Security Strategy. Sweden has shown to be flexible and ready to co-operate when necessary and understands the global changes in the policy area after the end of Cold War.

Threats facing Sweden

In 1999, von Sydow concluded that territorial invasion was not a feasible option in the next decade if the Swedes maintained their basic defence capability (von Sydow, 1999: 19). This was due to the shrinking size of the military in Russia and global trend that supported close co-operation on security despite of possible differences and interests in national policies of states.

According to the latest Government report to the Swedish Parliament, global threats of terrorism, the spread of weapons of mass destruction, organized crime, pandemics and environmental disasters are all making Sweden more vulnerable for instability. It specifically draws out climate change as 'one of the most serious threats to people's fundamental living conditions'. The recent economic crisis also needs to be taken into account in the security policy (Regeringskansliet, 2010).

Crisis management

In 2008, the Swedish Government submitted a *National strategy for Swedish participation in international peace support and security-building operations* (Regeringen, 2008). The aim for the strategy was 'to provide general guidance for Swedish action in international peace-support and security-building operations' (2008: 1). According to the communication: "[...] the Government links foreign, development, security and defence policy more closely together in these efforts"(2008: 3). In other words, Sweden would like to have strong links between policies which guarantees the comprehensiveness of their chosen strategy.

The fundamental values and principles that Sweden intends to maintain are similar to the EU's and Finland's. As for Finland, it is important for Sweden to be partly contributing to the 'international peace and security and thus facilitate fair and sustainable global development' (2008: 3). The values of democracy, human rights, gender equality, human dignity and development are the core of Sweden's values, which are in accordance to those of the EU. Communication states that: "Work on both crisis management and development is permeated by a realisation that security, development and respect for human rights and democratic principles are closely interlinked and reinforce one another" (2008: 5).

The political objectives or motives in participation are; first of all, they want to take the responsibility actively; secondly, they want to be strengthening the multilateral system and framework while also improving their national capability; thirdly, they want operations to be 'an integral part' of Swedish security, defence and foreign policy; and lastly, they want to participate with 'combined contributions' where civil and military collaborate efficiently together (2008: 5-8).

To summarize, Sweden's role in CSDP strategies according to the Government is to be 'at the core' of the European cooperation and be the 'driver' in the strengthening of the EU's role as an active player (2008: 10). Their leading role in the Nordic Battlegroup is one indication that they are determined. Sweden has been an active participant of all the civil and military operations conducted under the CSDP. The effort to make the EU's crisis management tools more usable and capable in its operations was one of the aims during its 2009 Presidency (Ministry of Defence, 2009). The challenge to find the best recruits for the Swedish Defence Forces remains yet to be seen.

The changes in the structure of the military that make the Swedish Defence Forces more functional, focused and based on voluntary participation, have been notable in Sweden (Regeringskansliet, 2009). It is a challenge to find any government positions that state where its international focus in future involvement may be, because Sweden is such an active participant wherever help is needed.

4.3.3 Process towards participation in the Althea operation

The national political decision-making process

On the 13th of October 2004, the Defence Minister gave a presentation to the parliament (Riksdag) on the conditions for Sweden's participation in Althea. On the 21st of October 2004, all the political parties in the foreign affairs and defence committees of the Riksdag approved the Government's proposal and agreed to the deployment of a Swedish contingent for Operation Althea. On the 27th of October, in compliance with Swedish legislation and the country's democratic tradition, a parliamentary debate took place on Sweden's participation in the operation: a clear majority voted in favour (Crema & Gülçicek, 2005: 7).

National debates

Government report

The report that the Government's Foreign and Defence Committee had put together emphasized issues, such as the great significance that the missions would have on the stability and security of Europe. Another motive was that it would provide extensive experience to the CSDP working together with NATO. It would signify that there would be no doubling of structures with the Berlin Plus Agreement. Sweden's track record after having participated in both two EU military missions so far, was important for the government to maintain. The unrest in the Balkans was also the biggest crisis after the World War II and therefore Sweden should be present. Participation would substantiate the strong engagement Sweden has for crisis management but also play a part in order to prevent another ethnic violent outburst in the region with serious humanitarian consequences.

The report is a mixture of Bailes' motives. There are all three motives, but mostly it seems that strategic motives take the lead in this report. There is the strategic notion of the EU's role working together with NATO, where Sweden is obviously leaning towards developing the EU's functions. Its will to actively participate in each EU mission will reaffirm Sweden's reputation as active crisis manager. Preventing violence is partly to do with the security of European borders as a remotely national motive but also an altruistic motive to contribute with humanitarian help to the people living in BiH.

Parliamentary debate

Similar to the Finnish case the Swedish parliament (Riksdag) approved, without any major setbacks, the participation of Swedish military troops in BiH in autumn 2004. The reasons and motives differed slightly from the Finnish parliament's speeches, although there also were many similarities. Some of the reasons for this were perhaps more personal, as Sweden has been a recipient country of immigrants from the Balkans area and therefore, many of its (now) citizens have family ties and history in the Balkans. Hence, historical reasons to participate in the operation were strong. It was also stated that at the time, BiH was one of the largest recipient of Swedish international aid. The aim that came up in the debate, that the Swedish government supposedly had, was that in the long run, Sweden's input would help the accession negotiations of the BiH to the EU. Historical reasons to participate in the operation were strong. Sweden had also participated, with NATO, in the previous NATO-led IFOR and SFOR operations as well as the two EU civilian operations. Sweden had been present with military troops since 1993. The military participation was seen as only helping the acute situation. Swedish approach highlighted the importance of a comprehensive approach in crisis areas.

One of the prime themes that the Riksdag stressed, was the importance of gender perspective where women's input would bring special value to the development of the CSDP crisis management tools. One MP addressed the floor explaining how involved Sweden was in this, with its own initiative to integrate this as part of the EU's formula and consequently help to control trafficking and prostitution, among other problems. The comprehensive way in which the EU acted compared to NATO's efforts, was also recognised by the Riksdag. Another view emphasized the need to protect minorities, such as children and women.

Regardless of the national political party, the MPs saw it as crucial no matter what the mission was, the UN mandate was necessary to support it. Without the mandate, Riksdag could not make an affirmative decision. Nonetheless, in the case of BiH and operation Althea more than one of the MPs saw it as self-evident that Sweden would take part. As the largest donor, it simply could not dodge the bullet. The Riksdag was even prepared to raise the number of troops that the government was asking for the operation. It was fundamental that the power to decide the strength of the troops was to be kept within the Swedish government and parliament. Resentment towards NATO

was in this case, apparent. Liberal MPs saw that the accountability that the Riksdag had to the citizens would suffer, if its role decreased in the decision-making process. The fact that Riksdag was willing to send more troops than originally planned naturally raised debate about the security of these men and women. It was important to be certain whose responsibility it was if news of soldier fatality made its way to Sweden. It also raised the question whether Sweden would lose any international influence that it has in crisis management, if it decided to send fewer soldiers. This further ignited the matter on the changes that the Defence Forces was facing in the near future.

The Green party (Miljöpartiet) representative raised a more ideological question that has a link to the way that Swedish armed forces, among others, should develop its functions. He claimed that it was a global failure to not be able to prevent wars and thus, more emphasis should be put in the EU framework to develop the conflict prevention tools. However, at the same time, he was agreeing that Sweden should double its manpower in the international crisis management missions. This should be seen as understandable, considering that there was a very minimal chance for any territorial threats and invasion and that more capital should be used on the international crisis management instead of territorial defence structures.

Crisis management according to a liberal MP is the dominant part of the defence forces. Sweden being one of the most active players in the field, it has simultaneously the responsibility to help countries that are in need. In the future, a great deal of thought should be placed on where and how Sweden use the limited resources in the most effectively fashion. According to a moderate MP, Sweden is 'extremely ambitious to give foreign aid' and 'its political will to help is undisputed'. This MP perceived that the presence of Swedish soldiers was very popular internationally and that Sweden had real capability as a small state to be a big player globally in the field of military crisis management.

For many MPs, the reputation of the EU to be globally where needed, was important. This would help the development of the CSDP. A Christian Democrat MP stated that Sweden's role to make the EU act as 'a power for freedom' is important. Surprisingly, the usually EU-negative parties in the Riksdag had no difficulty in agreeing to send troops to BiH. The left party saw the UN mandate as a deciding factor in this. It was also a question of humanitarianism where women's roles were emphasized. Saying 'yes' to sending Swedish troops to BiH was not seen problematic, because the mandate did

not say a word about the states acting as an European army which the EU-negative parties opposed rigorously. In their minds the EU was for once seen as actually being a useful contributor in helping together to create peace and stability in its near borders. Riksdag accepted the government proposal unanimously.

Conclusions

To conclude, the Swedish motives that can be found in the Riksdag debate are definitely more personal and thus direct and national, with reference to Bailes' typology. While Finnish MPs concentrated more on the legal base of the mission and the rules of engagement, Swedish MPs also saw the importance that the UN mandate possesses, but they were slightly more innovative when it came to the EU and how Sweden could play a role further developing the CSDP. The debate also shows some of the problems and reasons that have resulted in an organisational change in the Swedish Defence Forces. There are also different tones when it comes to the gender perspective that is missing from the Finnish debate.

The altruistic character of Bailes' motives is definitely also strongly represented as a motive to send troops to BiH. Preventing violence and its spread to west is one main and also indirectly national motive. It seems that the nature of Althea, as a more traditional military peacekeeping operation, does not give much input on the strategic motives where new threats can have an impact on the chosen strategy. The importance of the necessary UN mandate, to participate in overseas missions, points to the fact that in this case where perhaps new EU member states might want to establish their place in the EU, does not carry very far. The Swedish strategic motives are nonetheless strongly represented. Swedes want to participate rather in EU operations than NATO operations and not only reaffirm its reputation as an active participant but also develop the CSDP. The economic aspect of Bailes' strategic motives, also refers to the fact that Swedish have in a sense invested in BiH, Sweden being a substantial donor of aid to BiH.

This debate gives some deliberation to the theoretical assumption that Swedes are Europeanized but also making a substantial impact on the CSDP. It showed that Swedish politicians are actively making suggestions to improve the CSDP, but from a national point of view that would benefit a small state with limited resources. The

Swedes are proud of their traditions in the field of crisis management and they definitely want to remain as a state that has international influence.

4.4 Ireland

4.4.1 Ireland and CSDP

A folly that claims that Irish people can see the United States from their house, is not necessarily a convincing enough reason to claim that the geographical location of the Irish island has anything to do with its foreign policy and its long traditions to be a militarily non-allied state. The changes in the strategic environment in the world since the end of the Cold War have had impact on Ireland too. Ireland already had troubles in the initial phase of joining, the then EEC, when it decided to keep its neutrality after the Second World War, which was not received very well by the European community's NATO members. Consequently the first Irish application to join was actually rejected in 1961 (Commission, 2009a).

Daniel Keohane has written about the realignment that the Irish neutrality went through in the 1990s. He thinks that neutrality is a relic of the Cold War age and that Ireland was forced to realign its position and place in the world bluntly because it could not afford not to be engaged anymore. It had to be perceived as an active and effective member of the new strategic environment. Reasons for this were the new uni-polar world, globalisation and the changes in the meaning of security and defence. Security's new meaning has broadened to a concept where military, civil and economic capabilities all help to prevent and solve conflicts. Defence still means the defence of a national territory, but with collective defence alliances, such as NATO. Today's defence policy now consists of military capabilities and is only one part of a state's security policy (Keohane, 2001: 3-4).

Consequently Ireland's Cold War neutrality changed to non-alignment where it is 'militarily neutral' about defence but not 'militarily neutral' about security. As a non-aligned state, Ireland was not 'prepared to use force or deploy its troops for collective security and crisis management operations such as in the EU framework' (Keohane 2001). In the EU debate according to Keohane the Irish point of view is more interested in sovereignty rather than neutrality. This was proven to be accurate in the

two recent Lisbon Treaty referendums in Ireland. After the first referendum that rejected the changes that the Treaty would make, the EU leaders were forced to offer guarantees on national sovereignty in order to persuade the Irish people to support the Treaty (Keohane, 2001: 14).

Keohane saw the new situation as an opportunity for EU neutral states. Furthermore, it is actually organizations like the EU, NATO and UN who are starting to think more along the lines of the neutral states. The Irish participation in the development of the CSDP has possibly been more indirect than the other two MS, Finland and Sweden. It was actively participating in the European Political Cooperation (EPC) that the CFSP now follows. The EU's socio-economic, cultural and political influence on Ireland has made Ireland become one of the most stable MS (Keohane, 2001: 6).

Ireland had the EU Presidency in 2004 when the grandest EU enlargement to this date took place. Ireland invested time and resources to help the new MS to prepare for their memberships (Commission, 2009b). Enlargement is unarguably one of the most effective EU tools that has been successful in promoting peace and stability in the European region.

The already mentioned Treaty of Lisbon and the hiccups it went through with multiple referendums of more than one MS, including two Irish referendums, finally got Ireland what it wanted regarding the Council Conclusions that now read: “3. The European Council also agreed that other concerns of the Irish people, as presented by the Taoiseach, relating to [...] Ireland's traditional policy of military neutrality, would be addressed to the mutual satisfaction of Ireland and the other Member States, by way of the necessary legal guarantees. [...]” (Commission, 2009c).

More recently, in 2008, Ireland joined the Nordic Battlegroup, as it supports the developments of the CSDP as one of the decision-makers in the collective security actions in the European region.

To conclude, it is difficult to say how much Europeanization has altered the Irish foreign, security and defence policies. It is, however, clear that Ireland says that it supports the CSDP development. It seems that compared to the two Nordic states, Ireland feels safer due to its remote island location. It does not feel that its size is restricting its participation especially with its long UN peacekeeping traditions. It will definitely keep its place and policies with its non-alignment, and has the tools, such as

referendum, in place to fight against the decisions that may risk their traditional positions. To a small state like Ireland, agreeing with Keohane, for the politicians it is more important to avoid the public perception to show that the Government is 'being led' and show that they are equally participating and more importantly out of own choice (Keohane, 2001).

4.4.2 Irish national security and defence strategy

In 2000 the Department of Defence published its first White Paper on the strategy for Irish defence for the next decade. This Paper was reviewed in 2007. More up-to-date information about the present policies can be found on the Foreign Ministry website. This chapter will elaborate the current security and defence strategies that Ireland promote.

The foreign policy of Ireland as a liberal democracy is based on their values and interests with a small and open free-market economy. The ties with the EU and US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand are important. Ireland feels very connected with developing countries, such as countries in Africa. Central to the foreign policy is its UN membership and its strong commitment to effective multilateralism. It is actively co-operating with the EU, NATO and the OSCE. Furthermore, it is especially active in the protection of human rights and the promotion of disarmament (Department of Foreign Affairs, 2009).

Ireland has proven its commitment to keep its military neutrality policy, numerous times. Nevertheless, this does not exclude its over 50 years of contributions to UN and UN-mandated operations, as well as, playing an active part in the CSDP development (Department of Foreign Affairs, 2009). The White Paper states that: "Ireland is a small country with a limited capacity to influence its external environment. We have a practical as well as a principled interest in the maintenance of international peace and security in Europe and further afield. Our defence policy will seek to reflect this strategic interest"(Department of Defence, 2000). Its involvement in the CFSP, gives a chance to shape a policy in a Union which has globally more power than Ireland could have on its own (Timmins, 2007). Additionally, the 2008 Annual Report of the Department of Foreign Affairs stated that the Irish High Level Goal for the years 2008-2010 was to: "Secure

Ireland's interests in the EU and contribute fully to the Union's future development"(Department of Foreign Affairs, 2008: 21).

The Defence White Paper also states that: "By any international standard, Ireland is proportionately a very large contributor" (Department of Defence, 2000). When it comes to the EU operations it has participated in most of the military and also civilian missions. Peacekeeping is a significant part of the Irish foreign policy. The Irish view the non-alignment as a positive, where a state can play a neutral role in a crisis. Certainly this only benefits partners including the EU and its reputation (Keohane, 2001). The small size of the Irish state also means that: "Defence in Ireland is conducted within a modest level of resources" (Department of Defence, 2000: 8). Consequently, this reiterates the importance of co-operation with the EU MS, among others.

Threats facing Ireland

The changed global security situation means that territorially: "Ireland faces a generally benign security environment". And that: "The external security environment does not contain any specific threats to the overall security of the State" (Department of Defence, 2000: 12). The Irish specialty is, naturally, the inter-island security environment of Northern Ireland. According to the White Paper the progress that has taken place after the Good Friday Agreement in 1999 'provides the basis for a lasting peace' (Department of Defence, 2000: 12).

The threats that are stated in the White Paper and its Review in the wider security sphere include: international crime, the proliferation of small arms, drug trafficking, environmental problems, ethnic conflicts and refugee flows. Ireland's geographical location on the island in the periphery Northern Europe does give it an advantage and at least slows down these threats reaching Ireland's territory and thus, is an important factor in its security (Department of Defence, 2000: 15; 2007).

Crisis management

The White Paper (2000) proposes that Ireland needs: “Increasingly, proactive and preventive approaches which entail a range of co-ordinated techniques - for example, political, diplomatic, humanitarian, policing and military – in the form of regional peacekeeping and crisis management, are seen as necessary to ensure stability and to defend against threats to security in the European sphere”. Irish crisis management is therefore, comprehensive and in line with the EU approach. This chapter discusses the Irish military capabilities to participate in international crisis management.

In the White Paper Review (Department of Defence, 2007: 20) it says that: “Overseas Operations have been an important dimension of meeting Ireland’s international obligations, have significant training and morale-boosting benefits for the Defence Forces and enhance this country’s standing on the international stage”. It continues: “These deployments broadened the skills base and exercised the logistic requirement associated with such deployments that benefited the Defence Forces for the larger and more significant deployments that followed”.

One significant change that has made it possible for the Irish troops to participate more actively in overseas missions was the stabilized situation in Northern Ireland (Department of Defence, 2007). Some motives that the White Paper lists as factors that are assessed before agreeing to send troops overseas are: “1. An assessment of whether a peacekeeping operation is the most appropriate response. 2. Consideration of how the mission relates to the priorities of Irish foreign policy. 3. The degree of risk involved. 4. The extent to which the required skills or characteristics relate to Irish capabilities. 5. The existence of realistic objectives and a clear mandate which has the potential to contribute to a political solution. 6. Whether the operation is adequately resourced. 7. The level of existing commitments to peacekeeping operations and security requirements at home” (Department of Defence, 2000: 64). These motives seem to include Bailes’ national, strategic and altruistic characteristics.

Irish troops have a good reputation overseas. They are professional, motivated, due to their voluntary service, and they do not have language barriers with English as the operating language in multistate missions. Lastly, they have had ideal training whilst serving in Northern Ireland, which due to the nature of its conflicts is very similar to the features in other crisis areas overseas (Department of Defence, 2000: 65). In addition, they are accustomed to co-operating with another nation; with their long-standing traditions co-operating with the British troops. The biggest advantage, according to

Keohane, is that Irish troops are acknowledged for their impartiality and neutrality, and therefore are ideal to operate in crisis areas. As can be seen, there are many reasons why Ireland is actively participating in military crisis management operations.

To conclude, there are many factors that are put into the equation when deciding whether it is sensible for Ireland to participate in an international military crisis management mission. There are strategic and national reasons as well as altruistic reasons. The Defence Forces have a long-standing tradition of participation, with a good, impartial reputation and they see their size as an advantage but with operational limitations.

There is a structural change that the Defence Forces have made, aligned with the global development. Additionally, the EU operations have forced Ireland to make changes to its security and defence policies. It is, however, less clear to suggest whether this is more to do with globalization or pure Europeanization.

4.4.3 Process towards participation in the Althea operation

The national political decision-making process

In the Irish legislation in order to send Defence Forces to overseas missions the so called 'triple lock' needs to be fulfilled. The decision is based on the UN authorization which then needs the approval of the Government and the Dáil Éireann, the lower house of parliament. The decision-making process in the Irish national politics on sending troops to BiH was made very swiftly and extremely close to the starting date of the mission. On the 9th of November 2004, the Government authorized the Minister for Defence to arrange for the dispatch of a contingent of the Permanent Defence Force for a period of one year for service with Althea. On the 24th of November 2004, the motion was referred to the Select Committee on Justice, Equality, Defence and Women's Rights to debate the dispatch of an Irish contingent to Althea under the UN mandate. The next day, the 25th of November, the Dáil Éireann debated the motion before agreeing with the motion (Dáil, 2004a).

National debates

As has already been mentioned, the Government made the decision to start preparing for the operation in early November 2004. The Minister of Defence outlined the basis for the government decision when he addressed the Select Committee on Justice, Equality, Defence and Women's Rights on the 24th of November. Due to the UN Security Council resolution that gave the mandate for the EU operation on the 22nd of November, Ireland only had a matter of days for the decision-making process that needed the political approval of Ireland.

One main point that the Minister introduced as to why the Government was supporting Irish participation was precisely the fact that the UN was the 'cornerstone for Ireland's participation in overseas missions', and, that it had the duty to 'keep its commitments with the UN'. Another reason was Ireland's strong support to the increasing EU crisis management missions within the CSDP framework. The fact that it was the Irish Minister of Foreign Affairs, who in the spring 2004, was acting as the President of the EU Council, while Ireland had the EU Presidency, and wrote the terms for the UN Secretary General of the EU takeover from NATO, increased the political significance of Irish participation.

An important deciding factor to participate was also the possibility to be able to develop the abilities of Defence Forces in 'a multinational operation with an optimum level of inter-operability with other states, reflecting Ireland's commitment to international peace and security'. The Irish favorable position to develop rapid reaction forces was definitely weighted in the decision. The success of the mission would 'signal the strength of the EU's ability to undertake a robust and large scale mission'. From an Irish point of view positive attitude would reaffirm Ireland's support to the UN and promote multilateralism.

Parliamentary debate

Due to the short deadline of the following day to pass the motion to participate in Althea, the Select Committee debate was originally meant to be the only debate concerning the dispatch of troops. Nonetheless, the Dáil Éireann saw parliamentary

debate as necessary, as stated earlier took place the next day, on the 25th of November. There were not actually any significant differences in the tone of the debate between the Select Committee and the Dáil. Many were unsatisfied with the speed and rushed manner that the matter was dealt with. Like in the two previous cases in Finland and Sweden, the debate at times did turn into more general discussions about national defence. The role of the UN in the triple lock was a major issue that filled the floor with elevated discussion.

Motives to participate were also historical. Ireland had been in the area already from the beginning of the crisis in BiH in the 1990s. The problem of finding sufficient troops, was not considered a problem by a member of the Dáil, even suggesting that it was natural to participate, because it was in the ‘natural trait of many Irish people to want to get involved in things’. The safety of the troops was another observation limiting the positive approach to the operation.

There were also concerns about the military neutrality policy and especially neutrality within the CSDP. An MP from the Sinn Fein Party went further, suggesting that any other organization apart from the UN, had no business to operating in military missions. An MP from the Green Party expressed the geopolitical motives being behind the mission, where concerns for spillovers needed to be taken seriously if they were to have negative impact on the EU MS. This was in line with the expressed concern of the threat of organized crime spreading, as another European motive for the mission. An additional motive to participate was that Ireland is required to do more only because it owes it to the world, due to the fact that it has been helped on numerous occasions by different countries. The EU, as a wealthy region, is now able to deploy troops for military missions. Irish are ‘professional international peacekeepers’ but also ‘humanitarians and goodwill ambassadors’. The Irish definitely needed to be part of this, because their peacekeepers have good international reputation and ‘make the Irish proud’ – even with the risk of losing troops.

Conclusions

As has been seen, there are similar motives that can be found from the Althea debates from all three states. Irish speciality seems to be the huge impact that the UN has in the

decision-making process. Historical presence in the area, or national direct motives, together with countries including Finland and Sweden, as well as the chance to train troops, are all important Irish motives. Strategic motives that promote the Irish capabilities in the multilateral European concept seem to be another important factor. Globalisation affects all three MS and their altruistic motivations where the threats cross borders and can have snowball effects.

As mentioned earlier, the changes that have occurred in the Irish Defence Forces have been made due to the changed security environment. Irish trust their soldiers and are proud of them. That Irish security and defence policies have gone through a process of Europeanization is a strong assumption to make. The debates are concentrated more on the effect that the Irish troops can have, and what they can learn from multilateral operations, rather than how it will be beneficial for the EU in general. Nevertheless in order to be able to take part in the EU military operations, Ireland has been forced to make structural changes. In this sense they have been Europeanized. On the other hand, in the case of their national identity and non-alignment, they have not yielded.

5. Conclusions

This chapter will conclude the analysis and respond to the questions that were asked in the beginning of this thesis. Starting with the research question; *What motives do non-aligned EU Member States have in order to send troops to the EU military operations?*. The second question: *Are there common variables and reasons as well as differences, as to why the MS choose to send troops to EU overseas missions?* will be answered simultaneously with the first question. Finally, the Europeanization process that the three MS have presumably gone through, will be discussed, while answering to the last question: *Can a difference be seen between the level of 'Europeanization' in the foreign, defence and security policies of traditionally non-aligned Member States?*

5.1 The motives behind Finnish, Swedish and Irish participation in Althea Operation

Starting with Finland, the main motives according to the government and parliament papers and debates were: 1. To promote peace and security in Europe. 2. The history of Finnish troops in the area with previous NATO operations. 3. A test to prove to everyone that the EU is capable of carrying out successful military operations. 4. Rehearsal for future EU military operations and MS co-operation. 5. Part of the EU history making – Althea being the first large scale EU military operation. 6. Finland as a framework country would gain political respect and appreciation.

Sweden had similar motivations, albeit, some differences: 1. The importance to secure European peace and stability and prevent possible violence in the crisis area. 2. The

previous participation in the area in NATO operations. 3. The reputation of the EU. 4. The importance to continue participating in all EU operations. 5. To maintain Sweden's reputation and influence as an active military crisis manager. 6. To gain EU experience with NATO co-operation. 7. Personal relations with immigrants from Balkans living in Sweden. 8. Sweden's history as large aid donor in BiH. 9. To introduce gender perspective in the EU missions.

Ireland's motives were: 1. To promote peace and security. 2. The previous military presence in the area with NATO operations. 3. To keep commitments with the UN. 4. Ireland showing support to EU missions – especially to Althea because Ireland had been planning for it, as the Presidency state from early on. 5. The reputation of the EU was at stake. 6. Irish willingness to help, with long-standing traditions and good reputation as well as to develop the abilities of the Defence Forces. 7. To stop 'new threats' spreading to Europe such as, organised crime, as has been mentioned.

It seems that all three MS had at least three common motives that affected their decision to participate in the Althea operation. They all had previous experience from the area since the early 1990s, they were all concerned with the reputation and the credibility of the EU to implement a military crisis management operation and altruistically, they all wanted to be promoting peace and security in the European region. Additionally, Sweden and Ireland saw it as necessary to participate, in order to keep their reputation as active participants in international operations, and now especially with the EU. Finland saw it as a way to gain more international respect and appreciation. In addition, Finland and Ireland saw the aspect of improving military troops and capabilities as one important motive.

The biggest differences were that, where Finland saw the operation as a historically significant one, Sweden had a more personal approach with immigrants from the Balkan area living in Sweden as well as their active aid and development in the area. Ireland's commitment to the UN was their most important reason to participate. When analysing the parliamentary debates, it was very clear that all national parliaments took a positive stance regardless of the party position. This was largely because they saw it imperative that they, as Members of the Parliament, were still an integral part of the decision-making process, albeit, their role in the actual implementation being minor.

All three MS had national, strategic and altruistic motives to participate in the Althea Operation. When looking at the Table 2.1 *Alison J.K. Bailes: Motivations to send troops to overseas missions post Cold War era.* (page 9), the only motives left out were from the national motives section. None of the MS saw the reasons to participate as a favour for a favour. Additionally, even though they all would be serving in the same division, the motive was not to set up special units as a way to reconcile any regional differences that many Eastern European countries have gone through.

5.2 Europeanization

When it comes to the third question presented in the beginning of this paper: *Can a difference be seen between the level of 'Europeanization' in the foreign, defence and security policies of traditionally non-aligned Member States?*, it is challenging to draw conclusions.

It seems that the developments of the CSDP have been easier to accept by the non-aligned states, due to the fact, that a comprehensive strategic thinking may have been closer to their thinking in the first place. Due to the limitations as smaller states and their geographical positions they may have been forced to think more innovatively and comprehensively from the start. They do not have enormous Defence Forces and equipment but they are also not threatened by any army invading their territory. Due to their non-alignment policies, they have been able to concentrate on developing their Defence Forces that are deployed overseas in international operations and have gained experience and reputation in doing so. They are used to co-operating with others, as well as with each other, even though their non-alignment policy can sound a bit contradictory at times, when they decide to co-operate with military alliances such as NATO. The motives why the three MS want to be part of the CSDP and develop EU's capabilities include national, strategic and altruistic motivations.

Globalisation and the changes in the security environment have had a strong influence on security and defence policies of Finland, Sweden and Ireland. The external events have a great role to play in the nature of the foreign policy. In the end, it is difficult to ascertain who is advising who and what they should be doing. The CSDP has developed

tremendously and the EU is more ready to face the new threats and challenges that the globalised world now faces. However, it needs all its MS to be on board.

Size does not have to be a limiting variable when considering the initiations that these countries, especially Sweden and also Finland, have produced during the last decade in the field of the CSDP. Ireland has also had its constitutional referendum as an advantage to stop the development that goes too far from its own interests. Certainly, in general, the defence and security white papers are just words and hence, actions speak more loudly. All three states are 'active', 'committed', 'at the core of the EU', 'driving the development of the CSDP' to use some of the rhetoric's of governments' security and defence policies.

In terms of military capabilities, Sweden has gone through a significant change in its military structures. It can also be argued that Finland has followed suit, and that Ireland has been forced to rethink, how it can be most effective and secure its basic national defence, as well as, keep its reputation abroad. It is, however, challenging to measure the different levels of Europeanization. All three states see it only as a strength that they are non-aligned and would like it to remain this way.

Rieker's claim that Sweden has gone through a learning process, definitely holds true but while it has been 'a student' it has had a great part in 'teaching' the EU and its MS how to make the Union more capable, coherent and comprehensive in its CSDP. The Finnish institutional Europeanization also holds, but just like Sweden it has been actively promoting its own interests and goals. Ireland, as the oldest EU member from the trio, has profited tremendously from the EU socially, economically and culturally and knows and shows its place in the Union. Ireland's commitment to the CSDP only goes as far as it benefits its own interests. However, this may be due to Ireland's remote location, that they feel safer.

5.3 Future research

The national or European weight of this study remains yet to be seen. Even though the security and defence policies are strongly considered as internal and national, CSDP and the ESS has helped the MS to come closer together and possibly even trust each other to

a greater extent. This kind of study may help identify the motives of numerous states more concretely, and thus, help them to find the correct partners with similar or even the same values and motives to participate and co-operate with military overseas missions.

As mentioned in the introductory chapter there are 27 MS and only 3 were studied more closely in this study. To compare the motives it would be interesting to look at the other EU military missions where the three states have operated. The study could be also extended to the other 24 MS. The EU's relationships and operational co-operation with NATO, OSCE and the UN are also noteworthy topics for further investigation. For a comparison with Althea, it would also be interesting to look at recent missions, especially after the major developments in the EU military capabilities.

6. Executive Summary

This master's thesis examines the motives and effects that Finland, Sweden and Ireland as EU Member States have in order to participate and influence in the EU security and defence missions. The common variables of these three states are their position of non-alignment in security and defence policies, they all are located to the borders of the Union and their relatively small size in terms of their military capabilities. These common variables might intend that their motives correspond with each other, and that they all have very limited power, when it comes to deciding the European common strategies in security and defence policies.

Globalisation has forced the modern world to co-operate in various areas. Guaranteeing security is one of the most important functions of a state. The last decade or two has seen a tremendous change in the security environment. New threats do not consider the sovereignty of the states when they cross borders. It is more challenging and it is more costly to fight against them alone. At the same time, there is an opportunity to create common policies and capabilities, from which everyone can benefit with minimum cost. In the last ten years the EU has taken long steps towards a Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).

The thesis starts with explaining theories that help categorize and explain the motives and effects of the three MS' willingness (or unwillingness) to co-operate in the area of defence and security. Pernille Rieker's outlook, from a Nordic perspective, on Europeanization theory in the field of CSDP, is very helpful, in order to answer to the research question, that is concerned with the levels of 'Europeanization' in the foreign, defence and security policies of traditionally non-aligned MS. She found that the instrumental adaptation or learning of the Nordic countries were results from the degrees of participation rather than the type of the relationship that the countries had to

the EU. In addition, the differences, that the countries had with their security policy traditions and historical experiences played a role in the Europeanization processes.

Alyson J.K. Bailes has suggested a typology that categorises the motives, especially for the Western European states' willingness to send troops to military overseas missions. Her theory is covering the analysis of the main research question, which asks, what motives do non-aligned EU member states have, in order to send troops to EU military operations. The differences in the motives are looked at in the respective analyses of each country. Bailes sees that there are three main motives behind states' willingness to participate in military missions. They are national or direct, strategic and altruistic. The rest of the theoretical framework consists of an overview of previous studies that have written about the development of the CSDP, and Europeanization.

The method of the thesis is qualitative text analysis. Both discourse and content analysis are helpful for this study. Flick writes that in discourse analysis 'a special emphasis is on the constructions of versions of the events in the reports and presentations' (2006: 324). The content analysis uses categories that are evolved from theoretical models, such as Bailes' typology of motives.

The documents that are being analysed are the European Security Strategy, as well as, Government White Papers and Reports, concerning the national security and defence policies and strategies. Operation Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina was chosen as the case to look at, because it was the first major military crisis management that all three MS had a strong commitment to participate, in number of troops. To assess the motives of three MS' participation in Althea, the debates that have taken place in national parliaments and committees, and the debates that occurred in the governments and their committees, are being analysed.

The analysis part starts with an introduction of the development of the CSDP with a special emphasis on the changes that have affected the military crisis management. The development of the CSDP into a capable and operational tool has been very robust within the EU. The military, in addition to civilian, development and trade tools, make a comprehensive EU approach that has operated 22 missions to this date, and is a remarkable proof of EU's capabilities.

The second part of the EU chapter analyzes the European Security Strategy (ESS) that was composed in 2003 and revised in 2008. The ESS is very comprehensive, and the 2008 report introduces many instruments and arrangements that have been set up, in order to challenge the threats. The typology that Bailes provides can be well adapted with 27 member states. Considering the large scale of policy tools that make the ESS, this is not a surprise result. According to the EU's strategy, military crisis management is only one part of the great system that provides security. Nevertheless, it has a major role, and can create criticism from the non-aligned states' national parliaments and governments.

The rest of the analysis introduces and analyses the Finnish, Swedish and Irish governments' relationship with the CSDP. First, the approaches of the three MS to the CSDP are examined. Secondly, the national positions of the defence and security strategies of the states are studied. Third part is analyzing the debates that were going on in the national governments and parliaments of Finland, Sweden and Ireland, before the beginning of the Operation Althea.

The Finnish relationship with the CSDP suggests, that even though with respect to the size and political non-alignment attitude, which suggests that the Europeanization of Finnish security and defence policies have been EU-based. Surely in terms of the history Finland has also been the receiving party. The actions and initiations that Finland has done during the last decade towards the CSDP might imply that the Europeanization process is not that straight forward after all.

In the Swedish case, it seems that the size and non-alignment in the Swedish case has not restricted it to participate in the development of the CSDP. This does not mean, however, that the Swedish security and defence policy would not have been Europeanized in an ever changing global world. It is clear that as Finland, Sweden has made a lot of the same adaptations to their security and defence strategies that can be found from the ESS. Sweden shows to be flexible and ready to co-operate when necessary and understands the global changes in the policy area after the end of Cold War. The Althea debate also gives some deliberation to the theoretical assumption, that Swedes are more Europeanized, rather than making an impact on the CSDP. It showed that Swedish politicians are actively making suggestions to improve the CSDP but from a national point of view, that would benefit a small state with limited resources.

Irish case is slightly more challenging to analyse. It is difficult to say how much Europeanization has happened in the Irish foreign, security and defence policies. It is clear that they are supporting the CSDP development but it seems that compared to the two Nordic states, Ireland is feeling safer due to its remote location. It does not seem that its size is restricting its participation especially with a long UN peacekeeping tradition. It will definitely keep its place and policies with its non-alignment, and has the tools, such as referendum, in place to fight against the decisions that may risk their traditional positions.

It seems that the developments of the CSDP have been easier to accept by the non-aligned states, due to the fact, that a comprehensive strategic thinking may have been closer to their thinking in the first place. Due to the limitations as smaller states and their geographical positions they may have been forced to think more innovatively and comprehensively from the start. They do not have enormous Defence Forces and equipment but they are also not threatened by any army invading their territory. Due to their non-alignment policies, they have been able to concentrate on developing their Defence Forces that are deployed overseas in international operations and have gained experience and reputation in doing so. They are used to co-operating with others, as well as with each other, even though their non-alignment policy can sound a bit contradictory at times, when they decide to co-operate with military alliances such as NATO. The motives why the three MS want to be part of the CSDP and develop EU's capabilities include national, strategic and altruistic motivations.

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different levels of Europeanization. All three states see it only as a strength that they are non-aligned and would like it to remain this way.

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It seems that all three MS had at least three common motives that affected their decision to participate in the Althea operation. They all had previous experience from the area since the early 1990s, they were all concerned with the reputation and the credibility of the EU to implement a military crisis management operation and altruistically, they all wanted to be promoting peace and security in the European region. Additionally, Sweden and Ireland saw it as necessary to participate, in order to keep their reputation as active participants in international operations, and now especially with the EU. Finland saw it as a way to gain more international respect and appreciation. In addition, Finland and Ireland saw the aspect of improving military troops and capabilities as one important motive.

The biggest differences were that, where Finland saw the operation as a historically significant one, Sweden had a more personal approach with immigrants from the Balkan area living in Sweden as well as their active aid and development in the area. Ireland's commitment to the UN was their most important reason to participate. When analysing the parliamentary debates, it was very clear that all national parliaments took a positive stance regardless of the party position. This was largely because they saw it imperative that they, as Members of the Parliament, were still an integral part of the decision-making process, albeit, their role in the actual implementation being minor.

All three MS had national, strategic and altruistic motives to participate in the Althea Operation. The only motives left out from the Bailes' typology of motivations were from the national motives section. None of the MS saw the reasons to participate as a favour

for a favour. Additionally, even though they all would be serving in the same division, the motive was not to set up special units as a way to reconcile any regional differences that many Eastern European countries have gone through.

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