Conditions for a European Public Sphere

Political parties conceptualizations of the European Union

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Abstract

The democratic legitimacy of the European Union is a frequent topic when discussing European integration. Can democratic principles be withheld when political power is delegated from the nation-state to a supranational level? Can democracy be secured beyond the nation-state?

This thesis derives from a deliberative perspective, which emphasises the need for debate in democratic societies. From a deliberative perspective, the debate about the legitimacy of the European Union has had the wrong focus. From this view, the problem cannot be solved primarily trough the institutions. The solution is not of an institutional character but the development of a fundamental ingredient of democratic politics: a viable public sphere. This study focuses on opinion-makers capacity to affect the nature of the debate, specifically the role of political parties. The starting point is that political parties in their role of opinion-makers can affect the nature of the debate by how the EU is conceptualized.

Using idealtypes, an analytical framework is developed and applied to Swedish political parties election platforms and manifestos in the 2009 European Parliament Election.

The analysis shows that there are two various conceptualisations of the EU among the Swedish political parties. Based on the assumption that these conceptualisations affect the incentives for transnational debate I conclude through these results that there are obstacles for this to occur.

Key words: Idealtype, Public Sphere, Political parties, European Union, Deliberative democracy
Words: 8827

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1   Introduction

"What hampers democracy at the European level today is the lack of a common, law-based identification and the possibility for a pan-European discourse – a single European space– in which Antonio in Sicily, Judith in Germany and Bosse in Sweden can take part in a discussion with Fernando in Portugal and Julia in Spain on the same topics at the same time." (Eriksen, 2005:358)

A concern about the democratic legitimacy of the European Union is a frequent topic when discussing European integration. How can democratic principles be withheld when political power is delegated from the nation-state to a supranational level? Can democracy be secured beyond the nation-state?

In 2001 the European Commission published the White Paper on European Governance, which included a set of recommendations on how to enhance democracy in Europe and increase the legitimacy of the institutions (Commission 2001). The focus was on EU-society relations and how to strengthen the relationship between EU institutions and civil society organisations. The task was to institutionalize a new mode of governance that could guarantee wider involvement, correct inequalities that might hamper equal participation and increase opportunities for collective learning. (Kohler-Koch, 2010:103)

From a deliberative perspective, the debate about the legitimacy of the European Union has had the wrong focus. From this view, the problem cannot be solved primarily trough the institutions. The problem is instead that democratic politics itself are moving beyond the nation-state (Conrad, 2009:19-20). The solution is not of an institutional character but the development of a fundamental ingredient of democratic politics: a viable public sphere in which unconstrained debate, analysis and criticism of the political order can take place (Fossum & Schlesinger, 2007:1).

From this perspective the development of a European public sphere is a vital part when assessing the democratic character of the European Union. But what are the prospects of the development of a public sphere within the EU and how are European citizens to look beyond the national arena and engage in deliberation with other citizens of the EU? What are the conditions for transnational debate?

1.1   Statement of Purpose

There has been extensive research on democracy in the European Union, providing many different perspectives on the subject. This thesis derives from a deliberative perspective, which emphasises the need for debate in democratic societies. A great influence when choosing my subject has been the research of Maximilian Conrad, Erik Oddvar Eriksen and John Erik Fossum and their use of Jürgen Habermas concept of a Public Sphere. From this view, there is a need for a transnational communicative network within the EU that can provide a space for deliberation among European citizens (Fossum & Schlesinger, 2007:2, Eriksen, 2005:358). The aim of this thesis is therefore to contribute to this research by assessing the conditions for the development of a European public sphere.

My contribution will focus on opinion-makers capacity to affect the nature of the debate, specifically the role of political parties. The starting point is that political parties in their role of opinion-makers can affect the nature of the debate by how the EU is conceptualized. I will therefore try to answer the question:

How did the Swedish political parties conceptualize the EU in the 2009 European Parliament election?

To answer this question I will develop an analytical framework for conceptualisations of the EU based on the assumption that these could affect the incentives for transnational debate, and apply these on Swedish political parties in the European Parliament election of 2009. As seen by the question I've posed, I do not study *why* the conceptualisations are in a certain way or if they actually do *affect* the debate but rather how the conceptions *correspond* with the theoretical idealtypes I develop.

In the following sections I will present the methodological and theoretical base of the study. These will however be further developed in chapter 3 where I construct my analytical framework.

1.2 Method and Material

As described above, the purpose of this study is to analyse how the political parties conceptualize EU and present their policies towards the voters. To answer my question I do an *analysis of ideas*, which as described by Ludvig Beckman is the scientific study of political messages (Beckman, 2005:11).

Bergström & Boréus describes the classifications of different types of analysis of ideas as depending on the study's purpose, exemplifying by describing three possible purposes: *descriptive, explaining* and *normative.* (Bergström & Boréus, 2005:155) By the nature of my question, my analysis would be categorised as a *descriptive analysis of ideas* since my purpose is precisely that: to describe how the political parties are conceptualizing EU. But there is also a deeper purpose of the descriptive analysis that goes beyond reproducing the studied material. The interesting part of the analysis is instead the set of "glasses" that the researcher uses when interpreting the material. By using these "glasses", the researcher is able through analytical reading to describe something that is not explicitly expressed in the material itself (Beckman, 2005:49). In my case, my theoretical perspective constitutes these "glasses".

To ensure that my analysis meets the scientific requirement of *intersubjectivity*, I account for the research process, making it reconstructable for other researchers (Lundquist, 1993:119). This means that I am explicit when presenting both the theoretical perspective and my analysis apparatus, thereby making it possible for the reader to derive my research findings.

I have chosen to use so-called *idealtypes* in my study. The idealtypes are theoretical constructions that are used to categorize my findings (Bergström & Boréus, 2005:159). These are, as the name tells us, theoretical ideals and not something we expect to find in reality. But by using them we are able to "measure" reality by how it corresponds to the idealtype (Lundquist, 1993:82). In an effort to avoid that the idealtypes become to "rough", I follow Malena Rosén Sundströms example to subdivide the idealtypes in different subcategories or dimensions (Rosén Sundström, 2009:30). This makes the analysis more distinct by focusing on certain features of each idealtype. The operationalizations of these idealtypes are important to ensure the research a high level of *validity* and are described in chapter three (Ibid:99).

To ensure a high level of *reliability* and intersubjectivity, it's important that my analysis is as transparent as possible and that the material is analysed correctly. One way to assuring the study a high reliability is to return to the analysed material for a second analysis an see if I still agree with my first results (Ibid:65). Since the analysis is a systematic *interpretation* of the material, my results are based on tenable argumentation and presented in a clear way e.g. through extensive citation. But I also account for those cases where there is more than one possible interpretation so that it is possible for the reader to derive my results. (Ibid:119)

The material I have chosen for my analysis are the election manifestos and election platforms of Swedish parties in the 2009 European Parliament election. The reason I have chosen this material is because I think it's a good representation for how the political parties express their view of the EU and their politics. The material is therefore based on the assumption that the parties express these views when communicating them to the voters through e.g. debates or political rallies. The alternative would have been to study what is being said in these rallies and debates, but this would result in a disproportionate amount of material in relation to the size of this study. It would not have been possible to collect and analyse this amount due to the limited time. My belief is that the material I have chosen will be representative for what is being communicated to the public and is therefore suitable given the question I have set out to answer.

The difference between election manifestos and election platforms varies between the parties. The basic rule is that the election platform is a more detailed description of the party's policies and the manifestos are more of a summary of these policies. However, the size of these platforms and manifestos varies in reality where some parties have election manifestos similar to the size of other parties election platforms. I have chosen to use a combination of them both to get the broadest possible picture.

The cases I have chosen are all of the political parties represented in the *Riksdag*. My ambition was to analyse all of the parties participating in the European election, but due to the limited time and space, I have chosen to limit the study by focusing on these well-established political parties.

1.3 Disposition

Chapter 2 contains my theoretical background. I give a short introduction to deliberative democracy and the Habermasian approach, and complement this with a more elaborate presentation of the Public Sphere. In chapter 3 I develop my idealtypes that will be used in my analysis. Chapter 4 contains my findings where the results from my analysis are presented. The final chapter is reserved for a final summary.

2   Theoretical background

There are many different conceptualizations of democracy. From a minimalistic view presented by Joseph Shumpeter, where democracy is a power struggle of elites, to the liberal understanding which emphasises civil-and political rights. What unites these different perspectives can be traced to the foundational meaning of democracy: rule of the people. Put differently, that political rule is legitimate if it originates from the people. This is the lowest common denominator that unites the broad spectra of views on democracy. Beyond this general definition of democracy there are significant differences of how individuals are conceptualised and thereby how autonomy and equality should be defined (Rosenberg, 2007:4). These views are the "backbone" of the democratic theories and have great consequences for the normative aspects of democratic systems.

   In this study, I have chosen deliberative democracy as my theoretical foundation. However, even though deliberative democracy may be described as a view of its own, it's also a generic term that needs to be specified in order to understand the normative value of deliberation. I will therefore start this chapter with a short presentation of the foundational assumptions of deliberative democratic theory and then describe the Habermasian approach. From this I continue with elaborating the concept of a Public Sphere, and the chapter is concluded with a presentation of different views on the possibility for a public sphere in the EU.

2.1   Deliberative democracy

Deliberative democratic theory's development in the 1990's can be seen as a response to the "aggregative" view of democracy presented by rational choice theorists. From this rational choice view, the individual is conceived as rational in a very limited sense. The individual is assumed to have a set of preferences that are ordered according to his/hers desirability and assumed to make choices that correspond to these goals. In the political system, when the individual has the role of citizen, the key mechanism for achieving these goals are therefore the elections that, given they are fair, are able to represent these preferences through aggravation. By this conception of the citizen, autonomy is defined as the ability to freely affect collective decisions while equality is defined as a social relationship in which the individuals have equivalent opportunity to freely pursue these interests. (Rosenberg, 2007:5).

   Losers in these elections comply simply because it's in their interest to do so. If the system is fair and equal, the losers are able to pursue their goals in the next

election (Ibid:25). The system is therefore evaluated on how well it can provide equal opportunities for these different preferences, or to put it differently, the system must provide equal opportunities so that the cost of compliance is lower than the cost of defection. (Przeworski, 1991:26)

Deliberative democracy offers a different view of individuals and thereby a different understanding of autonomy and equality. This view of the individual has its origin from John Rawls and his theory of political justice. From this perspective, the individual citizens are logical in the sense that they are able to argue with reasons, recognise criteria for justification, understand rules of evidence and reflect upon their own presuppositions. They are rational because they can order their specific preferences and values relative to their overall life plan and sense of a higher-order good. But they are also reasonable because they are able to take the perspective of another person and thereby fairly consider those claims in that person's term. Individuals are not only able to consider personal values of specific actions and outcomes, but also the common value of general principles of interactions and are therefore capable to make judgements that are guided by a sense of justice and fairness. (Rosenberg, 2007:6)

Building on this view of the individual, deliberative democrats argue that the desired self-reflection and fair orientation to the other can only be realized in encounter with those beliefs, values and arguments of other citizens. They argue that Rawls cognitive device of a "veil of ignorence" is not sufficient to ensure that citizens approach political questions with the required reasonableness, rationality and logic. Instead it's participation in deliberation that leads individuals to reflect and interact in a way that is more logical, rational and reasonable. (Ibid:7)

This understanding of deliberation as something desirable has in turn consequences for the concepts of autonomy and equality. In this perspective, the concept of autonomy extends beyond the ability to pursue one's own interests and includes the freedom to participate with others in deliberation. Political equality is also re-conceptualised to include equal opportunity to participate actively in this deliberation. (Ibid)

This means that the problem of democratic governance is reconsidered. In this view, institutions such as elections and referendums are inadequate. Democracy is not exclusively a form of politics; it is a framework of social and institutional arrangements that facilitates free reasoning among citizens and favourable conditions for expression (Cohen, 1998:186). There must be a political space where deliberation can take place that is inclusive, public and able to influence public policy (Rosenberg, 2007:9).

Shawn W. Rosenberg describes two perspectives on deliberative democracy: The *Anglo-American* view presented above and the *Continental European* view represented by Jürgen Habermas and his discourse theory of democracy (Ibid:4). Even though these views share the same focus on citizen participation through public discourse, they differ on some basic assumptions.

One key feature of the continental theory is that rationality or thinking is sociohistorically relative. How people think (how they perceive, define and

integrate information, the understandings and values they construct) may vary across societies and historical epochs. From a continental perspective, the Anglo-American features of logic, rationality and reasonableness is not universal, but may vary across societies and time. Instead, thinking is a product of interactions between several subjects acting upon one another. The individual's cognitive activity is therefore a product of the discourses or social interactions in which she participates. In this view, autonomy is not a natural attribute of all individuals but is socially constructed and can thereby be regarded in terms of greater or lesser. Political relationships are understood as to enable social interaction in a way that affects the individuals cognitive capacity and thereby their autonomy. Deliberation must therefore be structured in a way that fosters the development of a greater autonomy of the participant. (Ibid: 12-14)

2.2   The Public Sphere

"By 'public sphere' we mean first of all a domain of our social life in which such a thing as public opinion can be formed. Access to the public sphere is open in principle to all citizens. A portion of the public sphere is constituted in every conversation in which private persons come together to form a public. [...] Citizens act as a public when they deal with matters of general interests without being subject to coercion; thus with the guarantee that they may assemble and unite freely, and express and publicize their opinions freely." (Habermas, 1989:231)

In its broadest sense, the public sphere is the space where individuals act through communication. There are in principle no limits for themes, time, participants or resources. In this ideal understanding of the public sphere, individuals assemble into a public and are able to set their own agenda through rational discussion (Eriksen & Weigård 2000:222 Fossum &Schlesinger, 2007:3). The public sphere is not an institution but a communicative network (Eriksen, 2005:345) and can therefore be created in and address widely different parts of society such as art, science or religion. This is an important point since the purpose of this study is related to the development of a *political* public sphere.

The public sphere is a common room in society, but it is also a room that is divided into different assemblies and is therefore a complex network of *various* public spheres that stretches across different levels, rooms and scales (Ibid). From the episodic publics in pubs or in the streets, to the occasional publics such as party assemblies, all the way up to a abstract public sphere of isolated readers, listeners and viewers scattered across a large geographic area and brought together only by mass media (Habermas, 1996:374). The labelling of the public spheres can therefore be said to relate to the character and topic of the communication and not in terms of physical boundaries. Publics can however be divided into "strong" or "weak" publics. The strong publics consist of organized institutions such as parliamentary assemblies, while weak publics refer to

deliberations outside the political system (Eriksen, 2005:348 Eriksen &Weigård, 2000:230). While strong publics have direct influence on decision-making, weak publics are the source of opinion formation.

The public sphere is independent of the state, but has also been institutionalised by the modern (democratic) state through civil and political rights. The citizen's power-potential is depending on their ability to freely deliberate on politics (Eriksen & Weigård, 2000:224). The development of a modern public sphere has in turn consequence for how democratic legitimacy may be conceived. Equipped with rights that they are able to exercise against the state, citizens are able to hold decision makers accountable. Decision makers therefore need to justify their decisions and gain support from the public (Fossum & Schlesinger, 2007:5). Strong publics are in this sense dependent on weak publics, where opinion formation takes place.

2.2.1 A European Public Sphere?

Maximilian Conrad presents two ideal-typical perspectives to show how the possibility for a public sphere has been imagined so far: The Community perspective and the Communicative perspective (Conrad, 2009:50).

For communitarians, the idea of democracy and in particular the idea of deliberative democracy is highly conditional. This view presupposes a homogenous culture, a united people that come together in public to deliberate and decide on common concerns. The public sphere is pictured as a place where enlightened and equal citizens can assemble to discuss public matters and come to discover a pre-existing good (Eriksen, 2007:29). This view therefore argues that political communication is dependent of the existence of a pre-political identity with shared values and traditions. Reasoned consensus can therefore only occur when there are shared values and common norms. (Conrad, 2009:51-52) The development of a public sphere is in this view closely linked with the nation-state and a common European public sphere is therefore unlikely to develop.

Conrad points out that this communitarian way of reasoning cannot explain how values change within societies. If common fundamental values are a precondition for sense-making deliberation, how can the communitarian approach explain the empirical fact that there are various definitions of "the good" in modern societies? If the public sphere is conceptualized foremost as a sphere of the self-reconstitution of the community's fundamental values, how do these values change? (Conrad, 2009:52-53)

This weakness of the communitarian approach is instead explained by the communicative. Building on Habermas, deliberation is instead thought of as to *generate* those resources of community that is held merely to *make use* of in the communitarian perspective (Ibid:54). Values and norms are not pre-existing necessities for sense-making deliberation, but a *result*.

In this view, public debate is held to lead to opinion formation, the forging of a common identity strong enough to enable collective action, indicating that a *post-national identity* is possible (Eriksen, 2007: 30). This communicative perspective therefore puts a high demand of the actual occurrence of deliberation, thus making the development of a European public sphere(s) the most prominent mean to ensure democratic legitimacy of the European Union (Eriksen & Fossum, 2004:446).

3   Analytical framework

As described above, the Public Sphere is a communicative space in which different subjects can be discussed. Using a metaphor from Maximilian Conrad I will further develop the purpose of this study and the idea behind my constructed idealtypes.

Conrad presents a thought experiment in which a class of sixty students are given an assignment to discuss a certain topic. The teacher divides the class in three separate groups and sends them to three different rooms where they are to discuss the same topic without any interaction across the groups. The doors to the respective rooms are therefore closed. The groups are then to present the outcomes of their discussions when they are rejoined with the other groups back in the original classroom. In his example, the three groups all present different outcomes of the discussions. They have all reached *different solutions* even though they discuss *the same topic.* (Conrad, 2009:33-34)

He then modifies this thought experiment by presenting a situation in which the doors between the rooms are removed. The premises are the same, only that now the students are able to move between the rooms and listen to the other groups. (Ibid:34-35)

This thought experiment is to underline a metaphorical point. In the first scenario each room constitute a communicative space of is own, but they are all separated. In the second scenario in which the doors are removed, a shared communicative space is possible.

Building on this thought experiment, the purpose of my study is *not* to analyse what these doors consist of or if there is movement between the rooms. The purpose of my study is instead related to the topic for what they are discussing and how the assignment they are given is presented. Is the topic presented as something that concerns the whole class or something that concerns the groups separetly? Is the assignment presented as something to be solved by the separate groups or by the whole class?

Given this thought experiment, the role of the teacher is in my case represented by the political parties, a metaphor that might not be approved by everyone, but the essence is that they both influence the nature of the discussion.

As presented in chapter 1, the purpose of this study is to analyse how the political parties conceptualise the EU, using idealtypes. I therefore start this chapter by introducing Eriksen & Fossum's three ideltypes on different logics of European integration, which will be used in the construction of my own idealtypes.

3.1 Three logics of European integration – Instrumental, Contextual and Communicative

In their article *Europe in Search of Legitimacy: Strategies of Legitimation Assesed*, Eriksen & Fossum presents three strategies as possible solutions to the European Union's legitimacy problems, consisting of three idealtypes of polity formations and three different logics of integration, (Eriksen & Fossum, 2004).

The first logic of integration conceptualizes the EU as a predominantly *intergovernmental* organization. There is little emphasis on collective tasks beyond the narrow interests of the member states, and membership in the EU is derived from its observable benefits. The EU is first and foremost conceived as a functional type of organisation whose purpose is to promote the interests of the Member States. In this view, the EU is merely a means for efficient decision-making and its legitimacy is therefore based on its performance. In democratic terms, indirect legitimation is sufficient and democracy is instead associated with the nation-state. (Ibid: 439)

This view follows an *instrumental logic*, where the purpose of EU is to solve problems facing the nation-states that they cannot solve by themselves. Action is seen of as motivated by preferences and anticipation of consequences (Ibid:440). This conceptualisation of the EU as a problem-solving entity means reducing the scope of integration by downscaling supranational ambitions for a more intergovernmental character. Integration can only be considered legitimate if it has a demonstrable capacity to solve the problem better and more efficient than the individual member state. (Conrad, 2009:105)

The second logic of integration follows a *contextual logic*, conceiving the EU as foremost a community of values that draws it legitimacy from a thick sense of European identity (Eriksen & Fossum, 2004:437 Conrad, 2009:105). This view is closely connected to the communitarian perspective where democracy is implausible beyond the nation state. The development is similar to that of nation-building, where the legitimacy of the European institutions are derived from some notion of a European identity based on pre-political ground. The EU is in this perspective conceptualised as a *supranational* entity based on common values. (Conrad, 2009:105)

The third logic conceives the EU as a *post-national* polity and follows a *communicative logic*. The EU, in this view, has developed far beyond intergovernmentalism and established a polity that is sensitive to cultural differences. It envisions a wider, cosmopolitan conception of democracy (Eriksen & Fossum, 2004: 445). The integration process hinges on the ability to produce a fair system of cooperation founded on basic rights and democratic procedures for deliberation and decision-making (Ibid:438). Democracy is conceived not only as an organizational arrangement (parliamentary or presidential democracy), but as a legitimating principle, i.e. a procedure that sets the terms for reaching legitimate decisions (Ibid:445).

Building on Habermas, only deliberation can ensure democratic legitimacy, and the development of a European public sphere is conceived as crucial to ensure legitimate decisions. The source of legitimacy is therefore to secure citizenships rights and for Europeans to conceive themselves as not only subjects of the law, but also as authors. The presumption is that public support will reside in a *constitutional patriotism* (Ibid:446). The process is therefore focused on more democracy *beyond the nation state* by strengthening European-level citizenship rights and the European Parliament (Conrad, 2009:106).

Table 3.1 Normative preferences on European integration and EU democracy[1]

Mode of Integration	Logic of Integration	Source of Legitimacy	View of EU democracy
Intergovernmental	Instrumental	Problem-solving capacity	Delegated
Supranational	Contextual	Community of values	Federal
Post-national	Communicative	Citizenship rights	Cosmopolitan

3.2   Two idealtypes

As mentioned before, the purpose of the idealtypes are to "measure" how the political parties conceptualise the European Union. The assumption is that how the EU is conceptualised will have consequences for the incentive to engage in transnational debate. Is it described as something that concerns the voters in their role as nation-state citizens, where questions are related to the promotion of nation-state interests, or is it described as something that concerns the voters in their role of *European* citizens where they are constituents of a democracy beyond the nation-state?

Following Conrad, my idealtypes will be constructed as a mix between the above perspectives on integration. Even though idealtypes are theoretical construction not likely to be found in reality, the above-described perspectives are in a sense to "rough".

The instrumental logic means a step back from the status quo with less supranational integration than we already have (Conrad, 2009:106). Even tough there are political parties promoting this view, it is unlikely that their entire election manifesto would reject the present situation where there are in fact supranational attributes of the European Union. After all, the very election they are participating in is an election to a supranational legislative body. This means

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[1] Table from Conrad 2007:105

that an idealtype that conceptualises the EU as a solely intergovernmental organisation is very unlikely to correspond to the view presented by the political parties. Instead it is more likely that this intergovernmental perspective overlaps with the supranational.

There is also expected to be overlaps between the supranational and the post-national perspectives. Even though post-national descriptions of a democracy beyond the nation state are likely, a complete rejection of the nation-state by the political parties is in turn highly doubtful (Ibid).

It is however unlikely to find overlaps between the intergovernmental idealtype and the post-national. The former strives for democracy to be remained at the level of the nation-state, while the latter promotes *more* democracy *beyond* the nation-state (ibid: 107).

Figure 3.1 Possible conceptualisations of the EU[2]

The result is two idealtypes, one Intergovernmental/Supranational and one Supranational/Post-national. The features of these idealtypes will be further elaborated in the following section.

The political parties are not likely to explicitly express their conceptions of the EU in terms of "The EU is a intergovernmental organisation" or "The EU is a post-national democracy" etc. Instead, the construction and the features of the idealtypes are based on the *logic* behind these conceptions, i.e. how the policies and the EU presented by the parties correspond to these logics of integration. The idealtypes can therefore be said to measure the *logic of policies*. Do the policies expressed correspond to an instrumental logic where the EU is seen as a tool in the service of the nation states, or do they correspond to a communicative logic that aims for more democratic features beyond the nation-state? In this sense, the idealtypes not only measures how the *present* EU is conceptualised but also the *future* EU, what it should be. Based on the assumption that political parties affect the nature of the debate by how the EU is conceptualised, I argue that conceptions

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[2] Figure from Conrad 2009:107

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categorised as corresponding to the second idealtype (Supranational/Post-national), have an positive affect on the citizens incentive to engage in transnational debate and in turn the development of a European public sphere. If the EU is instead conceptualised according to the first idealtype, (Intergovernmental/Supranational) following an instrumental logic where the EU is simply a tool for the member states, incentive for transnational debate will decrease. If the EU is simply a means for national interests, debate on European politics will remain at the national level.

3.2.1 The Intergovernmental/Supranational idealtype

Based on the features of the instrumental logic of integration, the Intergovernmental/Supranational idealtype corresponds to those policies that focuses on (1) Efficiency (2) Strengthening of nation-state influence (3) National identities

(1)   By efficiency we mean policies that express a view that these interests of the nation state is better solved within the EU than alone. Policies are therefore presented as to gain the nation-state through the EU. Cooperation is described as necessary simply because it's the most effective way to solve problems for the nation-state.

(2)   The second focus point concerns the legitimacy issue of the EU. Policies are described as to aim for a decrease of supranational influence in favour of national. Decision making beyond the nation state is seen as a problem. The answer is not to strengthen democracy a the EU-level, but to secure national sovereignty.

(3)   The third focus point concerns policies that are related to a national identity/values. The policies are explicitly expressed as related to nation –state identities/values. A *negative reading* of the contextual logic where democracy beyond the nation-state is impossible due to different identities/values.

3.2.2 The Supranational/Post-national idealtype

This idealtype combines the contextual logic with the communicative logic of integration, and is used for conceptions of the EU as a democracy beyond the member-state. Valid or not policies that express a view of common values or identities is positive for the view that democracy is able at the EU-level. Expressions of a common identity indicate that EU is not merely a organisation for the member states, but a polity for its citizens. Issues are not indirectly related to the citizens as a member of a member-state, but directly through their identity as Europeans. The communicative logic is represented by those policies that strive for a strengthening of individual rights beyond the nation-state and democracy at the EU-level. This idealtype therefore correspond to policies that focuses on (1)

Individual rights (2) Common European identity/values (3) A strengthening of democracy at the EU-level.

(1) Individual rights are related to those policies that aim for the strengthening of individual rights beyond the nation state. Policies that aim for equal rights among all European citizens.

(2) The second focus point concerns policies that are expressed in terms of a common European identity/values. Either in pre-political terms where a common identity is present even without the EU (a contextual logic), or in post-political terms where the EU has created a common identity based on the EU citizenship (representing the communicative logic).

(3) The last focus point is related to those policies that strive for a strengthening of democracy at the EU-level, e.g. through involvement of citizens or a strengthening of the European Parliament's influence.

3.2.3 Reflection

The features and focus points of the idealtypes are very distinct. They are theoretical ideal based on different logics of integration that are constructed for the purpose of categorising different views. However, as I mentioned earlier, I do not expect that all of the political parties conceptualisations distinctively correspond to these ideals. As a matter of fact it is more likely that the political parties express policies that could correspond to features of *both* idealtypes, or in some cases policies that correspond to *none* of the idealtypes. It is therefore my responsibility to only register those features that are noticeably visible and in the event of uncertainty clearly present those cases. I will therefore present my findings by subcategorise the results in "weak" correspondences to the idealtype.

4 Findings

The findings presented in this chapter shows that there is a divided view of what the EU is and should be. The political parties are almost equally distributed as corresponding to either the Intergovernmental/Supranational or Supranational/Post-national idealtype. All cases except one had features corresponding to both idealtypes and one "weak" case were registered but the overall picture shows that the idealtypes have been sufficiently diverse to enable categorising. Below is a summary of the registered focus points and the chapter is ended with a summary of the categorising.

The material from the Swedish political parties are all in Swedish, so the quotes presented in the analysis are all my own translations. The original quote is however presented using footnotes.

Table 4.1 Summary of findings

IDEALTYPE	INTERGOVERNMENTAL/ SUPRANATIONAL			SUPRANATIONAL/ POST-NATIONAL		
Focus point[3]	1	2	3	1	2	3
Miljöpartiet	Yes	Yes		Yes		
Vänsterpartiet	Yes	Yes		Yes		
Moderaterna	Yes			Yes		
Kristdemokraterna	Yes			Yes	Yes	
Centerpartiet	Yes			Yes	Yes	
Folkpartiet				Yes		Yes
Socialdemokraterna	Yes			Yes		Yes

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[3] Intergovernmental/Supranational:(1) Efficiency (2) Strengthening of nation-state influence (3) National identities
Supranational/Post-national: (1) Individual rights (2) Common European identity/values (3) A strengthening of democracy at the EU-level.

4.1 Intergovernmental/Supranational

4.1.1 Miljöpartiet (Green Party)

Miljöpartiets view of the European Union follows an instrumental logic. The party's main issue, the environment, is in focus through out the platform and EU is seen as a tool in the struggle against climate change. The party is explicitly critical against the supranational character of the EU, and argue for a decrease of EU influence in all areas except the environment. Features from the Supranational/Post-national idealtype are present, but very weak in relation to features corresponding to the Intergovernmental/Supranational idealtype. Following focus points were observed:

Intergovernmental/Supranational

(1 - Efficiency) The main political issues presented in the platform are related to the environment and the EU is seen as a tool for coordination and cooperation of environmental policies. The focus is on EU as an efficient means in the fight against climate change. Only those issues that are better solved at the EU-level are to be regulated by the EU. Quotes:
- *"[...] EU is to be a predecessor in the world and start by conducting a responsible climate policy with the goal to decrease greenhouse gas by at least 80 percent by 2020"[4] (Miljöpartiet a:3)*
- *" [...] EU is to have considerably less power within most areas, but we also think that there are areas where EU should have more ability to act, most of all in transnational environmental issues."[5] (Ibid:1)*
- *[...] Member-states should have the right to set higher requirements from a environment-and health point of view than those decided by the EU"[6] (Ibid:4)*

(2- Strengthening of nation-state influence) The party explicitly argue for a less supranational EU, more influence from the member-states and is critical to the Lisbon treaty. The vision is a intergovernmental cooperation with sovereign states and less power at the EU-level. Quotes:
- *" Our vision is a peaceful and democratic Europe, where people can move freely and with independent countries mainly cooperating on intergovernmental terms."[7] (Ibid:1)*

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[4] "[…] EU ska bli en föregångare I världen och börja föra en ansvarfull klimatpolitik med mål o matt utsläppen av växthusgaser ska minska med minst 80 procent till 2020,"
[5] "[…] EU ska ha betydligt mindre makt inom de flesta områden, men vi anser också att det finns områden där EU bör få store möjligheter att agera, framförallt I gränsöverskridande miljöfrågor."
[6] "[…] medlemsländer ska ha rätt att ställa högre krav ur miljö- och hälsosynpunkt än de EU beslutar om,"

-"We want popularly elected institutions, most of all the national parliaments, to have more power in the EU."[8] (Ibid:7)

-"the general principle shall be that every member-state has veto power when decisions are made in EU"[9] (Ibid:8)

<u>Supranational/Post-national</u>

(1-Individual rights) The party argue for securing individual rights at the EU-level but also that EU should be a force in the world and work for human rights on a global scale. The main goal is to work against discrimination and secure basic human rights. Quotes:

-"One of the EU's prioritized tasks shall be to guarantee human rights"[10] (Ibid:6)

-"Discrimination in all forms must be resisted. [...] Full participation is a right."[11] (Ibid:5)

-"Homo-and bisexual and transsexual persons rights must be secured within the EU"[12]. (Ibid)

4.1.2 Vänsterpartiet (Left Party)

Vänsterpartiet profile itself as the most EU-critical party in Sweden. The election platform is most of all a critique against all supranational aspects of the European Union. EU-is seen as a illegitimate polity based on ideologically based treaties. All supranational ambitions is opposed and instead the EU should be reconstituted into a intergovernmental organisation and national sovereignty reclaimed. They do have ambitions and policies that strives for a strengthening of individual rights beyond the nation-state. These are however not tied to a European citizenship but as universal principles that are threatened by the EU. These Supranational/Post-national features are therefore very weak in relation to the Intergovernmental/Supranational features.

<u>Intergovernmental/Supranational</u>

(1-Efficiency) Even though Vänsterpartiet fundamentally oppose the EU, they do see benefits of cooperation among the European nation-states. Cooperation is seen as a coordination of transnational problems such as the environment, crime

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[7] "Vår vision är ett fredligt och demokratiskt Europa med självständiga länder som huvudsakligen samarbetar I mellanstatliga former."
[8] "Vi vill att folkvalda organ, framförallt de nationella parlamenten ska få mer makt I EU."
[9] "den övergripande principen ska vara att varje medlemsland ska ha vetorätt när beslut fattas I EU,"
[10] "en av EU:s prioriterade uppgifter ska vara att garantera alla människors grundläggande rättigheter,"
[11] "Diskriminering I alla former måste motverkas. […] Full delaktighet är en rättighet."
[12] "Homo- och bisexuella och transpersoners rättigheter måste säkerställas I EU."

and protection of workers rights, but there should not bee any supranational features. Quotes:

-*"[A new European assembly] should only concern transnational issues such as the environment, trafficking and the protection of wage-earners."* [13](Vänsterpartiet a:10)

- *"The cooperation should be flexible and the nation-states decides for themselves which areas they want to participate in."* [14] (Ibid:10)

-*"We will work for agreements and cooperation around environment-and climate issues within the EU, but they should not be based on legislation."* [15] (Ibid:5-6)

(2- Strengthening of nation-state influence) As mentioned above, Vänsterpartiet oppose all supranational features of the EU. The treaties are seen as undemocratic based on a market-liberal ideas and should therefore be dissolved. Democracy is to be secured through the nation-state. Quotes:

-*"Vänsterpartiet is working for a broad, all-European cooperation on democratic grounds. This type of international cooperation is today hindered by the supranational character of the EU and the treaty-anchored right-wing politics. We therefore want Sweden to leave the EU."* [16] (Ibid:4)

-*"The EU-parliament could be replaced by a representative body with members from the national parliaments."* [17] (Ibid:10)

-*"But we also mark that the EU should not have any decision right whatsoever."* [18] (Ibid:5)

<u>Supranational/Post-national</u>

(1-Individual rights) Vänsterpartiet strives for individual rights beyond the nation sate. These are howewer not tied to a European citizenship but universal human rights. The party even sees the EU as a threat and the goal is therefore to safeguard people from the intrusion of those rights. This is done, not by legislation, but by working against politics that may put those rights at risk. Quotes:

-*"We expose and argue down those fundamentalist lobby groups that is trying to restrict womens right of abortion and HBT-persons rights."* [19] (Ibid:5)

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[13] "[Ett ny Europeisk församling] bör endast behandla gränsöverskridande frågor som miljö, sexhandel och skydd för löntagare."
[14] "Samarbetet ska vara flexibelt och länderna avgör själva på vilka områden de vill delta"
[15] "Vi kommer att verka för överenskommelser och samverkan kring miljö-och klimatfrågor inom EU, men de ska inte bygga på lagstiftning."
[16] "Vänsterpartiet arbetar för ett brett, alleuropeiskt samarbete på demokratisk grund. En sådan internationell samverkan hindras I dag av EU:s överstatlighet och fördragsfästa högerpolitik. Därför vill vi att Sverige lämnar EU."
[17] "EU-parlamentet kan ersättas med en församling av ledamöter från de nationella parlamenten."
[18] "Men vi brukar också markera att EU inte borde ha beslutsrätten överhuvudtaget."
[19] "Vi avslöjar och argumenterar ner fundamentalistiska lobbygrupper som försöker inskränka kvinnors rätt till abort och HBT-personers rättigheter."

-" [...] so that every person within the EU have their human rights recognized, independent of heritage or civic status."[20] (Ibid:6)

4.1.3 Moderaterna (Moderate Party)

Moderaterna expresses a instrumental logic of integration. The purpose of the EU is to act as a problem solver for the member states and only acting in those areas where it is more effective for the nation-state to cooperate than act alone. Features of both idealtypes were observed, but due to the explicit expressions of an instrumental logic, Moderaterna is categorised as corresponding to the Intergovernmental/Supranational idealtype.

<u>Intergovernmental/Supranational</u>

(1- Efficiency) As mentioned above, Moderaterna express an explicit instrumental logic. The basic idea of cooperation between the nation-states is to be preserved and only those areas which are more effectively handled at the EU-level is to be transferred. Quotes:

-"We moderates protect the basic idea of the cooperation. This means that the union shall only handle such things that the member-states can't achive on their own."[21] (Moderaterna a:32)

-"It is important that the EU concentrates on the right things. Therefore, we do not want to see a routine-like expansion of the Unions authority. This also means that all things that are good don't necessarily have to be decided at the EU-level."[22] (Ibid)

<u>Supranational/Post-national</u>

(1-Individual rights) The party welcomes a strengthening of EU citizenship rights and the legal rights of the individual. Quotes:

-"The EU needs to establish clear rules of the individuals procedural rights, for example the right to an interpreter, translation and legal representation, and a strengthening of the individuals protection in the detention process."[23] (Ibid:23-24)

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[20] "[…] så att varje människa inom EU tillerkänns sina mänskliga rättigheter oavsett ursprung eller medborgerliga status."
[21] "Vi moderater värnar grundtanken med samarbetet. Det innebär att unionen enbart ska sköta sådant som medlemsländerna inte kan genomföra bättre på egen hand."
[22] "Det är viktigt att EU koncentrerar sig på att göra rätt saker. Därför vill vi inte se en slentrianmässig utvidgning av unionens befogenheter. Det innebär också att alla saker som är bra inte nödvändigtvis måste beslutas på EU-nivå."
[23] "EU behöver lägga fast tydliga regler om den enskildes processuella rättigheter, till exempel rätt till tolk, översättning och rättsligt biträde, samt stärka skyddet för den enskilde i häktningsprocessen."

-"Therefore, it is good that the Lisbon treaty gives the EU sharper tools for law enforcement and also making citizenship rights binding at the Union-level."[24](Ibid:21)

4.2 "Weak" Intergovernmental/Supranational

4.2.1 Kristdemokraterna (Christian Democrats)

Even though Kristdemokraterna express policies and views that correspond to two features of the second idealtype, Supranational/Post-national and only one explicit feature of the first one, they are still categorised as Intergovernmental/Supranational. Policies and vision of a common European identity as well as individual rights beyond the nation-state are present, but the overall picture and the explicit expressions of an instrumental logic categorises Kristdemokraterna as corresponding to the Intergovernmental/Supranational idealtype.

Intergovernmental/Supranational

(1-Efficiency) Kristdemokraterna clearly express a view of the EU as a problem solver for its member states. Policy areas that are more efficiently solved together is to be transferred to the supranational level if they gain the nation-state. EU is not a goal in itself but merely a tool for cooperation. Quotes:

-"EU does not exist for its own sake but is a cooperation between countries so that each country has a possibility to handle existing common challenges in a way that guarantees their citizens safety."[25] (Kristdemokraterna a:2)

-"[...] is an important part of the EU-cooperation and a necessity for enabling an active job-creating policy and a positive growth within the member states."[26] (Ibid:5)

-"[The EU] shall be a complement to local, regional and national politics."[27] (Ibid:11)

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[24] "Därför är det bra både att Lissabonfördraget ger EU skarpare verktyg för gemensam brottsbekämpning och samtidigt att det gör medborgerliga rättigheter rättsligt bindande på unionsnivå."
[25] "EU finns inte till för sin egen skull utan är ett samarbete mellan länder för att varje land ska få en möjlighet att hantera de gemensamma utmaningar som finns och på så sätt garantera sina invånares trygghet."
[26] "[…] är en viktig del I EU-samarbetet och en nödvändighet för att kunna ha en aktiv jobbskapande politik och få en god tillväxt I medlemsländerna."
[27] "[EU] ska vara ett komplement till lokalpolitik, regionalpolitik och nationell politik."

(1-Individual rights) Kristdemokraterna expresses a vision of a EU that takes greater responsibility in securing individual rights. The EU is to take a political responsibility that corresponds to its economic power and to promote and safeguard those rights. Quotes:

-*"EU:s foreign policy must ultimately be aimed for promoting democracy and human rights all over the world, and of course within the EU."[28] (Ibid:8)*

(2-Common European identity/values) The party express a view of a common European identity as well as a need for increasing that feeling of affinity. Quotes:

-*"[...] every man 's dignity and integrity, solidarity, compassion, equality and the individuals freedom and responsibility. Those are values that must stay an important part of the European identity."[29] (Ibid:2)*

-*"The feeling that we in Sweden are a part of Europe is a central part in the work and shaping of the future EU."[30] (Ibid:11)*

4.3 Supranational/Post-national

4.3.1 Centerpartiet (Centre Party)

Centerpartiet expresses an explicit view of the EU as a polity for its citizens. Policies are described as for all European citizens with a focus on individual rights to be secured at the EU-level. A common identity through this citizenship is expressed as well as references to a shared pre-political culture. Democracy is to be strengthened at the EU-level. They do express a view that corresponds to the first feature of the Intergovernmental/Supranational idealtype about EU being an efficient way of solving the member-states problems, but the overall picture corresponds to the second idealtype, Supranational/Post-national.

Intergovernmental/Supranational

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[28] "EU:s utrikespolitik måste ytterst syfta till att främja demokrati och mänskliga rättigheter runt om I världen, och givetvis inom EU."
[29] "[…] varje människas värdighet, jämlikhet och personens frihet och ansvar. Det är värden som måste förbli en viktig del av den europeiska identiteten."
[30] "Känslan av att vi I Sverige är en del av Europa är en central bit I arbetet med utfomandet av framtiden EU."

(1-Efficiency) Even though the overall picture corresponds to the second idealtype, there are references to a EU as the problem-solver of the member-states e.g. that the EU is a means for cooperation in international affairs. But it's also expressed the other way around, if it does not gain Sweden, we should *not* be a part of it, Centerpartiets no to the EMU being the case in point. Membership is expressed as a result of advantage calculations. Quotes:

-*"Through EU, Sweden have greater possibilities than ever to affect the surrounding world,"*[31] *(Centerpartiet a:7)*

-*"In 2003 there was a referendum on a Swedish membership in the EMU:s third step. Centerpartiet said no to a membership and worked actively on the no-campaign. (...)The result of the referendum still applies and we see no reason for a re-vote. The party shall however, as before, observe and discuss the monetary policy development and be open for new discussions.*[32] *(Ibid:18-19)*

<u>Supranational/Post-national</u>

(1- Individual rights) Centerpartiet argue for a strengthening individual rights beyond the nation state, both in terms of strengthening the European citizenship but also to secure that the EU is a guarantor for human rights. Quotes:

-*"The EU shall be there for it's citizens and secure our liberties-and rights and be welcomingly, safe, apply rule of law and tolerance."*[33] *(Ibid:4)*

-*"The EU is to secure the security of person by introducing common rules for example period of detention, rules against leaving the country and the right for a impartial trial."*[34] *(Ibid)*

-*"The EU is to be a global predecessor of human liberties-and rights."*[35] *(Ibid:5)*

(2-Common European identity/values) A common European identity is expressed throughout the election platform. Mostly in terms of a post-poltical identity with a focus on a common European citizenship but there are also references to a pre-political identity where Europeans are seen as part of the same culture. This is most explicitly expressed in their election manifesto (Centerpartiet b). Quotes:

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[31] "Genom EU har Sverige större möjligheter än någonsin att påverka omvärlden."
[32] "År 2003 genomfördes en folkomröstning om att ansluta Sverige till EMU:s tredje steg. Centerpartiet sa nej till en anslutning och arbetade aktivt på nej- sidan. Utvecklingen har hittills visat att linjen med en självständig Riksbank och penningpolitik har fallit väl ut . För Centerpartiets del liksom för regeringens gäller att frågan under mandatperioden inte ska tas upp till förnyad prövning. Folkomröstningens resultat gäller och vi ser ingen anledning till omprövning. Däremot skall partiet liksom tidigare följa upp och diskutera den fortsatta penningpolitiska utvecklingen samt vara öppet för nya diskussioner."
[33] "EU ska finnas till för sina medborgare och ta tillvara våra fri - och rättigheter samt vara välkomnande, tryggt, rättssäkert och tolerant."
[34] "EU ska ytterligare stärka rättssäkerheten genom att införa gemensamma regler för exempelvis häktningstider,utreseförbud och rätt till en opartisk rättegång"
[35] "EU ska vara en global föregångare i skyddet av mänskliga fri - och rättigheter."

-" [...] you actually live in a part of the world that invented democracy, academia and the penicillin. A culture that has defeated barbarity, poverty and epidemics. That has cleaned out it's own ghosts and once and fore all joined together in a peaceful union."[36] (Ibid:1)

-"Around you stands a half billion EU-citizens with the same dreams and agonies as you. 497 millions! That's more than the USA and Russia together."[37] (Ibid)

4.3.2 Folkpartiet (Liberal Party)

Folkpartiet expresses a clear vision of a future federal Europe with more democracy at the EU-level. There is a large focus on individual rights beyond the nation-state and a strengthening of the Euorpean citizenship. There are expressions about the benefits of cooperation, but it cannot be said to correspond to the first feature of the Intergovernmental/Supranational idealtype. The benefits are not tied directly to national interests but as for all of Europe. The only registered focus points has therefore been features of the second idealtype, Supranational/Post-national.

<u>Supranational/Post-national</u>

(1- Individual rights) Folkpartiet express clear policies for the strengthening of both European citizenship rights and the need for safeguarding universal human rights. EU is seen as the guarantor of these rights. Quotes:

-"The EU-cooperation shall defend and strengthen the democratic society, with freedom of expression, political freedom, freedom of association, freedom of religion and the individual's legal security and safety."[38] (Folkpartiet a:2)

-"EU should have greater responsibility to guarantee the citizens basic rights, and the charter of fundamental rights included in the Treaty of Lisbon will be a important tool in this task."[39] (Ibid:9)

."The EU's Fundamental Rights Agency should have increased authorization to control how the member-states follow rules and conventions of human rights, and in those cases suggest sanctions."[40] (Ibid)

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[36] "[…] du faktiskt lever i en världsdel som uppfann demokratin, akademin och penicillinet. En kultur som besegrat barbari, fattigdom och epidemier. Som har rensat ut sina egna spöken och en gång för alla förenats i en fredlig union."

[37] "Runt dig står en halv miljard EU-medborgare med samma drömmar och våndor som du. 497 miljoner! Det är fler än USA och Ryssland tillsammans."

[38] "EU-samarbetet ska försvara och förstärka det demokratiska samhällssystemet, med yttrandefriheten, den politiska friheten, föreningsfriheten, religionsfriheten och den enskilda människans rättssäkerhet och trygghet."

[39] "EU bör få ett tydligare ansvar för att garantera medborgarnas grundläggande rättigheter, och rättighetsstadgan som ingår i Lissabonfördraget blir ett viktigt verktyg i det arbetet."

[40] " EU:s byrå för grundläggande rättigheter ska få ökade befogenheter att kntrolera hur medlemsländerna följer regler och konventioner om mänskliga rättigheter, samt I förekommande fall föreslå sanktioner."

(3 - A strengthening of democracy at the EU-level) The overall picture provided by Folkpartiet is a strengthening of authority and democracy at the EU-level. The party explicitly envisions the EU as a future federation. Quotes:

-*"Folkpartiets vision is a federal Europe that is strong and united where cooperation is needed, but that leaves the everyday-questions to the member states and the citizens themselves. A union that is open, democratic and where more citizens feel confidence in the European cooperation."*[41] *(Ibid:2)*

-*"The European Parliament and the Council of Ministers should have the same influence in all areas and the Commission shall function as the union's government."*[42] *(Ibid:15)*

4.3.3 Socialdemokraterna (Socialdemocrats)

Socialdemokraterna was one of the most difficult parties to categorise. A lot of the manifesto is an explicit critique of the current Swedish government and there are difficulties to see where the critique of the government ends and the policies for the European Parliament start. However, two features of the Supranational/Post-national idealtype was observed (individual rights and a strengthening of democracy at the EU-level), while only one feature from the Intergovernmental/Supranational idealtype could be registered. The features from the former was explicitly expressed while the feature from the latter was harder to read. Socialdemokraterna is therefore categorised as corresponding to the Supranational/Post-national idealtype.

<u>Intergovernmental/Supranational</u>

(1-Efficiency) Even though an instrumental logic was not explicitly expressed, some policies were presented as to benefit the member-states and not necessarily the European citizens. Cooperation was viewed as necessary for the strengthening of the nation state. Quotes:

-*"Open boarders in Europe have increased Swedens possibility for trade and exchange. Correctly used, could the cooperation in Europe contribute to strengthening our competitiveness."*[43] *(Socialdemokraterna a:4)*

-*"A well functioning EU could contribute to Sweden growing stronger and safer. That requires that the EU concentrate on the right things. That is not the case today."*[44] *(Ibid:3)*

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[41] "Folkpartiets vision är ett federalt Europa som står starkt och enat där samarbete behövs, men som lämnar vardagsfrågorna åt medlemsländerna och medborgarna själva. En union som är öppen, demokratisk och där allt fler medborgare känner förtroende för det europeiska samarbetet."

[42] "Europaparlamentet och ministerrådet bör ha lika inflytande på alla områden och kommissionen ska fungera som unionens regering."

[43] "Öppna grönser I Europa har ökat Sveriges möjligheter till handel och utbyten. Rätt utnyttjat kan samarbetet I Europa bidra till att stärka vår konkurrenskraft."

<u>Supranational/Post-national</u>

(1-Individual rights) Socialdemokraterna strives for securing individual rights beyond the nation state. Both by actively work against discrimination as well as strengthening citizenship rights. Quotes:

- *"We want EU legislation against discrimination to be strengthened so that we efficiently can fight discrimination based on gender, heritage, religion, age, disability and sexual orientation all over Europe."*[45] (Ibid:7)

- *"Strengthening of privacy. EU's protection of privacy and civil liberties must be strengthened."*[46] (Ibid:9)

(3 - A strengthening of democracy at the EU-level) Socialdemokraternas policies strive for more democracy beyond the nation-state, both in terms of actively including citizens in the political process and a strengthening of the directly elected institutions. The citizens are to gain more influence by strengthening their representation through both the national level and the EU-level. A strengthening of the national parliaments influence over EU-legislation could be interpreted as a strengthening of the nation-state influence, but in this case the aim is for citizens to be more involved in EU legislation, not as representatives of their nation-state but as subjects and authors of European law. Quotes:

- *"Requirements for democracy and insight in EU must be increased, both through national and direct channels. There is no contradiction in strengthening the Riksdag's influence and the popular elected's role in the EU. Cooperation between individuals, parties, popular movements and business must be strengthened in Europe."*[47] (Ibid:6)

- *"EU must be sharper, more open and more democratic. Power of politics must increase relative to that of law."*[48] (Ibid:3)

- *"We want the EU to reform in a direction towards more openness and insight. It should be a statutory responsibility for all the EU's institutions to actively communicate with the citizens."*[49] (Ibid:7)

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[44] "Ett väl fungerande Europa kan bidra till att Sverige växer sig starkare och tryggare. Det kräver att EU arbetar med rätt saker. Så är det inte alltid idag."

[45] Vi vill att EU:s lagstiftning mot diskriminering ska stärkas så att vi effektivt kan bekämpa diskriminering på grund av kön, ursprung, religion, alder, funktionshinder och sexuell läggning I hela Europa."

[46] "Stärka den personliga integriteten. EU:s integritetsskydd och de medborgerliga fri-och rättigheterna måste stärkas."

[47] "Kraven på demokrati och insyn I EU måste skärpas, bade via nationella kanaler och direct. Det ligger ingen motsättning mellan att stärka riksdagen och de folkvaldas roll I EU. Samarbetet mellan individer, partier, folkrörelser och näringsliv måste stärkas I Europa."

[48] "EU måste bli spetsigare, öppnare och mer demokratiskt. Politikens makt måste öka I förhållande till juridiken."

[49] "Vi vill att EU reformeras I riktning mot mer öppenhet och insyn. Det ska vara en lagstadgad skyldighet för alla EU:s institutioner att aktivt kommunicera med medborgarna."

4.4   Summary of categorisations

Table 4.2 Summary of categorisations

Intergovernmental/Supranational	Supranational/Post-national
Miljöpartiet	Centerpartiet
Vänsterpartiet	Folkpartiet
Moderaterna	Socialdemokraterna
"Weak" Cases	**"Weak" Cases**
Kristdemokraterna	None

5 Summary

The analytical framework adopted for categorising conceptualisations of the EU has proven to be an effective way of describing how opinion-makers presents the EU. Based on the logics of integration presented by Eriksen and Fossum, the idealtypes has provided an efficient way to categorise and "measure" how different actors presents the EU.

My analysis has shown that there are two various conceptualisations of the EU among the Swedish political parties. Based on the assumption that these conceptualisations affect the incentives for transnational debate I conclude through these results that there are obstacles for this to occur. The crucial development of a European Public Sphere may not hinge on these conceptualisations, but my analysis has shown that there is limited help to be found through the political parties in their role as opinion-makers. Three out of seven parties presents a view that could benefit the development of a Public sphere, while four parties could be said to hinder the development. If the development of a European Public Sphere is dependent on opinion makers to conceptualise the EU in a way that encourages citizens to engage in deliberation with other member states citizens, the political parties view of the EU have to be complemented with other opinion makers views. If democracy beyond the nation state is to be secured through a common public sphere, other opinion makers such as media or civil society organisations need to complement the picture given by the political parties and take a large role in providing a view corresponding to the Supranational/Post-national idealtype.

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