

Lunds universitet
Statsvetenskapliga institutionen
Freds- och konfliktvetenskap

FKVK01
VT2010
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Normative Intervention

A look from the hard and the soft side on the EU intervention
in Chad and the Central African Republic

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Abstract

This paper is a qualitative case study of the Normative Power Europe theory and Neo-realism, which will be applied to the case of EUFOR's intervention in Chad and the Central African Republic. The paper seeks to find if European military interventions can be explained with a normative approach.

The paper outlines the key elements in these two theoretical perspectives and uses them to analyze the case. From the analysis, I discuss the reach and limitation of these two perspectives to assess where these two perspective overlap and differs. The result shows that a normative approach does not explain the motives for military intervention. When analyzed from neo-realism it presents underlying motives for the involved actors. The conclusion is that a normative approach to military intervention is counter-productive for an actor relaying on normative power.

Keywords: Normative Power Europe, Ian Manners, Neo-realism, EUFOR, Normative power, Chad, Central African Republic

Abbreviations

CAR – Central African Republic

CSDP – Common Security and Defense Policy

CSFP – Common Security and Foreign Policy

EC – European Community

ESDP – European Security and Defense Policy

EUFOR Chad/CAR – European Union Force Chad and Central African Republic

JEM - Justice and Equality movement

IDP – Internally displaced people

MINURCAT – UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad

NPE – Normative Power Europe

SLA - Sudanese Liberation Army

TEU – Treaty of the European Union

WEU – Western European Union

UN – United Nations

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1 Introduction

The European Union (EU) is aspiring to become a bigger actor in the world of international peacekeeping. The EU has contributed to a number of civilian peace missions and has been leading a limited number of military interventions. The latest was the bridging operation between EU and United Nations (UN) in Chad and Central African Republic (CAR). The discourse surrounding the operations has portrayed it as something good, in compliance with international law and the accepted universal norms.

The reasons and policies for selecting and conducting a certain military intervention can to some extent be determined from the norms that the intervening actor prescribes itself.

Ian Manners has done recent research in the field of norms and the EU with his thesis about Normative Power Europe (NPE). One weakness that I can identify is that the NPE theory to some extent does not include purely military intervention. Manners stand on the EU, when using military power, is that it does not comply with the picture of the EU as a normative power in world politics. This is something that I want to examine.

In the first chapter, I present my question, the selected theories, and the reasons for selecting them. I will summarize the most important elements of the two theories so I can be able to use it in my analysis. In the first chapter, I also present my method and discuss the material I will be using. In the second chapter, I present the case. In the third chapter I use the method and theories discussed in chapter one to analyze the case. From this discussion, I will draw my conclusions in chapter four.

1.1 Earlier research

The NPE theory has evolved from its creation in 2002 and Ian Manners has written two additional articles involving the NPE theory. In his research, he has used case studies to find support for his theory. He has theorized around the work conducted by the EU for the abolition of the death penalty and two civilian interventions in former Yugoslavia. The impact of this research has widened the discourse surrounding soft power and the power to deem the **normal**. It has also

Kommentar [D1]: När det gäller tidigare forskning kan det vara bra att nämna NPE som nytt perspektiv och att det har genererat debatt inom IR och Europaforskning. På samma sätt bör du "kontextualisera" neorealistiska perspektivet.

widened the concept of the European Union, to an international actor that has power over the discourse.

Other scholars such as Thomas Diez has tested and developed the NPE theory, specializing in the way the EU acts in civilian intervention and pointed out that the EU's civilian interventions needs to fulfill a number of preconditions to be accepted (Diez, o.a., 2007 s. 14).

Realism has been the one of the dominating theories in the field of international relations. It has been used to explain why states act the way states do. In its original form realism meant, that the driving force behind the international system was the nature of human behavior. The neo-realistic perspective challenges this assumption. It points out the *structure* of the international system as an important factor.

The foremost advocators of the neo-realistic perspective have been Kenneth Waltz and Barry Buzan, whom has contributed much to the development of the theory. It is a common perspective used in international relations and it has been a dominating perspective used in the design of American security policy.

These two perspectives are each other's counterparts and the research surrounding NPE has received much critique by academics adhering to the realistic school of thought. The realistic school of thought was developed under the treat from the bipolar world during the cold war crisis. A global stalemate that

The research around the intervention in Chad and Central African Republic has been tested in several different articles that focus on different research questions, from interventionism to the role of different actors and their agendas.

1.2 Question

The purpose of my paper is to explain the reason on what basis the decision to conduct a military intervention in Chad and CAR was made. To enhance the explanatory value of the paper, I will look at it from two different theoretical perspectives, the NPE and Neo-realistic perspectives. Using these two theoretical perspectives, the paper will discuss them using Kjell Goldmanns theories regarding a theory's reach and limitation. My question will be narrow and leave room for a discussion regarding how much the two perspectives really can explain.

How and on which kind of justification did the EU decide to participate in the intervention in Chad and CAR? My main sub question is if a normative approach can be used to explain a military intervention? On a more abstract level if a normative approach can be used to explain a military intervention

Kommentar [D2]: Källa

Kommentar [D3]: Går det att hitta något i sheeans bok här

Kommentar [D4]: Försök att vara mer explicit när det gäller två teoretiska perspektiv som skall appliceras på ett fall för att testa teorins räckvidd och begränsning. Det framgår inte tydligt varken i dina frågor eller metod

Kommentar [D5]: Men har dessa militära interventioner verkligen skett utifrån en normativ grund där EUS grundläggande normer i fråga om mänskliga fri- och rättigheter varit det som legat bakom valet av insats. Eller har andra agendor som har påverkat valet av insats? Kommer två olika synvinklar ge skilda eller överlappande svar på frågan.

Varför valde EU att intervensera i Chad? En utvärdering utifrån två perspektiv för att se teorierna räckvidd och begränsningar i förklarande av varför EU valde att intervensera i Chad.
Hur fungerade EU som internationell säkerhetspolitisk aktör vid beslutet om den EU ledda militära insatsen i Chad?
Fint att du reviderat planen. Med tanke på vad du är ute efter bör du omformulera problemet. Den nuvarande frågan fokuserar på HUR medan du med de två perspektiven vill förklara (VARFÖR) EU valde att agera för en militär insats i Chad. Vidare som jag nämnde på seminariet är det viktigt att om du vill köra två perspektiv så måste du renodla dessa, dvs det är inte bara Hyde-Price kritik av Manners utan det neo-realistiska perspektivet som skall presenteras. På samma sätt behöver du fler källor än Manners när du presentera NPE perspektivet.
Hälsar Karin

1.3 Theory

1.3.1 Normative power Europe

Ian Manners developed the theory of Normative Power Europe (NPE) in a series of articles (2002, 2006, and 2008). Ian Manners is a PhD in political science and specializing in European politics, policy's and normative theory. He theorizes that the European Union's greatest asset in international relations is its normative power.

The term normative power developed from the discussion by Hedley Bull and Francois Duchêne. Francois Duchêne claimed that the European Union represented civilian power and did not contain any military power that made any impact on international relations. He claimed that traditional military power had given way to the civilian power, in order exert power over the international relations. Bull criticized this statement, he said that Europe needed to develop its military power. However, the lack of military power and the unwillingness to develop it would lead to the EU failing as an actor in international affairs (Manners, 2002 ss. 235-238).

It was out of this discussion that Manners constructed his NPE. The core idea in NPE is that the power over norms is the power to have the ability to shape the conceptions of what is considered "normal". Instead of focusing on the EU as a state with the notions of civilian and military power, NPE tries to include the cognitive processes behind policies and politics (Manners, 2002 s. 239).

There are three reasons why the EU has this unique position in the international system. It is mainly from the EU:s historical context, hybrid government form and political-legal constitution. The EU is a product from the aftermath of the Second World War, where the nationalism of the ninetieth and first half of the twentieth century had led to massive wars and genocide on a scale not seen before. The constitution and institutions were created in this context and spirit, which led to the founding texts putting much emphasis on working for peace and liberty.

The EU represents a different form of governance that has transcended the Westphalian state system. The difference between the inside and outside of the state has been blurred with the EU cooperation. This new form of common governance emphasizes on principles that are common to the member states.

The constitution of the EU has mainly been an elite-driven, treaty-based, and legal order affair. Because of this, the constitution emphasizes strongly on universal norms although it was only first put in the constitution in the Treaty of Europe (TEU) created in 1992 (Manners, 2002 ss. 239-241).

Kommentar [D6]: Vem är Ian Manners.. MORGON ÄNDRAT

The combination of these three bases in the post cold war era has placed norms at the forefront of the EU's relations between its member states. Also in its external relations the EU informs and sometimes conditions its work on a series of norms (Manners, 2002 ss. 239-241).

1.3.2 The NPE core values and their diffusion

The NPE theory outlines nine core norms that is situated in the most central texts of the EU's constitution. The nine core norms are *peace, liberty, democracy, rule of law, human rights, social solidarity, inclusive equality, sustainable development, and good governance*. The combinations of these norms allow the EU to become greater than the sum of its parts (Manners, 2008 ss. 48-55). I am not going to bring it up here, but Manners defines these core norms in his paper.

Kommentar [D7]: Behövs det mer här? Skriv mer om manners liberal idelaistiska perspektiv..

Manners identify six ways of norm diffusion, *contagion*, where norms are unintentional diffused, *informational* diffusion where the official declarations from the presidency or the president of the commission express the official norms of the EU. *Procedural* diffusion is when the institutions of the EU and third party work together, *transference* when the EU exchanges aid, goods or trade under conditions that the receiving partner agrees on the norms the EU represents. *Overt diffusion*, is when the EU is physically in another state both in the form of the member states official delegations or the EU led missions like the one in former Yugoslavia. The last way that norms is being diffused is the *cultural filter*, which is the way the receiving part can learn, adapt, or reject the norms that the EU expresses (Manners, 2002 ss. 239-245).

Later work by Manners has developed the NPE theory and put much discussion in the actual subject of the militarization of the EU. After the start of the "War on Terror" increased emphasis has been put on security because of the "new" threats of terror. A post 2003 agenda has emerged that contains space for preventive engagements. This refocuses Europe's foreign policy from focusing from human security to concerns on national security (Manners, 2006 s. 192).

The danger with this is that the normative power of the EU is being undermined and the quest to expand into the realm of military power is counterproductive. The reason for this is that the will to use short-term military intervention will increase instead of using the long-term engagements that has been successful in the past for the EU.

This is the weak point of the NPE theory because Manners does not underpin his argument with an empiric example, why an EU led military intervention will undermine its normative power.

2007 Thomas Diez and Michelle Meile studied the EU as an intervening actor seen from a civilian perspective and concluded that the preconceived perceptions

Kommentar [D8]: FORTSÄTT EFTER TOLKNING av DIEZ MORGON ÄNDRING

of EU has a clear relevance to the success of EU's civilian interventions (Diez, o.a., 2007 ss. 13-14).

1.3.3 Testing NPE

To determine the normative power of the EU in world politics, it has been suggested to analyze the EU's actions from three different moral theories. Firstly out of a virtue ethics perspective, which means how well the EU itself lives up to the norms it advocates. How well the EU is "living by example" and being consequent in its actions and not promoting norms that it do not comply with itself.

The second perspective to evaluate how normative the EU's action is through a deontological approach. This is in which manners the normative actions have been taken and if the actions that have been preformed complies with the norms that are being promoted. It puts much emphasis on the practice of law when pursuing the common good. The important thing is that the actions they have taken are debated and there is consent between all the involved parties.

The third part in this analyzes is to consider it through a consequentialist perspective. The perspective looks at which impacts the action preformed has had. A sort of the goal justifies the means thinking but in combination with the other two perspectives, it does not mean that anything can be done. This thinking also suggests that the EU should do the least harm in the world politics (Manners, 2008 ss. 55-59).

This three-part analysis model is helpful to use when looking at actions taken by the EU and see if it lives at it learns. The weak component with this model is that to fully use it, the event or action that you want to look at, must have played through all its phases, else you can't fully determine the consequences.

The critique against Normative Power Europe has come from several different directions.

Scholars that has engaged in the NPE discussion is Thomas Diez and Michael Merlingen. Merlingen points out that the norm diffusion practiced has a contradiction over them. He argues that progress does not happen without domination and the norm diffusion defeats its own purpose when being spread by domination (Merlingen, 2007 ss. 449-450).

The value-based discourse used by EU in its foreign policy shows a lack of insight into the EU's internal politics which gives negative consequences. The norms that the EU so correctly expresses abroad in its foreign policy statements it forgets the not so good norm compliances record it has at home. This discrepancy weakens its ability to diffuse its norms internationally.

Thomas Diez critique, points out that the normative power language often "others" actors that does not live up to the norms advocated in the normative

Kommentar [D9]: Lägg till mer om Merlingen. Hans kritik och att det är Diez med anhang som ska nämnas kritiserar Skriv in hur dessa har kritiserat MORGON ÄNDRING

discourse. This construction and shaming of “others” can increase the violence in world politics based on universal norms (Merlingen, 2007 s. 438).

The NPE perspective is a liberal-idealistic theory, which very easily can be criticized from a neo-realistic perspective. The critique against NPE is that military power is considered the dominating power projecting capability, which is the foundation for a super-power. In addition, the NPE does not put much emphasis on economical factors in the world of international relations.

1.3.4 Neo-Realism

The neo-realistic perspective has sprung from the realistic perspective. The core assumptions made by the realists is that the international system is an anarchy system of states without any supreme governing entity that can construct and enforce rules and regulations. This is a state-centric perspective, which means that the states are the supreme actors in the international system. They are not the only international actors but the most powerful states are the most influential actors (Hyde-Price, 2006 s. 220).

The central agenda for the state is its own survival and the protection of its own citizens both from external and internal dangers. The result of this assumption is that the need to defend the national interests has resulted in the concept of national security tied to military power.

The anarchical system also makes states functionally similar, in the way that they produce the same institutions and socialize in the international system. The neo-realist theory also assumes that states are rational unitary actors.

The consequence of these preconditions is that all states are subjected to a security dilemma, which in short means that they cannot really trust anyone but themselves. This security competition can lead to war given the anarchic international system, but this seldom occurs.

Another core assumption is that states are forced to self-help for their own protection and national security. This usually means that the states interpret the measures they take for their protection as defensive and the measures of others as threatening (Sheehan, 2005 s. 8). This leads to the assumption that all states has the same agenda of survival and therefore will always have a military force at its disposal. The risk with a military force is that other state experiences it as an aggressive force. With this logic, other states will always assume the worst (Sheehan, 2005 s. 9). However, not all states are suspicious against each other and feel threatened. This is because it is not only material considerations that are important but also a subjective judgment about the other states posture and intentions.

Considering the interstate cooperation, many neo-realist scholars means that the security dilemma puts a clear limit to the amount of cooperation the states can have in a anarchic system (Sheehan, 2005 s. 11). Although the security dilemma makes cooperation difficult, it does not make it impossible. However, the institutions created to control the cooperation have no own power or autonomy. The bases of the institutions are on the self-interest of the great powers and have no real effect on states behavior.

From the neo-realist perspective, the EU should be seen as an actor that only matters in the margins of European Security (Hyde-Price, 2006 s. 221).

The key difference between realists and neo-realists is that the realists consider the states act accordingly, because of the violent and power seeking human nature. One problem with this is that it does not consider why internal political behavior differs and why for some times in history there has been cooperation between states.

The neo-realist was not satisfied with the explanation that it was human nature that was the reason but instead they put forward the explanation for the security dilemma lay in the nature of the international system. It is the structure of the international system that forces the states to act in a certain way. This would explain the similarities the states have in their defense and foreign policies and at the same time have different internal political systems (Sheehan, 2005 s. 17).

The problems with the neo-realistic that has been subject for critique is just that is it a state centric perspective and the changing world order after the fall of the Berlin wall the deficiencies of the theory has been observed. The new inter-state actors and internal conflicts occurring outside the old state system has made the realistic school of thought to lose some of its explaining value.

Kommentar [D10]: Mer kritik emot realism

1.3.5 Motive for selecting theories

The NPE theory is to some extent a controversial theory. Its foundation is not widely accepted in the world of international relations. The “hard-facts” people in for example the realistic tradition theorizes that “might is right” and the power over soft issues will never transcend this fact. This is then nothing strange that the foremost criticism comes from predecessors of the realistic theory and in particular the neo-realistic theory, which is the one that I decided to use.

Therefore, I think by putting these two theories against each other in analyzing the same case, will give different answers and maybe weaken or strengthen the theories, especially regarding the practice of military intervention.

I'm fully understood that the NPE theory does not really include the use of military intervention, however I believe, that to present yourself as a relevant actor in the world politics you must be able to act with military actions. The combination of striving to be a normative power and acting with military action is

something that I think can be done, but will require much consideration regarding the interventions that the EU should engage in. The interesting in my research is to see how much the EU has acted in compliance with its norms and not been affected by other considerations or motives brought up by neo-realistic scholars.

1.4 Method and Material

1.4.1 A qualitative case study

In the construction of my research design, I am going to use a qualitative method. The study itself will be a theory testing survey of the NPE theory to try to evaluate if the notion about military action will diminish Europe's normative power in the world.

The reason why I chose to work with qualitative method is that it enables me to dig deeper into the specific research area. However, this method is also to prefer because there has been so few cases in the study in the field of military intervention by the EU and Chad is the most resent and actual. Therefore, I chose to concentrate my survey to this one case.

The method I am applying to this paper is that I will be descriptive about the case and try to be as neutral as possible and describe the events that have taken place leading up to the intervention. Maybe this ontologically sounds very realistic, meaning that the truth can be view as a objective truth, but it coincides with my point of view (Lundquist, 1993 ss. 67-68).

I will outline the important actors, their relations, and actions. The method I use will be a systematic work method with the purpose to clarify the thought structure of the EU, the history of the region. (Esaiaasson, o.a., 2004 s. 245). I try to see to which extent the EU chose this intervention on normative grounds.

From this empirical starting point, I will use it in my analytical discussion concerning the two perspectives view on the events that has taken place. This part is inspired from Graham Allison's book *Essence of decision*, were he described the case of the Cuba missile crisis from three different perspectives and increased the explanatory value. When using different perspective to look at an event it is likely to attain different answers and different questions will be asked. The reason for this is that different perspectives present different aspects of the problem. In not only the answer but also which evidence that is deemed relevant, the concepts used in examining the evidence and which explanations are relevant (Allison, 1999 ss. 387-388).

My intention is to use a modified model inspired by Allison where I use the same empirical description as a foundation for my analytical chapter.

Kommentar [D11]: Istället bör du betona och utveckla din metodologiska diskussion om hur du går tillväga för att applicera de två teoretiska perspektiven (med hjälp av Goldmanns och Allison's resomenang)

Kommentar [D12]: MORGON ÄNDRING.. Referens o ontologi

In the analytical chapter, I will analyze the case from both perspectives in separate sections to increase the sense of separation between the two perspectives. To conclude I will use these two analyses as a starting point for the discussion about the reach and limitations of the theories.

The problems I can identify by using this research model is that it won't be able to be used to generalize the behavior by EU as a actor but instead be limited to this specific case. However, I consider it is sufficient to be able to use it for a discussion about the theories reach and limitations but also to draw conclusions on the decision to intervene on a more abstract level.

In the discussion concerning the NPE and Neo-realism, I will use Kjell Goldmanns discussion about how to examine a theory. Everyone agrees that a theory can never be all-inclusive and there will always be weak points. The important thing is to identify and be aware of these limitations. It is important to understand with which reservations the theory is still valid. In addition, what the theory cannot explain and how meaningful the neglected factors are (Goldmann, 1982 s. 112).

The important thing is to identify which reach, or explaining value, the theory has. With this, I mean that a theory is a statement or a series of statements of phenomena that on a given manner influence other phenomena. It is the relationship between different variables. The reach of a theory is in short which independent variables are or what the theory is really about (Goldmann, 1982 ss. 113-114).

A theory can have good validity in certain boundaries and you can say that a theory with a short reach can explain a lot but that has been prescribed with a long reach can have a low explanation value.

The critique against a theory is comments on the theory's limitations. The critique does not mean that the theory is not valid but it has claimed to explain more than its reach can (Goldmann, 1982 s. 115).

My adaptation of this in my paper will be that I will discuss the NPE theory's reach and limitations in the case of military interventions. I chose to do this because this is a weak point of the theory since all that Manners does in his article is to conclude that military intervention is a short-term solution that undermines the normative power of the EU.

1.4.2 Material

The material I will use is a combination of first hand material and second hand material. The first hand material will consist of official material and press releases

from the UN and the EU. This material can I mainly use to describe the intent and the official declarations. It will also be used to describe the “hard-facts” concerning the troop contribution and organization. The limitation with this official material is that it is released to portray the right image of what is intended.

The second hand material that I will use will be that of journalistic articles and academic articles. The journalistic articles might not be the ones that give the best description of what has happen, with all the limitation with using this kind of material. However, it will give an insight into the feelings of the involved parties on the ground. I think he academic articles are the best but they are dependent on the research question they are putting on their material. In addition, the angle that the author is putting on the material must be interpreted before using them.

I have also used academic literature to develop my methodological section and theory section. I use it to discuss Neo-realism and to some extent in my case study. These books must be subjected to the same considerations as the academic articles.

Kommentar [D13]: Läg till om böcker

1.5 Definitions of central terms

1.5.1 Norms

In the discussion of the definition of a norm in international relations, one can conclude that norms are a context dependent phenomena. The definition is divided in three, behavior, prescription and shared expectations. Norms can be said to represent a “shared” behavior of states either that repeats itself or in some cases a single event that set a norm. Prescription of norms is the way they inflict a sense of obligation in them. The last part the definition of norms is based on is shared and collective expectations. This considers how different actors expect to behave properly under certain circumstances. However, the problem with the intersubjectiveness of norms is that the interpretation relies on the receiving actors, which in some cases can lead to norm confusion (Björkdahl, 2002 s. 40).

The way norms functions divide into three different functions of norms, regulating, enabling, and constituting. The regulating norms are the norms that regulate the code of conduct in international relations by setting the “rules” for the behavior of actors. The constituting and enabling norms tell of the actors interests and identity, what the actor seeks to accomplish and how the actor portrays itself (Björkdahl, 2002 s. 41).

The way these norms can affect the international system can be determined from the norms robustness. Looking at the norms durability, persuasiveness, feasibility, and applicability you can get an understanding of the robustness of a norm. The norm will be evaluated from how long it has existed, how well the ideas corresponds with its followers beliefs, how well it translates into practice and in how big of a context the norm can be applied.

A more direct definition of a norm can be:

“Norms are intersubjective understands that constitute actors’ interests and identities, and create expectations as well as prescribes what appropriate behavior ought to be by expressing values and defining rights and obligations. (Björkdahl, 2002 s. 43).

2 Case Study

2.1 EU as a international actor

To describe the EU:s status as an international actor you first have to look at how it has been organized. The guiding principles of the EU are divided into three pillars. The first pillar has been with the EU since the start and is the same as they were in the European Community (EC) and has changed very little. The second pillar is about a common foreign and security policy (CFSP). This can in short said to be a way to coordinate the foreign policy's of the different member states. The ambition of the pillar is to give the EU the same voice in the political world as in the economic. The third pillar is the member states cooperation regarding police and juridical questions (Tallberg, 2004 ss. 65-66).

However, the second pillar is the interesting one to my case. The CFSP developed through a series of failures and successes since the beginning of the European cooperation. Nevertheless during the fifties and sixties there were a small defense alliance called the Western European union (WEU) but this was small in comparison with NATO that stood for the defense for a big part of Western Europe. During the sixties, concerns came up, that Europe was a disorganized ally, exemplified by Henry Kissinger's question: *Whom do I call if I want to talk to Europe?* There was a need for the European community to be able to speak with one voice. The first step taken in this direction was the European political cooperation (EPC) that was not a part of the EC framework and therefore did not fall under the over-national institutions of the EC. The EPC simplified the work for the foreign ministers and heads of states to develop a common ground and act more unitary in international politics (Tallberg, 2004 s. 74).

During the eighties, the EPC transformed into today's CFSP but its shortcomings showed when the civil war in the Balkans erupted. Despite reforms, the same lack of ability presented itself during the conflict in Kosovo. Even here NATO dominated and the EU was overshadowed (Peterson, o.a., 2008 s. 236).

This lead to a drive to expand EU:s ability to be a force for good and be able to prevent conflicts and efficiently deal with the crisis that do occur. The consequence of this was that the EU approved the plans to establish a rapid reaction force consisting of 60 000 personnel and be able to supply the right personnel both for military intervention but also for law enforcement and juridical support (Tallberg, 2004 s. 75). This combined approach is the foundation in the

European Security and Defense Protocol (ESDP). The ESDP framework regulates the workings of the EU when acting multilaterally in peacekeeping, humanitarian, and developing operations.

This reorientation was set in motion by Javier Solana that outlined the future of EU:s conflict prevention policy's. He emphasized that if the EU was to be able to succeed in being a realistic alternative for crisis management it must have the ability to act early and be able to apply a broad concept of conflict prevention tools. The EU should be able to both act diplomatic with treaty and sanctions but also with military force to stabilize a situation so other means can be applied (Solana, 2002). There is a common purpose for all member states as Solana expresses it:

“We share a common purpose. The values rooted in our founding texts are common to all. They are shared also with those who cannot be in Helsingborg – the victims of conflict whether in the Balkans, in the Middle East, On the Horn of Africa and in Central Africa. Our purpose is to enable these values to flourish and find expression where they already have deep roots” (Solana, 2002)

This reorientation has both been seen as a militarization of the EU but it also emphasizes that the core norms of the EU is the common purpose to which the foreign policy is being oriented.

This can be considered to be a step on the way in the development of the EU's goal to become a global security actor. The EU's multilateral conflict management model has better acceptance and legitimacy than unilateral action or action by NATO. The EU also has better efficiency than the UN and this combination is almost a perfect mix of political legitimacy and military efficiency (Charbonneau, 2009 s. 553). However, the self-reproduction done by the EU in constructing itself as a security provider in Africa is happening from a Eurocentric perspective. This results in Africa becoming a security consumer with no real influence in which questions are relevant. In addition to strengthening the EU:s role as a security actor it also allows the member states to take care of specific interests in Africa (Olson, 2009 s. 246).

There are different theories why the EU as an international actor can be so portraying as it is. Out of a neo-realistic perspective with the world, being a zero-sum game and all states are unitary actors, it is hard to see the potential of the EU's foreign policy's.

Looking at it from a liberal perspective the states have not given up their sovereignty but instead “merged” it with others because they reason that they are stronger together than the sum of their parts (Peterson, o.a., 2008 s. 237).

2.2 The history of the region

The background of the region in which the EUFOR intervention was taking place is interesting to study to be able to understand the motives behind the actions conducted by the European actors. Especially one EU member state in particular. France has been the colonial ruler of the whole area. I will make a short summary of the history since the beginning of the twentieth century.

2.2.1 Chad

The colonial rule by the French was in Chad characterized by mismanagement and uneven rule. They concentrated their rule to the southern parts of the country and developed it unevenly, which has put its mark on the conflicts of today.

The independence from France was a peaceful affair but soon it transformed into a one-party state that worsened the gap between the north and the south and this situation looks to some extent similar to the one in Sudan.

This situation resulted soon in a rebellion and civil conflict when Muslim groups started an armed struggle. This conflict where more or less active until 1981 when Hissén Habré ceased power. However, he could never consolidate the country and Idriss Déby, whom is still the leader of Chad, ousted him in a coup during the 1990. However, he has to date not been able to fully contain the problems and a number of conflicts have occurred with the latest one in 2005 being a spillover effect from the conflict in Sudan (Uppsala Conflict Database, 2008). Rebel fractions has been dissatisfied with Déby and tried several times to remove him from power, the latest attack occurred in February 2008 when rebel elements pushed from their bases in Sudan and attacked the capital N'djamena but were stopped after fighting in the streets (Safer Access, 2008).

After the independence from France, Chad has also fought two inter-state wars, both against Nigeria and Libya. During the eighties Muammar Gaddafi, the leader of Libya, had his eyes on territory in Chad which lead to a number of military confrontations during the 1980's. These where fended off with help by the French (International crisis group, 2010).

2.2.2 The Central African Republic

Like Chad, the CAR also was a colonial area under French rule and granted independence at the same time as Chad. The French colonial rule was characterized by ruthless exploitation of the natural resources and it was not until twenty years before the independence that the colonial masters started to develop the country.

The composition of the countries' ethnic groups is heterogeneous and this mixture has been and is a factor in the internal conflicts. It is not the triggering factor but much of the discourse around the conflicts revolves around this.

After the independence CAR also became a one-party state that soon fell into civil conflict and coups and dictators came and went during until the beginning of the nineties. Then a relatively elected government came to power but did not succeed in appeasing the different ethnic groups and this government fell in a coup by Francois Bozizé in 2003, in which Chad's president Déby supported him. He tried to unite the country and was elected in elections that were deemed relatively fair and open. However, a new internal conflict started in 2006 when rebels declared that Bozizé only was helping his own ethnic group (Uppsala Conflict Database, 2008).

2.2.3 The French

The French was the colonial masters of this region and called it French Equatorial Africa. The French's history in the region has been that of colonial master and then a French neo-colonialist agenda. This agenda has led to several military interventions in recent history beginning with Operation Epervier. This operation started in 1986 when Libyan forces entered Chad in an attempt to annex parts of the country. Its official mandate was to protect French and foreign citizens, partake in a mission of "internal presence" to be able to give support to other conflicts and to support the Chadian armed forces. This operation is still active today though in some different form. Since the start of this operation, the French has stationed about 3000 troops in Chad (Olson, 2009 s. 255).

This pattern of military intervention has continued to this day with the latest example being the protection of Chadian president Déby in 2005, 2006 and February 2008. In addition, the CAR's president Bozizé received military aid in November 2006 and March 2007 (Charbonneau, 2008 s. 292).

Some have described the French involvement in the politics of Africa as a form of Neo-colonialism. The decolonization movement did not mean that the French broke all form of connections with its former colonies, but instead a reconstruction of the former imperial relationship. New arrangements with so-called "military cooperation" between the former colonies and the French government make it possible for the French to maintain military presence in former colonies and be able to intervene swiftly if so needed (Charbonneau, 2008 ss. 281-282). The French was allowed to do this because it made up a defense against communism spreading in Africa.

In a recent speech by the French president Nicolas Sarkozy in Dakar 2007, he revived an old French dream, *Euroafrica*, which is the concept of peace and prosperity for both Europeans and Africans. The meaning of this is not clear but it implies that the French neo-colonialism has transformed into a European affair.

The French discourse surrounding its involvement in Africa has changed and been adapted to suit the newest norms, which suit the French need for bases and military presence well (Charbonneau, 2008 s. 283).

2.3 The latest conflict in Chad and the CAR

The most recent conflict in the area has been spillover effects from the conflict in Sudan. This is a multi-layered conflict with ethical tensions resembling those in Sudan. It is a result of Chadian President Déby's support to elements from his tribe active in the Sudanese Liberation Army (SLA) and Justice and Equality movement (JEM). This support to the anti-Khartoum rebel groups lead to Khartoum responding in the same manner and is supporting anti-Déby rebel groups that operate from areas in Darfur.

This multi-layered conflict can be broke down into four parts. First, it is an internal power struggle with different factions fighting for power out from ethnical and political lines. Secondly, it is fighting between local groups over territory and natural resources. Third, it is a spillover effect from the conflict in Darfur and fourth it is a proxy war between Chad and Sudan. These rising tensions are a consequence of the tribal relationships between Chad's president Déby and rebel groups in Darfur (Safer Access, 2008).

The way that the CAR is involved in this mess is that Chad help to Bozizé, which resulted in the northeastern part of the country, falling into an insurgency. In addition, the Sudanese rebels been alleged to destabilize this part of the country to open a bigger front into Chad (Safer Access, 2008).

This crisis in Darfur has created many refugees from the areas in Darfur whom have taken refuge in the eastern part of Chad. It was estimated that approximately 230 000 Sudanese refugees and almost 200 000 internally displaced Chadians were holding up in the eastern parts of Chad (Seibert, 2007 s. 9). These people, have been caught up by the hostilities between Chad and Sudan and subjected to increasing cross-border attacks from rebels and militias.

2.4 Decision making – EUFOR Chad/CAR

To be able to do a good analyzes on the decision making around the intervention a comprehensive description of the EU mission EUFOR must be undertaken, the

connections with the ESDP agenda, the involved actors, and the mandate for the mission.

2.4.1 The mission and mandate

The EUFOR mission was a short-term intervention with a set end date, it was the start of a comprehensive approach from EU to try to stabilize the area. This approach was selected though an intervention in Sudan was not possible and the way that was selected was to act in the margins of the **conflict** (Charbonneau, 2009 s. 556). The mandate for the EUFOR mission stipulated it to be active one year from the 15 march 2008 to the 15 march 2009 and replaced by the UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) after its time limit expired. Its limited mandate means that it was a bridging operation to an UN mission, in which EUFOR would provide the muscle.

Kommentar [D14]: Källa

The mission was adopted in the Security Council's resolution 1778 from which expresses its concerns for the deterring security situation in eastern Chad, the northeastern CAR and Sudan and expressing that seizing power by violent means is unacceptable.

The resolution mandates two missions, the MINURCAT that starts as a liaison mission, which will be in place to train the local police, military and government in a manner consistent with human rights, good governance and rule of **law**. This work would be conducted with the Security Councils resolution 1325 in mind, meaning putting a gender perspective on the solution. This is so the local police would be able to deal with daily life (IRIN, 2008).

Kommentar [D15]: Lägg till omgender perspektiv MORGON ÄNDRING

The EUFOR mission acted on a chapter seven mandate with the time limit described above. The EUFOR's mission was:

(i) To contribute to protecting civilians in danger, particularly refugees and displaced persons;

(ii) To facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid and the free movement of humanitarian personnel by helping to improve security in the area of operations;

(iii) To contribute to protecting United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment and to ensuring the security and freedom of movement of its staff and United Nations and associated personnel (Security Council, 2007).

The combined UN and EUFOR mission are generally meant to act as a stabilization force in a volatile region with Chadian IDP that needed protection and would be repatriated **eventually**.

Kommentar [D16]: MORGON ÄNDRING

2.4.2 Participators and Force distribution

Fourteen nations contributed with military personnel to the EUFOR mission. The operation commander was the Irish general Nash and the force commander was the French general Jean Philippe Ganacia. The largest contributor to EUFOR was the French contingent. It supplied about 2000 troops of the 3700 that composed the EUFOR force. The French did have the logistical advantage, mainly because of their existing presence in the country. This made the French to make a promise to fill the gaps that presented itself during the troop contribution phase. They also contributed with the bulk of the helicopters and transport aircrafts (Olson, 2009 s. 255).

The other nations that participated with large contingents were the Polish, Irish, Swedish, and the Belgians.

2.4.3 Reactions to EUFOR

The different actors in the conflict expressed a mixed set of reactions regarding the EUFOR presence in the area of operation. The NGO's and aid organizations welcomed the introduction of a robust peacekeeping force because of the increase attacks and robberies that had taken place in the late 2007. Nevertheless, the dual structure of the force mandated by the Security Council raised concerns if the people would be able to distinguish between the EUFOR, MINURCAT and the regular French forces.

The association with the French forces is something that has worried both aid workers and the rebel forces. The aid workers were afraid that the EUFOR force would mainly be associated with the French forces already stationed in Chad and which reputation was that they supported the president of Chad (IRIN, 2008). This dilemma has led to that the rebel leaders warned the EU before the mission started. They said that the rebel fractions had no problems with the EUFOR force if they only did what they were mandated to do, to protect the refugees from the conflict in eastern Chad. However, if they were to stand in the way of the rebels it would be a completely different situation.

Other rebel leaders expressed concerns that the EUFOR were only there to protect EU's interests in Chad's oil and not in peace. They warned that if the situation wasn't taken seriously the risk for "total" war was apparent (IRIN, 2007).

3 Analysis

I will do this analyzes in a two part approach. It will focus on dismantling the way that the actors has acted, looking at it from two perspectives and determine how the two ways of looking at the same event will overlap and differ.

3.1 The mission from a NPE perspective

The EU involvement in Chad was decided by the member states of the EU in the framework of the ESDP cooperation. The ESDP cooperation ensures that the political unity for the mission exists inside the union and that it was decided in a democratic fashion. Coupled to this the mission was based upon a UN mandate and attained international legitimacy this way. In addition, from a normative point of view the UN mandate is essential.

The missions mandated tasks where also based on the common normative grounds that is essential in both the UNs and the EUs core governing texts. The resolution tasked MINURCAT with developing the legal mechanism to increase the rule of law and work for good governance with the governments of Chad and the CAR, all with a gender perspective in mind.

Analyzing the intervention from the three-part analysis suggested by Manners its virtue, deontological and consequential perspectives increase the explanatory value. From a virtue perspective, the intervention seems, at first glance, to be very normatively correct. It receives its legitimacy from a UN mandate and the mandated operational objectives are highly normative. However, the underlying reason the EU has comes from the construction of itself as a security provider.

The deontological aspect is that the EUFOR operation is a first step in a comprehensive strategy with civil actions follows in the wake of the military intervention. The military will concentrate on protection and no offensive actions will be conducted. In this manner, the operation fits into a deontological perspective of normatively thinking. However, the troop contribution by the French, using troops already stationed in country makes it harder to use normative argument in motivating the operation.

Although the mission was mandated on a UN mandate and were invited by the president in both Chad and CAR this ensured international legitimacy which is the essential in using a normative approach and discourse.

The consequences of the operation are too early to discuss in full detail because the operation has just ended and the comprehensive actions not been fully implemented. However, given the short timeframe, it seems unlikely that there would be any chance of repatriating the IDPs and refugees. Moreover, if the MINURCAT does not receive an extended mandate after it ends in 2010, the mission will have accomplished very little. The spillover effects from the crisis in Darfur will also continue to disturb until there can be a lasting solution on that crisis.

3.2 The mission from a Neo-realistic perspective

The state centric focus in neo-realism will focus this discussion on the role of the French, the governing forces in Chad and Car and the EU's function as a forum for cooperation.

The long involvement by the French in this part of Africa residing from the colonial heritage means they have much interest in how the area develops. The decolonization did not mean that they gave up their control, but changed in nature. The recent history has shown this, when offering help to the presidents in Chad and the CAR to stay in power. The oil production that begun in Chad in 2003 increased French interest in helping the Chadian government to stay in power and to be able to secure resources.

The intervention is a way to tie these parts closer to Europe and tie Chad and the CAR closer to France and Europe.

The driving force behind adopting a mandate to intervene was the French government (Olson, 2009 s. 255). They pushed for a resolution in the Security Council and then were the biggest troop contributor, whilst using much troops already stationed in the country.

The EUFOR mission to protect the IDPs and refugees meant that the two governments could withdraw troops that had been used to control the camps and use to fight the rebel movements. The reason to grant access to the EU mission was a way to establish some breathing room for Chad and CAR.

This mission can be considered support to repressive and non-democratic regimes.

The EU as an international actor is reliant on the second pillar in the guiding principles. This pillar works with little supranational guidance, which makes it easier for single states to influence the policy of the EU at a greater level. In this case, the French being one of the biggest members has big advantage.

Kommentar [D17]: The consequentialist perspective is a little early to analyze though the operation

The three part analyses suggested by Manners
Virtue – Living by example? Tveksam, IAF motivering till missionen
Denotological – Skyddar flyktingar och
Consequentialist – To soon to say. But the output from the operation is that is didn't solve the situation or repatriated

The mission -
Overt diffusion

Based on a UN mandate bridging to UN operation
- Kontrollen i FN?
- Fransmännen tryckte på för mandate både hos FN och bland EU.

Protection IDP and refugees
Emphasizes good governance, rule of law

Collective action
For the better for arica
Invited by Chad and CAR president
Limited time in country

NPE – minskar till tron till EU som normative makt
Kan NPE förklara interventioner – NJA men den förklarar helt klart diskursen kring interventioner och med vilka medel som

Kommentar [D18]: sida

The French has also a permanent seat in the Security Council in the UN, which gives them extra working space to push for military intervention. This mission would also help to protect the existing state system by not allowing coups to occur.

The neo-realism does not really explain why the other EU member states commit their military to EUFOR. It is a weak point in the theory, however beside the French it was only smaller nations that contributed troops to EUFOR. Their motivation in doing this lays in their need to position themselves with the bigger powers and better their position in forming the EU's policy.

The EU strengthens its position in international relations as a security provider and develops the European security cooperation under the ESDP framework.

3.3 The different theories reach and limitations

How well does the Normative Power Europe explain the intervention in Chad and the CAR? A clear motive will it never produce but it is very useful to explain the discourse regarding the military intervention and the EU's reorientation to comprehensive approaches with peace efforts. It gives an explanation to the limited objectives the operation had.

The limitations of the NPE theory is not a theory that cannot explain why military intervention occur, even when generalizing, there are too many variables between the EU member states in their foreign policy's to be able to explain it. It cannot be broken down to explain single states motives for actions, but it can explain the discourse and norms used by single actors.

To contrast against NPE the Neo-realisms reach is much better when trying to evaluate individual actor's motives. It describes how different major powers still are the dominating in the current structure and that they are including the recent norms on good governance in their policy's. In this paper, the neo-realism is a good complement to the NPE because it explains the underlying motives, like the neo-colonial aspirations by the French.

The limitation of neo-realism is that it does not give a full explanation to why other EU members pledge their troops to a mission, when looking from neo-realism, is clearly a French affair. The cooperation between states is the soft spot of this theory. It does not explain how the normative discourse has become an important piece in the EU community. The neo-realism does not take in to account the power of being able to influence what is considered normal.

Kommentar [D19]:

Gamla franska koloniala strävande och Euroafrica. Knyta Afrika närmre europa för att öka sin makt inflytande på området
Stöd till sittande presidenter, och därigenom stöd till en represiv sittande regering
Bevarande av existerande statsystemet

Olja från 2003, kontroll över dessa tillgångar
Nå och påverka

Säkra sina gamla investeringar – Chad och CAR men även ett avståndstagande från

EU stärker sin roll som internationell "fredsbevarare" och tränar interventioner.

Sudan – Påverka denna gamla allierad och dess

Statscentrerat – Anarkiskt system.

Självhjälp -

Zero-Sum - OLJA

Starkes rätt

Kommentar [D20]: Förklarar inte storpolitiken och kopplingarna mellan historia, geopolitik och maktsträvanden.
Bakomliggande faktorer, ekonomiska intressen. Dessa

Kommentar [D21]: Mycket ändrat här MORGON ÄNDRING

4 Conclusions

The EU as a normative power in military interventions is something dual edged. The worry that Manners expresses in the NPE theory regarding military action undermines the normative power of Europe, is a concern that I also share. The motives for the intervention in Chad do not coincide with the norms and normative discourse the EU presents to the world. The involvement in military action dominated by a single member's interest will undermine the way that the EU can portray itself as a normative power. The EU tried to use a normative discourse and a UN mandate to justify the intervention but these arguments undermined by the clear interest from France.

What normative power brings is a change in the discourse and methods used by members that will expand its sphere of influence. They adapt to the norms that the EU prescribes but the underlying motives are the same as before.

On a more abstract level the use of a normative discourse when justifying a intervention means that there must not be any question marks regarding the motives by the intervening actors. It must also be done with the local context in mind and not only with norms constructed from a western perspective.

In the case of EUFOR in Chad and CAR these two perspectives sheds light on the official discourse and the underlying motives, seen from a statecentric perspective. It shows that the discourse used is applying a highly normative language to justify the intervention. However, when using neo-realism it clearly brings forward the states interest and in the studied case shows that Frances motives played a big part in pushing for a intervention.

To continue the research around normative actions it would be good to examine the future military interventions being lead by the EU from the three-part analysis and try to determine how the normative arguments and justification is being used. However, at the same time an examination of the motives for the individual states taking part in the intervention must be considered.

In the end a completely other perspective must be applied, the one of the country that the intervention is taking place in. The discourse of today is mostly a product of European policy makers and scholars that risk the EU to be a dominating norm diffuser. From these preconditions, there must be a change in perspective to look at it from the intervened part. This would be an interesting point of view to examine Normative Power Europe.

Kommentar [D22]: The European Union (EU) is aspiring to become a bigger actor in the world of international peacekeeping. EU have contributed to a number of civilian peace missions and has been leading a limited number of military intervention, which the latest was the bridging operation between EU and UN in Chad and Central African Republic (CAR). The discourse surrounding the operations has portrayed it as something good in compliance with the international law and the accepted universal norms. The reasons and policies for selecting and conducting a certain military intervention can to some extent are determined from the norms that the intervening actor prescribes itself. The theorizing around normative actions has been an actual subject in the latest couple of years but what I have found, not that much about military interventions.

Ian Manners have done recent research in the field of norms and EU with his thesis about Normative Power Europe (NPE). A weakness that I can identify is that the NPE theory to some extent does not includes purely military intervention. Manners stand on EU, when using military power, is that it is counter-productive with the pictures EU displays as a normative power in world politics. This is something that I want to examine.

This papers disposition will be that I will in the second chapter outline the question that I will answer in my paper. The third chapter is my theory chapter where I discuss the theories I selected and the reasons for this. Here I will summarize the most important elements of the two theories so I can be able to use it in my analysis. The fourth chapter is my methodological and material discussion where I describe the method I will use for my research. The fifth chapter is the description of the selected case. Chapter six is the analysis of this case out from the two theories. The last chapter will be my conclusions concerning this subject.

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