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The Militarization of Mexico's Black Spot

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Abstract

Since 2006, President Calderón has used the army to combat organized crime. The object of this study is to investigate the effects of militarization, as a strategy to contain the war on drugs, on Ciudad Juárez. The paper will focus on violence, corruption, public denounce, economy, policy making and international cooperation as indicators to help evaluating the strategy chosen by the Mexican Government. This study can help to answer the question on how to proceed in other Mexican cities with similar problems.

Using the case study method with the help of electronic media, this research aims to analyze how the combat against organized crime through militarization has affected Ciudad Juárez. Theories of the challenges that organized crime poses to the state, the monopoly of violence and the militarization of *black spots* were used in order to conduct the study.

The most visible outcome of militarization is a city that suffers from violence and insecure climate for doing business. A natural effect is that migration in order to find better opportunities in other parts of Mexico or in the United States has increased. This negative trend has led to international agreements and national strategies aiming to promote social development as a counter strategy. However those agreements have still a security focus and on the ground no such counter strategies are visible.

Key Words: Ciudad Juárez, militarization, drug cartels, black spots, violence.

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“When fighting organized crime and terrorism, democracies are condemned to failure if they prioritize the use of army forces and police over the use of intelligence systems.

*– Dominique de Villepin –
Former French Prime Minister*

1. Introduction

Organized crime groups have become a growing problem over the past couple of decades. The traffic and the production of illegal drugs such as marihuana, cocaine and methamphetamines are issues affecting several parts of the world. In 2009, with the economic crisis, Antonio Maria Costa, head of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, said that the “proceeds of organized crime were ‘the only liquid investment capital’ available to some banks on the brink of collapse last year. He said that a majority of the 352 billion dollars of drugs profits was absorbed into the economic system as a result” (Syal, 2009). Other authors say that the volume of financial flows in past years related to the organized crime reached approximately 600 billion dollars per year (Andreas, 2002; Stanislowski, 2004). Therefore, it can be assumed that the profitable activities of the organized crime are far from over.

The Chinese Triads, the Colombian Cartels, the Italian Mafia, the Japanese Yakuza, and the Russian Mob are five examples of the most important organized crime groups of the last decade (Mandel, 2009). Unfortunately, these are not the only ones and new groups of organized crime are emerging and becoming more important. Examples of this are the Golden Triangle in South East Asia (Burma, Thailand, and Laos), Turkey, Egypt and Mexico (UNESCO, 1999) among others.

Mexico, being the neighbor of one of the most important drug consumer countries, has become a major player in the drug traffic world. It is said that “Mexican cartels are the leading wholesale launderers of drug money from the United States. Mexican and Colombian trafficking organizations annually smuggle an estimated \$8.3 to \$24.9 billion dollars in drug proceeds into Mexico for laundering” (Cook, 2007:5). To Mexican economy, drug trafficking generates more incomes than

the export of petroleum, which is its main legal economic activity (Reuters, 2010). It is then understandable that drug money is everywhere in the country, infiltrating in every aspect of life. However there are cities that have been more affected than others by the illegal activities and this is the case of Ciudad Juárez.

The Mexican drug cartels are not new actors in the Mexican reality; they have been around for decades. The main profits for them come from buying illegal drugs from countries in South America like Colombia and Bolivia and selling them for a profit to its neighbor countries in the north, the United States and in a less extent to Canada. Thus, their main target is not selling drugs to the Mexican population.¹

Since the United States is an attractive market for the drugs sale, there are different drug cartels that compete for the control of the border cities. For years there was relative peace and quiet between the Mexican drug cartels. There are even rumors that former presidents allowed and tolerated the drug traffic and the existence of drug cartels (Gutiérrez, 2007) with the only condition of keeping the drug away from the streets so that they would not reach the Mexican youth. The reality is now very different. In 2006 when the current President Felipe Calderón Hinojosa took office, one of his first actions was to start a combat against the narco cartels. The government strategy is to use 50, 000 soldiers and marines to fight drug traffic. The upraising conflicts have brought a war into the country, with such levels of violence that have not been seen since the Revolution war in 1910 (Villalobos, 2010). The end is not yet visible.

Between 2006 and 2009, 10,000 to 20,000 lives were lost because of the war on drugs.² Most of the deaths have taken place in the so called “Golden Triangle”

¹ According to Aguilar and Castañeda, the drug consumption in Mexico is still on its minimum. In the last 10 years the increase on consumption according to the population (110 million people) has been of 6%. In 2008 a study revealed that only 0.4% of the Mexican population is drug consumers. This number is relatively low compared to consumption rates of the United States that is 3%, Germany 2.1% and Holland with 1.8% of drug users. (2009:19)

² According to the newspaper El País (Spain) the “narco-war” has taken over 10,000 lives; the most printed newspaper in Mexico, Reforma, talks about 14,000 deaths; however, unofficial sources (Aguilar and Castañeda, 2009) argue that the deaths have reached over 20,000. During the writing

which is formed by the states of Chihuahua, Sinaloa and Durango. The city that has been most affected by the violence is Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua, which has been called the most violent in the world.³

It is understandable then that the decision of President Calderón of declaring war against drug traffic has been questioned. Some analysts⁴ think that his actions have brought the state to the verge of collapse; some others think it was about time for a president to take action. Nonetheless, what has happened from 2006 until today, has not made it clear to the Mexican population who is winning the war.

1.1 Aim of the Research and Research Question

I intend to study the case of Ciudad Juárez, where the militarization of the city has been more visible and the violence that has come with this action is threatening the population. Therefore, the research question I intend to analyze is: *How has militarization, as a strategy to contain the war on drugs, affected Ciudad Juárez?*

I intend to analyze what has happened in Ciudad Juárez in matters of violence, economy, policy making, and international cooperation. The period covered is four out of his six years of Calderon's presidency, meaning from 2006 up to the present day. What will be analyzed are the effects in each of the areas mentioned before as a consequence of the "war on drugs". The case that will be analyzed is the one of Ciudad Juárez which has been one of the most affected by the killings originated from it.

By focusing on these issue areas, the answer to the question will be developed in a way that the consequences to Ciudad Juárez will be analyzed first. Then, an

process of this thesis, on February 16, 2010, the Mexican Senate recognized that there had been 17,000 deaths related to the war on drugs carried out by President Calderón. (El Universal, 2010).

³ Ciudad Juárez has been called the most violent in the world for the second time in an study conducted by a Mexican NGO called *Consejo Ciudadano para la Seguridad Social y la Justicia Penal*. The study revealed that in the past year, Ciudad Juárez had a total of 2,658 homicides which is about 191 deaths per 100,000 habitants. In second place there was San Pedro Sula, Honduras and in third place San Salvador, El Salvador (Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 2010).

⁴ See Friedman, 2008

analysis of the consequences that the situation in Ciudad Juárez has brought to the national and international level will be performed. Therefore, another aim of the analysis is to have a comprehensive view of the effects by starting at the local level and finishing with the international level.

1.2 A Review of the Literature

Organized crime groups and the ways governments deal with them are topics that have been greatly exploited in the academic world. However, in the case of Mexico the literature is still limited and in the case of Ciudad Juárez even more. During the last years, most of the academic research written about this city has been focused on the homicides of hundreds of women also known as feminicides⁵.

In the academic world, regarding the organized crime in Mexico, an important contribution on this subject is a book called *Organized Crime and Democratic Governability* by Bailey and Godson (2000). This book focuses on the challenges that organized crime has posed to governability especially during the 70 years of government of the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), when the government made agreements and trade-offs with the organized crime groups in order to stay in power. Raúl Benítez Manaut contributes with a chapter in this book. His chapter, "Containing armed group, drug trafficking and organized crime in Mexico", talks about the role of the military throughout Mexico's history. He claims that the armed forces have not only been key players against organized crime and armed groups but also as providers of social services like education, transportation, health and food supply. One of his central statements is that the government has always been keen on relying on the army to carry out these activities because of its inability to achieve governability. Scherlen (2001) also talks about the use of the army when combating organized crime and he analyzes some of the challenges that this has brought to democracy in Mexico.

⁵ See: Morales and Bejarano, 2009.

Another significant contribution on state responses in Mexico against the organized crime in the form of drug trafficking is made by Monica Serrano (2009) in a chapter called “Drug Trafficking and the State in Mexico”⁶. She looks at the state-crime connections and argues that we have seen a change in response from the state to the drug cartels because of the transition from authoritarian to democratic regime. The response has changed from being a model of a state-led criminal market to a criminally privatized market. In this transition the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) played a key role.

However, the implementation of NAFTA was not the only decisive factor for this change as Andreas (2002) points out but this is the natural path that transnational organized crime organizations were to follow thanks to the liberalizing trends in the global economy. He also explores the idea that the pressure of the free market has led farmers to turn to organized crime as a survival strategy.

It is important to note that most articles and books written about the recent events on organized crime and militarization in Ciudad Juárez have a journalistic approach since the presentation of empirical evidence is what prevails over the framing of these facts within a certain theory. For example, in *La Guerra por Juárez*, edited by Pérez Varela (2009) several known authors narrate their experience and encounters both with the organized crime and with the army in Ciudad Juárez with the purpose of spreading the word about the reality that is being lived in this city. Miró, 2003; Fernández and Ronquillo, 2006; Gutiérrez, 2007 and Sánchez, 2009 are also examples of authors who have presented several facts and evidence around the war on drugs that Mexico is carrying on.

In this case, the contribution of my research will be to gather empirical facts and information about the militarization of the combat of organized crime or drug cartels in Ciudad Juárez and framing them in a theoretical framework. This will be used to build on the effects that militarization has had in different issue areas which

⁶ The book in which this chapter is included is called *Crime and the Global Political Economy*, edited by Richard Friman.

will be mentioned in the following section. Also, the aim of this research is to be used as a base for further research on the matter.

1.3 Outline of the Thesis

In order to conduct the study, I will first present theories about globalization and the threat that transnational organized crime poses to the nation-state. Then I will proceed to describe the concept of monopoly of violence from the state and how organized crime defies it. For the last part of the theoretical framework the focus will be on the description of the *black spots* theory as well as militarization as a strategy to deal with drug traffic and organized crime.

The second part of the research will be dedicated to describe the methods used. For this research, the method used was the case study relying on qualitative analysis of first and second hand data such as radio interviews with experts, newspaper articles and discourses from the Mexican president, Felipe Calderón and other members of the government. The use of electronic media as sources for conducting this research and the use of qualitative methods will also be mentioned.

The third part will be devoted to give a contextual background of Ciudad Juárez's reality and why is it a key element for Mexican drug traffic. A description of the situation of the drug cartels in the city and the ongoing battle of two of the main drug cartels for the domain of this city will also be included in this chapter.

For the fourth part of the research, analysis of the data gathered concerning the consequences of the militarization of Ciudad Juárez in matters of violence and corruption, economy, policy making and international cooperation will take place as well as the mentioning of some of the alternatives to the militarization that have been presented by several experts.

After reading this paper, the reader will be able to understand which have been the main effects that militarization has had in Ciudad Juárez not only in a local but also on a national and international level.

2. Theoretical Framework

In this chapter, the theoretical framework that will be used to analyze the case of the militarization of Ciudad Juárez will be developed. First, a definition of the term globalization is given and its links to organized crime are presented. This will be followed by a section on the threats that organized crime poses to the state and the relation between them. The concept of monopoly of violence that the state has over the use of force will be introduced next. Lastly, the theory of militarization and a description of the *black spots* theory will be presented in order to understand the current situation in Ciudad Juárez.

2.1 Globalization and Organized Crime

In order to understand the importance of the situation that is now being lived in Ciudad Juárez one must first understand the tight connection of globalization and organized crime.

The term “globalization” is not easy to define and there is not a consensus of what it implies. However, most of the time, when studying globalization the focus is mainly on the economic changes or processes (Franko Aas, 2007) and the interdependence that countries have in this matter. Globalization also emphasizes the feeling of world shrinkage and the sense of a “borderless” world as being the most important consequences of the technological revolution that has been the main fuel for globalization (Dicken, 2007).

Unfortunately, globalization has not just brought progress, time-space compression⁷ and interconnectedness but it has also been accompanied by a clandestine side⁸. There are some undersides to it including transnational organized⁹

⁷ See Albrow in Lechner F.J. and Boli, J. (2004). *The Globalization Reader*.

⁸ See Andreas, P. (2004). Illicit international political economy: the clandestine side of globalization. *Review of International Political Economy*. 11:3, 641-652.

crime and terrorism as the main threats to security and to the nation-state as a whole (Stanislawski, 2004). The criminal groups have learnt how to use to their favor the advantages that globalization offers. Especially the blurring borders which they have used to “avoid the legal reach of a particular country or jurisdictional unit” (Stanislawski, 2004:165). This situation has led in some cases to the militarization of borders¹⁰ in order to prevent this scenario. Economic liberalization has brought great advantages for transnational organized crime since it has made that the costs of transportation decrease, the infrastructure for transportation has been improved and therefore, the distribution networks have grown (Andreas in Berdal and Serrano, 2002:40). These changes have made organized crime to be a highly profitable business.

Still, one must remember that crime and organized crime are not new phenomena or something that have emerged in recent years. However, during the last century a transition can be observed in the fact that these groups which first had a more local and regional base have now expanded becoming transatlantic and even global (Strange, 1996:113). It can be said that organized crime has been affected by globalization processes in the sense that “it has not only gone global but is transforming the international system, upending the rules, creating new players, and reconfiguring power in international politics and economics” (Naím in Friman, 2009:2). This has made that the organized crime becomes a threat to the nation-state.

2.2 The State vs. Organized Crime

The Westphalian state has been continuously challenged by the processes that globalization conveys, and therefore a decline has come that can be observed in:

⁹ According to the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized crime, transnational organized crime is understood as a “structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or offenses in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit (UN 2000, Art. 2a)

¹⁰ See Dunn, T. J. (2001) “Border militarization via drug and immigration enforcement: human rights implications”, *Social Justice*, 28, 7–30.

“...a novel redistribution of power among states, markets, and civil society. National governments are not merely losing autonomy in a globalizing economy, they are this time sharing powers, including political, social, and security roles that lie at the core of national sovereignty – with businesses, with international organizations and with a multitude of ... non-governmental organizations, or NGOs. The steady accumulation of power in the hands of states that began 350 years ago with the Peace of Westphalia is over, at least for a while. Increasingly, resources and threats that matter, whether they are money, information, pollution, popular culture, circulate and shape lives and economies with little regard for political boundaries.” (Mathews in Williams in Hall and Biersteker, 2002:162).

Critical realism argues that the state seems to be retreating¹¹ and it has become evident that the state is not able to manage certain activities that in the past it had the power to control (Williams in Hall and Biersteker, 2002:163). For example, a report from 1993 by the Italian Parliamentary commission on the Mafia states that the relationship between the state and the mafia was conducted as between sovereignties, “neither would attack the other as long as each remained within its own boundaries...” (Commissione, 1003 in Strange, 1996:115).

However, it now seems that the power of the state is being topped by the power the organized crime organizations have and heads of governments are the last ones to realize that they do not have the control they used to have over their societies (Strange, 1996:3). It seems quite evident now that the appearance of other non-state actors is a factor contributing to the diminishing of state power.

This is especially accurate in the case of organized crime. Threat to the state has also come in the form of organized crime that “both threatens states and exploits states” (Williams in Hall and Biersteker, 2002: 164). Organized crime activities defy borders which makes them transnational organizations.¹²

In this matter, the provision of security is one of the areas that have suffered the most. Nils Christie argues that provision of security is now left to the market and

¹¹ See Strange, S. (1996). *The Retreat of the State. The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy*.

¹² Interpol defines organized crime as “any group having a corporate structure whose primary objective is to obtain Money through illegal activities, often surviving on fear corruption” (1993 in Williams, in Hall and Biersteker, 2002:164). Therefore, transnational organized crime should be understood as “criminal businesses that, in one way or another, crosses national borders. (Williams in Hall and Biersteker, 2002: 164)

therefore, crime control is seen an industry (2000 in Franko Aas, 2007:12). It is then when crime organizations come in the scene. Craig Murphy argues that what is really new about the global governance is the emergence and consolidation of 'private' authorities at a global level. These private authorities control states' economy and society and also transnational operations (Murphy, 2000:794). Organized crime groups have become this 'private' authority by providing security for exchange of money, bribing authorities, or in other words, a "plomo o plata" law¹³. This is a threat of violence to whoever does not comply with their terms. "To the extent that this succeeds, the state has failed in one of its major functions, securing the safety and prosperity of its citizens" (Williams in Hall and Biersteker, 2002: 167) which is a normal scenario in countries with weak governments.

2.3 The monopoly of violence and the illegal violence

One of the main weapons that organized crime uses is violence and the threat of violence. This constitutes one of the main threats to the state since it confronts the rules and laws that constitute the core of states (Williams in Hall and Biersteker, 2002:167). Examples of this are the cases of countries like Pakistan, Colombia and Mexico where criminal groups have become stronger and more powerful than the State in some cities or in the whole country.

The centralization and monopolization of the means of force or coercion by the state took centuries to be accomplished (Jachtenfuchs, 2005:37) and now it is one of the main characteristics of a state. According to Max Weber¹⁴ the state is defined as a "political organization whose administrative staff successfully upholds the claim to the monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force in the enforcement of its orders" (Weber, 1922:29 in Wimmer, 2003). The fact that the state has a monopoly

¹³ Literally meaning "lead or silver".

¹⁴ See Jachtenfuchs, M. (2005). "The monopoly of legitimate force: denationalization, or business as usual?" in *European Review*. Vol. 13, Supp. No. 1, 37–52

over the use of force does not mean that it is the only one allowed to use it but means that the use of force or violence by non-state¹⁵ actors is illegal.

To think of a society without violence coming from outside the State is practically impossible. Violence, according to Luhman, has three main characteristics that make it very attractive as a mean towards different ends. Violence or the threat of violence is so effective because: it leaves the victim with no alternatives; it is almost completely independent of contextual factors (day or night, seasons, social contexts, country); and it is easily organized (1975 in Wimmer, 2003) and therefore the appearance of different mafias and drug cartels is inevitable.

According to the World Bank (1997 in Wimmer, 2003), one of the biggest problems of the post-soviet states and also from Latin American countries has been the criminalization of economy. The growth of informal economy, where the State is perceived as weak has also brought a sense of 'lawlessness' characterized by:

new groups of shady "businessmen" which are part of the decaying institutional apparatuses through various forms of corruption, speculation or even crime, linking up to international circuits of illegal goods (especially arms and drug traffickers), the emergence of new forces who demand "protection money" by using violence or the threat of violence; tax evasion is widespread, which weakens the revenue base of the state; police forces and army get no regular pay and try to find some resources on their own; the existing laws are not respected and the judiciary is not regarded as independent and trustworthy etc. (Wimmer, 2003)

Whenever one or more of these features appear in the state, it is considered that the State has been unsuccessful to provide security and protection to its citizens. This could possibly lead to the capturing of the state (Williams in Hall and Biersteker, 2002).

Organized crime groups, such as drug cartels and mafias, even if they challenge the state in several ways, they also tend to imitate it. This is especially noticeable on the way they are organized and the way they exercise authority. They have an established power structure, which regulates its members and activities by the threat of using violence and occasionally using it. In both State and mafia the

¹⁵ The means by which the State applies force is the police and the military.

discouragement of opposition and the use of force are key elements for obtaining, accumulating and keeping power (Strange, 1996:110). Therefore when they engage in a war against each other, the levels of violence reach high levels.

Organized crime and the state are also connected in the way they conduct their activities since they both own and operate economic enterprises. The mafia, as well as the states, has as an important source of income the money they ask from civil society for protection. The difference is that when the government does it is called taxation and when the mafia does it, it is called extortion (Strange, 1996:110). In addition, both are always looking for the maximization of profits.

Williams argues that there are certain weak states that share some of the following characteristics: “there is a low level of state legitimacy; border controls are weak; the institutions and people who represent the state put other goals above the public interest; business is not legally regulated or protected;... and other typical state functions are not carried out with either efficiency or effectiveness” (in Hall and Biersteker, 2002: 170). This creates certain capacity gaps or functional holes (Williams in Hall and Biersteker, 2002) in which the organized crime groups see opportunities to infiltrate the State by filling them or taking advantage of the free room to maneuver. In table 1 some of the capacity gaps and the implications for organized crime are mentioned.

Capacity Gaps	Functional holes	Implications for organized crime
Social control	Ineffective criminal justice system	Organized crime operates with impunity
Social welfare	Lack of provision for citizens	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Migration to illegal economy - Organized crime recruitment - Paternalism substitute for state
Business regulation	Lack of regulatory framework	Organized crime as arbitrator, protector, and debt collector
Oversight and accountability	Lack of control and transparency	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Opportunity for extensive use of corruption - Hijacking of privatization processes
Border control	Weak interdiction capability	Use state for transshipment of various illegal products
Legitimacy	Lack of authority and affiliation	Build on patron-client links and other relationships that are more important than loyalty to the state

Electoral norms and patterns	Campaign financing	Opportunity to influence election outcomes and cut deals with politicians
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Table 1. Capacity gaps, functional holes, and transnational organized crime. (Williams, 2002:171)

Organized crime groups tend to emerge and proliferate where there is weak state authority and where the government has failed to obtain the consent of the citizens (Cressey, 1969 in Strange, 1996:116). When they operate they become a threat to human security since they confront the state institutions by using corruption or violent physical force to obtain what they want. (Stanislowski, 2004:160). The influence that some organized crime groups get to obtain in some cases surpasses the State influence. Therefore, authorities end up accepting that there are “no-go zones” or *black spots* in which the rule of law means very little since the rule of the organized crime has taken over.

2.4 The Militarization of Black Spots

The growth of organized crime has had as consequence the appearance of safe havens or criminal enclaves in which organized crime groups can operate with more freedom than in other places. These places, which appearance can lead to the creation of criminal states, are characterized by the appearance of criminal organizations existing like parasites and blending with the existent state structure (Bunker and Sullivan, 2003:46). Therefore, the identification of these safe havens is not an easy task.

These enclaves have been called with different names but the first one to describe this phenomenon was Xavier Raufer. Raufer spotted grey areas that were “uncontrolled spaces from which the nation-state has disappeared for good and where the real power is exercised by coalitions between guerrillas or militia and drug-traffickers, with their millions of dollars from heroin and cocaine” (1998:1). The concept has evolved and changed and now these areas are also referred to as informational black holes (King, 2001); black holes (Kershaw, 2006; Makarenko,

2004); dark corners (Crane, 2008) and *black spots*¹⁶ (Stanislawski, 2006). The term *black spot*¹⁷ is used to refer to those cities or regions in the world that are sustained by illegal activities and that appear to be outside of effective government control. These areas not only represent an international menace since the insecurity and the problems within them can be exported to other states (Stanislawski, 2008:370) but they also are a threat to the nation-states that host them.

The formation of these grey areas, *black spots* or black holes is the natural consequence of criminal organizations gaining economic and political power over certain territory within a state or over an entire state (Makarenko, 2004:139). *Black spots* are characterized by the following features: 1) lack of effective state dominance, 2) dominance by illicit organizations, 3) transnational illicit activities that may be considered as breeding and exportation of insecurity, 4) existence of informal rules governing the area, 5) existence or high potential of criminal-terrorist nexus, 6) they remain mostly in the shadows of international media attention (Stanislawski, 2006:285) and they can be found in several places of the world.

In *black spots*, corruption, extortion and dissolving social structures (Crane in Stanislawski, 2008) are the elements that regulate society over the rule of law since they are a direct threat to the democratic values (Denny 2002 in Stanislawski, 2006:42) of the State. Corruption is a key element in the creation of *black spots* because it is through corrupt relations that states and organized crime groups become partners and democratic governance and accountability become questioned (Stanislawski, 2006). Furthermore, the problems that come with corruption can be exported to other parts of the world.

¹⁶ All of the previous authors mentioned in Stanislawski (2008). See Stanislawski, B. (2006). *Black Spots: Insecurity from Beyond the Horizon* for an analysis of the Paraguayan city of Ciudad del Este; the federally administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan; and the areas dominated by the Medellín and Cali cartels and FARC guerrillas in Colombia.

¹⁷ Bartosz Stanislawski argues that Black Spots may be compared to the astronomical notion of black holes in the universe since “we know they exist, but they are difficult or impossible to see. Moreover, although they are called holes, which might imply that they are empty, they “suck” in everything that comes their way”. (Stanislawski, 2006:8)

There is growing evidence that non-state actors such as organized crime organizations, drug cartels and terrorist groups, in the absence of a strong state, produce parallel economic and political structures (Makarenko, 2004:139). These conditions are reached in places where the government is not only weak but has also lost its monopoly of violence and the capacity gaps have been filled by organized crime groups. Here, illegal activities are prone to take place since they offer an attractive alternative lifestyle to those who have been marginalized by the state (Stanislawski, 2006:47). This scenario can be observed in jurisdictional and trade junctures since they facilitate movement of products. In these places, illegal cross of borders occurs and national authorities do not cooperate effectively to coordinate actions to stop the illicit activities (Stanislawski, 2006) that take place on both sides of the borders.

In order to combat *black spots* Levitsky suggests that:

The first requirement for dealing with black spots, therefore, is recognition by states of the threat they pose to governance. The second is the will to prevent and combat them, and the third is the capability to carry out a consistent strategy to win them back to state control. The latter will vary from country to country, but in most cases success will depend on international cooperation and assistance. This can be accomplished by both bilateral and multilateral arrangements. (2008:392)

Prevention and combat of *black spots* is of great importance for states. Weak or captured states that take the decision of combating organized crime will need to rely in multilateral efforts to do so (Williams in Hall and Biersteker, 2002:180). Some of the strategies to fight back will consist in establishing treatment programs, education, prevention projects and social, political, and economic reforms (Welch, 1999:58). In addition, there must be a strategy to combat corruption, intelligence gathering and the use of armed forces (Levitsky, 2008) in order to tackle the problem effectively.

When using these strategies “care should be taken that military action not be exercised in a way that alienates the very people that it is attempting to reincorporate into national society” (Levitsky, 2008: 394). Nonetheless, this is not always achieved

since the increase of violence and corruption are natural consequences of the use of armed forces when combating organized crime (Scherlen, 2001). Also, it is important to take into consideration that the war on drugs most likely will benefit the drug cartels and the organized crime. When the military forces appear, the risk factor contributes to the increase of profits for these groups, making drug traffic an even more lucrative activity (Buxton, 2006:101) and harder to stop.

The militarization of drug strategies can refer to two different things as Julia Buxton describes.

It first means the use of military-grade weaponry, combat strategies and military rules of engagement by national police and enforcement agencies. As violence is expected from criminal organizations, enforcement agencies have responded by increasing their own capacity for violence. Militarization also refers to the incorporation of the armed forces into anti-drug operations. (2006:132)

According to the just war theorists¹⁸, military action and warfare in any situation can only be considered just if it protects the values, rights and dignity of human beings (Welch et al., 1999:51). However, the militarization as a response to conflict is not always on the benefit of the population since “the militarized drug control policy undermines individual constitutional rights (e.g., privacy, protections against unreasonable search and seizure) and perpetuates inequality by disproportionately impacting the poor (Welch et. al., 1999:58). The use of the military to combat organized crime has also negative effects on democracy since later on can be used to carry out other tasks such as maintaining order or suppressing protests (Buxton, 2006:135). This can lead to violation of human rights.

Welch et al., use the example of the militarization of the war on drugs in the United States and argue that this action does not fit with the criteria of a just war. Also, they maintain that the war on drugs has been accompanied by effects to social equality. Social equality is damaged since the war on drugs is always mainly fought in low-income neighborhoods (Welch et. al, 1999:62). The war on drugs in these

¹⁸ See Bove and Kaplan, 1995; Cady and Werner, 1991; Walzer, 1977; mentioned in Welch et. al.

neighborhoods creates loss of jobs, increase of income inequality and racial segregation (Fagan in Welch et. al., 1999:62). All these factors leave low-income areas even more vulnerable to the seduction of the organized crime activities.

But the United States is not the only country that has witnessed a militarization of an anti-drug strategy. In Bolivia and Colombia the militarization of the combat against drug traffic had consequences to democracy. In these countries the government used the war on drugs as a campaign against rebel groups (Buxton, 2006:136). In other parts of the world it has had similar consequences. For example, in countries like Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan the militarization of anti-drug strategies led to the violation of civil, political and constitutional rights (Human Rights Watch, 2003 in Buxton, 2006). In this region, the war on drugs was used to delegitimize political opposition and target minorities (Lubin, 2001 in Buxton, 2006:136) which led to a tightening of political control.

When militarization is used, not only democracy and civilians¹⁹ are damaged as a consequence of the “collateral damage” (Welch et. al., 1999) but also the armed forces suffer negative effects. The use of the army on anti-drug operations leaves its members vulnerable to corruption by drug money (Buxton, 2006:136) creating a vicious cycle that the State will not be able to break. It would seem that the “only effective counter to drug penetration is the creation of strong, viable democratic states supported by economic development assistance” (Buxton, 2006:144) however, in countries like Mexico this will not be easy to achieve.

3. Methodology

The previous section provided different concepts and key theories that will help later on with the analysis of the empirical evidence. The following chapter reviews the method that was used in order to gather and analyze the material used to conduct the

¹⁹ See Dunn, T. (2001). *Border Militarization Via Drug And immigration Enforcement: Human Rights Implications* .

research. The first section describes the case study method and it also explains why this was the method selected for this study. This is followed by a section on how the data collection was performed. The third section is about the limitations and considerations that have to be taken into consideration for the research. Lastly, a section on the validity and reliability of the study is presented.

3.1 The Case Study Method

Research in political science has the advantage of being very flexible since it can be conducted using several strategies from qualitative or quantitative methods or even a triangulation of both. For the case of the militarization of Ciudad Juárez I focus mainly on qualitative methods and conduct the research as a case study.

Some authors refer to case studies as being one of many ways to construct a research design (Bryman, 2001; Odell, 2001). Others also consider it to be a research strategy that comprehends both design and methodology to collect data and analyze it especially in “empirical enquiries that investigate a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context” (Platt, 1992; Yin, 2003: 13).

For my research I use the case study as a strategy since it fulfills the three main characteristics listed by Yin (2003) for case studies. First of all, he argues that case study design and methods are focused for research questions that analyze “how” or “why” and therefore, their nature is more descriptive or explanatory rather than exploratory. The second reason for the research to be conducted as a case study is that the case under analysis has been “constructed out of naturally occurring social situations” (Gomm, 2000:3). This means that I, the researcher, have no control over the course of the events that take place in Ciudad Juárez or have no influence on any of the actors that are involved in this particular context. The fact that the focus of the research is “on a contemporary phenomenon within some real-life context” (Yin, 2003) is the third reason that makes it a solid base for taking it as a case study. This is because what will be studied is the ongoing situation that takes place in Ciudad

Juárez because of the militarization as a response to the war on drugs that the President Felipe Calderón started in 2006.

3.2 Data Collection

Some advantages that case study as a strategy offer is the fact that it relies on multiple sources of evidence and that it benefits from the development of theoretical propositions to guide through the collection and analysis of data (Yin, 2003). Given that the case study allows the use of a variety of evidence I decided to develop my research having as data books about the subject of organized crime and Ciudad Juárez. The main sources of information were constituted by online newspapers, articles, blogs, interviews from radio broadcasts, discourses from the President and statistics available on the Internet. It is important to note that since most of the information I will be looking at is available in Spanish I will be doing the translations of all the material for the analysis.

Because of the nature of the research, the fact that it is so recent and changes and events are taking place by the day it is very difficult to find previous research and academic material of the subject. Therefore, most of the evidence collected was by doing research over the Internet. Using different keywords like militarization, Ciudad Juárez, drug cartels, corruption, violence, etc. in search engines such as Google and Bing I could find different online newspaper articles. The main newspapers used were El Universal, Reforma, La Jornada, Milenio²⁰ and El País; as well as political magazines, like Proceso, that talked about what has been happening in Ciudad Juárez.

Another important tool for the research was MVS news and the program of a famous reporter Carmen Aristegui which provided interviews with several experts. Youtube was also an important tool since it gave me access to other kind of evidence

²⁰ These four newspapers are among the most known newspapers in Mexico. Each of them has a different political tendency or orientation. Both El Universal and Milenio are perceived as having a central approach, Reforma is considered to be right-wing oriented and La Jornada has a left-wing tendency.

that is constituted by expert comments, senators, reporters and scholars opinions, interviews and says of the matter that I can use for the analysis as first-hand data. These expert opinions and interviews are usually part of TV or radio programs and the original audio and video is available.

Lastly, another source for evidence were books written as journalistic research of certain cases of corruption and involvement with the drug cartels during the years of Calderon's presidency. Some examples of these books are *La Guerra por Juárez*, *De los Maras a los Zetas: Los secretos del narcotráfico de Colombia a Chicago*, *Narcotráfico: El gran desafío de Calderón*; just to mention a few of them. I decided to use these books since they are some of the most recent ones written about the situation of Ciudad Juárez and they provided interesting empirical evidence.

3.3 Analysis

Yin argues that “the first and most preferred strategy for analyzing data in case studies is to follow the theoretical propositions that led the case study” (2003:111) and this is what I did for my research. All the data collected was used to relate to the theory and illustrate the case of Ciudad Juárez based on the theoretical framework that was discussed before. This analysis strategy is called relying on theoretical propositions.

The main advantage of using this strategy is the fact that when using case study methods it is valid to have stronger empirical grounding (Odell, 2001). When using this strategy triangulation with quantitative methods is not necessary. Therefore, the data collection is a very important part of the process and any kind of documents are allowed in order to gather information.

When using this strategy, the theoretical propositions guide the data collection and they also help to decide which data is relevant and which is not. In this case, once I had read all the previous research and the theoretical foundations, four main issue

areas emerged as the most prominent. Those four issue areas are where the focus of the analysis will be.

After studying the theory I realized that there were four themes that would constitute my main issue areas which are: violence and corruption, economy, policy making and international cooperation. These units emerged after reading the theory and were useful when I started collecting data to realize which information was useful and which was not. This was especially helpful because of the great amount of data found. The data was then analyzed using the theoretical framework and the analysis was written in a linear-analytic structure. This kind of structure consists in writing the theory and methodology before the analysis of the data.

3.4 Limitations and Considerations

Due to the nature of the study, being the army and organized crime two of the main actors of the research, an actual field study was out of reach for me, not only because of security and safety matters but also because of the economic means. For this reason, the research was conducted from Sweden since a flight to the location exceeded my budget and therefore, the study had to rely on the sources I could find online. Also, even though I tried to establish contact with several people in the government in order to get to conduct some interviews I could not get anyone to agree to participate in my research because of the delicate nature of the topic. For these reasons, I decided that the best way to conduct the study was with the material available.

The fact that the research comes from material already available is the most important limitation of the study. However, I believe that people's stories and reports would have been similar if I would have gone to Ciudad Juárez since the situation is still the same. This obstacle was considered less of a hurdle due to the fact that I was able to find interviews with experts in the matter as well as politicians. This I would have probably not been able to do in person even if I were to do a field study. The

only limitation with this is that the information available from those expert interviews or comments was limited to the questions the interviewer asked.

One of the considerations that I needed to keep in mind was that the documents I used for my analysis were not made specifically for the purpose of research and therefore I needed to consider issues like the validity of the source of the evidence I found. This is why I tried to keep the evidence coming from known newspapers, journals and authors and information found in blogs was clearly identified so it would not be taken as coming from a professional source. In the case of newspapers and journals it is important to take into account that they have different political tendencies and therefore their opinions sometimes can be biased. Therefore, whenever a news article or editorial was found that might seem biased I looked to other newspapers for a similar note and compared what was being reported as will be seen in the case of the demonstration in Ciudad Juárez called “Marcha de coraje, dolor y desagravio”.

Since Internet content can change or be modified in a daily basis, when I found an article containing valuable information for analysis I made a hard copy of it in a Word document, including the web address so I could go back to check if the website was still available, which was the case for every page consulted.

3.5 Reliability and Validity

These issues are of great importance for every research since they are linked to the quality of it and therefore, it is important to mention them.

Yin (2003) argues that for case studies one should consider internal and external validity. Internal validity is only an issue for explanatory case studies rather than for the descriptive or exploratory ones (Yin, 2003) and therefore, these concerns are not an issue for my research.

One question that always arises from case studies related to the external validity of the study is if there is ground for generalization with the results obtained

(Gomm, 2000). It is very difficult to generalize when studying so specific cases; however, this study might lead to “generalization to a similar case rather than a generalization to a population of cases” (Gomm, 2000: 23). I believe that if this research can be the ground for further investigations on similar communities or in Ciudad Juárez then it can be said that the objective was fulfilled.

When it comes to reliability it is important to consider that if another researcher were to conduct the same case study using the same research question, then the investigator should get the same findings and get to the same conclusions. I believe that if another researcher would use the same research question, follow the same steps as I did and use the same methods to conduct the research, the findings would be compatible. For this reason, it can be said that the research is reliable.

4. The Case of Ciudad Juárez

In the previous chapter, the methodology used for conducting the study was discussed. Now, in order to move to the analysis of the data found it is necessary to know some facts about Ciudad Juárez in order to fully understand the situation that is being lived there. In this chapter, a short introduction on general facts of Ciudad Juárez will be presented. Some of the aspects that will be pointed out are its location, the famous “femicides” and the maquiladoras in this city. In the second section of this chapter, a description of the two cartels that are currently fighting for controlling Ciudad Juárez will take place.

4.1 Ciudad Juárez – The Gateway

Ciudad Juárez has always had the blessing (or the curse) to be a key factor in the interactions between the United States and Mexico because of the closeness of this city with El Paso, Texas. Located in the northern part of Mexico, Ciudad Juárez is part of the state of Chihuahua, which is the biggest of the thirty-one states in Mexico.

The city has the Río Bravo or Río Grande on the north, separating it from El Paso; to the south the desert of Chihuahua and to the west a mountain range called Sierra de Juárez.

Precisely because of the closeness to the United States, the *maquiladoras*²¹ started to operate in Mexico in the 60's but it was only until the 80's that this kind of industry flourished in the region. "In 1969 there were 13 maquiladoras in Ciudad Juárez, which employed less than 2,000 workers. At the end of 1982, the number of plants in that city had risen to 257 and that of workers to approximately 50,000" (Fernández-Kelly, 1983:214). Most of the employees in the maquiladoras are women. This situation was one of the factors that led to the phenomenon of the hundreds of women homicides, also called "femicides" (Morales and Bejarano, 2009), that stroke the city and that are still unsolved. However, people seemed to have forgotten about because of the current events.

The rise of the maquiladoras in Ciudad Juárez brought a rise in the migrant population, both from other states of Mexico and from Central and South America; looking to get a job there and hoping for a better life. However, the development of infrastructure did not come at the same time as the growth in population and therefore, poverty has always been part of the Ciudad Juárez's reality.

All these factors have colluded so that the organized crime groups or drug cartels flourish in this city. However, we must not think that the narco cartels are something new to Juárez. The illegal activities in Juárez, which is also known as El Paso del Norte, flourished in the 1920's, when the Prohibition Act was in force. During this time Juárez became one of the main suppliers of alcohol to its northern neighbor (Pérez Espino in Páez Varela, 2009) and also became known for activities related to the sex and drug businesses.

²¹ "Sixty percent of the maquiladoras in Ciudad Juárez are of the electric/electronic type, and 30 percent are involved in textile/garment manufacturing. The rest assemble miscellaneous products that include plastic sprays, toys and asbestos yarn" (Fernández-Kelly, 1983:214). The automobile industry is also one of the main employers in Ciudad Juárez.

4.2 The Fight for Ciudad Juárez: The Juárez Cartel and Sinaloa Cartel

To make a complete analysis of the Juárez Cartel and the Sinaloa Cartel one would need a paper on its own due to the history they have and the complex organization that most drug cartels have. However, it is important to know some background of the cartels in order to understand the recent events and the escalation of violence in Ciudad Juárez.



Map 1. *The Reach of Mexico's Drug Cartels*. Modified version of the one available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2009/03/22/us/BORDER.html>. by Farhana Hossain and Xaquín G.V in The New York Times

The Juárez Cartel is one of the main drug cartels in Mexico. It was founded in the late 1980's by Amado Carrillo Fuentes. When Amado died in 1997, his brother Vicente Carrillo Fuentes became the leader of this powerful cartel (McKinley, 2008) that has presence in 17 of the 31 Mexican states (Gómez y Aponte, 2005). Today, it is said that about 90% of the drugs (mainly cocaine) that are imported into the United

States come from Mexico²² (Aguilar and Castañeda, 2009) and although there is no clear numbers on how much of this percentage actually goes through Ciudad Juárez, it is said that this city is one of the main gates. For this reason, it has become one of the most wanted spots for kingpins; which has become clearer over the past years since the violence has increased due to fights between the Sinaloa Cartel and the Juárez Cartel to control this city (see map 1).

However, the Sinaloa Cartel, whose leader is Joaquín “*El Chapo*” Guzmán Loera²³, and the Juárez Cartel, whose kingpin is Vicente Carrillo Fuentes, have not always been enemies. In 2001, an alliance emerged between several kingpins²⁴, including Vicente Carrillo and “*El Chapo*” Guzman which was called La Federación (Gómora, 2008). In 2004 is when the rupture between the two leaders takes place when the brother of Vicente Carrillo Fuentes, Rodolfo Carrillo Fuentes, is murdered, supposedly by “*El Chapo*” who wants to take control over the “*Golden Triangle*” (Ordoñez, 2008) which is formed by the states of Sinaloa, Durango and Chihuahua.

From this moment on, a violent struggle to dominate Ciudad Juárez, between the two cartels and its “*gangs*” started. The Juárez Cartel has an armed wing called La Línea, which recruits young people from gangs to become their killers (Ordoñez, 2008). The main gang associated with them is called Los Aztecas which is in a constant fight against Artistas Asesinos, the gang that supplies young killers to the Sinaloa Cartel.

²² During the 1980's, most of the drug was smuggled through the Caribbean to Florida. However, during the end of the 1990's, the United States managed to close down this route and then the drug routes switched to Central America and the Colombian Cartels had then to ally with the Mexican ones. (Rodríguez, 2009). Therefore, by the end of the 1990's, 66% of the drug smuggled to the United States came through the Caribbean and México, by the year 2000 the percentage had increased to 66%, in 2003 it was 77% and in 2006 is when the number increased to 90%. (Aguilar and Castañeda, 2009: 89)

²³ In 2009, “*El Chapo*” Guzmán was for the first time in the list launched by Forbes of the richest men in the world with the ranking 701 and a fortune of over a billion dollars. (CNN Expansión, 2009)

²⁴ La Federación was an alliance between kingpins of the Sinaloa, Sonora and Juárez Cartels including: Ignacio Coronel Villareal, Arturo Beltrán Leyva, Juan José Esparragoza, Ismael Zamabada, Vicente Carrillo Fuentes and Joaquín Guzmán Loera. La Federación controlled up to 2008 approximately 60% of the drug that crossed the country. (Gómora, 2008). The alliance was broken on 2008 when Arturo Beltrán Leyva secretly made an alliance with the Gulf Cartel and its armed wing called Los Zetas, which are the main enemies of the cartels that formed La Federación.

5. Analysis – The Militarization of Ciudad Juárez

After getting to know the general facts about Ciudad Juárez and the situation with the drug cartels in this city in the last chapter, the analysis of the data collected will proceed. Throughout the following sections, several examples and empirical evidence will be presented. This evidence is related to the four issue areas described in the methodology section which are: violence, corruption and public denounce; economy; policy making and international cooperation. The evidence will illustrate how militarization has affected Ciudad Juárez and this will be appraised by reference to the theoretical framework. It is important to note that it is not my intention to discuss if the militarization has been successful or not since it is too soon to foresee or know the long term effects of it. My intention in this chapter is to critically present the facts that have been reported as taking place in Ciudad Juárez since the militarization strategy was put into action and analyze what consequences they have had for the population in this city.

5.1 Violence, Corruption and Public Denounce

As discussed in the theoretical framework, violence is the main weapon of organized crime and this can be observed in the case of Mexico too. When the State loses its monopoly of violence in certain areas due to organized crime groups, criminality rises. However, when the State decides to fight back with militarization as its strategy, then the first plausible effect will be the raise of violence and corruption. (Scherlen, 2001).

Throughout this chapter, several examples that prove the increase of violence related to the militarization of Ciudad Juárez will be presented. Three examples of the raise of violence will be discussed: 1) a recount on the number of deaths occurred in

the city during President Calderón's government, 2) the use of "narcomantas" as a form of violence used by the drug cartels and 3) the infiltration of the organized crime in the state in the form of corruption of police forces. These three examples are some of the ways in which violence has increased since the process of militarization started. Also, an example on how media reported the gathering of a public demonstration and denounce against militarization will be analyzed since militarization not only affects the state and the criminal organizations but also civil society. Lastly, a review on why the militarization of Ciudad Juárez has helped for it to be named a 'black spot' will be discussed.

5.1.1 A deadly city

The violence coming from drug cartels is not new for the Mexican society and certainly not to Ciudad Juárez's population. However, the killings have become more violent and more frequent during the last four years. Throughout this period the drug cartels have not only fought each other but have also fought against the army because of the decision the President Felipe Calderón made in 2006 of declaring the war to drug cartels. From December 2006 until February 2010, the count of killings was of 18,060 (Castillo, 2010) most of them occurring in Ciudad Juárez. For example in 2008, the total of executions reached 1,653 (Chávez Díaz de León in Pérez Varela, 2009: 117); in 2009, this number increased by 40% reaching 2,650 killings which represent 70% of the killings in the state of Chihuahua (García and Pedraza, 2010) and during the first ten days of 2010, the number of killings reached 100²⁵ (EFE, 2010). For this reason, Ciudad Juárez was named in 2009 the most violent city in the world (El Universal, 2010) and the violence does not seem to stop since reports of people that have been executed keep appearing in the news almost every day.

²⁵ On March 25, 2010, The Economist reported that 555 people have already died in 2010. This number is higher compared to the first quarter of 2009 in which, by approximately the same date, a number of 449 people had been reported dead.

The official introduction of the armed forces to Ciudad Juárez was during March 2008, when the Operativo Conjunto Chihuahua²⁶ was put into action. The operation started with approximately 2,026 members of the armed forces and 425 members of the PFP²⁷ (Secretaría de Gobernación, 2009). In 2009, it was informed that 5,000 more soldiers (Cano, 2009) would be sent to Ciudad Juárez since the violence kept increasing. According to the newspaper Reforma, during 2008, the average of executions related to the war on drugs was approximately 2.5 per day; whereas, in 2009, the number increased to 6.6 executions per day (Brito, 2009). In 2010, the newspaper La Jornada reported that Victor Orozco, from the Human Rights Commission of Chihuahua, argued that the introduction of the army in 2008 did lower the violence but only during the first month; but now the violence has increased for about a thousand percent (Orozco in Alonso, 2010). However, it is important to note that no mention on the percentage of the reduction was made, nor what were the aspects considered to define the term “violence” in order to make such claims.

5.1.2 The narcomantas

In January 2007, a very particular form of violence started in Ciudad Juárez. Banners with intimidating messages from drug cartels called “narcomantas” started appearing in public places such as pedestrian bridges that cross the main avenues of Ciudad Juárez. This phenomenon quickly spread to other parts of the country and it is now said that in total, there have been around 1,150 narcomantas in Mexico (Medellín, 2010). The narcomantas are used generally as a form of intimidation or psychological violence. They usually contain threats against a rival cartel or reporting corruption cases from police, politicians or members of the army (Chávez Díaz de León in Paéz Varela, 2009). This kind of violence works by bringing fear to the community, which suggests that the presence of the army did not have the expected

²⁶ Now, the Operativo Conjunto Chihuahua has changed its name to Operación Coordinada Chihuahua (Coordinated Operation Chihuahua).

²⁷ Which stands for Policía Federal Preventiva, literally meaning Federal Preventive Police.

consequences on combating organized crime and the feeling that the drug cartels rule the city, is still present.

The following are three examples of narcomantas:

- 1) "For all the allies of Chapo, Mayo Zambada, Nacho Coronel, and Changoleón stop protecting them, care about your lives, this war is not against you is for all the people in the government and generals of the Mexican army who protect them."



Para todos los Aliados del Chapo, el Mayo Zambada, Nacho Coronel, Changoleón dejen de protegerlos, aprecien sus vidas, esta guerra no es con ustedes es para todos los funcionarios de gobierno y generales del Ejército Mexicano que los protegen

Image 1. Narcomanta. Source: <http://foros.elsiglodetorreon.com.mx/foro.php?foro=4&post=137705>

- 2) Mr. Felipe Calderón

With all your respect, stop helping us. Venom is combated with venom. Sincerely, Union of Mexican Drug Cartels against the Zetas. When we finish with them, you can continue chasing us. WITHDRAW THE ARMY.



Señor Felipe Calderón

Con todo el respeto que se merece deje de ayudarnos, el veneno se combate con el mismo veneno. Atte. Fusión de Cáteles de México unidos contra los "Z" después de que acabemos continúe siguiéndonos. RETIRE AL EJERCITO

Image 2. Narcomanta. Source: <http://www.blogdelnarco.com/tag/felipe-calderon/>

- 3) “Mr. Governor this is the list of all the stupid people who are killing innocent people. They are kidnappers who call themselves Gente Nueva and their leader is El Chapo from the Sinaloa Cartel. Sincerely, La Línea.”



Señor Gobernador esta es la lista de todos los pendejos que andan asesinando ministeriales. Gente inocente secuestradores se hacen llamar Gente Nueva al mando del Chapo del Cartel de Sinaloa. Atentamente, La Línea.

Image 3. Narcomanta. Source: http://lamafiamexicana.blogspot.com/2010_01_01_archive.html

As Susan Strange (1996) points out, drug cartels as well as the government always use violence or the threat of violence in order to keep their power through strategies such as force, quelling and discouraging opposition. In an interview made by Jorge Zepeda Patterson for the newspaper *El Universal*²⁸, President Felipe Calderón Hinojosa argued that he understands that the different military and police operations have not had as a consequence the reduction of violence. However, what they do is that they make it possible for the State to strengthen, regain or assume completely the power that the State has over its own territory. The drug cartels in Ciudad Juárez and in Mexico use the narcomantas in order to fulfill their objective of gaining power by intimidating their rivals, which are not only other drug cartels but also the state. In addition, disqualifying the army and the police forces by announcing corrupt members makes it clear that the State no longer has the monopoly of violence in this area. As we can see, the State and the organized crime have engaged in a battle for power and prestige which does not seem to have an end.

²⁸ Interview published on February 27, 2009. To see complete interview (in Spanish) see: <http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/nacion/166067.html>

5.1.3 'Lawlessness' and Corruption

This was clearly observed during a particular scenario that took place on February 2009. A narcomanta announced that if the police chief of Ciudad Juárez, Roberto Orduña, did not resign, a person would be killed every 48 hours until he did. This announcement was made on a Wednesday and by Friday, the first two bodies were found and Orduña finally announced to the media he was leaving his office. Nobody knew who was responsible for the killings; neither the army nor the police could find the guilty (Chávez Díaz de León in Páez Varela, 2009: 68). A great amount of members of the police forces have resigned since the war on drugs began (EFE, 2008) because of the fear of being killed. It is fair to say that it is hard to expect that policemen will stay and fight a war that the organized crime seems to be winning and the civil society is being caught in the middle.

In this scenario of 'lawlessness' it is common that police forces and army do not get a regular pay or one that compensates the kind of risks they take; forcing them to find extra resources, which often come from the organized crime (Wimmer, 2003). In Ciudad Juárez, an average policeman earns less than 300 euros each month, which is not enough to support a family. As a result, lots of them accept extra money coming from the drug cartels (Ordaz, 2009). Therefore, the police forces have become corrupt, which makes the combat against organized crime harder to perform.

This is why part of the strategy of the government has been to replace the local police with elements of the army. It is said that in Ciudad Juárez from the 1,700 police members that this city has, more than 300 were fired because they failed to pass several trust exams, including a lie detector exam (Hegewisch, 2010). Also, the mayor Reyes Ferriz (in Cano, 2008) stated that 175 police members were conditioned due to the fact that they had once consumed illicit drugs and 200 more were under supervision. The problem with former members of the police or the army is that if they do not find another job, the risk that they will work for the organized crime is high. For example, it is said that a group of ex army members called "Los Linces"

work as killers for the Juárez cartel (Gómez, 2009). This tells us something about the weakness of the institutions in Ciudad Juárez and how much the organized crime has been able to infiltrate them and to fill in the gaps that the State is not yet capable to fill.

5.1.4 Citizens denounce abuse – Public Denounce

Miguel Ángel Chávez Díaz de León, a known writer and journalist, argues in a book called “La Guerra por Juárez”²⁹ that “the presence of the Armed Forces to combat organized crime in Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua, has increased the complaints for murders and disappearances” (in Paéz Varela, 2009). He also argues that when one of the main military operations started in Ciudad Juárez in March 2008, called Operativo Conjunto Chihuahua, the city authorities were forced to open an office in which people could present their complaints.

A year after its opening, there were already 710 complaints from which 62% were directed against members of the army and the rest towards the federal police (Chávez Díaz de León in Paéz Varela, 2009: 120). From 2009 to 2010 there have been 978 complaints placed in this same office from which 630 were for the army and the rest to the federal police (Villalpando, 2010). However, he does not mention which kind of complaints were the most common. This was presented by a report made by and NGO called Centro ProDH (2008) which mentioned that the most common violations to human rights made by the military in Ciudad Juárez are: physical abuse and torture, attack with firearms, arbitrary detention, robbery, invasion of houses and sexual abuse.

The constant violation of human rights and the undermining of constitutional rights (Welch, 1999) are some of the negative effects that militarization brings to civil society and in Ciudad Juárez there is no exemption to the rule. Human rights violations and violence towards civilians are taking place every day.

²⁹ Literally meaning The War for Juárez.

The violence has reached its peak during the last months. On January 31 a group of sixteen students were murdered at a party in one of the municipalities of Ciudad Juárez called Salvárcar. The killings were attributed to the Aztecas gang, which works for La Línea, the armed wing of the Juárez Cartel. The feeling that these killings awakened in Ciudad Juárez was of despair and of lack of trust towards authority. In an interview for a radio station³⁰, Héctor Aguilar Camín, a renowned novelist and historian argued that people do not believe in the authorities anymore, the rage of the people was not towards the gangs that form part of the drug cartels but against the authorities that do not know how to protect them. “It is almost as if authority in Ciudad Juárez didn’t exist” said Camín during the interview; people have become so angry towards the government and by their reaction it feels like “is almost as if the government was the responsible for the killing”. This was reflected in the demonstration that took place days after in which around 1,300 people walked around the city asking for the removal of 6,000 members of the army arguing that the presence of the army in Ciudad Juárez has done more harm than well (AFP, 2010) in the war against drugs of Felipe Calderón.

One interesting aspect of this demonstration called “Marcha de coraje, dolor y desagravio” is that they also were demanding the resignation of the President Felipe Calderón, the governor of Chihuahua José Reyes Baeza and the mayor of Ciudad Juárez, José Reyes Ferriz. This news was reported by the news agency AFP (Agence France-Presse) and locally, by the newspaper La Jornada, which political affiliation is mostly associated with the left wing, and in blogs³¹ that are also clearly linked to this political affiliation. What is worth pointing out is that in the main newspapers the news was just barely reported. For example, in the newspapers Reforma, El Universal and Milenio, which have right and center political affiliations, the demonstration was mentioned but the demands about the resignation of the before mentioned people was

³⁰ Interview for W Radio on February 4, 2010 available at:
<http://www.wradio.com.mx/oir.aspx?id=948700>

³¹ Examples of these blogs can be found at: *soyizquierda.blogspot.com* and *sosjuarez.blogspot.com*

never mentioned in these newspapers. The scope given to the news was that people were demonstrating to remember the students killed days before and to condemn the violence that is being experienced in the city. Also, El Universal (2010) pointed out that the assistance to this demonstration was organized using social networks like Twitter and through different blogs, including the ones previously mentioned.

5.1.5 The 'Black Spot'

These events are clear examples of how Ciudad Juárez is a *black spot*, since, even if national and international media are constantly reporting the killings and violence that is taking place in Ciudad Juárez, the mass media pays little attention to what happens apart from the news that sell. Therefore, these areas remain in the shadow of media attention (Stanislowski, 2006). Not all the situation is reported and the details of what happens in Ciudad Juárez remain unknown to the public both in a national and in an international level.

What remains unquestionable is that violence and insecurity have not dropped with the presence of the army. In an interview to Milenio newspaper (Ronquillo, 2010), the mayor of Ciudad Juarez, argued that before the arrival of the army, the drug cartels would not kill any civilians. However, since the arrival of the army in 2008, the attacks towards police and civilians in form of kidnappings, extortions, car stealing and robberies have increased.

These activities and the fact that the drug cartels have their own rules that they impose to the city, makes it clear that Ciudad Juárez can be considered a black hole. The government has been trying to deal with it as suggested by Levitsky (2008) with the use of armed forces. Still, the situation has not changed and every day there are reports of people been killed, executed and being victims of extortion in Ciudad Juárez either by the drug cartels or by the army.

The situation is now even more delicate since the violence of the war on drugs has now become an international issue as well. On March 13, three persons linked to

the consulate of the United States were shot to death by members of the Aztecas gang. The reaction of both governments will be discussed in the coming section on international cooperation.

It is safe to argue that Ciudad Juárez fits in the category of *black spots* and therefore, the combat of them has to be done in a strong way; for example using the armed forces (Levitsky, 2008; Stanislawski, 2006). However, one of the other points in Levitsky's argument is that this fight must be combined with intelligence gathering, which has not been as important to the Mexican government as has been making the army present in different cities (Bolio y López, 2008). Therefore, the visible effects to the moment of the militarization of Ciudad Juárez regarding violence and corruption is the evident increase of violence, the constant violation of human rights of the population and no real plans to make the police trustworthy or to prevent corruption both in the military and in the police.

5.2 Economy

The increase of violence has been one of the most noticeable effects of the militarization of Ciudad Juárez but it is not the only one. Effects on the economy of the city have also been noticeable due to the presence of both the military and the organized crime.

Throughout the following section I will present empirical evidence of the economic environment that has been taking place in Ciudad Juárez and how it has been affected by militarization. This will be followed by a section describing the extortion money that organized crime charges to businesses. This has had an effect on the economy since it has caused several companies to close down and has also resulted in an increase of the number of people migrating to the United States due to the insecurity and lack of employment.

5.2.1 The Price of Drugs

In the theoretical framework it was stated that Buxton (2006) argues that risk is a key factor in the price of drugs. Therefore, as a consequence of the militarization of this gateway, the drug prices in the United States have increased since the risk of trafficking the drugs has also increased because of the great number of armed forces that have been deployed in Ciudad Juárez. In the table below, it shows that the price per gram of cocaine in the United States is approximately 139 dollars. In 2006 the price was no more than 70 dollars per gram of cocaine (Lacey, 2009).

Eduardo Medina, Mexico’s former Attorney General, stated that the price per kilogram of cocaine from Colombia to the United States increases 55 times its value, at least (Anderson, 2008). Here is how the prices increase from place to place:

Country / City	Price USD/kg
Colombia	2,500
Panama	4,000
Guatemala	6,000
Mexico City	12,000
Border Mexico / United States	16,000
United States	139,000

Table 2. Increment of price of cocaine from Colombia to the United States. Data from: Anderson, 2008.

The presence of the armed forces in Ciudad Juárez has contributed in the increasing of the prices in the United States, and according to Dennis Blair, the Director of National Intelligence, the annual earnings for drug cartels coming from the drugs sales in the United States are approximately 18,000 to 39,000 million dollars each year (Esquivel, 2010). The drug business has been so successful that is being said that “if the Juárez Cartel could go public, the stocks would be sold in a matter of minutes” (Paéz Varela, 2009: 94). One of the main problems that the militarization has had is that there has been a lack of intelligence operations in order

to 'counterattack' the organized crime and the image of the drug dealers has been stereotyped. For this reason, the only ones that have been affected are the people working in the lower levels of the structure (Páez Varela, 2009). These persons are the ones that actually get caught, but hardly ever the administrators nor the ones at higher levels. According to the Senator René Arce, who forms part of the political party PRD³², there has been a lack of interest to know where the money from the organized crime goes and until the government takes care of that issue, the organized crime will continue to be strong (Arce, 2010) and hard to combat.

The increase of drug prices as a consequence of the militarization of the city has been of great importance to Ciudad Juárez. Even if it has no direct impact on the economy of the city, it is definitely a factor that affects the city given that it becomes such a desirable place for the organized crime to control.

5.2.2 Private taxes

Another aspect that must be considered in the ciudad Juárez scenario is that, it is common that in places where there is a weak government and there is chance that the organized crime flourishes, a certain kind of "private authority" will emerge. These private authorities act parallel to the government structure in providing 'security' for the citizens in exchange of protection money (Murphy, 2000; Wimmer, 2003). This is a common practice in Ciudad Juárez, where in the different municipalities of the city, several businesses are forced to pay a form of extortion, a private tax which is called "derecho de piso"³³ that the different drug cartels charge to businesses in order to "guarantee" their protection and that no action will be taken against them.

Cecilia González Guzmán, the commissioner of Security and Justice for the Food Markets of Mexico and Latin America, revealed to Reforma newspaper that approximately 80% of the businesses in Ciudad Juárez, and other cities where the power of the drug cartels is evident such as Tijuana and Reynosa, have to pay a tax to

³² PRD stands for Partido de la Revolución Democrática, which is one of the main opposition parties.

³³ Which literally means "floor right".

the drug cartels that can reach 5 thousand dollars (Jiménez, 2010). This tax has to be paid whenever the members of the gangs Aztecas or Artistas Asesinos come by and ask for it which can be every week or every month. González also argues that business owners would rather pay this tax than pay the police for protection since police often cannot do anything to protect them from the robberies or fires that the gangs cause if the owner refuses to give in to the extortion and pay the tax.

5.2.3 The Exodus to El Paso

The constant abuses from the armed forces are reported every day by national and local newspapers, but mostly by blogs³⁴. The constant fear generated by the insecurity that comes from the drug cartels and its gangs, has caused what has been referred as an “exodus” from the people from Ciudad Juárez to its neighbor city, El Paso, Texas. The exact number of people that have migrated to the United States from this city is not clear since the data reported in the different newspapers varies.

The news about the exodus appeared in the months of February and March of 2010. For example, the newspaper Milenio reported that around 500,000 people have left Ciudad Juárez in the last two years and from them, there are approximately 100,000 that have migrated to El Paso, Texas (Becerra-Acosta, 2010). In the other hand, in El Universal, they reported only 30,000 cases of people that have migrated to this city in the United States (EFE, 2010). Also, in El Economista, the report of people that have left Juárez is of 200,000 (El Economista, 2010) but the number of people that have gone to El Paso is of 30,000. Due to the fact that there was a great variation in the numbers presented by the newspaper, the question of whether this had anything to do with the image of the government raised. However, the news report in La Jornada, which left wing orientation opposes the one of the current government, reported the same number as El Universal, which has a more centered orientation.

³⁴ See for example: <http://juarezenlasombra.blogspot.com/>

Nonetheless the source of this news is a news agency and not reporters of the newspaper.

It is important to note that *El Economista* and *Milenio*, the newspapers that reported the total of migrants and not only the ones moving to El Paso, were the only ones that had official sources. In the former, the source was Manuel De Santiago, member of the Commission of Housing, Treasury and Border Issues of Chihuahua's Congress. In the latter, the numbers came from the Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI). However, the disparities in the numbers are still present and the way of presenting the news can give a wrong idea to the population. Whether it is to protect certain interests of political parties or to prevent the population from panicking, the reason why the numbers differ so much from newspaper to newspaper is still not clear.

What is clear is that the situation is so delicate that the mayor of Ciudad Juárez, José Reyes Ferriz, prefers to have his residence in El Paso Texas as stated by Oscar Cantú, the director of the newspaper *El Norte de Ciudad Juárez* on a radio interview³⁵ with Carmen Aristegui. This information was also available in different blogs³⁶ and in local newspapers like *El Ágora de Chihuahua*. However, the mayor denied this fact on an interview made by CNN México³⁷.

This fact exemplifies Welch's et. al. (1999) argument stating that low-income people are the ones that become the most affected by the militarization as a drug control strategy since they create job loss and increase income inequality due to the fact that the poor people are the most impacted by this strategy (Welch et al, 1999). These factors have been visible in Ciudad Juárez because people that have enough funds are migrating to El Paso, Monterrey or Guadalajara (Reuters, 2010) but the people that do not have the opportunity to move to another city have to deal with a reality of unemployment and poverty. This is especially true to young men to whom

³⁵ Interview broadcasted on March 17, 2010 on MVS Noticias.

³⁶ Blogs like: resistechihuahua.blogspot.com and unidosporjuarez.com

³⁷ Interview broadcasted on March 15, 2010 on CNN México.

becoming part of the drug cartels seem like one of the only options to earn some money.³⁸

5.2.4 Out of business

The Commerce Chamber (CANACO) estimates that in 2008, an approximate of 11,000 businesses were registered in Ciudad Juárez as reported in the newspaper Milenio. In 2010, only 2,700 are still working, meaning that 75% of the businesses in this city have closed in 2 years (Becerra-Acosta, 2010) leaving hundreds of unemployed people. The closing of businesses is mainly due because of the criminalization and militarization but the global financial crisis has also contributed to this. A local newspaper, El Semanario reported that the number of businesses that have closed is of 10,600; however, the number reported in the BBC (Miglierini, 2010) is only of 5,000. The latter number might say something about uncertainty of statistic numbers in ongoing wars.

Nonetheless, the loss of businesses has represented a loss of approximately 15% of the GDP of the country (Granados, 2010) according to the president of the Confederación Patronal de la República Mexicana (Coparmex), Gerardo Gutiérrez Candiani. The interesting fact here is that José Reyes Ferriz, in an interview given to a Colombian newspaper, El Espectador, argues that what saves Ciudad Juárez from the crisis is the fact that he got help from the Inter-American Development Bank. In addition, companies like Johnson & Johnson and Electrolux opened in Juárez since they had to close their operations in the United States (Maldonado, 2010). However, no other newspaper reported something similar.

Due to the increase of violence in Ciudad Juárez added to the global financial crisis, another one of the sectors that have been affected the most is tourism, according to the mayor of this city. The military tourism of army and marine members crossing the border to Juárez to its bars and restaurants represented an

³⁸ This was said in the blog: mexicoendescomposicion.blogspot.com

important part of the economic activities of the city. However, because of to the increase of violence, the State Department of the United States in 2009 recommended that visits that are not urgent or necessary to Ciudad Juárez should be cancelled (Michel, 2009). The same happened in March 2010, with the Canadian tourists, which represent the second biggest group of tourists to Ciudad Juárez (El Universal) and this will not stop unless the situation changes.

In this section, the main effects of the militarization that have taken place in Ciudad Juárez have been discussed. The most visible effects that this strategy to contain the war on drugs has brought to the economy of Ciudad Juárez and its population have been 1) the increment in the price of drugs derived from the growing risk factor, 2) the continuous extortion from the organized crime to the businesses in the city, 3) a so call “exodus” from this city to its neighbor, El Paso and 4) the closing of several businesses and the decay in tourism. It is hard to determine if these changes have been brought alone by the increasing presence of the army, since the economic crisis has also been present in the period of time that is been studied. What is true is that the tendency for these economic changes has been present since 2007, long before the burst of the economic crisis. These effects have also had consequences for the rethinking of the strategy and policy making in order to contain the war on drugs, which will be discussed in the following chapter.

5.3 Policy Making

In the last sections, the effects of the militarization in a local level have been presented. In this chapter, the militarization of Ciudad Juárez and the effects it has had on a national perspective will be analyzed. The effects that it has had are mainly noticeable in the proposition of new strategies in order to combat organized crime.

The militarization of Ciudad Juárez has caused controversy among its citizens and many wonder whether the presence of the army in this city as the main strategy for combating organized crime has been successful or not. From 2006, the main

strategy to combat drug cartels in Ciudad Juárez was, following Levitsky's logic, (2008) the use of the army forces. However, during February 2010, the proposals for new policies and strategy were conceived; hence, two of them will be mentioned in this chapter³⁹.

To understand what led to the proposal of new policies it is important to know what happened on one special event that took place on January 31, 2010. For this reason, a brief introduction to the events that lead to new policy proposals will be made. This will be followed by the presentation of two examples on how the government has decided to act in addition to the militarization. The first example is the establishment of the strategy "Todos Somos Juárez" which is supposed to have an integral approach since it not only handles security aspects but also social development for the citizens of Ciudad Juárez. This kind of strategy is what is recommended in order to combat organized crime in *black spots*, as it was mentioned in the theoretical framework. The second example is the proposal for transferring the government powers of the state of Chihuahua to Ciudad Juárez. This proposal was later on voted down in congress. The transfer of powers was seen as a measure of having the government close to the people and attending their needs since the militarization of the city has not had concrete results (Dávila, 2010) and its inhabitants wish to be heard.

5.3.1 The Salvárcar killings

As mentioned in the violence chapter, in this date sixteen students, most of them teenagers, were murdered in one of the municipalities of Ciudad Juárez called Salvárcar. When the killings took place, the President Felipe Calderón was in Japan for a state visit. When he got to know about the incident, his first declaration was that the killing was between members of rival gangs (Silva, 2010). After this statement,

³⁹ These two strategies are the most recent and the ones that propose a more noticeable change. Some of the strategies that have also been implemented in Ciudad Juárez are: installing 200 video cameras around the city, a system for denouncing criminals anonymously, rewards for 1 million pesos for denouncing members of drug cartels, etc (Dávila, 2010).

the families of the victims⁴⁰ started demanding first for a public apology by the government for accusing their children of being parts of gangs and second, they were asking for justice (Silva, 2010) to all three levels of the Mexican government.

The significance of this event to the militarization of the city is attributed to the fact that, as mentioned on the violence chapter, the inhabitants of Ciudad Juárez turned their backs not against the gangs that form part of the drug cartels but against the authorities that were not able to protect them. “It is almost as if authority in Ciudad Juárez didn’t exist...is almost as if the government was the responsible for the killing” (Camín, 2010).

For this reason, on February 11, President Calderón arrived to Ciudad Juárez in order to apologize in person to the families. He also talked about a “comprehensive strategy” in order to combat organized crime in this city (El Universal, 2010) which is called “Todos somos Juárez, Reconstruyamos la Ciudad”⁴¹

5.3.2 Todos Somos Juárez

According to Welch, “some of the strategies to fight back organized crime will consist in establishing treatment programs, education, prevention and social, political, and economic reform development projects” (1999:58). Until February 2010, the strategy for combating organized crime in Ciudad Juárez consisted merely in the use of the armed forces. However, with the strategy “Todos Somos Juárez, Reconstruyamos la Ciudad” a more integral approach, as the one suggested by Welch, is taken.

This strategy is based on four main pillars in which the three levels of the government will be focusing on: institutional, operational, social and citizen participation (El Economista, 2010). According to the official website of the strategy, this consists in 160 objectives that are divided in six different areas which are:

⁴⁰ The families of the victims had as one of their main representatives a woman called Luz Dávila, who was the mother of two of the boys killed in Salvárcar and were supported by several NGOs such as Ririki Intervención Social and S.O.S. México

⁴¹ This means “Everyone is Juárez, Let’s reconstruct the city”.

security, economy, employment, health, education and social development. The strategy presented is planned to have visible results after 100 days of its implementation on March 11, 2010. The official website also states that the changes are also planned to be permanent.

However, President Calderón stated that the strategy does not consist in withdrawing the army from the streets of Juárez. The President argued that: “If I had the certainty that by withdrawing the army the violence problems in Juárez will be over please be certain that I would do it. However my fear is that the contrary will happen since the criminal logic implies that there should be an authority that confronts and combats them” (Calderón, 2010). This follows the logic of the concept of the State’s monopoly of violence and how it uses it to legitimate the use of “physical force in the enforcement of its orders” (Weber, 1922:29 in Wimmer, 2003) when combating the organized crime.

In the following part I will appraise four areas that the strategy “Todos Somos Juárez” contains. The sections of security, economy, employment and social development are the ones that will be analyzed⁴².

5.3.2.1 Security

When organized crime becomes as powerful as in Ciudad Juárez, one of the main problems becomes the provision of security. In *black spots* “crime control has become an industry, where most states to a varying extent leave the provision of security to market forces” (Christie, 2000 in Franko Aas, 2007: 12). This is precisely why one of the main points in this new strategy is to focus on the betterment of security provision by the state. This strategy attempts to combat the “private authorities” that are linked to the organized crime and that are known for charging ‘derecho de piso’ as mentioned earlier.

⁴² The sections of health and education will not be analyzed deeper since they are not the central focus of this study.

In the security section of the strategy of “Todos Somos Juárez”, the main capacity holes that are aimed to be improved are the social control and border control. For this purpose, 16 of the 160 objectives of the strategy are devoted to security including the improvement of the emergency call centers, more control in the security checks at the border and making the investigation and penal processes of the state more efficient.

5.3.2.2 Economy and Employment

For these areas, the capacity gaps that are aimed to be improved are business regulation and social welfare. It is an attempt to prevent the creation of conditions that will favor the creation of alternative economic and political structures that are present when a strong state is absent (Makarenko, 2004) leaving it vulnerable to the presence of organized crime.

In this area, the main objectives to be fulfilled are related to the supply of loans and credit for different companies, training, employment fairs and support for entrepreneurs. With these measures, the government attempts to stop certain effects that the militarization of the war on drugs. What they aim to accomplish is the decrease of people migrating to illegal economy, stop the increasing income inequality and growing racial segregation (Fagan in Welch et. al., 1999). With these measures, the combat to organized crime is expected be more effective.

5.3.2.3 Social development

This part was developed in order to collaborate with different NGOs and members of civil society since its main objectives are to combat poverty, to solve housing problems, to recover public spaces and increase the quality of life in general of the citizens of Ciudad Juárez. With these objectives, what is being addressed is the capacity gap of social welfare and what the government is trying to do is to combat

violence by strengthening the community tissue (Guerra, 2010) since it is one of the most affected by the presence of the military forces in the city.

However, the issue of the protection to constitutional and human rights is not tackled properly since none of the 19 objectives in the social development area talk about this issue that is of great concern to Juárez's citizens (Ronquillo, 2010). As Welch et. al. argue "the militarized drug control policy undermines individual constitutional rights (e.g., privacy, protections against unreasonable search and seizure) (1999:58). This has made that now less than 20% of the population of Juárez support the presence of the army in the city (Cipriana, 2010) because of the violations that occur on a daily basis in Ciudad Juárez, as reported in several newspapers.

5.3.3 The transfer of powers

Another policy attempt that is worth mentioning is the suggestion of transferring the government powers from the capital of Chihuahua to Ciudad Juárez. According to Buxton, the "only effective counter to drug penetration is the creation of strong, viable democratic states" (2006:144). The construction of a strong, democratic state was what this policy proposal was trying to accomplish.⁴³

The governor, who is part of the political party PRI, stated that "this is something necessary but temporal... it is for the citizens of Juárez, so they can express their comments and doubts and so that the social development strategies can be applied better" (Baeza in Notimex, 2010). However, the Congress declined this proposal since it did not obtain two thirds of votes in favor. The main opponents of the policy proposal were members of the political parties PAN and PRD.⁴⁴

In this section, two policies that have been in the government's agenda due to the complications that the presence of the army forces has had in this city were presented. "Todos Somos Juárez" and the proposal of the transfer of powers have

⁴³ The policy of transfer of powers was made by the governor of the state of Chihuahua, José Reyes Baeza.

⁴⁴ The political party Partido Acción Nacional (PAN) is considered to have a center-right political orientation whereas the Partido de la Revolución Democrática (PRD) is considered to be left-wing.

been the latest attempts of complementing the militarization of the war on drugs that has been taking place in Ciudad Juárez. However, there are still unsolved issues like the protection of the human rights while the armed forces are still in the city. In addition, the results that the new strategy will bring cannot be analyzed yet since the implementation is not yet over and it is still too soon to know what the results in the long term will be. What can be expected is that people will start feeling safer in the city, but until the police corruption is tackled and the army continues doing what the police are supposed to do, no real change can be expected.

5.4 International Cooperation – The Merida Initiative

The recent events that Ciudad Juárez has experienced have not only had an impact on the national level, but also in the international level. This has been especially noticeable in the change of scope that the already existing Merida Initiative is attempting to have. The changes that have been observed in this initiative, which is a result of the cooperation between the U.S. and Mexico, are what will be discussed in this section.

The mayor of Ciudad Juárez, José Reyes Ferriz argues that neither Washington D.C. nor Mexico City understand the border since one is 5,000 miles and the other is 2,000 miles away from it (Maldonado, 2010). However, what has been happening in this city has become a priority for both governments.

In this last chapter, the Merida Initiative, one of the main agreements of cooperation in matter of drug combat between the United States and Mexico will be analyzed. The first part demystifies the argument that has been presented by some analysts of Mexico being a failed State⁴⁵. The militarization of Ciudad Juárez and the presence of the drug cartels in the country have led to some discussion about this topic and to understand the degree of cooperation between the two countries it is vital

⁴⁵ See Friedman, 2009.

to be aware of Mexico's situation and what the reasons for the United States to cooperate are. This is followed by an introduction to the Merida Initiative, some general remarks and its central objectives are presented. The last part presents and discusses the recent events that took place in Ciudad Juárez which gave path to a revision of the initiative. The revision of the initiative led to a so called "change of scope" in the initiative. This new scope is supposed to involve a more social approach to it and not only the supply of technology for the combat of the drug cartels.

5.4.1 Is Mexico a failed State?

The organized crime and its activities in Ciudad Juárez have not gone unnoticed to the Mexican and American government or to the international eye. First were the feminicides that caught the attention of the world and then, the killings and the presence of the army in this city. This situation has raised international awareness and especially the United States is watching closely. Ciudad Juárez is close to its border and it is considered one of the main entrances to the neighbor country. Therefore, what happens there could mean a flooding of refugees and migrants to the United States (Luhnow and Cordoba, 2009); meaning that this could represent a matter of national security concern for them.

The presence of the army in this city and the constant killings related to the organized crime have caused that the United States media portrays Ciudad Juárez as being similar to Baghdad, Iraq (Negron, 2009). Also, Mexico has been paralleled with Pakistan to being in the verge of turning into a failed state (Luhnow and Córdoba, 2009) or as already being one, as suggested by George Friedman in STRATFOR (2009). However, it is true that instability and private authorities connected to the organized crime are present in certain cities in Mexico, such as Ciudad Juárez. Nonetheless, Mexico is not a failed state for two reasons.

The first reason is that the Mexican government still has control over its territory, as pointed out by the Mexican Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Patricia

Espinosa (Ordaz, 2009). Susan Strange (1996) points out that one of the main challenges for the State is to recognize that its control over its territory is not what it used to be and that organized crime is getting stronger. However, this does not mean that a State has become a failed State, but it means that it has been weakened, due to capacity gaps (Williams, 2002) in which the organized crime has found space to maneuver.

The second reason, which was pointed out by the American ambassador in Mexico, Carlos Pascual, is that Mexico is still a State in which elections take place and the results are respected and accepted by the President, even when the opposition wins (Bello, 2009). The cooperation between the two countries has been framed in the fact that Mexico is not a failed state. This is why both governments have been working in order to establish a bilateral cooperation in the so called 'war on drugs'. However, this does not mean that Mexico is not a weak state. Analysts argue that Mexico is on the list of weak states mainly because: it does not count with the monopoly of violence over its territory, and as a consequence, it does not warranty the security of its citizens (Kaplan in Gómora, 2009). Eizenstat et. al. argue that for the United States, "the gravest danger to the nation lies in the weakness of other countries... weak and failed states and the chaos they nurture will inevitably harm U.S. security" (2005:134-135). This is why the United States sees as a priority the cooperation with Mexico to fight the organized crime and drug cartels since this time, the danger is right next door to them.

In addition, as Levitsky (2008) argues, two of the key elements in order to combat *black spots* are: the will of the State to combat them and the capability to carry out a strategy that will bring the black spot back to State control; which most of the times can only be accomplished through bilateral or multilateral agreements. In the case of Mexico, the will to combat them was translated in the use of the army and the second one, the logic step was to cooperate with the northern neighbor, the United States.

5.4.2 The Merida Initiative

The most notable effort for cooperation against the organized crime between the two countries was made in 2007, when Felipe Calderón and George W. Bush agreed in the implementation of a plan to cope with the drug cartels called the Merida Initiative. The United States Embassy in Mexico defines the Merida Initiative as “an historic program of cooperation that acknowledges the shared responsibilities of the United States and Mexico to counter the drug-fueled violence that has threatened citizens on both sides of the border” (2009). The Merida Initiative was planned to give Mexico 1.4 billion dollars over 3 years, from 2007 to 2009.

In an article published by The Heritage Foundation, Mexican President Felipe Calderón, was described as “serious, purposeful, and businesslike – who accepts full responsibility for problems in his country without resorting to demagogic diatribes against the United States” (Walser and Roberts, 2007:2). By this time, it was clear that the government from the United States under the Bush’s administration supported the Mexican President and the decision to combat the organized crime, since it is a priority for the United States government as well. Their logic was, as presented by this article, that a “win for Calderón is a win for the U.S. and a setback for Chávez” (Walser and Roberts, 2007:3). With this in mind, the Merida Initiative supported the decision of President Calderón to use the army as a strategy to cope with the war on drugs and most of the budget was used to provide the Mexican army with equipment such as helicopters and airplanes (Esquivel, 2010) in order to do it.

As it was mentioned earlier in the theoretical framework, the cooperation between states using the armed forces is just one way of combating the organized crime. The strategy should be combined with the establishment of treatment programs, education, prevention and social, political, and economic development projects (Welch, 1999:58) as well as programs for combating corruption and

intelligence gathering (Levitsky, 2008). However, in the case of the cooperation between Mexico and the United States the strategy has failed to orchestrate a combination of measures other than the use of the army and the police forces. This is explained by Fernández and Ronquillo (2006) argument that during Bush's administration, the scope for the combat to drug traffic was the same used for combating terrorism (2006:24). The Merida Initiative that started under this administration was mainly seen as a strategy that had a security standpoint. This can be seen in the official document of the Mexican Center of Documentation, Information and Analysis which states that the main objectives of the Merida Initiative are:

- Improvement of the security agency of our partners for the surveillance of their territory
- Support the security agencies through equipment.
- Improvement of computerized technology to strengthen the coordination of security and information agencies between Mexico and the United States.
- Produce a safer and more protected hemisphere, where criminal organizations will not threaten the government or the regional security
- To block the entrance and spread of illicit drugs and transnational threats in the whole region and towards the United States

Table 3. Main objectives of the Merida Initiative. Information taken from Reyes, 2008. My translation.

The Secretariat of Foreign Affairs presented every semester a document stating the progress of the plan, which consisted mainly in the purchase of equipment and training for the military and police forces. When the new administration began, the program was kept with the same scope and in 2009 President Obama signed a supplemental budget which meant that the Merida Initiative funding for Mexico had

reached the \$1.12 billion⁴⁶ (Embassy of the United States in Mexico, 2009). However, for the fiscal year 2010, the budget destined to Mexico in the frame of the Merida Initiative was of 403 million dollars, and for 2011, the budget will be reduced 30%, meaning that 310 million dollars (AFP, 2010) will be destined to the combat of organized crime.

5.4.3 2010 – Change of scope?

The incident that took place on March 13, 2010 in Ciudad Juárez was what detonated the feeling that a change in the paradigm or the scope that both governments had been having towards the war on drugs was needed. On this day, three persons linked to the American consulate⁴⁷ were shot to death by members of La Línea⁴⁸, the armed branch of the Juárez cartel (Dávila, 2010). President Obama declared that this situation was “outrageous” (Aristegui in CNN, 2010) and after that, different statements from members of the Obama’s administration and the Mexican government started to appear in the media. As a result, a meeting between Mexican and American authorities was scheduled.

The political magazine *Proceso* reported that after the homicides Janette Napolitano, the current Secretary of Homeland Security of the United States, declared in an interview on March 17 that she recognized that the president Calderón has been deeply involved in the war on drugs and in the combat of the drug cartels. However the use of the army in Ciudad Juárez “has not been of much help” (Napolitano in Esquivel, 2010:7). Of course, it was expected that this statement would not be

⁴⁶ The newspaper *El Economista* published a note on April 22, 2010 stating that Mexico has only received approximately 10% of the budget that has been approved under the Merida Initiative framework. (Notimex, 2010)

⁴⁷ The persons murdered were: Jorge Salcido Cenicero, husband of an employee of the American consulate; Lesley Enríquez and her husband Arthur Haycock Redelfs, the sheriff of El Paso’s jail in Ciudad Juárez.

⁴⁸ The gang called Barrio Azteca, which is the one in charge of providing new members to La Línea and who supposedly was responsible of the killings of the people related to the American consulate, are thought to be operating in El Paso, according to a documentary made by The History Channel in 2009 (Aristegui in MVS Noticias, 2010).

welcomed by the Mexican authorities and later on, the Interior Secretary of Mexico, Fernando Gómez Mont, argued in a press conference that the role of the army has been extremely important and it is still needed (Mejía, 2010). This argument was backed up by the American ambassador in Mexico, Carlos Pascual (Otero, 2010) in order to keep balanced the environment for negotiations. However, he pointed out that the use of army is not enough to fight against narcotraffic and that the strategy needed to be rethought (Olson, 2010).

Much was said about the reaction of the government, some people even felt that the murder of the three persons linked to the American consulate was given more importance than all the killings that have taken place in Ciudad Juárez for the last 3 years (Espino in Aristegui in MVS Noticias, 2010), as Manuel Espino argued. Some others were concerned about the violation of the sovereignty of the Mexican state because of the presence of several DEA and FBI agents (Nájar, 2010). What is true is that after this event, it was perceived that the Merida Initiative needed a change and the perception was that it was until this point that the United States became more involved in the Mexican war on drugs.

On March 23, 2010, a meeting involving both the Mexican and the United States government took place. The head of the delegation of United States was the Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton and the head of the Mexican delegation was the Mexican Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Patricia Espinosa. In this meeting it was decided that the Merida Initiative needed to be extended and work not only as a security strategy in the sense of involving only supply of equipment and training of the police and the military, but should also have a more social focus (Saldierna et. al., 2010) in order to tackle the problem in a better way. Also, as reported by the newspaper Milenio, the Merida Initiative was now intended to be a regional plan of cooperation since the problem of demand and production is an issue that affects the whole region and the first countries that will receive help within the framework of the Merida Initiative will be Haiti and Dominican Republic (Notimex, 2010).

After the reunion, a document was presented that contained the new agreements that had been made. In this document, there were four main points that are now the objectives of the new stage of the Merida Initiative:

- 1) Decrease the power and operations of the organized crime by focusing on the capture of the leaders and fighting against drug production and traffic as well as money laundry.
- 2) Improve and reinforce the capacity of the public security institutions as well as professionalize the army and the police.
- 3) Development of a safe border for the XXI century. This means to facilitate the legal commerce and the movement of people while restricting the illicit flow of drugs, people, arms and money.
- 4) Construction of strong and cohesive communities in both countries. This would be achieved by creating and implementing job programs, involving young people with their communities and generating trust in public institutions.

Table 4. Main objectives for the new stage of the Merida Initiative. Information taken from. Villamil, 2010; Otero and Ramos, 2010. My translation.

The document, as it can be seen, has still a security focus, since only one out of four points has a social perspective and addresses the problem with a bottom – up approach, involving the society as part of the solution. However no clear information on how this would be accomplished was found.

Joaquin Villalobos argues that this is the way to proceed when cities like Ciudad Juárez face the problems of organized crime. In this case, what the State needs to do first is to regain the control it has lost to the drug cartels, to break with the power they have to intimidate (Villalobos, 2010). He uses the case of Colombia and argues that in this country the war against the drug cartels was won 10 years ago, but is only until now that the social approach to the problem has started giving results (Villalobos, 2010) and there is no indicator that shows that this would be different in

the case of Mexico. Therefore, the security scope is still a priority in the fight against the drug cartels.

According to Senator Mario López Valdés from Sinaloa, who is part of the political party PRI⁴⁹ one of the reasons why organized crime is getting more powerful is because of the weapons they can find in the United States (López Valdés, 2010) and bring illegally to Mexico. Also, as the Secretary of State Hillary Clinton points out, this is due to the fact that there is not enough emphasis on the combat on consumption of illicit drugs (in Otero and Ramos, 2010) and this contributes greatly to the problem.

The World Health Organization estimates that approximately 72 million people between 15 and 65 years old in the United States have consumed some kind of illicit drug on an occasional basis, which makes this country the biggest drug consumer (Aguilar and Castañeda, 2009:90). This is why, President Obama, in addition to the Merida Initiative, has planned for 2011 to increase by 13% the budget assigned to prevention of drug abuse and 4% to its treatment (Villamil, 2010). The fact that Mexico is one of the main transit countries for illicit drugs and that it is next to the biggest market for them, has brought to the political agenda of Mexico the controversy of legalization of drugs. However, this is a very broad subject and due to space limitations will not be discussed in this paper.

The results of this new stage of the Merida Initiative cannot be predicted yet, and even despite the fact that now the objectives consider a more social scope, there is still a lot left to do in order to be able to consider that this cooperation strategy can be successful. It is undeniable that the cooperation between the United States and Mexico is a fundamental factor in the combat against drug traffic and the drug cartels but much more has to be done. Also, a real new scope is still needed, one where

⁴⁹ Which literally means Partido Revolucionario Institucional. This party was in power for 70 years until the year 2000 when Vicente Fox from the Partido Acción Nacional (PAN) won the elections. Felipe Calderón is part of this political party.

development and human rights protection is also part of the scope. The supply of equipment will only keep the violence increasing.

6. Conclusions

This research project intended to analyze some of the effects that militarization, a state response to fight organized crime, has had in Ciudad Juárez. Ciudad Juárez is now in the middle of a battle between drug cartels and since 2006 and the army has become a key player in this battle.

The research was performed as a case study and analyzed prominent political events unfolding in Ciudad Juárez in order to find the consequences of militarization. In order to do so, the research revised the existing literature on the subject. The revision showed that although organized crime and state responses to combat it in Mexico have been studied, there is a gap of deeper research directed to specific cities which have been the most affected by the drug cartels. Also, militarization of Ciudad Juárez is a relatively recent event and therefore, most of the literature is written with a journalistic approach and lacks a theoretical ground. These are the gaps that this research intends to fill by having a deeper understanding of how the militarization has affected a specific city, in this case Ciudad Juárez and give a theoretical ground to it.

For this reason, the research was then conducted by the construction of a theoretical framework that would give the reader the understanding of how the organized crime has benefited from the advantages that globalization offers. The blurring of territorial borders, the economic liberalization and the technological advances are some of the factors that organized crime has used to its advantage. The theoretical framework also built on how the state and organized crime interact and oppose. In this case, drug cartels especially challenge the state by threatening one of its core elements which is the monopoly of violence. The use of force, which used to belong exclusively to the state, is now used also by drug cartels to fight adversaries

and the state. Militarization as a way of combating organized crime was also explored in the theoretical chapter.

This case study relied on the theoretical propositions discussed above. The propositions were the ones guiding the data collection by showing which data was relevant to the analysis and which was not. The theory pointed out four main issue areas where the effects of militarization could be noticed the most: 1) violence, corruption and public denounce 2) economy 3) policy making and 4) international cooperation.

The analysis showed that the increase of violence and corruption are some of the main effects that militarization has had in Ciudad Juárez. This is the normal condition when a war on drugs occurs (Scherlen, 2001). The increasing number of deaths in this city, the constant use of narcomantas, the corruption of the police forces, the ongoing human rights violations are some of the effects that militarization has brought to Ciudad Juárez. Even if strategy has had a few victories but people are getting desperate when they see that violence increases and their human rights are being abused by the same forces that are supposed to be protecting them.

Ciudad Juárez is a very attractive space for the organized crime to control. The presence of the military in the city creates a risk factor (Buxton, 2006) that contributes to the increase of price of drugs. This is why two of the main drug cartels are fighting for the control of this city. After analysing the evidence, it was found that the increase of extortion, growing migration to the United States and the closing of businesses are part of the reality that occurs in Ciudad Juárez since the army arrived in 2006.

The analysis showed that civil society has not welcomed the presence of the military precisely because of the constant violations towards human rights. This has affected the way the state is planning further strategies and policies in order to tackle the problem of organized crime. An example of this is the new strategy “Todos somos Juárez” which pretends to have a more integral view on the conflict and not rely uniquely on the use of the army. Nonetheless, it was found that the focus is still

on security and the creation of programs that target poverty, education, social development (Welch et. al., 1999) and the protection of human rights are still missing.

On an international level, the militarization of Ciudad Juárez has also affected the cooperation between the United States and Mexico. For combating *black spots* international cooperation is a key factor (Levitsky, 2008). The Merida Initiative, which is the main cooperation effort between the two countries, was affected by the violence that has hit Ciudad Juárez. As a consequence, new objectives for the Merida Initiative that intended to include a more social approach were planned. However, the analysis showed that the new objectives of the Merida Initiative are still based on a security perspective. It is important to realize that as long as there is demand for illegal drugs on the other side of the border drug cartels and organized crime will continue to exist and the flux of arms, people and violence related to them will continue. Therefore, a greater level of engagement between the countries is needed.

Militarization used to combat organized crime is a perilous strategy and the outcomes can be devastating if it is not combined with intelligence gathering. Programs combating poverty and social development are also needed in order to deal with the roots of the problem. Combating organized crime or in this case drug cartels, with the use of armed forces can cause that both groups engage in a war in which civil society will be the most affected.

It is important to understand that Ciudad Juárez is not the only *black spot* in Mexico. Other states such as Michoacán, Sinaloa and Guerrero are also home to major drug cartels and the rule of the organized crime is overwhelming the state. The study of the consequences that militarization has brought to Ciudad Juárez will be of great importance in order to understand what is happening in other parts of the country. In addition, the study of how militarization has affected Ciudad Juárez is aimed to serve as the basis for studying the alternatives for dealing with organized crime in this city. It is argued that Ciudad Juárez can be the reflection of what might happen in the rest of the country (Paéz Varela, 2009). In order to avoid this situation,

it is important to understand how the presence of the armed forces has affected the city in order to prevent the same situation in other parts of the country as well as in other parts of the world.

7. Executive Summary

The increasing presence of organized crime in Mexico is a phenomenon that Mexico has had to deal with for years. Throughout the years, organized crime has been fought in several ways and in 2006, when President Felipe Calderón got to power; the chosen strategy was to combat it with the military. From 2006 until the present day, President Calderón has used over 50,000 soldiers and marines in order to combat drug cartels.

The aim of the research is to answer the question: *How has militarization, as a strategy to contain the war on drugs, affected Ciudad Juárez?* The analysis focused on four main areas that are: violence, corruption and public denounce; economy; policy making and international cooperation. These four issue areas were chosen since they were the most prevalent in the theoretical framework.

Theoretical Framework

The research was conducted first, by the creation of a theoretical framework in order to understand how organized crime groups oppose to the state. It is said that the state is retreating (Strange, 1996) and this is the case in matter of provision of security. The emergence of global private authorities (Murphy, 2000) that tax people for protection has become a common problem in countries where organized crime operates.

Another area in which the state is being challenged is in the use of force. One of the main characteristics of a state is that it possesses a monopoly of violence over its population (Williams in Hall and Biersteker, 2002). The State having a monopoly over the use of force does not mean that it is the only one allowed to use it but means that the use of force or violence by non-State actors is illegal.

The presence of organized crime groups, drug cartels and terrorist groups in weak states has encouraged the formation of areas where the rule of law is being

shaded by the rule of organized crime groups. These areas are called *black spots* (Stanislawski, 2006) and they are characterized by the presence of corruption, extortion and dissolving social structures (Crane in Staninslawski, 2008). Establishing treatment programs, education, prevention projects and social, political, and economic reforms (Welch, 1999) are some of the strategies suggested to combat *black spots*. In addition, there must be a strategy to combat corruption through intelligence gathering and not only use armed forces (Levitsky, 2008) in order to successfully combat organized crime. International cooperation will also be a key factor in the combat of these kinds of elements.

When incorporating the armed forces into anti-drug operations, care should be taken to protect civil society. This strategy often undermines constitutional and human rights (Welch, 1999) and affects democracy by using the military to enforce law (Buxton, 1996). This also leaves the armed forces vulnerable to corruption by organized crime (Buxton, 1996) which contributes to the weakening of the state.

Methodology

This research was conducted as a case study. According to Robert Yin (2003) this kind of method is the most convenient for “how” questions, for contemporary phenomenon and for cases studying social situations where the researcher has no control over the events.

The analysis was performed based on the theoretical propositions previously mentioned. These propositions were the ones guiding the data collection by facilitating the process of deciding which material was relevant to the case and which was not. Most of the evidence collected was by doing research over the Internet. The main sources of information were constituted by online newspapers, articles, blogs, and interviews from radio broadcasts, among others.

Although some considerations need to be kept in mind because of the nature of the evidence, the research is considered reliable and valid. If another researcher

would use the same research question and follow the same steps as I did and use the same methods to conduct the research, the findings would be compatible and therefore, it can be said that the research is reliable.

Analysis

For the analysis, the four areas that were considered were violence, corruption and public denounce; economy; policy making and international cooperation.

The most visible effect that militarization has had is the increase of violence. This is a common scenario when drug cartels are combated with the armed forces (Scherlen, 2001). The number of deaths, which is approximately 18,060, is what has been noticed the most. The use of over 5,000 members of the army in the state of Chihuahua has not stopped the great amount of the deaths and executions. Related to this are the use of banners with intimidating messages by the drug cartels called *narcomantas*. This phenomenon first appeared in 2007, shortly after President Calderon announced the use of the military to combat the drug cartels. These circumstances in combination with corruption of police and the constant violation of human rights are examples of why Ciudad Juárez can be considered a black spot.

In terms of economy, the militarization of Ciudad Juárez has made it even more important for the drug cartels to control it. The risk factor has contributed to the increase of drugs prices and therefore, militarization instead of preventing the appearance of drug cartels is making exactly the opposite. The emergence of private authorities that offer protection in exchange of money (Murphy, 2000; Wimmer 2003) is a visible consequence of the militarization. The fear of violence combined with the constant extortion from drug cartels has created a hostile environment for legal businesses. As a consequence, businesses are closing and people that have the possibility are migrating to other parts of the country or to El Paso, Texas.

Furthermore, the increase of violence in Ciudad Juárez, consequence of the militarization, has also had effects on the national policy making of the country.

According to Welch, “some of the strategies to fight back organized crime will consist in establishing treatment programs, education, prevention and social, political, and economic reform development projects” (1999:58). However, in the case of Ciudad Juárez this did not apply and militarization was the only strategy used. The killings of sixteen young students in Ciudad Juárez made civil society wake up and demand for solutions that did not involve the army and therefore, the strategy Todos Somos Juárez was implemented. This strategy looks to have a more social scope to the problem. However, it is visible that the emphasis on security, the military and the police still prevails.

Lastly, the violence in Ciudad Juárez due to the militarization has also had effects internationally. International cooperation is key to the combat of *black spots* (Levitsky, 2008) and the Merida Initiative is the cooperation agreement that exists between the United States and Mexico in order to combat organized crime. This strategy, which has mainly focused on the provision of equipment to Mexico, changed its objectives after the killings of people related to the United States consulate. After an emergency reunion between the Mexican and American delegations, the decision of having a more social scope in the initiative was taken. However, the analysis showed that the objectives are still based on a security scope and only one of them focuses on a social perspective.

This study aims to analyze the main effects that militarization has had in Ciudad Juárez in order to learn from its experience. It is important to realize that the combat against organized crime cannot be exclusively made by the militarization and the use of police. Care should be taken that the combat against organized crime involves not only the presence of the military but also the implementation of measures that promote social development to attack the roots of the problem.

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