

# With purpose to target smart

- The EU's political strategies towards Zimbabwe

# Abstract

Derived from theories of hard- and soft power, sanctions and constructive engagement, the thesis analyses the effect and interplay of targeted sanctions and political dialogue, by highlighting the political strategies that the EU conducts towards Zimbabwe. Based on semi-structured interviews with six influential officials in the EU, the thesis explains and describes the tensions of the foreign policy instruments through the Zimbabwe case, in order to better understand their complexity. The EU's stance, in form of targeted sanctions and political dialogue towards Zimbabwe, have so far not turned out to be successful since no fundamental political change has appeared in the country.

The work concludes that the EU's member states to some extent needs to be more engaged and coherent on how to deal with Zimbabwe. In order to help the Zimbabweans to help themselves the EU has to respect and understand Zimbabwe's cultural, historical and political conditions better. More generally, the thesis suggests that the future sanctions research should focus on the unexpected implications of targeted sanctions but also under what conditions and perceptions the sanctions are implemented on those targeted.

*Key words:* Targeted Sanctions, Political Dialogue, EU, Zimbabwe, ACP

# List of Abbreviations

ACP -	African, Caribbean and Pacific group of states
ANC -	African National Congress
CA -	Cotonou Agreement
CE -	Constructive Engagement
CFSP -	Common Foreign and Security Policy
EU -	European Union
GNU -	Government of National Unity
GPA -	Global Political Agreement
ITO -	Iraqi Theatre of Operations
MDC -	Movement for Democratic Change
NGO -	Non Governmental Organisation
SADC -	Southern African Development Community
SASO -	Successful conduct of Stability and Support Operations
TEU -	Treaty on European Union
UN -	United Nations
ZANU-PF -	Zimbabwe African National Union - Patriotic Front

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# 1 Introduction

The last decade's sanctions have become a popular policy instrument in order to affect and change complicated economic, political and military situations. Generally speaking, a sanction is a potentially useful tool built on limitations and punishments towards a state, organisation or an individual. It purposes as an international effort in order to protect global peace and security (MFA2). Whereas sanctions originally were applied as strategic measures, today's more ethical use of sanctions is marked by social, diplomatic and cultural measures. The transformation of sanctions as a political instrument has thus moved from being conventional trade sanctions into smart and targeted sanctions (Eriksson 2009:1, 3). Consequently, there are divided opinions on whether these instruments should be harder or softer, in combination with military force and/or political dialogue or not. Recent studies indicate that the effects of targeted sanctions are less damaging than conventional trade sanctions in a social and humanitarian perspective (Cortright & Lopez 2002:1, 6-7). There is a shared conclusion that sanctions should be directed at the change of policies and not of individuals. However, the question whether sanctions are effective strategies in order to improve political conditions and thereby give the broader population better life conditions is challenging to investigate.

Since 2002, the European Union (EU) imposes targeted sanctions on Zimbabwe's President Robert Mugabe and approximately 200 of his adherents (Säll 2009). In general, targeted sanctions are strategic tools, implemented in a country where the ruling elite don't comply with UN resolutions, in order to change the behaviour of the targeted state and engage its key decision makers in a dialogue based on concerns raised by the sender (Eriksson 2007:5). Hence, after ten years of silence, a dialogue was once again opened up between the EU and Zimbabwe when an EU delegation visited the country in September 2009. The EU's political strategies against the country were thereby extended with political dialogue which was a new era in the EU and Zimbabwe's relationship (M&G 2009).

In what way these political instruments affect and influence the behaviour of President Mugabe and his adherents is hard to straighten up. Thus, the tensed relationship between the EU and Zimbabwe has experienced certain changes the last decade and it is therefore essential to see what the pressure on Zimbabwe has generated in a political and humanitarian perspective. The thesis will first illuminate the political instruments; sanctions and political dialogue in a broader perspective. In order to contribute with a better understanding to these political strategies, they will be discussed in the context of the strained relationship between the EU and Zimbabwe.

## 1.1 Aim of the Study & Research Problem

The EU delegation's meeting with the Zimbabwean government in Harare in September 2009 developed the EU's political strategy into two: restricted measures (sticks), and the political dialogue, (carrots). Although the member states agree upon maintaining restrictions against Zimbabwe, the views on how to deal with the relationship differ. Through interviews in Brussels with six officials that work with the EU's position on Zimbabwe, the ambition with the study is to give an actual insight into the EU's real stance on this matter. Hence, the purpose of the thesis is to illuminate the political strategies, sanctions and political dialogue, in order to understand their implementation processes and effects better. The contribution of this study will be the interviews which provide a fresh perspective to the sanctions research in general as well as the understanding of the political development in Zimbabwe. Overall, the thesis aims at providing a new depth of understanding of the process, and effects of the interplay between political dialogue and sanctions in general. The main research question is thereby:

- What are the pros and cons of targeted sanctions and political dialogue: do these political strategies really matter and what are the effects of the relation between them?

The tension between restrictive measures and political dialogue will be highlighted through the example of Zimbabwe. Following subordinate questions will therefore be tested through the EU-Zimbabwe case in order to answer the main research question above:

- In what way does the EU influence the Zimbabwean regime with restrictive measures and political dialogue?
- What are the consequences of going from restrictive measures to political dialogue: how has this interplay functioned in the Zimbabwe case?

The thesis operates thus in between a descriptive and explanatory research design. Yin claims that a specific case can serve as a good instrument in order to explain and question a theory (Yin 2006:60-61). According to his argument, the thesis is an explanatory and descriptive study about sanctions- and political dialogue theories in which the EU constitutes a case of foreign policy strategies towards a regime, in this case Zimbabwe, that one wants to influence in a certain direction. Similarly, this constitutes the context in which the case is characterised and it makes the thesis principally relevant. In line with Esaiasson's arguments, since the step into an explanatory research problem is taken, the thesis appears also into the context of being theory consuming (Esaiasson et al. 2007:38). Even though the EU imposes sanctions on other African countries, the Zimbabwean case is a distinct example since the relationship is especially complicated. The

implementation of the political dialogue illustrates this since the EU adopts this measure towards “especially difficult partners”.<sup>1</sup> Therefore the processes as well as the implications of these strategic instruments, which the EU imposes on the Zimbabwean government, are particularly interesting to analyse. Despite that two strategic instruments are under scrutiny in the thesis, the theoretical emphasis will be on the sanctions.

## 1.2 Sources and Limitations

The research opportunities are innumerable which makes it necessary to define the thesis within a reasonable framework. A way to adapt to this, has been to focus the interviews only on the EU’s voices, thus the Zimbabwean government has not been included. The views and opinions of the six respondents were first meant to be used as regular complementary material but turned out to occupy a more crucial role. The officials’ opinions and experiences through their work with the EU’s stance towards Zimbabwe, give the theoretical framework in the text a more practical and different dimension. In line with Kvale and Brinkmann, the interviews have in that perspective shaped the analysis in this case study which gives a complex picture of the EU’s attitude in their foreign policy strategies towards the Zimbabwean government (Kvale & Brinkmann 2009:34). However some readers might question the quality of the interviews on the ground that the numbers of respondents are too few in order to generalise the results. Once again there is reason to refer to Kvale and Brinkmann who underline that it is possible to analytically generalise through research-interviews, regardless the form of the analysis or the selection of the respondents (Kvale & Brinkmann 2009:285). To sum up, the reliability of the respondents should be considered as strong, especially in view of their professional positions. Likewise, the results in the thesis should be viewed as reliable since the respondent’s answers likely would remain the same towards another researcher. As Kvale and Brinkmann remark, validity arises: “when our observations really reflect the phenomena or the variables that interests us”<sup>2</sup> (Kvale & Brinkmann 2009:263, 264). In that sense, the study should also be regarded as valid.

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<sup>1</sup> Further discussion of Political Dialogue in chapter 4.

<sup>2</sup> Kvale and Brinkmann refer to Pervin 1984:48 in Kvale & Brinkmann 2009:264. (The quote is freely translated.)

## 2 Methodology

### 2.1 The EU – Zimbabwe case

Since the EU-Zimbabwe case has been studied in Brussels, the thesis is a combined field- and case study with an intensive and thereby qualitative composition. Further, the study has an empirical character since it aims to describe and explain the complexity of the EU's incipient dialogue and measured restrictions against Zimbabwe. In line with Yin's arguments about case studies, the study is on the one hand a crucial case since the relationship between the EU and Zimbabwe is complex. As remarked by a respondent from the Commission: "The political situation in Zimbabwe is really complicated and the country is considered to be one of the most difficult that the EU is in relation with" (Interviewee 2). On the other hand the EU brings sanctions and restrictions against many other countries and in that sense the study is representative (Yin 2006:62). The scientific relevance is based on previous research about the EU and Zimbabwe's relationship, which are built on international law and other examples of political strategies towards cases similar with Zimbabwe. The thesis contributes thereby with a new dimension of the EU's official stance in the Zimbabwe case and additionally a better insight of the meaning and consequences of the sanctions- and political dialogue theory. According to Teorell and Svensson's arguments about case studies, the thesis is thereby cumulative (Teorell & Svensson 2007:18).

#### 2.1.1 The Interviews<sup>3</sup>

Interviews compose one of the most enriching material sources to case studies (Yin 2006:116) and are therefore the chosen method in the thesis. Thus the interviews in this study were focused but at the same time openly and flexibly

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<sup>3</sup> The informants were all informed of the general purpose of the study. Hence they gave their permission to freely participate in the project. The possibility of being anonymously referenced in the thesis were also proposed which five of the informants desired. In line with Kvale and Brinkmann, this is an ethical principle the interviewer must respect (Kvale & Brinkmann 2009:87, 89). This indicates hence that the topic of the thesis must be regarded as a delicate one. However, the interviews were not recorded.



implemented which according to Kvale & Brinkmann define them as semi-structured (Kvale & Brinkmann 2009:43). In line with their definition, the informants have in the thesis contributed with a deeper understanding and meaning of the described phenomenon (Kvale & Brinkmann 2009:19). Through devoted search, knowledgeable officials were at last found and hence interviewed about their own professional opinions as well as facts in this topic. A mix of open questions has thereby contributed to good descriptions and explanations of the EU's political stance against Zimbabwe. In order to correspond with Kvale and Brinkmann's comments about the importance of reliability, a good balance between objectivity and improvisation during the interviews was thus desired (Kvale & Brinkmann 2009:264). In addition, the respondents were encouraged to talk freely in order to let them take the positions they felt comfortable with. The fact that all the informants have duties within the EU that are related to the phenomenon in the thesis contributes thereby, in line with Kvale and Brinkmann's remarks, to the reliability as well (Ibid.). Hence, the respondent's interpretations of the effects of these strategies give the analysis good strength.

## 3 Theory and Key Concepts

The case study offers different theoretical glasses through which the reader will generate a picture of reality. The key concepts are the EU's policies towards Zimbabwe in form of restricted measures and political dialogue. Initially in this chapter, a theoretical background of general trade-/economic sanctions will be described. Advocates and opponents of the effects of economic sanctions, represented by David A. Baldwin<sup>4</sup>, in favour of sanctions, and Robert A. Pape<sup>5</sup> whose position is rather sceptical, will also follow. The reconsideration of general trade sanctions to “smart” and today “targeted” sanctions is advocated by David Cortright’s<sup>6</sup> and George A. Lopez’s<sup>7</sup> studies in the area as well as Mikael Eriksson’s<sup>8</sup> actual research on this subject (Eriksson 2009:3). The political dialogue concept is defined through the concept constructive engagement. The reader should have in mind that economic sanctions and general trade sanctions are representing the same concept while targeted sanctions and smart sanctions are similarly defined. Also, the concept; restricted measures is a form of targeted sanctions (Eriksson 2007:18). The political instruments; trade sanctions and political dialogue can be seen in the light of Nye’s<sup>9</sup> theories of hard- and soft power which thereby contribute to a better understanding of the concepts. Nye’s theory will therefore be defined in this chapter as well.

### 3.1 A background of the Sanctions Theory

The sanction theory’s first wave emerged in the 1930s and has passed through five sorts of phases since then (Eriksson 2009:2). Eriksson refers to Galtung’s early definition of conventional understanding of sanctions: “[...] actions initiated by one or more international actors (the “senders”) against one or more others (the “receivers”) with either or both of two purposes: to punish the receivers by

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<sup>4</sup> David A. Baldwin is Ira D. Wallach Professor of World Order Studies in the Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University (Baldwin 1999/2000:80).

<sup>5</sup> Robert A. Pape is Professor in Political Science at the University of Chicago.

<sup>6</sup> David Cortright is President of the Fourth Freedom Forum and Research Fellow at the Kroc Institute.

<sup>7</sup> George A. Lopez is Director of Policy Studies at the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame.

<sup>8</sup> Mikael Eriksson earned his Ph. D. at the Department of Political and Social Sciences of European University Institute in Florens.

<sup>9</sup> Joseph S. Nye, Jr., is former Assistant Secretary of Defence and Dean of Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government.

depriving them of some value and/or to make receivers comply with certain norms the senders deem important” (Eriksson 2009:4/Galtung 1967:379).<sup>10</sup> This general form of trade sanction or economic sanction where implemented towards an entire state which affected not only those in power but also the civilians. An economic sanction is a valuable instrument for the International Community<sup>11</sup> to strengthen peace and safety in the world. In order to democratise a regime, a group or an individual that doesn't follow human rights, the consequences of sanctions are for example that the freedom of trade is limited for the targeted state, measures that hopefully will force it to agree on democratic principles (MFA2).

The eventual success and effects of economic sanctions have been strongly debated. Baldwin, who defends the use of economic sanctions, claims that the answer to whether sanctions<sup>12</sup> are effective or not depend on the situation. He discusses different definitions of economic sanctions and affirms that it is commonly measured in terms of how effective the goals are being obtained. Likewise, economic sanctions are often valued in stipulation to its costs and Baldwin finds these measures and definitions quite misleading (Baldwin 1999/2000:87). He refers to the fact that economic sanctions can be used in order to achieve different targets as: “to punish the target, or to make a symbolic statement; but we believe that the focus of the debate regarding the effectiveness of sanctions is on whether they can enable the sanctioner to achieve its goals of altering the behaviour of the target” (Baldwin 1999/2000:88). Therefore, in order to counsel policymakers on how to achieve fruitful sanctions, the goals with this political instrument have to be sober and realistic (Ibid.). Baldwin's belief becomes clear by stating: “It would be difficult to find any proposition in the international relations literature more widely accepted than those belittling the utility of economic techniques of statecraft (Baldwin 1985:57/Eriksson 2009:4).

To sum up, according to Baldwin, whether economic sanctions are a “quick-fix” measure or whether it should ever be used in the first place is quite misleading to ask. The accurate way to put it, he claims, is to determine its potential convenience in relation to the expected utility of other political strategies; the more that is at stake, the more complex the task will be to achieve (Baldwin 1999/2000:91, 105-106). Further, the cost issue is also relevant as well as the importance of comparing and estimating the pros and cons of alternative policy instruments as for example diplomatic- and military measures (Baldwin 1999/2000:106). His critical standpoint is directed to those who don't admit how effective economic sanctions really are (Eriksson 2009:4) and he criticises Pape who claims that sanctions should not be regarded as a fruitful and faithful policy strategy (Baldwin 1999/2000:92).

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<sup>10</sup> Johan Galtung is Professor of Peace Studies and the principal founder of Peace and Conflict Studies.

<sup>11</sup> What is indicated by the use of the International Community is based on the form of the UN's Security Council as well as other leading coalitions of countries.

<sup>12</sup> Baldwin uses the term economic sanctions as well as sanctions in his text.

After having challenged and examined the most influential study<sup>13</sup> on whether economic sanctions are fruitful or not, Pape concludes that there is small empirical evidence that this political instrument can reach significant foreign policy goals (Pape 1998:66). While the study of 115 cases showed that 34% of them succeeded, Pape's examination concluded that only 5 of the 115 cases stood up. The other hundred were for example dependent on direct or indirect use of military force or could not even be considered as an affair of economic sanctions (Ibid.). He underlines that the debate should therefore be about whether sanctions are fruitful instruments independently of other political actions, which thereby should be regarded on as a substitute and not a complement. Pape points out that it is misleading to advocate the usefulness of sanctions if its strength is combined with military force (Pape 1998:68-69).

He also illustrates considerable human costs on the population of a target state by economic sanctions. The international economic sanctions on Iraq since 1990 have, according to attestations, caused the lives of nearly 600,000 Iraqi children. In relation to the number of civilian deaths during the Gulf War, this amount is about 550,000 more (Pape 1998:76). Pape's further opposition to sanctions is the fact that the policymakers tend to advocate the use of sanctions in order to save their own reputation, or the credit of their state's global prominence. This behaviour is at the expense of the target regime and can generate extreme damages on the civilians of the target state if the sanctions decline. In order to use economic sanctions as a substitute to war, it might provoke it to happen. Pape underlines though that historical examples like the Vietnam War and the Somalia War illustrate that military force is a political strategy as devastating and fruitless as economic sanctions can be (Pape 1998:77). Contrary, Baldwin affirms that economic sanctions sometimes must be used as the most appropriate measure in a given situation, even though the probability of its success or effectiveness is dejected (Baldwin 1999/2000:92). In turn, Pape summarises his position by highlighting diplomatic measures as a more credible instrument than force to reach foreign policy goals since economic sanctions do not have a strong: "stand-alone capacity" (Pape 1998:77/Eriksson 2009:4).

### 3.1.1 Definitions of Hard and Soft Power

The "old" form of sanctions; economic sanctions, can be seen in the light of hard power, as well as the recent theoretical definitions of the political instrument; targeted-/smart sanctions. Hence the political dialogue strategy can be connected to the soft power measure. Nye argues that *hard power* is a quite effective military and/or economic action which more or less gets others to change their position. He exemplifies hard power as a menacing and forcing measure in form of

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<sup>13</sup> According to Pape the most influential work on this question since 1985 is *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered*, by Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Jeffrey Schott, and Kimberly Ann Elliott (HSE).

economic sanctions (Nye 2004:5-7). In turn *soft power* means by definition: “[...] getting others to want the same outcomes you want, and that requires understanding how they are hearing your messages, and fine-tuning it accordingly” (Nye 2004:111). Further, the soft way of using power is about to stimulate, convert and attract the counterparty through constructive argumentations and dialogues. However, he points out that the different powers: “are both aspects of the ability to achieve one’s purpose by affecting the behaviour of others” (Nye 2004:6-7). Thus, concerning international foreign policy, the soft power is normally a result of a country’s values, cultures and policies which makes it more or less difficult, depending on the country, to implement (Nye:2004:7-8, 11). However, the more coherent a country’s values and policies are with the international rules, more it will be regarded as legitimate and less it will need costly carrots and sticks (Nye 2004:10-11).

Nye remarks that the effects of power are always dependent on the actors and the context of the situation, most clearly defined by soft power since communication and values become useless if the receivers and the interpreters can’t cooperate with each other. Additionally, attraction through behaviour as values and diplomacy is much more abstract than coercions like threats and sanctions. In all, this makes soft power measures more complicated to implement in order to achieve for example human rights and rule of law in a country (Nye 2004: 16, 31). It is also probable that soft power is more vital to realise in a country where power is allocated instead of concentrated. Nye discusses that a dictator can impossibly ignore the opinions of the people in his country but on the contrary, he can afford to be cold, calculative and insensitive towards another state depending on his own interest in this country (Nye 2004:16). Nevertheless, soft power has a vital part in order to encourage human rights- and democracy values since it is a simpler task to achieve democracy through attraction than by compulsion and threats (Nye 2004:17).

As noted, the interplay between hard- and soft power is imperfect and sometimes they strengthen, sometimes they weaken one another (Nye 2004:25). However, Nye argues that the strong democracies of today use less hard power than ever before but still, the major part of the world consist of non-democratic states which aggravates a global consensus of power (Nye 2004:30). Africa is not an exception where a majority of the countries are led by dictatorial regimes, have weak institutions and disrespect human rights and the rule of law. Consequently, such a complex and brindled world requires that all the sources of power, i.e. military, economic and soft, persist to be used in different mixes and compositions (Nye 2004:30). Further, soft power used by nongovernmental organisations will likely increase as well as their impact on states. Thus they might increase the importance of soft power in general through dialogue and communication (Nye 2004:31-32). Nye finally claims that a deeper comprehension and adaptation of the function of soft power as well as a better interplay between hard- and soft power, i.e. *smart power*, can be a successful path to democratic transformation of world politics (Nye 2004:31-32, 147).

This brings us over to the next section, where clarifications on the political instruments targeted/smart sanctions will be illuminated.

## 3.2 Definition of Targeted/Smart Sanctions

Targeted sanctions are strategic tools that are implemented in a country where the ruling elite don't comply with UN resolutions. By limiting the official capacity on a leadership that strangle human rights and neglect the rule of law, the aim with these strategic instruments is to involve the targeted state and engage its key-decision makers in a dialogue based on concerns raised by the sender (Eriksson 2007:5). Smart sanctions are not completely easy to define but according to Cortright and Lopez, the concept signifies the use of targeted sanctions which is the contradiction to general trade sanctions. The authors claim that: "If the goal is to minimize unintended consequences, targeted sanctions are clearly "smarter" than general trade sanctions" (Cortright & Lopez 2002:1). Eriksson refers to yet a definition by the authors: "In our definition, a smart sanctions policy is one that imposes coercive pressures on specific individuals and entities and that restricts selective products or activities, while minimizing unintended economic and social consequences for vulnerable populations and innocent bystanders" (Eriksson 2009:22-23/Cortright & Lopez 2002:2). Targeted sanctions contain measures like financial restrictions, arms embargoes, trade sanctions, visa bans and restrictions of diplomatic relations (Eriksson 2009:i).

What's new with targeted sanctions is that they are objected to a specific person, organisation or a state's government, instead of the entire country (MFA3). This is usually done by the sender who's aim is to obtain as much influence as possible by targeting the political heart of the ruling elite, thereby diminishing the power of those listed (Eriksson 2009:iii). In this way, civilians are estimated being less affected by the eventual negative aftermaths of the sanctions (MFA3). Even though targeted/smart sanctions are less negative for the civilians than general trade/economic sanctions, it would be incorrect to say that there are no humanitarian costs at all. In cases where political leaders of a regime are targeted with smart sanctions they know how to transfer the damages of the sanctions upon the weakest and poorest people (Cortright & Lopez 2002:6). An increase in criminal activities is a common effect of an economic decline in a country and thereby an easy way for those targeted to blame the senders. Even though these effects are more common due to general trade sanctions, they do appear in a small scale when targeted sanctions are implemented as well (Ibid.). Cortright and Lopez illustrate when general trade sanctions and targeted sanctions have been politically effective, more or less:

1. Iraq, 1993-1994: General trade sanctions prevented the regime to rebuild its military force;
2. Yugoslavia, 1992-1995: General trade sanctions contributed to negotiations with the Belgrade regime which lead to the Dayton Peace accord;
3. Cambodia: UN's targeted sanctions lead to a decline in power of the Khmer Rouge;
4. Libya: Targeted sanctions lead to negotiations that probably illuminated suspected terrorists which consequently lead to a decline in Libya's support of international terrorism (Cortright & Lopez 2002:7).

The examples above give an equal result of the political efficiency of general trade sanctions contra targeted sanctions. The author's conclusion after having challenged ten further cases of sanctions is however that general trade sanctions are politically more effective than targeted ones. It is though subjective to value an achievement in terms of political and economic effects instead of humanitarian ones (Cortright & Lopez 2002:10). Even though sanctions can serve as a form of economic or mental pressure, it can not be considered as a "quick-fix" policy measure. The authors argue that smart sanctions are the most effective in relation to other political instruments, in particular when the combination is an inducement as: "a carrot-and-stick bargaining process" (Cortright & Lopez 2002:15). The strength with this combined approach is that it forces policymakers to give up their benefits with the old policy, in order to give in for the unpleasant policy that they are requested to follow. It is however a complex way to go since it can be inconsiderate for the reform-disposed people, even at the elite level, who contradict with the regime's policy (Cortright & Lopez 2002:16).

While the theoretical discourse speaks for the advantages with targeted sanctions versus conventional trade sanctions in a humanitarian and ethical perspective, its benefits are in practice much more complicated to prove. In reality, civilians are suffering from these instruments as well and it is therefore necessary to take a closer look at the circumstances under which sanctions actually are useful and what impact they have instead of questioning whether they are successful or not, Eriksson argues (Eriksson 2009:20, 33). Even though the ethical transfer into more smart sanctions should be considered as positive, Eriksson argues that sanctions research has to be more focused on the relationship between the sender and the receiver as well as the political agreement that is offered at the moment (Eriksson 2009:19). He exemplifies diplomats whose prospects and apprehensions of smart sanctions surely are not the same as the views of the implementers (Eriksson 2009:36). Regardless which type of sanction used, general or targeted, it can never be expected to democratise a regime or convert a dictator on its own. In that sense, they should be regarded as limited instruments of power which effects are completely dependent on those political factors they are expressed to assist. As Cortright and Lopez put it: "Sanctions are only as effective as the overall policy they are designed to serve" (Cortright & Lopez 2002:15).

### 3.3 Definition of Constructive Engagement

Soft power instruments seek to: "stimulate, convert and attract the counterparty through *constructive* argumentations and *dialogues*" (Nye 2004:6-7). Yet a definition of this form of political dialogue that is used as a soft instrument in diplomatic relations is constructive engagement (CE): "the policy of maintaining limited political and business links with a country while continuing to demand political or social reform in that country" (CE). Looking at the soft power that the EU holds, the European Commission affirmed in 2001 that: "respect for human

rights and democracy should be an integral or mainstream consideration in all EU external policies” (Kaussler 2008:270). Kaussler refers to the EU’s document of this political dialogue with developing countries, which accentuates that: “the most effective way of achieving change is [...] a positive and constructive partnership with governments based on dialogue, support and encouragement. This should aim to improve mutual understanding and respect, and promote sustainable reform” (Ibid.).

However, this diplomatic way of maintaining foreign policy is an instrument that has been criticised; especially in the case of South Africa. South Africa’s former President Thabo Mbeki led a policy of CE towards President Mugabe and his regime in Zimbabwe. This escalated in 2000 and while the EU as well as the UN strongly condemned the undemocratic elections in Zimbabwe, Mbeki collaborated with and supported Mugabe in several actions. For example, South Africa made businesses with Zimbabwe, which increased even after the condemned elections in 2000. Nevertheless, there were no obvious personal correspondence between Mbeki’s African National Congress (ANC) and Mugabe’s Zimbabwe African National Union - Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) (Davies 2008:5-6).

Thus, there are positive critics about the CE method too. In the so-called Iraqi theatre of operations (ITO), successful conduct of stability and support operations (SASO) obligate a vivid mixture of deadly- and non deadly measures (Rodriguez et al. 2007:87). The authors, who are all working for the U.S. military force, are celebrating the CE method. In their report, they all agree on that military operations in combination with CE methods are more efficient than conventional military operations. In Baghdad, through CE, the U.S. commanders engage local tribal- and religious leaders in dialogue. In return, mutual respect towards one another’s religions, cultures and prestige is obtained. CE is thereby, according to the authors, the right glue between successful diplomacy and hard power (Rodriguez et al. 2007:87-88, 91). By creating a personal dialogue and contact with the local leaders, doing psychological operations in the villages as showing interest and communicate better, these collaborations generate fruitful results (Rodriguez et al. 2007:91).

The definitions in this chapter show that a combination of diplomatic soft power measures as political dialogue, and harder power measures as targeted sanctions, are common instruments that the International Community uses towards undemocratic regimes today. The thesis will therefore use these political instruments on the Zimbabwe case in the following chapter.



# 4 The EU's Political Strategies towards Zimbabwe

In the following chapter a closer look at the implementation and the aftermaths of the EU's foreign policy towards Zimbabwe will be illuminated. Two of the respondents are active within the EU's institutions; the Council of the EU and the European Commission, while the other four are representing different member states; the Netherlands, Sweden, Germany and France. As noted, five of the interviewees desired to be anonymously quoted.<sup>14</sup> Initially a brief historical background and an insight in the current situation of Zimbabwe will be illuminated.

## 4.1 Background of Zimbabwe – Now and Then

"This is the jewel in Africa's crown. Don't tarnish it" (Good 2002:8). This was what the former President of Tanzania, Julius Nyerere, reportedly said to Mugabe after having attended the independence celebrations in 1980. And he had reasons for it because Zimbabwe was at that time a prosperous and powerful state with a large industry, good education and a strong security system (Good 2002:7-8). Zimbabwe is an ancient British colony that both before and after its independence has been hardly exposed in many ways. The first Prime Minister of Rhodesia<sup>15</sup> Ian Smith, ruled Zimbabwe by apartheid. With time the Zimbabweans had had enough of the colonial power and desired a government without the white as the ruling elite (Eriksson 2007:9). Originally the people believed in Mugabe as a leader that could unify and liberate their traumatised country. Hence they could never believe what kind of future he would generate. In 1979, the end of the white minority rule appeared through the *Lancaster House Agreement*<sup>16</sup> which was implemented in order to give back land to the black population (Eriksson 2007:10-11). President Mugabe has ruled the country with an iron fist since 1980 which has led to a sharp deterioration of the human rights and the rule of law in the country (MFA1).

As dissatisfactions were established among the Zimbabweans, a new

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<sup>14</sup> If the reader desires to get access to additional information about the interviews it can be provided on request.

<sup>15</sup> Rhodesia is the former name of Zimbabwe before its independence.

<sup>16</sup> Further reading of Zimbabwe's Historical Legacy in Eriksson 2007: chapter 2.

opposition party Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) was launched on 11 September 1999. Morgan Tsvangirai was named as Secretary General of the party and came to symbolise the alternative to Mugabe's regime that called for an end to "fear and apathy" in Zimbabwe (Good 2002:23). In 2007, the SADC-countries (Southern African Development Community) opened up to a mediation process between Mugabe's ZANU-PF and Tsvangirai's MDC. A small sign of democratic progress appeared thus at the elections in September 15, 2008 as an intergovernmental cooperation was established between the government of President Mugabe and the opposition leaders Morgan Tsvangirai and Arthur Mutambara (Kubatana.net). Today Mugabe is still the President, while Tsvangirai is Prime Minister and Mutambara the Deputy Prime Minister. As expected, the cooperation is strained and infected between the parties. Among other things, Mutambara and Tsvangirai accuse Mugabe for his continued restrictions of the human rights and that he doesn't let go of the critical appointment policy which still exists in the country (SVT 2009). In turn, Mugabe and his government blame the EU and the western world for the massive economic decline due to sanctions and restrictions (Eriksson 2007:8).

The country is currently in a deep financial crisis; GDP fell by almost 50% the last ten years because of the disastrous policies in the country. With an inflation that has reached above 15 000 per cent, an unemployment rate estimated to be over 70%, nearly 2 million people that currently are HIV infected and an estimated life expectancy under 40 years, Zimbabwe is today falling into the category of one of the worlds most repressive regimes<sup>17</sup> (Eriksson 2007:7-8). While these figures clearly describe a bleeding country in decline where the majority of the Zimbabweans are suffering, various actors have different opinions on what the Zimbabwean crisis devolves upon. As the internal opposition and the civil society note neglects of the human rights, an escalated repression, election frauds, corruption and non existing social services, the Zimbabwean government point out the EU as culpable exploiters.

With this in mind, let's take a look at how, when and why the EU's political strategies against Zimbabwe have been processed. Seeing that they are all based on the Cotonou Agreement, an explanation of its content will follow as well as other crucial turning points in the EU and Zimbabwe's relationship.

#### 4.1.1 The EU and Zimbabwe – Crucial Turning Points

The EU's relationship with African countries have been institutionalised and prioritised ever since the beginning of the European integration process. Thus, the Common Foreign and Security Policy<sup>18</sup> (CFSP) is the European body in power to

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<sup>17</sup> Eriksson has based this on notes from *Freedom House*.

<sup>18</sup> In 1993, the EU lettered the CFSP as an own interaction of the European foreign policy and its main objectives are to develop and consolidate democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights. Thus, in the context of

implement the sanctions and the political dialogue in Zimbabwe. However, the EU's foreign policy towards Zimbabwe is constituted on the Cotonou Agreement<sup>19</sup> (CA) which was signed on June 23, 2000, in order to encourage a positive direction on the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries (Eriksson 2007:18/Keukeleire & MacNaughtan 2008:288). The main objectives with the agreement are the rule of law, human rights, democracy and good governance and the renewable part of it was that the civil society, the private sector as well as new actors on the political level in the Group's member states were incorporated in the decision procedure (CA). In 2005, the relationship was intensified and more coordinated since the European Council adopted the Strategy for Africa.<sup>20</sup> Consequently, this generated a stronger involvement of the EU's foreign policies with certain parts of Africa, as inter alia the sub-Saharan area (Keukeleire & MacNaughtan 2008:288). Further, on 15<sup>th</sup> September 2008 in Harare, the Global Political Agreement (GPA) was signed by Zimbabwe's three main parties with intention to: "create a genuine, viable, permanent, sustainable and nationally acceptable solution to the Zimbabwe situation" (ZIG1). The GPA anticipates a list of political and economic reforms that resulted in the Government of National Unity (GNU) in February 2009, which already has generated at least nearly €200 million to the Zimbabwean people in health, education, food security and governance (EU Press). However the GPA is far from being ultimately implemented and the promised change in the behaviour of the Zimbabwean government is therefore: "[...] still on a distant horizon, and the world media churns out a daily stream of articles describing a political landscape that closely resembles a warring battlefield" (ZIG2).

#### 4.1.2 The EU's strategies towards Zimbabwe – Articles 96 and 8

In 2001, the consultations conducted under the ACP-EC Partnership Agreement would be closed and sanctions implemented if:

- the Government of Zimbabwe prevents the deployment of an EU election observation mission starting by 3 February 2002, or if it later prevents the mission from operating effectively, or;
- the Government of Zimbabwe prevents the international media from having free access to cover the election, or;
- there is a serious deterioration on the ground, in terms of a worsening of the human rights' situation or attacks on the opposition, or;
- the election is assessed as not being free and fair (CCP 18/2-2002).

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the CFSP, the EU constitutes and shapes the framework of international sanctions (White 2004:12/CFSP 17/2-2010/Gov.Se.). Further reading about CFSP in the references mentioned.

<sup>19</sup> See footnote 32 in Eriksson 2007:18.

<sup>20</sup> See EUSfA in the reference list.

Since the above listed actions came to be the scenario in Zimbabwe, the Council phrased their deepest worries about the escalated violence in connection with the election in 2002. Based on Article 96 in the CA, the EU demanded the Zimbabwean government representatives to comply after certain joint consultations (Eriksson 2007:18).<sup>21</sup> Hence the political dialogue, which stipulates that the EU and ACP: “shall regularly engage in a comprehensive, balanced and deep political dialogue” (Holland 2002:201), was implemented in 2009. Intended for especially difficult partners, the joint consultations were based on the political dimension Article 8 in the CA.<sup>22</sup>

#### 4.1.3 The implementation of the Political Strategies

In light of the neglecting of human rights and the generally deplorable political situation in Zimbabwe, on February 18th 2002, the EU imposed targeted sanctions in form of restrictive measures in Zimbabwe (Eriksson 2007:18). Those targeted where Mugabe and his supporters in ZANU-PF but also individuals and businesses with a direct or indirect contact with the ruling elite (SVT 2009) among other Zimbabwe's top executives for the military and intelligence services. The restrictions against Zimbabwe were hence directed towards Mugabe's command centre, rather than his government. By lifting Article 96 and the CFSP's restrictive measures, the EU's objective aims to normalise their relations with Zimbabwe in line with the progress of GPA (EU Press). In the Council's first Common Position in 2002, clear restrictions against twenty listed people where set and the visa bans where expressed as follow: “Member States shall take the necessary measures to prevent the entry into, or transit through, their territories of the persons listed in the Annex, who are engaged in activities that seriously undermine democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law in

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<sup>21</sup> The points listed are directly quoted from Eriksson 2007:18. Eriksson has taken the information from the European Commission, October 26, 2001; see footnote 33 in Eriksson 2007:18. The joint consultations were: **end** the political violence (and the public tolerance of such violence); **allow** the EU to be invited to monitor the election and be granted unlimited access to the upcoming election; **allow** for the protection of the media; **make** the legal system become more independent; **end** the illegal occupation of land.

<sup>22</sup> Directly quoted from the points 1-4 and 7 in Article 8. The joint consultations were: **The** Parties shall regularly engage in a comprehensive, balanced and deep political dialogue leading to commitments on both sides; **The** objective of this dialogue shall be to exchange information, to foster mutual understanding, and to facilitate the establishment of agreed priorities and shared agendas, in particular by recognising existing links between the different aspects of the relations between the Parties and the various areas of cooperation as laid down in this Agreement; **Through** dialogue, the Parties shall contribute to peace, security and stability and promote a stable and democratic political environment. It shall encompass cooperation strategies as well as global and sectoral policies, including environment, gender, migration and questions related to the cultural heritage; **The** dialogue shall also encompass a regular assessment of the developments concerning the respect for human rights, democratic principles, the rule of law and good governance; **Regional** and sub-regional organizations as well as representatives of civil society organizations shall be associated with this dialogue.

Zimbabwe”.<sup>23</sup> Exceptions were however established for humanitarian reasons or, in exceptional cases, for intergovernmental meetings where dialogue is democratic and promotes human rights (CCP 18/2-2002). As the Dutch respondent remarked: “The restrictions have to remain since they are the only pressure that the EU possibly can target towards Zimbabwe” and that the visa bans are the most effective measures since they are obvious: “pain-in-the-necks” for those people targeted (Interviewee 1).

The freezing of assets included following measures: “Funds, financial assets or economic resources of the persons listed in the Annex, who are engaged in activities that seriously undermine democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law in Zimbabwe, will be frozen”.<sup>24</sup> Also: “No funds, financial assets or economic resources will be made available directly or indirectly to the persons referred to in [the list]”.<sup>25</sup> Hence, exceptions of financial resources necessary to cover living expenses and for expenses to cover legal costs where set (CCP 18/2-2002). As the German respondent remarked: “The freezing of assets aren’t effective since Mugabe and his adherents already have an enormous fortune, so why should they bother”? The informant noted further that the income Mugabe gets from his diamond business is sufficient in itself and that the loss of trade with the EU therefore is trivial for him (Interviewee 6). As Eriksson claims, the EU’s decision to fracture its relationship with Mugabe wasn’t an easy one, especially since hopeful political efforts to ensure democratic elections had been made only some months earlier (Eriksson 2007:18). Hence the restricted measures have been modified several times since 2002. Thus in 2009 the renewing list reached 203 adherents of the Mugabe’s regime as well as 40 legal persons, entities and authorities compared with the 20 people that were listed in 2002 (CCP 26/1-2009/CCP 19/2-2004).

Since the intergovernmental cooperation between the ZANU-PF and the MDC came ahead in 2009, the EU’s political strategies against Zimbabwe were extended with political dialogue. This was a quite startling happening in the EU and Zimbabwe’s relationship and as noted in an article: “The European Union and Zimbabwe [...] launched a new era in relations with their first official talks in seven years, with the EU vowing to fully restore ties once “sticking points” are overcome“ (M&G 2009). According to the German respondent: “Article 8 is ‘what you have’ while Article 96 represents ‘what you can get’ and it is therefore vital that the EU seeks to find out what these two measures can do in combination with one another” (Interviewee 6). The Commissioner argued that: “Article 8 is supposed to serve as a ‘road-map’ to a normalisation in the EU-Zimbabwe relation but since it one year after its implementation still hasn’t lifted Article 96, it is obviously a failure”. The same respondent remarked that the communication between the EU and Zimbabwe has declined as the Zimbabwean government did

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<sup>23</sup> Note Article 3 in the CCP 18/2-2002.

<sup>24</sup> Note Article 4, point 1, in the CCP 18/2-2002.

<sup>25</sup> Note Article 4, point 2, in the CCP 18/2-2002.

not even show up on an agreed meeting in Brussels some months ago. The Commissioner added that South Africa's President Jacob Zuma has even tried to mediate between the parties but the political dialogue is hence still in stagnation (Interviewee 2). Thus, Nye's definition about soft power as a verbal instrument to get others to want the same outcomes as you want, has in the Zimbabwe case not been successful (Nye 2004:5).

## 4.2 Aftermaths of the Political Strategies

Although the meeting with Mugabe in 2009 was regarded as "good", according to the Swedish Minister for International Development Cooperation Gunilla Carlsson,<sup>26</sup> Europe remains committed in maintaining the restrictive measures towards Zimbabwe (Säll 2009). Thus, in 2010 a modified Common Position of the Council founded that the restrictive measures that were settled in the previous positions would be extended until February 20, 2011<sup>27</sup>, since the progress in the GPA implementation was considered as insufficient. As remarked by the respondent from the Council, Mr Clausen:<sup>28</sup> "Even though none of the restrictions that were implemented in 2002 have led to any significant change and/or successful result, the EU's official stance is that the restrictions must remain". He added that the visa bans are not especially effective but that they might be "intellectually embarrassing" for Mugabe and his adherents (Interviewee 4).

Mugabe continues hence to neglect the international requirements of human rights while human rights organisations indicate that there has hardly been any major change in the country since the implementation of the strategic instruments (Säll 2009). As the French respondent underlined: "The situation is very far from being normalised and almost every political agreement has failed" (Interviewee 5), the German respondent remarked pessimistically that: "The targeted sanctions will not have any crucial affects on Zimbabwe at all" (Interviewee 6). In line with Nye, it is obviously very difficult to reach a good balance in the interplay between hard and soft measures. The case of Zimbabwe also shows that the diplomatic dialogue is not easier than the threatening sanctions. This contradicts to Nye's arguments that democratic values are simpler to achieve through verbal attraction (Nye 2004:17, 25). According to Eriksson's research, the targeted sanction strategy has not been a complete happiness either. On the contrary, he exemplifies how it has turned out to be a; "hostage' of its own" (Eriksson 2007:33) and summarises its weakness as follow:

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<sup>26</sup> Sweden held the Presidency of the EU in autumn 2009.

<sup>27</sup> Note Article 1 in the CCP 15/2-2010.

<sup>28</sup> Mr Peter Clausen operates since 1981 as an Economist at the Council of the EU and thus the only informant who freely would be directly quoted in the thesis.

The difficulty with the imposed sanctions though is that the measures did not include the level of clarity that one could have hoped for, i.e. a step-by-step proposal on how the government of Zimbabwe could move ahead amidst the emerging political crisis. The Common Position could have provided for more exit strategies (Eriksson 2007:33-34).

This is a reminder of Baldwin's arguments about how effective sanctions must be based on realistic requirements from the sender in order to alter the behaviour of those targeted (Baldwin 1999/2000:88). Whether Mugabe will give in is according to the German respondent a utopian idea since he will rather continue to: "protect his fortune, power and political standpoints" (Interviewee 6). Through Eriksson's interviews in Harare in 2006, several voices from the civil society were clearly skeptical that targeted sanctions could change the behaviour of Mugabe and his adherents: "Nothing is likely to change as long as President Mugabe is around. One should not forget that the leadership is like a big family. Everyone has something to lose if the sitting government fall" (Eriksson 2007:53). As Eriksson describes, another dejected interviewee claimed: "Introducing targeted sanctions in Zimbabwe is not about targeting specific individuals but an entire system" (Ibid). This is a reminder of Cortright and Lopez's remark that political leaders targeted with smart sanctions, know how to make the most vulnerable people suffer from it anyway (Cortright & Lopez 2002:6). Mugabe acts hence according to their assumption. Eriksson's arguments highlights that sanctions research in general should be more focused on the relationship between the sender and the receiver as well as the political agreement that is offered at that moment. As he claims further, the view on what a smart sanction is differs clearly between the European diplomats and the implementers in Zimbabwe (Eriksson 2009:19, 36). Hence this is in accordance with Nye's belief that the more coherent a country's policies are with the UN resolutions, less it will need costly carrots and sticks (Nye 2004:10-11).

So far through the analysis in this thesis there is no explicit cause to the EU's failure of the targeted sanctions and the political dialogue towards Zimbabwe. The examples mentioned above show that there are many challenges that the EU are facing in order to change the behaviour of Mugabe and his adherents. Several aspects are though crucial to consider when analysing the pros, cons and aftermaths of the EU's political strategies towards Zimbabwe. Six significant factors will therefore be illuminated in the following subsection.

#### 4.2.1 Significant challenges facing the EU

First of all, it is contra productive that Mugabe blames the EU for the generally disastrous economic situation in the country. As remarked by the German respondent: "The restricted measures have failed in many ways and Mugabe abuses the situation in favour of his ZANU-PF as he blames the EU and the Western world for the economic and social decline in Zimbabwe". The interviewee claimed further that Mugabe and ZANU-PF takes advantage of the

EU's sanctions and that there is unlikely that he will ever adapt to and engage himself in the EU's politics: "They sell the sanctions very successfully as a failure for Zimbabwe. He could not care less about human rights and a better democratic future in the country since ZANU-PF survives strongly without an eventual removal of the sanctions" (Interviewee 6). Mugabe's behaviour refers to Cortright and Lopez who argued that a political leader targeted by sanctions knows how to transfer the damages of the sanctions on the most vulnerable people. The Zimbabwe case illustrates hence another example of how targeted sanctions not only affect those targeted but the innocent civilians as well (Cortright & Lopez 2002:6). Mugabe's views of his strained relationship with the EU were raised in an article in which he believed that the Zimbabwean government had accomplished the agreements in the GPA contract and that the EU therefore should lift the sanctions (Boström 12/9-2009). Mugabe's standpoint is that the EU aggravates the economic recovery in the country with their immovable actions. As Eriksson illustrates with a citation from the president of ZANU-PF: "Sanctions were imposed with the hope of making the ruling party realize its errors but this plunged our economy into a bottomless pit" (Eriksson 2007:33). This reminds of Nye's discussion about how a dictator can impossibly ignore the opinions of the people but still be calculative towards another state depending on his own interest (Nye 2004:16).

Another tough challenge that the EU faces is that Mugabe acts indifferent towards the EU's political strategies. The German interviewee remarked that the visa bans and the freezing of assets don't affect Mugabe at all since he always finds detours through the restrictions in order to achieve what he wants. The respondent exemplified the inefficiency with visa bans as: "1) Mugabe doesn't care about the restrictions at all; 2) Mugabe always finds solutions to his travels, as when he attended a meeting in Rome recently" (Interviewee 6). Furthermore, as noted in an article; when the president of South Africa Jacob Zuma visited Great Britain in March 2010 he begged Gordon Brown to lift the targeted sanctions towards Zimbabwe. Mr Brown specifically denied Zuma's desire by claiming that the restricted measures will not be removed until the country makes democratic improvements. He defended his point of view by underlining that it is only those who are directly targeted by the sanctions that suffer from them, i.e. not the broader part of the Zimbabwean people (Kjöllner 6/3-2010). In that very moment, Mugabe held a press conference in Harare where he announced that he would remain the President of Zimbabwe and that the visa bans did not bother him at all since he had no interest in travelling to cold European countries anyway. As remarked in the article, the restricted measures in form of visa bans and frozen assets become quite trivial in this perspective. To stand up against Mugabe's dictatorship, any type of financial aid that potentially could fill the Zimbabwean Government's pockets must be removed, as for example the humanitarian aid money from the EU (Kjöllner 6/3-2010). These examples underline the precariousness with sanctions but also that they still are very important and symbolic political instruments.

A third difficult challenge for the EU is the media's situation in Zimbabwe, which according to the French interviewee: "Is one of the EU's toughest



challenges and also an explanation to why the situation in Zimbabwe is hard to change” (Interviewee 5). The German respondent argued that, in order to make people understand how ZANU-PF biased the media in Zimbabwe really is, the EU does all it can to reach out to the civilians by supporting the MDC and Tsvangirai (Interviewee 6). The Commissioner respondent claimed further that the EU is struggling against the ZANU-PF biased media in Zimbabwe by letting EU-officials, who are stationed in the country, inform the Zimbabweans through continuous diplomacy measure: “They seek to increase the awareness of the situation among the Zimbabwean people through big events as inter alia organised support for farmers” (Interviewee 2).

Another challenge for the EU is the non-existing cooperation between President Mugabe and the MDC’s Morgan Tsvangirai. According to the intergovernmental cooperation in 2008, the parties are supposed to cooperate with each other in order to reach a stabilisation of the country. The so called cooperation between ZANU-PF and the MDC is cracking in many ways, as exemplified in an article which remarks how Mugabe handed out food parcels to their party supporters while the partisans in the MDC got nothing (Kjöller 28/5-2010). As remarked by the German respondent, the MDC and the ZANU-PF don’t cooperate with each other as they are supposed to on paper which is yet one of the biggest challenges for the EU to solve: “to make these two Zimbabwean parties cooperate” (Interviewee 6). Thus, unlike Mugabe, Tsvangirai is obviously behind the GPA decision which indicates that the EU will maintain its restrictions against ZANU-PF (Säll 2009). It is also noted that as soon as Tsvangirai and his MDC was included in the government cooperation he went on a tour where he managed to get a lot of humanitarian aid and claimed: “I am actually encouraged by the level of positive support and indicators that have been given to us” (M&G 2009). He also said: “What is important up front is to establish long-term relationships” (Ibid.). Consequently, in contrast to Mugabe, Tsvangirai has an easy contact with the international leaders and the schism between the two has thereby intensified even more (Säll 2009).

The fifth challenge for the EU is to improve the coherence between the member states in certain areas. The Dutch interviewee claimed that the important task for the EU is to engage and incorporate but that there might be different views on how to do this. The respondent added that objectively, the member states agree on how to achieve the goals but not on what they will obtain in the long run (Interviewee 1). The Commissioner respondent remarked as well that there are certain countries that use contradictory measures like Great Britain which, as many other member states, uses Morgan Tsvangirai as a marionette and thereby puts him in favour and prioritises him. The respondent added that Denmark is doing likewise and refuses to communicate with President Mugabe (Interviewee 2). This behaviour of favouritism contradicts with the EU’s stance that every party in the Zimbabwean government must be included in the dialogue strategy. The Commissioner respondent highlighted also that: “The EU has expressed its support to the entire Zimbabwean society and if that meaning shall be trustful, it is a negative sign if some member states keep certain Zimbabwean parties and politicians in favour. This signifies discordance between the member states and

thereby an illustration of that the GNU isn't functioning as it should" (Interviewee 2). As remarked by the Swedish interviewee, France and Great Britain have been the most energetic and tough countries in order to find compromises when implementing the restricted measures in Zimbabwe (Interviewee 3). Likewise, the French respondent claimed that the Netherlands, Great Britain and Germany have tougher standpoints towards Zimbabwe and their views on the restrictive political measures are harder as well (Interviewee 5). In turn, the member states that seek to find a more soft solution and thereby the most legal advocacy countries are Belgium, Austria and in some parts even Sweden, the Swedish respondent added (Interviewee 3). The views on how to define the eventual connections between the Articles differed among the respondents as well. While some claimed their clear inseparability, some argued that the strategies are distinctly separated from each other. As the French interviewee claimed, it is hard to draw a clear line between Article 96 and Article 8 since they are interacting with one another (Interviewee 5). Likewise, the German respondent added that the Articles should be seen as inseparable from one another but still, the restricted measures are "follow-up-mechanisms" while the political dialogue should be used on a regular basis even though the situation in Zimbabwe is ameliorating (Interviewee 6). However, according to the German interviewee, one illustrating problem of the EU's disagreement is that some member states want to draw a front line between the restricted measures and the political dialogue. On the contrary, the same respondent noted that the Articles should be united which has been a recent ongoing discussion and the Co-African group has propagated for the both Articles to be constantly implemented (Interviewee 6). In turn, the Commissioner affirmed that a "carrot-and-sticks-approach" doesn't exist (Interviewee 2). In line with Nye, if the view on how to deal with Zimbabwe differs too much among the member states, it is less likely that they will change the behaviour of the ruling elite at all. It also illustrates the need of an improved understanding and adaptation of the interplay between hard- and soft power in order to reach democratisation (Nye 2004:6-7, 31-32, 147).

The last tough challenge is the EU's limitations. The EU can't act differently than they do today, even though they are aware of the deficiencies of the CA. As the German interviewee remarked: "The member states feel a bit tied behind their back since the shortcomings of the Agreement prevent them to reach normalisation through the political strategies". The same respondent added that there might be difficult to create a "new" CA within the EU and underlined: "You should be aware of the weaknesses and limits of the restrictions. If the diplomats put as much pressure as necessary their prayers will be heard". In spite of this critic view on the EU's inefficient restrictions towards Zimbabwe, the German interviewee claimed that the restricted measures must remain and concluded that: "The main problem is that the Cotonou Agreement in itself ought to be reformed before other measures can be implemented in Zimbabwe" (Interviewee6).

## 4.2.2 The Future of Zimbabwe

The future of Zimbabwe is very uncertain and the belief in however Mugabe and the ruling elite in Zimbabwe will change their undemocratic behaviour or not differs. As remarked by the French interviewee: “Mugabe will never let go of his power as long as he remains in life” (Interviewee 5). According to the German respondent, the future of Zimbabwe is rather gloomy since the Mugabe history might repeat itself. Seeing that Mugabe does not cooperate according to the GNU there are rather personal contacts that will determine and direct the outcome of Zimbabwe’s future. The UN and the EU can put as much pressure they want but a change in Zimbabwe will never appear if not the Zimbabwean government itself starts to reach towards a political and democratic development in the right direction. The German respondent remarked further that the EU will certainly not have any significant impact on Zimbabwe and therefore never save the civilians. Instead, local NGO’s that are struggling in the country will reach more fruitful results (Interviewee 6). As referred to Nye, NGO’s might here constitute important actors as well, in order to inform the Zimbabweans about the ruling elites ignorance of human rights through dialogue (Nye 2004:31-32).

As noted by the Dutch respondent: “The peaceful accommodation is completely dependent on its people. One should therefore not overestimate what the EU can actually change in the criminal and undemocratic behaviour that is permeating the Zimbabwean society today” (Interviewee 1). This corresponds with Nye who claims that regardless which power used, its effects are always dependent on the actors and the context of the situation (Nye 2004:16). However the Dutch interviewee claimed that the EU’s role is distinct: “it must help Zimbabwe to help itself”, i.e. help the country to implement the democratic measures according to their own conditions (Interviewee 1). Since the EU obviously has a vague impact on Mugabe and his ruling elite, some informant argued that the SADC-countries and South Africa especially, could be successful in democratising Zimbabwe. The German respondent remarked the importance of South Africa and how President Zuma might get a crucial role of Zimbabwe’s future: “Even though Zuma is doing efforts in the Zimbabwe case, he has to do more since he has stronger impact on Mugabe and his adherents” (Interviewee 6).

Overall, the cultural and traditional differences between the EU- and the African countries constitute a difficult lack of understanding which is a big problem, the respondent claimed. South Africa has a strong voice within the whole SADC-region and if the SADC-countries should implement sanctions on and political dialogue in Zimbabwe, a democratisation of the country would be obtained much faster, the German interviewee noted. The same respondent concluded that Mugabe would be forced to democratise Zimbabwe if Africa itself urges him to do it (Interviewee 6). This corresponds to Nye’s remarks about how soft political measures through constructive argumentations and dialogues appear in an entity’s culture and values which make it more or less complex to implement (Nye 2004:7-8, 11). Mugabe and his adherents have certainly not found the EU’s requirements legitimate and attractive. According to the Dutch respondent, the ZANU-PF is getting more and more isolated and the MDC is thereby increasing

in power (Interviewee 1). As remarked by Mr Clausen, Tsvangirai and his MDC constitute the first example of a successful party in Zimbabwe which has focused on the middle class in the villages. Without the support of the middle class the parties cannot reach political stability which is the successful concept in order to reach economic and political stability in the long run (Interviewee 4). As the French respondent underlined, the EU will continue its pressures on Zimbabwe in form of the restricted measures and diverse cooperation programs and political dialogues: “especially with those people who are expected to run the country in ten years” (Interviewee 5). The Zimbabwe case shows that the restricted measures have not had a successful “solitary” capacity and in line with Pape’s arguments, diplomacy measures should hence be combined with sanctions in order to increase its credibility (Pape 1998:77).

However, whenever the EU will change the behaviour of the ruling elite in Zimbabwe is difficult to predict. As defined by the Dutch interviewee: “A definition of successful sanctions is that they generate political and democratic changes” (Interviewee 1), and since this has not yet been fulfilled in Zimbabwe the EU’s political strategies remain contradictory. Hence, the EU-Zimbabwe case confirms Pape’s belief that diplomatic measures are more credible than force, since sanctions have a weak “stand-alone-capacity” in order to reach foreign policy goals (Pape 1998:77/Eriksson 2009:4). In turn, Baldwin’s opinion that sanctions sometimes must be used as the most appropriate measure in a given situation, even though the probability of its success or effectiveness is dejected, obtains in this case not the same credibility (Baldwin 1999/2000:92). Since Baldwin determines sanctions potential convenience in relation to the expected utility of other political strategies, he should include a better interplay with the dialogue path in the Zimbabwe case. Thus, his belief that sanctions are not a “quick-fix-measure” becomes clear in the study (Baldwin 1999/2000:91, 105-106).

Even though the thesis dismisses the EU’s political strategies towards Zimbabwe as successful, they are more powerful in relation with each other than separated. Seeing that stationed EU observers and NGO’s are increasing the EU’s voice in Zimbabwe, as well as Zuma’s and Tsvangirai’s good relation with the European countries, a change of the behaviour of Zimbabwe’s ruling elite will likely not be achieved without the diplomatic dialogue path. However, as remarked by Clausen: “It is too late to remove the restricted measures since the development in Zimbabwe has moved to far but these arguments are of course very subjective” (Interviewee 4). This corresponds to Cortrights and Lopez’s remarks about the subjectivity of measuring an achievement in terms of political effects instead of humanitarian ones (Cortright & Lopez 2002:10).

## 5 Conclusions

The thesis illustrates that it is a difficult challenge for the International Community as well as the European Union to find a good balance between hard and soft pinches in order to change the behaviour of those targeted. The thesis indicates moreover that it is more complex to use soft dialogue measures in order to influence a country's regime in the right direction, especially if there are major differences between the parties' cultures, traditions, religions and politics. Thus, the Zimbabwe case has not proven to be an exception. In the thesis, the respondents show that there has not been any significant progress in Zimbabwe since the EU implemented targeted sanctions in form of restricted measures towards Mugabe and his adherents in 2002. Although some interviewees indicate that Mugabe is disturbed by the visa bans and the freezing of assets, his indifferent attitude towards the EU and the Western world speak for itself. A normalisation is today far from obtained and the interplay between the political strategies illustrates that the restricted measures have not yet been lifted through political dialogue. In other words, it is clear that the EU's pressure in form of threats and mediation is not having any effect on Mugabe and in the words of the respondent: no major change will appear in Zimbabwe while President Mugabe is alive.

The study also shows how the EU finds itself tied behind its back in relation to Zimbabwe since the actual form of the CA prevent them from applying tougher measures. Further, the thesis indicates that some member states refuse to communicate with the whole Zimbabwean government and Article 8 fails thereby already in its first paragraph. Hence the member states must adopt a more coherent approach that addresses the questions in *what way* and under *what circumstances* they should change the behaviour of the ruling elite in Zimbabwe. The cultural and political differences between the EU and Zimbabwe, as well as the non existing coherence which to some extent occurs among the EU's member states, illuminate another reason to why a normalisation is so hard to achieve. Maybe the main problem is rather related to a coordination problem than the political strategies themselves? It is thereby reason to question whether the restricted measures and the dialogue strategy would have a greater impact on Mugabe and his adherents, if those who are targeting were consistent in how to act in relation to the given situation in Zimbabwe. Hence, the dialogue strategy is much more abstract than coercions like sanctions and therefore vital to improve. Although it should be seen as a progress in itself that the EU today has a political dialogue at all with the Zimbabwean government, its combination with targeted sanctions have so far only contributed to symbolic effects. According to several voices that emerged in the thesis, NGO's, the MDC as well as South Africa continue to put pressure on Mugabe and they may therefore get a more crucial

role for the future of Zimbabwe. However, given the high age of Mugabe it will be interesting to observe what the following years will bring in terms of democratic progress to the Zimbabwean people. Leaving the EU-Zimbabwe case, there are more general conclusions relevant to add as well which will be highlighted in the final section.

## 5.1 Future research

Seeing that the sanctions literature has increased significantly recent years, there are hence other possibilities on how to contribute with future research on targeted sanctions. As in this study, targeted sanctions research has proven that the foreign policy instrument is facing many challenges in form of unexpected implications. Future researches on those are therefore proposed.<sup>29</sup> Further, seeing that the diplomats not always have the same view on how to implement the targeted sanctions and the dialogue aspect as those targeted, further research would adequately focus on the circumstances and perceptions that the targeted person or state are facing. Likewise, future research could focus more on the people that is targeted, why and on the basis on what the sanctions are directed towards them.

Even though the political strategies analysed in the thesis are complex measures which aftermaths are both strengthening and weakening the democratic behaviour of those targeted, they are still tools aimed to increase global peace and security. Therefore, this research area must continuously be stimulated.<sup>30</sup>

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<sup>29</sup> See Eriksson 2009: 326-327

<sup>30</sup> Ibid.

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# Map of Zimbabwe

