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The effect of Europeanization on bilateral conflicts in the enlargement process:

-the bilateral conflict between Greece and Macedonia

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I would like to thank my parents Dimco and Blaska for the endless love and support they provided me through my entire life.

Special thanks goes out to my love Dijana for the encouragement while writing this thesis.

This thesis is dedicated to them.

“In this crazy time, wise people are being taught by incompetents....”

- Dimco Cekov

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Abstract

Given the increasing role of the bilateral conflicts in the enlargement process, the purpose of this thesis is to examine the impact the Europeanization has on the countries involved in bilateral conflicts i.e. to account for the specific norms promoted by the EU that contribute to rapprochement between the parties in the conflict, which may further contribute to finding mutually acceptable solution on the conflict. In doing so, the thesis tries to answers the overarching question related to this problem, that emerge both in the studies of conflict regulation and Europeanization: What is the role of the EU in the bilateral disputes in the enlargement process? What instruments does it have at its disposal as to address these problems and advance the enlargement process? And how does the EU exerts its influence on the countries involved in bilateral disputes, contributing to conflict regulation?

The regulation of these conflicts may advance the enlargement process, allowing accession of the potential member states in the European Union. In its endeavor to answer the overarching questions stated above, the thesis will especially focus on the dispute between Macedonia and Greece over the name issue.

Key words: bilateral conflict, Europeanization, conflict regulation, name dispute, Macedonia

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1. Introduction

1.1. Defining the research problem

The enlargement is considered as one of the most influential and efficient tool of the European Union foreign policy which has significantly helped the EU to increase its weight on the global scene. Through the enlargement process the EU is pursuing its strategic interests in enhancing economic opportunities, consolidating democracy, promoting stability and security in the world.

Currently in the enlargement process are involved the countries from the Western Balkans (Croatia, Serbia, BIH, Macedonia, Albania and Montenegro) Turkey and Iceland. Beside the many challenges the countries face in the accession process in terms of meeting the established criteria for full membership, an additional hurdle has emerged threatening to derail the accession process. Namely, as Uilnereef (2010) contends, “bilateral disputes have emerged as a new phenomenon in the recent enlargement rounds to which the EU institutions have not found the right answer” (5p). Drawing on the experience from the enlargement process so far, bilateral disputes especially come out into view in the process of acquiring candidate status, or later in the negotiation process, having in mind the decision-making procedure in the Council of the EU which entails unanimity in adopting ”common position” towards the candidate country.

Against this background, we will point to some of the current bilateral disputes which have to some extent impeded the enlargement process. Namely, the Croatian EU accession has been recently blocked by Slovenia as the latter did not allow opening and closure of some of the chapters of the *acquis* in the negotiation process. The Slovenian

decision took place in light of the bilateral disagreement over demarcation of the maritime and land borders which has been occupying the relations of these neighboring countries ever since they disintegrated from Yugoslavia as independent countries in the early nineties. However, after the referendum in Slovenia gave green light to the government to pursue settlement of the dispute through the international arbitration of the ICJ, the veto was lifted, enabling Croatia to advance in the EU accession process. Moreover, the progress of Turkey's accession has been under a great influence of the bilateral dispute with Greece, in which center are the Cyprus and Aegean issue between the countries. Nevertheless, the country eventually started the negotiation process in 2005.

Unlike Turkey and Croatia which have started the negotiation process, Macedonia is still waiting for a Council decision on a date to start the negotiations. The delay has been *inter alia* implicitly related to the dispute that Macedonia is involved in with Greece over the name issue. Thus, despite the Commission's recommendation, the Council of the EU has not yet adopted a common position towards Macedonia regarding the start of the negotiations.

With regards to the Commission's positions that: "a gradual and carefully managed enlargement process is of strategic interest to the European Union" (EU Commission Strategy 2007), the questions that arise then are: what is the role of the EU in the bilateral disputes in the enlargement process? What instruments does it have at its disposal as to address these problems and advance the enlargement process? And how does the EU exert its influence on the countries involved in bilateral disputes in terms of conflict regulation?

What is more, the position of the European Commission regarding the role of the bilateral disputes in the enlargement process can be also seen from the statement of the EU enlargement commissioner Fuele, maintaining that: "the bilateral questions should not hamper the accession process of any country and the parties in the dispute should reach mutually acceptable solution on a bilateral level" (Euobserver: October 2009). In addition, Uilnereef (2010) and Nouthceva (2007) rightfully conclude that the "hard conditionality" has never been used by the EU as to exert influence on the outcome of the bilateral disputes. This suggests that the impact of the EU should be

sought elsewhere, since the hard conditionality and mediation as direct involvement in conflict regulation in this case is limited or out of the scope.

1.2. Research question and purpose

The name issue has been at the heart of the disagreement between Macedonia and Greece for almost twenty years. The origin of the dispute can be traced back to the period when Macedonia proclaimed independence after the dissolution of SFR Yugoslavia in 1991. Ever since then, the bilateral relations between the countries have been characterized mainly with reference to the name issue. Such climate has led to restrain in the relations between the countries in many spheres including political, diplomatic, economic and cultural, just to name some. At the peak of the adversarial attitudes manifested by both countries, in 1993 Greece decided to impose total trade embargo over its northern neighbor. The embargo has seriously affected the weak and fragile economy of Macedonia, raising questions related to the survival of the small country. The International Community has condemned such actions from Greece, and what is more, both the EU and the United States undertook decisive actions in order to put pressure on Greece to lift the embargo. The diplomatic relations were eventually restored after signing the Interim Agreement which allowed development of closer relations between the countries in almost every sphere.

This period also coincides with the lack of coherent and focused policy of the EU towards the Western Balkan. In the succeeding period the EU has changed the approach towards the WB, offering the prospect of limited integration within the EU structures at the beginning, and full integration as of recently. Hence, the influence of the EU in the region has drastically increased.

The bilateral dispute proved to be one of the main impediments to the Macedonian accession into Euro-Atlantic structures. Having in mind that membership in both the EU and NATO is set out as main objective of Macedonian foreign policy, the country has undertaken challenging reform processes driven by these organizations on the road to full membership, which inevitably has had significant impact on the domestic socio-political structures.

Today, the relations between the countries are significantly improved, compared with the times of the total trade embargo, even though the name issue has remained unresolved. Presumably, the trend of developing closer relations is related to the process of Europeanization which takes place not only in the countries, but in the region as well. In order to examine the impact the Europeanization has on the disputant countries the thesis poses following research question:

- ***To what extent Europeanization affects the course of the conflict between Macedonia and Greece by changing the environment in which the conflict takes place hence, contributing to conflict regulation?***

Having in mind that the Europeanization is an ambiguous and broad concept in its scope, the thesis will proceed narrowing down the concept in order not to defocus the empirical analysis. Hence, the Europeanization would be mainly used to denote the explicit and implicit norm system of the EU, especially in the context of promotion regional policies and initiatives that have considerable impact on the environment in which the bilateral conflicts take place.

Eventually, the overarching objective the thesis seeks to attain is to provide relevant information about the impact the Europeanization has on Macedonia and Greece, in the context of conflict regulation on the name issue between the countries. Therefore, the thesis can be characterized as having theory-informing function.

2. Methodology

2.1. Research design

As noted, the thesis will focus on the bilateral dispute between Macedonia and Greece over the name issue with an ambition to account for the complexity and particular nature of the case (Stake 1995, cited in Bryman 2001: 47) in context of the enlargement process. Thus, the research design of the thesis is constructed as single case-study analysis.

As research design, case-study analysis is related to the “desire of the researcher to understand the complex social phenomena”, while at the same time retaining the “holistic and meaningful characteristics of real-life events” (Yin 2009: 4p). Another important characteristic of the case study is seen in its feature to bring out the details from a perspective of the participants by using multiple sources of data (Tellis; 1997: 4p) According to Yin (2009), the case studies can be categorized into: explanatory, exploratory and descriptive case studies, depending on the relationship between the aims of the study in question, the technique used in the process of analysis and the outcome of such study (7p). Following this logic, the case study in this thesis has explanatory function, which is to say that it seeks to explain the impact the Europeanization has on the parties in a bilateral dispute and to investigate how the promotion of a particular set of EU norms and values contributes to rapprochement between the respective countries.

The bilateral dispute between Macedonia and Greece has proved far more complex and difficult to be regulated than originally thought, as it touches upon very sensitive issues. Additionally, the focus of the dispute has moved from the original

topic (usage of the name Macedonia) easier for the International Community to understand the conflict, to derived question of bilateral identity issues (Axt, Milososki, Schwarz 2006: 3p). Hence, it is important to discern between the issues raised over the years, as to be identified the most problematic ones. The purpose is, the issues leading to intractability of the conflict to be appropriately addressed. With a view of this, the thesis will analyze the dispute primarily as a conflict in which the identity related issues are being at the heart of the disagreement. The arguments for such approach will be outlined in the next section when the thesis deals with the conflict regulation literature in order to properly categorize the conflict.

Sub-questions:

- How can the conflict be classified?
- How the conflict issues were framed over the year?
- What was the impact of the frames on the conflict regulation?
- Which EU policy instruments have had particular influence on the disputant parties?

In order to tackle the central research question and the sub-questions efficiently, I propose the following conceptual framework which will be elaborated in the next section:

- Conflict definition and classification;
- Framing conflict issues;
- Identity conflicts;
- Factors shaping the course of the conflict;
- Europeanization and conflict regulation:
 - Good neighborliness
 - Regional cooperation
 - Solidarity in the EU

In the next paragraph the thesis will outline the methodological approach which will be used in the analytical part, explaining the research strategy, research design and the research methodology respectively.

2.2. Research strategy: Qualitative research

Research strategy is simply defined as “general orientation of the research” (Bryman 2001: 21p). The role of the research strategy is thereby, to provide guidance through the process of conducting the research by keeping it in the previously constructed framework, built as a result of the interplay between the epistemological and ontological considerations on one hand and the aim of the research on the other hand.

Since the purpose of the thesis is to explain the complex causal relation between the conflict regulation and the impact the Europeanization has on the disputant parties, the thesis will take the form of qualitative research.

Another reason that justifies the choice of qualitative research in this research is that “people as objects in the social science are capable of giving meaning to the events and process that take place in their environment” (Bryman 2001: 36p). Thus, the interpretivism embedded in the qualitative research seems valuable predisposition to account for the multi-dimensional characteristic of the case under scrutiny. Moreover, prominent technique which accounts for the attributed meaning of the social process is taking a perspective from the inside. In summary, the researcher will be able to better understand the logic of particular actions and what is more, to understand how the concerned parties are affected by those actions better than from a perspective of a neutral observer. For instance, the bilateral dispute over the name issue at the outset was mainly perceived by the international community as more or less “a technical problem” related to the usage of the name. However, from the inner perspective such perception could be only one (visible) facet of the problem, obscuring the question of bilateral identities. Moreover, all the actions and processes are to great extent determined by the social context in which they take place. As the bilateral conflict between Macedonia and Greece takes place amid the enlargement process and the Europeanization, the solution of the conflict is relevant to the Macedonian accession in the European Union.

Bryman (2001) further says that “qualitative research tends to view the social life in terms of process” by taking into consideration the way in which “the events and patterns unfold over time inducing certain change on the concerned actors” (456p). For example, the recognition of Macedonia under the constitutional name by the USA made considerable impact on the course of the conflict, because it was interpreted as an intention of expressing support to particular party.

A peculiar feature of the qualitative research is seen in the way in which the concepts are developed and their usage in the empirical part. This process is also significantly different from the quantitative research in a sense that the latter is more prone to use “definitive” concepts as opposite from the “sensitizing” concepts, to which Blumer (cited in Bryman 2001: 269p) especially gives priority to the latter in the qualitative research. Definitive concept used in quantitative research is a concept which “once developed becomes fixed through the elaboration of the indicators” (Bryman 2001: 269p) According to Blumer (1954) qualitative research will benefit more from utilization of “sensitizing” concepts because they provide general sense of reference and guidance in approaching empirical instances (cited in Bryman 2001: 270p) Thus, the role of the sensitizing concept is to serve as an indicator of what to look for and to equip the researcher with sufficient knowledge as to be able to uncover the variety of forms that the case under scrutiny can take on (Ibid). In that respect, the formulation of the general concepts which will be used in the empirical analysis of this thesis to better fit in the ambition of this paper to address the research question more efficiently.

An important aspect of any research is related to the question of assessing the quality of the research. In this regard, the quantitative researches meet the criteria for a quality of the research through the established criteria of reliability and validity, respectively. Nevertheless, these criteria are somewhat difficult to be applied on the qualitative researches, since these criteria stipulate both “a degree to which a study can be replicated”, as in case of external reliability, “and degree to which findings can be generalized across social settings” (Bryman 2001: 272p) In order to overcome this situation, Lincoln and Guba (1985) have proposed an alternative for assessing the quality of qualitative studies. Thus, they sum up the alternative criteria in two groups: *trustworthiness* (credibility, transferability, dependability and conformability) and

authenticity. These two groups of criteria are concerned with different aspects of the research project and their primary goal is to provide assessment framework through which qualitative research should prove its sustainability and quality.

2.3. Qualitative content analysis

Collection and interpretation of the data will be done by Qualitative Content Analysis. As defined by Krippendorff (2004), “[QCA] is a research technique for making replicable and valid inferences for text (or other meaningful matter) to the context of their use” (18p). Furthermore, the author maintains that the Content Analysis, as named in Krippendorff’s work, provides insights, increases a research understanding of particular phenomena or informs practical actions (Krippendorff 2004: 22p) As it can be seen from the definitions, texts can have different meanings which to large extent depends upon the context, discourse or the purpose. Thus, the information in the text, regardless of its form in which appears, is not self-sufficient and meaningful for itself, because usually this information stems from a sender, who through the channels of communication sends some kind of message to the recipient. In addition to this, Neuendorf points out that the qualitative analysis includes careful examination of the human interaction, investigation of the word usage in news releases and political speeches and so much more (Neuendorf 2002: 16p). The role of the researcher is thereby, to interpret the message taking into account the social context in which it takes place and to ascribe particular meaning on the text from where the message origins, in relation to the aim of the research she/he has undertaken (Ibid).

As sources of data in the thesis will be used various documents, deriving from the states involved in the bilateral dispute, the European Union and from private actors respectively. I will also look at the official documents issued by Greece and Macedonia that contain information relevant to the name dispute, and the official documents from the EU such as progress reports, agreements, opinions by the Commission, memoranda etc. Valuable source of data for this research are the mass media outputs which will be analyzed with particular attention, since they provide information on a day to day basis,

important to account for the changes in the relations between the parties in the conflict and to account for change of perceptions towards each other, respectively.

It should be noted however, that in the policy analysis the documents (for example agreements between countries) are only written evidence of some process that has been going on, or it is to be initiated. Therefore, the thesis will also analyze the wide variety of process which are relevant to the analysis, for example Stabilization and Association Process.

2.4. Limitations

Europeanization is an ambiguous and broad concept in its scope. Therefore it should be approached with caution when one seeks to employ it in analysis. In order to make it more operational for the purposes of this thesis, the scope of the concept will be narrowed down to correspond with the aim set forth. Thus, Europeanization in this thesis will be used mainly to denote the explicit and implicit normative system of the EU embedded in the policy frameworks with relevance to the region where the bilateral conflict takes place. Having said this, the aim is to account for the specific norms that contribute to rapprochement between the countries involved in the conflict, tellingly Greece and Macedonia, and to examine whether to what extent these specific norms contribute to conflict regulation.

A possible drawback of the thesis is that the analysis is not straightforward, since it is somewhat difficult to filter out only the impact the EU norms have on the bilateral conflict bearing in mind the engagement of the other influential actors present in the countries, and in the wider region (for example USA, OSCE, CoE). The analysis will take this influence into account, whilst mainly focusing on the influence of the EU norms.

With a view to the research design (single case-study), the findings of the analysis are relevant to the case under scrutiny, namely the bilateral conflict between Greece and Macedonia over the name issue. The findings of the research however, might serve as general assumptions for doing analyses in the similar context.

2.5. Literature review

Needless to say, the bilateral dispute between Greece and Macedonia has been inspiration for a number of authors who have contributed to our understanding on the topic. Over the last two decades the dispute has been analyzed from several perspectives each covering particular aspect of the dispute.

Kondonis (2003) in his analysis of the bilateral relations between the two countries focuses on the impact that the signing of the Interim Agreement between Greece and Macedonia in 1995 has had on the improvement of the cooperation in many areas (such as political, economic, social etc.) Kondonis further maintains that even though the name issue has not been resolved, the Interim Agreement has significantly contributed to removal of the political obstacles that derive from the name issue allowing gradual development of the mutual relations. (Kondonis 2003: 54) The importance of the Interim Agreement for the rapprochement between Greece and Macedonia has been further accentuated by the Tziampiris (2004), who focuses on the changes that led to softening of the position of both countries towards each other after the agreement was signed. These changes according to the same author were mainly result of the process of restoring the diplomatic and economic ties between the two countries (Tziampiris 2004: 234).

Significant contribution to the understanding of the role of the bilateral disputes in the enlargement process has been made by Uilenereef (2010) by analyzing the institutional capacity of the European Union to address these problems as to advance the enlargement process in the candidate countries. In this respects, the author takes the cases of Croatian and Macedonian accession processes and looks at the role of the Commission as a potential “mediator” in the disputes. However, Uilenereef further maintains that the active role of the EU actors in such manner is to large extent limited due to the fact that the non-member states openly question the legitimacy of such an action, expressing their concerns that the asymmetrical relations will prevail in the process which may create an outcome more favorable for the member state in question (Uilenereef 2010: 9).

Extensive analysis of the bilateral dispute between Greece and Macedonia has been conducted by the Duisburg Essen University in Germany, sponsored by the Volkswagen Stiftung. The project named as a “Conflict settlement through Europeanization”, has been initiated as to examine the bilateral disputes of Greece with its neighbors-Macedonia and Turkey and to account for the impact of the Europeanization on conflict settlement. The project has provided valuable information by analyzing the media output from the beginning of the conflicts until 2006. Despite media analyses, there are also academic articles covering the topic. Thus, Axt, Milososki and Schwarz (2006) jointly have analyzed the bilateral dispute in the context of the Europeanization pointing out that the main driver of the normalization of the mutual relations between Macedonia and Greece is the cooperation in the economic sector. In that respect, this is an important precondition to rapprochement between the countries, in terms of social and eventually political cooperation (Axt, Milososki, and Schwarz 2006: 31).

Having in mind that the way in which the issues in disputes are framed significantly determine the approach of conflict settlement, and thus affect the outcome of such effort, the thesis aims to approach the question from a perspective of an identity based conflict which on the other hand will contribute to account for the impact of the Europeanization in such context more efficiently.

3. Theoretical framework

3.1. Conflict definition and classification

Conflict as a social phenomenon is present in every aspect of human life. Accordingly, many scientific disciplines have tried to define the conflict as such, each of them departing from their own theoretical perspective and understanding and for their own reasons and purposes. Hence, it becomes clear that there is no general definition of conflict, but rather the research field determines which aspects of the conflict will be more accentuated. The multi-faceted nature of the concept has spurred lots of controversy and forging different conceptions around the term, which on the other hand has been a subject of conflict itself (Bonacker, Imbusch 2005: 69p).

Having in mind the nature and purpose of this research, the thesis will take the political science perspective with focus on inter-state conflicts. With reference to this, the thesis will adopt the definition by the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research which defines conflicts as:

“[...]clashing of interests (positional differences) on national values of some duration and magnitude between at least two parties (organized groups, states, groups of states, organizations) that are determined to pursue their interests and win their cases.” (HIK 2005: 2)

Furthermore, conflicts can be discerned in relation to the degree of violence manifest so they can be categorized as violent and non-violent conflicts respectively. While violent conflicts are more visible and acknowledged by the parties involved and the international community, non violent conflicts require different logic to be approached. However, the absence of force or coercion should not exclude the

possibility of conflict and conflict situation, as the conflict interests can be pursued by different means. Moreover, as Axt, Milososki and Schwarz (2006) maintain, the existence of non violent conflict should be noticed and recognized by the outside world and at least one of the parties in the conflict (6p).

In addition to this rather general classification of conflicts, further categorization has been offered by Phetsch (1994). According to this author, the conflicts can be distinguished with reference to the escalation dynamics, categorized into five types: latent conflict, manifest conflict, crises, severe crises and war (Phetsch 1994: 216). As it can be noticed, the first two types encompass non-violent conflicts, whereas the other three pass the threshold of violence gradually and fall into the scope of violent conflicts.

Table 1: Overview and definitions of the conflict intensity

State of violence	Intensity group	Level of intensity	Name of intensity	Definition
non-violent	low	1	Latent conflict	A positional difference on definable values of national meaning is considered to be a latent conflict if respective demands are articulated by one of the parties and perceived by the other as such.
		2	Manifest conflict	A manifest conflict includes the use of measures that are located in the preliminary stage to violent force. This includes for example verbal pressure, threatening explicitly with violence, or the imposition of economic sanctions.
violent	medium	3	Crisis	A crisis is a tense situation in which at least one of the parties uses violent force in sporadic incidents.
	high	4	Severe crisis	A conflict is considered to be a severe crisis if violent force is repeatedly used in an organized way.
		5	War	A war is a type of violent conflict in which violent force is used with a certain continuity in an organized and systematic way. The conflict parties exercise extensive measures, depending on the situation. The extent of destruction is massive and of long duration.

Source: HIIK (2005: 1).

Evidently, the above classification takes into account the dynamics and intensity of conflicts respectively and what is more, gives primacy to the “objectivists” logic in accounting for conflicts, such as social and political set up of the society (Schmid 1968 cited in Axt, Milososki, Schwarz 2006: 4). An alternative approach for categorization of conflicts is possible if one takes into account the nature of the conflict issues as a

criterion. In this respect, we should note that the conflict issues are product of the “perceived incompatibility of goals and differences”, which eventually lead to conflict situation (Deutsch 1991: 30p). Thus, the backbone of this categorization is differences and goals which may not be objectively incompatible, but rather the parties in the conflict tend to perceive them as such. Drawing on these accounts as well as the different ways in which the perceived incompatibility can be articulated, Diez, Stetter and Albert (2007) make distinction between: *conflict episodes*, *issues conflicts*, *identity conflicts* and *power conflicts* (6p).

According to the authors, *conflict episodes* are defined as low intensity conflicts on isolated incompatibilities. *Issue conflicts* denote the persisted incompatibilities over a particular issue. *Identity conflicts* are those in which the parties articulate their respective differences in context of identity related issues. *Power conflicts* are centered on desires of one party to impose its domination over the other party in the conflict or eventually to eliminate it (Diez, Stetter and Albert 2007: 8p)

3.2. Framing conflict issues

The literature on conflicts and conflict resolution has identified three approaches in dealing with conflicts in international relations which were briefly mentioned in the previous part. These approaches have been largely modeled with reference to the question of how the conflict issues are being framed.

In a broader sense, framing as a cognitive process is based on simplified views of the world that help us understand and give meaning of the events and processes around us. Thus, the framing as a process largely relies on a collection of stereotypes and anecdotes used to make sense of the world. According to Kaufman, Elliot and Shmueli (2003), “Frames help us to interpret the world around us and represent that world to others. Moreover, they help us organize complex phenomena into coherent, understandable categories” (56p).

In the context of conflict and conflict regulation, frames and framing play very important role since both of them construct and interpret the articulation of the conflict issues. In that sense, the perception of the involved actors on the conflict in view of

conflict regulation is to large extent determined by the way in which the conflict issues are being framed.

Frames are used by both the involved parities in the conflict and the outside world. When used by the disputants, frames are constructed on a base of internal values, beliefs and practices and can affect the intractability of the conflict if the frames of the both parties are formed on opposite ground. On the other hand, third parties, through the process of framing try to understand and respond to the conflict situation appropriately (Drake 1996: 305p).

In order to address the intractability of a conflict, the third parties engaged in a conflict transformation often use the technique of *reframing* conflict issues, which is defined as “purposive management of the established frames and constructing new ones” (Fisher, Coperman and Schneider 1994: 39p). Through this process, the intractability of a conflict can be efficiently transformed into more constructive relationship that provides ground for interactive communication and eventually, rapprochement between the disputants (Kaufman, Elliott and Shmueli 2003). In summary, reframed conflict issues may have great impact on the change of perceptions at both parties on the conflict as an initial step of conflict transformation.

Depending on how conflict issues are framed, the literature of conflict studies makes distinction between *resource-based conflicts*, *interest-based conflicts* and *identity-based conflicts*. It should be noted, however that these issues are not necessarily mutually exclusive, so that often appear intertwined in the conflict situation. Notwithstanding, as the thesis looks upon the identity based conflicts, in the next section I will outline the characteristics of this approach.

3.3. Identity Conflicts

Rothman and Olson (2001) have observed that “the role of identity in international conflicts and conflict management has gained increased attention in the recent decades among the scholars and researchers” (289p). This became especially evident in the aftermath of the Cold War when in spite of the expectations of many scholars and researches the world “has not become a more peaceful place” (Ibid). This situation has

prompted the conflict studies to focus more on the newly emerged phenomena, in order to offer better explanation for their role in the international conflicts, and what is more to explore the possibilities of conflict regulation in the newly emerged circumstances. Conversely, up until recently, the researchers have been almost exclusively focusing on the resolution of the conflicts through addressing the question of satisfactory distribution of resources and interests, seen as of paramount conflict issues in the international relations. Nevertheless, the recent experiences from the Balkans and the Middle East for example, have exposed the limits of such approaches when the identities are at stake. As in a conflict situation is not excluded the possibility of occurrence of all three issues simultaneously, neglecting the identity aspect while addressing only resources and interests can even prove contra productive in the process of conflict management as it might further fuel the animosity between the parties in the conflict. The reason is, as Rothman and Olsen (2001) further argue that these traditional approaches of dealing with international conflicts are firmly rooted in the power-politics paradigm, and moreover, conflict resolution is often achieved by compromise (231p). Thus, it might empower one party at the expense of the other. However, since the identity, unlike the resources and interest, is often non-negotiable, it becomes clear that a new approach was needed as to address the identity-based conflicts more efficiently. This requires better understanding of the identity issues and the motives of the actors involved in conflicts to persistently sustain their positions.

Table I. Interest-Based Versus Identity-Based Conflicts

<i>Interest-based conflicts</i>	<i>Identity-based conflicts</i>
Issues are concrete and clearly defined. Desired outcomes are defined in terms of tangible interests and resources. Involve relatively agreed upon interpretations of the sources of the conflict and conditions for settlement.	Issues are abstract, complex, and difficult to define. Desired outcomes are intangible and difficult to identify. Involve interpretive dynamics of history, psychology, culture, values, and beliefs of groups that are often, at least initially, framed in ways that are mutually exclusive.

(Rothman and Olsen 2001: 298)

In order to understand the identity issues, one should look at preconditions that lead to their occurrence. Drawing on the insights of the social identity theory and complemented by the studies on political identity, the sense of collective identity which

is general predisposition of identity conflicts, to large extent affects the perception of the members of certain group (religious, racial, ethnic, etc) about the world around them. In that respect, the differences that occur between the members of the groups can often escalate into conflict if the members of one group perceive certain actions from the members of other group as a tread to their shared values, interests, needs, tradition or/and norms which are firmly embedded in the identity of the group. These aspects of identity are pertinent to the group by which they differentiate themselves from the others. Identity thus, is constructed on the base of the various traits and experiences (Kriesberg 2003).

Regarding construction of identities, there are mainly two strands of literature which depart from different perspectives in providing explanation. The first strand tends to see the salient characteristics of the individual identities, which later expand to group level (or in our case national level) as “primordial” qualities. Thus, the authors from this strand contend that identity is relatively ancient and very stable salient characteristic, hardly changeable over the time. On the other side are the authors who argue that identity is a social constructive process and in that respect identity is seen as “a kind of discursive performance that occurs in reference to the others in particular situation” (Fisher 1997: 25p) complemented with the interpretive dynamics of history, culture beliefs, values and interests (Rothman and Olsen 2001: 29p). The thesis draws on the on the last strand in the literature, considering national identities as a socially constructed phenomenon.

As noted, some aspects of identity often proved to be non-negotiable for both sides in the conflict which is to say that identity conflicts are particularly prone to become intractable (Kriesberg 2003: 2p). Intractable conflicts are usually defined as conflicts that “stubbornly seem to elude resolution, even when the best available techniques are applied” (Burques, Burques 2003: 2p). In the international relations the world has seen number of conflicts that have been sustaining quite long (for example, Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Kashmir, Sri Lanka etc.) Nevertheless, in spite of the negative connotation that the term may imply which is on the other hand in line with the opinions that the regulation of these conflicts are doomed from the outset, it has been argued by number of scholars that the intractable conflicts can still be transformed to

more constructive relations between the parties in the conflict, either as a result of endeavors of the parties themselves or the engagement of a “third party” that aims to reconcile them.

3.4. Factors shaping the course of conflict

There are many factors that determine the occurrence, persistence and the transformation of conflicts. Understanding those factors can greatly contribute to finding appropriate measures for transformation or/and eventually for settling down conflict situation. The factors that shape the course of conflict can be categorized into three groups: internal factors, relational factors and contextual factors. Each of them affects the conflict dynamics by means of changing the structural features of socio-political environment in which conflicts takes place.

Internal factors that shape the course of conflict pertain to dynamics of the domestic structural processes that largely determine the behavior of the disputant party, and the way in which the actions of the opponent are perceived. In Kriesberg’s opinion, these factors include for example level of economic development, cultural patterns, decision-making institutions and public opinion, and to great extent influence the processes of “self-conception and identity, what goals are formulated and the methods used to attain them” (Kriesberg 2003b: 2p).

Important role among these factors has public opinion as it exerts great influence on the actions of the political elites in relation to conflict. Likewise, the choices of action available to the political elites can be either limited or extended depending on the inclination of the public opinion, bearing in mind that the public support is crucial for the political elites to maintain their legitimacy as to stay in power in any democratic political system. Furthermore, the way in which the domestic decision-making process is structured can also greatly affect the course of the conflict. In a similar vein, greater inclusiveness of various domestic political actors, such as opposition leaders and academic analysts can contribute in shaping the type of political action towards the adversary in the conflict.

The structure of the relations between the parties in the conflict has also proven as a powerful factor which affects the course of the conflict. The differences between the adversaries in terms of economic resources, population size and of coercive power creates asymmetrical relation in which the more powerful country try to impose its perspective on the conflict over the other party, and moreover to present this perspective as an “objective” view to the outside world. In that respect, the discursive power that one of the parties possesses affects the perception of the other party in terms of anticipation of actions at the former.

However, the necessity of the cooperation between the countries in many fields creates a leeway where the situation that leads to intractability of the conflict can be lessened despite the intransigent and adversarial attitude towards each other. In today’s world of multifarious interdependence, the parties involved in a conflict very often develop relations of close cooperation in economic, social cultural and many others spheres in parallel with the ongoing conflict issue which is left to be of concern to the political elites to deal with. This kind of integration alongside with the conflict perseverance is often seen as a common ground where the disputants can be call on to engage in interactive dialogs, which can eventually lead to transformation of the conflict situation by learning the importance of cooperation.

As for the external actors and factors, Kriesberg (2003) has pointed out that “conflicts are not independent of the context” in which they take place. Thus, the external factors and actors play the role of agents of change on the contextual structure of the conflict which effect can vary in scope and impact (3p). The author especially emphasizes the role of the global norms and international organization in accounting for the impact they have on the course of the conflicts. Nevertheless, the influence of these external factors is to great extent contingent upon the perception of the disputants in relation to their legitimacy and appropriateness. Thus, depending on these parameters, the purposive diffusion of norms by international actors as well as the direct intervention of the international organizations as mediators or facilitators, can exacerbate, entrench or transform the conflict respectively.

In addition, it is worth taking into account the effect of the bridge-building concept which was developed to help in addressing the intractability of conflicts. The

premises that the concept is based on is in line with the idea of developing good relations between conflict parties, which is crucial in fostering the communication between the adversaries. In absence of good communication, the conflict can always potentially escalate. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that the adversaries will engage in a constructive dialog by simply asking them to do so. Instead, drawing on the insights of the social psychology, the parties in the conflict will develop closer relations between each other if they are assigned with a common task, or participate in joint projects (Ury 2004). The cooperation towards common goal can help greatly in building trust, which is essential in eliminating the stereotypes that frame the perceptions of the conflict parties. Also, through the process of social learning which derives from the cooperation, parties are being enabled to realize the importance of pooling the resources in the fight against the global treats such as terrorism, human trafficking and illegal migration drug trafficking and so on. In most of the cases, the external factors are those which create atmosphere of cooperation and thus promote good relations between the disputants. The role of the International Organizations in this respect is seen through their “disciplinary power” which enables them to assign the parties to joint projects pertaining to security, economic or other issues.

3.5. Europeanization and conflict regulation

Europeanization has become fashionable term which enjoys considerable popularity within the study of European integration. In that sense the concept of Europeanization has been largely used in accounting for the impact of the European norms and practices on the domestic political system (Vink 2002: 2p). However, despite the popularity of the term and the incremental use of the concept as an analytical tool over the years, the term still remains ambiguous and, what is more there is no shared definition between the scholars. The lack of scholarly consensus over the term and concept respectively, suggests that the definitions of Europeanization are dependable upon the context in which the concept is to be applied.

The literature of Europeanization discerns between two dimensions of the concept. The first one pertains to the change of national identity, institutional and policy practices caused by the impact of the EU norms and practices at member state level

(Borzal 1998; Olsen 2002; Risse 2001; Hix and Goetz 2000). The second dimension refers to the changes in non-member states which are strongly affected by the process of Europeanization through the enlargement and neighborhood policies of the EU (Grabbe 2002; Schimelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005; Noutcheva 2007; Vachudova 2007).

Evidently, the term “Europeanization” used in this sense denotes the process of diffusion of norms, values and practices where the European Union is a key player. This has prompted another group of authors to make distinction between the “Europeanization” and “EU-zation” (Nouthceva et al. 2004: 6) departing from the fact that beside the EU there are also other international organization which promote the idea of “Europeaness” such as Council of Europe, OSCE, etc.

The thesis for its purposes views the Europeanization as an EU driven process, which is to say that mainly looks upon the influence of specific EU policies on the “recipient” countries. However, the influence of the other actors in promoting the common “European” norms and practices will be recognized and will be taken into account appropriately.

Recently the scope of the Europeanization as an analytical tool has been expanded in context of conflict regulation. In the literature, the causal relationship between the Europeanization and conflict regulation has been analyzed by the EU BorderConf Project (see Stetter, Diez and Albert 2004) the Center for European Policy Study (see Coppieters et al. 2003) and the Jean Monett Group (see Axt, Milososki and Schwarz 2006). The first two approaches mainly concentrate on the impact of the Europeanization in context of border and secessionist conflicts. Even though these approaches are not quite applicable to the thesis’ case study, the general premises on which they operate can be used in the broader debate on Europeanization and conflict transformation. The third approach in that sense is more applicable as it focuses on the important role of the economic relations between the disputant countries as a main vehicle of building trust and affecting the course of the conflict.

According to Diez, Stetter and Albert (2004), the European Union can influence the course of conflict in four different ways. First, the European Union can use the conditionality mechanism in order to create a link between the rewards and sanctions on

one side and the progress in the conflict settlement between the conflict parties on the other side. Second possibility for the EU is to use its institutional integration structure as to provide framework in which through the integration will help creating a bridge between the political elites of the conflict parties. Third, the institutional integration structure can be used in creating bridge between the conflict parties in the societal sphere, thus providing opportunity for the relational factors to take place (29p). Finally, the European Union can have constructive impact on the conflict parties by inducing a change of identity in general (Axt, Milososki and Schwarz 2006: 6p). In addition, it has been pointed out that: “Europeanization in the field of secessionist conflict settlement and resolution should be understood as a process which is activated and encouraged by the European institutions, primarily the European Union, by linking the final outcome of the conflict to a certain degree of integration of parties involved in it into European structure. This link is made operational by means of specific conditionality and socialization mechanisms, which are built into Europeanization” (Noutcheva et al. 2004: 7p).

Nevertheless, the approach of the EU regarding the bilateral disputes in the context of enlargement process differs in terms of linking conflict’s final outcome to the integration dynamics. This is more evident when the bilateral dispute is between a member state and candidate member state, since the EU refrains to use its “hard” conditionality mechanism to affect the outcome of the conflict (Uilenreef 2010).

Drawing on the approaches outlined in the previous paragraph we can conclude that the conditionality enables the EU to diffuse specific norms and practices, which can exert considerable degree of influence on the course of conflict. Having said this, one can assume that the Europeanization in the context of bilateral disputes in the enlargement process mainly affects the course of the conflict through the process of *socialization and learning*. In this regard, the definition of Radielli (2004) on Europeanization seems more suitable since it draws on more comprehensive approach on the impact of norms and values. According to the author: „Europeanisation consists of processes of a) construction, b) diffusion and c) institutionalisation of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’, and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the EU policy process and

then incorporated in the logic of domestic (national and subnational) discourse, political structures and public policies“(Radielli 2004: 3).

The process of norm promotion as an agent of change of domestic political structures in the literature is explained by two different models drawing on the rationalists and constructivists accounts respectively: *external incentives model* and *social learning model*.

External incentives model departs from the assumption that the actors involved in the process of norm adoption are “strategic utility-maximizers interested in maximization of their own power and interests” (Schimelfennig 2005: 3) Thus, the norms are adopted on a base of cost-benefit calculation of the external incentives (rewards and sanctions) and the domestic costs of adoptions. As Schimelfennig further maintains, “a state complies with the norms if the benefits of the reward exceed the domestic adoption costs”. More specifically, the calculus approach is dependent on the balance between the size and credibility of the rewards on one hand and size of the domestic adoption cost on the other (Schimelfennig 2004: 4). This is say that the states follow the “logic of consequences” as a main rationale in the process of norm adoption.

External incentives model is inbuilt in the conditionality of the EU as a main vehicle for inducing change in the countries where the prospect of EU membership is given as an eventual reward if the country fulfills the established criteria for the EU membership. In this respect, conditionality plays an important role in “Europeanizing” the countries in the enlargement process (such as Macedonia) by changing the domestic political and institutional structures on the targeted country. Additionally, the model implies commitment of hierarchical politics which means that substantial pressure is exerted on the country to adopt norms and values (Axt, Milososki and Schwarz 2006: 6). The conditionally model is largely employed in explaining the process of norm adoption in the accession countries, and thereby the process at member state requires different model of explanation.

The social learning departs for a different logic in explaining the mechanism of norm adoption at domestic level. According to this model, the countries follow the “logic of appropriateness” in the process adoption the norms and values. Thus, instead

of cost-benefit analysis, the rationale is drawn on a base of cultural factors which determine whether the norms and values will induce change in the domestic context. The general proposition according to Schimelfennig is that “a state complies with the European norms if it is persuaded in their appropriateness (Schimelfennig: 2004: 5).

The social learning model is constituted mainly from three mechanisms: *imitation*, *argumentation and influence* (see for example Risse 2000; Checkel 2004; Johnson 2001).

The mechanism of imitation as part of the social learning model operates on the assumptions that the norms and values are established templates which help the actors in the international relations to understand their role in the world and moreover, to assume the behavior which is expected from them to conduct. The mechanism presumes that on the base of the appropriateness, the countries will adopt the practices of the “role model” (in this case the EU) as a way of appropriate behavior. Furthermore, the imitation in terms of providing an “example to be followed” by the European Union, is a central argument to account of the EU’s normative power, a concept which is developed by Ian Manners largely to explain the role and the influence of the EU in the international relations.

Social learning process can be also conveyed through argumentation. According to this mechanism, the countries are persuaded in the appropriateness of the norms by the power of “better argument”. This is to say that in an interactive dialog between the EU and the targeted country, the former seeks to provide sound arguments as to foster adoption of specific norms and values which eventually, induce changes in the domestic socio-political structures at the latter.

Finally, the influence of the actor that stems from the social status, popularity, respect, and positive image respectively can also induce the process of social learning as an agent of domestic change.

Additionally, another model was developed taking a middle ground between external incentives and social learning model - lessons learning model. This model takes into account both the calculus approach and cultural approach in adoption the norms and values, but the logic behind such action is different than in the two other

models. Namely, the states are seen as responsible actors that consider norms as pertinent to the national strategy. The proposition that can be drawn on base of this is: “A government adopts EU rules if it expects these rules to solve domestic policy problems effectively” (Rose 1969 cited in Axt, Milososki Schwarz 2006: 7)

Table 2: Instruments for exertion of influence for the EU

Exertion of influence	EU-Member	Non-EU-member
Hierarchical	Majority decisions Arbitrages Monetary fines Sanctions Exclusion	Sanctions Screening Conditionality Gate-keeping Transition arrangements Suspension clauses
Non-hierarchical	Models Argumentation Conviction Consulting Benchmarking Shaming Monitoring Financial assistance	Models Argumentation Conviction Consulting Shaming Twinning Benchmarking Monitoring Financial assistance

Source: Axt, Milososki and Schwarz (2006: 7)

As it can be seen from the table 2, the instruments for exertion influence by the EU are slightly different depending on whether it is exerted in a context of member state or non member state. What is clear is that in both cases the EU has efficient instruments through which can induce change of the domestic political, institutional and social structure.

4. Case study analysis: the bilateral conflict between Greece and Macedonia

4.1. Background of the conflict

The bilateral disagreement between Macedonia and Greece drew the attention of the world in the aftermath of the Yugoslavian dissolution in the beginning of the nineties. In this period, beside the violence that rampaged across the country fueled by the nationalistic movements, it has been created an opportunity for the Macedonian state to gain independence and thus to fulfill the national dream of creating its own sovereign state (Danforth 1995: 32). However, in parallel with the struggle of the newly born state to affirm its self as non-contested authority on its territory, worrying signals were coming from its southern neighbor regarding the international recognition of the country. Namely, Greece raised its objection towards international recognition of a state under the constitutional name “Republic of Macedonia” on the ground that it poses security treats to Greece and thereby, in their view, it will have serious security repercussions to the whole Balkan region. The arguments for such claims were elicited in line with the asserted exclusive right of Greece to use the term Macedonia for its own purposes (Shea 1997: 162). Moreover, the politics of denying international recognition was underpinned by questioning almost every aspect of Macedonian cultural and historic heritage which on the other hand heavily undermined the stability of the newly born state, making it more vulnerable to the internal and external treats (Spasenovski 2006: 5).

In objecting the right of usage of term Macedonia to the newly born state, various socio-political structures from Greek side (including the government, the Diaspora, non-governmental organization etc.) have began intensive international campaign presenting the Greek side of the “truth” through political advertisements in some of the most prominent media in the world such as New York Times, Washington Post, the Economist etc. (Danforth 1995: 54). As the Macedonian officials at these times have been primarily focused on the endeavors to re-affirm the state on the domestic and international scene, the general impression was that they did not respond to the challenge with equal intensity as to provide sound arguments in their own defense, as far as international diplomatic and media campaign is concerned. Thus the world in the early period has been informed largely from the arguments provided by the Greek side.

It should be noted that at the outset of the conflict in the early nineties, the problem was none other than “difference over the name of the state” (Kofos 1999: 125). Given this framing of the conflict issue, the Security Council of the UN issued the resolution UN S/RES 817/1993 in which stated that the disagreement between Macedonia and Greece “needs to be resolved in interest of maintaining peaceful and good neighborly relations in the region” (Dalis 1996: 147). Nevertheless, as it will be later become more apparent, the problem was far more complex as it involves cultural and identity related issues, which accordingly requires different approach and measures. Thus, the evolving crisis in the Greek-Macedonian relations have had detrimental effect on the wider Balkan region, especially when Greece imposed economic embargo to its northern neighbor in order to pressure Macedonian government for a solution of the conflict. The embargo was in force from March 1994 to September 1995, and it has produced extremely severe impact on the economic, political and security structures of the newly formed state.

According to Roudometof (2002), the name issue is a contemporary form of the so called “Macedonian Question” which has occurred in the nineteenth century, in the period of “awakening” of the national movements on the Balkan which saw their chances in light of the weakening of the Ottoman Empire to realize their dream of establishing a nation state within the borders of their “imagined communities” (Anderson 1991: 36). Thus, in the second half of the nineteenth century, the region was

fiercely claimed by all the neighboring nation-states which “used the educational system and the church as instruments to acculturate the population to their respective imagined community” (Roudometof 2002: 5). As the same author maintains, the conflict has appeared in the contemporary politics as a result of the conflicting ethnocentric *national narratives* of the both sides defined as “historical tales that refers to the evolution of a particular people through the ages” (Roudometof 2002: 7). In a similar vein, this trend illustrates the importance of the culture as a venue for political conflicts in the twentieth century (Wallerstein 1990 cited in Roudometof 2002: 6).

Hence, the dispute over the name between these two Balkan countries is to large extent result of the competing and different interpretations of historic facts, particularly in the parts concerned with the ancient history mainly related to the ancient Macedonian Kingdom and Alexander of Macedon (Shea 1997: 34). For both countries, these parts of the history are perceived as of great national importance which has been related to the national identities owing to the fact that both of them tend to extend the origins of its identity to ancient times and to incorporate the glorious historic heritage that the ancient Macedonian Kingdom bestows to its “legitimate” descendants.

6.1.2. Arguments of the both parties in the conflict

On the Greek side, the campaign against international recognition of its northern neighbor and denial of her national identity have been endorsed and carried out by various social-political structures (both state and non state). Thus, from the outset of the conflict active role have been taken by the Greek Orthodox Church, different organizations in the Diaspora, political parties and the government which in different ways and by different means have articulated the Greek argument in the conflict. The statements were summed up in the books of Shea (1997) and Danforth (1997)¹

From an analysis of the statements published as political advertisements in different international newspapers, travel advertisements, materials distributed by the Greek embassies across the world and pamphlets distributed by the Greek Orthodox Church it can be drawn several conclusion regarding the Greek position in the conflict:

¹ See appendix 2 at the end

- Any relation of Macedonia (FYROM) to the ancient Macedonian Kingdom has been contested and denied;
- The historic facts has been falsified and further fabricated in the national history of Macedonia, thereby creating “artificial” Macedonian nation after the Second World War.
- The creation of the Macedonian nation has been part of Tito’s expansionists plans on the Balkan;
- International recognition of Macedonia “would encourage aggression, increase tension destabilize Balkans and validate ‘shameless fraud’”
- Macedonia has no right to use this name since Macedonia is and it has always been region in Greece, in contrary Macedonia demonstrates territorial pretensions towards this Greek region.

Macedonian arguments in the conflict are presented as a response to the Greek denial of the right of usage of the name and different questions regarding the cultural relations to the kingdom of Alexander of Macedon, which from Macedonian side were perceived as threats to the national identity. In summary the arguments express the following concerns:

- The name Macedonian is part of the national identity of the country and any change regarding that would have negative implication for the country
- Macedonian tends to view its national history in continuity, dating back from the period of ancient Macedonia and Alexander the Great.
- The negotiation on the name would undermine the stability of the country, as the majority is against any concessions on the name
- The Greek veto on Macedonian accession in the Euro-Atlantic structures implies security threats in the whole region.

4.2. Bilateral relations between Greece and Macedonia

The relations between Macedonia and Greece can be analyzed in three periods, each of them having specific features that characterize the mutual relations between the two countries in different periods. Thus, the first period has been mainly characterized with the Macedonia struggle to gain international recognition of the state and the Greece objections in this respect. This period lasted from 1991 until signing the Interim Agreement in 1995, by which the openly manifested adversarial behavior by the two states in the early years has been changed, in terms of stabilization and normalization of the relations and creating conditions for development of closer relations and improvement of the mutual cooperation in several spheres, most notably, the economic one. The second period started in the aftermath of the Interim Agreement (1995) until the time when Macedonia acquired the status of candidate member state of the EU in 2005. In this period the general impression is that the relations between Macedonia and Greece can be marked as gradual improvement and further “normalization”. Significant progress has been made in the change of the perception at both sides which has increased the mutual trust encouraging the business sector to cooperate more closely. The third period has been marked by the endeavors of Macedonia to start the negotiations with the EU for accession. The Greek position in this latter period has returned to its hard lines regarding Macedonian accession into the EU without prior settlement of the name issue. However, the positive trend of gradual improvement of the relations, aside the name issues, has continued.

4.2.1. From the Independence to the Interim Agreement (1991-1995)

The disintegration of Yugoslavia has enabled the nationalistic movements on its former territory to articulate their dreams for gaining independence and establishing their own states. As the trend since the very beginning has been mark with violence (seen in the Croatian-Slovenian hostilities, and later on the Bosnia war) in order to prevent and regulate further security implications to the region, the EEC at that time, responded to this challenge by setting up conditions which were necessary to be fulfilled by the countries which aspire to become independent in order to gain international recognition. As for Macedonia, additional burden was the Greek objection to the recognition of its northern neighbor. Kofos (2000) has pointed out that the Greek

positions were to large extent result of the political climate that has emerged in the period after the traumatic war experiences (1940-9) especially in connection to the Macedonian Question which encompasses minority related issues (120p). Therefore, the changing political constellation on the north border has brought about some feeling of uncertainty, especially in times when the Greek-Turkish relations were “simmering” on the east (Kofos 2000: 127p). From Macedonian perspective, among the conditions for gaining international recognition set up by the EEC, especially cumbersome was the condition to be provided evidence that Macedonia does not have territorial pretensions to its neighbors, as it was perceived as realization of the Greece’s pressure on the European level for protection of her national interests. Namely, the European Community has added the following paragraph in the text of EU’s declaration on recognition of new states:

“The Community and its Member States also require a Yugoslav Republic to commit itself, prior to recognition, to adopt constitutional and political guarantees ensuring that it has no territorial claims towards a neighboring Community State and that it will conduct no hostile propaganda activities versus a neighboring Community State, including the use of a denomination which implies territorial claims.” (Resolution of the EC Council of Foreign Ministers, 16th of December 1991).

Eventually, after an exhausting debate in the Parliament as well as in the public, the Government decided to accept the Resolution. The explanation given by the Macedonian Foreign Minister at that time, Denko Maleski was that “Macedonia does not have any territorial pretensions towards Greece, nor it has conducted any propaganda activities that might offend its neighbors” (Nova Makedonija 1991). Hence, it has been argued that “accepting the Resolution does not mean that Macedonia is subdued to the criteria requested by Greece” (Nova Makedonija 1991: No. 16130). In addition, the Government has proposed constitutional amendments to the Parliament, as to confirm unequivocally that “Republic of Macedonia does not have any territorial pretensions towards any neighbor and it will not interfere in the sovereignty or internal matters to any of other states” (Nova Makedonija 1991: No. 16132). However, the opposition party VMRO-DPMNE has strongly objected the constitutional amendments on the ground that this is not other than a pressure from the EEC, protecting Greece’s national interests (Taleski, 2007: 48p).

In spite of the endeavors of the Macedonian officials to win recognition, the EEC has had difficult times to adopt common position towards Macedonia. Thus, contrary to the expectations of the Macedonian government and public respectively, the EEC Lisbon Summit has failed to reach a common position and to recognize Macedonia, mainly due to the objections of Greece. These developments had caused “bitter feelings” at the Macedonian side, which initiated uproar in the media and the public, uttering the dissatisfaction of the perceived “betrayal” from the EEC (Nova Makedonija 1991: No. 16371, 16335).

As for the Greek side, the EC Council Resolution from 16th of December 1991 was regarded as being in line with the effort of ensuring stability in the region, thus giving voice to the Greek concerns of eventual irredentism from Macedonian side. Given the wording in the text which refers to the “hostile propaganda”, in view of Greece, “its purpose was mainly to prevent fomentation of a minority questions, chiefly through pressure for the return of the Slav-Macedonians who had fled Greece in the period 1940-9”(Kofos, 2000: 128p). In addition, the President of Greece Constantine Karamanlis in the letter that was addressed to the leaders of the EC member states, outlined the security threats that the recognition of the newly born state under the constitutional name of “Republic of Macedonia” might pose on Greece and the wider region, whereas the cultural aspect of the issue related to the national identity was treated as a matter of secondary importance (Tziampiris, 2000: 213p).

It was in this period when the first attempts for mediation by the EC came forth. Thus, during the Portuguese presidency in 1992, the Portugal’s Foreign Minister Pinheiro was given a mandate from the EC Foreign Ministers Council, as to offer a solution on the dispute (Axt, Milososki and Schwarz 2006: 14p). In this respect, Pinheiro’s endeavors for solution, after repeated consultation with Skopje and Athens, resulted in two text- draft treaty and a letter from Macedonian government giving guarantees for fulfilling the “treaty” demands. The so called “Pinheiro package” included, inter alia, the following aspects: a) Mutual recognition of the existing borders; b) Restrain on the minority-related demands; c) Both parties to undertake measures as to prevent offensive action towards other party’s cultural and historic heritage. In order to tackle the name issue, Pinheiro proposed the name of “New Macedonia” for the

Former Yugoslav Republic. In spite of its previous hard position, the Macedonian government saw this proposal as worth taking into consideration. Nevertheless, the Greek government being stuck in its “hardliner competition with domestic opposition” rejected the proposal as inadequate (Axt Milososki and Schwarz 2006: 14p).

In the succeeding period additional efforts has been made as to broker a solution on the bilateral dispute, so the EU has been the key international actor and arena where the name dispute was taking place. Notwithstanding, these endeavors eventually indicated that EPC/CFSP institutional framework proved ineffective in brokering solution for the name dispute. Moreover, the Lisbon Resolution was seen as Greek instrumentalization of the EU policy, in line with its national interests which on the other hand undermined the EU negotiation capability in the dispute (Axt 1993: 72p). In doing so, Greece has been calling forth the “principle of solidarity” which in her view was about the preference of the EU for the Greek position, as contrary to the European Union notion of solidarity as shared preferences in the foreign policies among the member states.

The recognition of the Former Yugoslav Republic did not happen even on the EC Summit in Edinburgh which was clear signal for the Macedonian Government that the political constellation in the EC, bearing in mind the position of Greece as a member state seen in context of decision making process in the EC Council, was not in favor for the former.

The Greece’s security concerns that derive from international recognition of its northern neighbor under the constitutional name “Republic of Macedonia” was further raised against the Macedonian accession into the UN. In this respect, the new Greece’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Michalis Papakonstandinou, submitted a “memorandum” to the UN, opposing the admission to the UN of Macedonia, adding *inter alia* another issue to the dispute. Namely, in Greece’s view, controversial was the use of sun of Vergina on the Macedonian flag, which was perceived (also stated in the memorandum) as an act of “monopolizing” the history of ancient Macedonian Kingdom. All of the Greek arguments, including the usage of the ancient symbol, were taken into consideration by the UN when the Former Yugoslav Republic was admitted as a member of the UN. However, the admission did not happen without concessions by the Macedonian side. Macedonia agreed to be accepted by the provisional name “Former

Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” (FYROM) which met strong dissatisfaction by the opposition and the public. As a result, under the UN Resolution 817/1993, FYROM officially became member of the UN.

The motives of the Macedonian Government to make concessions for the sake of UN membership, could be best understood if one takes into account the development of the events in the region. The Bosnian war that rampaged across the region was a serious security threat both for Macedonia and Greece. Thus, as Macedonia at that time was extremely vulnerable due to external and internal factors, membership in the UN was considered as of utmost importance for “survival” of the state.

What is more, the Macedonian accession in the UN has had further implications for the bilateral conflict. Tellingly, this has created a leeway for the dispute to be transferred from the EU arena, to the UN where both countries were deemed equal. Consecutively, intensive negotiations followed under the auspices of the UN, led by Cyrus Vance and Lord Owen acting as mediators. The endeavor resulted in producing a text which was meant to regulate almost all aspects of the bilateral relations between Greece and Macedonia. As for a name, the mediators proposed the term “Nova Makedonija”, which is in fact Cyrillic transcription of Pinheiro’s proposal “New Macedonia”. In spite of the fact that at that time the draft treaty did not pass, the texts served as a basis for the Interim Agreement, except for the provisions which referred to a solution for the name issue.

4.2.2. The Interim Agreement and its impact on the bilateral relations

In the years following Macedonia’s recognition by the UN under a provisional name, several events in relation to the name dispute have had particular influence on the bilateral relations between the conflicted parties, mainly in the direction of additional exacerbation of the situation. Namely, in 1993 the results of the elections held in Greece, brought in power the leader of PASOK – Andreas Papandreu, known as a hardliner opponent of any compromise with Skopje over the name issue. Hence, the more moderate approach, which was showing signs of stepping back from Greece’s uncompromising position and preparedness for discussion of a compound name for her

northern neighbor, was not given appropriate chance (see Kofos 2001). Furthermore, the political climate in Greece regarding the name dispute was additionally exacerbated as of February 1994, after the USA recognized Macedonia under her constitutional name “Republic of Macedonia”. The developments of these events have contributed to large extent Greece to impose a total trade embargo over her northern neighbor in 1994. The decision was taken in light of the expectations that the embargo will put pressure on the newly born state as to make concessions regarding the Greek demands. Among the other arguments, the embargo was justified from Greek side on the ground of the Article 224 of EC Treaty which allows taking extraordinary measures by a member state, invoking the principle of solidarity in the following cases:

“... the event of war, serious international tension constituting a threat of war, or in order to carry out obligations it has accepted for the purpose of maintaining peace and international security.”(Article 224, EC Treaty)

Contrary to the Greek expectations for the effect of the embargo on the bilateral dispute, the reaction from the EU was in line with the condemnation that many Member States explicitly or implicitly manifested towards Greece’s policy in the region, in light of her image as a “trouble maker” (bearing in mind the restrained relations with Turkey, minority issues raised from neighboring countries, etc.). As a result, the European Commission opposed such measures, and tried to persuade Greece in the “inappropriateness” of the measures, which was seen as to have serious political, security and above all, economic implications for the new state as well as the region. After the negotiations between the European Commission and Greek Government did not succeed, the Commission for the first time in the history of the EU started legal proceeding against a member state (Greece in this case) before the European Court of Justice (ECJ), for infringement of provisions on free trade (Axt 1997a: 172p). Nevertheless, the proceeding was called off by the Commission in the succeeding period, in view of the fact that countries have reached an agreement for stabilization and normalization of the mutual relations which came after signing the Interim Accord in New York in 1994.

In spite of these developments, some important lessons were drawn by all concerned parties. Thus, it became clear that if the EU is to develop further the CFSP as a main foreign policy tool for achieving the established goals in the international

relations in terms of increasing its role as an important regional and global actor, the CFSP should not be held hostage of individual member state's national interests or domestic party politics. Greece's political leaders realized that the politics for isolation of its northern neighbor is not in compliance with the EU's policy goals in the international relations, and what is more, persistent pursuance of such objectives may result in isolation from its European partners, and "erosion of her image on the international stage" (Axt, Milososki and Schwarz 2006: 18p). Macedonian government for its part became aware of the discursive power of Greece in the conflict, mainly stemming from her position in the EU Council, which motivated the Macedonian politicians to seek solution for the conflict through the UN institutional framework instead of the EU one. This indicated that the EU was no longer seen as the most important factor in the bilateral dispute, which was mainly due to the perceived partiality from the Macedonian side, in light of the expectations that the UN can provide more "neutral" and objective approach. More importantly, the economic and business relations were seriously affected by the trade embargo, resulting to negative trade exchange between the countries. The lesson learned from this situation was that economic relations are far more important than any unresolved political issues between neighboring countries, as far as everyday life is concerned.

As noted, significant progress has been made with signing of the Interim Accord between Greece and Macedonia, by which the mutual relations between the disputed parties to large extent have been stabilized and normalized. However, it should be noted that the Interim Accord was mainly result of the political pressure that came from the USA, and corresponds to the change of the priorities in Macedonian foreign policy seen in the approximation with the USA's objectives.

In fact, the Interim Agreement indicates a change in the approach by the International Community for brokering solution for the political impasse in the mutual relations between the two countries. Namely, with the Interim Agreement the security issues were played down so that the emphasis is put on the cultural aspects of the problem and seeking for a "modus vivendi" as to circumvent the main impediment for developing good neighborly relations, tellingly the name issue. Thus, "the negotiations

for resolution of the core problem were postponed to an unspecified future date” (Kofos 2001: 137p).

The Interim Agreement regulates the most important aspects of the mutual relations between Macedonian and Greece, from which the both sides have gained advantages. The total trade embargo was finally lifted, which has opened the doors for unobstructed flow of “goods” and more importantly, for the Greek investors, which have helped in strengthening the Macedonian economy. The provisions of the Interim Agreement *inter alia* stipulate that Greece will officially recognize the country under the provisional name “Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” and gives guarantees not to hinder the accession of the country in the international organizations. In return, the Macedonian Government removed the Vergina Sun (royal symbol of the ancient Macedonian Kingdom) from its flag, on Greece’s demands which was seen from her part as stealing Greek national symbols. Moreover with the Interim Agreement the diplomatic relations between the countries were restored on a normal base. As for the security threats, which were the main Greek arguments against international recognition of Macedonia under the constitutional name, in the Accord, they were to a large extent played down on account of the cultural and identity related issues. With regard to the security issues, the provisions of the international law in respect to inviolability of the borders, territorial integrity as well as non interference in internal matters of the neighboring countries was reaffirmed by both signatory parties.

Even though the Interim Agreement did not offer ultimate solution for the conflict, its importance is seen through laying down solid foundations for bilateral cooperation, good neighborly relations and confidence building measures. Thus, the Agreement represents a cornerstone in the mutual relations between the two countries, and creates a framework for bilateral and multilateral cooperation in the political and economical sphere. This new chapter in relations between the countries also indicates significant changes in perception at both parties. On the Greek side, consolidation of its northern neighbor was seen as important security interest for Greece, in light of the developments in the broader region. On the Macedonian side, Greece began to be perceived more as a “strategic partner” than as a foe, which follows the Gligorov’s approach in the foreign policy established as early as 1993 (Taleski 2007: 63p).

In spite of the diplomatic rapprochement and improved cooperation on a bilateral level in many spheres, the confrontational rhetoric between the countries was still dominant in the succeeding period regarding the usage of the name Macedonia and the cultural and identity issues deriving from such actions. With reference to this, the general perception on the Greek side was that this “strategy” was primarily sponsored by the Macedonian Minister of Foreign Affairs at that time Ljubomir Frusckoski, whilst President Gligorov was considered as more moderate in regard to the name issue (Tziampiris 2000: 231p). In a similar vein, the Government in Athens continued its diplomatic mission of finding allies among European partners and on the global scene as to pursue its national(istic) interests.

In the aftermath of the Interim Agreement, the mutual relations between the countries has been following a positive trend, and it can be characterized as “economic dynamism” and “political pragmatism” (Axt, Milososki and Schwarz 2006: 20). For example, in the early years of the name dispute (1991-1993) the Greek direct investments are hardly noticeable, amounting less than 1 million USD. (Spesenovski 2006: 41p). The Greek export to Macedonia before the Interim Agreement in 1994 was USD 23.5 mill., but in 2004 reached 280 mill USD and it follows increasing tendencies. Macedonia also increased its export from USD 12.7 mill. to USD 237 mill. (see Jolevski 2005). This was made possible by keeping the name issue under a rug, while focusing on pursuing mutual interests in many areas which resulted in signing number of bilateral agreements between Greece and Macedonia for mutual cooperation in many areas such as policing, economy, regional integration, military etc.

4.3. The effect of Europeanization on the bilateral conflict

In the early phase of the name dispute the role of the EU was to large extent limited in terms of direct intervention in brokering a solution on the conflict. Mainly, this was because of the capability-efficiency gap in the EU’s foreign policy. Another factor that enhances Greece’s relative power in the bilateral conflict is its position as member state of the EU as well as in most of the international organization where Macedonia aspires

to become member. Thus, Greece's bigger discursive power in the conflict gives significant advantage to begin with, over its small and newly born neighbor on the northern border. Moreover, the packages for solution offered by Pinheiro (during the Portuguese Presidency with the EC Council) and later O'Neil (during the UK Presidency) have failed to put an end to the conflict in its early stage, allowing severe political and economic implications for Macedonia and the region respectively. This coincides with the period when the lack of "cohesive" and "focused" EU policy towards the Western Balkan, including Macedonia was general definition of the EU presence in the region (Panagiotou 2008: 13p). Hence, the EU capability to exert influence on these countries was limited in terms of promoting norms, values practices which on the other hand, could have had impact on the process of finding solution for the name dispute. It was the developments in the region with broader security implications, tellingly the Kosovo crisis, NATO bombings in Serbia that spurred the EU to rethink its position towards the Western Balkans, and consecutively to acknowledge the necessity of more "hands on" approach in the region as to address the security threats in its own backyard (Ibid). This necessity resulted in creation of a strategy which offered the prospect of closer European integration to the countries as an incentive for the reform process in accordance to the EU normative system. In respect to this, the EU has created the Stability Pact for the South Eastern Europe, and the succeeding Stability and Association Process as main vehicles through which the Europeanization of the region – including Macedonia- has been carried out. As for Greece, the change of the policy in relation to the name issue follows different logic and hence, it has been carried out through different instruments, with regards to Greece's different position.

4.3.1. Europeanization and the factors shaping the course of the conflict

As noted earlier in the thesis, there are number of factors that shape the course of the conflict. It was further discerned between the factors that induce changes in the domestic structures, relational structures and external or contextual factors, respectively. Therefore, the next task of the thesis will be to outline the norms, values and practices in the EU policy which are viewed as to have particular impact on the

conflict regulation in the case under scrutiny. As we have seen from the previous part, the EU has many instruments at its disposal through which influence on the targeted country can be exerted. However, accounting for the influence on the domestic political, institutional and social structure requires more extensive analysis which, on the other hand might defocus the research scope of the thesis. Therefore, I will focus the analysis on the European norms and standards that in particular shape the relational factors between the conflict parties. In this context, the Europeanization is seen as driving force that has significant influence on the factors outlined in the previous section and thereby, it affects the course of the conflict.

Drawing on the bulk of literature on Europeanization which deals especially with regional promotion of peace and stability, the thesis will look at the impact of the *principles of good neighborliness, regional cooperation and solidarity* on the conflict transformation. That is to say that these particular principles will be employed as to serve as *independent variables* in accounting for the impact of the Europeanization on the conflict transformation, since adoption of these principles may contribute to rapprochement between the parties as a desirable precondition for successful conflict regulation.

4.3.1.1. The principles of good neighborliness and regional cooperation

The principle of good neighborliness is a universal concept, incorporated in the preamble of the Charter of United Nations. Thus, the UN member states commit themselves to “practice tolerance and live together with one another as good neighbors”, in the endeavors for international peace and security while abstaining from use of force (Charter of the UN). Also, the commitment to promotion of good neighborly relations was also declared in the founding document of the OSCE (CSCE) by calling on the member states “to promote mutual understanding and confidence, friendly and good-neighbourly relations among themselves, international peace, security and justice” (CSCE Helsinki 1975: Chapter 9). Having in mind that all EU member states are at the same time members in these organization, the EU has firmly

endorsed the principle and has been successfully promoting it as a mean of preventing and maintaining peace and security in its near abroad.

With reference to the enlargement process, the EU has introduced the concept of good neighborliness in 1991 in the “Pact on the Stability in Europe”, also known as a “Balladur Plan” which focused on the countries from Central and Eastern Europe (Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Czech Republic, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia and Slovakia). The bilateral disputes between these countries, mainly related to minority issues, have posed serious treats to the stability in the region and especially to their endeavor to join the EU. Therefore, it became clear that in parallel with the reform process, these issues need to be address appropriately. In a response to this need, the countries have decided to organize regional round table “with the aim to create favorable conditions for good neighborly relations” (Uilenreef 2010: 10p). The countries have been also encouraged to conclude bilateral agreements in respect to human rights and minority issues, in order to improve the mutual relations. However, as Kelly (2003) has pointed out, the progress in the reform process was mainly carried out in respect to the EU conditionality.

The importance of good neighborly relations was further emphasized in the “Agenda 2000” of the Commission report in 1997, which reiterated the position of the EU that prior to accession the candidate countries should resolve the outstanding bilateral issues with other countries.

As for the Western Balkan countries, the promotion of good neighborly relations has become imperative of the EU foreign and enlargement policy. Moreover, the necessity of establishing peace and security in the war thorn societies in the countries of former Yugoslavia, has further accentuated the endeavors for developing mutual relations between these counties built on mutual trust and cooperation. Given the complexity of the situation in this region in terms of coping with the challenges in the reform process, the European Union has forged the Stabilization and Association Process, which was based on the Pact on Stability in Europe introduced in the previous enlargement round.

In addition, the Heads of State and Government of the countries participating in the South East European Cooperation Process (Romania, Bulgaria, Turkey, Albania, Greece and Macedonia), in 2000 in Bucharest have signed the Charter of good neighborly relations, stability, security and cooperation in Southeastern Europe. In the preamble, the countries declared their determinacy “to further work together to create in our region conditions for the prosperity of our nations in an environment of peace, security, good neighborliness and stability” (Charter of good neighborly relations 2000).

The Conference of European Union Council held in Thessaloniki in 2003 is considered crucial for the membership perspective of the countries from the Western Balkans. In the Presidency conclusion, it was clearly confirm that the EU fully supports the European perspective of these countries, but in order to advance the reform process, they should work more closely for developing good mutual relations in the region. Furthermore, the Summit in Thessaloniki has introduced the regional integration as an initial step to join the EU. However, it was made clear that the assessment of the countries would be done on individual base, meaning that the regional approach will not be applied in the accession process as in the previous rounds of enlargement.

Development of regional cooperation as a mean of promoting security and prosperity has also been addressed by the European Commission in its policy paper from 2005, when it was pointed out that it corresponds to a commitment made by the countries of the region at the Zagreb Summit (2000) and Thessaloniki Summit (2003). Regional cooperation between the countries is much needed in terms of establishing political stability, security and economic prosperity (EC Policy Paper 2005). Therefore, in the Stabilization and Association Agreements, by which the EU establishes contractual relations with each country in the region, it is given central place to building closer regional ties between the countries. As a specific requirement in the SAA, regional cooperation is seen as precondition for the countries to join the EU. Or in words of the Enlargement Commissioner Oli Rehn: “rapprochement between with the EU will go hand in hand with the development of the regional cooperation” (Oli Rehn 2005). In that respect, the Progress Reports on the candidate countries contain

assessment of the countries' commitment to the principles of regional cooperation and good neighborly relations.

The principle of solidarity, in its broader sense, refers to actions of members of particular group which take into account the interests of other members and the group as a whole (Eurofond 2009). Within the European Union the solidarity principle is recognized as a one of the founding values. Thus, alongside the values of respect for human dignity, liberty, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, it has been noted that “the societies of the Member States are characterised by pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men” (Europa; Scadplus 2009).

The principle of solidarity within the EU derives from the mutual practice among the member states, especially in the context of social rights protection, under the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. However, the effect of principle has spilled over other common areas. Thus, article 11 of the EU-treaty defines the aim of the CFSP as “protection of common values” and further, “protection of peace and the fortification of the International Security considering to the principles of the United Nations Charta and also to the principals of the Helsinki Final Act and the aims of the United Nations Charta of Paris”.

Nevertheless, the solidarity principle is also an ambiguous concept due to the versatile interpretations by the member states. Thus, many member states often invoke the principle of solidarity to serve as a cloak of their intentions to pursue their own national interests in context of bilateral relations with third countries. Among the bulk of cases in this respect, we can point out on the most recent one, when Slovenian Prime Minister Borut Pahor in light of the border dispute with Croatia, stated that the European Union should protect the interests of its member states, not those of the third countries (BBC News 2009).

4.3.2. Macedonia: from “equal distance” to a good neighbor

With reference to the name dispute, the Europeanization in the Macedonian case can be best seen through the analysis of the principles guiding the Macedonian foreign

policy over the years. In this sense, the official doctrine of the Macedonian foreign policy in the early years of its independence was epitomized in the term “equal distance” in the relations with the neighboring countries (Tziampiris 2000; Danforth 1997; Shea 1996; Taleski 2006; Spasenoski 2007). The main promoter of the doctrine was President Gligorov who endorsed such politics as a response to the number of issues that the neighboring countries raised against Macedonia after the country declared its independence in 1991. In summary, Serbian nationalistic movements objected the existence of Macedonian nation. In a similar vein, Bulgaria contested the existence of Macedonian nation and Macedonian language, because, in view of Bulgaria, Macedonia is de facto inhabited by Bulgarians and consequently, the language spoken on this territory is Bulgarian dialect. Greece raised its voice against recognition of a state under the name “Republic of Macedonia” on a ground that such country might have territorial pretensions towards its region with the same name and contested some parts of the Macedonian history. The relations with Albania were to large extent characterized through the so called “Albanian Question” in the region, having in mind the large percentage of ethnic Albanians living in Macedonia. Having said this, the doctrine of “equal distance” was defined as “cooperation with the neighbors but still keeping a safe distance” (Gligorov, interview in Nova Makedonija 1992).

Needless to say, the doctrine was not in accordance to the European norms and practices of conducting foreign policy based on the principles of good neighborly relations and close cooperation. Nevertheless, the doctrine of “equal distance” was deemed necessary choice by the government in Skopje so that the small landlocked country survives in the “hostile” environment (Panagioutou 2008; Taleski 2006; Tziampiris 2000; Kofos 2003). The change of the doctrine and its approximation to the European norms and practices was determined by two preconditions that was necessary to be fulfilled: a) change in the environment; and b) change in the domestic political structures. As noted, the change took place after the EU adopted more focused and cohesive policy towards the region. For the non-member states (Albania, Bulgaria and Serbia) this policy was carried out mainly through the Stability Pact and SAP.

Prior the SAP, Macedonia was integrated in the PHARE program immediately after signing the Interim Agreement. The PHARE program provided significant development aid for the Macedonian Government, but more importantly, it conveyed the political message that the EU is willing to upgrade the relations with the country, offering the prospect of closer integration. Simultaneously, the EU initiated negotiations with Macedonia for signing the Cooperation Agreement, which was seen as “the first important stage in Macedonia’s European course” (Kondonis 2003: 20p). The Cooperation Agreement was finally signed on 27 April 1997, and became effective as of 1st of January 1998, for a period of four years.

The SAP was initiated by the EU as a “framework for negotiations with the Western Balkan countries all the way their eventual accession” (European Commission, 2006). Its aim is to stabilize the countries and encourage their “swift transition” to a market economy, to promote regional cooperation and offer the prospect of membership in the EU (Ibid). As through the SAP the EU provide helps to countries in capacity building to adopt the EU law and international standards, it becomes clear that the SAP is a main vehicle through which the EU creates entry points for promoting the principles of regional cooperation and good neighborliness in the aspiring countries. Thus, it significantly influences the course of Macedonian foreign policy, aligning it to the EU’s norms and standards in this area.

The Stabilization and Accession Agreement (SAA) was signed on 9th of April 2001, by which the relations between the EU and Macedonia has been regulated on a contractual level. Within the SAA the EU asserted its “readiness to integrate to the fullest possible extent the [FYR of Macedonia] into the political and economic mainstream of Europe [...] on the basis of the Treaty on European Union and fulfillment of the criteria defined by the European Council in June 1993, subject to successful implementation of this Agreement, notably regarding *regional cooperation* (emphasis added)” (Stabilization and Association Agreement 2001: 6p).

Given that the armed conflict in Macedonia, between the Macedonian security forces and Albanian rebels was going on at that time, the enactment of the SAA was implicitly linked to the outcome of the conflict. In a similar vein, the promotion of the norms that pertain to enhancing regional cooperation in the succeeding period was

mainly through the model of external incentives, given the prospect of the EU membership as an ultimate reward. With reference to the regional policy, the SAA puts an emphasis on the trade matters in the framework of the regional cooperation and good neighborly relations (Kondonis 2003: 76p).

It is especially noteworthy that significant rapprochement between the disputed countries was made during the Greek EU Presidency in the first half of the 2003, given that the Western Balkan, which includes Macedonia was one of the priority areas on the agenda. In this respect, the Greek EU Presidency stressing the importance of the regional cooperation as well as continuation and full implementation of the SAA with the EU has re-affirmed the European future of the Western Balkan. What is more, the SAA was ratified by the Greek Parliament on 27 May 2003, which indicates for the positive climate in the Greek-Macedonian relations, bearing in mind that this was the first international joint agreement with FYROM (Kondonis 2003: 77p).

The “positive climate” in the Greek Macedonian relations was also well acknowledged in the Greek and Macedonian media respectively. Thus, in the Macedonian media was announce (even though with considerable dosage of suspicion) a new era of the Greek Macedonian relation where Greece was no longer seen as a foe, but rather as a “strategic partner” towards the European future and great supporter of the integration process in Macedonia (Dnevnik 2003). In this situation, a quantum of hope emerged that the name issue may be resolved in a near future. However, these predictions proved way too optimistic.

Since the SAA was enacted in 2004, the progress of the country regarding the approximation to the EU norms and standards has been assessing annually in the EU Commission’s reports. Moreover, the implementation of the provisions of the Ohrid Framework Agreement, which brought to an end the armed conflict in 2001, is one of the main objectives of the EU policy in Macedonia within the framework of the SAP. Considering the EU’s active role in negotiations for the Ohrid Framework Agreement, it can be seen as build around the core norms of the EU (Bjorkdahl 2005: 272p). Hence, the implementation of the provisions unambiguously induces changes in the domestic political structure in terms of approximation of the country to the EU standards.

The Commission's progress reports for Macedonia, with regards to the regional cooperation and maintaining good neighborly relations indicate constant progress, including the relations with its southern neighbor (EU Commission progress reports 2006; 2008). However, this statement is only true if the unresolved name issue is omitted from the assessment. Regarding the outstanding bilateral dispute over the name, the EU has reiterated its position that "[...] negotiated and mutually acceptable solution to the name issue, under the auspices of the UN, remains essential" (EU Commission Report 2008: 23p).

4.3.3. Greece: from a “trouble- maker” to a role model in the region

In the early years of Greek membership in the EU, the process of Europeanization of Greek Foreign Policy was mainly characterized through the retrenchment of the previously determined *ethnika themata* (issues of national importance) and the inflexibility of the government in Athens to align it with the European norms, values and standards in respect to this (Iokimidis 1999: 25p). Thereby, the Europeanization in this phase was perceived by the Greek officials as well as the academia as having constraining effect on Greek foreign policy (Floudas 2001; Tziampiris 2000, Ioakimidis 1999). The divergences between Greek government and the EU were pronounced in the position of the both parties regarding some issues in the regional and international relations, most notably the Turkey's integration, Cyprus issue, (New) Macedonian Question and the policy towards Serbia. With reference to this, Greece has tried to persuade its European partners that “the development of the EU-Turkish relations should be conditional upon the progress of the Greek-Turkish relations” (Agnantopoulos 2010: 10p). On the other hand, Greece was pushing hard for integration of the Greek Cyprus into the EU in spite of the unresolved conflict on the island. Moreover, Greece was objecting the international recognition of Macedonia under its constitutional name, maintaining that it might have security implication for Greece and the whole region, respectively (Ioakimidis 1999, 2001p). Regarding the EU policy towards Serbia, Greece as a traditional ally of the country, expressed its disapproval considering the policy as being “anti-Serbian biased” (Agnantopoulos 2010: 10p).

Having said this, the image of Greece among its European partners was mainly defined as problematic (Ioakimidis 1999; Stavridis 2009; Kouveliotis 2001; Pagoulatos 2002).

Notwithstanding, the recent change in the Greek foreign policy clearly indicates that the EU membership has had significant influence on re-defining Greek positions and attitude towards the respective issues. In view of Agnantopoulos (2010), this change was mainly result of the “reactive adaptation” in the early stage as well as the “significance of the constitutive effects” later on, of the Greek FP against the EU’s influence (11p). It is important to stress, however, that the drivers of change were both political and formal legal pressures that the EU have exerted on Greece.

As for the formal legal instruments used to be exerted pressure, a blatant example was the legal proceedings that the EU initiated before the ECJ against Greece, regarding the Greek embargo over Macedonia. This was first time the EU Commission to bring a member state in front of the ECJ for breaching Community provisions (Axt 1997: 28p). The effect of such action by the EU Commission has resonated in the Greek domestic political structures, amplifying the voice of the opponents against such policy.

The political pressure by the EU could have been seen through disregarding Greece’s preferences in the decision making process on the issues where the position of both parties were divergent. For example, the decision for imposition embargo over Serbia, disregarded the objection of Greece, as it was made by qualified majority based on article 113 of the Treaty of Rome (Regulation EEC 1432/92 and EEC 990/93) by which the EU bypassed the lack of explicit “competence to impose sanctions” (Agnantopoulos 2010: 12p). In a similar vein, the Greek objections with regards to establishing custom union between the EU and Turkey were neglected, sending strong message to the policy makers in Athens that the policy objectives of the Greek FP need to be more attuned to the European ones.

An obvious change in the Greek policy towards the Balkan can be seen in the promotion of the functional and regional integration schemes as a mean of improving multilateral relations in the region, which on the other hand can well contribute to resolution of the outstanding issues between countries. Nevertheless, the cooperation between the “traditional” adversaries was not an easy task. Eventually, this was made

possible by concluding large number of bilateral and multilateral agreements for regional cooperation, which induced change in the political discourse in the respective countries towards mutual rapprochement. The idea behind these initiatives can be well explained through the statement of Greece's foreign minister at that time- George Papandreou, saying that:

“[The] frequent contacts among common people as well as between academics, business and journalists, can contribute decisively to the reduction of mutual suspicion [...] It has been possible for implacable enemies to overcome their mutual hatred and cooperate harmoniously in the context of the European Union [...]” (Papandreou 1999)

With reference to above, we should stress that in 1999 nine bilateral agreements for mutual cooperation between Greece and Turkey were signed in different policy areas such as economy, policing, judiciary, ecology (Diamantopolou 2005: 23p) . In 1998 an agreement between Greece and Bulgaria was signed, by which it was established a NESTA River cross border cooperation scheme between the Drama (Greece) and Gotse Delchev (Bulgaria), emulating the integration scheme of the EU which can be seen from the following statement:

“Today we are in a position to offer a model for co-operation within the framework of a unified Europe [...] The association is paying attention, copying, learning from, following up and implementing all the developments and policies of cross-border co-operation practices that apply all over Europe, within internal and external border regions” (Diamantopoulou 2005: 26)

What is more, the integration scheme of the EU has served as a template for creation the institutional set up of the South East European Cooperation Process, with a mission to foster the regional cooperation among the Balkan countries. The SEECP was established in 1996 and it was considered as “a genuine Balkan cooperation forum which focuses on political cooperation and dialog, covering a wide range of issues from security, economic cooperation, justice and home affairs, humanitarian social and cultural cooperation” (Delevic 2007: 18p). The importance of this initiative was seen in the fact that SEECP was not result of any political pressure from outside, but rather, during the Greek Presidency, it has been stated that: “solutions to the problems in the region should emanate from the region” (Delevic, 2007: 19p). Furthermore, the SEECP

has to large extent contributed to normalization and stabilization of the relations among the neighboring countries, thus promoting the principle of the good neighborliness as *modus vivendi* in the region. This has given legitimacy to the SEECP and it has been recognized by the EU as a “voice of the region” (General Affairs Council Conclusion, 19 November 2001). As a result, the EU has established the Troika (system of governance) in the endeavor to coordinate the regional initiatives between the representatives of the EU commission, Stability Pact and the SEECP (Ibid).

The trend of regional integration has continued in the succeeding period. With regards to economic integration it is worth noting that the Western Balkan countries has signed the Central European in 2006, which was expected to be the main vehicle in promoting the EU normative system in the region (Gray 2007: 4p). In Gray’s (2007) opinion, “European norms could be adopted through regional cooperative initiatives, each country helping the other through the CEFTA process” (6p). In this manner, the countries from the region are to be assigned with the task of developing feasible economic structures, which will help considerably in the approximation to the EU standards in this field.

Greece on its side has developed a leadership in number of initiatives for integration in many spheres, most noticeable being the one in the energy sector where the need for cooperation was more than desirable given the small capacity of the infrastructure in this sector.

5. Conclusion

With reference to the criteria for classifications of conflicts, several conclusions can be drawn from the case study analysis. Regarding the conflict dynamics, the bilateral dispute between Greece and Macedonia unequivocally falls in the scope of non-violent conflicts since the adversarial behavior of the parties does not pass the threshold of physical violence. According to the typology of non-violent conflicts, in the early years the behavior of the countries took the form of manifest conflict, taking into account the economic sanctions imposed by Greece over Macedonia. In the latter phase however, the adversarial behavior does not exceed the frames of a *latent conflict*. Furthermore, drawing on the subjectivist's conflict classification with focus on perceived incompatibilities between the countries, the bilateral dispute between Macedonia and Greece can be characterized as an *identity conflict*.

Despite the evident rapprochement between Greece and Macedonian and developed closer cooperation in almost every sphere (including diplomatic, economic, educational, security, energy and many others) the backbone of the disagreement has remained unresolved. Namely, the name issue still occupies large space of the political discourse in the countries, and what is more, if the progress is to be measured only with reference to the name issue, one can easily conclude that no significant step forward is made. The improvement however, was only made possible by bypassing the name issue and postponing the resolution for an unspecified future period.

In the beginning of the conflict, the behavior of the countries towards each other was by far more adversarial. As it could be seen from the analysis, Greek government was objecting establishing new state on the northern border. In light of the Macedonian struggle to win international recognition, the government in Athens was arguing that the state on its northern border is not viable, and therefore, Greece's diplomats were trying

to persuade their European counterparts to reconsider the eventual decision for recognizing this former Yugoslav republic. In this period, the main arguments raised by Greece were in line with the perceived security threats from Macedonia, arguing that the usage of the name implies territorial pretensions to its northern territories with the same name. In terms of conflict regulation, such framing of the conflict issue was not cumbersome at all. The Greek concerns were addressed by amending the contested articles in the constitution of Macedonia, which were pointed that imply interference in the internal affairs of the neighboring countries. The second framing of the conflict issues by the diplomats from the both sides was related to the derived questions of identity issues. This framing proved as a main factor that led to intractability of the conflict, since it involves cultural aspects which are difficult to negotiate.

The early attempts of the EU for mediation in the conflict were not successful. Moreover, the general impression in this period was that Greece managed to exert considerable degree of influence on the EU policy towards Macedonia. Hence, it could be argued that Europeanization in this case was from the “bottom-up”. What is more, the Greek instrumentalization of the EU policy was not in line with the EU interests, but rather promotion of interests of a member state. Thus, it has become clear that the EU needs to develop more consistent and influential framework, both within the EU and the CFSP, as to be able to pursue its interests more efficiently. The lack of such focused and consistent policy framework was the main reason why the influence of the EU on the countries from the Western Balkans was to large extent limited in its scope and effectiveness.

The need for policy framework towards the Western Balkans was further accentuated by the developments with regards to the Bosnian war, Kosovo issue, and Serbian political situation. The emerging political situation required intervention in traditional understanding, something that only the US was able to provide in that period. Thus, in order to prevent further security implications for the regions and wider, the US undertook firm policy actions underpinned by military power having at its disposal. With regards to this, it is worth noting that the trade embargo was lifted largely as a result of the political pressure from the US on Greece, resulting with signing of the Interim Agreement in 1995.

With the Interim Agreement the relations between the Macedonia and Greece have began to normalize and stabilize at least on the diplomatic level. This has opened the doors for the Greek investors in Macedonia. The investment was necessary for enhancing the fragile economy of the former Yugoslav republic, which contributed to viability of the country.

In the succeeding period, the EU has began to develop more consistent policy framework for the Western Balkans, as it became clear to the decision-makers in Brussels that in order to keep the prosperity within the EU, it must be addressed the security threats in the neighborhood. Most noticeable step in this direction was offering the prospect of integration in the EU structures. At the beginning, the prospect was offered to limited extent, but latter for the successful countries which will fulfill the Copenhagen criteria was offered full membership. Main vehicle through which the EU exerts its influence in terms of promoting norms, standards and practices were the regional initiatives for cooperation.

The most prominent and influential policy framework was the SAP. Accentuating the need for regional integration, prior to joining the European family the EU has considerably changed the environment in the Western Balkans. The regional frameworks for cooperation have also had perpetual effect. Hence, the countries themselves set out their own initiatives for regional cooperation, using the templates of the EU. This corroborates that the Europeanization in the region was on the way.

Nevertheless, the analysis of the case-study has demonstrated that the Europeanization has limited effect on the countries involved in bilateral conflicts. Indeed, larger degree of Europeanization of the countries in the conflict means closer ties and cooperation which contributes to building mutual trusts between the adversaries. Moreover, being part of the enlargement process also means attuning the objectives of the foreign policy to the European values and standards which can have preventive role in emerging conflict.

However, the capacity of the Europeanization should not be overestimate. The impact the Europeanization has on the conflict resolution is to large extent dependent on the conflict issues and the dynamics of the conflict situation. As the analysis

demonstrated, the impasse between Greece and Macedonian was resolved by external political pressure from the United States. It was only after this intervention in traditional understanding, when the effects of the Europeanization become more potent and influential as to shape the course of the conflict, hence contributing to further rapprochement between the disputant parties.

As a general conclusion, this thesis argues that the effects of the Europeanization on the bilateral conflict between Greece and Macedonia has had great impact leading to rapprochement and building mutual trust between the countries, which has contributed to normalization and stabilization of the mutual relations in the European spirit, based on good neighborliness and close cooperation. Notwithstanding, the Europeanization in the contexts of conflict regulation yields best effects in conjunction with interventions by the traditional “military” powers such as United States, especially when the conflict regulation efforts reach deadlocks.

7. Executive Summary

The purpose of this thesis was to examine the potentials of the Europeanization in the context of conflict regulation. In doing so, the thesis departs from the idea that the environment, in which the conflict between the countries takes place, has great influence on the course of the conflict. These assumptions are underpinned by the “transformational” power of the European Union epitomized in the terms Europeanization. The Europeanization thus, by inducing changes at domestic level, can have perpetual effects in terms of inducing changes in the broader region. Given that central place in the EU’s policy towards the region take the norms of good neighborliness and regional cooperation, the aim of the thesis was to analyze these particular norms and values embedded in the EU’s foreign policy. In trying to account for the impact the effect of the Europeanization has on the bilateral conflict, the thesis asks the question: *To what extent Europeanization affects the course of the conflict between Macedonia and Greece by changing the environment in which the conflict takes place hence, contributing to conflict regulation?* Furthermore, in order to better structure the analysis, the following sub-questions were posed:

- How can the conflict be classified?
- How the conflict issues were framed over the year?
- What was the impact of the frames on the conflict regulation?
- Which EU policy instruments have had particular influence on the disputant parties?

Answering these questions requires theoretical framework which will be capable to live up to this challenge. Therefore, I have constructed theoretical framework, consisted of the following concepts:

- Conflict definition and classification;

- Framing conflict issues;
- Identity conflicts;
- Factors shaping the course of the conflict;
- Europeanization and conflict regulation

After the theoretical framework was outlined, the thesis proceeded with the actual analysis of the bilateral conflict and the effects of the Europeanization in that respect.

The analysis was conducted following the principles of the qualitative research, underpinned by a qualitative content analysis which was employed in the process of data collection and data interpretation. Its contribution was of valuable importance, because it equips the researchers with substantial knowledge to understand and to interpret the messages that the particular statement, official documents and the media outputs conveys from the sender to the receiver of the message. This kind of analysis was employed in the analytical part in accounting for the impact the Europeanization has on the course of the conflict. In terms of time frame, the subject of analysis was the period for the Macedonian independence (1991) to the time of completion the data collection in the thesis (September 2010).

The results of the analysis were outlined in the conclusion of the thesis. In summary, the thesis concludes that the Europeanization, by means of promotion the norms and principles of good neighborliness and regional cooperation in the Western Balkan, contributes to rapprochement between Macedonian and Greece, leading to closer bilateral cooperation and increasing the mutual trust between the countries. This was evident from the analysis of the bilateral relation between the countries, accounting for the change in the principles guiding the foreign policies of the both countries.

However, as the analysis has shown, the effect of the Europeanization is limited, and the Europeanization best works in conjunction with interventions in more traditional understanding, especially when the conflict regulation efforts reach deadlock.

6. References

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Appendix 1:

News articles

- Cf. "Macedonia is for friendship and good neighborly cooperation" in Nova Makedonija No 16028, Saturday 7 September 1991, p. 2.
- Cf. "Lets vote for the dignity of Macedonia" in Nova Makedonija No 16209, Sunday 8 September 199, p. 2
- Cf. "Request for recognition of Macedonia" in Nova Makedonija No 16115 Tuesday 3 October 1991, p. 1 and 3
- Cf. "Recognition of the independence of the Republic on 15 January" in Nova Makedonija No 16130 Wednesday 16 December 1991, p. 7.
- Cf. "Accepting the documents - confirmation of the wish for independence" in Nova Makedonija No 16132 Friday 20 December 1991, p. 2.
- Cf. "Additional amendments for changing the Constitution" in Nova Makedonija No 16138 Thursday 26 December 1991, p. 1.
- Cf. "Macedonia wants repatriation from EC" in Nova Makedonija No 16210 Tuesday 8 March 1992, p. 1.
- Macedonia and the Balkan Wars" in Nova Makedonija No 16371 Thursday 20 August p. 2.
- Cf. "We do not give the name Macedonia" in Nova Makedonija No 16339 Saturday 18 July p. 15.
- Cf. "We will never give up the name" in Nova Makedonija No 16355 Tuesday 4 August 1992, p. 1.
- Cf. in "Nova Makedonija" No 16862, "Economical stabilization - condition for prosperity", Friday 31.12.1993, p. 2.
- Cf. in Nova Makedonija No 16961, "Cooperation with Greece our permanent policy", 12.04.1994, p. 1.
- Cf. in Nova Makedonija No 16929, "For the Macedonians - US before EU", 10.03.1994, p. 2.
- Cf. in Nova Makedonija No 17019, "Mk position accepted from the international community", 10.06.1994, p. 2.
- Cf. in Nova Makedonija No 16924, "Little supporters for Greater Macedonia", 05.03.1994, p. 2.
- Cf. in Nova Makedonija No 17802, "EU will do every thing to help Macedonia", 13.08.1994, p. 1.
- Cf. in Nova Makedonija No 17133, "Europe to change its attitude toward the Balkans", 03.10.1994, p. 2.
- Cf. in Nova Makedonija No 17141, "The European orientation of Macedonia can not be put in question", 11.10.1994, p. 4.
- Cf. in Nova Makedonija No 17181, "Macedonia remains true to developing democracy", 20.11.1994, p. 2.
- Cf. in Nova Makedonija No 17188 "Citizens against change of the name Mk", 27.11.1994, p. 1.
- Cf. in Nova Makedonija No 17212, "Time for radical economic reforms", 21.12.1994, p. 2
- Cf. in Nova Makedonija No 17400, "Consensus only after same attitudes", 03.07.1995, p. 2.
- Cf. in Nova Makedonija No 17401, "The Govt does not speak with the opposition", 04.07.1995, p. 2.
- Cf. in Nova Makedonija No 17402, "Two pillars of stability", 05.07.1995, p. 2.
- Cf. in Nova Makedonija No 17403, "The time works for our name", 06.07.1995, p. 2.
- Cf. in Nova Makedonija No 17404, "Macedonia - exception from all rules" 07.07.1995, p. 2.
- Cf. in Nova Makedonija No 17464, "Deal with Greece next week in NY", 05.09.1995, p. 1.
- Cf. "Change in the Balkans, but not of the borders" in Dnevnik, No 1040, August 30 1999, p. 1.
- Cf. "Macedonia wants to become political, economical and cultural center of the Balkans" in Dnevnik, No 1017, August 3 1999, p. 1.
- Cf. "Construction of the pipe line Skopje-Solun begins" in Dnevnik, No 1101, November 11 1999, p. 1.
- Cf. "EU will make up mistake to Macedonia" in Dnevnik, No 1103, November 13 and 14 1999, p. 1.
- Cf. "We were never Scandinavia" in Dnevnik, No 1133, December 18 1999, p. 7.
- Cf. "Skopje will not recognize Greek Cyprus", in Dnevnik, No 1166, February 2 2000, p. 1.

- Cf. Dnevnik, No 1167, February 3 2000, p. 1.
- Cf. "EU with higher rating than NATO in Macedonian citizens" in Dnevnik No 1419, December 1 2000, p. 2.
- Dnevnik, No 1444, December 30 2000, p. 8-9.
- Cf. Interview with Mathew Nimitz in Dnevnik No 1457, January 22 2001, p. 2.
- Cf. "Greece will block Macedonia entering NATO and EU" in Dnevnik, No 1460, January 25 2001, p. 1.
- Cf. "Kerim: No proposal or package for the name of the country and for the church" and "Despite predictions 'the Macedonian tent' will not fall", in Dnevnik Nos 1474 and 1468, February 10 and 3 2001, p. 1 and 7.
- Cf. "Georgievski: We will accept any solution that leads to the constitutional name" in Dnevnik, No 1475, February 12 2001, p. 1.
- Cf. in Dnevnik No 1477, February 14 2001, p. 2.
- Cf. "Hand of friendship toward neighbor to the south" in Dnevnik No 2603, November 08 2004, p. 1.
- Cf. in Dnevnik No 2046, January 10 2003, p. 2.
- Cf. "Concordia flies the European flag of security" in Dnevnik No 2115, April 01 2003, p. 1.
- Cf. "Let go of past to see reality" in Dnevnik No 2574, October 04 2004, p. 3

Appendix 2

Arguments of the Greek side deriving from both state and non-state actors, as summarized in Danforth (1997) and Shea (1997):

1. *"Skopje's government seeking recognition as the 'Republic of Macedonia' perpetuates a fraud. Macedonia has been Greek for 3,000 years. In ancient times Macedonians spoke Greek, worshipped Greek gods, expressed their creativity through Greek art and maintained a refined Greek culture ... all archaeological discoveries continue to unearth more information attesting to the indisputable Greekness of Macedonia."*
2. *"Out of the blue, in 1944, the Yugoslav communist leader, Tito, wishing to weaken Serbia on the one hand, and set the footing for future territorial claims against Greece on the other, schemingly gave South Serbia the Greek name 'Macedonia' and re-wrote the 'history' books to declare that ancient Macedonia was Slavic and that these people were descendants of Alexander the Great."*
3. *"The existence of a 'Slav' Macedonia could never be, and indeed, has never been supported either by historical data, or by ethnographic maps, or by statistics, or by some census, or by archaeological finds, or by even an obscure mention of such a nation from antiquity till today."*
4. *"Macedonia has been the name of Northern Greece for more than 3000 years. The Greek region ... has one of the most homogeneous populations in the world (98.5% Greek). Its population speaks Greek, feels Greek, is Greek."*
5. *"An independent 'Macedonia' would monopolize the name at the expense of the real Macedonians who are twice the number of the Slavs. The use and abuse of the name would cause widespread confusion as is already apparent."*
6. *"Macedonia is an indispensable part of Greece's historical heritage it cannot identify, in an ethnic sense another nation."*
7. *"The Skopje 'language' is undeniably Slavic."*
8. *"The Slavs did not set foot in the Balkans until 1000 years after Alexander the Great."*
9. *"The name 'Macedonia (which is etymologically Greek) was in use at least 1500 years before the arrival of the first Slavs."*
10. *"Every known Macedonian town, river and person had a Greek name – Philip (lover of horse), Alexander (protector of men), Archelaus (leader of people), Amyntas (defender), Ptolemy (warlike), Bucephalus (ox-head)."*
11. *"The Old Testament (Daniel Ch. 8) and the New Testament (Acts Ch. 17) confirm the Greekness of Alexander and the Macedonians."*
12. *"It was the Greek language that was taken to Asia (Bible written in Greek) and cities with Greek names and institutions that were founded."*
13. *"There are 60,000 archaeological finds that confirm that the Macedonians were Greek in language, culture and religion."*

14. *"The home of the Greek gods was in Macedonia. Is it feasible that a people would worship its national gods in a foreign country?"*

15. *" Yugoslav Macedonia is not even geographically in the territory occupied by ancient Macedonia."*

16. *"Independent sources in this century (Turkish Census of 1904 when the region was part of the Ottoman Empire, League of Nations Census of 1926 and declassified British Archives 1934) make no mention of any ethnic Macedonians whatsoever until the Communists came along with their preposterous concoction to dominate the Balkans."*

17. *"By appropriating and maintaining the name 'Macedonia' the Slavs are laying the foundations for future territorial claims against the region of the same name in Greece. They have clearly expressed this intention by:- (a) plagiarizing and blatantly falsifying history (b)... continuously using maps and emblems that include northern Greece as part of 'Macedonia~ and (c) refusing to comply with the directive of the European Community in its declaration of 16th December 1991 to (i) cease hostile propaganda; (ii) commit itself to guarantees that it has no territorial claims and (iii) not use a denomination (Macedonia) which implies expansionist intentions."*

Arguments of the Macedonian side deriving from both state and non-state actors, as summarized in Spasenovski (2007):

1. *"Macedonians are a particular ethno specific group with a separate nationality different from the one of its neighbors: Bulgarians, Serbs, Greeks and Albanians;*

2. *Macedonians have been living on a naturally defined territory on the Balkans for more than 4000 years;*

3. *Macedonians are descendants of ancient Macedonians and of Alexander the Great;*

4. *The common conscience, language, traditions and rituals of Macedonians were preserved throughout several continuous consequent invasions and centuries of foreign reigns - Byzantium, Serbia, Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire;*

5. *A Macedonian is a person speaking a Slavic language and coming from the part of Europe known as Macedonia, regardless of the fact if he/she lives in Macedonia, or in the parts belonging to Greece, Bulgaria or Albania;*

6. *Macedonian language is a part of the group of southern Slavic languages. There are significant differences of grammatical, lexical and phonetic nature between Macedonian and the other neighboring languages;*

7. *Macedonian national history is a history of a long and heroic battle of the Macedonian people for freedom and independence. It is the battle of the enslaved Macedonians for preserving their national identity and culture against national assimilation and cultural genocide Macedonians experienced in all parts of Macedonia, in the period between the division of 1913 and the Second World War.*

8. Whereas Macedonians were constantly Macedonians throughout history, the Greeks changed their name several times;

9. Aegean Macedonia had been called Northern Greece by the Greek authorities for a long period of time, but all of a sudden, in 1990, this situation radically changed.